



# VISION

VISIONARY INSIGHTS INTO THE STRATEGIC INQUESTS OF NATIONS

## SVI FORESIGHT

VOLUME 8, NUMBER 1

JANUARY 2022

Compiled & Edited by:

Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai

**Strategic Vision Institute**  
**Islamabad**

# SVI FORESIGHT

VOLUME 8, NUMBER 1  
JANUARY 2022

Compiled & Edited by:  
Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai



**Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)**

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this edition are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Strategic Vision Institute.

## **Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)**

---

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is an autonomous, multidisciplinary, and non-partisan institution, established in January 2013. It is a non-governmental and non-commercial organization, administered by a Board of Governors (General Body) supervised under a Chairperson and administered by a Management Committee headed by a President/Executive Director.

SVI aims to project strategic foresight on issues of national and international import through dispassionate, impartial, and independent research, analyses, and studies. The current spotlight of the SVI is on national security, regional and international peace and stability, strategic studies, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and strategic stability, nuclear safety, and security and energy studies.

## **SVI Foresight**

---

*SVI Foresight* is a monthly electronic journal. It has a multi-disciplinary perspective highlighting contemporary strategic and security studies. The Journal is envisioned to be a collection of policy-oriented articles written by its Research Associates, Visiting Faculty, and professional experts. The objective is to provide the readership with a concise all-around and real-time policy-oriented discourse on contemporary strategic regional and international developments, highlighting their relevance to Pakistan.

## **Contents**

<i>Editor's Note</i> .....	1
<i>Russia-Pakistan Growing Strategic Partnership</i> .....	3
<i>Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai</i> .....	3
<i>India Launches 3rd ARIHANT-Class Nuclear-Powered Submarine</i> .....	5
<i>Sher Bano</i> .....	5
<i>India's Nuclear Doctrine: Misleading Document</i> .....	6
<i>Ahyousha Khan</i> .....	6
<i>South Asia and New Nuclear Technology</i> .....	9
<i>Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai</i> .....	9
<i>Contours of National Security Policy of Pakistan 2022-2026</i> .....	11
<i>Sher Bano</i> .....	11
<i>Babur Cruise Missile: Pakistan Strengthening its Deterrence</i> .....	13
<i>Ahyousha Khan</i> .....	13
<i>Advancement of UAVs and Future of Warfare in South Asia</i> .....	15
<i>Ahyousha Khan</i> .....	15
<i>Strengthening Sea Based Deterrence: Pakistan's Quest for Strategic Equilibrium</i> .....	17
<i>Sher Bano</i> .....	17
<i>Undiminished Scars of 1971 Tragedy – II</i> .....	19
<i>Asif Haroon Raja</i> .....	19

## Editor's Note

The relationship between Moscow and Islamabad in the past has never been smooth yet both states have recently entered a new era of their strategic partnership. A strategic shift can be noted while looking at the recent geopolitical developments in the region. Afghanistan is one of the main regional factors that have brought Russia and Pakistan to the same page. The Russia Pakistan rapprochement is a signal for the United States not to ignore Pakistan's serious concerns.

With reference to South Asian strategic stability, Pakistan never considered Indian nuclear doctrine as India's actual policy intentions because of the contradictory statements in the document and differences in actual capabilities pursuit by India from the one required by India, if doctrine is to be followed. However, this lack of clarity in Indian policy circles of issues of NFU, CMD and massive retaliation is issue for Pakistan in case of crisis and peace. In crisis, this lack of clarity fuels "uncertainty" and "higher alert" and in case of peace, it is fueling "arms race" as India under the pressure of its industrial complex is accumulating, building and acquiring modern technologies.

The recent hyped about cruise missile in today's international system are hypersonic cruise missiles or hypersonic glide vehicles. Global powers are competing to being able to deploy this technology. India is also taking part in this global race and has claimed that it has developed a "scramjet" technology. Question in this regard is that whether Pakistan would also invest in hypersonic cruise missiles or it could maintain the strategic deterrence without this.

Pakistan is continuously strengthening its sea-based capabilities in order to deter India's triad of land, sea, and air-launched nuclear weapons. There should not be any doubt about Pakistan's capabilities and resolve to the challenges postured by the latest developments both in conventional and nuclear realms in South Asia.

On January 14, 2022, Prime Minister Imran Khan launched the public version of the Pakistan's first ever National Security Policy 2022-2026. Overall, it is an impressive policy document that covers various aspects of Pakistan's National Security. NSD (National Security Division) should be given the credit for putting something that was understood on a piece of paper in the form of official policy. It would prove to be an engine to move forward and for putting thoughts into action. It would be stimulating to see the operationalization of the policies presented in NSP-1.

It is hoped that readers will find a good blend of articles focusing on various aspects of the contemporary security discourse in South Asia. The *SVI Foresight* team invites and highly encourages contributions from the security and strategic community in the form of opinion-based short commentaries on contemporary political, security, and strategic issues. Any suggestions for further improvements are welcome at our [contact address](#). Please see [here](#) the copy of the *SVI Foresight* electronic journal. You can find us on [Facebook](#) and [Twitter](#) and can also access the [SVI website](#).

*Editor SVI Foresight,  
Islamabad.*

## *Russia-Pakistan Growing Strategic Partnership*

*Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai*

The relationship between Moscow and Islamabad in the past has never been smooth yet both states have recently entered a new era of their strategic partnership. A strategic shift can be noted while looking at the recent geopolitical developments in the region. Afghanistan is one of the main regional factors that have brought Russia and Pakistan to the same page.

Moreover, the US is also a major factor in shaping the Russia-Pakistan relationship. Moscow and Islamabad seems stimulating their strategic partnership. Islamabad needs Russia to reduce its dependency on Washington. Islamabad tries to realize Washington that it has other options if its relationship is not good with the latter. Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, its relationship is not smooth with Pakistan. It's a history of US-Pakistan partnership or alliance that ends by lifting relations souring.

When the US interest served in the late 1980s by defeating its Cold War rival in Afghanistan, the US in the end put Pressler Amendment in place and Pakistan came under the US sanctions. Though Pakistan played its cards differently in the post-9/11 alliance with the US, the relationship never remained smooth after winding up the US Afghanistan war. The gap between Pakistan and the United States has provided for closeness between Moscow and Islamabad. Moreover, India-US collaboration is also the main factor that pushes Pakistan closer to Russia. Islamabad needs a new political and strategic partner that could have defense, strategic and economic ties with it. Pakistan is interested in advanced Russian military equipment in addition to technology. It has also signed the North-South gas pipeline that will connect Karachi-Lahore.

Similarly, Russia is interested in the CASA-1000 energy project that would provide electricity to Pakistan and Afghanistan. The renovation of the Karachi steel mill by Russia is also under consideration. On the contrary, Russia needs Pakistan due to its strategic location. Though Russia-Pakistan does not share any border yet the latter is next to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Militancy and extremism in Afghanistan and Central Asia were a prime concern of Russia in the past for which Pakistan was considered a supporter. However, the changing circumstances in the

region have cleared Moscow's concerns. Russia assumes Pakistan is key to putting Afghanistan on the path of stability. A stable Afghanistan and close strategic relations with Islamabad may enable Moscow to play an active role in the Indo-Pacific. Russia and Pakistan are also quite close in defense cooperation. Russia is providing Mi-35M helicopters to Pakistan.

Moreover, Pakistan has gotten 20 Mi-35Ms helicopters as well. Joint military exercises Druzhbha and Aman naval exercises are also an example of Russia-Pakistan's close defense cooperation in the recent past. Besides, defense cooperation, there is a vast potential in the field of communication, energy sector, space technology, tourism, and steel production. In order to achieve multiple objectives, there is a shift in Pakistan's foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia. In the past, there was a gap between Moscow and Islamabad. However, there is a realization now in Pakistan that distant allies and ignoring nearer powers have cost Pakistan economically, politically, and strategically. At the same time, Pakistan cannot detach itself from the United States for a number of reasons.

However, the Russia Pakistan rapprochement is a signal for the United States not to ignore Pakistan's serious concerns. On the other hand, India is concerned about Russia-Pakistan's close cooperation. However, Moscow believes close cooperation with Pakistan can bring India and Pakistan towards normalization of their relations. However, any robust defense cooperation between Moscow and Islamabad may affect India-Russia relations. Russia would not want its relations with India to be affected. India is a larger market for Russian goods and defense sales as compared to Pakistan. Russia would be very cautious while in its defense cooperation with Pakistan. Both states are members of BRICS, SCO, and RIC. Hence, in any case, Russia would not like to take any step that could irritate India. Nevertheless, Russia has the opportunity at the moment that its interests are converging with that of Pakistan and both can play a positive role in the region especially Afghanistan. The current potential to further Russia-Pakistan cooperation is an opportunity for both countries to build a comprehensive partnership.

<http://southasiajournal.net/russia-pakistan-growing-strategic-partnership/>.

*Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai is Senior Research Associate at Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad.*

## ***India Launches 3rd ARIHANT-Class Nuclear-Powered Submarine***

*Sher Bano*

As per a report by the UK-based Janes Defence Weekly on December 29, 2021, India on November 23, 2021, quietly launched its third SSBN (Nuclear Missile Submarine) at the secretive SBC (Ship Building Centre) in Visakhapatnam. Neither the Indian Navy nor the Ministry of Defense confirmed the news but according to the sources in the SBC (Ship Building Centre) in Visakhapatnam and Indian navy, the launch of the submarine was confirmed. The newly launched SSBN called S4 could be critical for India's credible nuclear deterrence like the previous two SSBNs and could have serious implications for South Asian security.

The submarine has been built jointly by the DAE (Department of Atomic Energy), DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation), Russian technicians and scientists, and Indian Navy personnel. The publication also reported that the submarine has been relocated near the fitting-out wharf that was previously occupied by the INS Arighat which was launched in 2014 but still waits its commissioning delayed due to pandemic. As per the report, the satellite imagery shows that at 7000 tonnes, the SSBN is slightly larger, with 125.4m load waterline measurement as compared to the 6000 tonne and 111.6 m load waterline measurement of INS Arighat which is considered the lead boat in its class. Hence the S4 could be categorized as a successive boat of Arihant class variants. The magazine further reported that the additional length of the submarine shows the expansion of the vertical launch system of the submarine, it could support nearly eight launch tubes (missiles) which are double as compared to the previous SSBN. The submarine would be able to carry eight K-4 SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles) or 24 K-15 SLBMs with 3500 km and 750 km strike range respectively. However, the K-4 missile is still under development and has not been launched yet.

India in its quest to complete its nuclear triad plans to build six SSNs (Nuclear Powered Submarines). The naval platform is considered to be the most significant leg of the nuclear triad as it assures the second-strike capability of the state. But looking at India's ambiguous NFU (No First Use Policy) such developments could become a huge threat to the strategic stability of South Asia. The development of SSBNs by India is a matter of concern for not only Pakistan and the Indian Ocean littoral states but for the international community as well. With the development of nuclear-powered submarines, India has entered the club of a handful of countries that can construct, design, and operate such submarines.

The belligerent and aggressive attitude of India's leadership raises serious concerns regarding responsible nuclear stewardship in India and threatens the strategic stability of South Asia. Construction of SSBNs and increased frequency of missile tests every year shows the aggressive posturing of India. Moreover, the deployment of nuclear weapons by India also requires the international community to reassess the non-proliferation benefits provided to India by various arms control and non-proliferation cartels. Pakistan being a responsible nuclear state is committed to the objective of strategic stability in the region. Pakistan believes that the only way forward for both states is to agree on nuclear and missile restraint measures.

Pakistan is also continuously strengthening its sea-based capabilities in order to deter India's triad of land, sea, and air-launched nuclear weapons. There should not be any doubt about Pakistan's capabilities and resolve to the challenges postured by the latest developments both in conventional and nuclear realms in South Asia. Pakistan has already built Baber-3 (Sea Launched Cruise Missile) that has MIRV (Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle) capabilities to counter the growing submarine capability of India. It would provide a credible second-strike capability to Pakistan which would augment the existing deterrence considering the provocative nuclear posture and strategies in the neighborhood by developing ship-borne nuclear missiles and nuclear submarines. Other than that, even though India had successfully tested K-4 missiles, its range still remains sub-optimal which would require the SSBN to operate at the Bay of Bengal's northeastern fringes. This means that these submarines in order to target China's economic and political hubs would have to travel around the Bangladeshi and Burmese littoral waters. Hence India's sea-based deterrence capability would remain incomplete unless it is able to deploy an SSBN fleet with intercontinental-range missiles.

<http://southasiajournal.net/india-launches-3rd-arihant-class-nuclear-powered-submarine/>

*Sher Bano is Research Affiliate at Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad.*

## ***India's Nuclear Doctrine: Misleading Document***

***Ahyousha Khan***

If one has to define "doctrines" in simplest forms they are beliefs or cluster of beliefs on certain issue of importance. On level of nation states doctrines serves as "stated principle by any government authority" which can also be used to govern the capability and capability can be of

any nature (theological, ideological, political and military). nuclear doctrines are part of larger dimension of “military doctrines”, in general military doctrines provide the guidelines to forces that in which environment they might have to operate and which kind of capability the military forces could use against the adversary.

Moreover, military doctrines are drafted in a way that they try to maximize the capabilities of forces in service of attaining the national interests of the nation. These doctrines prioritize the threats for a state, at operational level all military forces (land, air and sea) have their own service doctrines which emanates from the larger military doctrine of the state. With the invention of the nuclear weapons and after witnessing their massive destruction and continuous development in technology it became imperative for states to devise a set of principles that could provide guide the development, employment and deployment of its nuclear forces. Moreover, as nuclear weapons change the nature of warfare, previously doctrines guides state how to fight war now with the invention of nuclear weapons they have to be developed to “stop the war”. Although, the purpose of the one of the major component of the military doctrine was changed but even than nuclear doctrines of any state must have the ability to reflect the intention of “actual use of force” to dissuade the adversary from any misadventure. The credibility of a nuclear doctrine is nullified, if there is a huge gap in the capability of a state and the threat it is issuing to its adversary through its nuclear doctrine.

In case of South Asia, Pakistan and India are two hostile nuclear neighbors, where India has a declared nuclear doctrine. On the other hand side, Pakistan does not have a declared nuclear doctrine and has adopted a “bit by bit approach”, which is gradual declaration of its policies, threshold, and development and deployment capabilities of its nuclear weapons to remain dynamic in response to Indian hegemonic actions.

It is true that there was no “formal” or “explicit” nuclear doctrine by the Indian forces before August 1999, but there were indirect/unspoken options and policy for the use of nuclear weapons. In 1990s committees were formulated to examine nuclear weapon issues and advised the Prime Minister on these issues. One of the committee assessed the “cost of a nuclear deterrent” in 1985 and reported it to the PM Rajiv Gandhi. Another committee presented the guideline to “formulate procedures for effective control of the nation’s nuclear arsenal and other issues related to nuclearisation” and report was presented to the P. V. Narasimha government.

These developments indicate that India was working on some of the very important tenants of its nuclear policy before the tests of May 1998. Right after the over nuclearization, India's than national security advisor Brajesh Mishra presented the document commonly known as "Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) as a guiding principles for India's nuclear capability. Indian government never approved the DND but for many coming years the DND was referred to as the parameter of India's strategic thinking, which was misleading because when 2003 India actually operationalized its military doctrine there were many important tenants which were not present that were previously part of the DND.

After a decade or so of issuance of Indian nuclear doctrine BJP's election manifesto before 2014 election, statements from retired NSA Shivsnakar Menon, former defence minister Manohar Parikar comments and former Strategic Forces Commander Lt. Gen. B.S. Nagal views started a new wave of debate in International media and academia. Cornerstone of this debate is that India would consider a nuclear first use as a preemptive counterforce attack against Pakistan and that India has already relinquished the policy of NFU.

Advocates of changing Indian nuclear doctrine in Indian policy making circles are of the view that as India's security environment is changing, its nuclear doctrine should also change to add element of "credibility" and "transparency" to India's nuclear policy, posture and review. The debate on Indian nuclear doctrine reflects India has started about taking actual measures to change its nuclear doctrine. However, in reality Indian nuclear doctrine has always been an open ended document with a lot of lacunas and jargons, which gave Indian policy makers a huge space to stir the policy in any direction that seems favorable to them.

In present times there are very little chances that India might actually change its nuclear doctrine document because its current doctrine is full of ambiguities and lingual lacunas that do not commit India to any singular policy and allows it to pursue offensive capabilities. Scholars argue that it is not necessary for India to go for explicit change in policy of NFU because internally India could contemplate and plan for nuclear weapons use without diplomatically acknowledging it.

Moreover on the basis of this diplomatic image of restrain through NFU, India is building its case in Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and is trying to be accepted in global nuclear

mainstream. Thus, explicit change in Indian nuclear doctrine would damage this objective of India. However, new offensive military capabilities and clash with China on border are putting evident strain on India's claim of NFU, wherein international commentators consider India's military build-up contrary to its NFU pledge and domestic commentators argue in favor of ending NFU pledge amid conflicts with India.

With reference to South Asian strategic stability, Pakistan never considered Indian nuclear doctrine as India's actual policy intentions because of the contradictory statements in the document and differences in actual capabilities pursuit by India from the one required by India, if doctrine is to be followed. However, this lack of clarity in Indian policy circles of issues of NFU, CMD and massive retaliation is issue for Pakistan in case of crisis and peace. In crisis, this lack of clarity fuels "uncertainty" and "higher alert" and in case of peace, it is fueling "arms race" as India under the pressure of its industrial complex is accumulating, building and acquiring modern technologies.

<https://www.eurasiareview.com/27012022-indias-nuclear-doctrine-misleading-document-oped/>.

*Ahyousha Khan is a Research Associate, Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad.*

## ***South Asia and new nuclear Technology***

***Zafar Iqbal Yousafzai***

The development and deployment of nuclear technology are bringing a shift around the world. South Asia is no exception. The deployment and quest for sophisticated weapons may alter the dynamics of nuclear deterrence. The China-US and Russia-US rivalry have a deep impact on the South Asian strategic dynamics. The non-nuclear long-range precision strike capabilities, advanced missile defense systems, hypersonic weapons, counter space race, and cyber warfare are new challenges for deterrence and stability in the region.

India has always sought advanced strategic weapons that have indulged the region in an arms race. Whether it was the quest for nuclear weapons in the 1960s or the nuclear deal with the US in the new millennium, it has badly affected the region and has caused a sense of insecurity in Pakistan that has compelled Pakistan to go for the same in order to attain balance of power. Thus, the arms race is going more acute than in any other area of the world. This vicious cycle is very difficult to break in the current circumstances.

The advent of strategic non-nuclear weapons and its race between the major powers also inclined India and Pakistan to seek the same. Though both the states are quite behind the major powers in this field, it is not possible to stop them from acquiring it. If on one hand, India is seeking sophisticated technology, on the other hand, China is building and developing its own sophisticated weaponry and technology. China is building its technology to compete with the United States; India is following China to counterbalance while Pakistan makes efforts for the balance of power in South Asia in order to avoid any conflict that may result due to any strategic imbalance.

Hence, the US-China competition and then their relationship with New Delhi and Islamabad also provide for the strategic transformation of South Asia. When India signed the civil nuclear deal with the United States, it had a huge impact on Pak-US relations by deteriorating it. Similarly, it resulted in close cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad. A few years after the Indo-US nuclear deal, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project and Belt and Road Initiative surfaced which further strengthened China-Pakistan relations.

Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, US-Pakistan relations are at their lowest ebb. However, the US needs Pakistan to cooperate in counter-terrorism efforts and Afghanistan. Afghanistan's situation is still uncertain after five-month since the Taliban has taken control of the country. The US as well as the international community has eyes on the Taliban administration what direction they set their channels. Besides, the US wants to keep its contact alive with the Pakistan army. However, Pakistan wants a stable and smooth relationship with the United States as well as with China. Though US-Pakistan relations are not smooth at the moment, these are decades old and have a long history of cooperation during various times especially Cold War and the war on terror. Pakistan is also one of the main recipients of US aid. Yet at the same time, China is a reliable strategic partner. The main thing that is lacking in US-Pakistan relations is trust. The trust deficit is one of the main factors that provide for irritants in US-Pakistan relations all the time.

Though India shares concerns about the Chinese rise with the United States in the Indo-Pacific India is not willing to serve the US interests. India wants to maintain its economic growth by avoiding any serious conflict. However, her strategic culture and quest for sophisticated weapons are disturbing the strategic balance in South Asia. Besides the nuclear arms race, the

developments of non-nuclear technologies also contribute to the geopolitical competition in the region and will have an impact on the future of the region as well. Still, there is time with India to avoid unnecessary quest for weapons and technology and save the region from any instability that could lead the region to war and destruction.

<http://southasiajournal.net/south-asia-and-new-nuclear-technology/>.

## ***Contours of National Security Policy of Pakistan 2022-2026***

***Sher Bano***

On January 14, 2022, Prime Minister Imran Khan launched the public version of the Pakistan's first ever National Security Policy 2022-2026. He was of the view that now the country is headed towards the right direction. Earlier only one-dimensional mindset prevailed in the country that Pakistan only needs military security, but the new security policy has defined the term 'security' in the right manner. It wants to co-locate Pakistan in evolving global trends by identifying the priorities and objectives of the policy under a foreseeable and prevalent regional and global environment.

The National Security Policy has recognized both non-traditional and traditional aspects of the security or threats. However, the core of comprehensive national security is 'economic security' that any policy framework that is environment savvy would have done. The purpose is not to replace geopolitics by geo-economics but has insisted upon the complementing roles of both. It indicates that the stronger economy would result in a robust security by allotting more resources to defence and national security. The NSP appreciates the symbiotic relationship among traditional, human and economic security in an emerging environment that contains various centers of military and economic power within the contemporary global landscape that is moving towards multipolarity. It also recognizes Pakistan's proximity to global flashpoints, its geostrategic location, global competition which is something considered as our negative relevance to the global and regional power construct. The policy stresses upon looking forward approach and proactivity of the policy makers of the state. The policy would be a success if there are actionable steps that remain in step with the evolving global environment, improving our internal security, external relations and bringing societal harmony within the state.

However, the public version of the NSP does not provide details regarding the specifics of foreseeable and prevalent global, regional and domestic security environment; National interest of Pakistan and the framework to protect them. Various other policies such as economic policy, internal policy, defence policy and foreign policy etc. would also be extracted from the mother document and would contain greater detail. This policy document provides an insight into the country's national security overall direction and vision. There is greater hope that the civil-military collaboration through which this document has been created would have used rigorous approach in classifying the hierarchy of National purpose e.g., objectives, aims, interests etc. that NDU has been teaching to the generations of policy makers.

Following are some the important takeaways from the document; Section I of the NSP is about the process and the periodic review of NSP. The Section II explains in detail the concept, vision and principles of the National Security Policy for its successful implementation. There are six thematic sections followed by Section II. In the Section III policy guidelines and opportunities for national cohesion were identified. The details regarding securing the economic future of Pakistan by identifying opportunities and challenges were provided in Section IV. Defence and territorial integrity was discussed in Section V whereas Section VI deals with the internal security of the state. Foreign policy of Pakistan in emerging global framework was provided a huge space in Section VII. The last Section VIII was devoted to the human security.

The policy document reiterates that Pakistan would ensure its deterrence, defence, space and cyber-security and territorial integrity at all costs. It would defend any sort of aggression through FSD (Full Spectrum Deterrence) that also CSD (Credible Minimum Deterrence) without indulging in any arms race. This robust policy framework talks more openly about both non-conventional and conventional means of deterring the enemy. It also emphasizes upon promoting Positive reality of Pakistan. It reiterates that only vital interest of Pakistan is peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Furthermore, it stresses upon Pakistan's economic ties and mutual cooperation with the GCC. It also focuses on building stronger relation with US through cooperation in trade, investment, counter-terrorism, intelligence cooperation and security and leaving behind the camp politics.

Overall, it is a very impressive document that covers various aspects of Pakistan's National Security. NSD (National Security Division) should be given the credit for putting

something that was understood on a piece of paper in the form of official policy. It would prove to be an engine to move forward and for putting thoughts into action. It would be stimulating to see the operationalization of the policies presented in NSP-1.

<https://www.eurasiareview.com/28012022-contours-of-national-security-policy-of-pakistan-2022-2026-oped/>.

## ***Babur Cruise Missile: Pakistan Strengthening its Deterrence***

***Ahyousha Khan***

A month of December 2021 Pakistan successfully tested “indigenously developed” Babur cruise missile 1b. In this recent test, Pakistan enhanced the range off the Babur cruise missile 1b, although it was not revealed that how much the range was enhanced in official statement from the ISPR. But Associated Press Pakistan has stated that now the range of the cruise missile is almost 900 kilometres which is twice the range of the previous versions of the same missile. The previous versions of the Barber cruise missile his only range of 450 kilometres. The DG Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan in his official statement states that the purpose of the test is to enhance “Pakistan’s strategic deterrence”.

Today Pakistan strategic deterrence is based on the concept of “full spectrum deterrence” which is only “India-centric”. The purpose of the Pakistan’s strategic deterrence is to bring “every Indian target” within the range of its nuclear missiles. According to the Lt. General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, Pakistan deterrence capability must allow it to choose it from the variety of options against variety of targets. The purpose of the Pakistan’ nuclear missiles and its strategic capability are to deter threats emanating from its adversary from “sub-conventional to strategic levels”. Thus, missile development by Pakistan is based on the logic of averting conventional and strategic attacks, dynamism and cost-effectiveness vis-à-vis its nuclear adversary in the South Asia.

South Asia in last two decades witnessed the development of missile technology including cruise missiles, ICBMs and MIRVs along with simultaneous acquisition and development of missile defence systems by India. Missile defence system development and acquisition by India was based on the objective to deny the existing “mutual vulnerability” between both South Asian neighbours. Moreover, it was to achieve a “sense of security” from the threat of being attacked. Thus, to maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis its adversary Pakistan invested in cruise missile technology.

Today, Pakistan is capable of launching cruise missiles (nuclear tipped and conventional) from land, sea, submerged platforms and air. Development of cruise missile option for Pakistan was necessary response against India's BMD development and acquisitions. In the latest saga of India's BMD acquisition saga India is importing much hyped S-400 missile defence system, which is "considered as best available missile defence system in the market" and the first batteries of the said system is to be deployed in Indian Punjab. Although, it is said that S-400 missile defence system is effective against cruise missiles, aerial targets and UAVs other than ballistic missiles but in reality, due to the high maneuverability and terrain hugging capability of cruise missiles they are highly difficult target to intercept. Ballistic missile defenses despite given much hyped to are penetrable, through missiles, decoys, MIRVs and UAVs. With recent advancement in UAVs and Swarm drones technology, it is deemed favorable by many scholars that BMDs could be overwhelmed and destroyed through swarm technologies. However, though this swarm technology is highly effective but all states have not yet achieved the level of sophistication and advancement in IA to manage the swarms.

In this regard missile systems are attractive, cost-effective, advanced, précised and sophisticated enough technology against missile and air defence systems. Moreover, due to recent advancements in missile technology cruise missiles are capable of high precision striking while dodging the missile defence systems of the adversary. Thus, in this regard the Pakistan's cruise missiles provide it the capability to hit target with precision strike without being intercepted by the adversary missile defence systems. As they fulfil the role of maintain the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence, nuclear tipped cruise missiles are of strategic importance to Pakistan. In current situation where India is working towards upsetting the deterrence equilibrium in the region by inducting more and more sophisticated military technology, cruise missile technology of Pakistan provide it with reliable mean to maintain the deterrence equilibrium in the region.

The recent hyped about cruise missile in today's international system are hypersonic cruise missiles or hypersonic glide vehicles. Global powers are competing to being able to deploy this technology. India is also taking part in this global race and has claimed that it has developed a "scramjet" technology. Question in this regard is that whether Pakistan would also invest in hypersonic cruise missiles or it could maintain the strategic deterrence without this.

<https://modern diplomacy.eu/2022/01/28/test-of-babur-cruise-missile-pakistan-strengthening-its-strategic-deterrence/>.

## *Advancement of UAVs and Future of Warfare in South Asia*

*Ahyousha Khan*

Although drones considered as a modern day technology but their history can be traced in World War I and II as flying bombs and inaccurate devices, than in Cold War as surveillance and reconnaissance devices and later on right after the Cold War drone technology contributed in artillery and surveillance missions. However, than these weapons did not have their current day sophistication; start of 21st century, digitalization and computer based systems with the help of automated maps and satellites provided the current level of sophistication to drone technology. In 21st century this technology gains their notoriety when Bush Administration used them against terrorists in many countries, which lead to the debate of violation of sovereignty of states and elements of transparency in killings. Owing to their ability of ISR, precision striking and air support these weapons became widely sought after weaponry in arsenals of nations states.

Today, states are using these weapons against each other not just for ISR but also against to fight wars such as in case of Nagorno-Karabakh. South Asia is a home to two rival nuclear neighbors which are interlocked in to situation of uneasy peace due to many territorial disputes, hostile borders and deep rooted mistrust. The deterrence equation between both countries is getting effected due to continuous technological developments, offensive policy and doctrinal initiatives and because of the involvement of global powers in the region. In terms of technological developments recently both countries are working towards acquiring and operationalizing sophisticated drone technology. Therefore, the essential question in this wake is to analyze the trends of UAVs technology development and acquisition in Pakistan and India, while also it is important to analyze the impact of this technology in any future conflict.

In terms of drone technology recently Pakistan's GIDS (Global Industrial and Development Solutions) showcased its Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) Shahpar-II drone, which is indigenously developed by the NESCOM and was also displayed at the military parade on 23 March, 2021 by the country. According to the media sources, Pakistan's Shahpar-II is equivalent to the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 with its carrying capacity of nearly 170 kg and other capabilities. Other than, Shahpar-II, Pakistan also inked the contract with Turkish Aerospace

Industry to develop MALE combat drone. Moreover, Pakistan also acquired 4 Cai HONG MALE UAVs from China and in 2018 both countries inked the agreement where China would sell 48 Wing Long II drones to Pakistan. Other than this international collaboration there are indigenously developed drones by Pakistan such as Buraq and Shahpar-1, which are in service and Pakistan has operationalized them against terrorists and for ISR at its eastern border. India after its strategic agreements with the US is also in process of acquiring several high-end military UAVs. At the moment it is in process of procuring 30 MQ-9B Predator UAVs from the US, Heron from Israel and has already inducted guardian drones from the US for its Navy. With the arrival of drones technology in the region India is heavily investing in anti-drone technology as well.

On the other hand, Pakistan has so far not invested in anti-drone technology. But with the recent trend where Pakistan alone till mid of year 2021 shot down 8 India Spy small drones or quad copters reflect that in future Pakistan might need to invest in certain kind of air defence system that would also provide defense against drones ingress at its borders. India, recently in month of December, handed over its armed forces, locally developed and anti-drone system along with automated air-launch system and advance countermeasure radar system. Recently given anti-drone system to Indian armed forces possess the “soft-kill” and “hard-kill” capabilities, which means it can electronically jam in the incoming drones and through laser strike can kill it as well. India is also deploying its recently acquired batteries and systems of S-400 anti-aircraft and anti-missile system along with its border against Pakistan. As drones are less expensive than combat air planes and can achieve the objective of increasing in adversary’s homeland they will be preferred by a state that wants to exploit the territorial boundaries between states.

At the moment due to current Indian strategic thinking where it deems fit to exploit the levels below the nuclear threshold by conducting surgical strikes armed UAVs could together with capability to target adversaries aerial capability could give the “false sense of superiority” to India, which could lead to it using drones as a mean to conduct surgical air strike. However, any such situation will require Pakistan to respond to Indian offensive actions because in 2019 crisis, Pakistan showed its commitment towards its reliance on the policy of “quid pro quo plus”. Thus, what is needed is to realize that levels below the nuclear threshold, even if they seem exploitable, are not exploitable without the risks of escalation of crisis into full blown conflict. Drone is a technology which provides both countries with numerous benefits for not only their security but

also for the development of their society, thus it is important that both countries remain cautious in their use.

<http://southasiajournal.net/advancement-of-uavs-and-future-of-warfare-in-south-asia/>

## ***Strengthening Sea Based Deterrence: Pakistan's Quest for Strategic Equilibrium***

***Sher Bano***

Pakistan's Navy on December 8, 2021 conducted a successful live-fire test of SAMs "surface to air missiles" at Karachi port demonstrating its GBAD "Ground Based Air Defense". It was a joint venture carried out by Pakistan's navy and air defence unit, showcasing the armed forces combat readiness. Strengthening its sea based nuclear capabilities would allow Pakistan to counter India's growing BMD "Ballistic Missile Defence" capability and other technological developments by Indian navy. The Pakistan's pursuit to enhance its sea based deterrence is defined by concept of mutual vulnerability and is based on rational calculations. In the evolving maritime environment, if there is no effective nuclear deterrent at sea by Pakistan, the chances of conflict escalation and the probability of use of nuclear weapons would also increase.

As per the spokesperson of Pakistan's Navy, the missiles successfully hit the target in the live-fire test. Admiral Muhmaad Amjad Khan Niazi (The Chief of Naval Staff) was chief guest at the occasion. He was updated about the ongoing developments, operational capabilities' of Pakistan navy and how the induction of SAMs would augment the security. The Chief of Naval Staff expressed his satisfaction over the operational readiness of the navy. He reassured that Pakistan navy is fully ready and prepared to prevent any nefarious strategy against the country. The Pakistan navy earlier also conducted "steel cutting" at Karachi shipyard in order to begin the work on fifth hanger class submarine that would be first of its kind to be indigenously built by Pakistan navy. This submarine is the part of agreement of eight submarines with China that have the capability to attack various targets simultaneously. In 2015, Pakistan bought eight submarines from China. Pakistan will manufacture four among the eight vessels and rest would be supplied by China. By next year the first submarine built by China is expected to be delivered, whereas the other four are expected to be built at Karachi by the year 2028.

Even though right now Pakistan does not have SSBN but these viable sea based deterrents would help it to maintain the strategic equilibrium and to stabilize its deterrence relationship vis-à-vis India. The naval nuclear deterrents have historically relied on submerged platforms because as compare to land based deterrents, they offer a fair degree of concealment. This advantage of reduced sea based deterrent vulnerability is critical in order to stabilize deterrence. It is also important to note that despite being significant platform in attaining second strike capability, nuclear weapon states do not pursue SSBNs as the first platform to achieve deterrence. The reason behind this is the technological and economic considerations. However with the increasing possibilities of pre-emptive strikes by India, Pakistan as next logical step needs to develop SSBN capability and attain credible sea based deterrent.

India is also rapidly increasing its ASW “Anti-Submarine Warfare” capabilities that might become a challenge for Pakistan’s sea based deterrent in future. In order to meet the futuristic requirements of Indian navy, it has been collaborating with the US. As a result of 2020 Indo-US deal on ASW, India had acquired MH60R Seahawk helicopters and DRDO has also been collaborating with India’s Defense Research to develop multiple AUVs “Autonomous Underwater Vehicles”. In the emerging maritime environment, this ASW operation might shift from being defensive mission to an offensive one in order to attain greater surveillance in sea. Even though yet there is no practical application of ASW offensive capability, if India decides to take this step, it might limit the operational mobility of Pakistan’s submarines endangering their survivability by targeting and locating the submarines on patrol. Hence this increasing vulnerability of the undersea forces might lead to crisis instability. These emerging trends might have implications for Pakistan and would force it to diversify its sea based and land deterrent forces. The possible offensive use of these systems that aim to enhance deterrence would worsen the crisis stability and would instigate arms race. Pakistan has responded to India’s growing counterforce capabilities by opting for diversifying its nuclear platforms instead of increasing its land based nuclear arsenal that would ensure greater survivability along with credible targeting options to counter Indian BMDs.

<https://www.eurasiareview.com/29122021-strengthening-sea-based-deterrence-pakistans-quest-for-strategic-equilibrium-oped/>.

## ***Undiminished Scars of 1971 Tragedy – II***

***Asif Haroon Raja***

***Elections Results and Effects***

"The people who cast the votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide everything". Joseph Stalin

In the elections held on Dec 7, 1970, AL swept the polls in EP with a tally of 167 out of 169 national assembly seats and the PPP securing 87 of 126 seats in WP (simple majority in Punjab and Sindh). As per Bengali writer Maswani, 'Only about 7% of Muslim votes in EP had catapulted secessionist AL into majority. Its apparent success didn't truly represent the will of the people of EP. The AL had won with only 43% of total votes, out of which about 12% were bogus votes cast mostly by infiltrators and 24.35% by the Hindus. (AMK Maswani, Subversion in EP, P 2).

There is no doubt of heavy rigging before and during the polls by the AL since the entire civil machinery was in its hands, the people terrorized and the military looked the other way. After creating political ruckus to force Ayub to resign, Bhutto chose to side with the military junta rather than with the AL after the 1970 elections. Mujib-Bhutto confrontation sparked over the issue of framing of constitution, former wanting to formulate it entirely on his six points inside the Assembly and the latter wanting to do it jointly outside the Assembly. Both adopted a piggish stance which created a logjam. Had Gen Yahya retained the 1962 Constitution or reincarnated the 1956 Constitution, the constitutional crisis wouldn't have arisen.

From Feb 1971 onwards, Bhutto became highly aggressive. Wanting to share power he threatened to break the legs of politicians going to Dacca. Mujib paid his bellicosity in the same coin which heated up the political temperature. Bhashani added fuel to the fire. Upset by Mujib's intransigence over six-points, Yahya began to lean more heavily upon Bhutto.

Bengali nationalism was intensified by Mujib during the year-long election campaign based on his six-points, resulting in AL's landslide victory. Militancy peaked when on 01 March President Gen Yahya postponed the session of the Constituent National Assembly at Dacca scheduled on March 3, 1971 indefinitely on the advice of Bhutto and hawks in his cabinet who dubbed Mujib as a security risk. It set ablaze the festering volcano.

### ***Slaughter of Non-Bengalis/Biharis***

From 02 March a systematic genocide of Biharis, non-Bengalis and pro-Pakistan Bengalis, rapes of women and destruction of their properties was unleashed by the AL activists and Mukti Bahini (MB). West Pakistani officers serving in East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) and their families were killed, and banks were looted. Pakistan flags were burnt, BD flags hoisted and taxes were not paid. Military cantonments were besieged and water supply and fresh supplies blocked; soldiers confined to barracks since 4 March were abused and ridiculed. A parallel government had been put into force in EP and it was only Mujib's directives that were obeyed. Bedlam could have been kept under control had reinforcements sent from WP not stopped, and troops not sent back to barracks on 4 March.

### ***Unproductive Parleys***

March 25 was given as the new date for the National Assembly meeting but it didn't mitigate the anger of Mujib who became haughtier. In order to defuse the explosive situation, Gen Yahya and his team flew to Dacca on March 15 and till 24 March held negotiations with the Mujib led team. On 21-22 March, WP politicians joined to avert the crisis. Bhutto played on both sides of the wicket by poisoning the ears of Mujib and Yahya. Talks broke down when Mujib ruled out federation and insisted upon confederation provided EP was given 56% share of federal assets. According to Professor G.W Choudhury (p.168), 'Some foreign economists financed by the Ford Foundation were the loudest in making extreme demands and were responsible for the failure of the Dacca dialogue'.

### ***Operation Searchlight***

When the ten-day negotiations between the two teams at Dacca failed to yield results due to obduracy of Mujib, and there was no letup in the killing spree, and Gen Yahya was scorned for keeping the army in cotton wool, the President directed Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan, who had replaced Lt. Gen. Sahibzada Yaqub Khan on 7 March, to launch Operation Searchlight on the night of March 25. Mujib and Dr. Kamal were arrested while all other AL leaders managed to flee to India where they set up BD govt in exile. Had they been rounded up, things could be different.

By dawn of 26 March, Dacca was in full control of the army after killing 66 extremists and injuring 31. Bhutto hailed the action saying "Thank God, Pakistan has at last been saved". His exclamation was the manifestation of inner sentiments of the majority in WP. Yahya was eulogized for his action. Only three EBR could be disarmed and the rest defected with arms. AL was outlawed and Mujib was declared a traitor and tried on charges of treason.

The military action which was falsely termed as genocide by Indian media resulted in exodus of 7-10 million Bengalis to India 85% of whom were Hindus who should have migrated in 1947. It also sparked province wide rebellion which morphed into 9 months of civil war. The MB, six EB Regts, 16000 Bengalis in EPR and 45000 Policemen were aided by 50,000 Indian soldiers dressed in civvies. There were 116000 Bengalis in units, HQs, EBR, EPR, Police etc. and all had rebelled.

### ***Role of Outsiders***

The western media had turned against the military regime after the ouster of journalists from Dacca by Lt Gen Tikka due to their biased reporting. In the Whitehouse tapes released in the mid-nineties, President Nixon referred to the involvement of U.S diplomats in Pakistan who ignored his instructions and supported the separatists. CIA and the US Congress sided with Mujib in spite of Gen Yahya taking the risk of arranging a meeting of Henry Kissinger with Chinese PM at Beijing in Jul 1971 which led to US-China rapprochement. The USSR concluded a defence agreement with India in August 1971 to forestall any intervention by China.

### ***Airlifting of Additional Forces***

The magnitude of the insurrection was beyond the capacity of lone 14 Division. 9 and 16 Divisions, two wings each of CAF and Rangers and 5000 policemen were airlifted to Dacca via Colombo in a record time of less than two weeks since the East-West air corridor had been blocked by India after the engineered hijacking of Indian airline on Jan 31 the blame of which was put on Pakistan.

In order to tackle the insurgency and to be prepared for a war with India, local Razakars numbering 60, 000 were raised to provide rear area security. The EPCAF numbering 13000 with a heavy intake of Biharis and pro-Pakistan Bengalis were formed into units and wings. Out of the Razakars, Al-Badr and Al-Shams were created which mostly comprised Biharis and patriotic

Bengalis. The two outfits became the eyes and ears of the army. The Razakars and the EPCAF supported the army fighting the insurgents and in the clearance of border towns and border posts captured by the MB.

Bhutto encouraged Yahya to withhold invoking UN action when India started to intervene militarily in April 1971 (Memories and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat, p. 359). Foreign Secretary Sultan M. Khan wrote in his book (Memoirs and Reflections of a Pakistani Diplomat, London Centre for Pakistan Studies), 'After the use of military power in East Pakistan on March 25th. 1971, the situation escalated out of Yahya Khan's grasp and he could no longer control it. From then on he was merely reacting to the developing situation and had lost all initiative'.

### ***Situation Normalized***

By end April 1971, the whole area was cleared and the slaughter spree of the MB that was at its height till March 31 began to decline rapidly. By May/June complete normalcy was restored, the civil administration became functional. A general amnesty was announced, reception centres established for those who had fled to India including the politicians and a call for by-elections was given. However, India blocked their return, and in concert with Russia continued to train, equip and launch MBs to keep the pot of EP boiling. RAW and BSF had set up 59 training camps.

In the clearing operations from March to Nov 1971, 237 officers, 136 JCOs and 3559 other ranks were killed and wounded in action. (Indian Army after Independence, Major K.C Praval, Delhi, 1990, p 321).

### ***Gathering of War Clouds***

The MB supported by BSF and Indian Army launched border attacks in Sept/Oct with a view to draw Pak forces towards the border. Eastern Command hastened to push forward army units, broke them in sub-units and deployed them in penny-packets all along the border. Even the command reserves (53 Bde) were pushed forward denuding Dacca of regular troops. It resulted in loss of cohesion and made the units vulnerable to envelopment and piecemeal destruction.

Creation of ad hoc divisions/brigades two weeks before the start of the war was a big sham, since they were raised by milking the resources of infantry divisions/units and further

weakening their combat strength deployed on extended frontages with no depth and no reserves. The formations were critically short of war munitions and manpower and didn't have a single medium artillery regt. Limitation of range of guns and tanks were another drawback.

EPCAF and the Razakars plugged the yawning gaps between defensive localities and took part in the war with India. They fought valiantly till the end and large numbers embraced martyrdom or were injured in action

### *The War (Nov 21 – Dec 16, 1971)*

When it was found that the MBs were unable to defeat the Pak forces or to capture a chunk of territory near the border where a BD flag could be hoisted, the Indian military barged into EP on 21 Nov which was Eid day, and attacked 23 salients across the border. Lodgment areas were secured in Jessore, Dinajpur and Sylhet sectors. The MB resorted to large-scale massacre of pro-Pakistan elements in the captured areas. That was the time to modify the defensive plan and bring a change in the exaggerated forward posture but it was not done. Lt Gen Niazi issued orders, 'Fortress will be abandoned after incurring 75% casualties'. On the diplomatic front, it was the right time to move the case to the UN against unprovoked aggression of India as was suggested by Agha Shahi, but no move was made.

On Dec 2, India threw in 3 more divisions supported by armor to expand its penetrations at 7 different fronts. At that stage it dawned upon GHQ that India's plans were much bigger than assumed, but it was too late to affect a change in defensive posture. Most crossing points on the rivers were destroyed or seized by the MB.

The Indian forces aided by the MB launched their offensive through gaps under complete air superiority on multiple axes with speed, grounding defending forces in respective compartments, while the MB stepped up their disruptive activities in the rear to block rearward moves of Pak troops. It made the task of forward troops to converge into the Dacca Bowl almost impossible. The ground situation changed with such rapidity that it left the Eastern Command dislocated and paralyzed. Its strategic balance lay in tatters and the defensive operational cycle got jammed.

After the PAF launched an air offensive on the western front on Dec 3, India declared war on both fronts with main effort in EP and secondary effort in the WP. India also forwarded a complaint to the UN Secretary General alleging that Pakistan had attacked India.

In EP, the Indian military enjoying 15:1 superiority, launched their offensive with main effort against Sylhet-Comilla by 4 Corps, secondary effort against Jessore sector by 2 Corps, another secondary effort against Bogra by 33 Corps and an auxiliary effort against Mymensingh-Tangail sector by 101 Communication Zone.

It had 7 armor regts with T-55 and T-72 tanks, a Para Bde, 46 artillery regts including Mediums, 24 Mortar Btys, 4 AA regts, 32 BSF units, 4 BD Bdes, 287000 MBs, helicopter support, 11 sqns of MiG-21, SU-23, Gnat, Canberra generating 120 sorties a day. Its naval assets consisted of one aircraft carrier, 3 landing ships and 8 destroyers. The IAF flew 80 air sorties in support of ground forces from 3-15 Dec and generated a total of 1978 sorties. The Indian Navy affected a sea blockade on 4 Dec.

Pakistan's Eastern Command had one Corps HQ, 3 infantry divisions, 2 adhoc divisions, one armor regiment with M-24 tanks, 6 Field regts, 5 Mortar Batteries, 13000 EPCAF men, 60,000 Razaqars. The PAF had only one squadron and the Navy had 4 converted gunboats and 8 Chinese Coasters/landing crafts.

Major towns were converted into fortresses. While the static fronts outmaneuvered by Indian tanks and supported by armor collapsed at most places, at Hilli, 4 FF under Lt Col Akhlaq Abbasi, SJ put up a gallant fight and didn't allow 20 Mountain Div with an additional Inf Bde supported by Armored Bde to breakout towards Bogra for 19 days. The unit was ordered to withdraw on 11 Dec when the opposing enemy outflanked the whole brigade. Another gallant fight was put up at Kamalpur and Jamalpur by 31 Baluch under Lt. Col. Sultan, SJ & Bar. 107 Bde under Brig Hayat Khan, SJ, put up a stubborn resistance at Khulna till 16 Dec. There were several other valiant actions at sub-unit levels. Most of the fortresses were intact on 16 Dec.

The lone PAF squadron put up an extremely brave show by flying 292 air sorties in support of the ground forces from 29 March till 6 Dec. Pak Navy's Ghazi sent from Karachi to carry out strategic mining of Visakhapatnam and to interdict Indian Navy ships sank close to its target with 93 all ranks on board on the night of 3 Dec as a result of underwater explosion.

On 12 Dec, Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan informed Lt. Gen. Niazi that US and Chinese help was on the way. On 14 Dec, the GHQ gave an assurance to Niazi that the UNSC was in session and was most likely to order a ceasefire and he should hold on. Niazi cracked up when the heat came upon Dacca on 15 Dec. His oft repeated motto "last man last round" was probably meant for the forward troops only. Dacca, which was viewed by the opposing side as the toughest nut to crack and identified by Niazi as the center of gravity, was left defenseless and had no regular troops. It fell like a ripe apple without being penetrated and without a fight.

Heavily outnumbered, outgunned, cut off from the world, subjected to psychological war and demonized by Indo-Russian-Western propaganda, the beleaguered Pak forces fought and defended the motherland gallantly. Overwhelmed by the sheer weight and size of the enemy and adverse obtaining conditions, Gen Niazi gave orders on the morning of Dec 16 to stop fighting and ceasefire. The ceasefire transformed into surrender.

To be continued.

*The writer is Brigadier, war veteran, defence analyst, international columnist, author of five books, and sixth book under publication. Chairman Thinkers Forum Pakistan, Director Measac Research Centre. [asifharoonraja@gmail.com](mailto:asifharoonraja@gmail.com).*

---