

Journal of Security & Strategic Analyses (JSSA)



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Editor's Note

The Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses (JSSA) presents a comprehensive collection of intellectually stimulating academic analyses to its esteemed readership. Within the scope of JSSA's mission, this volume accentuates matters of security and strategic significance at national, regional, and global levels with a specific emphasis on South Asia.

Five research articles and two book reviews have been carefully selected after a rigorous three-tiered double-blind peer-review process. Each research article provides a coherent and policy-oriented perspective, accompanied by theoretical frameworks and precisely delineated methodological approaches. As a result, this volume offers a compelling resource for scholars, students, and policymakers alike, ensuring its relevance and value within the academic community.

SVI acknowledges the authors who have made significant contributions to this issue of the journal. Notably, the contribution of reviewers is an important aspect of the scholarly publishing process in JSSA. SVI acknowledges and appreciates their time, effort, and expertise in providing valuable feedback and improving the quality of the manuscript.

The JSSA conforms to the standard HEC guidelines/rules of publication and seeks to maintain the general quality of the contributions as per the international standards. It is an HEC-HJRS-recognised journal in the Y category and aspires to become a top-ranking HEC-recognized journal. The quality aspect remains and will always be the prime concern of the SVI, supplemented by a careful selection of the manuscripts, wherein the readers can find a collection of well-written, academically sound research papers that have attempted to methodically examine various strategic and security issues in detail. It is hoped that the readers will be able to benefit from the analyses presented in this issue.

Let me assure you that SVI will continue to bring out subsequent volumes of JSSA regularly and is looking forward to receiving high-quality manuscripts exclusively written for the JSSA.

RESEARCH PAPERS

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‘Propaganda of the Deed’ as a War Termination Strategy

Victor Ofosu ¹

Abstract

For decades the bulk of academic analyses and findings have maintained a linear interpretation of propaganda of the deed. Propaganda of the deed is linked to actions by non-state actors such as terrorists and militant groups. Indeed, the traditional interpretation has limited the expansion of the term and its application in different academic fields. In this paper, I show that propaganda of the deed should not be exclusive to explaining terrorist’s violent action. Hence, I argue that the military and academics should employ the term to explain a nation’s excessive use of violent action against a belligerent state in modern warfare. Therefore, arguing that non-state actors and states use the propaganda of the deed is not mutually exclusive. For this reason, I focus on the application of propaganda of the deed as a war termination strategy, again insisting that the concept can be successfully applied on the battlefield by a state to subdue its adversary to enter a war termination negotiation, thus bringing an end to the war. In its narrow sense, as a war termination strategy, the concept can assist in transforming our understanding of war termination from the battlefield.

Keywords: Propaganda, War, Battlefield, Strategy, War termination, Propaganda of the deed, War Strategy, Communication, Strategic, Terrorist, Russia, Ukraine, Vietnam War, Second World War, Military

¹Victor Ofosu is an independent researcher, author and an expert in arms control and international security.

Introduction

In the military setting, war is examined as a separate activity, thus, rejecting the conception that war is an extension of politics. However, “On War” insists that politics is the only source of war.² Clausewitz argues that “we see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.”³ Clausewitz’s statement infers that war is a normal facet of a state’s policy. Nevertheless, the state engages in war to protect its population. In contrast, Clausewitz defines war as an act of violence deployed by the opposing states to compel the defending state to fulfil a political or policy objective.⁴ Thies and Sobek argue that war is fought for political and economic reasons.⁵ To the authors, war is fought not only to settle a dispute between states but to acquire territories (land) and to pursue the economic interest of the states. Although wars are fought to settle disputes, the central function of war is to serve the population’s interest.⁶ Therefore, war should only be fought to meet the state interest. Clausewitz contends that war should be fought to achieve a rational objective; to him, the population’s interest is chief in waging war.⁷ Indeed, states engage in war to either win territories or to assert their political will on the defending states. Furthermore, states enter wars intending to achieve an outcome in the short term, understanding that prolonged wars are costly and may impact the outcome of war.⁸

Although the military is interested in understanding the most effective strategy to win wars, they are equally interested in the process

² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Ware: Wordsworth, 1997), 12.

³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 12.

⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 13.

⁵ Cameron Thies and David Sobek, “War, Economic Development, and Political Development in the Contemporary International System,” *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2010): p. 267-287, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40664246>

⁶ Adolf Hitler, *Hitler’s Second Book; The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf*. (Huddersfield: Enigma Books, 2006), 33.

⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 57.

⁸ James Petras and Henry Valtmeyer, *Multinational on Trial: Foreign Investment Matter* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013), 65.

of war termination. The research argues that battle outcome determines the premise for war termination; therefore, decision of the state to end or continue a war should primarily be based on data gathered from the outcome of small battle engagements.⁹ While there is a valid argument in the conception that the outcome of battles should form the premise of war termination, there are challenges in deploying data as a key component for war termination. Some challenges include the validity of the data and the availability of data. Hence, the analysis produced will concentrate on the theoretical perspective of war termination. The exclusion of empirical data does not affect this analysis from using battlefield outcomes to explain why a state may choose to terminate a war.

Ramsay maintains that events on the battlefield are essential when explaining war termination. Ramsay sees battles as the central feature of war.¹⁰ Indeed, the battle is where a state attempts to use violent action to subdue the other to achieve its political goal. From this perspective, one can argue that a relationship exists between war termination and the outcome of the battles. Violence is the chief variable to force an opponent to accept war termination on the battlefield. Therefore, violence is necessary to win a war. However, the successful outcome of deploying violent action as a war termination strategy depends on understanding the opponent’s strength. There are factors that determine the relationship between war termination and the battle outcome. These factors include the role of diplomacy, emotions, mind-set of the soldiers engaged in the battle, and media. These factors contribute to war termination outcomes. The role of the listed factors will be examined in detail. The article argues that propaganda of the deed is vital in war termination. Propaganda of the deed should not be exclusive to explaining terrorist’s violent action employed to influence policy outcomes through exerting fear into the population but should be applied as a strategy that states can utilise to end

⁹ Kristopher W. Ramsay, “Setting it in the Field: Battlefield Events and War Termination,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no 6 (2008): pp 850-879, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708324593>

¹⁰ Kristopher W. Ramsay, “Settling It on the Field: Battlefield Events and War Termination,” 850-879.

a war. In justifying this conception, the paper will examine the relationship between war termination and violent deeds.

Furthermore, the role of emotion in war termination will be discussed. The researcher seeks to develop a new definition to explain the propaganda of the deed. Also, the definition will be supported by Pavlov's classical condition. The article suggests that emotional events on the battlefield coupled with violent deeds can affect war termination. In addition, the Ukraine War will be employed as a scenario to simulate the use of propaganda of the deed as a war termination strategy. Indeed, the author will utilise the bargaining war model to justify his analysis. The research also intends to explain the cost of war and its impact on war termination.

Further, a link will be developed between the cost of war and the application of propaganda of the deed in war termination. It is hoped that the association between the cost of war and the propaganda of the deed will shed light on the significance of the concept as a war termination strategy.

Bargaining War Model

To Filson and Werner, the notion that war termination can be achieved simply from "*fighting to finish*" is erroneous.¹¹ Filson and Werner maintain that the "*Fight to finish*" model is commonly applied in academia due to its simplicity. War termination is a complex process that requires identifying various factors that can facilitate ending a war. Therefore, a simplified notion may not necessitate terminating a war. The bargaining War Model suggests that the negotiation process of war termination should not exclude a political process; thus, achieving war termination should comprise political and military manoeuvres.¹² An

¹¹ Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War," *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 4 (2002): p. 819, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3088436>.

¹² Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace," 819.

agreement to settle a war occurs when both sides’ military and political decision makers agree to settle their differences. However, military manoeuvres on the battlefield supported by political manoeuvres are necessary for war termination.

Each player always wants more resources and benefits, that the marginal utility of resources and benefits are diminishing, and that the marginal utility of benefits is increasing in resources and the marginal utility of resources is increasing in benefits. This last condition implies that a disputant’s willingness to risk resources in battle increases his resources and decreases the size of his benefits. War consists of an alternating sequence of negotiations and battles. If negotiations succeed, the war ends.¹³

In contrast, various factors can determine a settlement leading to war termination. These factors may include the depletion of battlefield resources, the role of media, diplomacy, emotions, morale of the soldiers, role of policy and battle duration.¹⁴ Filson and Werner contend that diplomacy alone cannot affect war termination.¹⁵ The authors maintain that if diplomacy is effective in war termination, the disputants in the war may not have engaged in the conflict. Moreover, war termination without military and political manoeuvres can only be realised through a decisive victor. Furthermore, war termination is possible when military activities on the battlefield support political negotiation.¹⁶ While diplomatic negotiation may fail, activities on the battlefield may persuade the disputant to terminate the war. Issues such as losses on the battlefield and

¹³ Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace,” p.822.

¹⁴ Karl R. DeRouen, *An Introduction to Civil Wars* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2015),21.

¹⁵ Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, “A Bargaining Model of War and Peace,” p.822.

¹⁶ K. R. Sorfleet, “Conflict Termination: Implications for Military Officers,” *Defence Studies* 1, no. 1 (2001): pp. 49-74, <https://doi.org/10.1080/714000019>.

a prolonged war may increase the cost of war. Hence the role of propaganda of the deed as a war termination mechanism becomes significant. Propaganda of the deed as a battlefield and military manoeuvre can force an opponent to enter a war termination negotiation. Indeed, battlefield losses and effective media propaganda can influence a belligerent force to negotiate a termination.

The casualties of the war on the battlefield can influence the belligerents to settle their incompatibility. For example, using an atomic bomb as a battlefield manoeuvre can increase war casualties, thus influencing the opponent to seek a peaceful settlement. Under this condition, a peace process is achievable. On the 7th of September 1970, during Vietnam War negotiations,¹⁷ deeds on the battlefield, such as dropping 214 tons of bombs on Cambodia, were advantageous for the US to push for a war termination agreement.¹⁸ Advances during US operations in Cambodia played a role in the US negotiation strategy to end the war. Indeed, a peace process is possible when state actors recognise the impact of the costly war on their political survival.¹⁹ Under the Bargaining war Model, war termination is achievable when the cost of war outweighs achieving the policy and political outcome. Moreover, resource depletion can influence the belligerent force to pursue a different outcome. Incapability to terminate war will introduce the need to develop bargaining leverages. A bargaining leverage and acceptability by all parties will determine a successful war termination effort.²⁰ However, when depletion of resources or increased casualties cannot induce a war termination, a decisive military victory is needed. Arguably the application of the deed, proceeded by successful propaganda, can contribute to a state achieving a decisive military victory.

¹⁷ Cheng Guan Ang, *Ending the Vietnam War the Vietnamese Communists' Perspective* (Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2014), 35.

¹⁸ Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan, Bombs Over Cambodia, Yale University, October, 2006. https://gsp.yale.edu/sites/default/files/walrus_cambodiabombing_oct06.pdf.

¹⁹ Tansa Massoud, "War Termination," *Journal of Peace Research*, no. 4 (1996): 491-496, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343396033004009>

²⁰ Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace," 822.

Definition of the Propaganda of the Deed

Rothenberger defines propaganda of the deed stating that “it is a mean of creating political change through fear.”²¹ Alternatively, the term can be defined as using violent action to show an insurgent group’s military strength, capability, and purpose.²² The mention of propaganda of the deed triggers the term terrorism which is mainly associated with the application of propaganda of the deed. The concept is characterised by violence, murder, kidnappings, and other activity to exert fear in a population. The concept is also perceived as an integral part of urban guerrilla warfare.

Nevertheless, the research argues that the term propaganda of the deed should not be exclusive to violent terrorist actions aimed at exerting fear in a population. However, the term can equally be adopted to describe a state’s use of excessive violence to exert fear in the opposing state’s population to compel it to concede defeat. Propaganda of the Deed as a negotiation strategy can affect a war termination on and off the battlefield. Understanding this perception obliges an analysis of the definition of propaganda of the deed.

The research argues that the use of propaganda of the deed by state and terrorists is not mutually exclusive. Some literature on the subject may classify extremely violent actions of states as state terror. However, as the state intends to exert fear in a population to achieve the desired outcome, the action is synonymous with its application by a terrorist group and non-state actors. Levy and Adams state that “*Paul Brousse, one of the early advocates of anarchist communism in the anti-authoritarian International, came to conceive of propaganda of the deed as exemplary forms of direct action designed to provoke and to inspire*

²¹ Rothenberger Liane, *Terrorism as Communication Stocktake, Explanation and Challenges* (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2023), 23.

²² Derina Holtzhausen and Ansgar Zerfass, *The Routledge Handbook of Strategic Communication* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 482.

the masses to revolutionary action."²³ Johann Most, who vocally advocated propaganda of the deed in the US, is recognised for his stance on the term. Propaganda by the deed can be traced from the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st centuries and is known to have emerged in the 1870s.²⁴ It can be traced back to Bakunin, who is known to have declared the term propaganda by the deed. In contrast, in 1873, Errico Malatesta was responsible for coining and defining the term. Errico Malatesta and others, such as Carlo Cafiero, insisted that an insurrection through the act of the deed was the most effective means of propaganda.²⁵ Malatesta maintained that through the propaganda of the deed, one can penetrate the deepest layers of society. The successful application of the concept provided an opportunity to force humanity to rise against the oppressive nature of the government. Nevertheless, Malatesta and Cafiero did not directly espouse violence but argued that a revolution was a logical path for insurrection. However, Colson argues Berkman, who is also credited with the inception of the term propaganda by the deed, enacted violence to react against the government.

Propaganda of the deed was first employed as a guerrilla tactics by the Irish Catholics in 1916.²⁶ The British response to the application of propaganda provided the apparatus for impetus to Irish Republican Army (IRA) to increase its popularity and justify its activities against the British. However, recently, propaganda of the deed has been employed by terrorist groups such as Hamas, Al Shabab, Al Qaeda and many others.

²³ Carl Levy and Matthew Adams, *The Revival of Anarchism as Politics, Methodology, and Its Presence in Academia*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019) 338.

²⁴ Dan Colson, "Propaganda and the Deed: Anarchism, Violence and the Representational Impulse," *American Studies*, no. 1 (2017): 163-186, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44982624>.

²⁵ Dan Colson, "Propaganda and the Deed: Anarchism, Violence and the Representational Impulse, 163-186.

²⁶ Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, and Eric Dickson, "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2 (2007): 364-381, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4620071>.

Al Qaeda’s utilisation of the concept was observed during the bombing of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.

The 11th of September 2001 saw 19 men hijacking planes, purposefully crashing the planes into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon²⁷ killing 3062 people. From the terrorist perspective, propaganda of the deed was a mechanism to facilitate communicating change through violent action. The Violent action is deliberately enacted to secure the population’s attention by exerting fear. Again, violence is a message that state or non-state actors communicate to the population to pressure the government to act favourably, assisting the group in achieving their objectives.²⁸

Propaganda of the deed communicates that the deed initiated at a particular time can produce an impact far more significant than words uttered by thousands of political agitators.²⁹ However, the principle is forged with the understanding that the size of the deed is subjective, yet the deed's impact and time are necessary to dispense the required message to the targeted audience.³⁰ There is a relationship between the deed and propaganda; thus, in its application, the action of the deed should proceed through effective propaganda.³¹

Propaganda of the deed is the use of violent action to achieve the conditioning of the population through exerting fear; however, the deed is meaningless without propaganda. There are two aspects to the

²⁷ Arthur Garrison “Defining Terrorism: Philosophy of the Bomb, Propaganda by Deed and Change Through Fear and Violence”, *Criminal Justice Studies* 17, No. 3 (2004): 259-279, DOI: [10.1080/1478601042000281105](https://doi.org/10.1080/1478601042000281105)

²⁸ Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric Dickson, “The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization,” 364–81.

²⁹ Carl Levy and Matthew Adams, *The Revival of Anarchism as Politics, Methodology, and Its Presence in Academia*, In the he Palgrave Handbook of Anarchism, ed. Carl Levy, Matthew S. Adam (London: Palgrave, 2016), 19.

³⁰ Liane Rothenberger, “A Terrorist Group’s Strategic Communication—the Case of the Red Army Faction,” *International Journal of Strategic Communication* 11, no. 4 (2017): pp. 286-305, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1553118x.2017.1339191>.

³¹ Carl Levy and Matthew Adams, *The Revival of Anarchism as Politics, Methodology, and Its Presence in Academia*. 19.

propaganda of the deed: the first is the deed which is proceeded by the second aspect, which is the propaganda effect. The propaganda of the violent deed encompasses the message informing the population of the violent action, which may harm the population. The effectiveness of propagating the deed depends on the actor's ability to dispense a positive message explaining the purpose of the deed.³² The message enforces the deed in the minds of the targeted population. Propaganda of the deed is delivered to affect the targeted population psychologically. The action triggers a feeling of fear and thus paralysing the intended audience.³³

The research argues that the propaganda of the deed should be defined as using violent action to exert fear and condition a targeted population to act favourably. The term conditioning is significant in this definition; thus, it is understood that a repeated action (Violent action) acts as a neutral stimulus, and propaganda (conditioned stimulus) is to trigger fear (conditioned responses) in the targeted population. The definition suggests that the actor engaging in violent action employs violence as a neutral stimulus that may not elicit a response in the targeted population. However, by repeating the action and attracting media attention, with the propagation of the action, which is the conditional stimulus, the actor can trigger the feeling of fear; fear is an emotion that responds to the information delivered by the media. The conditioned effect of the deed allows the actors to induce a favourable response from the targeted population.³⁴

The definition of the term is consistent with Pavlov's Classical condition, which is instrumental in asserting the devised definition. In his dog experiment, Pavlov argued that there are things that a dog does not need to learn. For instance, a dog does not need to learn to salivate when

³² Dan Colson, "Propaganda and the Deed: Anarchism, Violence and the Representational Impulse." *American Studies*, no. 1 (2017): 163-186, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44982624>.

³³ Kristopher Ramsay, "Settling it on the Field; Battlefield Events and War Termination," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 6 (2008): 850-879.

³⁴ Christine Brain, *Advanced Subsidiary Psychology: Approaches and Methods* (Cheltenham: Nelson Thornes, 2000), 20.

it sees food. From a behaviourist perspective, when examining Pavlov's experiment, food is recognised as an unconditional stimulus, while salivation is noted as an unconditional response.³⁵ The experiment employed a metronome as a neutral stimulus; however, during the experiment, Pavlov understood that by itself, the metronome could not elicit a response from the dogs. Pavlov began his experimental procedure when the clicking metronome was introduced to the dogs before the food was presented.³⁶ However, after repeating the trial, he introduced the metronome to the dogs. The repeated trial contributed to the metronome eliciting a salivating response from the dogs without the food. In his experiment, Pavlov demonstrated that they produced a conditioned response because the dogs were conditioned. That is, the neutral stimulus has become a conditioned stimulus.³⁷ He discovered that, for the dog to create an association, the two-stimulus must be closely presented in time. Arguing that time plays a central role in achieving a condition effect. The experiment showed that learning would not occur in the dog if the time between the conditional stimulus (bell) and the unconditional stimulus (food) were great.

Still, the propagandistic effect of the deed triggers a response in the audience.³⁸ To achieve the desired effect after the deed, the applicant should immediately ensure that the media propagate the action after its occurrence; time intervals play an important role in achieving a conditioned effect in the targeted population. In practice, the propagation of the deed should occur at the location the deed occurred. Further, achieving a full effect also requires the message explaining the deed's

³⁵ Ivan Pavlov, *Conditioned Reflexes* (London: Dover Publication, 1926), 69.

³⁶ Ivan Pavlov *Conditioned Reflexes*, 69.

³⁷ Douglas Mook, *Classic Experiments in Psychology* (Portsmouth: Greenwood, 2004), 42.

³⁸ Carl Levy and Matthew Adams, *The Revival of Anarchism as Politics, Methodology, and Its Presence in Academia* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 22.

reason and intended purpose. Masuku et al. argue that Bolt et al.³⁹ provide a classic example of the propaganda of the deed. Masuku states:

*The Irgun bombed the King David Hotel in Jerusalem on July 1946, killing 91 people and injuring another 46. The terror implemented by the Stern Gang and the Irgun played a central part in bringing the majority of Yishur (the Jewish community living in Palestine who were committed to reliance on Britain) around to their view that British friendship was irrelevant to the goal of securing Palestine as a Jewish State.*⁴⁰

Propaganda of the deed is a form of strategic communication deployed to change a population's attitude. Effective utilisation of the approach could redirect the targeted audience's actions, feelings, and emotions. Thus, the preferred outcome of the propaganda of the deed can influence the audience by activating an emotional response to an action.

Propaganda of the Deed as a War Termination Strategy

In Clausewitz's analysis, one can infer that, to him, war termination is possible through a decisive victor. Thus, activities on the battlefield are indicators that determine the war's outcome. Clausewitz stresses that defeat on the battlefield permeates the effectiveness of battlefield strategies.⁴¹ Applying propaganda of the deed as a battlefield strategy produces an outcome that impacts the losing party and affects its population, the government and the soldiers involved in the battle.

³⁹ Masuku, Mfundo Masuku, Victor Mlambo and Bhekani Ngwenya, "The Critical Analyses of Propaganda of the Terrorism Deed," *Technium Social Sciences Journal* 25, (2021): 619-629,

<https://techniumscience.com/index.php/socialsciences/article/view/4886>.

⁴⁰ Masuku, Mfundo Masuku, Victor Mlambo and Bhekani Ngwenya, "The Critical Analyses of Propaganda of the Terrorism Deed," 619-629.

⁴¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 156.

Therefore, achieving victory in a battle using the propaganda of the deed as a strategy will contribute to the collapse of the defending force.⁴² A defeat in battle can deliver the expected outcome and implies a weakness of the losing party, thus having an emotional and psychological effect on their ability to continue with the war. Milevski⁴³ argues that a defeat develops into a paralysing effect, expanding the fear of continuing the war. There are merits in this assumption; however, during the war (the Second World War) between Japan and the US, Japanese losses in the battle were insufficient to necessitate their need to terminate the war. The Doolittle Raid of 1942 (here referred to as propaganda of the deed) was a bombing raid on Tokyo and other cities in Japan; the raid killed “*at least 80,000 people, and likely more than 100,000, in a single night; some one million people were left homeless.*”⁴⁴

Although the bombing was a possible turning point of the war and boosted American morale to continue the war effort, the bombing had a lesser impact on coercing Japan to enter a settlement. The analysis demonstrates that in certain situations, propaganda of the deed as a battlefield strategy can influence the losing side to terminate the war depending on the type of conflict. However, the resilience of the belligerent will constitute the deployment of a different strategy to end the war. Ramsay contends that supremacy in number in battle is essential in determining the battle’s outcome.⁴⁵ Arguably, the battle’s power ratio can determine the war’s outcome. Supremacy in war includes factors such as the number of forces, intelligence capability, funding and resources and firepower capability. Indeed, when considering Clausewitz’s

⁴² Daniel Statman, “Ending War Short of Victory? A Contractarian View of *Jus Ex Bello*,” *Ethics* 125, no. 3 (2015): pp. 720-750, <https://doi.org/10.1086/679561>.

⁴³ Lukas Milevski, “Battle and Its Emotional Effect in War Termination,” *Comparative Strategy* 39, no. 6 (January 2020): pp. 535-548, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1826844>.

⁴⁴ R.G. Grant, “Bombing of Tokyo,” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, accessed May 2, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Bombing-of-Tokyo>.

⁴⁵ Kristopher W. Ramsay, “Settling It on the Field,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 6 (2008): pp. 850-879, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708324593>.

analysis, he argues that a supreme force is expected to attain a higher advantage over its opponent.⁴⁶

For example, in the Pacific War of 1945, the atomic bomb was used as an instrument for war termination. The nuclear attack on Japanese cities was United States' battle strategy to force a settlement to end the war. Tomonaga maintains that on the morning of August 1945, the Japanese city of Hiroshima was destroyed by the first atomic bomb. The bomb, equivalent to 12.5 kilotons of TNT, reduced around 5 miles of the city to ashes⁴⁷ and caused an estimated 120,000 deaths.⁴⁸ After the bombing of the second city of Nagasaki, the US released a statement to justify the bombing. Two crucial factors associated with the propaganda of the deed are visible. First, dropping the atomic bomb is a violent act, and second, the message is sent to the media to justify their action. The strategy deployed by the US is a representation of the application of propaganda of the deed. Here, the impact of the deed, propagated by the world media, was significant in forcing the Japanese to surrender. There are two key factors emanating from the use of the atomic bomb. These factors are the emotional impact of the deed and the cost associated with the continuation of the war. Under this condition, the United States' use of nuclear weapons was a strategy to assert its will on Japan to achieve war termination. Propaganda of the deed initiated from the battlefield allows the superior and powerful force to resolve the pending dispute by asserting their will.

In the past, nations like the US have achieved war termination by imposing their superiority and military capability to achieve a decisive victory. The issue under examination transpired during the Persian Gulf

⁴⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Ware: Wordsworth, 1997), 121.

⁴⁷ Masao Tomonaga, "The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: A Summary of the Human Consequences, 1945-2018, and Lessons for *Homo Sapiens* to End the Nuclear Weapon Age," *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 2, no. 2 (March 2019): pp. 491-517, <https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2019.1681226>.

⁴⁸ Masao Tomonaga, "The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: A Summary of the Human Consequences," 491-517.

War, fought between 1990 and 1991.⁴⁹ When there are power differences between two opposing states, the state with the higher capacity is expected to overcome a weaker state in battle. The victory over the less capable state will end the war. Although it is expected that a superior capable force may overcome its opponent and thus ending the war, it is inconclusive to argue that superior capability will produce a decisive victor in war. For example, in the war against the Taliban, which was fought between 1999 to 2021, the United States’ superior capability was superfluous in achieving a decisive victory.⁵⁰ War termination was gained through diplomacy and negotiations between the opposing forces. The example informs the understanding that numbers and superiority in capability are insufficient to achieve war termination as different conflicts warrant applying different strategies to obtain a settlement.

Propaganda of the Deed and Emotional Consequences in Battle

For decades, academics have observed a linear interpretation of propaganda of the deed, (as applied in explaining terrorist violent actions) thus eliminating any possibility of its application as a war termination strategy. However, this article submits to the conception that the non-linear approach of the term should be tolerated. The approach is vital on the battlefield as a war termination strategy to overcome a belligerent force.

The dropping of the atomic bomb emotionally affected the Japanese population and the soldiers on the battlefield. The devastating effect of the bomb reduced the soldiers’ morale and impacted their ability to continue the war. As Milevski observed, the effect will discourage the defeated party from continuing the war.⁵¹ Emotional consequences

⁴⁹ “Persian Gulf War,” Encyclopædia Britannica , accessed on March 27, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Persian-Gulf-War>.

⁵⁰ Sandy Gall, *War against the Taliban: Why It All Went Wrong in Afghanistan* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 65.

⁵¹ Lukas Milevski, “Battle and Its Emotional Effect in War Termination,” *Comparative Strategy* 39, no. 6 (January 2020): pp. 535-548, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1826844>.

remain useful in war termination. For instance, the emotional consequences of the atomic bombs' effect on the Japanese population, the state's actors and the soldiers can affect changes in cognitive behaviour. The behavioural change transpires through the reflective process of the devastating impact of the deed on the population. However, the impact of propaganda in communicating the message to the population influences the current and future emotional tendencies of all actors on the losing side.⁵² Hence, the emotional appraisal influences the soldier's interest in continuing the war. Milevsky sees that five emotional characteristics can influence a state's engagement in a settlement.⁵³ The emotional characteristics are humiliation, pride, hope, fear, and anger. The complex combination of fear and emotion resulting from the propaganda can lead to depression in the losing party. Depression can also manifest as shame and guilt in the losing party. Drawing on Milevsky's argument, one can argue that losses resulting from the propaganda of the deed can prompt the losing party to enter a negotiation. Considering the emotional devastation of the violent deed, the enemy in a particular situation will begin to cooperate and then concede to the will of the winning state. The analysis affirms Filson and Werner's understanding that the combined battlefield and diplomatic manoeuvring are crucial in achieving war termination.

Propaganda of the Deed and Cost of War Continuation

The impact of propaganda of the deed has a cost implication. For instance, in the current war between Russia and Ukraine, deploying a violent deed by either side can affect the cost implication of the war, and its impact can contribute to the war termination. Recently authors such as Pierre de Dreuzy and Andrea Gilli have focused on discussing the cost implication of Russia using an atomic bomb as a deed to force Ukraine to surrender, therefore, ending the war through a decisive victory.⁵⁴

⁵² Lukas Milevski, "Battle and Its Emotional Effect in War Termination," 535-548.

⁵³ Lukas Milevski, "Battle and Its Emotional Effect in War Termination," 535-548.

⁵⁴ De Dreuzy and Gilli Andrea, "Russia's Nuclear Coercion in Ukraine," NATO Review, last modified November 29, 2022, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/11/29/russias-nuclear-coercion-in-ukraine/index.html>.

Alberque observes that “*on the 6th of October, US President Joe Biden stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent nuclear threats amounted to the most dangerous situation the world has seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, warning that any use of tactical nuclear weapons could lead to Armageddon.*”⁵⁵ Indeed, using a nuclear weapon to terminate the war in Ukraine will generate the same emotional effect as previously discussed. In addition, there will be human, political, and economic cost.

In a scenario where Russia deploys nuclear weapons, Ukraine cannot retaliate with a nuclear weapon. Ukraine’s key ally, the US, may not deploy nuclear weapons to defend Ukraine due to fear of a possible nuclear war between NATO, Russia, and its allies. The US may also consider the impact of a nuclear intervention on its domestic and international security interests. Therefore, Ukraine will be forced to enter a settlement. The devastating impact of the deed will result in internal and external cost implications. The external cost is associated with the decline in prestige on the international stage, loss of allies and the imposing of sanctions.

In contrast, the internal cost of a nuclear war termination will relate to casualties, and the leaders can also incur a domestic political cost.⁵⁶ In Ukraine, the opposition party can influence public opinion to terminate the war. Clausewitz argues that war is an extension of policy; therefore, ending war can result in a policy change.⁵⁷ In the case of Ukraine, one can argue that the devastating nature of a nuclear attack will lead to cost in casualties. This was the case between the US and Japan during the Pacific War. Similar events occurred that influenced the termination of the Vietnam War. Indeed, domestic politics can influence the direction of a war. When a government calculates the possibility of

⁵⁵ William Alberque, “Russia Is Unlikely to Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine.”

⁵⁶ Victor Ofosu, *The Demise of Arms Control: Non-Compliance and the New World Order* (Washington DC: Academica Press, 2021), 37.

⁵⁷ Victor Ofosu, *The Demise of Arms Control: Non-Compliance and the New World Order*, 37.

losing power, it might decide on war termination due to domestic pressure.

On the other hand, the Ukraine government may choose to continue the war, understanding that either a negative or a positive outcome will contribute to losing position. Massoud states, "*Most studies have shown that costs are linked to the calculations of actors in planning and ending a war. This view assumes that leaders are affected by costs because they value lives and material losses.*"⁵⁸ However, the cost of war, resulting from the propaganda of the deed, can compel a state to terminate a war. Still, a combination of propaganda of the deed and diplomatic pressure might contribute to war termination.

Conclusion

The analysis has shown that propaganda of the deed is an effective strategy for war termination. Indeed, the claim signifies that it is vital for academics to adopt the non-linear approach of applying propaganda of the deed, therefore arguing that the term is not exclusive to explaining terrorist strategy. The evaluation observed an emotional implication to using the propaganda of the deed; however, the emotional effect of the approach is mandatory to force the belligerent opponent to enter into a settlement agreement. The main component of emotions examined was the impact of fear and anger on the targeted audience's cognitive process. The analysis demonstrates that the cost implication, related to the political, economic, and human cost of deploying propaganda of the deed, effectively influences war termination. During the analysis, a new definition was developed to explain the propaganda of the deed. The conditional effect of propaganda of the deed underpinned the definition.

Furthermore, applying Pavlov's classical condition achieved a definitive understanding of the definition. Indeed, during the analysis, it was evident that battlefield event was the focus of war termination. Thus,

⁵⁸ Tansa G. Massoud, "War Termination," *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 4 (1996): 491-496., <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343396033004009>.

arguing that a battlefield event could necessitate a conflict's termination. The bargaining model of War demonstrates that combining military and diplomatic maneuverer was vital to achieving war termination. In conclusion, battlefield strategies determine the outcome of the actions of belligerent parties and implementing Propaganda of the Deed through fear and anger (predominantly fear) is a prerequisite for war termination.

South Korean Nuclear Aspiration and its Impact on Regional Security

Gulraiz Iqbal¹ and Ammar Hassan Sajjad²

Abstract

This paper explores the complex and multifaceted challenges surrounding South Korea's nuclear weapons programme. It is recognised that as a key player in the regional and global security landscape, South Korea's decisions on this issue will have far-reaching implications for the future of international security and stability. Drawing on the Nuclear Revolution Theory, the paper examines the potential benefits and drawbacks of possessing nuclear weapons, as well as the historical context and regional security considerations that have shaped South Korea's past interest in a nuclear weapons programme. The study also analyses the current geopolitical landscape, including the danger posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons programme and US policy on nuclear proliferation. The viability of the nuclear weapons programme and its implications for South Korea are assessed through qualitative reasoning. The South Korean potentials for nuclear proliferation, its negative impact on global non-proliferation efforts, its deterrence value against North Korea and regional security benefits are examined. Alternatives to pursuing a nuclear weapons programme, such as strengthening conventional military capabilities and diplomatic

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efforts to denuclearise the Korean peninsula are also discussed.

Key Words: Nuclear Revolution Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, Deterrence, Nuclear strategy, Nuclear Weapons, North Korea, South Korea.

Introduction

South Korea's military is primarily focused on defending borders from neighbouring North Korea, which it considers a serious military threat given the nature of its bilateral relations. Geography dictates the relations between these two states. Located in East Asia, the country has arch-rival North Korea on its Northern, the Sea of Japan on the Eastern, the Yellow Sea on its Western and the Korean Strait on its Southern Border. Having a population of 51 million, South Korea is the 28th largest state in the world and has a strong military with over half a million active-duty personnel.³

South Korea has improvised in developing advanced conventional weapons capabilities to take on a nuclear-armed rival North Korea, which is a unique *modus operandi* for a non-nuclear armed state.⁴ In September 2021, South Korea tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), becoming the first non-nuclear country with such a capability.⁵ In January 2023, President Yoon Suk Yeol stated that if threats from North Korea worsen, the country may move towards developing "tactical nuclear weapons."⁶ Such calls have been thwarted by the international

³ "South Korea", CIA World Factbook, accessed June 12, 2023, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-south/#people-and-society>

⁴ Ian Bowers and Henrik Stålhane Hiim, "Conventional counterforce dilemmas: South Korea's deterrence strategy and stability on the Korean Peninsula", *International Security* 45, no. 3 (2020): 7-39.

⁵ Kelsey Davenport, "South Korea Tests Submarine-Launched Missile", *Arms Control Today* 51, no. 8 (2021): 34-34.

⁶ Kelsey Davenport, "South Korea walks back Nuclear Weapons Comments" *Arms Control Association*, last modified March, 2023, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-03/news/south-korea-walks-back-nuclear-weapons-comments>

community, which continues to view nuclear proliferation as a significant threat to global security.

ROK's military has a key role in maintaining security and stability. Due to a strong rival state across the border, the political and military dimensions of South Korea are closely intertwined. The East-Asian state spends heavily to develop or maintain its military muscle and continues to communicate with allies, including the US and Japan, to ensure presence on the diplomatic front. All these factors make South Korea a complex and dynamic country with a unique political and military landscape focused primarily on defence against threats posed by nuclear North Korea.

South Korea is located in hostile neighbourhood that includes North Korea, which has developed nuclear arsenals and long-range missiles, posing threat to its national security. As a result, South Korean policymakers believe that developing their own nuclear weapons could serve as a deterrent and enhance their national security. The pursuit of nuclear weapons will also provide political leverage to South Korean politicians and policymakers who believe that possessing nuclear weapons would boost the country's political standing and increase influence on the global stage.

South Korea relies heavily on the US for its security, and the US nuclear umbrella provides a measure of deterrence against potential adversaries. However, the credibility of this deterrence could be undermined by changing US leadership or shifts in US foreign policy. Developing their own nuclear weapons would ensure that South Korea has a credible deterrence capability independent of the US.

This paper explores the complex and multifaceted challenges surrounding South Korea's nuclear aspirations. Drawing on the Nuclear Revolution Theory, the paper examines the potential benefits and drawbacks of possessing nuclear weapons and regional security considerations that have shaped South Korea's past interest in a nuclear

weapons programme. The paper evaluates the viability of nuclear weapons for South Korea and suggests other viable options to safeguard its national security.

Nuclear Revolution Theory

The Nuclear Revolution theory suggests that the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons alter the nature of global politics. According to this theory, nuclear weapons are a powerful tool for deterrence and coercion. Through nuclear weapons, prospects of preserving the status quo increase since the defendant has more at stake as the pain of losing a thing is always greater than the joy of gaining another of the same value.⁷ It also states that a war between two nuclear-weapon states would be less likely once both manage to acquire a second-strike capability.⁸

In South Korea's case, the possibility of pursuing a nuclear programme must be considered in the context of a complex geopolitical landscape. On one hand, the nuclear weapons programme of DPRK presents a significant risk to the security of South Korea and the broader stability of the region; while on the other hand, South Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons could have significant implications for its relationship with the US, China, and other key players in the region.

From the perspective of the Nuclear Revolution theory, the development of nuclear weapons by South Korea would likely lead to several significant changes in the regional security environment. First and foremost, it would introduce new dynamics as North Korea and other potential adversaries would need to adjust their strategies and calculations considering this new threat which may also increase the risk of miscalculation in any future conflict.

⁷ Robert Jervis, *The meaning of the nuclear revolution: Statecraft and the prospect of Armageddon* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), 28-31.

⁸ Robert Jervis, "The meaning of the nuclear revolution", 35.

At the same time, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea would also provide a powerful new tool for deterrence and coercion. By possessing nuclear weapons, South Korea would be able to deter North Korea and other adversaries from taking aggressive action. The risks of attacking South Korea would increase, and states would be forced to fear destruction in retaliation.⁹ After becoming a nuclear weapons state, South Korea may also be able to use its nuclear arsenal as a bargaining chip in negotiations or other forms of diplomacy. However, possessing nuclear weapons also carries significant risks as the threat of their use can sometimes lead to unintended escalation or crisis.

Overall, the viability and implications of a nuclear weapons programme for South Korea must be carefully assessed, considering the complex geopolitical landscape in which it finds itself. While nuclear weapons could provide a powerful new tool for deterrence and coercion, they also introduce significant risks and uncertainties. They could have far-reaching implications for South Korea's relationships with other key regional players. As such, any decision to pursue a nuclear weapons programme should be made only after careful consideration of these factors and a comprehensive assessment of the costs and benefits of such a programme.

Nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula

Since the peninsula's bifurcation in 1945, the Korean rivalry has continued. Security threats have persisted with the two countries engaged in a tense and often violent standoff for decades. However, the North Korean pursuit of nuclear weapons has added fuel to the fire. North Korea has been actively pursuing nuclear weapons for many years, which has increased international concerns about the proliferation of weapons and regional stability.

⁹ Scott D. Sagan, "Nuclear Revelations About the Nuclear Revolution," *Texas National Security Review* (2021): 136.

Pyongyang has remained involved in nuclear research programmes since the 1950s as it feared lagging behind South Korea. The former also reached an agreement with the Soviets to develop peaceful nuclear infrastructure, because of which the Soviets helped North Korea establish a reactor at Yongbyang. North Korea started to see nuclear weapons as a deterrent against foreign aggression and, in 1980, established a facility that could produce weapons-grade Plutonium.¹⁰ Later in January 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006. The International community has constantly pressured Pyongyang on multiple fronts, but the latter's lure for nuclearisation remains intact.¹¹

South Korea's interest in developing nuclear weapons is not new. Rather, it dates back to the Post-Korean War period. Policymakers in South Korea believe that developing nuclear weapons would provide the country with a strategic deterrent and enhance its security. There have been voices in South Korea demanding the development of an indigenous weapon programme rather than resorting to the US commitment to providing a nuclear umbrella which experiences shifts with changing leaders. For instance, when the Nixon Doctrine declared that the Asian allies should depend more on self-defence, the confidence of stakeholders in Seoul shook and paved the way for increased interest in nuclear weapons.¹² Also, the fear of the development of nuclear weapons by DPRK has contributed to the sense of urgency in South Korea. The reasons for promoting proliferation were diverse, encompassing concerns

¹⁰ B. Wakefield and R. M. Hathaway, "Revisiting History: North Korea and Nuclear Weapons," Wilson Center, November 3, 2010, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/revisiting-history-north-korea-and-nuclear-weapons>.

¹¹ "Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards," International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed June 9, 2023, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards>.

¹² Rebecca KC Hersman and Robert Peters, "Nuclear u-turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese rollback." *Nonproliferation Review* 13, no. 3 (2006): 540.

regarding national security, political goals, the need for deterrence credibility and the desire for national prestige.

In 1970, the Weapons Exploitation Committee was formed in ROK, which initiated a programme in collaboration with Defence Development Agency that required nuclear technologies and reactors. During the same period, Seoul started a covert weapons research effort to develop its own nuclear arsenal in case the US removed its nuclear umbrella.¹³ Hence, under President Park Chung Hee, South Korea continued its nuclearisation attempts from 1971 to 1975, before these attempts were halted due to immense US pressure, which led to the former's ratification of the NPT in 1975.¹⁴

In the early 1990s, Seoul reassured its resolve against nuclearisation and signed a "Joint Declaration on denuclearisation" with DPRK in December 1991.¹⁵ However, in 2004, Seoul disclosed that it was involved in chemical Uranium enrichment between 1979 and 1981. It was also revealed that Plutonium was separated, and Uranium munitions were manufactured from 1983-1987.¹⁶ ROK acknowledged that in 2000 it conducted clandestine enrichment experiments. This led IAEA to start an investigation against Seoul, unveiling that the latter was involved in reprocessing experiments in violation of safeguards.¹⁷ However, it is also true that South Korea is one of the most vocal opponents of nuclear weapons and has actively participated in international efforts to avoid the development of nuclear weapons. For instance, it played a leading role in

¹³ Rebecca KC Hersman and Robert Peters, "Nuclear u-turns," 541.

¹⁴ Christopher Way and Karthika Sasikumar, "Leaders and laggards: When and why do countries sign the NPT," *Montreal: Research Group in International Security (REGIS) Working Paper* (2004): 14.

¹⁵ Christopher W. Hughes, "North Korea's nuclear weapons: implications for the nuclear ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," *Asia Policy* 3 (2007): 93, 95.

¹⁶ Jungmin Kang, Peter Hayes, Li Bin, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Richard Tanter, "South Korea's nuclear surprise," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 61, no. 1 (2005): 40.

¹⁷ James M. Acton, "the Problem with nuclear Mind reading," *Survival* 51, no. 1 (2009): 136.

promoting regional cooperation through participation in initiatives including ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit and the Six-Party.¹⁸

International Response to South Korea's Nuclear Ambitions

Efforts to prevent proliferation in the Korean Peninsula have been ongoing for many years. The United Nations has continually imposed sanctions on DPRK to limit its access to fissile materials and enrichment technology, which have, in some instances, seriously hampered people's livelihood.¹⁹ There have also been diplomatic efforts to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict, strengthen non-proliferation regimes and increase cooperation on non-proliferation. Despite the fact that the addition of nuclear weapons has complicated the situation in the Korean Peninsula, global powers (averse to proliferation) have not been able to halt DPRK's nuclear ambitions, a factor that stakeholders in South Korea may not ignore.

South Korea's interest in developing nuclear weapons has received significant attention from the international community. While the country ultimately abandoned these efforts and has become a strong advocate for non-proliferation, concerns about South Korea's nuclear ambitions have not diminished.

The U.S pressured South Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programme and sign civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 1974, which restricted the latter's Uranium enrichment capabilities.²⁰ Since then, South Korea's nuclear activities have been closely monitored. Other regional countries, particularly North Korea and China, have also closely monitored South Korea's nuclear activities. North Korea has cited South Korea's past nuclear ambitions as a justification for its own nuclear

¹⁸ John S. Park, "Inside multilateralism: The six- party talks", *Washington Quarterly* 28,no. 4 (2005): 75.

¹⁹ Hazel Smith, "The ethics of United Nations sanctions on North Korea: effectiveness, necessity and proportionality," *Critical Asian Studies* 52, no. 2 (2020): 182.

²⁰ Fred McGoldrick and Duyeon Kim, "Decision Time: US-South Korea peaceful nuclear cooperation", *On Korea* (2014): 79.

programme. China has expressed concerns about the possible destabilising effects of a nuclear-armed South Korea and opposed THAAD on the grounds that it would hamper peace and stability in East Asia and impact the proliferation regime.²¹

International organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), have also played their part in monitoring ROK's nuclear activities. IAEA has conducted inspections of South Korea's nuclear facilities and has collaborated to improve the country's nuclear safety and security practices.²² South Korea's commitment to non-proliferation has been recognised and the country's participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative have been commended by the international community.

The international response to South Korea's nuclear ambitions has been shaped by a range of factors, including regional security concerns, international norms, and South Korea's own commitment to non-proliferation. There have been concerns about the potential destabilising effects of a nuclear-armed South Korea. Still, the country's active participation in international non-proliferation efforts has kept it away from unwanted attention.

Implications of South Korean Nuclear Weapons

There are significant risks associated with development of nuclear weapons by South Korea. It may increase regional tensions and spark an arms race with North Korea, China, and Japan. North Korea has already acquired nuclear weapons to ensure its own security and the nuclear weapons of South Korea would be seen as a direct challenge to North

²¹ Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese views on South Korea's deployment of THAAD," *China Leadership Monitor* 52, no. 4 (2017): 4.

²² Jungmin Kang, Peter Hayes, Li Bin, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Richard Tanter, "South Korea's nuclear surprise," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 61, no. 1 (2005): 43-45.

Korea.²³ This could escalate tension between both countries, with the potential for a nuclear conflict.

Additionally, developing nuclear weapons would have significant diplomatic consequences for South Korea, as it would violate international non-proliferation norms resulting in strong condemnation from the international community and allies, specifically the US. The possession of nuclear weapons by ROK would also carry the potential to lead to a breakdown in the global non-proliferation regime.

South Korea's nuclear weapons could trigger a proliferation cascade in the region, with other countries, such as Japan and Taiwan possibly following suit. Japan has long had the wherewithal to develop WMDs but has refrained and relied on security alliance with the US.²⁴ The nuclear weapons ambitions of South Korea could also lead Japan to reassess its security situation and potentially pursue nuclear weapons. Similarly, Taiwan, which faces an increasingly assertive China, may feel compelled to develop nuclear weapons to deter any potential Chinese aggression. On the other hand, China may feel compelled to respond to South Korea's development of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the development of nuclear weapons by South Korea would have significant implications for regional and global security, most of which cannot even be fully anticipated.

Alternatives to Pursuing a Nuclear Weapons Programme

There are several alternatives that South Korea could pursue instead of a nuclear weapons programme. One alternative to a nuclear weapons programme would be to focus on strengthening South Korea's

²³ Bruce W. Bennett, Kang Choi, Myong-Hyun Go, Bruce E. Bechtol Jr, Jiyoung Park, Bruce Klingner, and Du-Hyeogn Cha," *Countering the risks of North Korean nuclear weapons*"(Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2021), 29, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1015-1.html>.

²⁴ Richard P. Cronin, "The North Korean nuclear threat and the US-Japan security alliance: perceived interests, approaches, and prospects." *Fletcher F. World Aff.* 29 (2005): 51.

conventional military capabilities. This could include investing in advanced weapon systems, increasing troop numbers, and improving training and readiness. By doing so, South Korea could maintain a strong conventional deterrence against North Korea and other potential adversaries without the need for nuclear weapons. For example, South Korea has been investing in missile defence systems such as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) and Patriot, which can intercept incoming missiles and protect key military and civilian assets.²⁵

Another alternative would be to pursue diplomatic engagement with North Korea and other potential adversaries in the region. South Korea may build trust and reduce tensions through negotiations, confidence-building measures, and other forms of dialogue. This may help to address the underlying security concerns of North Korea and may lead to a more stable and peaceful region overall. South Korea has been involved in diplomatic efforts to engage with North Korea including summits between the two Koreas in 2018 and 2019, which can be pursued further.

South Korea can pursue greater cooperation with regional countries to enhance security and deter potential threats. This includes closer partnerships with the US, Japan, and other allies. It may further expand to build stronger ties with China and Russia. By working together to address common security challenges, South Korea could help to build a more stable and secure regional order. For example, South Korea has been working to strengthen trilateral security cooperation with the US and Japan and has also sought to build closer economic ties with China.²⁶

²⁵ Tenny Kristiana, "China's Carrot and Stick Game on Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System Deployment," *Studies on Asia* 6, no. 1 (June 3, 2021): 55–71.

²⁶ William T. Tow, "Contingent Trilateralism: Applications for the Trilateral Security Dialogue," in *Asia-Pacific Security*, William Tow, Mark Thomson, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Satu Limaye (London: Routledge, 2007). 14.

Policy Considerations

Domestic politics and public opinion are significant factors in the decision-making process. In the case of South Korea, the government must consider the potential backlash from its citizens and opposition parties, who might view the development of nuclear weapons as a security threat or a misuse of public resources. Furthermore, international legal obligations and treaty commitments play a crucial role in South Korea's decision-making process. South Korea is a signatory to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Pursuing a nuclear weapons programme would violate these international legal obligations and damage South Korea's credibility in the global community. Another critical policy consideration is the impact on regional and global strategic stability. Nuclear weapons programmes often increase the likelihood of arms race and inducing regional instability. The nuclear weapons programme could trigger North Korea to accelerate its nuclear weapons programme, heightening regional tensions and causing instability.

Alternative security strategies should also be considered, such as strengthening conventional military capabilities, diplomatic efforts to denuclearise the Korean peninsula, and cooperative security arrangements with other countries. For example, South Korea could focus on building its missile defence system, strengthening its conventional military capabilities, and pursuing diplomatic efforts with North Korea and other regional actors to denuclearise the Korean peninsula. Alternatively, South Korea could explore cooperative security arrangements with countries like Japan, Australia, and the US, who share similar security concerns in the region.

In terms of future research directions, the impact of emerging technologies on nuclear deterrence and proliferation is a critical area to study. The potential development of hypersonic missiles and other advanced technologies may change the dynamics of nuclear deterrence

and lead to new arms races.²⁷ Additionally, there is a need to examine the role of regional actors in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, such as China's role in North Korea's nuclear programme. Finally, the impact of a nuclear-armed South Korea on the US-South Korea alliance is an area that requires further investigation, including the potential for increased tensions with China and other regional actors.

The South Korean government must carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of such a programme while considering alternative security strategies and their potential effectiveness. Future research can help inform policy decisions and ensure that actions taken are in the best interest of South Korea and the international community.

Conclusion

The issue of whether South Korea should pursue a nuclear weapons programme or not is a complex ordeal that involves numerous geopolitical and security considerations. South Korea's interest in nuclear weapons, the current geopolitical landscape, and the advantages and disadvantages of South Korea possessing nuclear weapons will decide the future course of action. There are viable alternatives to pursuing a nuclear weapons programme which include strengthening conventional military capabilities, diplomatic efforts to denuclearise the Korean peninsula, and cooperative security arrangements with other countries.

Policy considerations regarding South Korea's nuclear ambitions are complex and involve balancing security concerns with diplomatic considerations. Future research should continue to examine the viability and implications of a nuclear weapons programme for South Korea in the context of a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. Ultimately, any decision to pursue a nuclear weapons programme must carefully consider

²⁷ Michael T. Klare, "An 'Arms Race in Speed': Hypersonic Weapons and the Changing Calculus of Battle," *Arms Control Today* 49, no. 5 (2019): 6–13.

the potential costs and benefits and the views of key stakeholders, both domestically and internationally.

Prospects of Integrated Deterrence for Pakistan Amid Conventional Asymmetry in South Asia

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Abstract

This paper attempts to illustrate the relevance and importance of integrated deterrence in one of the most unpredictable regions of the world where India and Pakistan, have inched closer to crossing the nuclear threshold amid crises. Conventional asymmetry, offensive doctrines and the changing character of war impact South Asia's strategic stability. India's existing doctrinal thinking, technological developments in the military domain and its temptation for a pre-emptive military strike demands a corresponding review of Pakistan's doctrinal thinking. In this regard, Pakistan's shift towards integrating nuclear and conventional forces, effective diplomacy, and a quest for strong economy are integral for eradicating the probability of limited war in the region. The future of South Asian strategic stability lies in the practical implementation and adaptation of integrated deterrence by Pakistan into its doctrinal thinking and force posture, as this policy shift will help Pakistan develop a more cohesive, robust, and effective conventional response against offensive Indian military posturing.

Key Words: Cold Start, Limited War, Integrated Deterrence, Credible Minimum Deterrence, Full Spectrum Deterrence, India, Pakistan.

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Introduction

South Asia is considered one of the most volatile³ regions of the world because of the two nuclear arch-rivals, India and Pakistan. This region witnessed wars in 1948, 1965, 1971 and many crises including 1999 Kargil and recent 2019 Pulwama crisis. The nuclearisation of South Asia changed the entire spectrum of security when India conducted second round of nuclear tests in 1998 and declared itself nuclear weapon state. Pakistan responded to the challenge and restored the strategic balance by conducting its round of nuclear tests. Both Pakistan and India adopted the policy of credible minimum deterrence; however Indian conventional military modernization and offensive doctrinal response encouraged India to develop Cold Start Doctrine to fight limited war under nuclear overhang. Considering the conventional asymmetry in the land, air, and sea domain between India and Pakistan, it has been observed that this asymmetry seeks a doctrinal shift in South Asia.

The 2019 Indian offensive aerial strikes into the settled territory of Pakistan (Balakot) raised question marks on deterrence stability in South Asia. The event can be traced back to the February 14th, 2019, Pulwama incident when a Kashmiri youth, whom Indian authorities associated with Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), attacked an Indian police convoy in Pulwama. India's strike across the Line of Control (LoC) in Balakot to target an alleged JeM camp was part of Modi's New Normal,⁴ giving an impression that Pakistan's nuclear weapons do not deter India and it will respond with punitive military strikes against hostile non-state actors. Pakistan responded to India's provocation the next day and effectively shot down two aircrafts, one crashing within Pakistani territory, with the pilot apprehended alive. This was a clear signal by

³ Ashley J Tellis, *Stability in South Asia*, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2005), p. 7.

⁴ Salma Malik, "Indian Surgical Strike: Implications and Response by Pakistan," *IPRI Journal* 20, no. 1 (Winter 2022): 13, <https://ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Article-4-IPRI-Journal-XX-I-Ind-Sur-Str-ED-SSA-FINAL.pdf>.

Islamabad that despite having a conventional disadvantage, it still has the capacity and capability to match up to India. Operation "SWIFT RETORT" was a calculated and effective response against Indian intrusion into Pakistan's territory.

Pakistan's former Director General Strategic Plans Division (D.G. SPD), Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, stated at a workshop organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), that Pakistan effectively "deterred India from expanding operations beyond a single unsuccessful airstrike" at Balakot. He warned that "while it may be easy [for India] to climb the first rung on the escalation ladder, the second rung would always belong to Pakistan, and that India's choice to move to the third rung would invariably be dangerously problematic in anticipation of the fourth rung response by Pakistan." Finally, he cautioned that the Indian air strike "was playing with fire at the lower end of the nuclear spectrum and Armageddon at the upper end."⁵

As mentioned above, General Kidwai's speech highlights the rationality behind maintenance of deterrence stability in South Asia. The Indian government's decision to provoke a limited war under the nuclear overhang is based on irrationality, recklessness, and irresponsibility, negatively impacting regional strategic stability.

From Kargil to the 2019 surgical strikes, the character of war under the nuclear umbrella is gradually changing, and therefore there is a need to develop viable policy options to deter such emerging threats in future. This paper will look into the changing nature of deterrence and prospects of integrated deterrence for Pakistan, illustrating how integrated deterrence is a feasible option for a weak economy to counter conventional threats from India. Integrated, cross-domain and full-

⁵"Keynote Address and Discussion Session with Lieutenant General (Retd) Khalid Kidwai," International Institute for Strategic Studies, last modified February 6, 2020, <https://www.iiss.org/events/2020/02/7th-iiss-and-ciss-south-asian-strategic-stability-workshop>

spectrum deterrence will be discussed to provide a comparative analysis of each under the prevailing conventional asymmetry between Pakistan and India. This discussion will further explain the efficacy of integrated deterrence to plug the existing gap and maintain deterrence stability in South Asia.

Changing Nature of Deterrence

Carl Von Clausewitz, the 19th-century philosopher of war studies, stated, "War can be defined in two different ways one is its absolute form, and the other is its present character."⁶ War has both facets, an ever-changing character and a constant (permanent) nature.⁷ Taking this as a baseline from the Clausewitz school and its application to the concept of deterrence, it can be stated that similar to war, deterrence also has a constant nature and ever-changing character, under which it can take as many forms as per the demand of events and strategic environment. After applying the concept of deterrence in Clausewitz's school of thought, the question arises: if the nature of deterrence is unchanging, then what would be the character of 21st-century deterrence?

In response to this question, deterrence has several kinds, not one constant character. First, it is imperative to interpret and identify where and how deterrence is needed. Secondly, states should ensure that their deterrence needs are adequately identified and turned into capability. Thirdly, there is a challenge to the integration of these deterrent capabilities into one coherent variable. It demands a great rationale against the given commitments if they are to be operationalised within a specified time.

The cornerstone to deciphering this intricate maze of deterrence is to give a prologue before explaining the concept of integrated

⁶ Carl V. Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Micheal Howard and P. Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 62.

⁷ Carl V. Clausewitz, *On War*, trans.

deterrence, which in simple terms, can be explained as the optimal response to hybridised, cross-spectrum strategic challenges.⁸ Furthermore, integrated deterrence can be defined as a posturing strategy and employment of conventional and nuclear forces to acquire the military objectives at the lowest level of escalation, eradicating the chances of inadvertent or accidental war. There is a huge distinction between inadvertent or accidental war and pre-planned attacks (pre-emption) and attacks launched under the mistaken expectation of the other side. Usually, accidental or inadvertent war occurs when military operations lead toward an undesired increase in the intensity of conflict or toward its dangerous form.⁹

This leads to another question concerning the role of conventional and nuclear weapons in management and the escalation of limited conflict. How can a conventional weapon be used as a deterrent factor in response to the adversary's limited war option under the nuclear overhang? How are conventional forces still relevant and can operate in the nuclear environment? The concept of integrated deterrence justifies deterring and countering the challenge of limited conventional conflict/war against the nuclear-armed adversary. To attain this end, conventionally weak states such as Pakistan, confronted with the challenge of a limited war under the nuclear umbrella from its adversary, need to adopt an integrated deterrence approach.

Conventional-Nuclear Integration

Conventional and nuclear integration demands that contemplating conventional deterrence independently and detached from the nuclear force is not viable to counter hybrid conventional-nuclear strategies and

⁸ Paul Cornish, *Integrated Deterrence: NATO's 'First Reset' Strategy* (Slovak Republic: Globsec Policy Institute, 2017), 44.

⁹ Stephen J. Cimbala, "Accidental/Inadvertent Nuclear War and Information Warfare," *Armed Forces & Society Sage Publications* 25, no. 4 (Summer 1999): 654., <https://www.jstor.org/stable/45346333>.

threats. The contemporary threats demand better integration between nuclear deterrent operations and conventional defence policy and strategy. During the Cold War, the US nuclear deterrence played a significant role in the US deterrence strategies. However, after the demise of the USSR, nuclear deterrence took a backseat in the US national security policy and defence strategy. In the 1990s and 2000s, the US nuclear weapons observed a declining role in its national security policy. The nuclear deterrent and its associated platforms were marginalised in the post-Cold War era. Nuclear capabilities were considered the last resort and were used for extreme emergencies. Such a posture made sense immediately after the Cold War.¹⁰ There is also an assertion that the entanglement of conventional and nuclear deterrence could risk strategic stability. If the adversary misperceives this integrated and dual-capable conventional and nuclear platform as a nuclear signal, or if the dual command and control system tries to gain an advantage in a conventional conflict, it will inadvertently affect the nuclear weapon system. The adversary's strike on the dual-capable command and control could escalate the conflict.¹¹ Henceforth, in such types of conflict situations, the active role of communication between adversaries is one of the most important factors in reducing the chances of inadvertent/ accidental war.

Conventional and nuclear integration should be understood as an objective, with command and control working to maximise the potential of deterrence through effective communication. Conventional nuclear integration could reduce the adversary's destabilising practices; it will increase the effectiveness and readiness of conventional forces and reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, turning the conflict into a nuclear

¹⁰ Robert Peters, Justin Anderson, and Harrison Menke, "Deterrence in the 21st Century: Integrating Nuclear and Conventional Force," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 4 (Winter 2018): 16, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26533613>.

¹¹ James M. Acton, "Inadvertent Escalation and the Entanglement of Nuclear Command-and Control Capabilities," Belfer Center For Science and International Affairs, October 29, 2018, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/James%20Acton_Policy%20Brief_October%202018_0.pdf.

war. The effectiveness of conventional and nuclear integration and the existing military doctrines must reflect the ambitions for planning nuclear activities at the regional level, which is a necessary pre-requisite for conventional nuclear integration at the operational level.¹² The conceptual assumptions identified and explained in the conventional nuclear integration will be applied to the case study of Pakistan having conventional asymmetry vis-à-vis arch-rival India. Let us first examine the existing full-spectrum deterrence being followed by Pakistan.

Full Spectrum Deterrence

Full spectrum deterrence describes that nuclear weapons will deter both conventional and nuclear war at multiple levels. Pakistan combined its conventional and nuclear deterrence to attain strategic equivalence to overcome the widening asymmetries vis-à-vis India in the conventional domain.¹³ The Pakistan Army Doctrine: Comprehensive Response: 2011 clearly illustrates that strategic equivalence has diminished the total conventional war and concentrated on the sub-conventional domain.¹⁴

Full spectrum deterrence as a concept remains fluid, and it has been kept deliberately vague, and technological goals are left open-ended. Regarding its doctrinal practice, Pakistan follows the policy of ambiguity in a well-thought manner to manage the existing conventional asymmetry with India. The concept of full spectrum in response to India involves five key assumptions: (i) An India-centric policy and posture, (ii) Attaining strategic equivalence against India at the strategic and sub-conventional level, (iii) Pakistan will always remain reactive to India, (iv) Pakistan will

¹² Adam Mount and Pranay Vade, *An Integrated Approach to Deterrent Posture*, Federation of American Scientists, (2021), last modified April 1, 2021, <https://fas.org/pub-reports/an-integrated-approach-to-deterrence-posture/>.

¹³ Strategic Equivalence is applicable between players having asymmetric power balances, which is possible in the case of Pakistan and India.

¹⁴ Pakistan Army New War Fighting Concept, Pakistan Army Doctrine Comprehensive Response 2011: p.2

opt for First Use of nuclear weapons (v) All forms of aggression will be deterred by combining strategic and conventional forces.¹⁵

Though full spectrum deterrence is a viable option to match India's conventional superiority, there are some loopholes within the full spectrum deterrence. As mentioned earlier, the character of war in South Asia has changed with India's conventional superiority and offensive doctrinal posture. Full Spectrum Deterrence of Pakistan has the potential to deter a limited war; however, with the presence of new warfighting concepts such as surgical strikes, this notion is not effective in the longer run. The lexicon of full spectrum deterrence now must be shifted towards integrated deterrence, considering the potential threats of military modernisation and offensive doctrines from adversaries.¹⁶

Integrated Deterrence

The concept of integrated deterrence was introduced by the Chinese military strategist in 2013; according to them, the central military deterrence includes; nuclear, conventional, space, network space, and integrated conventional and nuclear deterrence. The Chinese understanding of integrated deterrence rests upon transforming comprehensive national power into useful and effective capabilities; further enhancement will lead towards a robust deterrence. Integrated deterrence will help China to defend against a strong enemy.¹⁷ Later on, this concept was further explained and expanded in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

¹⁵ Sania Abdullah, "Pakistan's Evolving Doctrine and Emerging Force Posture: Conceptual Nuances and Implied Ramifications," *Pakistan Horizon* 21, no. 1-2 (August 2018): 84-85.

¹⁶ Feroze Hassan Khan, In Person Interview, Islamabad September 20, 2022.

¹⁷ China Aerospace Studies Institute, *In Their Own Words: Foreign Military Thought Science of Military Strategy (2013)* (USA: China's Aerospace Studies Institute, 2013), 213.

integrating conventional and nuclear forces.¹⁸ In 2022, the US adopted integrated deterrence as the cornerstone strategy of its national security policy. Conventional and nuclear integration can keep the nuclear threshold high because it caters for a balanced interplay of conventional and nuclear forces. Thus, it allows the US forces to counter the threat of Russian conventional military forces by keeping its nuclear forces intact.

According to the US, integrated deterrence means integrating all tools of national power, including the network of allies and partners through which the US credibly deters aggression.¹⁹ However, the concept of integrated deterrence, in the words of General Austin, is defined as “the right mix of technology, operational concepts and capabilities. These all are knitted together and networked in a credible, flexible and formidable way that it will stop the adversary from taking any action further.”²⁰

Integrated deterrence comprises four key elements: vertical, horizontal, functional, and temporal integration. Vertical integration is the amalgamation of all three military tiers for deterrence, including the nuclear to conventional, at the operational, strategic, and tactical levels of war. It also corroborates the ability of the commander and his troops. This vertically integrated deterrence posture requires credibility, capability, and communication at all levels of war and not at the strategic level alone. In this regard, a pertinent example is that of Russia, which has worked on its vertical integration of deterrence and nuclear threshold. They are

¹⁸ Nuclear Posture Review 2018, U.S. Department of Defense, accessed October 13, 2022, <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF>.

¹⁹ Anna Pederson and Michael Akopian, "Sharper: Integrated Deterrence," *Centre for a New American Security*, January 11, 2023, accessed May 1, 2023, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/sharper-integrated-deterrence#:~:text=The%202022%20National%20Defense%20Strategy%20explicitly%20states%3A%20%22Integrated%20deterrence%20means,of%20aggression.%22%20Following%20the%20release.>

²⁰ Charlie Dunlap, "Dr. Frank Hoffman on “Conceptualizing Integrated Deterrence,” *Lawfire*, January 8, 2022, <https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2022/01/08/guest-post-dr-frank-hoffman-on-conceptualizing-integrated-deterrence/>.

modernising their command-and-control system along with the induction of conventional capabilities.²¹ Russia has modernised its nuclear weapons by deploying the SSC-8 cruise missiles after the US, during the Trump Administration, scrapped the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) with Russia.²²

Horizontal integration explains the integration of deterrence to ensure that all governmental entities, including foreign offices, diplomacy, and the state's economy are included in the maintenance of deterrent posture. Functional integration adopts and employs horizontal integration's broad principles and rules but restricts them to activities and functions instead of departments and other non-governmental organizations. Whereas temporal integration is more concerned with the time variable, it can be maintained and changed over time and as per the changes in the circumstances and strategic environment. National security and defence strategy is one of the most important dimensions closely associated with temporal integration.²³

Prospects of Integrated Deterrence for Pakistan

Integrated deterrence is the convergence of conventional and nuclear deterrence; however, there are certain prospects of having integrated deterrence in the policy posture of Pakistan. It is agreed that there is conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan and an economic gap in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between India and

²¹ Mark Galeotti, "The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War," In Moscow's Shadows, last modified February 27, 2013, <https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/>.

²² Micheal R. Gordon, "Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging Trump," *New York Times*, February 14, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/world/europe/russia-cruise-missile-arms-control-treaty.html>.

²³ Paul Cornish, *Integrated Deterrence: NATO's 'First Reset' Strategy*, (Slovak Republic: Globsec Policy Institute, 2017), 12 https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/gnai_-_integrated_deterrence.pdf.

Pakistan (The current Indian GDP is \$3173.40 billion²⁴ and Pakistan's GDP is \$346.34 billion²⁵). For economically weak states such as Pakistan, integrated deterrence has more potential than cross-domain or full-spectrum deterrence. Cross-domain deterrence is ensured by having capabilities in different domains (land, air, naval and cyber), which are quite costly. Apart from the economic factor, integrated deterrence also supports and substantiates Pakistan's policy of credible minimum deterrence which means that (i) Pakistan would not conduct more nuclear tests, (ii) it would retain a minimum number of deterrence forces, (iii) avoid an arms race in the region, (iv) it would have a minimum number of forces in terms of quantity, enough for deterrence. Pakistan's conceptualization of credible minimum deterrence is based on the notion that the minimum is affordable and ensures deterrence at a lower economic cost.²⁶

Pakistan acquired and operationalized its nuclear weapons to avoid war with India. Realizing conventional inferiority, Pakistan operationalizes its nuclear strategy to deter conventional and nuclear war. This posture relies on the state being unambiguous about its capabilities to get maximum deterrence effect.²⁷ Pakistan is employing this policy, considering the conventional asymmetry mentioned above. However, recent developments such as the Balakot Airstrikes 2019 and the threat of inadvertent escalation requires a synergistic approach to alleviate this

²⁴ "India GDP - 2022 Data - 2023 Forecast - 1960-2021 Historical - Chart - News," Trading Economics, accessed October 12, 2022, <https://tradingeconomics.com/india/gdp>.

²⁵ "Pakistan GDP - 2022 Data - 2023 Forecast - 1960-2021 Historical - Chart - News," Trading Economics, accessed October 12, 2022, <https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/gdp>.

²⁶ Zafar Khan, "The Changing Contours of Minimum Deterrence in South Asia," *Pluto Journals* 13, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 82, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.13169/polipers.13.1.0077>.

²⁷ Goferey Brown, "India's Deterrence Goldilocks Dilemma in South Asia," *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs* 3, no. 3 (Fall 2020): 77-78, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2331224/indias-deterrence-goldilocks-dilemma-in-south-asia/>

threat from India. In this sense, Pakistan needs to adopt the strategy of integrated deterrence to dilute the threat of unintentional warfare.

In Balakot Airstrikes 2019, the strikes were declared "non-military pre-emptive strikes."²⁸ by the civil and military officials of India. The next day, February 27th, 2019, Pakistan responded to the Indian air strikes and targeted the uninhabited land close to the Indian military installations to demonstrate the three important caveats of deterrence. (i) political will to attack and retaliate against Indian conventional strike-through conventional means, (ii) capability to conduct the military strikes, Pakistan successfully conducted the military strikes through active use of air power, (iii) communicating with the adversary about the potentialities of Pakistan's Air Force.²⁹

Integrated deterrence strengthens the notion that credible minimum deterrence is more viable than cross-domain deterrence. However, cross-domain deterrence in contemporary times cannot be ignored and can be strengthened through the integration of conventional and nuclear weapons. A sophisticated conventional response is required to counter conventional threats from India.³⁰ India acquired Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMD)³¹ to intercept the adversary's missile, and Rafael Aircrafts from France.³² This Indian conventional military build-up is creating space for limited war and challenging the strategic stability

²⁸ "India's 'Non-Military Pre-Emptive' Strike on Pakistan: What We Know, What We Don't Know," *The Wire*, February 26, 2019, <https://thewire.in/security/iaf-airstrikes-in-pakistan-what-we-know-what-we-dont-know>.

²⁹ Maheen Shafeeq, "Operation Swift Retort: The U.S. and Chinese Response and Analysis," *Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS)*, last modified February 27, 2021, <https://casstt.com/post/operation-swift-retort-the-us-and-chinese-response-and-analysis/319>.

³⁰ Feroze Hassan Khan, In Person Interview with author, September 20, 2022.

³¹ Balraj Nagal, "India and Ballistic Missile Defense: Furthering a Defensive Deterrent," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, last modified June 30, 2016, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-and-ballistic-missile-defense-furthering-defensive-deterrent-pub-63966>.

³² "India has received 26 Rafale aircraft till date: Govt," *The Hindu*, July 28, 2021, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-has-received-26-rafale-aircraft-till-date-govt/article35585665.ece>.

in South Asia.³³ However, this threat can be averted by Pakistan if it adopts conventional and nuclear integration into its policy posture under the pretext of integrated deterrence.

One of the essential elements of integrated deterrence is building collaboration and cooperation with allies. As discussed earlier, Pakistan needs a robust conventional deterrence to counter the conventional Indian offensive threat. However, considering Pakistan's economic condition, Pakistan must develop military cooperation with like-minded countries. The current strategic environment has witnessed the close military cooperation between China and Pakistan. Since the end of the Cold War, it has become Pakistan's leading supplier of conventional weapons and offensive strike capabilities. The recent geopolitical shifts due to the intense China-US strategic competition and strained China- India relations after a series of border skirmishes and US withdrawal from Afghanistan strengthened the strategic partnership between China and Pakistan.³⁴ According to the statistics given by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the estimated arms transfer from China to Pakistan in the past 15 years is \$8,469 million, which is equal to the arms transferred to Pakistan by China in the last 50 years \$8,794 million. Since 2015, around 75% of imported arms to Pakistan have been transferred by China.³⁵ Both China and Pakistan are not formally engaged in a military alliance, however, their diplomatic posturing signals the formation of a military partnership in the future. In August 2022, the then

³³ "Pakistan has cost-effective solution to India's latest ballistic missile defence system: Report," *The Economic Times*, November 7, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-has-cost-effective-solution-to-indias-latest-ballistic-missile-defence-system-report/articleshow/66535188.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst.

³⁴ Sameer P. Lalwani, "A Threshold Alliance: The China-Pakistan Military Relationship," United States Institute of Peace, last modified March 22, 2023, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/threshold-alliance-china-pakistan-military-relationship>.

³⁵ Nan Tian et al., "Trends in World Military Expenditure 2022," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed June 4, 2023, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/202304/2304_fs_milex_2022.pdf.

Army Chief of Pakistan, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, described China and Pakistan militaries as "brothers in arms" for securing collective interests.³⁶ China and Pakistan's diplomatic engagements and military exercises signal the growing military relationship. The China-Pakistan joint 'SHAHEEN' Air Force exercises highlight the growing complexity, interoperability, and trust for building future military cooperation.

Apart from the 'SHAHEEN' exercises, the Navies of China and Pakistan conducted bilateral exercises in 2014 and five iterations through 2017, emphasizing interoperability and interchangeability.³⁷ In 2020 this exercise was named "Sea Guardians."³⁸ The recent July 2022 iteration at the Shanghai coast included live fire attacks against maritime targets, tactical manoeuvring, replenishment, air and anti-missile defence and anti-submarine warfare, and joint support on damaged vessels.³⁹ The military engagement between China and Pakistan at all the tiers (land, air, and sea) and the changing geopolitical order in South Asia indicates the formation of a military alliance between China and Pakistan, which may assist in implementing integrated deterrence against conventional Indian threats.

Conclusion

Deterrence is creating fear in an adversary's mind without fighting a war. South Asia is a volatile region with two hostile nuclear rivals in close geographic proximity. India enjoys relative advantage over Pakistan due to its size and growth of GDP growth, technological development,

³⁶ APP, "Pakistan, Chinese armies 'brothers in arms': COAS," *DAWN*, August 2, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1702790>.

³⁷ "Pakistan, China Hold Joint Navy Exercise," *The Nation*, December 10, 2017, <https://www.nation.com.pk/10-Dec-2017/pakistan-china-hold-joint-navy-exercise>

³⁸ Chen Zhuo, "China, Pakistan kick off joint naval exercise 'Sea Guardians - 2' in Shanghai, Ministry of National Defense, Shanghai, accessed June 8, 2023, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/4915287.html.

³⁹ Liu Xuanzun, "China-Pakistan Joint Naval Drill Enters Live-Fire Phase with Participation of Both Countries' Type 054A Frigates for 1st Time," *Global Times*, July 12, 2022, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202207/1270355.shtml>

and military modernization. It is observed that military modernization in India, both quality and quantity, compels India to adopt an offensive doctrinal posture against Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan, cognizant of acute conventional asymmetry with India, tries to maintain deterrence and balance of power by operationalizing the policy of full spectrum deterrence. This policy posture is central to Pakistan's strategic thinking and a suitable option for containing India's Cold Start Doctrine. However, after the Balakot Airstrikes in 2019, the character of war in South Asia has changed. With its strong conventional military forces acquired with the support of the US, Russia, France, and Israel, India is challenging Pakistan's strategic calculus and seeking a limited war under a nuclear overhang.

This conventional imbalance in South Asia can potentially escalate the conflict from the sub-conventional to the strategic level. The most viable option for Pakistan with limited resources is to adopt an integrated deterrence policy in line with the policy of credible minimum deterrence policy. Integrated deterrence will enhance the credibility of Pakistan's conventional and nuclear forces; it will increase the probability of deterrence stability in the nuclear and conventional domains.

The Rise of Neo Ottomanism in Turkey for Strategic Autonomy in Liberal World Order

Tamseel Aqdas¹

Abstract

This research paper aims to investigate Turkey's quest for strategic autonomy in the Liberal World Order. As per these ambitions, Turkey has increasingly distanced itself from the European Union (EU) and the transatlantic alliance and has shifted its focus towards China, Russia, and the Global South. These developments are a direct consequence of the 2023 termination of the Treaty of Lausanne, along with the shift to multipolar world order. Turkey has viewed these shifts as a chance to gain strategic autonomy in the region and proclaim itself as the leader of the Muslim world. As a result, intervention in Syria, Libya, and the Black Sea was utilized to assert influence, and the atrocities of Israel and India against the Muslim community were also called out. Turkey's ambitions to cash on the shifting international system and redirect its foreign policy can be associated with neo-Ottomanism, implying that the Turkish state aspires to regain the lost glory of the historic Ottoman Empire and its regional dominance. US is creating hurdles in this process however, Turkey is adamant about its goals and continues to invoke strides in that direction.

Key words: World Order, Strategic Autonomy, Neo-Ottomanism, Regional Dominance, International system

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Introduction

Turkey's foreign policy has been changing in the past from an Islamic Ottoman Empire to a secular republic and now under the regime of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to neo-Ottomanism.² Currently, it is aligning with Russia, China and the Global South and distancing itself from the European Union. Moreover, Turkey is increasing its influence in the Middle East. All these signs demonstrate Turkey's desire for strategic autonomy.³ This can be associated with the Ottoman Empire's historical glory and the Turkey's strategic significance in the post-Treaty of Lausanne context. Nevertheless, such aspirations face the hurdle of the contemporary world order, as the US and its allies influence the international system by virtue of dollar dominance, military strength and strategic alliances like NATO.⁴ Accordingly, this research paper aims to investigate the rise of Turkey within the constraints of the existing world order.

For this research paper, neo-Ottomanism refers to a political ideology, seeking to revive aspects of the historical Ottoman Empire, emphasizing regional influence. While strategic autonomy refers to Turkey's ambitions for reviving neo-Ottomanism by acquiring regional dominance over the Muslim World. Thus, aspiring for greater engagement in regional and global affairs.

The Lost Glory of the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire was one of the greatest empire in the history that became transcontinental after it entered Balkans in 1354. It further

²Hakan Yapar, "From Strategic Depth to Blue Homeland and Beyond: Understanding Turkey's Drift towards Greater Strategic Autonomy," https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2021/DIEEEE040_2021_HAKYAP_Turquia_ENG.pdf.

³ Hakan Yapar, "From Strategic Depth to Blue Homeland and Beyond.

⁴ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order: strategic autonomy or new forms of dependence?" *International Affairs*. July 5, 2021, <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/4/1085/6314232>.

expanded when in 1453 it was able to subjugate Constantinople after the dismantling of the Byzantine Empire. Ottomans ruled over southeast Europe throughout the 13th century.⁵ However, the empire reached the peak of power and prosperity under Suleiman the Magnificent.⁶ During Suleiman's reign, the empire comprised 32 provinces, with Constantinople as the capital.⁷ The strategic location of Constantinople resulted in the empire being connected to both the Middle East and Europe, thus engendering great economic benefits. Despite the glorious years of the Ottoman Empire, it eventually met its demise due to its alliance with the defeated central powers in World War I and was colonization by Britain, Greece, Italy, and France. Subsequently, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk fought against the European powers through the Turkish War of Independence. After this war the Treaty of Lausanne was signed⁸ which reduced the jurisdiction of the erstwhile Ottoman Empire to present day Turkey, thus losing lost control over Libya, Egypt, Cyprus, Syria, Sudan, Iraq, and the Levant.⁹

The Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923 as part of the peace settlements after World War I in Lausanne, Switzerland, after a seven-month-long negotiation.¹⁰ This agreement established the conditions for peace between Turkey and the Allied nexus of Britain, France, Greece, Romania, Japan, Italy, and Yugoslavia. Turkey lost its claim over its former Arab territories and recognized British possession of Cyprus and Italian possession of the Dodecanese.¹¹ Moreover, the straits between the Aegean and the Black Sea were declared open shipping territories and

⁵ "Ottoman Empire," *History*, last modified February 28, 2020, <https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/ottoman-empire#:~:text=The%20Ottoman%20Empire%20was%20one,for%20more%20than%20600%20year.>

⁶ "Ottoman Empire," *History*, last modified February 28, 2020.

⁷ "Ottoman Empire," *History*.

⁸ "Ottoman Empire," *History*.

⁹ "Treaty of Lausanne," *Britannica*, last modified June 14, 2023.

[https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Lausanne-1923.](https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Lausanne-1923)

¹⁰ "Treaty of Lausanne," *Britannica*.

¹¹ "Treaty of Lausanne," *Britannica*.

Turkish autonomy over the seas was lost.¹² Nevertheless, the allied powers recognised Turkish sovereignty over its contemporary territory, thereby forgoing the demands of Kurdistan and the cession of Armenia.

Despite these setbacks, Atatürk carried aspirations of stabilizing Turkey through modern secular principles and rejecting former Ottoman values. Turkey was deemed a republic, and sovereignty was associated with the people.¹³ Resultantly, the Ottoman Sultanate met its demise. Moreover, nationalism was introduced to Turkish individuals along with the notion of recognising the sovereignty of other states; as a result, the imperial ambitions of the Ottoman Empire were sidestepped, and strides for a progressive Turkey were undertaken.¹⁴ However, after Atatürk's death, the ruling parties increasingly disputed the interpretations of this ideology, and Islamic principles were enforced recurrently. As the power of safeguarding secularism was passed on to the Turkish military, the state faced successful coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 and a failed attempt in 2016.¹⁵ The irony was that the coups undertaken to secure Turkey led to a deteriorating economy, directly impacted economic activities, which had negative implications for the GDP.

Against the backdrop of the declining economy, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan emerged alongside his Justice and Development Party in 2003. He had a reformist vision of bringing back the lost glory of Turkey. Erdoğan associated development with regional hegemony and reinvigorated the lost Ottoman prestige. Hence, unlike Atatürk, Erdoğan aspired to gain strategic autonomy for Turkey through the ideology of Neo-Ottomanism,¹⁶ an aspiration of re-establishing lost Ottoman glory by increasing its area of influence. This term can conveniently be used to

¹² "Treaty of Lausanne," Britannica.

¹³ Tamseel Aqdas, "From secularism to political Islam, Turkish neo-Ottomanism," *Foreign Policy News*, September 22, 2020, <https://foreignpolicynews.org/2020/09/22/from-secularism-to-political-islam-turkish-neo-ottomanism/>.

¹⁴ Tamseel Aqdas, "From secularism to political Islam, Turkish neo-Ottomanism.

¹⁵ Tamseel Aqdas, "From secularism to political Islam, Turkish neo-Ottomanism.

¹⁶ Tamseel Aqdas, "From secularism to political Islam, Turkish neo-Ottomanism.

describe the shifts in Turkey's foreign policy under Erdoğan's leadership. However, the idea of revival of Ottoman influence has been discussed and debated by Young Ottomans, Pan Islamists and Turkish nationalists even before Erdoğan came into power, but Erdoğan became a face of neo-Ottomanism in the practical political arena.¹⁷

Strategic Autonomy and Neo-Ottomanism

Turkish foreign policy has undergone change under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party (AKP). However, the change was slow and gradual. The concept of interdependence characterized his first tenure. In this initial phase, the state's regional interaction was followed by the economic factors of free trade agreements and visa-free access for Middle Eastern countries.¹⁸ There was a heavy emphasis on soft power and human rights. Thereby, Turkey acted as a mediator in the Israel and Syria conflicts.¹⁹ Further, in 2005, Erdoğan's government even initiated negotiations for Turkey's accession to the European Union (EU).²⁰ The visible shift of policy was demonstrated in the second decade of Erdoğan's government. The conception of interdependence was substituted with the notion of strategic autonomy. Under the realm of strategic autonomy, factors like military intervention and coercive diplomacy were introduced.²¹ This was demonstrated by Turkey's military involvement in the Syrian civil war, inducing a stalemate in its relations with Israel and halting its bilateral ties with Egypt. Furthermore, Erdoğan directly confronted Western states and their global order on various accounts, such as energy exploration rights in the Mediterranean Sea against the EU. A clash on regional security with the US and its NATO allies was also witnessed.

¹⁷ Tamseel Aqdas, "From secularism to political Islam, Turkish neo-Ottomanism.

¹⁸ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order: strategic autonomy or new forms of dependence?" *International Affairs*,. July 5, 2021, <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/4/1085/6314232>.

¹⁹ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

²⁰ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

²¹ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

The shift in Turkish foreign policy and the quest for strategic autonomy resulted from various factors. With the rise of China and BRICS states, power is gradually shifting away from the West, which projects the ultimate downfall of the US led world order.²² China's rise also allowed like-minded states aspiring to rise in a multilateral world order, such as Vladimir Putin's Russia, to work side by side. Moreover, a rise in authoritarian right-wing populism was witnessed, such as Narendra Modi in India and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. These leaders induced nationalism and monopolised power, reducing influence of external powers in domestic affairs.

As for Turkey, it benefited from the declining influence of the US and the rise of regional powers to strive for regional autonomy by reviving neo-Ottomanism.²³ Additionally, Erdoğan belonged to the category of populist leaders, and the wave of authoritarianism in states like Hungary and India allowed him to take strides in that direction. Additionally, security concerns have always played a vital role in shaping Turkey's foreign policy. The state has encountered various security challenges over the years, which include non-state actors, regional instability and border tensions. Hence, it is argued that the security aspect of Turkish foreign policy is multifaceted by encompassing an entire range of issues. The non-state actors like Islamic State (ISIS), Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and border skirmishes in Syria and Iraq, resulting in a refugee crisis and potential infiltration of terrorism. Accordingly, Turkey needs to adopt a proactive approach toward counterterrorism and protecting its national security.

Turkey associates itself with the Global South based on its foreign policy vision. Hence, Erdoğan has a vision of joining like-minded

²²Hakan Yapar, "From Strategic Depth to Blue Homeland and Beyond: Understanding Turkey's Drift towards Greater Strategic Autonomy," Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, last modified April 12, 2022, https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2021/DIEEEE040_2021_HAKYAP_Turquia_ENG.pdf.

²³Hakan Yapar, "From Strategic Depth to Blue Homeland and Beyond."

powers, the Russia-China axis and the Global South against Western influence. Since the partnership between Turkey and Russia also has historical roots, the states had conflictual interactions during the Cold War amid Turkey's alliance with NATO against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, by the 1980s, Turkey and the Soviet Union developed improved relations, and their trade went from US\$476 million to US\$1.8 billion.²⁴ Their partnership further accelerated in the 1990s, when Russia's energy resources and Turkey's hold over consumer goods were deemed complimentary. The resulting partnership was known as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) project of 1992.²⁵ This partnership expanded to include trade, investment, energy, tourism, and human interaction. Before the 2008 financial crisis, there were extensive trade relations between the states, and the number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey had increased to 2.8 million.²⁶ Nevertheless, the relations between the states were largely bilateral and weakly institutionalized. For example, the BSCE project was deemed a regional multilateral cooperation organization, and domestic issues of political significance were side-lined.²⁷ The efforts for strategic autonomy started after 2011. Consequently, the relations between the states were no longer limited to economic interdependence. Instead, matters like political identity and collective security were highlighted. Moreover, the domestic political transition into a presidential authoritarian government in 2018 increased political understanding between Turkey and Russia. Erdoğan and Putin successfully projected nationalism and anti-West narratives to pursue their interest in a multipolar international order.²⁸

The situation changed drastically after the failure of The CIA-backed coup in 2016. Turkey projected security concerns from the West

²⁴Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order: strategic autonomy or new forms of dependence?" *International Affairs*. July 5, 2021, <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/4/1085/6314232>.

²⁵ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

²⁶ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

²⁷ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

²⁸ Hakan Yapar, "From Strategic Depth to Blue Homeland and Beyond."

especially US. Accordingly, Turkey looked for alternatives and invested US\$2.5 billion in the Russian S-400 missiles. This purchase was met with criticism from NATO, but Turkey and Russia took the opportunity of escalating security concerns of Syrian conflict to build defence cooperation. The bilateral ties strengthened over the years, with trade exceeding US\$27.6 billion in 2020 and the number of Russian tourists in Turkey increasing to 7 million in 2019.²⁹ These economic realities supported strategic autonomy and Turkey boldly started venturing into new avenues for defence. Years old military reliance on the US cooperation always limited Turkey's autonomy. Hence, a strong military alliance with Russia made Turkey independent of the US, and in a position to pursue a more independent foreign policy.

Similarly, on the Chinese front, Turkey has forged closer ties. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey has effectively passed 13 laws on the Chinese domains of energy, trade, health, technology, and logistics. Further, President Erdoğan projected hopes for China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).³⁰ In the 2017 BRI Forum, Erdoğan expressed that this project will induce a new era of regional stability through political and economic investments. In 2002, the trade between China and Turkey was only US\$1.64 billion. However, with the rise of strategic autonomy, it increased to US\$22 billion in 2020.³¹ The trade expansion was accompanied by infrastructural developments and railway construction in Turkey, such as the Ankara–Istanbul high-speed railway. Moreover, in 2019, Erdoğan announced the 'Asia Anew' initiative, which aimed to generate political and economic opportunities in the emerging multipolar world order, and asserted Turkey's plan for regional dominance.³²

²⁹ Hakan Yapar, "From Strategic Depth to Blue Homeland and Beyond."

³⁰ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

³¹ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

³² Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

Turkey's Shift from the EU and the Transatlantic Alliance

Turkey's quest for strategic autonomy included pivoting away from the West with respect to political values and identity. In the post-Cold War era, Turkish foreign policy was largely directed by the US led world order. Nevertheless, the influence of the West in Turkish directives steadily decreased during Erdoğan's tenure, particularly in Turkey-EU relations. The Republic of Turkey signed the EU Customs Union Agreement in 1996, and consequently, the EU became Turkey's largest trading and investment partner.³³ The EU accounted for 45% of Turkey's foreign trade and 67% of its Foreign Direct Investments. However, despite these circumstances, Turkey could not achieve full integration into the EU based on geopolitical disputes, Turkey's size, level of economic development, and the collective identity of Europe.³⁴ Moreover, the rise in conservative democracies across Europe further impacted the full integration of Turkey into the EU. The conservatives directly challenged Turkish identity and labeled it non-European based on religious and cultural values. Turkey was viewed as a buffer state for Europe to prevent the rapid migration of refugees as opposed to a partner for the EU.³⁵ This view was especially projected by Germany's Angela Merkel and France's Nicolas Sarkozy. However, the rise of non-Western powers provided substitute partners for Turkey's foreign policy discourse. Although bilateral cooperation in economics, trade, and energy continues, the influence of the EU on Turkish politics declined.³⁶

It is critical to acknowledge that disassociation with the Western alliances may lead to economic losses for Turkey. For instance, the EU-Turkey Customs Union resulted in an improved Turkish industrial sector. Commercial ties were expanded, and the Turkish automobile industry grew. In 2020, Turkey's trade with the EU was worth US\$143 billion.³⁷

³³ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

³⁴ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

³⁵ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

³⁶ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

³⁷ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

Although Turkey-EU relations are deemed significant, the terms of their partnership are not sustainable from a geopolitical perspective, which makes Turkey's EU membership unlikely.³⁸ The Republic of Turkey does not proclaim a role in the trade policy decision-making of the EU, yet the state has to abide by the European Commission's decisions.³⁹ However, Turkey's gradual shift to Russia and China may eventually sideline the EU factor in the decision-making affairs of the country.

Regional Influence

In the first decade of his rule, Erdoğan induced cooperation with Syria at political, economic, security, and technical levels. In this manner, the states established trade relations along with investments. However, Turkey adopted different approach to account for the shifts in the international order in the strive for strategic autonomy. The emergence of the Kurdish factor redefined Turkey's approach to Syria since it directly challenged the sovereignty and regional autonomy of the state.⁴⁰ Turkey launched a military operation in Syria to fight the Syrian Kurdish Front and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) elements. This was followed by a military intervention in Northern Iraq to contain the Kurdish government and the plight of Kurds on Turkish territories.⁴¹

In the context of Libya, in 2019, Turkey convinced the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) to sign a maritime memorandum.⁴² As a result, the 16 nautical mile corridor between southwest Turkey and northeast Libya was deemed an exclusive

³⁸ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

³⁹ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order."

⁴⁰ Shaimaa Maged, "Turkey's Role in Syria: A Prototype of its Regional Policy in the Middle East," *E-International Relations*, September 21, 2021, <https://www.e-ir.info/2021/09/21/turkeys-role-in-syria-a-prototype-of-its-regional-policy-in-the-middle-east/>.

⁴¹ Shaimaa Maged, "Turkey's Role in Syria."

⁴² "Libya complains of arms cargo from Turkey, joint investigation launched," *Reuters*, December 22, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-turkey-idUSKCN1IOL0G3>.

economic zone (EEZ), and Greece's rights over the territory were effectively side-lined.⁴³ In return, Turkey offered the GNA defence against the eastern armed coalition led by Khalifa Haftar in the Libyan Civil War.⁴⁴ The assistance included training personnel, unmanned ariel vehicles, and support from the Turkish Navy. However, it can be argued that Erdoğan took these measures to gain political influence in Libya and access to its North-eastern Mediterranean coast. That is how Turkey will be able to increase access to the oil and gas reserves of the Mediterranean.⁴⁵ The increased revenue shall make strategic autonomy easier.

With the coming termination of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey can explore and utilize the natural gas reserves of the Black Sea.⁴⁶ According to President Erdoğan, Turkey has explored 320 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and aspires to launch production by 2023.⁴⁷ Consequently, Turkey can decrease its dependence on energy reserve imports from Iran, Iraq, and Russia and dominate one of the largest economies in the Middle East. This will further increase Turkish influence across the region.

Muslim World

As part of the quest for strategic autonomy, Turkey has presented itself as the liberator of the Muslim world. To pursue this notion, Erdoğan has developed an antipathetic stance on Israel and India by highlighting their human rights violations against Palestinians and Kashmiris. Upon delivering his speech after the conversion of Hagia Sophia, Erdoğan claimed that the next required liberation was of Al-Aqsa mosque, located in Israel, the third holiest Islamic site.⁴⁸ This statement was in response

⁴³ "Libya complains of arms cargo from Turkey, joint investigation launched"

⁴⁴ "Libya complains of arms cargo from Turkey, joint investigation launched"

⁴⁵ "Libya complains of arms cargo from Turkey, joint investigation launched"

⁴⁶ Klaus Wolfer, "The Black Sea and Turkey in focus," *Gis Report Online*, last modified April 20, 2022, <https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/black-sea/>.

⁴⁷ Klaus Wolfer, "The Black Sea and Turkey in focus."

⁴⁸ "Israel and Turkey hail new era in relations, but divisions remain," *Al Jazeera*,

to the emerging peace deals between Israel and the Arab world. In the wake of the silence of Arab states on Israeli atrocities, Erdoğan took it upon the Turkish state to build narratives in favour of the Palestinians.⁴⁹

Turkey and Israel have recently launched a new era of their relationship. After prolonged diplomatic turmoil, Isaac Herzog, the President of Israel, visited Turkey.⁵⁰ This was the first visit of an Israeli President since 2007. Erdoğan claimed that this visit was a turning point in the Turkey-Israel relationship as steps for energy cooperation between the states were undertaken. However, Erdoğan has demonstrated an unchanging stance on Palestinian rights despite these developments. Explaining this stance, Erdoğan stated that it is critical to reduce regional tensions and project a two-state solution vision.⁵¹ In his meeting with his Israeli counterpart, Erdoğan expressed Jerusalem's importance in the history of Islam as well as the religious identity associated with the Al-Aqsa mosque.⁵²

Moving forward, in the context of India, Erdoğan highlighted atrocities in Kashmir in a high-level United Nations General Assembly session. He further acknowledged that the Kashmir issue is a major cause of instability in South Asia and that it is critical to resolve it through dialogue and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.⁵³ Additionally, Erdoğan spoke in favour of the Pakistani stance on Kashmir since Pakistan is pushing for the right of self-determination for

March 9, 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/9/israel-turkey-relations-herzog-visit-erdogan>.

⁴⁹ Israel and Turkey hail new era in relations, but divisions remain."

⁵⁰ Duncan Randall, "Turkey and Israel: A Relationship Unlikely to be Fully Rekindled," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*. March 3, 2022, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/turkey-and-israel-a-relationship-unlikely-to-be-fully-rekindled/>.

⁵¹ Duncan Randall, "Turkey and Israel."

⁵² Duncan Randall, "Turkey and Israel."

⁵³ Amalendu Misra, "Is the India-Turkey Relationship Headed to Ruin?" *The National Interest*, October 1, 2021, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/india-turkey-relationship-headed-ruin-194660>.

Kashmiris.⁵⁴ Hence, by supporting the rights of Kashmiris and Pakistan's stance, Erdoğan was viewed as a liberator for the Ummah.

Challenges to Strategic Autonomy

Despite various steps undertaken by Turkey to attain strategic autonomy, it is critical to acknowledge the hurdles on this path. Turkey's global rise directly threatens the liberal world order, the dominance of the US, and Saudi Arabia's influence over the Middle East/Muslim world. It is argued that the US supported the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan's government, which reflects the US' concerns about the current neo-Ottomanism employed by Turkey. Turkey's regional dominance directly threatens the dominance of the US in the Middle East. US also considers Turkey as an obstacle in eliminating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Turkey's intervention in Northern Syria directly impacted the Kurds, who were allied with the US to defeat ISIS.

Turkey's stance on Israel and profound strategic relations with Russia and China, will compel the US to take measures to prevent Turkey's rise. For instance, the US imposed sanctions on Turkey after purchasing the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system. According to the US, this system was incompatible with that of NATO technology and hence, threatened the Euro-Atlantic alliance. In reality, the US deemed Turkey-Russian relations a threat to the liberal world order, indicating a potential rise to multipolar world order. Despite these setbacks, Turkey has stayed firm in its quest for strategic autonomy and combating the liberal world order. Yet Turkey's recent shift in domestic politics and receding economy might serve as a potential menace to these aspirations.

Domestic politics has played a critical role in shaping Turkey's foreign policy. Under the rule of Erdogan, Turkey was subject to various shifts in the domestic political landscape that had direct implications for external policies. Hence, the receding support for President Erdogan and

⁵⁴ Amalendu Misra, "Is the India-Turkey Relationship Headed to Ruin?"

his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has yielded similar results. This decline has been a product of a declining economy, corruption allegations, and undemocratic practices.⁵⁵ In retaliation, Erdogan has shifted towards increasingly aggressive foreign policy measures to increase nationalist sentiments and re-establish his strong political base. Military interventions in Syria and Libya are a result of that. Nevertheless, these aspirations can further strain Turkey's relations with the West, limiting its access to the international financial market and entangling the state in protracted military engagement, which can be alarming for an already economically challenged state.

Turkey's economic condition serves as a significant factor influencing its foreign policy. Turkey has been subject to various economic challenges like high inflation, unemployment, weakening currency, implications of earthquakes, and increasing public debt. These factors have directly constrained the state's ability to fund its ambitious policy of strategic autonomy. Addressing these economic challenges requires Turkey to establish good trade relations with the European Union, maintain foreign direct investment, and an effective balance of payments. This implies that despite Turkey's quest for strategic autonomy and close ties with Russia and China, the state cannot alienate the Western powers either.⁵⁶

Conclusion

Turkey's rise and quest for strategic autonomy directly threatens the liberal world order. Turkish foreign policy has embarked upon modifications over the years. Although, after the Cold War, Turkey's NATO membership and aspiration for EU membership demonstrated

⁵⁵Birsan Altayli and Humeyra, "Pollsters See Support for Erdogan's AKP Largely Unscathed Despite Quake," *Reuters*, March 3, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pollsters-see-support-erdogans-akp-largely-unscathed-despite-quake-2023-03-03/>.

⁵⁶ Birsen Altayli and Humeyra, "Pollsters See Support for Erdogan's AKP Largely Unscathed Despite Quake."

signs of Western influence. Currently, Turkey appears to be striving toward a multipolar world order, which is emerging with the rise of China, Russia, and nationalist leaders across the globe. Accordingly, with these shifts and the potential termination of the Treaty of Lausanne in 2023, Turkey has expressed its desire for regional dominance and strategic autonomy.⁵⁷ To this end, Turkey took steps to cooperate with Russia, China and the Global South, as well as pivot away from the EU and the transatlantic alliance. Moreover, Turkey extended its influence over Syria, Libya, and the Black Sea, in addition to aspiring to be the Muslim world's leader. Nevertheless, the path towards strategic autonomy is challenged by the US' influence in the contemporary world order, and Turkey has met with sanctions due to its recent endeavours.⁵⁸ Turkey should aspire to pursue strategic autonomy through diplomacy and pragmatism while maintaining strong economic ties with the West. Without a stable economy, the state cannot support its foreign policy ambitions. Despite all these challenges Erdoğan still remains headstrong regarding Turkey's rise and reviving its lost glory of the Ottoman era.

⁵⁷ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order: strategic autonomy or new forms of dependence?" *International Affairs*, July 5, 2021, <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/97/4/1085/6314232>.

⁵⁸ Mustafa Kutlay, Ziya Öniş, "Turkish foreign policy.

Pakistan-Russia Relations in Changing Geostrategic Environment

Zeeshan Hayat¹

Abstract

Historically, due to Cold War politics, Pakistan and Russia have not enjoyed a long-term constructive relationship. However, changing geostrategic environment, which is marred with great power competition and changing alliances, has created an enabling environment for Pakistan and Russia to bridge the divergences and construct a pathway toward a strategic partnership. Over the last two decades, Pakistan and Russia have significantly improved their relations and cooperated in several areas such as counter-terrorism, Afghanistan, military-to-military engagement, economy and diplomacy. Despite the relationship being nascent, it currently has the potential to develop into a long-term strategic one, if both sides overcome existing challenges through diplomatic efforts, expand current areas of cooperation and find new avenues of bilateral engagement.

Keywords: Great Power Competition, Net Security Provider, Balance Relationship, Security Dilemma, Strategic Partnership, Pakistan, Russia.

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Introduction

Throughout history, the relations between Pakistan and Russia passed through many ups and downs due to Cold War politics and the post-Cold War international environment. Pakistan's tilt towards the US, Afghan jihad and the issue of terrorism hampered the prospects of the two countries getting closer. Despite the uneasiness in bilateral relationship in the past, there were times when both countries cooperated in diverse fields. The establishment of Pakistan's Steel Mill and Guddu Thermal power station in the 70s and 80s with the help of the Soviet Union is a testament to this fact.

Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's former President, visit to Russia in 2003 proved to be the icebreaker in the bilateral relationship.² Though, the relations are still facing difficulties even after 20 years of that visit, but in between these years, both countries have taken many significant steps that brought them closer. These steps include lifting of the ban by Russia on arms sales to Pakistan, Russian support for Islamabad's induction in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a permanent member and the settlement of Soviet-era trade dispute. After lifting the arms embargo, Pakistan purchased four MI-35 attack helicopters and two non-combatant MI-171E helicopters from Moscow.³ In 2015, Pakistan also signed a deal with Russia to import Klimov RD-93 engines for the JF-17 Thunder aircraft.⁴ Most recently, Pakistan received its first shipment of Russian crude oil at a discounted price. PM

² "President Vladimir Putin held negotiations with President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan in Moscow on a three-day visit", President of Russia, last modified Feb 5, 2003, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/28108>

³ Franz-Stefan Gady, "Pakistan Receives 4 Advanced Attack Helicopters From Russia", *The Diplomat*, August 29, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/pakistan-receives-4-advanced-attack-helicopters-from-russia/>

⁴ Franz-Stefan Gady, "Pakistan to Stick With Russian Engine for JF-17 Fighter Jet", *The Diplomat*, November 25, 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/11/pakistan-to-stick-with-russian-engine-for-jf-17-fighter-jet/>

of Pakistan, Shehbaz Sharif, termed it the beginning of a new relationship between the two countries.⁵

In the past decade, Pakistan and Russia have come closer to each other and reduced the trust deficit significantly. Current Moscow-Islamabad relations are developing under the changing geopolitical environment. Russia is looking for new avenues in South Asia under its Look East policy, announced in 2010 as its relations with the US and EU continued to deteriorate.⁶ Meanwhile, Islamabad is seeking new partners to diversify its foreign policy because of geopolitical realignment at the international level. Pakistan is also looking to use its important geostrategic location, magnified significantly by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a crown jewel of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).⁷

The current geostrategic environment is allowing both countries to take this budding relationship forward. Therefore, this paper will give an overview of how the current global environment, in which major countries are engaged in great power competition, is bringing Russia and Pakistan closer. It will also highlight challenges and areas of convergence between the two states and the way forward.

Geostrategic Environment

The current geostrategic environment is marked by great power competition. This competition involves three major powers, US, China

⁵ "Pakistan gets first shipment of Russian crude under the discount deal," *Al-Jazeera*, June 12, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/12/pakistan-gets-first-shipment-of-russian-crude-under-discount-deal#:~:text=Islamabad%20Pakistan%20%E2%80%93%20Pakistan%20has%20received,significant%20benefit%20to%20domestic%20consumers>.

⁶ Najimdeen Bakare, "Contextualizing Russia and South Asia Relations through Putin's Look East Policy," *Journal of Asia and African Studies* 56, no. 3, (May 2021): 676

⁷ Brig (Retd) Feroz Hassan Khan, "Russia–Pakistan Strategic Relations: An Emerging Entente Cordiale," *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, January 15, 2021, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2473361/russiapakistan-strategic-relations-an-emerging-entente-cordiale/>

and Russia. The US feels that its global post-Cold War pre-eminence is being challenged by the rise of China and the renewed Russian desire to find a greater role in global politics. However, unlike Cold War, this time the US feels that its major competitor and challenger is China as compared to Russia. As per the 2022 US National Defence Strategy Fact Sheet, China is a strategic challenger and Russia is an acute threat for the U.S.⁸ Secretary of State, Antony Blinken also believes that China is currently the only country with the entire wherewithal to reshape the rules-based international order constructed after two world wars.⁹

Therefore, to contain China, the US is shaping the strategic environment around Beijing to advance its interest in protecting the Western-constructed international order. To succeed in this objective, the US follows the "invest, align and compete" strategy.¹⁰ This strategy encapsulates strengthening US competitiveness and aligning Washington's efforts with its allies worldwide to compete with China. The main focus of the US in its strategy of competing with China is Indo-Pacific because it believes that China is the region's main threat. According to the 2022 US Indo-Pacific Strategy, China is using all elements of power at its disposal to become the Indo-Pacific and world power.¹¹ The strategy further states that US will focus on the Indo-Pacific region and strengthen its alliance with Australia, Japan, South Korea and India.¹² This strategy has also led to the emergence of new alliances in

⁸ "Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defence Strategy," U.S. Department of Defense, accessed June 26, 2023, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-1/-1/1/NDS-FACT-SHEET.PDF>

⁹ "The Administration's Approach to the People's Republic of China," US Department of State, accessed May 26, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/>

¹⁰ "The Administration's Approach to the People's Republic of China", US Department of State."

¹¹ "Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States," The White House, last modified February 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf>

¹² "Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States," The White House.

the form of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)¹³ and Australia, the United Kingdom, and the US (AUKUS)¹⁴ partnership.

On the other hand, China and Russia are getting closer to countering US encroachment in their areas of strategic interests and moving towards a multi-polar world. Their desire for a multi-polar world order is visible in their official statements. In a recent meeting in March 2023, both Chinese and Russian leaders committed to support the world's multi-polarity.¹⁵ For this, they have been cooperating in several areas such as diplomacy, economy, military, etc. As per the detailed statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, China and Russia have stayed in close communication and coordination in the UN, SCO, BRICS, the G20 and other multilateral forums, and worked together for a multi-polar world and greater democracy in international relations.¹⁶ In 2022, the bilateral trade between the two countries exceeded USD 190 billion; for the last 13 years, China has been the largest trading partner of Russia.¹⁷ Both countries cooperate in energy, aviation, space, scientific and technological innovation, e-commerce, etc.

On AUKUS and QUAD, both countries share similar concerns as well. China believes that QUAD is an exclusive bloc aimed at its containment and AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation constitutes

¹³ Sheila A. Smith, "The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: What to Know," Council on Foreign Relations, May 27, 2021, <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/quad-indo-pacific-what-know>

¹⁴ "Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS," The White House, last modified March 13, 2023, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/13/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus-2/>

¹⁵ "President Xi Jinping Meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin," Chinese Foreign Ministry, last modified March 21, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202303/t20230321_11045496.html

¹⁶ "President Xi Jinping Meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin," Chinese Foreign Ministry.

¹⁷ "Forging Ahead to Open a New Chapter of China-Russia Friendship, Cooperation and Common Development", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, last modified March 20, 2023,

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202303/t20230320_11044359.html

severe nuclear proliferation risks.¹⁸ It delivers a blow to the international non-proliferation regime, exacerbates arms race, and undermines regional peace and stability.¹⁹ Similarly, Russia has criticized QUAD for playing one country against another²⁰ and considered AUKUS a proliferation concern and fuelling tensions in the region.²¹

Even on the Russia-Ukraine war, China has not out rightly criticized Russia and has taken a balanced position. It has called for respecting the sovereignty of all countries, abandoning the Cold War mentality, ceasing hostilities, resuming peace talks and stopping unilateral sanctions.²² Furthermore, China has also offered to play a role in finding a political settlement of the Ukrainian-Russian dispute.²³

For Pakistan, this great power competition is forcing it to re-prioritize its foreign policy options. Pakistan's major concern in this great power competition is India's role as a regional net security provider against China. In 2009, the then US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, at Shangri-La Dialogue argued that US sees India as a net security

¹⁸ "Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Remarks on AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation," Chinese Foreign Ministry, last modified June 8, 2022, http://gb.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/PressandMedia/Spokepersons/202206/t20220608_10699989.htm

¹⁹ "Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Remarks on AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation," Chinese Foreign Ministry.

²⁰ "Russia features in anti-China Quad statement in India", *Dawn*, March 4, 2023, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1740305#:~:text=Russian%20Foreign%20Minister%20Sergey%20Lavrov,of%20the%20East%20Asia%20summits.>

²¹ "Kremlin says AUKUS submarine deal raises proliferation questions", *Reuters*, March 14, 2023, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-says-aukus-submarine-deal-raises-proliferation-questions-2023-03-14/>

²² "China's Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis", Chinese Foreign Ministry, last modified February 24, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html

²³ Alexander Smith, "China's Xi has first talks with Ukraine's Zelenskyy since Russia's invasion", *NBC News*, April 26, 2023, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-xi-talks-ukraine-zelenskyy-phone-russia-invasion-rcna81523>

provider in the Indian Ocean and beyond.²⁴ India was selected as the US Major Defence Partner in 2016 and later on in 2018, was given Strategic Trade Authorization tier 1 status.²⁵ This opened the gates for India to access a wide range of military and dual-use technologies regulated by US Department of Commerce.²⁶ Furthermore, the Indo-US security cooperation has resulted in four foundational agreements such as “Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI)”, “Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)”, “Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA)” and “Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA)”.²⁷ These agreements will enhance India’s military situational awareness, preparedness and ability to plan precision strikes, creating a security dilemma for Pakistan.

India, in all this situation, is playing smartly. On the one hand, it is gaining favours from the US and other Western countries under the cover of becoming a net security provider. On the other hand, it is utilizing its strategic partnership with Russia to buy oil at a discounted price. India is also a part of BRICS, which includes China and Russia. Therefore, keeping this in mind, Pakistan must also operate smartly and diversify its relations by looking toward other major world powers, such as China and Russia, in this volatile geopolitical environment.

With China, Pakistan enjoys a strategic partnership, which is time-tested and spread in different domains from economy to military.

²⁴ Anit Mukherjee, “India as a Net Security Provider, Concept and Impediments”, Policy Brief, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, accessed May 12, 2023, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/PB_140903_India-Net-Security.pdf

²⁵ Fact Sheet, “U.S. Security Cooperation with India,” U.S. Department of State, last modified January 20, 2021, [https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-india/#:~:text=U.S.%20India%20defense%20trade%20cooperation,\(ISA\)%20now%20in%20place.](https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-india/#:~:text=U.S.%20India%20defense%20trade%20cooperation,(ISA)%20now%20in%20place.)

²⁶ Fact Sheet, “U.S. Security Cooperation with India,” U.S. Department of State.

²⁷ Samran Ali, “Indo-US Foundational Agreements: Contributing to India’s Military Capabilities,” *Centre For Strategic And Contemporary Research* 18 (December, 2020): 1-6, <https://cscr.pk/pdf/perspectives/Indo-US-Foundational-Agreements-Contributing-to-India%E2%80%99s-Military-Capabilities.pdf>

While Islamabad's relations with Russia are improving and the recent bonhomie is a direct result of an emerging geopolitical tussle among major powers. Pakistan is facing difficulties in engaging with Russia because of US sanctions. When Pakistan-Russia signed an agreement to construct the North-South gas pipeline project known as Pak Stream Gas Pipeline Project, RT Global was nominated by the Russian side to complete the project. However, soon after the nomination, US imposed sanctions against RT Global in 2016, which halted the project.²⁸ In addition to that, there are some other challenges as well that may hinder the growth of this bilateral relationship.

Challenges

The India Factor. India is an important country for Russia. Both countries enjoyed good relations during the Cold War and India remained an important market for selling Russian military equipment. Though India is looking to diversify its military imports, Russia is still a top exporter of military equipment to New Delhi.²⁹ Furthermore, Russia is also supportive of India's membership of NSG and have time and again stated its readiness to facilitate the positive decision of the group in this matter.³⁰ The recent Russia-Ukraine crisis has led to stringent economic sanctions on Russia from the West. India, though is part of US led alliances but it is still buying oil from Russia despite Western sanctions on Moscow.³¹

²⁸ Zafar Bhutta, "Govt considers reviving Pakistan-Russia gas pipeline project", *Express Tribune*, February 2, 2023, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2398903/govt-considers-reviving-pakistan-russia-gas-pipeline-project>

²⁹ Devjyot Ghoshal and Aftab Ahmed, "India, world's biggest buyer of Russian arms, look to diversify suppliers," *Reuters*, May 18, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-worlds-biggest-buyer-russian-arms-looks-diversify-suppliers-2022-05-18/>

³⁰ "Joint statement on the visit of President of the Russian Federation to India for 15th Annual India-Russia Summit," Press Information Bureau, India, last modified December 11, 2014, <https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=113125>

³¹ "India's Russian oil imports jump 50 times; now accounts for 10% of all import: Official," *The Economic Times*, Jun 23, 2022, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/indias-russian-oil-imports-jump-50-times-now-accounts-for-10-of-all-import-official/articleshow/92417120.cms>

Given the nature of Pakistan – India relationship, India would not accept Russia and Pakistan developing their relations. This may limit bilateral Russian-Pakistani cooperation. There is a positive public perception of India in Russia. Many Russian tourists visit India and get inspired by its traditional heritage and soft power. As a result, the Russian public support pro-Indian positions when choosing between India and Pakistan.³²

The US Factor. The relationship between the US and Russia remained volatile even after the Cold War. President Putin, ever since coming into power, has focused on regaining the lost great power status of the Russian Federation. This has put these two countries at odds with each other. In this situation, countries like Pakistan are caught between the two giants. During Cold War, Pakistan sided with the US, which made Pakistan a close ally of the US. The current geopolitical changes at the international level have forced Pakistan to diversify its relationship, including improving ties with Russia. Considering the current state of US Russia relations, Washington will not let any country get closer to Russia, especially when it is an important country like Pakistan. Therefore, under the current geopolitical situation and considering US historical rivalry with Russia, Pakistan will be under a lot of pressure from the West, particularly from the US, to avoid getting closer to Russia. Overcoming this pressure, considering that US is the biggest export market for Pakistan will be a challenge.³³

People-to-People Contact. There has been less people-to-people contact between Russia and Pakistan. Pakistan's alignment with the US during the Cold War left a lasting impression on common citizens and officials of Russian Federation and created a lack of trust between the citizens of the two countries. Not many Russians and Pakistanis know

³² Oleg Barabanov, "Russia and the Search for Balance Between India and Pakistan", *Valdai Discussion Club*, 4 Mar 2019, <https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/russia-india-pakistan/>

³³ "US remains top destination of Pak exports with 43pc growth: Dawood," *Daily Times*, Jan 5 2022, <https://dailytimes.com.pk/863977/us-remains-top-destination-of-pak-exports-with-43pc-growth-dawood/>

each other's language. This language barrier also limits cultural exchanges, which reduces the possibilities for people from both countries to learn and appreciate each other's cultures. There are few scholarship opportunities available in the education sector in Russia for Pakistani students compared to Europe or the US, which also limits the interaction between the students of the two countries. Despite recent efforts to increase bilateral trade, the trade volume between the two countries is relatively small. Thus, improving the bilateral relationship will remain a challenge with this state of people-to-people contact.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict. Pakistan has enjoyed good relations with Ukraine since the 1990s that included arms trade. Now after the Russia-Ukrainian conflict, Pakistan is facing a serious dilemma. On one side, Pakistan is eager to develop its relationship with Russia, while on the other hand, it wants to maintain U.S. support. The U.S. urged countries to support sanctions on Russia³⁴ and warns of consequences if any state tries to evade these.³⁵ Pakistan also came under similar pressure when 22 Western diplomats stationed in Pakistan signed a statement urging Pakistan to "denounce Russia's invasion on Ukraine and back international calls for Moscow to immediately stop the war".³⁶ It seems that Pakistan is caught in a diplomatic uncertainty that is hampering Pakistan to make a dedicated stride toward Russia in terms of improving political and economic relations, hence affecting the bilateral relationship.

The current Russia-Ukraine crisis has divided the world, and many Western countries openly criticize Russia for its action against

³⁴ Jack Detsch and Robbie Gramer, "Biden Enlists Asian Partners for Unprecedented Russia Sanctions Plans," *Foreign Policy*, Feb 22, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/22/biden-russia-ukraine-sanctions-asia-allies-export-controls-invasion-plans/>

³⁵ "Ukraine crisis: US warns China against helping Russia," *BBC News*, Mar 14 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-60732486>

³⁶ "Western-Led Pressure Grows on Pakistan to Condemn Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," *Voice of America*, Mar 1, 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/western-led-pressure-grows-on-pakistan-to-condemn-russia-s-invasion-of-ukraine/6465104.html>

Ukraine. On the contrary, Pakistan has taken a balanced approach and called for an “immediate ending of hostilities and stressed the need for diplomacy and dialogue for an early, negotiated end to the Ukraine conflict.”³⁷ This shows importance of Russia in Pakistan’s foreign policy priorities.

Areas of Cooperation

Counter-terrorism and peace and stability in Afghanistan are currently the two main areas of cooperation between Pakistan and Russia that can drive this relationship forward. Under the counter-terrorism domain, both countries regularly conduct bilateral military exercises, commonly known as Druzhba (friendship), since 2016. The latest of this bilateral exercise was held in Russia in October 2021.³⁸ This exercise focused on counter-terrorism, adopting best practices in this domain.³⁹ Pakistan and Russia, both permanent members of SCO, have also been participating in multilateral counter-terrorism exercises under the SCO banner.⁴⁰

US withdrawal from Afghanistan and takeover by the Taliban have made the situation uncertain for Russia. Their major concerns regarding Afghanistan are the “spill-over of terrorism” and “drug trafficking” to the Central Asian States that can ultimately affect Russian security. Pakistan, which shares a long border with Afghanistan, has similar concerns and has stated many times that peace and stability in Pakistan is dependent on stability in Afghanistan. Therefore peace and

³⁷ “Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Hina Rabbani Khar, participated in High-Level International Donor's Conference for Ukraine,” MoFA Pakistan, May 6, 2022, <https://mofa.gov.pk/mos-khar-participated-in-high-level-international-donors-conference-for-ukraine/>

³⁸ “Pak-Russia joint military exercise Druzhba-VI concludes,” *Express Tribune*, October 9, 2021, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2324042/pak-russia-joint-military-exercise-druzhba-vi-concludes>.

³⁹ “Pak-Russia joint military exercise Druzhba-VI concludes.

⁴⁰ “Pakistan Army participates in ‘Peace Mission’ joint exercise in Russia,” *Express Tribune*, September 22, 2021, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2321393/pakistan-army-participates-in-peace-mission-joint-exercise-in-russia>.

stability in Afghanistan is a common ground for interactions between Pakistan and Russia. The latest meeting on Afghanistan between the two countries was held in April 2023, on the side line of “4th Neighbouring Countries of Afghanistan Meeting”.⁴¹ During this interaction, both countries emphasized on the importance of consultation on the promotion of shared objective of making Afghanistan a peaceful, stable and sovereign state.⁴²

Islamabad and Moscow also hold regular talks under the banner of the "Pakistan-Russia Consultative Group on Strategic Stability," established in 2002.⁴³ The 13th meeting of this group was held in Islamabad in March 2019, in which, issues such as, "non-militarization of outer space, upholding bilateral and multilateral treaties, and developments in the field of information and telecommunication in the context of international security" were discussed.⁴⁴ Both states shared unanimity of views on all matters that came under discussion. On 22 May 2019, Pakistan and Russia in a joint statement, pledged "No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space."⁴⁵ Complementing the agreed position regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Pakistan

⁴¹ "Pakistan, Russia to work closely for promoting the shared objective of peaceful Afghanistan," Radio Pakistan, last modified April 13, 2023, <https://www.radio.gov.pk/13-04-2023/hina-khar-sergey-lavrov-exchange-views-on-entire-spectrum-of-bilateral-regional-global-issues#:~:text=Pakistan%2C%20Russia%20to%20work%20closely%20for%20promoting%20shared%20objective%20of%20peaceful%20Afghanistan&text=Pakistan%20and%20Russia%20have%20agreed,stable%2C%20sovereign%20and%20prosperous%20Afghanistan..>

⁴² "Pakistan, Russia to work closely for promoting the shared objective of peaceful Afghanistan," Radio Pakistan.

⁴³ Muhammad Hanif, "Pakistan-Russia Relations: Progress. Prospect and Constrains," *IPRI Journal* 13, no.2 (2013):71

⁴⁴ "Meeting of Pakistan- Russia Consultative Group on Strategic Stability," MoFA Pakistan, last modified March 28, 2021, <https://mofa.gov.pk/meeting-of-pakistan-russia-consultative-group-on-strategic-stability/>

⁴⁵ "Pakistan and Russia sign Joint Statement on No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space," MoFA Pakistan, last modified May 22, 2019, <https://mofa.gov.pk/pakistan-and-russia-sign-joint-statement-on-no-first-placement-of-weapons-in-outer-space/>

and Russia are working collectively towards this end at various international forums.

On the economic front, both countries have shown interest in increasing bilateral trade, which currently stands at \$730 million.⁴⁶ The settlement of Soviet-era trade disputes in 2019 was perhaps the clearest signal of mutual commitment to deepen economic ties.⁴⁷ Pakistan paid \$93.5 million to Russia, clearing the path for a fresh start of economic engagement.⁴⁸ Pakistan's major exports to Russia include "cotton, textiles, leather, synthetic fabrics, rice, fruits, surgical and sports goods", while Russia's exports to Pakistan are "fertilizers, chemical elements and compounds, rubber, tyres and tubes, paper and paper board, iron and steel (raw and manufactured products) and machinery".⁴⁹

In 2020, after the "Russia-Pakistan Technical Committee" meeting, both countries renewed the discussion on North-South Gas Pipeline Project. The project was initially signed in 2015 but did not make any progress because of Western sanctions on Russian companies. However, the project has been renamed as the Pak Stream Gas Pipeline Project (PSGP) and scheduled to be completed in 2023.⁵⁰ The 1,100 kilometres pipeline will transport liquefied natural gas (LNG) from terminals in Karachi and Gwadar to Lahore.⁵¹ On 20 January 2023, both

⁴⁶ "Pakistan Ambassador to Russia, Shafqat Ali Khan, speaking at a webinar "Russia-Pakistan Cooperation: Regional Interests and Global Context," Strategic Vision Institute, Mar 29, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4gBGuRH2qzY>

⁴⁷ "Pakistan settles Soviet-era trade dispute with Russia," *Express Tribune*, Nov 7, 2019, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2095099/pakistan-settles-decades-old-trade-dispute-russia>

⁴⁸ "Pakistan settles Soviet-era trade dispute with Russia."

⁴⁹ "Pakistan-Russia Relations," Embassy of Pakistan, Moscow, accessed on Jul 14, 2022, <http://parepmoscow.com/en/pakistan-russia-relations/>

⁵⁰ Claudia Chia and Zheng Haiqi, "Russia-Pakistan Economic Relations: Energy Partnership and the China Factor," ISAS Working Paper, last modified Oct 6, 2021, https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/russia-pakistan-economic-relations-energy-partnership-and-the-china-factor/#_ftn1

⁵¹ "Pakistan, Russia sign pact for 1,100-km gas pipeline from Karachi to Lahore," *Business Standard*, 16 Jul 2021, <https://www.business->

sides agreed to work on a “Comprehensive Plan for Energy Cooperation and agreed to consider Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline Project as a comprehensive infrastructure under energy cooperation”.⁵²

Though this cooperation is encouraging but it has the potential to grow further. Russia is a world leader in natural gas exports and the second-largest oil exporter.⁵³ While on the other hand, Pakistan is facing an energy crisis. Pakistan has a gas shortfall of “1.5 billion cubic feet per day, expected to double by 2025”.⁵⁴ Therefore, Pakistan can overcome its energy crisis by importing gas/oil from Russia on low cost.

Way Forward

Interestingly, both sides have strong political will to take this nascent relationship forward. Pakistan needs to strike a balance in its relationship with Russia and the West. Pakistan, just like India, should confidently put its case in front of the world that Pakistan's cooperation with Russia is in the interest of its people as they are facing economic and energy difficulties. Pakistan is not looking to become part of any grouping and is interested in forming relations with all countries under a win-win approach instead of a zero-sum game. Furthermore, its relations with one country will not come at the cost of another. Russia should also consider striking a balance between its relations with India and Pakistan. Any economic cooperation between India and Russia is a non-issue for Pakistan, but military cooperation can create a security dilemma for

standard.com/article/international/pakistan-russia-sign-pact-for-1-100-km-gas-pipeline-from-karachi-to-lahore-121071600905_1.html

⁵² “Joint Statement of the 8th Session of Pakistan-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Islamabad: January 20, 2023,” Press Information Department, accessed May 29, 2023. http://pid.gov.pk/site/press_detail/21886

⁵³ “Energy Fact Sheet: Why does Russian oil and gas matter?,” International Energy Agency, last modified March 21, 2022, <https://www.iea.org/articles/energy-fact-sheet-why-does-russian-oil-and-gas-matter>

⁵⁴ Muhammad Athar Javed, “Growing Pakistan-Russia Relations: Future of Economic & Strategic Cooperation,” Valdai Discussion club, last modified Feb 23, 2022, <https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/growing-pakistan-russia-relations-future/>

Pakistan. In its engagement with Russian officials, Pakistan should sensitize them about Pakistan's security concerns emanating from India-Russia military cooperation. It is also in the interest of Russia to have a balanced relationship with both India and Pakistan because Russia is looking 'East' and for that, both Pakistan and India are important countries, which are also SCO members and none can be ignored.

There is a great potential to increase economic cooperation between the two countries as European countries are looking to reduce their dependence on Russian energy supplies after the Ukraine crisis and Moscow is looking East amid Western sanctions. While India and China are making the most of new discounted oil prices from Russia, Pakistan is a bit behind on this initiative. Though the first shipment of discounted Russian oil has arrived in Pakistan, it should be made a permanent feature of Pakistan-Russia relations, considering the impending energy crisis in Pakistan. This will create confidence in Moscow that Pakistan is willing to go an extra mile in its relations with Russia despite international pressure.

Furthermore, both countries should work together to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan because its location can act as a bridge between Central and South Asia. This will help Pakistan and Russia towards achieving the full potential of economic cooperation. There are several areas where both countries can cooperate, such as "trade and investment, energy, communication and transport, higher education, industry, improving rail and road infrastructure, finance and banking sector, customs, agriculture, science and technology, and information technology."⁵⁵ A peaceful Afghanistan can provide safe and secure transit and trade routes between Russia and Pakistan. The road and infrastructure development in Afghanistan would facilitate the movement of goods and services, leading to increased bilateral trade. Furthermore, Afghanistan's

⁵⁵ "Joint Statement of the 8th Session of Pakistan-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Islamabad: January 20, 2023," Press Information Department.

stability can create a favourable environment for Russia and Pakistan to explore the country's energy resources together. This will benefit all three countries, including Afghanistan as well.

Currently, the defence cooperation between Pakistan and Russia remains mostly concentrated in the anti-terrorism domain. However, the situation in Afghanistan is providing a ground for two militaries to engage further. The intelligence agencies of both countries can coordinate and cooperate by sharing important information, which will help in pre-empting any terrorist threat. This will create trust between the two militaries and help overcome past disenchantment.

It is interesting to note that China-Russia-Pakistan's interests align in this contemporary environment, where all three favour a multi-polar world order. Furthermore, the world is witnessing the emergence of new partnerships and alliances in the form of QUAD and AUKUS. These alliances will give countries like India and Australia a greater role in the region. However, these alliances could have serious security implications for China, Russia and Pakistan. For Pakistan, the presence of India in QUAD could threaten its security interests in the region. India could use its presence in the QUAD to increase its military build-up and use AUKUS as a template to gain similar favours from the US and UK under the banner of countering China. This would create a serious security dilemma for Pakistan, increasing military competition and regional instability. For China, the emergence of QUAD and AUKUS is a direct threat to its strategic interest and Russia has also stated that U.S and its allies are creating blocs such as QUAD and AUKUS based on anti-Russian and anti-Chinese principles.⁵⁶

Therefore, the emergence of such blocs gives China, Russia and Pakistan an opportunity to explore options that may safeguard their

⁵⁶ Anirban Bhaumik, "Russia slams Quad after India defends it", *Deccan Herald*, Aug 22, 2022, <https://www.deccanherald.com/international/world-news-politics/russia-slams-quad-after-india-defends-it-1138147.html>

interests. This potential trilateral partnership can allow Pakistan and Russia to come closer and discuss the security implications of QUAD and AUKUS and move forward in a bilateral relationship.

In addition, China, Russia, and Pakistan share concerns about regional stability, particularly in Afghanistan. They have held trilateral meetings and consultations to discuss peace efforts, support political reconciliation, and promote stability in Afghanistan. The three countries have collaborated in hosting talks and negotiations between Afghan parties to resolve the conflict peacefully.

Furthermore, Russia and China have shown interest in connecting BRI with Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and for that Afghanistan's stability is crucial. If this happens, it will connect two important regions of the world. Pakistan can also benefit from this as CPEC is a flagship project of BRI and through CPEC, Islamabad can play the role of bridge between China and Russia. Connecting the BRI and the EAEU can create a trade and transportation network, facilitating trade among Pakistan, China, Russia, and other countries in the region. The EAEU consists of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan; therefore, by connecting with the EAEU, Pakistan can enter into this market. It would also provide opportunities for Pakistan to expand and increase its export volumes in the EAEU member states. This will further strengthen the relationship between Islamabad and Moscow.

There is also a need to create a positive image in the public opinion of both countries by conducting purposeful interactions. Academics, students and policymakers should hear each other and discuss historical and contemporary problems to overcome them. People from both countries should be encouraged to learn each other's language and incentives should be given through scholarships to students and young professionals. This will increase people-to-people contact and may lead to cultural exchanges between the two countries, reducing the trust deficit and improving bilateral relationships.

Conclusion

Historically, Pakistan and Russia did not enjoy a healthy relationship. Still, the current geostrategic environment, marred with great power competition and changing alliances, is giving both countries a new opportunity to bury their past and start a new chapter. At the moment, the bilateral relations are moving in the right direction and there is also a political will and desire on both sides to convert this nascent relationship into a strategic one, but it will take some time. Despite many convergences, some challenges must be addressed to take the relationship in the right direction. There is a need to adopt a proactive foreign policy from both sides, free from any external factor and truly aimed at improving the relationship. This thinking will greatly help take the current trajectory of Pakistan-Russia relations toward new heights.

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BOOK REVIEWS

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The Difficult Politics of Peace: Rivalry in Modern South Asian

Christopher Clary, ISBN: 978-0197638415: (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022, 336 pages)

Reviewed by: Mustansar Siam¹

"The Difficult Politics of Peace: Rivalry in Modern South Asia" by Christopher Clary is a nuanced and thought-provoking analysis of the complex dynamics of rivalry and conflict in South Asia. Clary introduces the "Leader Primacy Theory" - a fascinating explanation of how Indian and Pakistani leaders navigate their domestic political landscapes to pursue peace-building initiatives. By analysing the complex interplay between leadership decisions and political circumstances, Clary sheds light on the factors that shape the two nations' approaches to conflict resolution. The author contends that leaders who aspire to end interstate conflict and rivalry must initially solidify and consolidate their control over foreign policy. If the leaders don't have reasonable control over foreign policy, veto players and other external factors can stop them from making important decisions or coming up with peaceful solutions. These players may try to make things worse instead of better. This can make it harder for countries to get along and could lead to more conflict. The author argues that enduring rivalry between two states ultimately creates a trust deficit among its officials and the public at large.

Clary's book is organized chronologically and consists of eight chapters. In chapter one of the book, the author introduces his theoretical framework, which centres on leader primacy. He argues that rigid structures of foreign policy authority can impede progress toward peace and lead to a lack of trust between nations. The chapter outlines the cycle of peace-building and war-making and explains how effective leadership is essential to break the cycle and promote diplomatic solutions. The

¹ Mustansar Siam is an MPhil scholar at the Department of Political Science, Government College University, Lahore.

author also compares his leader primacy theory with other theoretical approaches to conflict resolution, highlighting its unique contributions to the field. Overall, this chapter sets the stage for the rest of the book by providing a comprehensive overview of the author's theoretical assumptions and key arguments.

Chapters 2 and 3 delve into the early stages of the Kashmir conflict, examining the root causes behind this enduring rivalry. The violence and turmoil of the partition and the inability to reach a consensus regarding the fate of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir engendered animosity between India and Pakistan from the outset. This hostility was further fuelled by subsequent events, including the 1948 war. In the post-war period, both states regarded each other as military adversaries, resulting in heightened tensions. The Regional Security Complex theory also provides insight into this traditional hostility, wherein two states are compelled to act according to their security concerns, primarily driven by their immediate surroundings. The author employs the Leader Primacy Theory to elucidate the shifting interstate behaviours of these antagonistic states. Furthermore, the author examines significant political events that transpired between 1948 and 1954, including the reconciliatory efforts led by Jawaharlal Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan. While these negotiations succeeded in averting a further war during that time, they failed to bring a viable resolution to the Kashmir conflict, despite the involvement of the global community.

In chapter 4 of his book, *'Nehru Ayub and the Indus Water Treaty,'* Clary explores the significant political events between 1955 and 1960. During this period, President Ayub initiated peace talks with India to resolve complex issues between the two countries. This move by President Ayub raises an important question. If the Pakistani military was inherently committed to the conflict with India, General Ayub would not have engaged in peace initiatives to solve the intricate matters during that particular period. The efforts of Ayub and Nehru resulted in the historic Indus Water Treaty in 1960, which involved the World Bank. This

progress is particularly puzzling because it challenges the assumptions about the supposed genetic antagonism of the Pakistan army towards India and offers an alternative explanation for their behavior. Clary's analysis sheds light on the complex political dynamics that led to this historic treaty and encouraged a nuanced understanding of the region's history. In addition, he highlights the change in leadership style and its effects on the political landscape.

The 5th chapter of the book, '*The Rise of Bhutto, Sino-Indian Conflict, and the Second Kashmir War*', examines the ill-fated attempts at peace-building in South Asia during the 1960s. The author also delves into the ascension of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to power, his leadership style, and its impact on Pakistan's foreign and security policy. The author argues that Pakistan's efforts to gain control of Kashmir from India resulted in the 1965 war. Furthermore, the Sino-Indian conflict significantly impacted the regional security dynamics. The political events during the early and mid-1960s culminated in the incomplete peace agreement at Tashkent, which failed to achieve the desired results. The chapter provides valuable insights into South Asia's complex historical and political context during this period. It underscores the challenges and obstacles to achieving lasting peace in the region and the influential role of key figures such as Bhutto.

In chapter 6 of his book, '*Dhaka, Simla and an Incomplete Peace*,' Clary continues to shed light on changing the political dynamics and role of Bhutto in the East Pakistan crisis and the 1971 war. The author argues that Pakistan's will to protect its Eastern territory inevitably crumbled on the eve of 16th December 1971. As a result, India entered the crisis, leading to the Indo-Pakistan war. Furthermore, Clary disputes claims of Pakistan's Army's involvement in the ethnic cleansing of Hindus in East Pakistan, as there is no significant evidence of such allegations. The author's argument about the Pakistan Army's involvement in ethnic cleansing challenges conventional narratives and sheds new light on the conflict. After the secession of East Pakistan, leadership dynamics in

Pakistan underwent a significant change. The author uses his Leader Primacy Theory to evaluate civilian rule in Pakistan under Bhutto's leadership. Despite the 1971 trauma and the associated pitfalls, Bhutto made efforts to engage in peace with India. He collaborated with his Indian counterparts to take peace-building measures, which may have contributed to his downfall via a military coup and execution. This chapter's meticulous analysis and interpretation of events enable the reader to gain a deeper understanding of the intricate dynamics that shaped the region during this period.

The 7th chapter of the book, '*Dictatorship, Democracy and the Bomb in South Asia*', delves into the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s. The author provides an analysis of the leadership and characteristics of Zia ul Haq and Indira Gandhi, evaluating their impacts on the enduring rivalry and nuclearization in the region. Despite various peace-building measures, the desired results were not achieved, primarily due to the lack of strategic incentives. The US' aid to Pakistan, owing to its support in Afghanistan, diminished the need for Pakistani strategic introspection. The events taking place in Afghanistan also impacted South Asia's regional security dynamics. After India's 1974 nuclear tests, the Kashmir issue became a flashpoint between the two major powers. Pakistan's aspirations to become a nuclear state were accelerated after India's tests in 1974. The subsequent governments of Pakistan and India failed to build trust and improve peace-building measures after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, resulting in a severe crisis in the 1990s and a limited war between the two nations in 1999. In 1998, Pakistan proposed a Strategic Restraint Regime (SRR) for tenacious peace in the region. Overall, the Kashmir conflict remained dominant in defining political discourses in South Asia during the 1980s and 1990s. Despite various efforts, the conflict persisted, and tensions between the two nations remained high.

In the final section of the book, the author offers an in-depth analysis of the peace-building efforts and significant political events that

occurred during the reign of military dictator Pervez Musharraf and Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The author thoroughly examined the Indian BJP's role and the leadership of Manmohan Singh in implementing peace-building measures and their implications on the rivalry between India and Pakistan. Musharraf's loss of authority ended the decade without any significant peace initiatives. The author concludes the book with a nuanced discussion of his arguments untangling the implications of his theoretical approach to interstate rivalries. However, the author overlooks some critical events that have occurred, such as the abrogation of Article 370 and 35A in August 2019 by the BJP government, which had significant security and geo-strategic implications for South Asia and, in particular, Kashmir. The author also fails to mention the human dimension of the rivalry, which has a profound impact on the global community.

Overall, *"The Difficult Politics of Peace: Rivalry in Modern South Asia"* is a captivating and thought-provoking analysis that provides insights into the interstate rivalries in the region, particularly between India and Pakistan. Clary Christopher's use of the "Leader Primacy Theory" as a theoretical framework makes this book an academically enriching read and a valuable contribution towards understanding the Indo-Pakistani relationship and reconciliation measures under different governments. This book is a must-read for anyone who wants to gain a deeper understanding of the complicated political and security issues in South Asia, including policymakers, scholars, and anyone curious about the region. Its detailed and balanced approach to the complexities of the region's politics and security makes it an essential addition to any literature on South Asian politics.

The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War

Mark Galeotti, ISBN: 9780300253443: (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2022, 256 pages)

Reviewed by: Amber Afreen Abid

The book provides an engaging guide to the various ways in which the wars could be waged, and how to adapt to this new reality. Mark Galeotti, an expert on all things Russian, from history to security issues, explores and formulates big ideas precisely yet powerfully with conviction and provocation. He has used numerous examples of wars and conflicts to illustrate his ideas. He started off with the history, alluding fleetingly to the renaissance of Italy to discussing modern warfare in terms of social media and the interconnectedness of societies, and how they have opened new avenues for manipulation of every aspect of everyday life and abetting in warfare.

In this book, Galeotti has discussed modern warfare and has suggested that non-military conflicts, whether in the form of structured crime, law, business, culture, technology and politics are becoming the ‘new normal’ now. He went on to discuss that it is becoming so normal that we are not realising that we are engaged in a conflict, as we have accepted a certain level of conflict happening around as routine business. Many things are weaponised today including cultural, business relationships, law, crime, and information- each of which is a subject of a chapter in this book, outlining a vast range of non-kinetic tools.

The world today is more complex and interconnected. The interdependence, which once stopped the war, is now becoming the new battlefield. Wars are being fought with non-military means like subversion and sanctions. The author describes it as ‘we live in a world of permanent low-level conflict, often unnoticed, undeclared and unending - one in which our allies may be our competitors.’(p.5) However, for understanding the present and future scenarios, the author terms the study of the history of war to be essential, but in the book he just brushes through the history and slips through the significant details that need elaboration. Galeotti has not provided a comprehensive

overview of ‘everything’ and has remained selective. Questions like weaponisation for what reason, or against whom have not been responded.

To what extent everything could be weaponised? The author states that ‘if all things are weaponisable, some are more weaponisable than others.’ (p.5) Galeotti describes the ‘more weaponisable’ instruments as the weapons that have been strategically used to wage war in history. However, defining a new way of war, one has to gauge how much one strategy or mechanism can be termed more weaponisable in terms of measurement, threshold, or definition over the other.

The author discussed that social media has become a catalyst or an accelerator for movements, causes and events, ‘hashtags, memes and selfies have become weapons of new narrative wars in their own right, and have proliferated as much as the ubiquitous AK-47 rifle’ (p.32). The conflicts today are fought through outsourcing, and exploiting journalists and scholars through print and social media; and many of them are for hire to spread disinformation and propaganda against the adversary. (p.59) The author has aptly discussed this issue, as demonstrated in the example of Indian Chronicles¹, uncovered by EU DisinfoLab. India actively engaged in such kind of propaganda, used fake websites and NGOs to spread disinformation to damage Pakistan’s image.

Galeotti discusses Russia’s use of information warfare, quoting General Valery Gerasimov’s writing to the effect that ‘the role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness’ (p. 167). While the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a military conflict encompassing all types of weapons. Thus, it is not an example of the ‘new way of war’, with a new approach to tactics and strategies of power. This is like the debate of pen verses sword, as to which is mightier,

¹ ‘Indian Chronicles: Deep dive into a 15-year operation targeting the EU and UN to serve Indian interests’, EU DisinfoLab, accessed June 17, 2023, <https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/indian-chronicles-deep-dive-into-a-15-year-operation-targeting-the-eu-and-un-to-serve-indian-interests/>

and in most of the circumstances the adversary with superior weapons, tactics, and resources succeeds.

In an earlier chapter, Galeotti wonders aloud whether conventional inter-state warfare itself may become ‘de-weaponised’. He makes the case that the high costs of actual fighting often led states to pull back from direct clashes, preferring ‘bluff and bluster’, and the ‘theatrical’ uses of demonstrative force at the inter-state level, as seen in occasional India–Pakistan clashes (p. 40). The thought of wielding anything short of military weapons in an offensive manner is not well adopted in South Asia. The author has mentioned the 2019 crisis in this case, experts believe that India failed to strike any significant target inside Pakistan, though it was a provocative and aggressive action by India, an irresponsible Indian behaviour. Had it caused casualties and damage, the repercussions could have been stringent, and the conflict could have escalated.

Galeotti mentions that ‘the Soviet leaders certainly considered ‘peace only as a breathing space’ in their geopolitical struggle with the West, but failed in their study of war to see how it was changing’ (p. 224). However, in the case of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, hard power is certainly playing its role. It is crucial to recognize that hard power remains an essential element in warfare. The ability to project military force, deter adversaries, and protect national interest is still critical. Non-kinetic strategies are additional tools that can be employed to complement hard power approaches and potentially provide a tactical advantage in certain situations. Successful modern warfare strategies often involve a combination of military and non-military means such as economic sanctions, cyber warfare, and diplomacy, to achieve the goals tailored to the specific context and objectives of the conflict.

‘The Weaponisation of Everything’ serves as a valuable guide to readers, however, the endnotes are missing, instead, Galeotti includes a section titled ‘Want to Know More?’ containing a short list of topical readings. The book, nevertheless, is recommended for understanding various tactics and strategies to be employed in warfare. It is a must-read for anyone interested in the changing nature of warfare and its implications on global security.

Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is pleased to announce the publication of January-June (Vol. IX, No. 1) of its Bi annual Journal: Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses (JSSA). It is a peer-reviewed journal focusing on contemporary issues of peace, security and strategic studies.

Research papers are solicited for publication in the JSSA. The papers should be research based academic policy analysis. No lengthy historical backgrounds are needed because our target audience is informed academic, diplomatic and policy-making community. We welcome papers under the following categories, with ballpark figures for word limits:

- o Research Papers/Articles (4000-6000 words including footnotes)
- o Book Reviews (1000-2000 words including footnotes)

Papers/Articles must conform to the following guidelines:

- 1 The papers should be sent at ojs.thesvi.org
- 2 Each Article must be accompanied by an abstract of not more than 250 words. The abstract must be in a separate word document.
- 3 Please provide Author details with your paper, including qualifications and institutional affiliations. These details are to be provided in the first footnote of the paper.
- 4 For Book Reviews, please describe the subject of the review clearly, including the author, title, publisher, year and pages of the book.
- 5 All work must be original. By submitting any work, the author is presumed to declare that the article is original and has not been published elsewhere.
- 6 All articles must be submitted only in MS Word format (.doc or .docx extensions).
- 7 No border cover pages or title pages are required. Please mention the title of the submission once in the beginning of the piece, followed by the author's name.
- 8 United Kingdom English spellings should be used.
- 9 References must be footnoted according to Chicago manual 17th edition. Please follow the link:
http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html.
All references must be cited in simple text. No formatting is required for the citations.
- 10 Submission are promptly acknowledged. The decision on publication will take approximately 4-6 weeks after the receipt date.
- 11 For the detailed submission guidelines please visit the website www.jssa.thesvi.org

JSSA is currently open for papers on: peace, security and strategic studies, nuclear deterrence, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and security, strategic stability, doctrines, terrorism/counter terrorism, internal and external security, international security, geopolitical issues, peace and conflict studies, human security and energy security.

Submissions not based on guidelines for contributors will not be acceptable.

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

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SVI aims to project strategic foresight on issues of national and international importance through dispassionate, impartial and independent research, analyses and studies. The current spotlight of the SVI is on national security, regional and international peace and stability, strategic studies, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, strategic stability, nuclear safety and security, and energy studies.



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