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SVI FORESIGHT

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MAY 2022

Compiled:

Ghulam Mujtaba Haider

Edited by:

Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai

Strategic Vision Institute
Islamabad

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Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

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SVI aims to project strategic foresight on issues of national and international import through dispassionate, impartial, and independent research, analyses, and studies. The current spotlight of the SVI is on national security, regional and international peace and stability, strategic studies, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and strategic stability, nuclear safety, and security and energy studies.

SVI Foresight

SVI Foresight is a monthly electronic journal. It has a multi-disciplinary perspective highlighting contemporary strategic and security studies. The Journal is envisioned to be a collection of policy-oriented articles written by its Research Associates, Visiting Faculty, and professional experts. The objective is to provide the readership with a concise all-around and real-time policy-oriented discourse on contemporary strategic regional and international developments, highlighting their relevance to Pakistan.

Contents

Editor's Note.....	3
Youm-e-Taqbeer – The Day of Greatness	5
Realignment of Indian troops along the border: Implications for the regional stability	8
Russia's use of Strategic non-nuclear-weapon in Ukraine and implication for the global strategic environment.....	10
U.S.' Unperturbed Response to Indian BrahMos Launch in Pakistan: Aberration or New Normal?.....	12
Not Democracy, Rather 'Identity' As Referent Object of Security in Modern India	15
US-Pakistan security talks and the future of relations.....	17
Preventing a Directed Energy Weapons Arms Race.....	19
Nuclear South Asia and Challenges to Strategic Stability.....	21
India-Pakistan relations and the nuclear factor.....	23
Ukraine war proves why nuclear weapons are essential for Pakistan.....	25
Pakistan's Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology.....	27
Pakistan's Efforts in Utilizing Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes	29
Nuclear Jingoism in Indian Foreign Policy: South Asian Security in Crisis.....	32
India's obsession with "Limited Strikes" and Options for Pakistan	34
Role of its Nuclear Program in Socio-Economic Development of Pakistan.....	36
Modi's Delimitation in IIOJK: Possible Motivations	38
South Asian Strategic Stability	40

Editor's Note

Pakistan on the 28th of May proudly celebrated 'Yaum-e-Taqbeer' or the 'Day of Greatness' in commemoration of 24th anniversary of Pakistan nuclear tests. Pakistan's nuclear program had provided for deterrence and strategic stability. It became inevitable for Pakistan to test its nuclear arsenal in response to Indian nuclear tests conducted on 11th and 13th May 1998, becoming the sole nuclear power in South Asia. As a result, the leadership of Pakistan decided to balance the military power by conducting its series of nuclear tests on 28th and 30th May 1998 in its western province. Pakistan has always been unwilling to be a participant in the South Asian nuclear arms race. It's quite obvious that the decision-makers were quite conscious of the repercussions of the nuclear arms race in South Asia.

Thus, from time to time Pakistan put forward several proposals to avoid a nuclear arms race in the region including; A draft proposal before the UN for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. Secondly, Pakistan also proposed a joint Indo-Pak declaration, relinquishing the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons in 1978. Above all, Pakistan also offered simultaneous adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by India and Pakistan in 1979. However, all these proposals were constantly rejected by India convincing Pakistan to develop its erudite nuclear program to maintain the balance of power in the South Asian region. Nevertheless, India's aggressive hegemonic design was efficaciously neutralized by Pakistan by countering its nuclear tests.

Likewise, the great powers approach is not balanced towards South Asia. When India's nuclear-capable BrahMos cruise missile crashed into the territory of its nuclear-armed and ever-hostile adversary on the evening of March 9th almost pushing the two countries to the brink of catastrophic tit-for-tat exchange, the usually vociferous strategic experts and arms control enthusiasts in the USA maintained a cautionary conspicuous silence. Even it took the US State Department Spokesperson 06 days to issue a formal statement on the precarious issue and that too after being asked by a journalist during the daily press briefing.

Thus, the anarchic nature of global politics, and Pakistan had learned it from experience as well, pinpoints accumulating all means of defense on your own rather than relying on a savior that never comes.

It is hoped that readers will find a good blend of articles focusing on various aspects of the contemporary security discourse in South Asia. The *SVI Foresight* team invites and highly encourages contributions from the security and strategic community in the form of opinion-based short commentaries on contemporary political, security, nuclear and strategic issues. Any suggestions for further improvements are welcome. Please see [here](#) the copy of the *SVI Foresight* electronic journal. You can find us on [Facebook](#) and [Twitter](#) and can also access the [SVI website](#).

Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai

Editor, SVI Foresight

Youm-e-Taqbeer – The Day of Greatness

Dr. Syed Javaid Khurshid

To commemorate the country's first successful detonation of nuclear devices, Pakistan proudly celebrates 'Youm-e-Taqbeer' or the 'Day of Greatness' on May 28 every year. It seems more imperative to Pakistan that it becomes the 7th state of the world to possess nuclear power capabilities, hence becoming a member of the nuclear powers club after conducting five nuclear tests on 28th May followed by a sixth one on May 30. It became inevitable for Pakistan to test its nuclear arsenal in response to Indian nuclear tests conducted on 11th and 13th May 1998, becoming the sole nuclear power in South Asia. As a result, the leadership of Pakistan decided to balance the military power by conducting its series of nuclear tests on 28th and 30th May 1998 in its western province. This was indeed Pakistan's greatest accomplishment. This was a scientific breakthrough, and this day has been celebrated as National Science Day to highlight the achievements of Pakistan in the field of nuclear science.

The progression of Pakistan's nuclear program to attain the status of civilian nuclear technology and training of manpower in nuclear sciences and technology had already begun in the mid-1950s when a treaty was signed with the US on the peaceful use of nuclear power in 1953. It was impelled in a large part of the world by the US as the 'Atoms for Peace' program, which sought to spread nuclear energy technology across the globe. The then President of the US Dwight D. Eisenhower made a speech at the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953, promoting this peace program on which he called upon the member states to make peaceful use of atomic energy and at the same time proposed the formation of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The main purpose of which should on one hand promote the peaceful usage of nuclear energy and on the other hand, insurance of that nuclear energy is not to be used for military purposes.

Later Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was founded in March 1956 in Islamabad. The US provided Pakistan with \$350,000 as development aid for the construction of its first research reactor in the 1960s. A 5MW light water reactor known as PARR-1 (Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor-1) commenced its operations in 1965 at the Pakistan Institute for Nuclear Sciences and Technology (PINSTECH), Nilore. Later, a contract was signed also

between Pakistan and General Electric Canada for the construction of the first nuclear power station at Karachi known as Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), which was completed in 1971. Pakistan observed 24 January 1971 as the birth date for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in Pakistan.

Pakistan describes itself as a reluctant entrant into the club of nations with nuclear weapons as an independent nuclear deterrent to develop a countervailing capability. According to the officials and experts of Pakistan, its nuclear arsenals are a defensive and inevitable response to negative developments in the region at that time. Pakistan's security concerns have always been directed toward India. The two states have had four wars (1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999) and many crises. Due to the profound insights of weakness and state fragility dating back to its painful history since 1947, the partition of the subcontinent, Pakistan's political and military leaders felt strongly obliged to attain nuclear weapons. In particular, the war of 1971 between India and Pakistan, became the turning point in favor of acquiring nuclear weapons. This had also resulted in the loss of its territory i.e., East Pakistan. Both episodes fixed a deep and lasting scar in the mind of the people of Pakistan. Moreover, Indian nuclear tests astounded much of the world by detonating its first nuclear device, code named "Smiling Buddha" on May 18, 1974. So, domestic pressure was also a factor swaying the Pakistani government's decision giving new momentum to the Pakistani nuclear program.

Later, Pakistan began programs to produce highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium in the 1970s. Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production in 1985. According to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion, and finally, Pakistan was compelled to conduct its six nuclear tests on May 28 and 30th, 1998 in response to Indian nuclear tests on 11th and 13th May 1998.

Pakistan has always been unwilling to be a participant in the South Asian nuclear arms race. It's quite obvious that the decision-makers were quite conscious of the repercussions of the nuclear arms race in South Asia. Thus, from time to time Pakistan put forward several proposals to avoid a nuclear arms race in the region including; A draft proposal before the UN for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. Secondly, Pakistan also proposed a joint Indo-Pak declaration, relinquishing the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons in 1978. Above all, Pakistan also offered simultaneous adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by India and

Pakistan in 1979. However, all these proposals were constantly rejected by India convincing Pakistan to develop its erudite nuclear program to maintain the balance of power in the South Asian region. Nevertheless, India's aggressive hegemonic design was efficaciously neutralized by Pakistan by countering its nuclear tests. Countries from all over the world were startled by India's first nuclear test at Pokhran, Rajasthan in 1974. After this test, India maintained ambiguity about the status of its nuclear program. It was condemned by many countries but the US and Canada criticized the test as they had provided aid to India, for the peaceful purposes of their nuclear project. Yet again in 1998, the nuclear testing in South Asia opened a new chapter in international politics. Still, the international response to the Indian tests was mild even after its two rounds of nuclear tests conducted on May 11 and 13 1998. Following suit, Pakistan successfully conducted nuclear tests on May 28 and 30 of the same year. These tests were not carried out in haste. They were meticulously planned by the scientists of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, using highly sophisticated technology. Making nuclear detonation to perfection, assuring that no fallout should occur and no health and environmental problem should result.

This nuclear explosion met with massive support at the domestic level in Pakistan. However, there was chaos within the international community to Pakistan's nuclear tests particularly, drawing an additional feature of international politics. Pakistan was called a dangerous and unstable state by the western media and think tank reports and additional sanctions were imposed by the US and its allies on Pakistan, including denial of fuel and heavy water for an IAEA, safeguarded nuclear power reactor. They were more anxious that a conceivable India-Pakistan nuclear confrontation and increased reliance on nuclear capabilities would be devastating for international security. Despite all the sanctions and export control regimes, Pakistan has tried to brush aside all the propaganda and address the valid apprehensions. However, after 9/11, international media accelerated its criticism and accused Pakistan of expanding its nuclear weapons. In the subsequent years, the international media, think tanks, western officials, and nuclear experts continued to malign Pakistan over the issue of the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear assets. Certainly, Pakistan's nuclear weapons have stood the test of time and most of the past propaganda has lost its credibility. To ensure responsible nuclear behavior, it has also been vigorously strengthening its nuclear command and control structures, which are the best in the world.

To conclude, Pakistan met international challenges of scarcity of resources, lack of necessary infrastructure, acute external sanctions, international propaganda, resentment from western states, and firm nuclear export control in the achievement of nuclear potential for the continued existence of Pakistan's security dilemma. Pakistan always met the IAEA safety and security standards and is always appreciated by IAEA on different occasions. Yet, May 28 has been marked as Pakistan's effective 'historic milestone' to counter India's aggression through operational preparedness of the strategic forces to uphold peace and stability. To enhance the stability of its deterrent relationship vis-a-vis its larger adversary, developing nuclear capability was one of the key components for a state like Pakistan.

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Realignment of Indian troops along the border: Implications for the regional stability

Sabina Baber

Indian army's land warfare doctrine has focused on enhancing capacities to cater to multi-front threats. According to the doctrine, India would timely ensure the augmentation of forces on eastern and western fronts while guaranteeing effective deterrence. India is focusing on enhancing strategic mobility by quick mobilization of integrated groups. India's army is restructuring its force along the eastern and western fronts. The rebalancing and realignment of Indian troops can be identified by the recent shift of 6 divisions from the eastern border of Pakistan to the western border with China. In his interview in 2021, col Ajai Sukla mentioned that Before India China stood off, the total number of divisions facing China was 12, and 25 divisions were installed at the India-Pakistan border. Keeping above details in view and their alignment with the recent decision, the ratio has now changed with the addition of 4 divisions on the western border in 2021 and 6 in 2022. According to the above calculation, now the total number of divisions is 22 divisions on the western front with China and 15 divisions on the eastern border with Pakistan.

For decades, India has been talking about the two-front war, and they are now building a posture to counter both China and Pakistan. This rearrangement of the Indian army from the Line of Control (LOC) to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has implications for China and Pakistan.

To handle its two fronts, India will increase its security cooperation with the US. America is still wary of Chinese actions in the Indo Pacific Region and has always remained receptive of keeping India as a counterweight to Chinese growth what Washington termed as expansionism.

Pakistan is exposed to this dispute in a cross-cutting way. The conflict escalation between China and India is detrimental to Pakistan as it would further reinforce Pakistan's unpredictability in terms of India's strategic behavior. Reinstalling troops from the border could be a bluff by India, as BJP's government has always used security situations as a tool in their electoral discourse. An example of the 2016 surgical strikes of Uri was used as political fodder to serve the nationalist agenda. Similarly, the 2018 Balakot incident was also BJP's attempt to extract electoral mileage, and the recent Bharamos incident has happened when elections are expected in Gujarat. Overall, Indian military and security posture towards Pakistan is linked with its electoral discourse, and this reinforcement should not be considered irrelevant. There are chances that Indian forces can provoke a clash at LOC if they suffer any setback along the Sino-India border. This distrust would trigger an action-reaction mode and further weaken the regional stability.

The Indian aggression is inbuilt by seeking the role of a regional hegemon, and to acquire this status, it focuses on both fronts. Indeed, the dispute in Kashmir can be understood through the Ladakh standoff. China has control over certain parts of Kashmir region including the Ladakh area and the overlapping Sino-India claims in Ladakh area has resulted in a deadly standoff. During the Ladakh crisis in 2020, both countries reinforced their troops, engaged in skirmishes, and were on the verge of war. In 2021 both announced an agreement to disengage forces but failed to implement it. India has always receded from border agreements and this Indian military engagement portrays Indian aggressive posture in the region where India is mobilizing its forces to destabilize regional peace.

Although India has traditionally eschewed any participation by third party specifically in its dealings with China, nevertheless the old mantra of "common enemies can act as a unifying force" still echoes in Washington and New Delhi's louder than ever before. To handle its two

fronts, India will increase its security cooperation with the US. America is still wary of Chinese actions in the Indo-Pacific region and has always remained receptive of keeping India as a counterweight to Chinese growth what Washington termed as expansionism.

India is also likely to anticipate further extending military arrangement with the US when it would face a well-armed, economically integrated, more technologically advanced and robust China. Recent US-India security partnership COMCASA and BECA and regional alliances like Quadrilateral security dialogue (Quad) are to reinsure India's position in the region and this could be the reason for the Indian rearrangement along China's border as India wants to handle its two-front war due to surety from superpowers. Previously Indian forces were not able to counter China's advancement along the borders, however, now with security assurances, India could be of the view to handle its security situation. Overall Sino-India conflict is of concern for Pakistan, as Pakistan is an economic partner of China and any relocation of forces of border skirmishes will affect the security and economic situation of the region.

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<https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2022/05/23/realignment-of-indian-troops-along-the-border/>

Russia's use of Strategic non-nuclear-weapon in Ukraine and implication for the global strategic environment

Sabina Baber

The Clausewitz rightly stated that, every weapon is a strategic weapon by considering its relevance with political and military objective. Indeed, weapons are tools for enabling armed forces to pursue political ends. Strategic non-nuclear weapons are advanced conventional weapon system designed to accomplish specific strategic function. In recent decades, the proliferation of non-nuclear strategic weapons has progressed considerably. There is race between states for growing arsenals of conventional and non-nuclear strategic-weapon systems, including conventional precision-strike capabilities, electronic, anti-satellite and cyber weapons, as well as missile defense capabilities that may be used in strategic function.

The term 'non-nuclear strategic weapon' denotes a category of non-nuclear weapon systems that, used on their own or in conjunction with other weapon systems, and under certain

circumstances, can achieve decisive strategic outcomes in conflict. Non-nuclear strategic weapons refer to weapons systems below the nuclear threshold that can achieve the decisive strategic effect. The participants attributed this quality in part to their ability to engage targets at the strategic level of warfare, where the adversary's sources of national power are located.

The strategic non-nuclear weapons have been used in the past in Iraq- Iran war, in former Yugoslavia where they contributed to deterrence value. However, with the addition of Ballistic missile and a parallel pursuit of higher precision weapons has resulted in readjustment to proliferation paradigm. The conflict of Nagorno- karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan was not deterred by the availability of non-nuclear weapon. In this conflict, armed UAVs were used to cause devastating strategic effects, however non-nuclear strategic weapons armed UAVs are weapon systems, such as long-range strike weapons and armed UAVs which could be and were used to have devastating strategic effect by Azerbaijan, was known beforehand, but, surprisingly, was discounted by Armenia.

Hence, this suggests that their deterrence value should not be overestimated, and that the credible demonstration of such capabilities is often necessary before it can be used in deterrence signaling. In contemporary times, strategic non-nuclear weapons constitute more practical implications. The large-scale employment of these weapons will result in asymmetric conflict specifically in case of weaker states, it gives them edge as relying on superior technology and weapons will help them fighting the conventional war. In Russia Ukraine war, there is a conventional balance between Ukraine Russia, nevertheless Russia is enjoying the substantial advantage because of its non-nuclear strategic weapons. Russia has deployed long range precision guided weapons which support the notion of Russian emphasis on non-nuclear strategic military deterrence.

Ukraine has turned into a largest testing ground for cruise and ballistic missile, indeed in modern warfare Russia is focusing on non-nuclear strategic weapons. Russia is using non-strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine in different forms, it could use them for demonstration purpose, and not for creating any causality it could also use non-nuclear strategic weapons to coerce the west to agree to end their expansionism. Russia can also use these non-nuclear weapons to change an operational situations and to achieve ultimate coercion. Russia has launched more than 1950 cruise missile strikes. The Russian missile strategy has involved use of

cruise launches, ballistic strikes, hypersonic strikes and use of a coastal defense system to attack the ground target. The precision attacks under the non-nuclear strategy are titling the war in favor of Russia, recently Moscow has used new generations of powerful laser weapons to counter the western arms flow in Ukraine. The trajectories of hypersonic missiles is low, which makes them harder to detect for Ukrainian forces, Russia is using them to tackle any kind of defense provided by west. This war reinforces the transformation and position of power and deterrence with the use of strategic non-nuclear weapons and impacts the thinking of missile doctrine.

The basic task of use of non-nuclear weapon is to focus on de-escalation that is working as a bulwark against any military actions of the enemy. For Russia, the goals of these attacks is to degrade the Ukrainian force and ensure that if they cross the threshold it can retaliate with the strategic nuclear response. Strategic non-nuclear weapons by Russia are complementing its nuclear deterrence by helping Russia gain maximum advantage in their pre nuclear phase of military conflict. Apart from that Precision missile strikes are providing Russia a strategic advantage as it can attack on infrastructure and capabilities where aerial bombing is risky. Nevertheless, this capability has inflicted considerable damage to Ukraine, as Russia has targeted western Ukrainian assets and logistics through missile systems. The Ukrainian case is proving that non-nuclear strategic weapons can be feasible and effective in a conventional war. To conclude it all the strategic non-nuclear weapons and their impact on deterrence cannot be denied as they are linked with mutual vulnerabilities and will further encourage states to deploy more SNWS.

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<http://southasiajournal.net/russias-use-of-strategic-non-nuclear-weapon-in-ukraine-and-implication-for-the-global-strategic-environment/>

U.S.' Unperturbed Response to Indian BrahMos Launch in Pakistan: Aberration or New Normal?

Hamdan khan

As India's nuclear-capable BrahMos cruise missile crashed into the territory of its nuclear-armed and ever-hostile adversary on the evening of March 9th almost pushing the two

countries to the brink of catastrophic tit-for-tat exchange, the usually vociferous strategic experts and arms control enthusiasts in the USA maintained a cautionary conspicuous silence. Even it took the US State Department Spokesperson 06 days to issue a formal statement on the precarious issue and that too after being asked by a journalist during the daily press briefing. If one thinks for the USA – the self-proclaimed champion of nuclear safety and security – such a belated response to such a potentially hazardous “accident” constituted an anomaly, having a look at what the USA’s State Department’s spokesperson finally stated would be handy, which in essence uncritically endorsed the ambiguous and self-contradictory Indian viewpoint on the issue while refusing to make any further comments.

One does not need to wonder what would have been the reaction in the West had something of this character landed in India from Pakistan. Hell would have readily broken loose and the relevant academic, policy-advocacy, and policy-making circles in the West would have been up in the arms predicting a nuclear holocaust owing to irresponsible handling of sensitive weapon systems by Pakistan and making calls to fulfill their long-held desire of ‘securing’ Pakistan’s strategic arsenal. But given it was a breach on part of India, the belated and unperturbed response despite the profound precariousness associated with the fiasco makes complete sense.

Anomaly! Not really, because the apparent aberration is all set to be the new normal: only those nuclear safety and security breaches would concern the Western (specifically the US) strategic community happening apropos countries considered on the other side of the geostrategic equation and India – given its geostrategic utility vis-à-vis China – is positioned on the same side as with the Western world so even the strategic blunders like the recent one would be conveniently brushed under the carpet. Reason: any criticism of Indian BrahMos blunder or even expression of concern about the safety and security of India’s cutting-edge weapons systems would have infuriated overly touchy souls in New Delhi, which Washington has been trying so desperately to woo.

Though the convergence of geopolitical interests forms the most consequential and undoubtedly the umbrella reason for the USA’s unperturbed response to India’s BrahMos launch into Pakistan, it is not only the only one. Currently, the Indian diaspora constitutes one of the most powerful lobbies in the USA domestic political and electoral landscape augmented by their

deep ingress into academia, policy advocacy, and policy-making spheres, where they primarily act as the arm of Indian foreign policy and security establishments essentially safeguarding and qualifying all rights and wrongs by New Delhi and by default working to discredit its prime adversary Pakistan using a wide range of means and mediums. The relegation of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute from a self-determination demand of nearly 20 million people once backed by the USA at international forums to a mere Pakistan-sponsored insurgency in complete concurrence with the Indian standpoint and conspicuous apologetic attitude of the USA government and intelligentsia over India's now almost undisputed plunge into the abyss of fascism under Modi are the most vivid case studies of the lobby's influence in the USA, though backed by the umbrella of convergence of geostrategic interests.

Though the USA and Pakistan being long-time allies have their own baggage of alleged betrayals, sanctions, and double-games, the steep decline in the goodwill for Islamabad during the past few decades is attributable to years-old concerted efforts by the Indian lobby and the muted reaction to India's BrahMos launch in Pakistan even by the strategic and focusing on South Asia intelligentsia within the USA was another manifestation of the reality that the lobby has gained considerable check over the academic and policy discourse in the USA.

Ironically, the trend of overlooking India's shenanigans at home and abroad and potentially catastrophic breaches of safety and security of destructive weapons systems is all set to be the new normal as the aforementioned factors of geopolitical convergence and the lobby's role in influencing academic and policy discourse responsible for the setting the trends are only likely to be reinforced in the coming years and decades. However, there is a big question mark whether unwaveringly covering up New Delhi's abysmal domestic and regional track records undermines the USA's international legitimacy as the principal sponsor of "rules-based international order"? An unequivocal yes! But it appears policymakers in Washington are willing to let their legitimacy tarnish in barter for India's utility vis-à-vis China – a characteristic case of power politics triumphing idealistic charades.

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<https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/05/22/u-s-unperturbed-response-to-indian-brahmos-launch-in-pakistan-aberration-or-new-normal/>

Not Democracy, Rather 'Identity' As Referent Object of Security in Modern India

Komal Khan

While discussing 'identity' as still appurtenant to the modern politics, Francis Fukuyama in his book "Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment" infers upon the application of identity in politics as still relevant. To Fukuyama, the reason for this is that despite the promises of dignity, human rights, and equality for all done by the liberal democracy, the fact on the practical front is that the liberal democracy has failed to deliver so. This is the most relevant to the communities with a history of past marginalization, hence, leading to the resurgence of nationalistic fervor affiliated with religion and race. This politics of identity based on above rationale makes nationalism and religion the prevalent forces that have been shaping the modern politics. Modi's India is the prime case of it

India proclaims the world's largest democracy that is by and for the population of 1.39 billion people; claiming unity in nationhood, living diversity, acknowledging its multi-religious make up, as well as ethno-cultural pluralism. The ethnic make-up of India is such that Hindus are 79.8% of the population; Muslims are 14.2%; Christians are 2.3%; Sikhs are 1.7%; Buddhists are 0.7%; and Jains are 0.4%. This ethnic pluralism in India obliges the Indian constitutional framework to uphold the principles of secularism and formal equality; and theoretically, at least, it did.

However, the religious freedom in India has been subjected to an inexplicit constitutional clause that is "subject to public order". It legalizes suspension of the minority rights for national security, thus authorizing political abrogation of state secularism in India. With this constitutional crisis in practice which is contrary to the legitimate secular architecture of Indian constitution; the undergoing Hindu political engineering by Right-Wing politics in India is the cause of conflict amid Indian nationalism and human security situation of not only the Indian minorities, but of the intra-Hindu sub-sections as well. What is in need of being re-stressed is that the genesis of the ideology of 'Hindu' actually advocated the Hindu nationalism that is based on geographic affiliation, and not religious, acknowledging ethnic pluralism with substantive equality in relation to the ethnic minorities and majority residing in India.

In India today; the rise of Hindutva, or the neo-Hindutva, under the Modi's BJP characterizes India as Hindu majoritarian polity. Hindutva has been assimilated in the Indian polity as a mainstreamed strategic culture by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi since his election in 2014. The normative approach towards security and governance under the BJP has been taking into consideration the individual identities, rather than people collectively, as the referent of national security. However, under the international standards, the coherent human security occupies the referent status particularly in case of the state that proclaims to be the largest democracy in the world.

Human security in India reflects the ethno-cultural and geostrategic adaptation of Hindutva. In cultural aspects, the Indian minorities have been ordered in a hierarchical pattern, though this pattern of hierarchy is a historical stratification. However, the existing political order in India has complicated this very relationship to make sure their acculturation in Hindutva-majority normative framework, such as Animal preservation Amendment, no-religious conversion ordinance, Uniform Civil Code instead of Muslim Personal Law and many alike as measures of social control against Muslim minority. This Hindu-specific social order to the extremity includes policies of that declare the minorities stateless in India. This has been done under the Citizen Amendment Act (CAA), and National Population Register (NPR) 2019-2020; under the Pan Indian National Registration of Citizen law (NRC).

These constitutional measures indicate BJP initiated ethnocentric politics of the Hindutva constitutionalism. However, Article 15 of the Indian Constitution provides for the freedom of religion and the right to profess, practice and propagate religions as an inalienable right of citizens in India. Similarly, Article 14 and 25 to 28 of the Indian constitution legally bound the government of India to treat equally and impartially every religion in India without any discrimination and prohibit meddling in their religious affairs.

The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) based in India identifies the intensifying communal violence to the identity-occupied shift in Indian politics, notably the political application of the Hindu Nationalism by populist political parties. Similarly, the report in 2020 by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom keeps India in Tier 2 over the current status of religious freedom abuses in India. As per the report, the previously upheld constitutional rights that had been guaranteed to the religious minorities of India since

independence, are in a state of gradual erosion in present India. Similarly, multiple reports of the United Nations Human Rights Watch since 2020 raise concerns over deteriorating human rights state in India.

India has a history of sensitivity to the identity politics. Previously, the consequences of the politics of divide and rule have been witnessed in the Gujarat massacre that followed the Babri Mosque demolition and was supported by the BJP, the Shiv Sena, and the VHP in 1992 leading to about 2000 deaths; moreover, during the clashes between Hindu Jatts and Muslims in Muzaffarnagar, in the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) in 2013 that left 62 dead, 93 wounded and 50,000 displaced internally displaced people.

Since the present Hindu majoritarian politics of Hindutva or the modified Hindu nationalism is a cause of human rights violations, either as intended or unintentional consequences of populist governance model in India, it has worrisome implications on human security in India.

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<https://www.eurasiareview.com/25052022-not-democracy-rather-identity-as-referent-object-of-security-in-modern-india-oped/>

US-Pakistan security talks and the future of relations

Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai

The US-Pakistan security level talks held in Washington previous week before the visit of Pakistani Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. The senior level talks held between the CIA Chief William Burns and the Pakistani counterpart, Lt. Gen. Nadeem Anjum, Director-General (DG ISI). The talks are believed to have discussed the regional security situation especially Afghanistan since the US withdrawal.

Security level talks between both the states had held in July when Pakistan's National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf had visited Washington where he met with Jake Sullivan at the White House. Previously, Jake Sullivan had asked the Pakistani counterpart to play its role in reduction of violence in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban in the next month of the talks i.e., in July took control of Kabul days before the US complete withdrawal.

The US-Pakistan relations are not smooth since the US withdrawal and then the ouster of Imran Khan further damaged the relationship when he accused the US for interfering in the Pakistani politics and helping the opposition in their no-confidence vote. However, the US State Department has plainly rejected the accusations. Yet, the episode has a great impact on US-Pakistan relations on one hand and the anti-Americanism in Pakistan on the other.

If we look at the history of US-Pakistan relations, the alliances both the countries made were mostly for security purposes that helped push cooperation in other areas as well. However, whether it was political cooperation or security, we have witnessed a trust-deficit between Washington and Islamabad.

The very first cooperation between the two states was SEAT and CENTO that ended with fragility. Pakistan felt the US did not assist him against India during both its war in 1965 and 1971. Keeping in view both said agreement, Washington was liable to help Islamabad in case of any conflict with an outside state and any external threat. The US secured the Badabher airbase in Peshawar from where it used to make surveillance of the USSR and a time came when Russians shot down the U-2 plane and Pakistan came under extreme pressure from Moscow. However, about five years later, when Pakistan was engaged in war with India, the US didn't come to help Pakistan that caused resentment in Islamabad thus provided for a trust-deficit.

Similarly, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in late 1979, Washington needed Pakistan to play the role of a frontline state against the Soviets and support the jihadist outfits. This time too, Pakistan fully cooperated in logistics and training the Jihadists that led to the Soviet withdrawal and the subsequent disintegration of the USSR. This time too, the US objective entirely fulfilled. However, soon after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington imposed Pressler Amendment providing for sanctioning Pakistan. This was quite a surprising move for Pakistan as it had helped the US during the last one decade against the Soviets.

Likewise, the incident of September 11 that changed the dynamics of world politics also brought the US closer to Pakistan that needed the latter to play a role in its war on terror in Afghanistan. This time too, Pakistan captured a handful of Al Qaeda and Taliban members and handed over to the US in addition to logistic and aerial support. However, the US constantly

accused Pakistan for double dealing and asked for ‘do more’. Despite this full pledged cooperation, the US gave India a major role in Afghanistan that undermined Pakistan’s security.

Similarly, Pakistan remained instrumental throughout the Afghan peace process whether it was between the US and the Taliban or between the Taliban and the Afghan government. If Pakistan would not have cooperated, the Doha agreement was not possible and it is acknowledged by the US authorities. However, when it comes to the US relations with India, the former ignores Pakistan’s interests and concerns. Hence, this is the reason Pakistan assume the US as an unreliable partner and even the relationship is tactical rather than strategic.

In order to have a smooth relation with Pakistan, Washington would need to reassess its policies and gave Pakistan due importance as it gave to India and not to ignore its core concerns. Pakistan’s tilt towards Russia and China is the byproduct of the US policies towards Pakistan. Pakistan lies on an important geostrategic location and is a next-door neighbor of Afghanistan where there is still instability. The US cannot ignore the precarious situation in Afghanistan. Hence, a close US-Pakistan relation can help stabilize Afghanistan. Both the US and Pakistan needs to adopt a common approach to Afghanistan to play their role in the war torn country’s stability.

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Preventing a Directed Energy Weapons Arms Race

Akash Shah

Whenever you hear a military general, particularly one from the global north, say “modernization,” it is understood that they are referring to the development and integration of next-generation weapons. Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) are part of the same modernization scheme as the lasers integrated on U.S Navy destroyers, and research is underway to mount them on U.S. Air Force jets. The work is in its early stages, and it could still take decades before DEWs can completely replace existing instruments of war and turn science fiction into reality. Satellites are particularly vulnerable to a directed pulse of energy, which could potentially leave them inoperable. The multi-dimensional benefits of DEWs make them an interesting domain to explore and, at the same time, dangerous military assets for adversaries to acquire. However,

there is another side to DEWs. Directed energy is increasingly being used against human targets, which warrants much more deliberation and consensus than its use against inanimate military hardware does.

For anyone with an iota of topographical knowledge, Havana and the Himalayas couldn't be more different. Yet, two very different regions have been, apparently, connected by an ominous turn of events, one that is potent enough to unleash a new global arms race. What started in 2016 with symptoms of vertigo, headache, buzzing ears, and psychological distress for some U.S. diplomats in Havana may have culminated in the Chinese People Liberation Army's "beautiful solution" against the Indian Army in the Himalayas. While the Indian Army denies that microwave radiation was used against its soldiers in 2020, and the cause of "Havana Syndrome" has not yet been categorically identified, directed energy is the most plausible theory. CIA Director William Burns also personally believes them to be "attacks" and not incidents, despite his agency officially determining that the symptoms were not the result of a deliberate campaign by a hostile power.

The attacks on U.S. and Indian personnel are just the latest instance of DEWs being directed toward human targets. The United States has possessed a similar system, known as Active Denial Technology, since 2001. Even after deploying it in Afghanistan, an active warzone, it was never used because of "bad publicity." All the subsequent requests for its usage have been denied in the United States on similar grounds. Ironically, it is U.S. diplomats and spies who have become the targets of the same directed source of energy, inflicting physical and psychological harm in Havana, Guangzhou, and Vienna. Subsequent U.S. administrations have not allowed DEWs to be deployed against human targets. But all the leaders across the globe may not be as considerate, and even the United States might not hold on to altruism for much longer

Southern Asia is a notoriously hostile region where the domino effect of weapon proliferation is real, as indicated by the nuclear arms race between China, India, and, eventually, Pakistan. Havana Syndrome was the only plausible instance of DEW use until the Indo-China Galwan Valley skirmishes in 2020. Since it was China that allegedly set the precedent for the use of DEWs in a conflict, even if the claim was a gimmick, the arms race has already begun. It may be on the drawing boards or in the prototype stage for countries that did not possess DEWs

initially, but we have to assume that the game is on. And one thing we know that follows—as seen in the history of nuclear proliferation—is that technology only gets more sophisticated and more lethal from this point onwards.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said that an urgent priority for the United States is tackling Havana Syndrome and getting to the bottom of these mysterious cases. The truth is that it should be the most urgent priority on the agenda for international security. In a world that is governed by realpolitik, it would be naïve to think that countries could be stopped from developing DEWs. These weapons present a plausible look at future warfare. But there must be a consensus on the limits of their usage against human targets. Yes, the alleged DEW attacks so far do not indicate that these are lethal weapons, but a coordinated effort is needed to ensure that it stays that way. At a time when countries direly need to cooperate on the pressing issues of pandemics, poverty, and terrorism, another arms race is the last thing the world needs. Nuclear proliferation has taught us that disarmament is practically impossible if an arms race is not proactively tackled. The use of DEWs against human targets needs to be taken care of just as the world took on biological and chemical weapons.

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<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/preventing-directed-energy-weapons-arms-race-202717>

Nuclear South Asia and Challenges to Strategic Stability

Hamdan Khan

As he builds a theoretical explanation of Pakistan's pursuance and acquisition of Nuclear Weapons, Feroz Hassan Khan in his seminal work on Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program, among others, refers to the work of realist (neorealist) scholars, who reason that faced with an adversarial security environment, states either resort to external balancing (a commonplace occurrence before the advent of the nuclear age) or internal balancing, which has turned out to be a more viable strategy after the advent of the nuclear age.

Faced with a mammoth adversary next door threatening its survival, Pakistan did try to externally balance the threat from India by entering into the US-sponsored SEATO and CENTO treaties, but given the alliances did not defend Pakistan against the military threats and

aggression from India, specifically in 1971 resulting into the disintegration of the country, Pakistan's leadership was essentially left with no other choice except to resort to internal balancing by pursuing a clandestine nuclear program, which, given the highly oppositional international environment of the time, did accompany costly risks but was the most viable lifeline to country's territorial integrity.

Predictably, given the centrality of the nuclear weapons program to Pakistan's defense, the program turned out to be a rare venture that remained unaffected by the customarily frequent change of governments in Islamabad and even before it was formally announced and acknowledged in May 1998, helped diffuse two crises between Pakistan and India, essentially setting the stage for strategic stability in South Asia enabled by nuclear deterrence.

Despite the plethora of literature on the subject, there is little consensus on what led India to detonate its nuclear devices to upgrade to weaponized capability in May 1998. Some rationalize India's nuclear detonations citing the threat from China, which (it is pertinent to mention) was almost dormant back then while the critical voices blame India's long-held aspirations of international prestige to secure a distinguished position at the "global high table". Additionally, the role of domestic politics was also cited as one of the most credible reasons given the ruling BJP's jingoistic credentials.

Whatever the actual reason or combination of reasons might be, the Indian detonations did create a rightful pretext for Pakistan to go overtly nuclear, which it did only 17 days later on May 28th, 1998. Resultantly, the conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan was offset by nuclear weapons, and India, as opposed to the initial expectation of realizing its regional hegemonic and global prestige-centric ambitions owing to nuclear detonations, was left disadvantaged and its motivations thwarted.

The policymakers in New Delhi, however, did not correspond with the new reality of the nuclear equalizer rendering their edge counterbalanced, and soon started contemplating options to fight a limited war below the nuclear threshold as evinced by the planning and final admission of the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). Pakistan's response was swift and apposite as it developed the short-range Nasr missile, essentially to plug the gap that policymakers in New Delhi were aiming to exploit via CSD. Though with even minimum space left to unshackle their below nuclear threshold warfighting aspirations, Indians have not given up as demonstrated by the botched

delivery of ordinance by the Indian Air Force (IAF) in Balakot in early 2019. As the aerial raids into each other's controlled territories spread over two days finally saw an end, the Modi regime was left red-faced after IAF was outgunned and outmaneuvered in the aerial skirmish, which led Modi to escalate one more rung up the escalation ladder, only to be deterred by the threat of an even punitive response. Dangerous escalation with potentially catastrophic consequences was indubitably minutes away but the crisis stability ultimately prevailed.

Despite moving to the brink on numerous occasions, crisis stability has finally been prevailing between India and Pakistan. However, it is the other facet of strategic stability i.e. arms race stability that is consistently under stress thereby imperiling broader strategic stability in South Asia. Motivated by security considerations and international prestige aspirations, India features among the world's top arms importers and has recently embarked upon a massive military modernization and expansion drive. While the Indo-US nuclear deal has enabled India to vertically proliferate its nuclear weapons program, the acquisition of modern military systems by India being supplied by both the USA and Russia strains the overall balance of arms in South Asia with Pakistan compelled to take countermeasures, which, however, do not illustrate a classic parity-driven arms race but by making qualitative and quantitative changes in its weapon systems, Pakistan's objective is to maintain deterrence capability enough to deter "full-spectrum" of threats emanating from India.

Pakistan, however, with a smaller economy compared to the size of the Indian economy is always in a disadvantageous position concerning qualitatively modernizing and expanding its weaponry and the latter's interminable thirst for the state of the art weaponry continues to imperil strategic stability in South Asia.

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India-Pakistan relations and the nuclear factor

Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai

Since independence, relations between the two nascent states, India and Pakistan were not smooth. After a year of their independence, both fought a war at Kashmir which further

strained the bilateral relationship. India was of the view that Pakistan would not be able to sustain and will soon join India. However, that proved merely wishful thinking. Though Pakistan was passing through a very tough situation, the leadership worked hard to sustain.

India tried its level best to weaken Pakistan from both eastern and western sides. Afghanistan had strained relations with Pakistan since the independence of the latter and was the only country that voted against Pakistan's membership in the United Nations. In such a situation, India has a chance to exploit Pakistan from the Afghan side as well. Afghanistan's premier Sardar Daoud from 1953-1963 was a staunch supporter of the Pakhtunistan issue and used haji Mirza Ali Khan known as Faqir of Ipi against Pakistan.

Similarly, India and Pakistan went into another full-scale war in 1965 in which India could not weaken Pakistan but in 1971, Pakistan's eastern wing got independence with the Indian help by dismembering Pakistan. Hence, Pakistan was in a weaker position in the early 1970s. In 1974, India tested its nuclear device that alarmed Pakistan. Pakistan was in hot waters and the leadership had no way but to go for parity with India so that it could not threaten its security in the future. This was the turning point where Pakistan started its nuclear program to go nuclear due to an existential threat from its eastern neighbor. The efforts made by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan were instrumental in kick-starting the nuclear program.

Pakistan's nuclear program was objectionable to global powers including the US and there were many plans that could roll back Pakistan's nuclear program. The declassified documents published by National Security Archives states, "In November 1978, the United Kingdom and the United States sent complementary demarches to other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in efforts to "delay" the Pakistani nuclear program by denying it access to sensitive technology and equipment." Likewise, it was the US pressure that France backed out from its agreement for delivering a nuclear processing plant to Pakistan. However, as a blessing for Pakistan's nuclear program, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided an opportunity for Pakistan to continue its program.

During the Soviet campaign and the hot period of the Cold War, Pakistan developed its nuclear weapons though the west was in suspicion that Pakistan was working on its nuclear program but it could not take stern measures due to the latter's cooperation against the Soviets.

Bleeding the Soviet Union was more important than rolling back Pakistan's nuclear program. Thus, Pakistan skillfully utilized the opportunity and went ahead to achieve weapon grade enrichment.

The principal objective of Pakistan's nuclear program was to achieve parity with India so that it could not threaten it in the future. India has a superior and sizable conventional and nuclear power that was a source of great concern for Pakistan. Later in the 1990s, Pakistan was constantly pressured by the west to sign CTBT and NPT yet Pakistan refused and asked for a regional approach which should include India as well as a signatory.

When India conducted its nuclear test in May 1998 and declared itself a nuclear power, Pakistan was compelled to do the same and balance the equation. Hence, Pakistan despite extreme pressure from the west tested its nuclear device in late May. The nuclear parity is a reason that despite many major events, no war has happened between both the states in the last 24 years. Thus, the nuclear weapons have played a better role in deterrence between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan is not abiding by no-first use as in his speech in 2002, the then Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf stated that we would respond with full might in case of any conventional attack from India. Pakistan nuclear weapons have played a pivotal role in keeping the best deterrence between the two nuclear rivals. Hence, the nuclear factor is very important in India-Pakistan relations and has proved a guarantor of peace despite India's malign intentions and misadventures.

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Ukraine war proves why nuclear weapons are essential for Pakistan

Akash Shah

In the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, even the most ardent supporters of nuclear disarmament, at least in Pakistan, would now be clear in understanding the existential need for nuclear weapons for the state of Pakistan. Just two days ago, the country celebrated the 24th

Youm-e-Takbir, a day to commemorate the test of Pakistan's nuclear weapons in response to India's nuclear test on 11th and 13th May 1998.

A lot has been written in this context since 1974 when India first tested a nuclear device ironically terming it as "Smiling Buddha" to portray the 'peaceful' nature of these tests. However, this year's Youm-e-Takbir celebrations have essentially vindicated Pakistan with its rationale of pursuing a nuclear program that culminated in the nuclear tests of 28th May 1998.

From 3rd largest nuclear arsenal in the world to an invasion

Russian attack on Ukraine began on 24th February 2022, marking an escalation of the conflict that had been going on since 2014. Russia deems Ukraine's membership in NATO as an existential threat to its territorial integrity.

As the result of the invasion, a third of its population, 6.7 million Ukrainians have been displaced, the largest and growing refugee crisis in Europe since WWII. There is no comparison between both the countries as Russia is almost 3 times bigger in landmass compared to Ukraine and has nearly the same difference in the size of military personnel and hardware.

However, arguably, Ukraine did not necessarily have to be in such a vulnerable position had it not given up its nuclear weapons which were the third largest inventory at the time. In 1991, after Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union, the country possessed nearly 1900 nuclear warheads, 176 intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and 44 strategic bombers.

During its efforts to gain independence, Ukraine had pledged to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for support from the international community towards its independence cause. However, not everyone in Ukraine was on board with the idea that nuclear weapons should be given up as they feared Russia as a security threat to the country in the future.

A series of agreements and protocols were discussed between the two states between 1991 and 1994 to dismantle the nuclear weapons possessed by Ukraine. It culminated in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine where Russia, the United States, and the UK signed the political agreement.

The security assurances were against the threat or use of force against Ukraine, a promise that the country's political independence, territorial boundaries, and sovereignty would be respected. 28 years later, the paper on which the security guarantees were signed remains just a piece of paper as Ukraine is fighting a war for its survival, primarily on its own.

As the war continues, leaders in Ukraine regret giving up the nuclear weapons which they believe might have fended off Putin from attacking their country. It paints a very accurate picture of the prevalent global political system that endorses the Realist fears of anarchy and every state for itself.

A lifeline for Pakistan

In the light of ongoing turmoil in Europe, Pakistan's principal decision of becoming a nuclear power in response to the belligerent ambitions of a much bigger India stands vindicated. There has been an imbalance between both the countries since 1947 and the unresolved issue of Kashmir has been a bone of contention between the two sides.

Pakistan had already fought three wars with India, having lost East Pakistan in 1971, before the latter's 'peaceful' nuclear explosion. It had become a matter of life and death for Pakistan therefore its leaders at the time made the right call instead of believing any security guarantees.

The anarchic nature of global politics, and Pakistan had learned it from experience as well, pinpoints accumulating all means of defense on your own rather than relying on a savior that never comes.

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<https://www.globalvillagespace.com/ukraine-war-proves-why-nuclear-weapons-are-essential-for-pakistan/>

Pakistan's Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology

Amber Afreen Abid

The civil nuclear program comprised the major part of the nuclear program of Pakistan. Pakistan has always been cognizant of the use and benefits of nuclear technology in civil sector. The use of nuclear technology for civil purposes entails the use in medicine, utilization in

energy, agriculture or dealing with the climate change. It is contributing in various aspects, for the welfare of people, and ultimately in achieving the sustainable development goals.

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was established in 1956, with the primary aim to utilize peaceful uses of nuclear energy in various civil sectors of Pakistan. In 1970s, the first ever nuclear power plant was established by PAEC in Karachi- named as KANNUP, with the generation capacity of 135 MWe; it was also the first nuclear power plant in the underdeveloped or developing world. It was further followed by KANNUP-II, and KANNUP-III, besides four nuclear power plants Chashma- CHASNUPP-I, CHASNUPP-II, CHASNUPP-III, and CHASNUPP-IV. Other power plants at Chashma and Muzaffargarh are under consideration to be built by PAEC. PAEC has the target of achieving the nuclear energy generation of about 8800 MW, by 2030. This plan was given under the Energy Security Plan of 2005. The completion of the K-2 and K-3 projects will bring Pakistan closer to achieving its stated target.

The changing Climatic condition of the world can also be somehow controlled by the use of nuclear energy, and is thus one of the major drivers towards pursuance and utilization of peaceful nuclear energy by Pakistan. The nuclear energy is the comparative environmental friendly and clean alternative, and thus its utilization would be a great step towards the attainment of energy requirements of Pakistan.

In the field of Agriculture, Pakistan has made remarkable improvement, utilizing the nuclear energy, and working extensively on Biotechnology. PAEC is working efficiently to utilize nuclear technology in agriculture sector, by introducing a variety of pest control technologies, plant nutrition, with the collaboration of IAEA numerous institutes have been developed by PAEC, which includes National Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering (NIBGE), Nuclear Institute of Agriculture and Biotechnology (NIAB), Nuclear Institute for Agriculture (NIA), Nuclear Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA); these institutes are continuously working to enhance the productivity of the agriculture sector in Pakistan. PAEC and its agriculture center also organize “Farmer’s Days” to create awareness among farmers, to educate them about effectiveness of newly developed varieties of the crops and how cultivation of such crops can benefit them and country.

But this is not the only focus of the PAEC; it is also working in the field of nuclear and chemical sciences with special focus on their application for peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The major research and development institute of PAEC is PINSTECH which is ensuring the well balanced research in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear technology to facilitate the needs of the future. PINSTECH is effectively contributing for years towards achieving the goal of socio-economic development of the country, in various fields. The Pakistan Research Reactor- PARR-I and PARR-II- has enabled Pakistan to attain a higher degree of self-sufficiency.

Pakistan is successfully operating nuclear power plants, for over 04 years. It has a clean record of security and safety of nuclear materials. Pakistan has ratified and adheres to the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and UN Resolution 1540; IAEA and other global nuclear watchdogs have admired the safety and security of nuclear materials of Pakistan for years.

Recently, Pakistan has also presented its achievements in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in front of the international community at the IAEA headquarters, Vienna, for the first time ever. The exhibition stands to vitrine Pakistan's achievements in the peaceful aspects of nuclear technology in various grounds such as health, power generation, industry, agriculture and environmental protection. The remarkable and successful track record of Pakistan's safety and security of nuclear energy shows Pakistan's commitment to the national responsibility of the protection of such materials and plays its part in achieving global peace and security.

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<https://www.eurasiareview.com/31052022-pakistans-peaceful-uses-of-nuclear-technology-oped/>.

Pakistan's Efforts in Utilizing Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes

Sher Bano

The development of Pakistan's nuclear program in the early '50s was primarily meant for peaceful purposes. Since then, Pakistan has been using nuclear technology for the socio-economic development and betterment of society. In this regard, over the years, sufficient human resources and infrastructure have been developed in compliance with the international practices of nuclear safety and security and regulatory control. This is further evident from the fact that

Pakistan has achieved significant success in utilizing nuclear technology in public spheres ranging from; energy, agriculture, health, and industry. However, unfortunately, the international community, specifically the West is quite reluctant to acknowledge Pakistan's success in peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Furthermore, Pakistan has been facing discrimination from the international community at various international forums related to the use of nuclear technology. Despite this, Pakistan's successful journey of utilizing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would likely continue in the years to come.

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), established in 1956 is the pioneer government agency to oversee the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in the country. It was established to contribute to Pakistan's overall economic development through the utilization of nuclear energy in various public fields. These include; medical diagnosis/therapy, agricultural production, nuclear energy for power generation, and some other functions that involve peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In the early '70s, PAEC constructed the first-ever 135 Megawatts (MWs) nuclear power plant at Karachi KANUPP. This was also the first-ever nuclear power generation plant in the developing or underdeveloped world. The successful launch of this power plant later led to the development of four more nuclear plants at Chashma, the CHASNUPP-1, CHASNUPP-2, CHASNUPP-3, and CHASNUPP-4.

Furthermore, Pakistan also intends to build two nuclear power plants known as K-2 and K-3 at Karachi, one at Chashma, and two at Muzaffargarh. This is part of Pakistan's long-term plan to produce 40,000 Megawatts MWs of electricity by using nuclear energy by the year 2050. Here it is quite noteworthy to specify that nuclear power generation is believed to be one of the economical and reliable sources of electricity generation. Such credentials have included Pakistan among the list of 30 countries that have fully operational nuclear plants. Along with this, Pakistan is also among the only ten countries in the world that have completed the nuclear fuel cycle.

Likewise, in the field of agriculture, nuclear technology has contributed to various landmark achievements for Pakistan. In this regard, the PAEC has developed multiple facilities for the advancements in the field of agriculture and food in collaboration with the IAEA. It has also launched various programs to increase the nutritional value of staple foods so that it can meet the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to eliminate malnutrition and

hunger. Furthermore, various irradiation techniques have been used in the agriculture sector to enhance the quality of food and to extend the shelf life of products at the farms. Also, PAEC is working on various food fortification initiatives to enhance the vitamin and mineral content in the food and to eradicate malnutrition. This is further evident from the fact that nearly 98 new high-yielding and stress-tolerant crops have been created by using nuclear technology. For the availability of clean water in the country, PAEC for years has been collaborating with IAEA to analyze and detect pollutants in water by using isotopic and nuclear techniques. Pakistan has also built laboratories by collaborating with IAEA for mass breeding of insects that fight pests attacking the crops and thus the use of pesticides is decreased.

In Pakistan, nuclear technology has significant use in the field of medical science especially for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer disease. In this regard, over the years, 18 cancer treatment centers have been developed by PAEC where nearly 0.7 million cancer patients have been treated to date. This counts for almost 80% of the total cancer patients from all over the country. Radiation and various other nuclear techniques are used for treating cancer. Likewise, various cancer awareness campaigns are being run by the PAEC so that cancer gets diagnosed at the early stages. Other than these, PAEC has been collaborating with international organizations like the WHO, IRC, IAEA, and UICC, etc. This has facilitated the access of Pakistani scientists and doctors to the relevant international institutions and provides opportunities for training in the field of nuclear medicines. Taking part in various seminars and workshops also keeps the nuclear medical professionals updated about the latest developments in this field.

Moreover, in the field of technical industry, the Heavy Mechanical Complex (HMC) Taxila is one of the leading organizations in Pakistan's engineering sector. It works with an aim of indigenization, self-reliance, and import substitution and to give technical support to the country's industrial sector. It also focuses on enhancing manufacturing, design, testing, and inspection capabilities to produce high-tech parts, components, and equipment for the thermal, hydel, and nuclear power plants and alternate energy projects. It is a state-of-the-art facility for forging, fabrication, machining, welding, and heat treatment. It is Pakistan's first engineering establishment that is certified by PNRA (Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority) to develop Nuclear Safety Class 1, 2, and 3 components and equipment in the country.

Hence it is quite comprehensible that Pakistan has successfully demonstrated its commitment towards using nuclear energy for the socio-economic development of the country. This implies that there is another side of the nuclear coin of Pakistan's nuclear program and that is the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Based on this, the international community needs to admit Pakistan's continuous efforts of compliance with the international practices of nuclear safety and security and regulatory control. The international arrangements like the NSG and other such cartels, which are supposed to facilitate and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, need to acknowledge Pakistan's achievements in this regard. The grant of NSG waiver to India while ignoring Pakistan's outstanding track record in peaceful uses of nuclear technology has raised questions on the credibility of international arrangements. There is a dire need for openness to new contenders with a non-discriminatory approach. Last but not the least, there should be discrimination between proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear technology at the international level.

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<https://strategic-times.com/blog/2022/05/31/pakistans-efforts-in-utilizing-nuclear-energy-in-for-peaceful-purpose/>

Nuclear Jingoism in Indian Foreign Policy: South Asian Security in Crisis

Komal Khan

Does 'no first-use policy' of India's nuclear doctrine under BJP's conservative regime hold credibility? If it is 'not first, but isn't it not second, either?' In theory, it maintains that it does. But in practice, Modi, like other populist authoritarian leaders including Kim Jong-un of North Korea, is trust deficit in this respect.

Shivshankar Menon, the former Indian national security advisor, in his book 'Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy,' while assessing threat potential emanating from 'no first use' nuclear policy of India, stipulated his views regarding the Indian nuclear doctrine of 'no first use.' His views shed light on the ambiguous posture of Indian nuclear doctrine where if the need arises, India could strike first against a nuclear weapon state.

Stephen P. Cohen in “Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in South Asia” states that the key factors that motivated India to conduct nuclear tests back in 1998 were the deepest assumptions and beliefs held by the Indian policy making community. It is important to mention here is that it was the BJP rule in 1998 that officially recognized India ‘a nuclear state’ after conducting nuclear tests in May same year.

In March 1998, the election manifesto released by the BJP government, led by Atal Behari Vajpayee, pledged for a ‘nuclear state of India’ under the BJP. This trend of Hindutva in India’s national security politics still remains relevant for BJP. The BJP’s manifesto commitment for Indian election 2014 also pledges revision and updating of the nuclear doctrine of India to meet the contemporary challenges. While securing his Hindu vote bank, his commitment for leadership was designed on war and military claims that called on his voters as ‘alert soldiers’. Modi’s war-mongering politics of nukes is a potential threat not only to the South and East Asia’s general and human security, but also to global security as well.

Stephen P. Cohen describes South Asia a region which is more dangerous and less stable due to concentration of nukes with politically and ideologically antagonistic states of Pakistan and India. In ‘Call from Chagai & Pokhran: New Nuclear Order!’ Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed alerts the international community to Kashmir dispute that has possible nuclear potential in case of future escalations. The domestic credibility of populist civil and military institutions in South Asia thrives on averse security agendas in their foreign policy. For Pakistan and India, Kashmir is a vital national security interest in their foreign policies. Particularly, the BJP has been a tough lobby on Kashmir.

In respect to the Hindutva ethno-nationalist claimed territory of Hindu Rashtra and Akhand Bharat, the BJP has remained in opposition to Kashmir’s status as a disputed territory and its autonomy under article 370. An episode like Pulwama in February 2019, the revoking of articles 35A and 370 and repeated border escalations with China and Pakistan can be taken as an election stunts of BJP’s populist government to secure vote bank at the cost of regional and global peace.

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<https://www.eurasiareview.com/31052022-nuclear-jingoism-in-indian-foreign-policy-south-asian-security-in-crisis-oped/>.

India's obsession with "Limited Strikes" and Options for Pakistan

Sher Bano

In April 2017, India announced its Joint Military Force Doctrine to counter the “full spectrum of Military Conflicts.” One of the significant developments in this doctrine is the Indian infatuation with “surgical strikes” with the usage of this term first time in September 2016. It was claimed that the surgical strike strategy was opted for counter-terrorism. In 2017 India trumped the card that it has managed to launch a successful surgical strike near LoC and Pakistan denied that claim and declared it cross-border firing. Again in 2019, New Delhi portrayed the Balakot surgical airstrike as an intelligence-based non-military preemptive strike against alleged non-state actors linked to Jammu & Kashmir’s armed independence movement. India hoped to hide its aggression behind the guise of self-defense and just the use of force. On the other hand, Pakistan has vehemently denied the existence of an alleged camp at the Balakot site.

For quite a long, India had no answer to the threat of terrorism but to rely on diplomatic maneuvering. However, the surgical strike was only a fake capsule to manage the pressure of the Indian people implying that their state is not sitting idly in response to so-called Pakistani-sponsored terrorism. The fact must be noted that a surgical strike is a military action involving an airstrike; it is required to be conducted with efficiency, precision, and the element of surprise in it. This fact has been asserted by various national and international security personalities and scholars. On the other hand, Indian gave a slightly different definition of what is considered a surgical strike; it is a military action done by forces with lightning speed to hit and destruct the enemy’s installation and come back to the same position.

By considering the option of the surgical strike as an effective response to terrorist activities India has created an option for itself in response to threats it is facing. Consideration of surgical strikes as a viable option, somehow, signifies the development of surgical strikes as an answer to sub-conventional threats on the part of India. At the same time, this action has generated a debate that whether nuclear deterrence will be affected or will remain the same.

Deterrence is something that halts the enemy not to be ambitious for launching an attack and threats are delivered with a focus that such desires will not be met to end without heavy

costs. Since 1998, India and Pakistan are practicing an arduous task of deterrence and are constantly involved in an arms race to manage their security dilemmas.

Since the Nuclearization of South Asia, Pakistan is trying to mitigate the effects of Indian non-conventional military build-up to secure some nuclear equilibrium. It can be claimed to a certain extent that Nuclearization and deterrence have helped India-Pakistan to avoid complete extinction of each other. However, deterrence has virtually failed on lower levels of strategic stability. The absence of deterrence stability at more moderate levels has created adequate space for both rivals to contest each other. Surgical strike and its so-called use in counter-terrorism is also an Indian attempt to exploit the gap below the nuclear threshold.

Therefore, immediate concerns rise about how manipulations in such a way can escalate the conflict. Pakistan is a relatively smaller state than India. Its military budget is less than the Indian military budget. Indian conventional superiority is a perceived threat to Pakistan and Pakistan is relying on its deterrence capability of nuclear arsenals as a counter-strategy to this threat.

Apparently considering a surgical strike as an option, India is challenging the effectiveness of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence. India is posing as a launch nuclear weapons is a tough decision for Pakistan, and in this way, India may exploit the gap below the nuclear threshold. By doing so, India is also undermining the logic of rationality and fear that are guiding principles of deterrence discourse. Deterrence cannot work in an environment where nuclear rivals don't even consider the rationale behind holding on considering the consequences.

Even though what India declared as the surgical strike was nothing but a false claim, Pakistan is not at liberty to think that the same kind of border skirmish will be declared as a surgical strike in the future. With robust military and conventional capabilities, India might consider launching an attack. Furthermore, conflicts below the nuclear threshold do have the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict, In that case, will deterrence be effective? Or is it alright for India to keep exploiting levels below the nuclear threshold? As a countermeasure, it is necessary for Pakistan to strengthen its deterrence capability.

As of now, India has entailed this term in its official doctrine. Pakistan needs to take certain measures. First and foremost, the conventional military build-up is the necessity of time, and conventional deterrence is unavoidable to tackle enemies like India. Recent developments in

India and support of the International community for India would not help Pakistan to rely on nuclear deterrence. Indian access to MTCR is also a threat to deterrence stability. Owing to this fact, India will be able to access technology like-cryogenic engines, predators' avenger's drones, arrow theatre missile defense interceptors so on that can also facilitate the Indian dream of surgical strikes.

Secondly, Pakistan needs the procurement of fissile material to fulfill its growing domestic and military needs. Especially after the Indo-US deal, Indian fissile material resources are increasing. According to a report published by Harvard University "Indian Nuclear Exceptionalism," India can produce 2200 nuclear weapons. By having access to fissile material Pakistan would be able to maintain deterrence as we know it, otherwise, the disparity will change the strategic equilibrium in South Asia. Thirdly, Pakistan needs to increase its surveillance capabilities and early warning capabilities and need to invest in UAV technology.

Lastly, to ensure deterrence it is necessary that the state should not only develop credibility but develop a mechanism to communicate it as well. Therefore, surgical strikes have enough potential to pose future challenges for Pakistan in the given conventional and deterrence environment.

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<https://strategic-times.com/blog/2022/05/31/indias-obsession-with-limited-strikes-and-options-for-pakistan/>

Role of its Nuclear Program in Socio-Economic Development of Pakistan

Ahyousha Khan

Pakistan's nuclear program is mired with many controversies, such as in many western literatures it is categorized as "fastest growing weapons program" or even referred as "Islamic bomb". One of the most common misperception of about Pakistan's nuclear program is that it is only to cater military purposes. Even if one looks at the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear program the fact that surfaces is Pakistan made the decision to build nuclear weapons after India's so called peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) "Smiling Buddha" in 1974.

Before 1974 although Pakistan was working to acquire nuclear technology but the program was focused on harvesting the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Even

after the decision to build nuclear deterrence against India was taken, Pakistan did not compromise the development of its civilian nuclear program. Today, Pakistan has acquired excellence in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in the fields of energy, medicine, agriculture and biodiversity to attain the socio-economic development of Pakistan. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) developed in 1956 is today operating 6 nuclear power plants with capacity of 3500MW electricity production, providing diagnosis and treatment of Cancer through 19 Atomic Energy Cancer Hospitals nationwide and has developed more than 125 crop varieties through 4 Agri Biotech Centers.

Pakistan is a developing country which is facing serious energy crisis where in summer many parts of the country face electricity blackouts for 10-12 hours and in winter domestic users and industries faced the low gas pressure or low supply. According to the reports of Economic Survey of Pakistan during that time Pakistan was losing around USD 4.8 billion of Gross Domestic Production annually for five consistent years. Resultantly, initially to counter its energy crisis Pakistan started importing oil, coal, and recently LNG, which caused higher prices of energy sources in Pakistan. Other than a cause of inflation and higher prices thermal energy sources in any energy mix are also massive source of climate change.

In recent years, Pakistan has taken a lot of steps to not only counter its energy crisis but also to diversify its energy mix. In this regards, according to the most recent estimates of April 2020, Pakistan's installed capacity of electricity generation increased by 7.5 % by reaching 35,972 megawatts in comparison to 33,452MW in April 2019. Moreover, to diversify its energy mix, Pakistan also increased reliance on hydro sources of power and increased hydro-power generation by nearly 5%. Another important factor with a lot of potential to tap is “nuclear power”, in year 2020 Pakistan increased energy generation through nuclear power plants from 3% to 8.2 % in its overall energy mix. Other than renewable energy sources like Hydro-power and Solar, Wind, and Bagasse-Based Power options, for future energy generation sources Pakistan should seriously pursue nuclear energy for achieving energy security. As even today the biggest energy source for country is thermal power, which means reliance on natural gas and import of oil and LPG that are already causing high inflation and energy crisis (especially in winter of 2021) in country.

Other than nuclear energy other areas where nuclear technology is playing its positive role in Pakistan is in agriculture. Along with the help of the IAEA, Pakistan has developed many facilities for the advancement of agriculture and to eliminate malnutrition and hunger from the country while simultaneously achieve the UNSDGs. In this regard Pakistan has adopted various irradiation techniques to increase the shelf life of food. Moreover, Pakistan has also developed 98- new high yielding and stress tolerant crops by using nuclear technology to fight the consequences of climatic changes. To ensure the availability of clean water for drinking and growing crops Pakistan is collaborating with IAEA. Furthermore, Pakistan has also built laboratories by collaborating with IAEA for mass breeding of insects that fight pests attacking the crops and thus the use of pesticides is decreased.

In Pakistan, nuclear technology has significant use in the field of medical science especially for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer disease. In this regard, over the years, 18 cancer treatment centers have been developed by PAEC where nearly 0.7 million cancer patients have been treated to date. This counts for almost 80% of the total cancer patients from all over the country.

These developments of Pakistan in utilizing the peaceful uses of nuclear technology are mostly ignored fact. However, Pakistan is consistently pursuing the socio-economic development goals by utilizing its technological prowess in field of nuclear sciences.

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<http://southasiajournal.net/role-of-its-nuclear-program-in-socio-economic-development-of-pakistan/>

Modi's Delimitation in IIOJK: Possible Motivations

Zukhruf Amin

Amid the world's undivided attention towards the Ukraine crisis, Kashmir remains under an environment of an unprecedented wave of violence and suppression manifested by the Indian forces. The ongoing human rights violations, domicile rules in the aftermath of the abrogation of Kashmir's special status, and the massive crackdown on the innocent Kashmiris have raised serious questions on the state of affairs in the self-proclaimed world's largest democracy. The

current situation in Kashmir has the ingredients needed for an inadvertent escalation in the region. The emerging dynamics demonstrate the reality of Modi's anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim's policy which is not merely an electoral strategy but also linked with Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and BJP's extremist vision of Hindu nationalism.

Delimitation is an act of redrawing the boundaries of an assembly to represent changes in population over time. The decision of redrawing these boundaries in Jammu and Kashmir was carried out by the Delimitation Commission which came into being on March 6, 2020; just six months after the abrogation of Kashmir's special status on August 5, 2019. Redefining the electoral boundaries by the Commission is a tragedy by itself. The Commission recently issued a list of increasing the number of seats in the Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK) from 83 to 90. This includes 6 constituencies which will be in the Hindu-majority Jammu region and one in the Muslim-majority Kashmir region. It is tragic as Jammu has 37 and Kashmir holds 46 seats.

The Commission proposed increasing the number of seats to 43 and 47 respectively. In addition, it also aimed the removal of the distinction between Jammu and Kashmir, considering it as one constituency. The same pattern was reflected in the combination of the Anantnag region in Kashmir with Rajouri and Poonch in Jammu to bring about a combined Anantnag-Rajouri as a Parliamentary constituency. The upcoming assembly elections on the basis of the Delimitation Commission's proposals will thus end up electing a Hindu chief minister for India's only Muslim-majority territory. Hence, it will be a trump card for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 2024 parliamentary elections.

The voting rights in the region were initially reserved for the permanent residents of Kashmir which was annulled after the 5th August move. Now, this unconstitutional move has also revived fears among the Kashmiris that the locals would be barred from the local legislatures, thus disempowering them systematically. The delimitation will not only save BJP from people traditionally opposed to it but also alienate the ethnic Kashmiri Muslims. It is evident that such moves are meant to institutionalize the Hindu-majority rule and reinforce the demographic changes in the occupied region. The process was hinted at when the Jammu and Kashmir Grant of Domicile Certificate (Procedure) Rules were passed in 2020 that allowed the issuance of domicile certificates to non-Kashmiris. The move stands in clear violation of Article

49 Geneva Convention 4 which states that “the occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”

Modi’s government has once again disregarded the constitution by reinstating the Delimitation Commission to turn an electoral majority into a minority. It testifies to the ultimate goal of demographic change in Kashmir, the heinous design behind the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35(A). The BJP government is focusing on a strategy to settle the Hindu migrants in the occupied region where Muslims make up almost 95% of the total population. Some other strategies for bringing demographic changes include land allotment for Pandits, Hindu Shrines, and establishing cantonments. It is a fact that such an environment of massive suppression, systematic alienation, and human rights violations are not conducive to peace in the region. The world holds a moral obligation to force India to implement the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) Resolutions. Based on UN resolutions, Pakistan also needs to develop a strong counter-narrative focusing on legal aspects of the Kashmir issue. The use of proactive diplomacy by Pakistan is also required for an effective strategy by the policymakers to project India’s human rights violations on all international forums.

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<https://strategic-times.com/blog/2022/05/29/modis-delimitation-in-iiojk-possible-motivations/>

South Asian Strategic Stability

Amber Afreen Abid

Ever since Pakistan became a nuclear weapon state, Pakistan’s nuclear diplomacy has been in practice on the principles of restraint and responsibility. Pakistan was even reluctant to enter the club of nuclear weapon states but soon after India had conducted its first nuclear test in the year 1974, going nuclear became Pakistan’s strategic compulsion. India’s series of nuclear tests in 1998 had compelled Pakistan to demonstrate its nuclear weapon capability accordingly to restore the strategic balance in South Asia. The development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capability primarily serves the purpose of a credible and reliable defense against the existential threat from India and maintaining peace and stability in the region. After the inevitable nuclearization of South Asia, Pakistan has never been a part of any arms race in South Asia.

Whereas India has always pushed Pakistan towards an arms race and Pakistan has to ultimately work to restore balance in the region. Pakistan is carrying the onus of maintaining strategic stability in the region and maintaining credible deterrent forces.

The overt nuclearization of the region demonstrated that the nuclear deterrent capabilities of both states helped them to establish deterrence stability. This fact goes consistent with the assumption of deterrence theory that once the two adversaries acquire nuclear deterrent capabilities, the matters will stabilize. Pakistan attaches great importance to its nuclear deterrent capability. The South Asia strategic environment is shaped as such where the nuclear deterrence between the two neighbors has frozen the possibility of an all-out war. Despite little probability of such a war, the two states have been engaged in a perpetual arms race and strategic competition. Ever since the partition, Pakistan and India have found themselves in great confrontation with each other. The communal hatred and religious bias were also transformed into political aspirations that further lead to widening the gap between the two states. This gap has only resulted in infusing mistrust and animosity towards each other.

Moreover, the interplay of several international, regional, and local factors poses daunting challenges for deterrence stability in South Asia. Besides, India's burgeoning behavior in the region continuously pushes the region towards an arms race, through the introduction of advanced delivery systems, more risk-acceptant doctrinal shifts, missile defense systems, hypersonic missiles and tactical, sea-based (surface and submarine), and dual-capable nuclear systems all raise new challenges for the strategic instability in South Asia. The Indian aspirations to accumulate maximum power based on its strategic partnerships with the technologically advanced countries in the world are characterized by the classic Indian strategic thinking to establish its hegemony in the region.

The introduction of new technology would only bring instability in the region, and would eventually greet the arms race, which is an expensive game and would result only in chaos in the already volatile South Asian region. Furthermore, the concept of deterrence would be ruled out, as the fear of mutual vulnerability would be diminished, and one side feeling vulnerable on the other could go for the offensive first strike; or out of the fear of attack, the other side could ultimately strike first. Moreover, to neutralize the defensive posture, due to India's offensive

burgeoning behavior, effective countermeasures would be taken by Pakistan, and resultantly arms race will rise in the region.

“The history of our strategic force development clearly indicates that Pakistan has never allowed this (strategic) balance to be disturbed to our disadvantage; we have always found effective solutions to redress induced imbalances from time to time,” has been reiterated by Lt. Gen (R) Khalid Kidwai. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is primarily India-centric and is aimed at deterring possible aggression from the eastern border. Pakistani leadership is cognizant of the growing conventional asymmetries vis-à-vis India and therefore resolves to not adhere to the ‘no-first-use’ option. Pakistani leadership intentionally exercises ambiguity with regard to the country’s willingness to use nuclear weapons in order to additionally strengthen the credibility of nuclear deterrence. The nuclear deterrent of Pakistan is believed to be based on the principle of credible minimum deterrence. The introduction of full-spectrum deterrence does not in general negate the guidelines of credible minimum deterrence; rather the former complements the latter.

Since Pakistan is committed to ensuring the credibility of its nuclear deterrent, which is expected to deter possible aggression of any sort – be it conventional or nuclear – the adoption of full-spectrum deterrence is by no means a violation of minimalism rather it reinforces the credibility of country’s deterrence. The full-spectrum deterrence is an implication of India’s aggressive military thinking. Therefore, in order to strengthen the deterrence stability of the region, it is first important that the two countries refrain from devising aggressive military doctrines and postures. It is also the need of the hour that two states enter into some meaningful arms control mechanism that could help them mitigate differences and explore the possibilities of cooperation.

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