

# JOURNAL OF SECURITY & STRATEGIC ANALYSES



JSSA  
Winter 2017  
Volume III, Number 2

Understanding Modi's Hindutva  
Shamsa Nawaz

South Asia Nuclear Deterrence Beyond 2016: Challenges and  
Future Prospects  
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The Bright and Dark Faces of Globalization in Afghanistan  
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US Rebalancing Policy: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan  
Khalid Chandio

Journal of  
Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

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# **Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses**

## **(JSSA)**

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**SVI Journal**  
**Winter 2017**  
**Volume III, Number 2**

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# **Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses (JSSA)**

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**SVI Journal**  
Winter 2017  
Volume III, Number 2

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*Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses* (JSSA) is a bi-annual premier research publication of the SVI. It would primarily focus on the contemporary issues of security and strategic studies with a multi-disciplinary perspective.

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ISSN: 2414-4762

Cost Price: PKR 500.00

US \$ 10.00

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Designed and Composed by: Beenish Altaf

Printed by: Asia Printers, Islamabad

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## **Abbreviations**

AFSPA	Armed Forces Special Powers Act
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nation
BJP	Bharatya Janata Party
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CFR	Council of Foreign Relation
CIRUS	Canadian-Indian Research Uranium System
CMD	Credible Minimum Deterrence
CPEC	Pakistan-China Economic Corridor
CPPNM	Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CSF	Coalition Support Fund
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
FMCT	Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
FMF	Foreign Military Funding
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAI	Israel Aerospace Industries
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IDF	Israel Defence Forces
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMI	Israel Military Industries
INC	Indian National Congress
IOK	Indian Occupied Kashmir
IOR	Indian Ocean Region
ISKP	Islamic State in Khorasan Province
LOW	Launch on Warning
LYSR	Low Yield Short Range
MAM	Mutually Assured Misperception
MCD	Minimum Credible Deterrence

MLA	Member Legislative Assembly
MOAB	Mother of All Bombs
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NCA	National Command Authority
NFU	No First Use
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NISAS	National Institute of Safety and Security
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapon State
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRECC	National Radiation Emergency Coordination Centre
NSAP	Nuclear Security Action Plan
NSCP	Nuclear Security Cooperation Program
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSS	Nuclear Security Summit
NURESC	Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Support Centre
NWA	North Waziristan Agency
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
PCENS	Pakistan Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security
PNE	Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
PNRA	Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
QCG	Quad-lateral Cooperation Group
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCS	South China Sea
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
SLCM	Submarine Launched Cruise Missile
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
VHP	Vishwa Hindu Parishad

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## PREFACE

*Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses (JSSA)* strives to offer a holistic depiction of contemporary security and strategic environment at the national, regional and global level. SVI recognizes the significance of research and analysis in developing better understanding about the current trends in political, security and strategic debate. Hence the major aim of the *JSSA* is to serve as a general source of scholastic information for new academic research on the matters pertaining to the field of international relations, diplomacy, strategic and security studies. *JSSA* envisages presenting an impartial and unbiased analysis that will help policy makers adopt an independent and objective approach during the decision-making process in the fields of security, strategic and foreign policy.

In order to maintain credibility among worldwide readership, the facts presented in the *JSSA* have been carefully selected after extensive scrutiny, review and editing. The idea is to instill an independent thinking and scholarship that supports human security and fundamental freedom. The major areas covered in the research papers in this volume reflect upon a rapidly changing international security environment and primarily focus on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and non-proliferation/counter proliferation policy, deterrence and strategic stability. Some papers focus on strategy, statecraft, crisis management, regional security, conflict management and resolution, intelligence and the emerging spectrum of new and complex security and strategic threats. Some others cover areas like internal ethnic, sectarian, and religious conflicts, governance failure, and resources mismanagement.

The intelligible debate in this issue of *JSSA* offers an excellent compilation of well researched papers written by eminent scholars, academicians and professional researchers. The policy oriented research will hugely benefit the decision makers in devising multiple alternative approaches to various issues at hand. Hence, the *JSSA* not only can serve



as a valuable source of information but also as a guide to equip oneself with empirical and pragmatic policy tools in the relevant fields. The authors in their research articles have impeccably triangulated the historical perspective, present situation and the way forward by making use of both theoretical and analytical approaches to the study of a phenomenon. By applying number of research methods to their study, the seasoned writers have further facilitated the validation of data used in the research articles. Special emphasis has been laid on presenting a well-researched analytical narrative that is substantiated with appropriate facts, figures and sources which lend authenticity to the views presented by the authors.

One of the articles included in the journal gives an overview of the Indian Prime minister Narendra Modi's political tenure since 2014. In more than three years of his leadership until now, he has been staunchly propagating the Hindutva ideology in the country which itself was the major driving force behind his win in the general elections of 2014. It is unfortunate that the Gujrat riots of 2012 that killed more than 1500 Muslims, paved way for his glorious future as the Prime Minister of a so called secular state of India. This article critically analyzes the factors which helped Prime Minister Modi gained his present position as the state leader. It is rightly believed and proven with factual data that presently not just the Muslims but other communities are also not secure in the emerging de-secularised socio-political manifestation of India. The writer has suggested the need for concrete measures to effectively address the challenge of radicalism. This paper particularly gives an eye-opening account of events and facts, which the readers will find specifically useful in order to understand Modi's Hindutva which is only inciting intolerance against diversity in the country. While going through this research paper, the reader understands the weaknesses in the socio-political fabric of India which is in tatters.

The next research paper digs deeper into the dynamics of nuclear deterrence in South Asia and tries to assess its future prospects by

evaluating the present challenges. This article also makes reference to the rising tide of Hindu nationalism in India and maintains that the dictates of Indian nuclear doctrine are in the hands of BJP led government which is essentially the right-wing party and profoundly affecting the strategic stability of the region. The existing deterrence equation between India and Pakistan tends to become fragile in the wake of irresponsibly aggressive statements from the Indian defence and government officials. The intent for pre-emptive strike against nuclear armed Pakistan is not just dangerous but also unwise. The author reiterates that any change to the existing nuclear doctrine by India will only increase the chances of an all-out nuclear war in South Asia. This research paper will compel the readers to think why and how the confidence building measures between India and Pakistan, along with a pragmatic conflict resolution mechanism, should be devised. The authors offer various possible alternatives in policy choices that could be adopted in order to keep the regional situation under control.

Another research paper elaborates on various dimensions of globalization and its direct implications on Afghanistan. It is believed that Afghanistan as a case study would help demonstrate the pros and cons of globalization. Major areas of focus have been Afghanistan's narcotics trafficking, the media, and foreign aid. It is primarily through these three media that the global market forces have attempted to engage into and exploit Afghanistan for their own vested interests. This is not to suggest that Afghanistan did benefit from the wave of globalization. In a strange way, globalization has had both its positives and negatives visibly manifested in this country. While the internationally supported poppy growing and opium production inside Afghanistan brought about huge economic dividends for the country, at the same time it led to a wide scale drug trafficking. The media and communication revolution is another benefit of globalization which Afghanistan is increasingly being exposed to. However, this factor also raises certain challenges for the government as the general public is now more informed about the ideals of governance and demand better delivery on part of the government.

The authors also look into the effect of huge of sums of money which came into the country as an international aid but has also led to a society where corruption has become more rampant. This research paper is indeed an interesting take on the bright and dark sides of globalization.

One of the research papers included in the journal gives a detailed analysis of the current Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) debate that is going on in the international political circles. It deliberates upon the possibility of India and Pakistan getting a membership for this nuclear cartel. The quest for prestige and status has been identified as one of the major driving forces behind their aspiration, which however could prove to be quite challenging to achieve given the nuclear renaissance and recent trends in global politics. It also highlights the expected economic dividends that New Delhi is eyeing if it gets the membership. While closely scrutinizing all the dynamics and trends, the author establishes that both India and Pakistan might encounter tough resistance in getting the membership of NSG in the near future as many members of the Group seem determined to thwart non-NPT members' attempt to join the Group without a criteria-based approach. The article presents an in-depth analysis of the whole situation and attempts to analyse various proposed criteria and assess the prospects of NSG membership for the non-NPT nuclear weapon states. The readers are surely going to find the debate and analysis very informative and useful.

The next paper elaborates on prospects of Pak-US relations under the Trump administration and what opportunities and challenges is Pakistan more likely to face. This is an important paper given the fact that the Pak-US relations mark the corner stone of Pakistan's foreign policy and for the US also Pakistan has always figured prominently in its South Asian policy options. The readers will find an interesting take on the bilateral relations as the authors tend to believe that Trump's policy towards Pakistan is relatively positive as compared to his predecessors. However, for the future of the relations it has been observed that the US will adopt a state specific i.e. conditional approach towards Pakistan as compared

to actor specific i.e. cordial relationship with active and stable role in the region. It is believed that the future of Pak-US relations will largely depend upon Pakistan's security policies and the terms of re-engagement with wider geopolitical realities. A number of challenges have been identified by the authors for the readers to evaluate and make their own assessments.

Last paper included in this issue talks about the US rebalancing policies in Asia-Pacific region in response to China's massive economic rise. It further looks into challenges and opportunities for Pakistan that this great power engagement in the region presents to the country. China's ascend as an economic power in the region and beyond is seen as a direct threat to the US' interests and for its allies and partners in the region. This paper offers an insightful analysis to the readers as it evaluates Pakistan's choices and options in a tricky situation where it is the strategic partner to China and a non-NATO ally of the US.

SVI endeavors to contribute to the policy discourse that serves Pakistan's security and strategic interests. *JSSA* being the major academic output of the SVI effectively delivers on the commitment to fend off any anti-Pakistan portrayal. It seeks to develop a counter narrative to the prevalent policy discourse that acts against the security and strategic interests of Pakistan, and threatens regional stability and international security. SVI as a research based think-tank has always endorsed the ideas of enquiry, investigation and impartial analysis in order to promote strategic foresight regarding important issues. The intellectual input gained through such methods is more effective when employed in the decision-making process. Additionally, it is hoped that the narrative should reach out to a larger audience where the voice could be heard and registered in national and international policy circles.

*JSSA* conforms to the standard HEC guidelines/rules of publication and seeks to maintain the general quality of the contributions as per the international standard. It is aspired to become a top ranking HEC recognized journal. The quality aspect remains and will always be the prime concern of the SVI, supplemented by careful selection of the

manuscripts wherein the readers will be able to find a collection of well written academically sound research papers that have attempted to methodically examine various strategic and security issues in detail. It is being hoped that the readers will be able to benefit from the analyses presented in this issue. SVI plans to bring out subsequent volumes of *JSSA* on a regular basis and is looking forward to receiving high quality manuscripts exclusively written for *JSSA*.



## **RESEARCH PAPERS**



## Understanding Modi's Hindutva

Shamsa Nawaz\*

### Abstract

*Narendra Modi has completed more than three years in office as the Prime Minister of India. He had emerged as a strong but controversial leader from right wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) after the gruesome Gujarat riots of 2002, in which 1500 Muslims were massacred. Though, the idioms of management, economic excellence, national security and civilizational glory swayed the Indian public opinion in his favor during 2014 elections, yet the communal crescendo is continuing from his close aides. They speak of Muslims and terrorism in the same breath. The other communities are also not secure in the emerging desecularised socio-political manifestations of India, since the recent past. Modi's own interpretation of Hindutva resonates with political compulsions and its inherent limitations towards religious minorities, particularly Muslims, as also sections of backward classes and Dalits. More than 200 temples and other religious institutions have been vandalized in Delhi, along with the churches and a Catholic school. Modi is considered as a lightning rod on faith and tolerance. India has so far failed to come up with any clear guarantee to give way to the primary identity of Indian non-Hindu citizens despite Modi committing that his government "will not allow any religious group, belonging to the majority or the minority, to incite hatred against others, overtly or covertly."<sup>1</sup> In the absence of concrete measures, the challenge of intolerance towards diversity is providing more of a conceptual framework to the radical*

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\* Shamsa Nawaz is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.

<sup>1</sup> Annie Gowen, "Narendra Modi's remarks on religious tolerance spark national debate in India", *The Guardian*, February 24, 2015. [www.theguardian.com](http://www.theguardian.com)

*enthusiasts in the region. It rekindles debate on ideological issues and national identities on foreign policy fronts as well since secularism is strictly confined to politics in India. As a result, Pakistan's threat perceptions are also shifted even further afield, given its Muslim stature.*

**Keywords:** Communal Rift, Hindutva, De-Secularization, Indus Valley Civilization, Hinduism, Nationalism, Democracy, Terrorism, Regional Integration

### Introduction

The persistent and growing communal heterogeneity is making Hinduism a fast growing political and socio-cultural force across India. It is likely to be of great influence for the future and a threat for India as a modern secular democracy. In a secular society, there is no control of the religion on social institutions since morality is kept fundamental.

The Indian demography is very diverse: a composition of 78.5 percent of Hindus, 14.2 percent Muslims, 3.6 percent Christians, 1.9 percent Sikhs, 0.8 percent Buddhists and 0.4 percent Jains.<sup>2</sup> However, while quoting, in his article 'Modi and Conversion Trap', Ravi Shankar unveils that there would be only 23,000 non-Hindus (as in Parsis) left in India by 2020.<sup>3</sup> On the contrary, the recent claims of the Pew Research Centre envisage the number of 1.3 billion Hindus and 311<sup>4</sup> million Muslims by 2050, making it the largest Muslim country in the world.<sup>5</sup>

In either case, it may enlarge worrisome conjectures for the socio-political scenarios. India is expected to be the most plural country of the world. The resurgent right-wing Hindu radicalism in India has regrettably anti-secular foundational ideology inundated with the ingredients of social and communal split, particularly between the Muslims and the

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<sup>2</sup> The World Factbook, [www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html)

<sup>3</sup> Ravi Shankar, 'Modi and Conversion Trap', *Indian Express*, Delhi, March 29, 2015.

<sup>4</sup> "Culture of India", *Revolvy*, [www.revolvy.com](http://www.revolvy.com)

<sup>5</sup> Jack Detsch, "India's growing Muslim population: A Political Challenge?" *The Diplomat*, Asia Pacific, May 1, 2015.

Hindus. The religious and communal antagonism carries a tendency of deterring long-desired socio-cultural affinity.

On the contrary, politics benefits from the stability of the societies. For example, culture has historically bonded the societies since "it promotes more coherent and acceptable behaviors between the individuals" says Satyajeeet Ray.<sup>6</sup> In India, the communitarians unfortunately hold the views in sharp contrast and express no desire for communal and cultural integration. They wish to stop "thus far and no further"<sup>7</sup> and aspire to have 'India for Hindus' only. This would posit the divergent thoughts of Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Gandhism, nationalist, secularists, Maoists, Stalinists, liberalists, democrats and many more living in India on a path to collision.

The ascendant role of pugnacious Hindutva, and a noticeable radical religious argument of fanatics is polarizing India's secular ethos and is weakening India's national identity as a secular state. The resulting socio-political and strategic effects on the South Asian region, populated by thirty percent Muslims would be colossal. Pakistan as an ideological Muslim neighbour is likely to face the brunt. Pakistan and India already have perpetual animosity in their relationship ever since the partition of the sub-continent in 1947. The combination of religious particularism and xenophobic polity would give space to non-state actors to influence peace efforts. Furthermore, South Asia is already at crossroads where radicalism and militancy is continuously an evolving threat since 9/11. It has made terrorism a very relevant factor in foreign policy perceptions of each country of the region which calls for a cooperative approach to collectively deal with the issue.

The paper speculates India's leap forward in this direction, and argues whether in a secular country religious beliefs may have socio-political

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<sup>6</sup>Amartyasen, *The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian Culture, History and Identity* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.



implications beyond their individual domains. The paper analyzes the philosophy of Hindutva in the politically deviating views of both BJP and Indian National Congress (INC); its fracas with secularism and composite nationalism; and the challenges for Modi's Hindu nationalism as a lifelong member of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The possible threat of radicalism hoisted by non-state actors on the Hindutva bandwagon may have long-term security imperatives for India. Their substantive imprints for regional neighbours, with thirty percent Muslims living in the South Asian region, could damage largely shared socio-cultural homogeneity. Its prevalence and almost unstoppable rise to country's corridors of power is a specter of tremendous ramification for all.

### **Modi's Hindutva**

The journey of Modi from a humble tea boy to the Prime Minister of India is perhaps the most valiant upshot of Indian parliamentary democracy in a class and caste-ridden society. BJP's electoral success with 248 out of 548 parliamentary seats breaks the electoral records, which no Indian political party has ever held before. The results were more personality driven. It equally resounds the exclusive but controversial 'Gujarat Model' pitch for Delhi. Modi is the emblem of both economy and religion. He is referred to by many as a 'poster child' for India's development with a double digit growth rate in view, and is applauded as a leader of Hindutva.<sup>8</sup> Modi is accredited for his scientific planning and its flawless execution, adroit micro-management, his charisma and mass appeal during his long period of chief minister ship. Although, he is quite careful of his pronouncements ever since the massacre in Gujarat to dispel being branded as the 'Milosevic of Gujarat', yet his religio-economic bet in the liberal democracy of India show more signs of prejudice and alienation of minorities.

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<sup>8</sup>Pankaj Mishra, "Narendra Modi and the new face of India", *The Guardian*, UK, 16 May 2014.

Modi's BJP, as an off-shoot of Hindu Mahasbha, pioneered the 'New Hindu Movement'. It regards Muslims as "foreigner" or "outsiders" or non-Indians. For them, Muslims are sheer blood thirsty Turks, who had not only conquered 'Mother India' but also lured vulnerable lower-caste Hindus into a non-Indian religion. Hindu Mahasbha was banned, since Nathuran Godse, a follower of Veer Savarkar, assassinated Mahatma Gandhi for his conciliation with Muslim majority State of Pakistan. For them, Pakistan was carved out of Bharat Varsha,<sup>9</sup> although Jaswant Singh, the former BJP leader and an Indian Foreign Minister, during the times of A.B. Vajpayee, had accepted that large scale conversion in India was mainly because of the peaceful movements of Muslim mystics of the Suharwardia, Chishtia and Qadriya traditions. They still hold great attraction for the people of India.<sup>10</sup> Later, Jaswant was thrown out of BJP for his pro Muslim stance.

An extravagantly chivalrous notion of Hindu Nation started from the times of Ayodhya by the BJP. The silence of Modi on increasing incidents of communal hysteria all across India along with Hindutva statements given by his ministers to declare India a Hindu State by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and demanding a uniform civil code for the entire nation, are all distressing developments for a long known secular state of India. The ideology of Hindutva has regrettably fallen prey to nationalist doctrine. It is notoriously described by its Hindu supporters such as Shiv Sena, Bajrang Dal, Sangh Pariwar, BJP and the VHP all associated with the mother organization of the RSS who regard India and Hinduism as synonymous.

Inter-faith relationship is already considered a taboo in some parts of India in the social arena. In a recent incident in Uttar Pradesh, a Hindu

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<sup>9</sup> Fr. Sunny Jacob. *SJ, Reflection: The Birth, Growth and the Ideology of Hindutva.* - <http://sunnyjsj.blogspot.com/2008/09/hindutva-growth-and-strategy-closer.html>. February 27, 2015 12:40 IST

<sup>10</sup> Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah: India – Partition – Independence*, Rupa & Co. New Delhi, 2009

girl, who had earlier eloped with her Muslim friend, was brought on the national television forcibly to accuse him of abduction and rape.<sup>11</sup> In the absence of affable inter-faith relationship, the fear of marginalization and the rise of majoritarianism are promoting a culture of chauvinism. The burning of five churches in a month's time in Delhi during the first half of 2015, the molestation of a nun, and forcible conversion of non-Hindus are all the result of the belief that India belongs to Hindus.

Secularism, when first introduced in 1851, was meant for the harmonious functioning of the society. It had to uphold both reasoning and sensitivity to accept the general values of tolerance. Today, Indian history also sadly anchors more on the Hinduist subscription. It tends to promote modern day centralized intolerant Hinduism driven more towards a theocratic state. The judicial Hindu dominated process, for both the 1998 anti-Christian violence in Dangs region of Gujarat, and the 2002 violence across Gujarat, have already run aground without proceeding to sentence.

The 'politics of beef' in India is simply appalling for all those who believe in a secular ethos. It highlights the inclusion of 'otherness' with a view of suspicion and/or fear. The lynching of Mohammed Akhlaq by a Hindu mob for keeping beef in the fridge and later sent for forensic testing by the government officials is a reflection of right-wing Hindu nationalist agenda meant to homogenize the entire nation of India. Later, the same year in 2015, engineer Rashid, Member Legislative Assembly (MLA), was beaten by the co-members for serving beef in his party. The oppression endorsed by Modi's close aides had gone to the extent of saying "people who desire to consume beef should go to Pakistan"<sup>12</sup> said Mukhtar Abbas. Similarly, the 'Ghar Wapsi' movement by Hindu nationalists and fundamentalists is yet another side of bigotry for

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<sup>11</sup> Sanjay Nirupam. "Slippery Grounds of the Secularism Debate". *Indian Express*, New Delhi, 15 September, 2014.

<sup>12</sup> Aprita Mandal, "The Politics of Beef in India," November 12, 2015. [www.warscape.com](http://www.warscape.com).

achieving predominance under Modi's rule mainly and is hosted by RSS. The forced conversion of Muslims and Christians is bribed with the offer of a choice of caste in a caste-based Hindu India.

Further, the false propaganda against Jihad by the saffron outfits is largely meant to gain political mileage. Jihad is for the good cause, as declared by the Board of Muslim Personal Law, India. In fact, the RSS is the one which insists that India's non-Hindus must adopt Hindu culture and wholly subordinate themselves to the Hindu nation.<sup>13</sup> Their insistence on 'GharWapsi' (return to Hinduism) programme, with a promise of better living conditions, casts a destabilizing feature through religious particularism. Similarly, the retraction of 'Love Jihad' in recent times is casting a longer shadow on its emergence in 2009, when a Hindu extremist Janajagrati Samiti claimed that some 30,000 women in southern Karnataka state converted to Islam.<sup>14</sup>

The overjoyed fantasy of Indian economic ascendancy also holds several misgivings rooted in communal discrimination. The Moradabad brassware industry exports Rs. 2,500 billion worth products. Muslims constitute a majority of the labour force in this industry while the factories are mostly owned by the non-Muslims. Similarly, Saharanpur, the traditional business centre for wood and furniture, has a majority of Muslim artisans while the shops and factories are owned by Hindus and Sikhs. In August 2014, the business loss was reported to the tune of Rs. 244 billion in 10 days during communal riots.<sup>15</sup>

The Indian Planning Commission Report on Human Development 2011 and the Sachar Committee Report already suggests that 'Muslims lag behind all social groups except scheduled castes and in all economic and

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<sup>13</sup> Abhaya Srivastava. "India Love-Jihad claims fuel Hindu-Muslim tensions", *Dawn* (Islamabad), 26 October 2014

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Sanjeev Sabhlok. Revolutionary Blog. P.3. [www.subhlok.city.com](http://www.subhlok.city.com).

social indicators'.<sup>16</sup> Taking from the National Sample Survey 2004-2005, an economist Michael Walton of Harvard's Kennedy School, has given the statistics to establish the discrimination and poverty of the Muslims in India with incidence of 35.5percent, ahead of scheduled caste at 38.5 percent. Poverty incidence among Hindus is 26.9 percent.<sup>17</sup>

History has proven that communalism permeates serious socio-economic discrepancies. It happened in Italy and Germany, where Fascism and Nazism gained roots respectively in the first half of the twentieth century. In India, the combination of high-class and high-caste had been controlled both the economy and politics. The rise of Modi owes itself to the moneyed class and high castes. Just after three months of Modi's electoral victory, a member of his own coalition protested against the discrimination and distrust of the Muslims and for bringing the 'hands out of the gloves' so overtly. Though, President Obama, in his January 2015 visit to India, had identified the religious divisions in India by showing his apprehensions during his farewell dinner, nevertheless, under the circumstances, the continuing inappropriate support for Modi's saffron policies by the West is a push to yet another fall of the region to communal and ideological extremism.

### **Indian Occupied Kashmir & Modi's Hindutva**

Kashmir is rampaged by Modi's Hindutva policies and seven hundred thousand occupying forces of India. It was immobilised for more than two months by long protracted curfews and blackouts, ever since the gunning down of a 22-year old freedom fighter, Burhan Wani, in July 2016. Even those who had come out to offer funeral prayers spontaneously were victimized at point-blank range, several have been blinded by the use of pellet guns, and more than 10, 000 have been seriously injured.

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<sup>16</sup>Rupa Subraman. "Economics Journal: A Theory Why India's Muslims Lag?" *Wall Street Journal*. 3 October 2012.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.



Already, enforced on July 5, 1990, Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) shields soldiers from prosecution in IoK. It gives unbridled facilitation to the Armed Forces in the most militarised region of the world to detain, harass or kill civilians on mere suspicion or sometimes just on the whims of the personnel of the forces. The abuses range from mass killings, forced disappearances, torture rape, and sexual abuse to political repression by legitimizing the barbarism. This is even endorsed by the global human rights group Amnesty International in its report titled "Denied Failures in accountability for human rights violations by security force personnel in Jammu & Kashmir". It also discloses the presence of mass graves. Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The Basic Principles and Guideline on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, and Article 2(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)<sup>18</sup>, to all of which India is a state party and therefore, is bound to follow in letter and spirit.

In fact, Indian Occupied Kashmir has an inopportune history under the rule of Modi and has become even graver under the rule of the coalition government of Peoples Democratic Party of Mehmood Mufti and BJP, who have agreed to settle tens of thousands of non-Kashmiri Hindus in the Muslim dominated disputed territory of Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK). Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has long vowed to settle 200,000 to 300,000 Hindus in (IOK). The three disclosed and two undisclosed composite Hindu townships for the non-Kashmiris, to be made on the acquired lands of the farmers, would be self-contained and heavily guarded. Modi's government is well aware that demography has a potential to reshape politics. It redraws the boundaries of populations in a way that is not possible with biological populations.

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<sup>18</sup> Christian Tomuschat, "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: New York, December 16, 1966", *Audio Visual Library of International Law*.legal.un.org accessed September 23, 2016.

Modi called Sardar Valbhbhai Patel an ardent secular leader and appreciated his efforts in integrating 562 Princely States into India. He insists that India needs Patel's secularism and not vote bank secularism.<sup>19</sup> He is now building the world's tallest statue of Patel at a cost of about \$340 million in Gujarat.<sup>20</sup> Modi has forgotten that on 21 August 1948, Patel had threatened to resign if the Army was not sent to Hyderabad, which was also a violation of India Act 1947. 'Operation Polo' against Hyderabad led to the complete destruction of Hyderabad's army, and the massacre of 40,000 people, with the help of an entire Armoured Division,<sup>21</sup> "They had split the responsibilities. Nehru did the running on the Kashmir question while consulting Patel who disagreed with his policies. Patel did the running on Hyderabad".<sup>22</sup> Congress is also no secular angel and has compromised with several communalists.

### Understanding the Origins of Hindutva

Going back to the history of the term Hindutva, it was first coined in the early 1800's by Hindu nationalist Veer Savarkar, and was used as an ideational force by leaders like Lajpat Rai, HarDayal and others. Linked with movements such as Shuddhi and Snagagathan, it could be seen as a blowback for the forces of modernity.<sup>23</sup> It is derived from the two terms "Hindu Tattva", which means Hindu Principles or "the way of life of the Indian people and the Indian culture and ethos".<sup>24</sup> Hindutva is based on diverse Hindu principles articulated for the continuation of the freedom of thought. It is, therefore, neither individual specific nor time, but is a compilation of human wisdom. It encapsulates multifaceted departments

<sup>19</sup>" Modi's Patel Statue Project. Legacy, politics, and controversy". [www.ndtv.com](http://www.ndtv.com), February 28, 2015.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> A.G.Noorani. "The Destruction of Hyderabad", Hurst & Company, London. 2013.

<sup>22</sup>HenrikBergland, "Religion and Nationalism". *Economic & Political Weekly*. vol. 39, no. 10. (6 March, 2004).

<sup>23</sup> Ram Jethmalani, "Hindutva is a secular way of Life", *The Guardian*. UK. [www.sunday-guardian.com](http://www.sunday-guardian.com), accessed on 11 May 2015.

<sup>24</sup>Saif Khan, "Understanding Hindutva: The Supreme Court Judgement" [Part 3]. 30 May, 2013. [saifahmadkhan.wordpress.com](http://saifahmadkhan.wordpress.com)

of thought evolving continuously. It sums up the activity related to Hindu community adaptable to all times. Gandhi certainly was a practicing Hindu, but his politics still stopped short of making it into a 'hegemonic majoritarianism'. In the same vein, Nehru's idea of India, despite its historical celebration and romantic wherewithal, felt uneasy in bringing in religion into politics in a plural India.

Though, in all its various incarnations, Hindutva contains assorted yet rich, powerful and vivid ideas and ideals, all aimed at systemic and societal 'engineering', it has however come to symbolize multi-polarization in the Indian society in the early 1990's. The rise of BJP is also seen during the same period. The reasoning or rationale given in its communal relationship has exerted more of its controversial notions and carry ambiguity. For example, the outlook of Hindutva is plaintiff of righteousness in its Satguna and reprehensive attitudes Dur-guna,<sup>25</sup> but is in clash with the concept of righteousness in other religions living in India. This makes it evolve with weaker political, social, and religious interpretations.

Historically, different sub-groups and individuals representing a range of religious persuasions found it to their advantage to accentuate or diminish the importance of Hindu and Muslim identity. The ideologies that supported the construction of such identities in the Indian Sub-continent were also reduced.<sup>26</sup> RSS was formed in 1925 with the aim of spreading Hindu culture.<sup>27</sup>

Savarkar in the Essentials of Hindutva underlines the requirement of identity to gel the nation by the redemption of Indus Civilization through Hinduism; otherwise it might meet the same fate as the Roman, Egyptian

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<sup>25</sup>Khushwant Singh, *The End of India*. (India: Penguin Books, 2003), P.69.

<sup>26</sup>James W. Laine, *Shivaji: Hindu King in Islamic India* (New York: Oxford Press University 2003) P.104?.

<sup>27</sup>Henrik Bergland, "Religion and Nationalism". *Economic & Political Weekly*. vol. 39, no. 10. (6 March, 2004).

and Greek civilizations and eventually disappear from the face of the earth. His followers believe that the feelings of insecurity were created under the Muslim rulers and during the British colonial period through missionaries. The deluge of Western culture has necessitated the resurgence of Hindutva.<sup>28</sup>

Originally the term Hindu is also not mentioned in Vedas (classical Hinduism) or Santana Dharma (original name of Hinduism/ Hindu Dharma) in the Vedas, Puranas or any other religious text. The term is the modified version introduced by the Greeks of the term Sindhu, used for the people living beyond the river Sindhu. The Persian explorers dropped the letters for their pronunciation rules and started calling them Hindus. It was meant for the geographical and cultural identity of the people living around the river Sindhu.<sup>29</sup>

Similarly, the term Hindusthan was also first used in the 12th century by Muhammad Ghori, who dubbed his new subjects as Hindus. On the other hand, Encyclopedia Britannica accepts Hinduism as a civilization with no last messiah. It is commonly called 'Living Idea', without being embodied in one book. Hence, the convergence through adaptation to evolutionary process makes it ever changing, and sometimes even for the religious or political objectives of individuals, organizations, societies and the nations.

## **Hindutva: From the Recent Past**

### **i. The BJP's Hindutva**

The most virulent form of Hindutva was exposed in 1992, when Babri Masjid was raised to ground by the Hindu preachers with a pretext of its construction on the site of a temple and the birth place of their god, Rama. L.K. Advani, a BJP leader, urged villagers throughout the country to hold religious ceremonies to sanctify bricks made out of the clay used by

<sup>28</sup>Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah: India – Partition – Independence*, Rupa & Co. New Delhi, 2009

<sup>29</sup>Ram Jethmalani, "Hindutva is a secular way of Life", *The Guardian*. UK. [www.sunday-guardian.com](http://www.sunday-guardian.com), accessed on 11 May 2015.

the Hindus only and send them to be used in the construction of the Ramjanmabhumi Temple in Ayodhya.<sup>30</sup> BJP is the political wing of RSS, which has graduated into a charitable, educational, right-wing Hindu nationalist group. Modi is one of the swayamsevaks trained in one of the shakhas of RSS, meant exclusively for Hindus. It is RSS which chose Modi for premiership.

In 1984, Advani, rode in a chariot across India in a Hindu supremacist campaign against the mosque in Ayodhya. Interestingly, a transformed Advani hailed Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as a "great man" during a visit to Pakistan in 2005.<sup>31</sup> He had to face humiliation both from within the party and the Hindu voter. The space thus provided Modi to fulfil his ambition of filling the gaps of Hindutva with firebrand rhetoric. Similarly, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, another prominent leader of BJP, celebrated for his liberal views all through the 1970's, became aggressive during his 1983 election campaign in Assam and thundered "foreigners have come here, and the government does nothing. What if they have come into Punjab instead, people would have chopped them into pieces and thrown them away".<sup>32</sup> The prejudice remained fundamental to all BJP leaders with the change of optics only.

The consequent chasm between the majority and the minority communities, particularly Hindus and Muslims, widened with the rise of Hindutva support base. Other than hostile attitudes towards Pakistan and occasional Hindu-Muslim riots, which have become more frequent during the current regime, the demolition of Babri Masjid, and making the Muslim Personal Law controversial, are all the manifestations of this ideology. Muslim Personal Law allows the Indian Muslims the Code of Shariat to apply in their personal affairs.

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<sup>30</sup>Iftikhar Haider Malik, "Modi Machine Moves On: India at its Watershed", *Strategic Outlook*. 2014.

<sup>31</sup>Ajaz Ashraf, "Vajpayee, Advani, Modi: Every leader has given Hindutva a twist", June 17, 2013. [www.firstpost.com](http://www.firstpost.com).

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

Currently, the ideational threshold of secularism and the socio-political construct on the basis of nationalism is experiencing tremors in India. The controversial conversion of Hindutva into a smokescreen for vote bank communalism is pushing it fast into 'an eye of storm' and confronts the idea of India itself. India had a liberal history and was always recognized for public deliberations from the times of Ashoka (269 BCE-232 BCE), and carried forward by the Mughal Emperor Akbar (1556-1605) only four hundred years ago. Interfaith dialogue was the spirit of Akbar's rule. The relations and attitudes were radically predisposed during the imperialist time of two hundred years and subset of individual thinking and the policy of divide and rule was pursued ruthlessly. The growing religious extremism and its increasing influence in the Indian society perturb even the Western scholars, who regard it as a threat to Indian stability.

The ideology is ostensibly seeking sustenance in the religion while exacerbating identity crisis for the non-Hindu nationals in these times of Modi government. The Indian External Affairs Minister, Sushma Swaraj has demanded that Bhagwat Gita, a religious text held sacred by Hindus, should be declared the national scripture.<sup>33</sup> Bhagwad Gita is considered as an accurate fundamental knowledge about god, the ultimate truth, creation, birth and death, the results of actions, the eternal soul, liberation and the purpose as well as the goal of human existence expressed in spiritual terms. The conviction, however, abet the belief system of non-Hindu community living in India.

Bhagwad Gita reasserts Hindus as Aryans, the supreme race with monolithic beliefs,<sup>34</sup> which sometimes are taken as indignation by other communities. On the other hand, the proposition politically contradicts the democratic constitution for declaring it a 'Holy Book'. It propels

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<sup>33</sup> "Bhagwat Gita Must be Deckared National Scripture: Sushma", *Indian Express*, December 7, 2014.

<sup>34</sup> Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah: India – Partition – Independence*, Rupa & Co. New Delhi, 2009

antagonism by the resurgence of chauvinistic movements called Hindutva. Furthermore, the body politic complexities of India are already compounded by caste based squabbles, poverty, and institutional weaknesses due to communal imbalance and corruption. The socio-cultural segregation is enhanced thereby; "worst form of bondage is the bondage of dejection, which keeps men hopelessly chained in loss of faith in themselves", said Rabindranath Tagore.<sup>35</sup>

## ii. Hindutva and Nationalism in India

Nationalism in India is largely contextualized with the fanatic religious belief in a profound blend of Hinduism. As a result, the humanitarian aspect of nationalism is experiencing a sharp slide. Nationalism originally does not hold a religious matrix in a largely secular world. It emphasizes on human rights. The national divisions are required to promise human community as much as a religion would do, with a different perspective.

Nationalism is subservient to multi-layered and multi-dimensional diverse cultures and religions living in India with contrasting ideologies. They cause several ethnic and religious conflicts. The size and diversity of India by itself is impregnated with several difficulties, while spawning their own trajectories but strongly influencing the politics of India. Their interaction with the Indian overarching nationalist paradigm looks monolithic.

Historically, nationalism often imbibed the consciousness of Indians prior to 1947 when India embodied the broader Indian Subcontinent, and influenced a part of Asia, known as 'Greater India'. The territorial sovereignty of India still derives its nationhood from its ancient history as a birth place of the Indus Valley Civilization and Vedic Civilization. Similarly, the four major world's non-revealed religions namely, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism are stretching across the Indian Sub-continent. In either of the beliefs of nationalisms, there is a

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<sup>35</sup>Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah: India – Partition – Independence*, Rupa & Co. New Delhi, 2009

dichotomy of accepting the territorial sovereignty in the post nation-state era and thereby the partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947. Contrarily and to the ironic stance of BJP, Sharif, Pirpur and Fazl-ul-Haq Reports have already indicated that Pakistan was the only answer to save the Muslims of India from the tyranny unleashed during Congress rule 1937-39. The reports also provide a reply to the questions of extremist Indians.<sup>36</sup>

### **Political Parties and Religious Nationalism**

India enjoys a multi-party political status at the national and state levels. Since the last six decades, the two national political parties, Indian National Congress (INC), representing the left of centre, and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), representing the right of centre political stream, have been ruling India in gaps. Between 1989 and 2014, India had seen a series of coalition governments with a national party holding the reins. However, there remained a dichotomy even within INC of Jawaharlal Nehru, who was unsure of any unanimous definition of nationalism, and of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, his successor and daughter. Nehru had declared:

When we talk loudly of our nationalism, each person's idea of nationalism is his own brand of nationalism. It may be Assamese nationalism, it may be Bengali, and it may be Gujrati, Uttar Pradesh, Punjabi or Madrasi. Each one has his own brand in mind. He may use the word nationalism of India in mind, [but] he is [still] thinking of that nationalism in terms of his own brand of it. When two brands of nationalism come into conflict, there is trouble.<sup>37</sup>

Whereas, Indira Gandhi considered the nation as a family and used to treat minority community as her own children, she believed if one of my sons is weak then I need to take more care of that son. And if for taking

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<sup>36</sup>Jaswant Singh, *Jinnah: India – Partition – Independence*, Rupa & Co. New Delhi, 2009

<sup>37</sup>Shamsa Nawaz, "Civil-Military Relations in India: Riding the Tiger", *Strategic Studies*, vol13, Issue no. 2, Summer 2013.



care of that son who is weak, if someone is angry with me, I am not bothered".<sup>38</sup> Though, the Blue Star Operation on Golden Temple in 1984 during her own regime leaves many to believe otherwise.

Today, the BJP is the largest political party of India. It has the majority representation in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha and State assemblies. BJP has close ideological and organizational links with the RSS. A Danish scholar, Thomas Blom Hansen, has very comprehensively captured the BJP's concept of Hindu Nationalism. Hansen's study is based on his field work in Maharashtra, which has the most communally non-fractured society. There are three perspectives of the Saffron Wave, highlighted by him:

- i. Imaginative political strategies.
- ii. Reserves of religious nationalism.
- iii. The public culture, which is neither in the political system nor in the religious field as such.<sup>39</sup>

Although, BJP had dropped most of the sensitive issues prior to 1999 Lok Sabha elections, such as the demand for the construction of Ram Temple at Ayodhya, the implementation of common civil code, and revocation of Article 370 of the constitution (which gives a special status to the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, having majority Muslim population) yet, in its 2009 manifesto, BJP very clearly stated that "Article 370 poses a psychological barrier for the full integration of the people of Jammu & Kashmir with the national mainstream".<sup>40</sup> Modi personally campaigned for the last state elections in held Kashmir to get 44+ seats for BJP to amend the constitution and drop Article 370 from it.

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<sup>38</sup>Pankaj Mishra, "Modi: A New Face of India", *The Guardian* UK. 16 May, 2014.

<sup>39</sup>Henrik Bergland, "Religion and Nationalism". *Economic & Political Weekly*. vol. 39, no. 10. (6 March, 2004).

<sup>40</sup>"Article 370: Why BJP fear to say Modi, party are not on same page", *FP Politics*, December 3, 2013.

The current wave of demographic transformation by the use of settlements of non-Kashmiris is an articulate perspective in this context. The Article does not allow non-Kashmiris to own the land. The decision is akin to Israeli style settlements in Palestine. It perpetuates the cycle of endangered and unlawful politics and gratifies the Indian acts of human rights violations in IoK. The Muslim population, which was 63% in Jammu in 1941, has come down to 30%.<sup>41</sup>

The Hindutva centric political movement also threatens democracy and civil rights. BJP offers a forensic transformation of majoritarian rhetoric for both the deprived and 'plebeian' or working class, seeking identity around cultural pride, order, and national strength, through the introduction of 'ancient' Hindu polity. According to BJP predicament, the conservative populism through Hindu nationalist movement also ensures security to the privileged groups against any encroachment.

The controversial affirmation on Indian nationalism has its basis in the debate between Nehru and Patel's contempt of secularism. It is evidently disclosed in the diary of his daughter Mani ben Patel, quoted by A.G. Noorani in his book 'The Destruction of Hyderabad'. Patel had even argued that the Muslim officials were bound to be disloyal even if they would opt for India and therefore, should be dismissed from their official status.<sup>42</sup>

L.K. Advani, the former 'iron man' of Hindu nationalism has warned of a bumpy ride ahead for the country's democracy. He had hinted at his former protégé, Prime Minister Modi's policies as autocratic.<sup>43</sup> VHP and RSS had often been involved in the banning of books written on Gandhi and Hinduism. A biography of Gandhi, written by the editor of the New York Times, Joseph Lelyveld was banned by the Modi government in

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<sup>41</sup>Riffat Hussain, "Resolving the Kashmir Dispute: Blending Realism with Justice", *Criterion Quarterly*, April 21, 2012.

<sup>42</sup>A.G.Noorani. "The Destruction of Hyderabad", Hurst & Company, London. 2013.

<sup>43</sup>Javed Naqvi, Who can crush Indian Democracy?, *Dawn*, 23 June, 2015.

Gujarat and the books by Wendy Doniger on Hinduism were withdrawn and pulped by Penguin Books, India.<sup>44</sup>

Similarly, there are several historical evidences, which speak loudly on Indian non-democratic assertions. For example, B.R. Ambedkar, the main architect of Indian Constitution, had warned in 1950 that "Democracy in India is only a top dressing on an Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic".<sup>45</sup> The term 'secular' was missing from the original Constitution of India of 1950. It was added when amendments were incorporated in connection with the 1976 emergency.<sup>46</sup>

### Conclusion

Whether protecting Indian civilization or defending the conservative populism through Hindu nationalist movement to transform democracy or using Hindutva smokescreen for vote bank communalism, the regional congruities on ideological issues and national identity in South Asian countries are worrisome. The aggressive salience of Hindutva poses grave security challenges both to bilateral and regional diplomacy. For example, an antagonistic debate on ideology and Hindu nationalism, rekindles the anxieties of the migrants on both sides of India and Pakistan borders by reincarnating the long-settled ideological conflict, and may unleash another human tragedy in future. The resurgence of belligerent Hindutva enlivens the agonizing memories of communal breakup of 1947.

India needs to initiate a collective positive vision which can correspond with the threat perceptions of not only the regional states but also various identities living in its neighbourhood to ensure regional stability. Any formidable departure of Indian society from an inclusive,

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<sup>44</sup> Iftikhar Haider Malik, "Modi Machine Moves On: India at its Watershed", *Strategic Outlook*. 2014.

<sup>45</sup> Thomas Blom Hansen, *The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India*, (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1999).

<sup>46</sup> Henrik Bergland, "Religion and Nationalism". *Economic & Political Weekly*. vol. 39, no. 10. (6 March, 2004).

liberal, and pluralistic polity towards a non-tolerant, right-wing pro-Hindu vision is a challenge not only for its own secular identity but polarizes the region.

The long-standing conflicts have locked both India and Pakistan into enduring enmity since the time of partition in 1947. The continuing enmity between the two, with several challenges, keeps their relationship vulnerable to instability. Pakistan is already fighting a War on Terror on its western borders against the violent extremist forces. It needs a robust regional security thinking and support from all countries including India to reinforce its counter-terrorism strategies. According to international law, it is an obligation for the whole of international community to come to the assistance of those states that are fighting terrorism.

Pakistan certainly wants to normalise its relationship with India, and therefore resists any new perspective like Hindutva to its threat perceptions. An inter-faith regional forum under the umbrella of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) would help reduce the tension, and enable the member countries to collectively work together to reduce the space provided by radical communal forces for any misunderstandings.

## South Asia Nuclear Deterrence Beyond 2016: Challenges and Future Prospects

Shams uz Zaman\*

### Abstract

*The rising tide of Hindu nationalism in India has profoundly affected the South Asian strategic stability as the BJP led government is both reviewing Indian nuclear doctrine and posture. Recent statements of Indian defence and government officials indicate that India is inclined to adopt a pre-emptive nuclear posture against Pakistan which is both dangerous and disastrous. Several issues between India and Pakistan, notably Kashmir, remain unresolved which pose even more dangers to the existing deterrence equation between the two countries. Any change to the existing nuclear doctrine by India would only increase the risks of nuclear war in South Asia. Therefore, under prevailing circumstances there is a dire need for confidence building measures between Indian and Pakistan besides devising a mechanism for conflict resolution for which the international community must play its part.*

**Keywords:** Credible Minimum Deterrence, South Asia, Deterrence, Massive Retaliation, Mutual Assured Destruction.

### Introduction

Indian nuclear ambitions can be traced back to even before partition as once in June 1946, Prime Minister Nehru echoed to acquire nuclear weapons either for security or status.<sup>1</sup> Having diverted the spent fuel

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<sup>1</sup>Naeem Salik, *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 59-61. See also: Zafar Iqbal Cheema, *Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development, and Implications for South Asian Security* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 48-49.

from the Canadian-Indian Research Uranium System (CIRUS) reactor, provided by Canada for peaceful purposes, India demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability in 1974 misleadingly terming it as a 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosion' (PNE). Scientific community has made it amply clear that technically there is fundamentally no difference between a peaceful and a weapon related nuclear explosion.<sup>2</sup> However, despite that clarification, many western scholars and states subscribed to this deceptive claim. One of the core proponent of nuclear disarmament in past, India has now become amongst the most invasive nuclear weapon state with a Hindu chauvinistic hardliner government in control of nuclear weapons. Although, the revision of nuclear doctrine was included in the election manifesto of the BJP government,<sup>3</sup> nevertheless it was expected that either India would review the massive retaliation clause, thus toning it down to proportionate response, or would annul the misleading No First Use (NFU) proclamation from the nuclear doctrine.<sup>4</sup> Instead several Indian government and defence officials, both in-service and retired, have openly stated that a pre-emptive nuclear strike posture is being considered by the incumbent Indian government.<sup>5</sup> This is alarming because such a posture could compel the other side to take appropriate counter measures. Pakistan may have to rethink its nuclear posture.

These developments offer grim prospects for regional stability and deterrence equation in South Asia. In an environment where disputes remain unresolved and the rising tide of Hindu extremism is dominating

<sup>2</sup> "Peaceful Nuclear Explosions", Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), undated, <https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/history-of-nuclear-testing/peaceful-nuclear-explosions/>.

<sup>3</sup> "Election Manifesto 2014", *Bharatiya Janata Party*, 2014, [http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf\\_2014/full\\_manifesto\\_english\\_07.04.2014.pdf](http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf), 39.

<sup>4</sup> Gurmeet Kanwal, "India's Nuclear Doctrine: Need for a Review", *Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)*, Commentary, December 5, 2014, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/indias-nuclear-doctrine-reviewing-nfu-and-massive-retaliation-4798.html>.

<sup>5</sup> Max Fisher, "India, Long at Odds With Pakistan, May Be Rethinking Nuclear First Strikes", *The New York Times*, March 31, 2017, [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/asia/india-long-at-odds-with-pakistan-may-be-rethinking-nuclear-first-strikes.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/asia/india-long-at-odds-with-pakistan-may-be-rethinking-nuclear-first-strikes.html?_r=0).

Indian politics, the space for mistakes becomes more constrained and limited. The Indian thinking indicates a trend towards a dangerous conviction of considering nuclear war-fighting a winnable and worth the risk proposition. Despite the fact that in foreseeable future, in the opinion of several scholars, India will not have the capability to conduct a decapitating strike against Pakistan, thus depriving it of nuclear retaliation, considering nuclear weapons as a tool for pre-emption is misleading and self-destructive. Under the existing circumstances, it appears that India and Pakistan could soon be in a nuclear equation of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) rather than Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). According to some studies, a nuclear war in South Asia would have catastrophic global consequences.<sup>6</sup> To save the world from nuclear annihilation, both the South Asian rivals need to strengthen the mechanism of conflict resolution rather than adopting offensive nuclear doctrines.

### **India's Nuclear Doctrine – a Path to Pre-emption**

After the nuclearization of South Asia, India lost the conventional edge over Pakistan with war being no more a rational option. There was a sense of frustration within Indian establishment and defence officials over this new reality which prevented them to wage a full-scale war in 2001 and 2008.<sup>7</sup> Having ruled out conventional war as an option between the nuclear rivals by both the states, it implied that a plausible justification has to be constructed by India to maintain such a large size conventional military. After the Kargil conflict, the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) became the *raison d'être* to justify such a large size of Indian military for India. While it taught Pakistan a bitter lesson that even a limited conflict between Islamabad and New Delhi may spiral into an all-out war risking a nuclear exchange, on the contrary, India drew different

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<sup>6</sup> Ira Helfand, MD, "Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk?", *International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility*, Second Edition, November 2013.

<sup>7</sup> Prateek Joshi, "Are Nuclear Weapons Pushing India and Pakistan Towards War?", *The National Interest*, December 8, 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/are-nuclear-weapons-pushing-india-pakistan-towards-war-18664?page=show>.

inferences from Kargil and weighed the plausibility of limited war – termed as CSD or Pro-Active Operation (PAO) – below the nuclear thresholds. Indian nuclear doctrine which was made public in 1999 had not only contained various contradictions but also marked a shift from earlier stated positions. Like, for example, a glaring contradiction regarding the NFU promise was contained in a clause at paragraph 5 of the draft nuclear doctrine which states that: “India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers.”<sup>8</sup> This condition practically makes NFU redundant.<sup>9</sup> It is interesting to note that the interpretation of ‘aligned’ has been intentionally left open, and it remains unclear whether aligned implies a formal defence alliance/treaty between Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) or could even refer to diplomatic, trade and economic cooperation between NNWS and NWS as well. And will such a mutual relationship, without any formal defence pact, qualify the NNWS as potential targets for the Indian nuclear strike? This clause theoretically justifies a nuclear strike against any state which has some linkage or relationship with a NWS.<sup>10</sup> These contradictions were remarkably given little consideration by most of the western scholars while commenting on the Indian nuclear doctrine.

Apparently both India and Pakistan remain dismissive of each other’s nuclear postures but still haven’t risked nuclear brinkmanship. On one hand, Pakistan remains sceptical of massive retaliation in response to

<sup>8</sup> “Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, August 17, 1999, <http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine>.

<sup>9</sup> Shams uz Zaman, “Myth of Indian ‘nuclear no first Use’”, *The Nation*, December 22, 2012, <http://nation.com.pk/columns/22-Dec-2012/myth-of-indian-nuclear-no-first-use>. For a detailed analysis of Indian shift on NFU and CMD see: Manoj Joshi, “The Credibility of India’s Nuclear Deterrent”, in *Deterrence Instability & Nuclear Weapons in South Asia*, ed. Michael Krepon et al., (Washington: Stimson Center, 2015), 43-47.

<sup>10</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, *India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrence and Ready Arsenal* (California: RAND, 2001), 304-305.



limited use of nuclear weapons while on the other, India keeps dismissing the threat of Pakistan's Low Yield Short Range (LYSR) nuclear warheads.<sup>11</sup> In the backdrop, the Indian government publicized another rejoinder to its previously disclosed nuclear doctrine in January 2003, which was visibly influenced by the US invasion of Iraq and threat of use of chemical and biological weapons. The pronouncement added following new conditions to the existing doctrine:

- Nuclear weapons would be used in retaliation to a nuclear strike on Indian territory or Indian forces anywhere.<sup>12</sup>
- India would reserve the right to respond with nuclear weapons if its forces are subjected to chemical or biological attack anywhere around the globe.<sup>13</sup>

These clauses were very significant and marked the Indian shift from 'nuclear retaliatory posture' by lowering its nuclear threshold against chemical and biological weapons. Indian doctrine now makes no distinction between biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. This trend illustrates that, in future, the inclusion of several other categories of weapons or capabilities could be included to justify nuclear retaliation. Like, for example, so far the radiological weapons or an explicit mention of pre-emption have not been included in the Indian nuclear doctrine which maybe done in the future. Another significant development which took place in the thinking of Indian policy makers, after development of LYSR nuclear capable missiles, was to evaluate the efficacy of doing away with the NFU posture or relaxing the provision of massive retaliation to

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<sup>11</sup> Toby Dalton, "Assessing Threats and Priorities in Nuclear South Asia", *Cornell University*, June 2016, <https://pacs.einaudi.cornell.edu/sites/pacs/files/Dalton%20-%20Nuclear%20South%20Asia%20June-final.pdf>. See also: Col Rajinder Singh, "Full Spectrum Deterrence vs Cold Start Doctrine: Prospects of a Nuclear Conflagration in South Asia", *Indian Defence Review*, July 15, 2016, <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/full-spectrum-deterrence-vs-cold-start-doctrine-prospects-of-a-nuclear-conflagration-in-south-asia/>.

<sup>12</sup> "Cabinet Committee on Security Review Progress in Operationalizing India's Nuclear Doctrine", *Prime Minister's Office – Press Release*, January 4, 2003, <http://pib.nic.in/archieve/Ireleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html>.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

proportionate response in the nuclear doctrine. The development of LYSR nuclear capable missiles by Pakistan actually foreclosed the option for India to impose a limited war on Pakistan.

With the qualitative and quantitative improvements in the size of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, especially after building the nuclear reactors at Khushab, Indian policy makers became further exasperated, resultantly prompting the Indian hardliners in Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to promise revising the Indian nuclear doctrine in the party's manifesto.<sup>14</sup> Since the BJP's rise to power, Indian policy makers and defence officials are earnestly evaluating and debating the possibility of revising the existing Indian nuclear doctrine.<sup>15</sup> At the Carnegie annual conference held at Washington in March 2017, Vipin Narang, citing several Indian current and former defence and government officials, also highlighted the shifting trends in the Indian nuclear doctrine.<sup>16</sup> According to Narang, not only is India considering to annul the NFU pledge(which in any case was not relevant in the Pakistani context) but there is also a growing indication that India may be contemplating a pre-emptive role for nuclear weapons against Pakistan. This dangerous development would diminish the space which had existed to evaluate and re-consider the risk involved in a nuclear strike due to constraints imposed by the fear of a pre-emptive nuclear strike.

### **Hindu Hardliner Government and Risks to South Asia**

Hindu extremists seek to transform the Indian Republic into a Hindu state with no place for other religious and ethnic communities (especially

<sup>14</sup> G Parthasarathy, "Time to review India's 'no first use' doctrine", *The Hindu*, December 14, 2016, <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/india-pakistan-and-nuclear-war/article9427061.ece>.

<sup>15</sup> Toby Dalton and George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Options and Escalation Dominance* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016), 10-13.

<sup>16</sup> Remarks by Professor Vipin Narang, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology at Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference Washington DC, titled: "Plenary: Beyond the Nuclear Threshold: Causes and Consequences of First Use", *South Asian Voices*, <https://southasianvoices.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Vipin-Narang-Remarks-Carnegie-Nukefest-2017.pdf>, 2-3.

Muslims and Christians) and including the weaker neighbouring states.<sup>17</sup> The incumbent Hindu hardliner government is a product of multiple streams of Hindu fanaticism which found a political umbrella under the banner of the BJP in 1980.<sup>18</sup> In the past, the adherents of the Hindutva ideology never accepted creation of Pakistan as an ideological state and have always envisioned the annexation of Pakistan back into the folds of their perceived view of United Hindu India commonly known as Akhand Bharat.<sup>19</sup> The current stream of Hindu hardliners have a slightly different view on the traditional concept of United India but they have not an iota of sympathy towards Pakistan, and worryingly they are becoming a part of the mainstream Indian government.<sup>20</sup> Such fanatics infected with the ideology of hate and extreme views, are bound when in power to influence moderate policymakers, thus paving the way for radical policy making which presumably would be a departure from the rational decision making model. The room for miscalculation and error would become more plausible under such circumstances.

On several occasions, Hindu terrorists staged terrorist attacks inside India while placing the blame on Pakistan under a purported plan of maligning Pakistan internationally.<sup>21</sup> The strategy of limited war or CSD was also conceived by the previous BJP government after having failed to gain any significant benefit from the escalation of 2001-2002. The CSD or

<sup>17</sup> Richard H. Davis, "The Cultural Background of Hindutva", 10-12. See also: Christophe Jaffrelot, *Hindu Nationalism – A Reader*, 2009, 6-7.

<sup>18</sup> "The Fountainhead: The BJP and the RSS – BJP History", *BHARATIYA JANTA PARTY – A Party With a Difference*, undated, <http://www.bjp.org/en/about-the-party/history?u=bjp-history>.

<sup>19</sup> PTI, "India, Pakistan, Bangladesh will reunite to form Akhand Bharat: Ram Madhav", *The Hindu*, updated March 26, 2016, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/akhand-bharat-india-pakistan-bangladesh-will-reunite-one-day-says-ram-madhav/article8031920.ece>.

<sup>20</sup> *BBC News*, "Who's the Hindu hardliner running India's most populous state?", March 29, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-39403778>.

<sup>21</sup> Andrew Buncombe, "Hindu holy man reveals truth of terror attacks blamed on Muslims", *The Independent*, January 12, 2011, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/hindu-holy-man-reveals-truth-of-terror-attacks-blamed-on-muslims-2182178.html>. See also: Parveen Swami, "Saffron Terror", Volume 19, Issue 06, March 16 - 29, 2002, <http://www.frontline.in/navigation/?type=static&page=flonnet&rdurl=fl1906/19060080.htm>.

PAO strategy was devised out of sheer frustration and having realized the futility of war after the nuclearization of South Asia. Under these risky environments, Pakistan saw the option of a limited war in South Asia imprudent and extremely dangerous proposition which could slip out of hand thus turning into a full scale nuclear war. Pakistan thus made some adjustments to its nuclear doctrine to deter war and thus ensure that the South Asian environment remains stable. The adoption of FSD (Full Spectrum Deterrence) was aimed at making doctrinal adjustments according to the emergence of newer kinds of emerging threats in the shape of limited war fighting strategy. Indian nuclear doctrine of pre-emption will not go unnoticed in Pakistan and several new changes could be adopted against this possibility in future.

### **Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrinal Shift and Thresholds**

Pakistan has not formally announced a nuclear doctrine as an official document. The doctrinal principles can only be learnt through the statements and interviews given by the government officials in their private and official capacity from time to time. There are primarily two stated principal functions of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine: first, to deter India from initiating a war, and second, in case the deterrence fails, deny India scoring a decisive victory against Pakistan.<sup>22</sup> The main contours of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine can thus be understood as:<sup>23</sup>

- Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability is India centric and is aimed at deterring Indian conventional aggression and nuclear strike against.
- Pakistan's nuclear weapons serve as insurance against any possibility of India securing a decisive victory against Pakistan in the event of a war, if deterrence fails.

<sup>22</sup> Sadia Tasleem, "Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Regional Insight, June 30, 2016, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-nuclear-use-doctrine-pub-63913>

<sup>23</sup> Naeem Salik, "The Evolution of Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine", in *Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Decade* ed. Feroz Hassan Khan, et al., (California: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2014), 79-81. See also: Bhumitra Chakma, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 47-55.

- Pakistan follows the principle of CMD (at times termed as Minimum Credible Deterrence (MCD) or even Minimum Deterrence (MD) without actually implying a shift, which is a dynamic concept and remains subject to revisions while taking stock of adversary's conventional and nuclear doctrines, force postures, BMD systems, fissile material stocks and size of nuclear arsenal.<sup>24</sup>
- Pakistan considers nuclear weapons not for nuclear war-fighting but war avoidance which serve a narrow purpose of deterrence.<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless, paradoxically the nuclear targeting plans remain an essential part of deterrence strategy which demonstrates the will and commitment to exercise nuclear option should deterrence fail.
- In response to the Indian development of nuclear triad and BMD systems, Pakistan has also developed second strike capability by conducting successful test of Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) and Multiple Independently-targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) capable ballistic missiles.<sup>26</sup>
- Pakistan has not subscribed to nuclear NFU but has reiterated to contemplate nuclear option only as a last resort. The 'last resort', however, remains subject to interpretation and may mean different things under different circumstances according to battlefield situation. According to existing literature, the option to employ nuclear weapons by Pakistan is likely to be considered under the following circumstances:<sup>27</sup>
  - Capture of a large city, port or territory by Indian armed forces or a deep incursion which constitutes a grave threat to national security or existence.

<sup>24</sup> Chakma, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons* (Routledge, 2009), 44, 48-51.

<sup>25</sup> Muhammad Umar, "Efficacy of Nuclear Deterrence, Its Role in Pakistan's National Security Policy", *South Asian Voices*, May 7, 2015, <https://southasianvoices.org/efficacy-of-nuclear-deterrence-its-role-in-pakistans-national-security-policy/>.

<sup>26</sup> "Pakistan gains second strike capability", *The Express Tribune*, January 10, 2017, 1.

<sup>27</sup> Mahesh Shankar and T. V. Paul, "Nuclear Doctrines and Stable Strategic Relationships: The Case of South Asia," *International Affairs*, Vol. 92, Issue. 1, January 2016, 12-14. Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, *Aerospace Power: The Emerging Strategic Dimension* (Peshawar: PAF Book Club, 2003), 148.

- Destruction of sizeable portion of conventional armed forces thus exposing the state virtually defenceless against conventional attacks.
- An attack on nuclear or strategic installations/sites (such as nuclear facilities, dams, missile sites etc.) either for destruction or in an attempt to seize/gain control of the nuclear/strategic site or weapons.
- Running out of war stamina due to shortage or exhaustion of supplies and resources critically needed for fighting a conventional war.
- Economic strangulation through naval blockade or other means falling in the category of aggression and aimed at economically crippling the state of Pakistan.
- Indian sponsoring of a large scale subversive movement, sabotage campaign or a political uprising which gravely threatens the national security or survival. This condition has probably been included after the bitter experience of 1971 when eastern half of Pakistan got separated due to Indian support to Bengali separatist groups.

### **Deterrence Stability and Prospective Risks in South Asia**

Although several issues between India and Pakistan could affect deterrence stability in South Asia, Kashmir remains the root cause of confrontation between the nuclear rivals. Since 1947, both states have been contesting on the future of the Kashmir region. Former Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru is on the record to have reiterated on numerous occasions the importance of plebiscite and the right of Kashmiris to decide their own fate and future through self-determination.<sup>28</sup> However, subsequently his opinion turned out to be a mere rhetoric to pacify the Kashmiri people as no Indian government has ever showed any serious intent to resolve the Kashmir dispute. In the

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<sup>28</sup> "India's commitment of Plebiscite for the People of Kashmir" *National Assembly of Pakistan*, updated, January 20, 2017, <http://www.na.gov.pk/en/content.php?id=85>.

past, several groups in Pakistan, having an element of sympathy for the Kashmir cause, had been the source of encouragement for the freedom fighters on the other side of LOC, which prompted India to accuse Pakistan of fuelling trouble in the restive region of Kashmir. However, the hollowness of this claim became apparent amid the latest uprising in Indian Occupied Kashmir, which has been accepted as being indigenous even by Indian and western sources as well.<sup>29</sup> Lingering border and territorial disputes coupled with growing tensions over the distribution of water resources is also threatening peace and stability in South Asia. India has shown complete disinterest in resolving the outstanding issues with Pakistan and the latest example comes from New Delhi's rejection of Washington's offer to mediate peace between India and Pakistan.<sup>30</sup> From Pakistan's perspective, this is a clear indication that India has little interest in resolving disputes in the region and intends to maintain the status-quo on territorial disputes.<sup>31</sup>

Even more troubling is the development of New Delhi seriously contemplating employing nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive role against Pakistan. Such a dangerous thinking would make South Asia more unstable as Pakistan would ostensibly be pushed to take necessary measures to mitigate the threats posed by this Indian offensive nuclear posture. Amid the Indian pre-emptive strike posture, right at the onset of any crisis due to threat of a decapitating nuclear strike, Pakistan would be facing a 'use it or lose it' dilemma regarding its nuclear weapons which ostensibly would be the principal target of the Indian pre-emptive doctrine. This would add on to the pressure of contemplating employing

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<sup>29</sup>Happymon Jacob, "A Year of Living Dangerously", *The Hindu*, December 22, 2016, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/A-year-of-living-dangerously/article16919538.ece>. See also: "Kashmir Uprising Indigenous: Norway", *The Nation*, November 20, 2010, <http://nation.com.pk/politics/20-Nov-2010/Kashmir-uprising-indigenous-Norway>.

<sup>30</sup> "India rejects US offer to mediate with Pakistan on Kashmir issue", *The Times of India*, April 5, 2017, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-rejects-us-offer-to-mediate-with-pakistan-on-kashmir-issue/articleshow/58018616.cms>.

<sup>31</sup> Ramesh Trivedi, *India's Relations With Her Neighbours* (New Delhi: ISHA Books, 2008), 7-8. See also: IkramUllah, "India is Losing Kashmir", *Foreign Policy*, May 5, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/05/india-is-losing-kashmir/>.

nuclear weapons even before the Indian pre-emptive option is exercised. Nuclear redlines in the case of India and Pakistan would be blurred and the risk of nuclear exchange would become more apparent in a 'bolt from the blue' scenario. Under such circumstances, any cushion for a delayed or considered decision to employ nuclear weapons, which otherwise may have helped to alleviate risks of a miscalculation or an accident, would no more be conceivable.

The Indian pre-emptive nuclear option would force Pakistan to increase the number of nuclear warheads and delivery means in order to ensure that an Indian pre-emptive strike remains ineffective in completely disarming Pakistan of its nuclear retaliatory capabilities. More so, Pakistan may increase its reliance on the nuclear weapons. The Indian pre-emptive doctrine would make the use of nuclear weapons even more plausible and indispensable giving these precedence over the conventional option. Nuclear use would thus become the first priority for both the state in a hair-trigger alert status, once Pakistan adopts a nuclear posture of Launch on Warning (LOW) in response to Indian pre-emptive nuclear posture. Such a situation would certainly precipitate a nuclear and missile arms race in South Asia besides increasing the risks of a nuclear exchange. This scenario would presumably deny any space for effective international diplomacy because, after India adopts a pre-emptive posture, the escalatory ladder to nuclear exchange would assumingly be climbed so quickly that there would be hardly any window of opportunity available for the international community to swing into action in order to defuse the nuclear crisis.

### **Mitigating the Risks**

The risks of nuclear exchange would increase exponentially because of India's extremely offensive nuclear and conventional doctrines. Indian CSD and pre-emptive nuclear posture puts over two billion people around the globe at the risk of annihilation.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, the world cannot just sit

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<sup>32</sup> Ira Helfand, MD, "Nuclear Famine", *International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War*, November 2013.



back and watch the events unfolding in South Asia and ultimately reaching a point of no return. A sequential approach would have to be adopted towards preventing the possibility of a nuclear war and normalizing the situation in South Asia.

- **International Mediation and Dialogue.** The most compelling issue in South Asia is the lack of communication channels and non-existence of a conflict resolution mechanism. Whenever India and Pakistan agree to negotiate, some incident brings them back to square one and therefore, whenever both the states resume negotiations, it is mostly about which conditions should or shouldn't be set before the resumption of dialogue. Media on both sides of the border usually creates hype thus undermining and sabotaging the dialogue process.<sup>33</sup> It would therefore be necessary for the international players to play a mediating role in bringing India and Pakistan to the negotiation table. Back channel diplomacy, Track 1 and Track 2 dialogue could play an important role in keeping the process of negotiations away from public and media's sphere and thus the minimise the chances of sabotaging the process. A most significant development was the offer of President Trump's administration to India and Pakistan for mediating the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. However, while Pakistan welcomed the offer, unfortunately, India rejected the proposal which clearly show the lack of interest by the Indian hardliner government in peace. Nevertheless, this must not be accepted as the end of the road: rather, more international pressure should be exerted on India to sit on the negotiation table for the resolution of outstanding disputes with Pakistan which threatens one-third of the world population.
- **Resolution of Disputes.** For seventy years, India and Pakistan have locked their horns over border and territorial disputes. Despite

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<sup>33</sup>Haneen Rafi, "Foreign policy of Pakistan, India seems to be media - driven", *Dawn*, August 5, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1349610/foreign-policy-of-pakistan-india-seems-to-be-media-driven>. See also: *The Patriot*, "Indian Media urged not to sabotage efforts for good ties with Pakistan", January 6, 2016, <https://dailythepatriot.com/indian-media-urged-not-to-sabotage-efforts-for-good-ties-with-pakistan/>.

several serious attempts to negotiate settlement over these lingering disputes, both states could not overcome the perception differences and internal pressures to solve these issues. The conflict resolution mechanism would therefore be a long and challenging process. The regional and global peace would remain hostage to the enduring disputes in South Asia as regional tensions would have reverberations across the globe due to close proximity of global powers like China and Russia. It would be therefore imperative to resolve the disputes preferably by involving international mediators in the dialogue process which should not be made public prematurely.

- **Arms Control Treaty.** India's obsession with high-tech weaponry, coupled with the offensive nature of conventional and nuclear doctrines, pose a serious threat to regional peace and stability. Pakistan perceives that the weaponization of South Asia is primarily as a consequence of Indian massive spending on defence, which would enhance Indian self-assurance and over confidence in its military capabilities. Such confidence and assurance may encourage nuclear brinkmanship from the Indian side, thereby increasing the risks of miscalculation and conflict in South Asia. Pakistan and India would have to take a lead from the Cold War politics by negotiating an arms control treaty. This arms control treaty could initially be aimed at limiting the specific type of missile systems and their ranges. Like, for example, the most significant pledge would be to stop installation of the BMD systems along with some other missiles of specific types and ranges.
- **No War Pact.** The most significant development would be signing of a No War Treaty or Pact by both the South Asian rivals. However, this step would only be possible once a durable peace has been found for the decades old disputes which sour the relationship between India and Pakistan. After the nuclearization of South Asia, Pakistan has repeatedly offered for a "No War Pact", but India has yet not

responded to it positively.<sup>34</sup> This is primarily because of the disputes which keep souring the mutual relations of both the states. Therefore, reaching a settlement on the problematic issues especially Kashmir would pave the way for successfully negotiating a no-war pact or treaty in South Asia.

## Conclusion

The deterrence equation in South Asia is gradually changing amid the acquisition of advanced technologies and missile developments by India, most notably the BMD system. These developments are compelling Pakistan to take necessary actions to maintain strategic balance in the region. In addition to these state of the art weapons procurements; India is also in a process of introducing changes to its nuclear doctrine and may adopt a pre-emptive nuclear posture. This posture would be an extremely destabilizing action which would fundamentally alter the deterrence equation and strategic stability in South Asia. Indian pre-emptive doctrine would be a serious threat for the regional peace as it may pressurize Pakistan to consider pushing the nuclear button even before India exercises the pre-emptive nuclear option in a crisis like situation. Consequently, a nuclear exchange in South Asia is becoming more plausible and believable right at the onset of a crisis or a terrorist attack which can escalate the situation between India and Pakistan. Pakistan and India would have to seriously get engaged in a dialogue process to prevent a bolt from the blue nuclear exchange as just a direct communication line between General Headquarters of Pakistan and India would prove inadequate in resolving a serious crisis in South Asia. However, looking at the current Hindu hardliner government, there is a little hope for optimism that India may consider the options to meaningfully resolve the existing issues which perpetuate instability. It thus becomes imperative for the international community, especially the global powers, to facilitate a dialogue process between New Delhi and

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<sup>34</sup> "India rejects Pak proposal for no-war pact", *The Times of India*, January 24, 2002, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-rejects-Pak-proposal-for-no-war-pact/articleshow/15396888.cms>.

Islamabad and to mediate on the unresolved disputes which pose an existential threat to one third of the world population. Regional forums like South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Shanghai Five, and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) can play an important role in facilitating conflict resolution between India and Pakistan.

## The Bright and Dark Faces of Globalization in Afghanistan\*

Marvin G. Weinbaum, Lillian Judge & Moh. Sayed Madadi\*\*

### Abstract

*Afghanistan offers an excellent case study for exemplifying the bright and dark sides of globalization. This paper seeks to provide a nuanced and balanced picture of the effects of globalization and regionalization as viewed through the lenses of Afghanistan's narcotics trafficking, the media, and foreign aid. No other element in Afghanistan's economy bears so clearly the marks of globalization as does narcotics, both in contributing to the country's economic survival and in serving as a threat to its success as a state. Global market forces, unmitigated by Afghanistan's weak post-2001 institutions, have made poppy growing and opium production the best of a poor range of options. Yet among several unintended consequences, the beneficiaries of global trade have included the Taliban insurgents, who tax production and exact payment from drug traffickers in exchange for protection. Afghanistan has meanwhile undergone a media and communications revolution. The country's exposure to foreign television programming has raised public expectations of more responsive governance and*

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\* This article is expanded and revised from a paper presented at a symposium on Governing Globalization at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign on March 31, 2017.

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*service delivery. There have been opportunities to strengthen people's national identity and gain access to difficult-to-reach populations. However, freedoms for the press and media have also laid the ground for more regressive, ethnocentric, and divisive tendencies. And the international development aid that has provided Afghanistan large sums of money for building economic and political institutions has also served to fuel corruption and to undermine government incentives for extracting taxes and taking responsibility for the country's security.*

**Keywords:** Afghanistan, Soviet invasion, Cold War, Globalization, Economy, Pakistan, Resources, Democracy

### **Introduction**

South Asia has been a prime beneficiary of globalization. Access to foreign educational institutions and ideas has produced some of the world's best doctors and engineers, and foreign direct investment has created new industries and helped to turn cities into hubs of commerce. With the diffusion of knowledge, the well being of the poor over vast swathes of the region has improved. Increasing mobile phone and Internet penetration has resulted in a more aware populations that demands greater government services and accountability from their rulers.

However, with globalization's benefits have come tradeoffs: unfettered markets often fail to promote social good, empowered unaccountable institutions can lead to state capture and subsequently predation, and wider access to information enables benevolent and malevolent actors indiscriminately. In the region, Afghanistan offers a unique case study of globalization, elevating from a disintegrated state isolated from the world to one where the fate of international politics was set to reveal itself for more than a decade.

Foreign influence prior to the mid-twentieth century was limited to Afghanistan's small elite. The Cold War brought attention to the country in the form of competing US and Soviet development assistance. The ouster of the Durrani monarchy in 1973 and subsequent political infighting and Islamic insurgency prompted the Soviet invasion and occupation. As the civil war in the 1990s gave way to the Taliban ascendance, Afghanistan was ignored by and virtually cut off from the rest of the world. However, with the American military intervention in 2001, the country was suddenly inundated with foreign aid and exposed to global forces. Long a social and economic backwater, Afghanistan was set on a course intended to build a modern state and economy.

International engagement has on the face of it been a positive aspect of Afghanistan's connectivity with the global community. Political and economic institutions were erected and gains have occurred in education and health for a country with some of the world's lowest socioeconomic indicators. Heavy international military assistance boosted economic growth sharply and created conditions for attracting foreign investment. Yet more than fifteen years later, it is clear that international interest and engagement in Afghanistan has also carried perverse effects, including unsustainable and distorted economic growth, wider and deeper corruption, and flourishing markets for illicit goods.

Because much of the global integration that has occurred since 2001 was managed and mediated by foreign powers, our understanding of Afghanistan's encounter with globalization has tended to emphasize its benefits rather than its costs. It is also a byproduct of the tendency to gauge Afghanistan's progress against its dark past (before 9/11) instead of what was expected and supposed to be achieved after 2001. This paper seeks to provide a more nuanced and balanced picture of the effects of globalization and regionalization as viewed briefly through the lenses of Afghanistan's narcotics trafficking, the media, and foreign aid.

Before discussing these three areas and how globalization has affected them, it is imperative to define globalization in the particular

context we are studying. We apply the generic and broadly accepted definition of globalization as the interconnectivity and interdependency across the world caused by the growingly freer flow of information, labor, capital, goods, and services. In Afghanistan, however, the military invasion of 2001 by the US-led NATO coalition played a fundamental role in throwing Afghanistan into the international scene. The connectivity of Afghanistan to the outside world was only a symptom of a strategic calculation on the part of big powers to fight a global war on the Afghan territory making sure it never poses a threat to the national security of those countries. How that militaristic nature of the post-2001 process affected globalization in Afghanistan is what we have taken deeply into consideration in the pages that follow.

### **Narcotics Trafficking**

No other element in Afghanistan's economy bears so clearly the marks of globalization as does narcotics, both contributing to the country's economic survival and serving as a threat to its success as a state. Afghanistan's narcotics trade is a deeply entrenched economic institution. The illicit economy, of which narcotics constitutes a large part, was the only mature part of Afghanistan's economy to survive on through decades of war. While its production was already well integrated into the global economy by 2001, foreign anti-opium policies and global market forces have since solidified Afghanistan's place as an opium producer. Today, the area of opium cultivation (in hectares) amounts to two and one-half to three times that of the 1994-2002 period and production has grown steadily since 2002.<sup>1</sup> Afghanistan produces approximately 90 percent of the world's opium, providing virtually all the opium and morphine base for heroin found in Eurasia.

Opium cultivation at the household level is far from nefarious. In fact, it is part of a carefully calculated subsistence strategy that results from a lack of workable alternatives. Growing poppy is exponentially easier than

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<sup>1</sup> "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2016: Executive Summary," New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017.



other crops and plantations that might have equally high revenue or grow in the similar environment such as saffron, cotton, and pomegranates. It is much more resistant to bad weather and natural conditions than other comparable crops. Cheap and plentiful labor have further cemented the dominance of this labor-intensive crop, a phenomenon that will continue to be exacerbated by tightening migration laws across the global but more particularly in Europe that restrict household abilities to diversify income streams. Opium has also proven to be a boon to local economies. Opium cultivation allows farmers to invest in agricultural infrastructure and purchase household commodities. More negatively, this income had an inflationary effect on markets across Afghanistan.

The extent of heroin demand emanating from Europe and Asia makes opium at least thirty times more profitable than wheat, and the absence of crop insurance or agricultural subsidies preclude poorer Afghans from substituting licit crops.<sup>2</sup> Lack of credit, independent of opium, has also made growing at least some opium a necessity.<sup>3</sup> Heightened access to information on agricultural techniques and variety types has increased opium productivity and profits, while traditional knowledge related to the cultivation of licit crops has eroded over the last several decades. With only 12-15% arable land in Afghanistan, growing poppy and the high revenue emanating from it makes it more attractive to farmers. There is only so much land to be used for agricultural purposes and years of conflict and irregular irrigation has deteriorated its fertility. The high price of opium makes it a logical crop in a country where more than 60% of the population subsists on farming.

An important aspect of narcotics in Afghanistan is its political economy. Opium is cultivated primarily in areas where there is extensive

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<sup>2</sup>Fishstein, Paul. "Despair or Hope: Rural Livelihoods and Opium Poppy Dynamics in Afghanistan." Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Anderson, Camilla. "Counterproductive Counternarcotic Strategies?" *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, Volume 95, No. 4: 917-931. 22 Feb. 2015.

insecurity. The local war economy creates a vicious cycle where insecurity prepares the environment for poppy cultivation and the narcotics funds the insecurity in an almost fundamental way. There are also local drug traffickers who might not necessarily be related to the insurgency ideologically but find the partnership profitable enough for their businesses. Weak state institutions have allowed the provincial and district level government officials to engage in drug trafficking to enrich themselves. Kandahar's Police Chief, General Abdul Raziq, for example, is known to be a sworn enemy of the Taliban. Many, however, believe his main animosity with the group is not over their regressive ideology, but family feuds, and more importantly, the revenue from opium<sup>4</sup>.

The intersection of economic interests of different actors in the government, the local tribal structures, and the insurgency, have facilitated the formation of networks of production and trafficking across the country, especially in provinces close to the main trade routes. In the northern network, opium is transited from Kunduz, Takhar, and Badakhshan to Tajikistan where it is then distributed or traded by large Central Asian and Russian mafias that stretch all the way to Eurasia and Eastern Europe. In the Southern route, the trafficking is controlled much more closely and rigidly by the Taliban which has a stronger grip over the territory. Helmand, in the South, is the single largest producer of opium in the world. Its production is often shipped off to the Gulf States and Africa through Pakistan's Karachi port. In the Western side, opium from Farah, Herat, and Badghis is often trafficked to Iran where there is a large consumer market with millions of drug addicts. Through Iran, it also easily transits to Turkey and Europe. In all of these areas, the political violence goes hand in hand with the criminality of the narco-trafficking.

The interdiction and eradication policies pushed by the international community have also had the perverse effect of exacerbating the extractive nature of opium production and alienating the rural

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<sup>4</sup> Aikins, Matthieu, "The Master of Spin Boldak: Undercover with Afghanistan's drug-trafficking border police." *Harper's Magazine*, Dec. 2009.  
<https://harpers.org/archive/2009/12/the-master-of-spin-boldak/2/>

population. When enforced, these policies spearheaded by the United States have often crippled local economies and led to widespread destitution in opium-dependent areas.<sup>5</sup> In many cases, if not all, these policies have targeted farmers in the villages who receive the smallest share of the revenue from opium and who do not have much of a choice in abandoning poppy cultivation. The insecurity does not allow them to grow other crops with regular access to markets, both domestically and regionally. Additionally, powerbrokers have corrupted eradication policies as a means to eliminate competitors, leading to the vertical integration of the narcotics market.<sup>6</sup> Farmers alienated because of crop eradication have in some areas welcomed back into their communities those Taliban factions promising to provide security from eradication.<sup>7</sup> The absence of security in rural areas and along trade routes leaves farmers open to extortion not just from criminal elements. This global trade has also profited the Taliban insurgents, who tax production and exact payment from drug traffickers in exchange for protection.

After 2001, some European countries spearheaded by the UK tried to legalize opium cultivation in Afghanistan<sup>8</sup>. The argument underlying their position was that eradicating poppy in Afghanistan is an arduous task hard to be accomplished. By legalizing its plantation, the revenue comes to the Afghan government and allows for the state institutions to rely on their own funding. Taking away the criminality aspect of it, legalizing opium will also, they argue, connect Afghanistan to large markets of pharmaceuticals where opium is considered a key ingredient for many drugs. It could have hypothetically contributed significantly to the

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<sup>5</sup>Felbab-Brown, Vanda. "Counterinsurgency, Counternarcotics, and Illicit Economies in Afghanistan: Lessons for State-Building." in *Convergence: Illicit Networks*, edited by Michael Miklaucic, 189-208. Washington: National Defense University Press, 2013.

<sup>6</sup> Hogg, Richard, Claudia Nassif, Camilo Gomez Osorio, William Byrd, and Andrew Beath. 2013. *Afghanistan in Transition: Looking beyond 2014; Directions in Development*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Patey, William, "The War on Drug is Lost – Legalize on the Heroin Trade." *The Guardian*, Jun. 14, 2014. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/25/war-on-drugs-heroin-trade-afghanistan>

weakening of the Taliban insurgency by drying up the largest source of their revenue. Given that Helmand was the main station for British troops, it is very likely that the exorbitant growth in poppy cultivation in the province after 2001 was partly a byproduct of the reluctance British troops might have had while they were fighting on the political fronts to legalize it. The Afghan government and the United States, however, were not sold on the proposal. While funds continued to be appropriated for eradicating poppy cultivation and policies were formulated, the progress has been sluggish at best.

### **Media**

For decades Afghans have been avid consumers of media despite chronic poverty and underdeveloped communications infrastructure. Persistent conflict magnified the importance of news access, providing information that was critical to decision-making at the household level. Since 2001, Afghanistan has undergone a media and communications revolution, driven by demand that reflects the value the average Afghan continues to place on gathering news. The country's exposure to foreign television programming has raised expectations among the public for more responsive governance and service delivery. Media has also presented the opportunity to strengthen people's national identity and to access populations, such as women and the rural poor, that are normally so difficult to reach. The freedom for the press and media to operate has also laid the ground for more regressive, ethnocentric, and divisive narratives and discourses.

After 2001, however, the media took an unprecedented turn in Afghanistan. With the ratification of the 2004 constitution that guaranteed freedom of speech and press, private media blossomed in the country. Until 2003, there only was the Afghanistan National Television airing taped programs for five hours a day. It wasn't until several years later that its news service went live for the first time. Today, Afghanistan is home to more than 40 private television channels, over 100 radio stations, and above 1000 print publications (newspapers and

magazines).<sup>9</sup> While security and access to information remain as major obstacles for journalists, the proliferation of the media is yet one of the most solid achievements of Afghanistan with the support of the international community. Foreign support, both political and financial, has been essential to protecting the free media against more conservative forces and its expansion and development.

Media broadcasting is also one of few ways the international community can reach Afghans in far-flung or dangerous areas. Aid organizations have long recognized this reality, and they have shaped programming to bring about normative shifts in Afghan attitudes and behaviors. There is convincing evidence from qualitative studies and randomized trials conducted in Afghanistan in the 1990s that the content of popular BBC programming led to knowledge acquisition and behavioral change amongst Afghans.<sup>10</sup> After 2001, the role and influence of media in shaping social behavior and promoting public discussion have only grown more prominent.

The goal of American funding for Afghan media after 2001 was to ensure it is free, independent, and liberal. Though this vision has failed to materialize in full, the media has proven to be resilient despite the stifling effect of government regulation and the threat of violence by anti-state actors. Journalism training programs have had some degree of success in creating a cadre of young professional journalists, though the dangers of such a job lead to high turnover.<sup>11</sup> Increased Pashto language programming is another positive development, allowing non-Taliban media to compete for hearts and minds in Afghanistan's south and east.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> "Afghanistan Profile – Media." The BBC, April 18, 2017.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12013942>

<sup>10</sup> Adam, Gordon. "Radio in Afghanistan: socially useful communications in wartime," in *Media & Global Change: Rethinking Communication for Development*, ed. Oscar Hemer & Thomas Tufte (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2005), pp. 358-359.

<sup>11</sup> Ayres, Sabra. "Can Afghanistan's press survive without the West's support?" *Columbia Journalism Review*. New York: Columbia University, 2012.

<sup>12</sup> Fraenkel, Eran, Emrys Schoemaker, and Sheldon Himelfarb. "Afghanistan Media Assessment: Opportunities and Challenges for Peacebuilding," Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010.

Promoting accountability of public officials has been something the media can be credited with more than any other institution. Investigative journalism in the print and television have surfaced cases of senior officials misusing public authority and resources for private gains. In 2016, the largest newspaper in the country, 8 AM, revealed documents that the cabinet had decided to divert the direction of a major power line, TUTAP, which brought electricity from Turkmenistan to Southern Afghanistan. Residents of central highlands, where the power line was initially set to pass through, took to the streets in protest calling the decision an act of discrimination against the Hazaras, an ethnic minority that populates the central parts of the country. Had it not been for that investigation by the newspaper, the ensuing street politics that projected the real extent of public movements in Afghanistan would have not taken place.

Several other aspects of this media revolution are more ambiguous. While the media leads Afghans toward increased political participation, people are also more likely to be critical of the government.<sup>13</sup> The increased availability of opposing viewpoints probably contributes to a sense of skepticism towards the status quo,<sup>14</sup> more so than when BBC and VOA were the only sources of news.<sup>15</sup> Many perceive the media to be divided along ethnic lines, and consider individual outlets to be biased.<sup>16</sup> Zhouwandoon, for example, is a television channel that is known to commit itself to promoting an ethno-centric discourse in favor of the Pashtuns.<sup>17</sup> At several incidents, it hosted programs with handpicked guests during a heated national discussion over the new identity cards. While it is unclear whether the media has sparked ethnic tensions, the difficulty inherent in sifting through all the news available in pursuit of

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<sup>13</sup>Burbridge et al., *Survey of the Afghan People* (Washington: The Asia Foundation, 2016), 131.

<sup>14</sup>Fraenkel et al.

<sup>15</sup> "Afghan Media Survey: Report Prepared for BBC Trust." D3 Systems & ACSOR Surveys, 2008. Also see Burbridge et al. 131-140.

<sup>16</sup>Fraenkel et al., Burbridge et al. 131-140.

<sup>17</sup> Stern, Jeffrey, "Afghanistan's Growing Identity (card) Crisis." *Foreign Policy*, Jan 21, 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/21/afghanistans-growing-identity-card-crisis/>

the truth has prompted many Afghans to rely on traditional filtered sources such as their village *shuras* and *maliks* for news.<sup>18</sup>

More negatively, this revolution has strengthened the ability of insurgent elements to influence the population and recruit anti-state forces. New technologies that have contributed to unifying and securing the country have also been used by a more media savvy Taliban seeking to bring down the Afghan government and transform the state and society. Cheaper and more widely available communication technology has allowed insurgent and anti-state actors to disseminate their message beyond their co-ethnics to wider and more varied audiences.<sup>19</sup> The Taliban recognized the importance of media early into their resurgence, and today the Taliban takes measures to disseminate its own media and to intimidate those news outlets critical of its actions.<sup>20</sup> In 2015, the Taliban targeted a shuttle bus carrying Tolo TV's staff to work accusing them of criticizing the Taliban unfairly. They later issued warning for Tolo and 1 TV Media, the second largest private network in the country.

The self-styled Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) has, however, taken the use of media to another level. Meticulous propaganda messaging through radio channels and the Internet has been the cornerstone of their global outreach and recruitment strategy. ISKP has also been ramping up its profile on social media in an attempt to draw recruits away from the Taliban.<sup>21</sup> In 2016, the Afghan government finally managed to shut down the group's radio channel in the eastern province of Nangarhar, the group's main stronghold. Warlords and regional powerbrokers have also adopted media as a tool to tighten their control. Tamadon, a television channel particularly popular among conservative Shias, is run by an old cleric close to Iran, Asif Mohseni. Other warlords

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<sup>18</sup> Burbridge et al. 131, 136.

<sup>19</sup> Ali, Obaid, "The Non-Pashtun Taliban of the North: A case study from Badakhshan," *Afghan Analysts Network*. Kabul: AAN, 3 Jan 2017.

<sup>20</sup> Zahid, Noor, "Afghan Journalists Fear for Their Lives Amid Terror, Militant Insurgency," Washington, D.C.: Voice of America, 27 Aug. 2016.

<sup>21</sup> Osman, Borhan. "ISKP's Battle for Minds: What are its main messages and who do they attract?" *Afghan Analysts Network*. Kabul: AAN, 12 Dec. 2016.

such as Abdul Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Mohaqiq, Abdul Rasul Sayaf and Salahudin Rabbani also have their own television channels that they use primarily to get their political messages across to their constituencies.

Another extension of media in Afghanistan has been the exponential growth of telecommunication. Today, there is at least one cell phone in every Afghan household and high-speed Internet penetration is increasing. It is equally increasingly getting cheaper. The most obvious effect of that is expanding and low-cost access to Internet and social media. The social media has surpassed all limitations of control and censorship for the Afghan youth in main city centers. Public campaigns, demonstrations, and advocacy initiatives are easily organized through social media with the possibility of reaching the widest audience. In 2015, eight civilians including a 13-years old girl were slaughtered by the Islamic State's affiliates in the southern province of Zabul. After their bodies arrived in Kabul in a late night, a group of young people put a public call on Facebook inviting everyone to gather for a demonstration. The next morning, hundreds of thousands of Afghans from all ethnic groups gathered and marched to the presidential palace carrying coffins of the dead bodies and demanding the government to secure major highways. The possibility of such mass mobilization through social media has significantly overshadowed the ability and monopoly of old traditional leaders to gather and rally people behind them.<sup>22</sup> By extension, the television channels owned by these leaders are also less important now than they once were. Social media has also undermined the ability of the state institutions to monitor—and censor if deemed necessary—public discussion and the content of media programming.

### **Foreign Aid**

Driving nearly all these positive and negative developments is foreign aid, large sums of money poured into Afghanistan to defeat terrorism and to

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<sup>22</sup> Crews, Robert, "Kabul's Rising Street Politics." *The Foreign Affairs*, Nov. 26, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2015-11-26/kabuls-new-street-politics>




develop political institutions. The efficacy of billions of dollars that went to Afghanistan is fiercely debated. It fed a vicious corruption network by making funds available to a fickle bureaucracy unable to spend it. This aid also undermined incentives for building Afghan institutions since the government did not have to worry much about taxation and its extractive capabilities—both central to the survival of a modern state. At times, the traces of foreign aid could even be found to spark insurgency and insecurity. Overall, however, foreign aid has not been entirely good or bad for Afghanistan. It is the aid management that most determines how useful and constructive it can be. And in Afghanistan, it was managed very poorly.

From 85 million in 2001, only the U.S. aid grew to \$13 billion in 2011 and 2012 when it was at its peak. Almost 90% of the overall obligated money was spent. In one decade from the collapse of the Taliban regime to the peak of insurgency, American aid increased nearly 15300%. The money from other countries poured in a similar pace, but in a much smaller scale. The total non-US aid to Afghanistan was no more than \$22 billion since 2001. The decline, however, also followed the same speed and pace. The total money that Afghanistan is expected to receive from the US government for 2017 is around \$4 billion, only 30% of the 2012 amount—a 70% decline in only five years.<sup>23</sup> Other members of the coalition supporting the Afghan government have shrunk their contributions significantly after pulling their troops out of the country.

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<sup>23</sup> “Afghanistan.” Foreignassistance.gov. <http://foreignassistance.gov/explore#>



year	Obligated	Disbursed	Undisbursed	% Undisbursed
2001	85	34	51	60
2002	453	345	108	24
2003	984	703	281	29
2004	1900	1200	700	37
2005	1700	1700	0	0
2006	3000	3400	-400	-13
2007	5000	4900	100	2
2008	8900	8300	600	7
2009	9000	8600	400	4
2010	11000	7800	3200	29
2011	13000	11000	2000	15
2012	13000	10000	3000	23
2013	9700	10000	-300	-3
2014	7300	7100	200	3
2015	3100	3300	-200	-6
Total	88122	78382	9740	11

Many blame the low capacity of the Afghan government for billions of international money gone to waste. When the Afghan government was set up in early 2002, the bureaucracy as conventionally understood was almost non-existent. Government offices were anything but workplaces. The organizational structure, and overarching rules and regulations, were old and outdated, if existent at all. Years of war and conflict had taken countless lives and millions of others had fled the country. Initially, then, the actual human capital capable of administering a bureaucracy was a rare commodity. Middle and low-ranking bureaucrats who had survived the years of brutal civil war were old and disconnected from the modern world. Relying on them to restart the Afghan bureaucracy was far from

ideal, but inevitable. As a result, formulating and implementing public policies with foreign aid remained a task for foreign advisors who had little knowledge of the country. The largest number of Afghans who had returned from abroad also lacked the know-how. Few had had administrative experience and like several members of the Karzai family ran small businesses. Those in senior positions often only enriched themselves through building extended networks of corruption that took advantage of the available money.

Most of the foreign money was spent directly by donor countries off the Afghan budget. Its consequences for institution building were dire. First, it created a parallel structure to the Afghan government. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) from NATO member countries in different provinces gave away small contracts to build schools, clinics, and roads. The demand for the accountability of the Afghan government in the early years of the conflict was minimal, mostly because there was not much to be accountable for. Second, it created a large coterie of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and private contractors who provided public services paid for directly by the foreign money. The salary in the government remained extremely low, far from enough to support an Afghan family. Those who returned from abroad and the newly educated class joined any sector but the government. With that, not only did the capacity of Afghan government grow very slowly, wide spread corruption marked the lower levels of the bureaucracy. Afghanistan has constantly been reported as one of the three most corrupt countries in the world with its key government institutions, namely the judiciary and the police, paralyzed and dysfunctional.

Yet the most important problem with foreign aid in Afghanistan was the complexity of incentives in the part of different actors, both those who donated and those who received. The primary purpose of the United States and the military coalition it led remained security-centered – to defeat terrorism and ensure Afghanistan would never pose a threat to the U.S. national security – even after the mission expanded to a wide

state-building effort. The focus on security inadvertently directed the money to areas that could potentially pose a security threat. Foreign soldier and money poured into Southern and Eastern Afghanistan to “buy security”. As the insurgency grew stronger and wider in the South, the international community only poured more money assuming it could buy security.

In the South more so, but across the country in general, security/insecurity was a business opportunity. Protecting military bases, guarding logistic and oil convoys, and building roads and schools in the most insecure areas brought the best return on investment. It, however, needed connections and network to have the trust of donor countries and get the contracts. The initial method many used was providing information on the Taliban and insurgents like what Kandahar governor Gul Aga Sherzai did. Locally powerful leaders branded their rivals as Taliban sympathizers in order to gain the trust of foreign military mission. In the process, they also eliminated those rivals once and for all. Later as they entrenched their economic interests, there was little they could give up. Many believed that people such as Hashmat Karzai, Ahmad Wali Karzai, Gul Agha Sherzai, Jan Mohammad Khan, and others manufactured violence to maintain their economic interests.<sup>24</sup> Private security firms were the most lucrative business. In 2010, nearly \$2 billion was spent only in Kandahar, from which almost 90% went to two families, the Karzais and the Sherzais.<sup>25</sup> Helmand Province, neighboring Kandahar, if were an independent state, would have been the fifth largest recipient of foreign aid.

Foreign aid empowered a small group of political elite to be the largest economic actors and at points even the most notorious criminals. Professor Ishaq Naderi of New York University wrote in 2001 that,

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<sup>24</sup>Gopal, Anand. *No Good Men Among the Living: America, the Taliban, and the War Through Afghan Eyes*. New York: Picador, 2015.

<sup>25</sup>Partlow, Josh. *A Kingdom of Their Own: The Family Karzai and the Afghan Disaster*. London: Simon & Schuster, 2016.

“for decades investment, principally foreign but also domestic, has gone into either the opium business or politics – that is, into guns. The amounts have been large; the return has been mainly devastation. The first task is to feed the Afghan people, a critical political as well as humanitarian challenge: the people who control the guns must not become the people who control the food.”<sup>26</sup>

Through foreign aid, the people who controlled the guns became the same as the people who controlled the food. Large oil importers, construction firms, private security companies, and even narco-traffickers were all connected to high-ranking officials in the government. Desperate to curtail the insurgency, the U.S. and its allies appropriated little effort into keeping these men into account. In 2010, an anti-corruption task force detained Mohammad Zia Salehi, a mid-ranking official at the Afghanistan National Security Council over charges of corruption. Hours later, he was released under pressures not just from his boss, President Karzai, but also the CIA station chief who had Salehi in his payroll as an informant.<sup>27</sup> Also in 2010, the Kabul Bank crisis implicated the brothers of President Karzai and his vice president, Qasim Faheem’s, in a one-billion-dollar scandal. No severe punishment followed; in fact, they were not even detained. Many to this day remain skeptical of the government in claiming that Mahmoud Karzai and Fahim have paid their debts to the bank. Targeting actors as such could threaten the stability of the government. American and NATO forces were already fighting an ever-growing insurgency and did not want to pick a fight with their allies in palace too.

The focus on security also dictated the nature of projects that were funded by the foreign money. Long-term large infrastructure projects

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<sup>26</sup>Nadiri, M. Ishaq, “Rebuilding a Ravaged Land.” *The New York Times*, Nov 26, 2001. <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/26/opinion/rebuilding-a-ravaged-land.html>

<sup>27</sup>Filkins, Dexter and Mazzetti, Mark, “Karzai Aid in Corruption Inquiry is Tied to C.I.A.” *The New York Times*, Aug. 25, 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/world/asia/26kabul.html?ref=topics>

received little attention. Most of the money went to financing the Afghan security forces and to small projects aimed at gaining public approval so they could deny safety and sympathy to the insurgency. The lion's share of the money never reached the people who were supposed to be the beneficiaries. Funds that were actually used to build schools, roads, and clinics in rural Afghanistan were often destroyed by the continuous fighting. A decade and a half later, the southern and eastern Afghanistan still resembles a ravaged land untouched by development. Those provinces like Badakhshan and Bamiyan, for many years the peaceful in Afghanistan, remained equally underdeveloped, but for the opposite reason. Their relative peace and stability did not make them seem important enough to receive foreign aid.

Interestingly, the general public in Afghanistan, despite their continued resentments toward the Soviet Union, sees its investment as far more effective for leaving behind major highways, tunnels, power dams, and housing complexes. To them, American money is most highly visible in the flamboyant houses of the capital's corrupt officials that destroyed neighborhoods, and their armored SUVs that disrupt the traffic.

## **Conclusion**

Other areas of the Afghan economy and its society and governance also exemplify the bright and dark sides of Afghanistan's global connectivity. Not always appreciated is the global contribution to what amounts to one of the most remarkable changes in Afghanistan since 2001, the growth of human capital on which the country is able to draw. These are mostly younger, educated individuals who not only have so much to contribute to their country but have a strong personal investment in its future. Initially, this capital came from what was brought back from exile in Pakistan and the West. They received educations there and on returning many found employment with NGOs and within the bureaucracy. Today, public and private educational institutions – many drawing on Western models and with financial assistance from abroad –

are producing qualified individuals.

- Millions of children and young people, including girls and women, have benefited from both basic and higher education and become acquainted with the outside world through contact with foreign educators and partnerships with Western universities and aid organizations. With education can come a better appreciation of fruits of global but also the value of regional connectivity. Regional countries can have a large role to play in the furtherance of education in Afghanistan. India has provided opportunities in higher and specialized education, and Pakistan has also admitted Afghan students to its universities. Of particular importance is the need to expand the numbers with vocational skills, including those technical skills needed for those occupations that Afghanistan will need in time to be internationally competitive.
- But with the advantages in having a more educated population comes the challenge of growing an economy able to provide employment. The youth bulge presents an especially critical problem of absorption.<sup>28</sup> Failure to absorb these individuals with their higher expectations creates frustrations leaving many who can't leave the country. Among the most alienated, there is the possibility of their choosing violence. While the outflow of immigrants to developed countries in recent years may contribute to expansion of links to the rest of the world, it also robs Afghanistan of some of its most talented citizens.

International donor funding has been the mainstay of the country's security sector, stimulating its economy, and helping to build vital institutional administrative capacity. But massive military aid and

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<sup>28</sup> Afghanistan has one of the youngest populations in the world, with an estimated 41 percent (some 13 million children) under the age of 14, nearly 64 percent under the age of 24. *The CIA World Factbook 2017*, [https://www.amazon.com/s/?ie=UTF8&keywords=cia+world+factbook&index=aps&tag=geminipcstand-20&ref=pd\\_sl\\_1jcf01cpl8\\_e](https://www.amazon.com/s/?ie=UTF8&keywords=cia+world+factbook&index=aps&tag=geminipcstand-20&ref=pd_sl_1jcf01cpl8_e)

generous economic and development assistance also stands accused of fueling corruption and distorting the Afghan economy. While private investment has injected capital and know-how into the economy, it has mostly attracted investors interested in extracting quick profits and has done little to contribute to sustainable economic growth. And the future riches promised by Afghanistan's export of its mineral wealth could also invite the "resource-curse" associated with countries whose dependency on nonrenewable commodity exports paradoxically leaves them with weak economic growth, slowed development, and less democracy – primarily due to the lack of institutional strength in the first place to manage the revenue from natural resources for economic development.

The political economy of the war created a small group of actors who controlled political power and economic wealth. The economy revolving around the international military intervention and more than a hundred thousand troops stationed in Afghanistan was highly inflated. After 2014, with massive drawdown of foreign personnel and money, economic growth also declined. The unemployment rate is increasing with every year far more people graduating from universities. With political uncertainty shadowing the fate of the current government, private investment, both from Afghans and foreigners, has plummeted. Insecurity has restricted the ability for many Afghans to work outside of city centers. Decreasing international assistance has curtailed the employment opportunities that came with development projects. All this throws doubt on the sustainability of all that a foreign-pushed globalization has achieved in Afghanistan. More positively, however, Afghanistan has become, as already noted, a more educated country with far greater human and physical capital than ever before. The society is more liberal and susceptible to modern values than any time previously. The Afghan media is a prime example of that transformation.

Whatever the costs of being exposed to global and regional influences and forces, the price for Afghanistan of isolation or neglect is far greater. A modern Afghanistan cannot be walled off. However, to optimize the



opportunities offered by global engagement and avoid the pitfalls that can come with openness, Afghanistan needs political leadership and institutions able to manage the pace and scope of interconnectivity. The political cohesion, legal framework, and infrastructure required to take advantage of globalization and minimize its vulnerabilities are unfortunately not yet in place. Nor is the security and stability that make successful global and regional connectivity ultimately possible. Globalization can be most successful when international actors, in this case states, are not just subjects of global events, but also agents of them. Unless Afghanistan contributes to this process – most likely through export of economic commodities and mineral resources and the growth and expansion of tourism – it can only gain so much from merely being connected.

## NSG Membership for Non-NPT NWS: Criteria and Prospects

Muhammad Nasrullah Mirza & Syed Adnan Athar Bukhari\*

### Abstract

*There is an emerging debate on the expansion of the 48-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)--a cartel of nuclear exporting countries-- for the non-NPT Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) (especially India and Pakistan, both of whom have formally applied for NSG membership in 2016). China calls for a strict criteria including signing of the NPT as a pre-requisite for NSG membership whereas the US strives for Indian entry into the NSG without strict restrictions. A criterion-based approach is also evolving which may create a balance between political motives and non-proliferation commitments. The June 2016 Plenary of the NSG has failed to achieve consensus on the issue. Subsequently, a synthesis called Grossi formula proposed nine conditions as a benchmark for the membership of non-NPT NWS. Though the 2017 NSG Plenary though considered applications of non-NPT states, yet it decided to continue deliberations on the issue. This paper attempts to analyse various proposed criteria and assesses the prospects of NSG membership for the non-NPT NWS.*

**Keywords:** NSG membership, Criterion-based approach, Non-NPT NWS.

### Introduction

India and Pakistan aspire to become members of the nuclear export cartel; the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG is a 48-nation volunteer arrangement dealing in export of nuclear material and

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technology. The cartel aims at nuclear non-proliferation and complements the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The current debate in the NSG revolves around determining the criteria for expansion in the nuclear cartel for the non-NPT Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), mainly India and Pakistan. India formally applied for the NSG membership on 12<sup>th</sup> May 2016 and Pakistan did so on 19<sup>th</sup> May 2016.<sup>1</sup> Different proposals are under consideration for the determination of an apt criterion. Presently, an aspirant of the NSG must be able to supply items mentioned in NSG Annexes to Part 1 and Part 2; adhere to NSG guidelines, be a party to the NPT or a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) treaty and have full-scope safeguards.<sup>2</sup>

There are various perspectives on NSG membership for a non-NPT NWS. For instance, China calls for strict criteria including the condition of signing NPT as a pre-requisite whereas the US favours criteria that facilitates Indian entry. However, some of NSG members call for a general criterion.<sup>3</sup> The June, 2016 Plenary of the NSG could not yield a consensus for granting membership to India and Pakistan. In December 2016, the Grossi formula was floated which aimed at getting India in and keeping Pakistan out of the NSG membership. Consensus on the Grossi formula could not be generated in 27<sup>th</sup> Plenary of NSG held from June 22-23, 2017 in Bern, Switzerland. However, the statement that, “the Group noted the requests for participation that had been submitted. The NSG had discussions on the issue of Technical, Legal and Political Aspects of the participation of non-NPT States in the NSG,”<sup>4</sup> draws wide attention of

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<sup>1</sup> Kamran Akhtar, “India’s NSG Politics” (views expressed by an official from Pakistan Foreign Office in a seminar at Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad, on November 08, 2016).

<sup>2</sup> Syed Adnan Athar Bukhari, “Indian Quest for Membership in the NSG: Prospects and Challenges,” Strategic Studies Institute Islamabad, (December 15, 2014) <http://ssii.com.pk/2014/12/15/competition-winner-syed-adnan-athar-bukhari/> (accessed September 9, 2017).

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Public Statement Plenary Meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Bern, Switzerland, 22-23 June, 2017, [http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/NSGPlenaryBernPublic\\_Statement\\_final.pdf](http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/images/NSGPlenaryBernPublic_Statement_final.pdf).

professionals and academics around the globe. It was agreed to convene an informal meeting in November, 2017.<sup>5</sup>

With this backdrop, the paper explores the evolution process, highlights the objectives of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), describes the present membership criteria, and evaluates the ongoing debate to consider requests of the non-NPT NWS, including the cases of Pakistan and India.

### **The NSG: A Voluntary Nuclear Export Cartel**

During 1950s and 1960s, the proponents of non-proliferation endeavored to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons that led to formation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime which included several treaties (for example, the NPT and Nuclear Weapons Free Zones), institutional arrangements (including the IAEA and its safeguards system) and voluntary export control regimes (including the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group). Major focus of the non-proliferation regime was to control the dual use of sensitive technologies that might be used for military purposes.

The NPT is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. It was signed in 1968 and called for banning proliferation of nuclear weapons, encouraging peaceful uses of nuclear technology and seeking disarmament. Keeping in view the encouragement of peaceful uses of nuclear technology, the danger associated with dual-use<sup>6</sup> of material and technology loomed large over the policy makers. In this connection, several NPT nuclear supplier states decided to deliberate which dual use technology should be shared with non-nuclear-weapon states. In 1971, these supplier countries established the Zangger Committee. The committee also required states outside the NPT to institute IAEA safeguards for import of specific items that might be used in developing

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Dual-use of material and technology is referred for those materials and equipments which can be used both for military and non-military purposes.

nuclear weapons. These items were collectively referred as the “trigger list.”<sup>7</sup>

When India carried-out ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosions in 1974, it was confirmed that nuclear material and technology could be used for building weapons too because it remained evident that India, which conducted an underground nuclear test at Pokharan in the Rajasthan desert, codenamed the “Smiling Buddha”, was actually part of an accelerated weapons programme.<sup>8</sup> Facts remain that India used CIRUS reactor provided by Canada and heavy water supplied by the US. India used these supplies to extract plutonium which was used for nuclear testing.<sup>9</sup>

The world realized the dangers of proliferation with regard to export of nuclear technology. It was decided to make more stringent efforts on export controls of nuclear technology and sensitive materials. Several Zangger Committee members along with France (that was outside the NPT then) established the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to augment efforts in curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>10</sup> The group was formed in 1975 as a consequence to the so-called Indian Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE). With time, its members increased.

Currently, the NSG is a 48-member nuclear cartel dealing with export of nuclear technology and sensitive nuclear material. The cartel is committed to the non-proliferation goal by implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports. It is pertinent to take into account the working of the NSG to comprehend the issue on the following lines:

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<sup>7</sup> Daryl Kimball, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) at a Glance,” *Arms Control Association*, last updated October 2012, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NSG>.

<sup>8</sup> “1974,” *Nuclear Files.Org*, accessed January 24, 2017,

[http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/timeline/timeline\\_page.php?year=1974](http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/timeline/timeline_page.php?year=1974).

<sup>9</sup> George Perkovich, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation* (California: University of California Press, 2002).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

- The NSG is a voluntary group which was formed to check Indian PNE type of nuclear testing.
- The NSG participants meet once in a year in NSG Plenary meeting (usually in June).
- The NSG troika (composed of three persons including past, present and future chairs of the NSG) work for outreach (activities related to adherence to the NSG guidelines) and coordination of the group.
- Its rules and working are not legally binding yet provides only a norm-based nuclear non-proliferation framework.
- The NSG works on the rule of consensus whereby each member has a veto power.
- All decisions are taken in the NSG by getting unanimous approval. This will also be required in case of expansion of the NSG membership.

The NSG has two sets of Guidelines which are provided in two parts. Part I was adopted in 1978. It included fissile materials, nuclear reactors and equipment, and reprocessing and enrichment equipment. Part II was published in 1992. It included dual-use goods, which are non-nuclear items with a potential to develop weapons, for example, machine tools and lasers. Part I was established after the Indian PNE of 1974 and Part II was adopted in response to Iraq's perceived proliferation potential in early 1990s.<sup>11</sup>

The fundamental objective of the NSG Guidelines is to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes should not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These guidelines are referred to as INFCIRC/254, Part 1 and INFCIRC/254, Part 2.<sup>12</sup> The former is known as 'trigger list' which includes guidelines for nuclear transfers such as physical protection, safeguards, special controls on sensitive exports etc. Its Annex B gives clarification of such items which include;

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<sup>11</sup>Daryl Kimball, "The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) at a Glance".

<sup>12</sup> "Guidelines," *Nuclear Suppliers Group*, accessed January 25, 2017, <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/guidelines>.

- “nuclear reactors and equipment;
- non-nuclear material for reactors;
- plants and equipment for reprocessing;
- plants and equipment for fabrication of nuclear fuel elements;
- plants and equipment for separation of isotopes;
- plants for heavy water production; and
- plants and equipment for conversion.”<sup>13</sup>

Part II of the NSG Guidelines deal with ‘dual-use items.’ It includes;

- “industrial equipment;
- materials;
- uranium isotope separation equipment and components (other than trigger list items);
- heavy water production plant related equipment (other than trigger list items);
- test and measurement equipment for the development of nuclear explosive devices; and
- components for nuclear explosive devices.”<sup>14</sup>

The updated list of the NSG Part I and Part II Guidelines were published on November 8, 2016 after three years of review. They were published on the IAEA’s website as INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2 respectively.<sup>15</sup> The NSG Guidelines complement the NPT and treaties on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.<sup>16</sup>

Full-scope safeguards are mandatory for export of items in Part I. The “Non-proliferation Principle” was adopted in 1994 in the NSG which established that a supplier authorizes a transfer only when satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons no matter the recipient being a member of NPT or/and member of treaty

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> “NSG Part 1 and Part 2 Guidelines Updated,” *Nuclear Suppliers Group*, accessed January 25, 2017, <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/>.

<sup>16</sup> “The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role and Activities,” INFCIRC 539 Revision 6, (The International Atomic Energy Agency, January 22, 2015), 1.

of any NWFZ.<sup>17</sup> Most NSG participants do not have facility of self-sufficient fuel cycle and thus import materials from other members with strict compliance to the Guidelines.<sup>18</sup>

In 2002 Vienna Plenary, several comprehensive amendments were agreed to avert any possible incident of nuclear terrorism. The meeting emphasized that effective export controls were significant to curb nuclear terrorism. In 2004, the NSG supported the UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004), and adopted a “catch all” mechanism in the NSG Guidelines in its Göteborg Plenary. This move directed the establishment of national legal mechanisms to control export of any item even if it was not on the control list provided these items are suspected to be used for any possible proliferation.<sup>19</sup>

In September 2008, participating governments (PGs) of the NSG permitted transfer of “trigger list” and dual use items and related technology to India for peaceful purposes. This specific waiver for export of nuclear technology was granted to India while considering various steps India took for non-proliferation including separation of civilian and military reactors, an IAEA safeguards agreement under INFCIRC/734, adherence to the NSG Guidelines, continuation of moratorium on nuclear testing, commitment to sign and adhere to Additional Protocol and work toward a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).<sup>20</sup> It is noteworthy that India has never signed the NPT, conducted nuclear weapons tests and does not have full-scope IAEA safeguards. Despite these facts, the NSG granted it a country-specific waiver which has outrightly questioned the credibility of the non-proliferation regime in general and NSG in particular.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Syed Adnan Athar Bukhari, “Dynamics of Nuclear South Asia: Implications for Non-proliferation Regime” (M.Phil. dissertation, School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 2014), 63.



India has signed agreements with USA, Russia, France, UK, South Korea, Canada, Argentina, Kazakhstan, Mongolia and Namibia after getting waiver from NSG cartel. It also secured a safeguards agreement with Canada in 2010 for promoting trade of sensitive nuclear material and technology. Such arrangements are in process with Australia as well. In this way, India became eligible to be recipient of nuclear technology and materials despite being non-signatory of NPT. "This implied the notion of politics of proliferation where economic interests dominate over non-proliferation agenda."<sup>22</sup>

The next section outlines the existing rules for the NSG membership and analyzes the emerging debate as to how to integrate the non-NPT NWS into the NSG. This entails conflicting perspectives and initiated a debate for determining criteria for such states.

### **NSG Rules for Membership**

The present procedure for membership of the nuclear cartel was adopted in the 2001 Aspen Plenary of the NSG. The following obligations were set-forth as criteria for the membership:

- "The ability to supply items (including items in transit) covered by the annexes to Parts 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines;
- Adherence to the Guidelines and action in accordance with them;
- Enforcement of a legally based domestic export control system which gives effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the Guidelines;
- Full compliance with the obligations of one or more of the following: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Tlatelolco, Bangkok, or an equivalent international nuclear nonproliferation agreement; and
- Support of international efforts towards nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> "Nuclear Suppliers Group," *Civil Services Mentor Magazine*, June 2016.

Moreover, the 2001 meeting also defined the term 'adherence' as:

"Adherence is accomplished by sending an official communication to the Director General of the IAEA stating that the government will act in accordance with the guidelines. This communication is to be intended for publication in the INFCIR series."<sup>24</sup>

There has been a debate in the recent years regarding expansion in the membership of NSG for non-NPT NWS (mainly India and Pakistan). Hibbs and Dalton asked if the NSG should be a universal export control organization or a group of "like-minded" states to follow near universal global non-proliferation principles.<sup>25</sup> For bringing India into the NSG, a debate over criteria for the NSG membership has been generated between the idea to grant membership based on non-proliferation norms versus the idea of bringing all those states which have potential for export of nuclear material, technology and equipment in accordance with the NSG trade control criterion.<sup>26</sup> Subsequently, it was claimed that "the NSG is neither an international treaty nor replica of NPT."<sup>27</sup> It complements the NPT by adopting NSG Guidelines. If this has been the case "then new NSG applicants need only to tighten up their export controls to NSG standards to gain entry."<sup>28</sup> This makes no compulsory requirement of signing NPT to be an aspirant of NSG membership.<sup>29</sup> Given the fact, if India and Pakistan are to become members of the NSG, it requires amending the rules of the NSG membership criteria by waiving/deleting of the clause of signing of the NPT or a treaty of NWFZ for non-NPT NWS.

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Mark Hibbs and Toby Dalton, "Nuclear Suppliers Group: Don't Rush New Membership," *Proliferation Analysis* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 14, 2012).

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "India-Pakistan Candidacy for NSG," *Journal of Security & Strategic Analyses*, Vol. II, No. 1 (Summer 2016), 18.

<sup>28</sup> Michael Krepon, "Club Membership," *Arms Control Wonk*, June 26, 2016, <http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201515/club-membership/>.

<sup>29</sup>Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "India-Pakistan Candidacy for NSG," 18.

### Three Approaches for NSG Membership for Non-NPT NWS

India and Pakistan applied for the NSG membership in May 2016 for their cases to be decided in the June 2016 Seoul Plenary of the NSG. However, the group failed to arrive at any consensus on their applications and decided to continue its discussion.<sup>30</sup> Likewise, the decision could not be taken in 27<sup>th</sup> Plenary which was held in Bern in June 2017. Amb. ® Zamir Akram suggested that there could be a two-step approach for admittance of India and Pakistan into the NSG. First is the setting-up of criteria for these states to join the NSG as a member and the second is to consider their applications following a laid down procedure.<sup>31</sup>

For the determination of criteria, three approaches being discussed are evaluated below:

First approach places requirement of signing the NPT for the NSG membership. Peoples Republic of China is the major supporter of this approach which has created a stumbling block for the US efforts to get India into the NSG. China's position has encouraged other eleven states (including Ireland, Austria, Switzerland, and Mexico) to draw a clear line.<sup>32</sup> These states are considering not to revise the criteria. Neither India nor Pakistan would be in a position to sign the NPT; therefore, this approach restricts entry of these states into the cartel.

The second approach is related to 'like-mindedness' which can also be referred to as country specific approach. This was advocated by India on behest of the US.<sup>33</sup> The US called for making efforts to bring India into export control cartel including MTCR, NSG, Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group in 2010. India, in this scheme, has been granted membership of MTCR in June 2016. Mr. John Kerry, former Secretary of State claimed that:

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<sup>30</sup> Public Statement of Plenary meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Seoul, Republic of Korea, June 23-24, 2016.

<sup>31</sup> In-house Seminar, "27<sup>th</sup> NSG Plenary Meeting: Challenges and Prospects," organized by Strategic Vision Institute, May 29, 2017.

<sup>32</sup> Zamir Akram, "The NSG after Seoul," *The Express Tribune*, July 5, 2016.

<sup>33</sup> Michael Krepon, "Club Membership".

“The United States believes each application should be considered individually on its merits and according to the NSG’s factors for consideration....India has shown strong support for the objectives of the NSG and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and is a ‘likeminded’ state deserving of NSG admission.”<sup>34</sup>

This approach is discriminatory and creates exceptionalism in the non-proliferation regime for a specific country rather than determining general criteria for even-handed treatment with all Non-NPT Nuclear Weapons States.

The third approach can be categorized as a ‘criterion based approach.’ Pierre Goldschmidt in his article “NSG Membership: A criterion-based Approach for Non-NPT States” enumerated fourteen conditions for consideration while making an objective criteria for entry of the non-NPT states into the NSG. A general criterion can be set by adopting all or many of the following conditions for non-NPT NWS to become member of the nuclear cartel:

1. To comply with Articles I, III.2 and VI of the NPT. (This requires guarantee of nuclear weapon states (India and Pakistan) not to transfer nuclear weapons or other explosive device and nuclear material and technology for manufacture of nuclear weapons; undertakes not to provide fissionable source unless the source is subject to safeguards; and, seeking disarmament.)
2. To make and enforce a Voluntary Offer Agreement (VOA) with the IAEA to place all new nuclear facilities located outside the existing military nuclear sites according to INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreements;
3. To ratify an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement; (India has signed and ratified the Additional Protocol in 2014. Pakistan needs to conform to the IAEA Additional Protocol);

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<sup>34</sup> Anwar Iqbal, “China opposes India’s bid to join NSG,” *The Dawn*, June 10, 2016.

4. Should not be in violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement;
5. To make commitment not to export or transfer items specified in INFCIRC/254/ Parts 1 and 2 to a NNWS unless such State has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and an Additional Protocol (AP) in force with the IAEA;
6. To make and enforce legal measures for effective and uninterrupted implementation of the NSG Guidelines, both Part 1 and Part 2, including export licensing regulations, enforcement measures, and penalties for violations;
7. To make commitment to share information on “catch all” denials with the IAEA and members of the NSG;
8. To sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as specifically requested of India and Pakistan;
9. To make commitment to adhere to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, as required under Step 2 of the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document’s “13 Steps”, pending the entry into force of the CTBT;
10. To fully implement all UN Security Council resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation or terrorism (in particular, Resolution 1540);
11. To adhere to the guidelines of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and make and enforce the corresponding export control legislation;
12. To ratify the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), as amended in 2005;
13. To be a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as adopted by the UN General Assembly in resolution A/RES/59/290 (April 2005);
14. To make commitment to implement in good faith Step 3 of the “13 Steps” of 2000 NPT RevCon which calls for agreeing to immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production

of fissile material for nuclear weapons which will be concluded within five years, pending completion of a formal treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.<sup>35</sup>

Goldschmidt claimed that considering such conditions for making criteria would reinforce the non-proliferation regime and would avoid further discrimination among NPT non-nuclear weapon states.<sup>36</sup> Waseem Qutab claimed that criteria based approach would also bring the two states together to an agreed upon framework. This will also multilateralize a bilateral problem.<sup>37</sup>

The first approach is restrictive and stringent as it puts the requirement of signing of the NPT for NSG candidature. Neither India nor Pakistan will be ready to sign NPT by rolling back their nuclear weapons programme. The second approach only considers the admittance of India with exclusive criteria which is tailor-made by the US specifically to facilitate India's entry into the cartel. The third approach seems reasonable and practicable as it sets a general criteria for Non-NPT NWS. Such criterion-based approach should, therefore, be adopted which should be equally applicable for all non-NPT nuclear weapon states.

### India's Case

The NSG waiver to India granted in 2008, opened avenues for it to carry out nuclear agreements with the US under the Indo-US nuclear agreement of 2008 and with other countries including Australia, Canada, France, Kazakhstan, and Russia.<sup>38</sup> The Obama administration committed to support India's membership into the four multilateral export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime,

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<sup>35</sup> Pierre Goldschmidt, "NSG Membership: A criterion-based Approach for Non-NPT States," *Proliferation Analysis* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), May 24, 2011.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Waseem Qutab, in-house Seminar, "27<sup>th</sup> NSG Plenary Meeting: Challenges and Prospects," organized by Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad, May 29, 2017.

<sup>38</sup> Daryl G. Kimball, "Nuclear Suppliers Divided on Indian Bid," *Arms Control Association*, July-August, 2016, [https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016\\_07/News/Nuclear-Suppliers-Divided-on-Indian-Bid](https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_07/News/Nuclear-Suppliers-Divided-on-Indian-Bid).

Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement) in 2010.<sup>39</sup> Ambassador (R) Masood Khan, the President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the then DG, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) highlighted that India was receiving special treatment because of the 'Realpolitik' rather more appropriately the 'US-politik.' This approach promotes exceptionalism and discrimination.<sup>40</sup> Subsequently, India endeavoured for the NSG membership since 2011 and its efforts were augmented when it formally applied for the NSG membership in May, 2016. The Indian external minister Sushma Swaraj claimed that she was confident of the support of 21 countries in the NSG for voting in favour of India becoming a member in 2016 Seoul Plenary. However, it is worth mentioning that consent of all 48 countries is mandatory for admitting a new member into the cartel.<sup>41</sup>

Securing NSG membership is a matter of national prestige for India because it is already availing almost all benefits of the nuclear trade having exemption under the 2008 Indo-US Nuclear Deal. This fact has also been acknowledged by the Indian external minister, Shushma Swaraj, saying that, "Why are we pushing now? It is about the difference between sitting inside and outside the room. Despite the waiver, we were outside the room. When you are inside the room, then you take part in the decision-making."<sup>42</sup>

The NSG in its June 2016 plenary at Seoul could not decide upon membership of India, despite a high-level lobbying effort done by both the US and Indian governments.<sup>43</sup> In November 2016, representatives of the NSG met to discuss the matter of membership for non-NPT NWS. China, Turkey, Austria and Ireland rejected India's request. Switzerland, Brazil, Russia and New Zealand indicated their support but practically did

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<sup>39</sup> Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister of India, November 8, 2010.

<sup>40</sup> Masood Khan, "Pakistan's Non-Proliferation Efforts and Strategic Export Control System" (views expressed at a seminar of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI), Islamabad on May 3, 2016).

<sup>41</sup> "A brief history of the NSG," *WION*, June 26, 2016, <http://www.wionews.com/south-asia/a-brief-history-of-the-nsg-843>.

<sup>42</sup> DevirupaMitra, "Hopeful of Convincing China on India's Membership of NSG: Sushma Swaraj," *The Wire*, on June 20, 2016.

<sup>43</sup> Daryl G. Kimball, "Nuclear Suppliers Divided on Indian Bid".

otherwise, while Italy, Kazakhstan and Belgium called for a criteria-based approach.<sup>44</sup> There has been a clash of interest between the two major world powers; China acting as nonproliferation hardliner state and the US trying to secure waiver for its strategic partner India.<sup>45</sup>

Despite the rejection of Indian membership to NSG, it succeeded to secure entry into MTCR in June 2016 Plenary. The inclusion of India as MTCR member has given birth to another interesting situation: China being an NSG member has been denied entry into MTCR while India has been granted MTCR membership without getting into NSG. A possibility of bargain between China and India is there: getting India into the NSG by China and getting China into the MTCR by India.<sup>46</sup>

### **Pakistan's Case**

In view of the Indian application for the NSG membership, Pakistan also requested for the NSG membership in May, 2016.<sup>47</sup> Its application has been based on arguments that it has been a staunch supporter of non-proliferation and disarmament. It has an extensive nuclear programme for peaceful purposes. Pakistan's Foreign Office claimed that, "Pakistan has the expertise, manpower, infrastructure, as well as the ability to supply NSG controlled items, goods and services for a full range of nuclear applications for peaceful uses."<sup>48</sup> It has adopted international standards in nuclear safety and security with a robust legal, regulatory and administrative structure.<sup>49</sup>

Pakistan Atomic Energy Agency (PAEC) runs many open peaceful nuclear programmes to showcase to the world. Pakistan established its Export Control Law in 2004 and submitted NSG compliant report in 2005, 2007 and 2012.<sup>50</sup> The revised export control lists in 2015 covers the scope

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<sup>44</sup> "Politics of NSG and Ballistic Missile Tests" (views expressed at a seminar of Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad, on December 29, 2016).

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "India-Pakistan Candidacy for NSG", 23.

<sup>47</sup> "Pakistan applies for NSG membership," *The Times of India*, May 20, 2016.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Kamran Akhtar, "India's NSG Politics".



of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group (AG). This makes Pakistan to qualify for membership of the NSG.<sup>51</sup>

An official of Pakistan's Foreign Office claimed that the country's strategy for the NSG membership is two-pronged; first to highlight Pakistan's strengths in the non-proliferation realm and second to point out the shortcoming of NSG exemption (with regard to India specific arrangements).<sup>52</sup>

Zafar Khan, the Director General of Strategic Export Control Division in Pakistan's Foreign Office, claimed that "Pakistan's application for NSG was founded on solid grounds and it had the expertise, human resource, infrastructure as well as the ability to supply NSG Part-I and Part-II items."<sup>53</sup> A Pakistani analyst, Tariq Osman Hyder, argued that Pakistan could contribute significantly in the non-proliferation regime as full partner if it is included in multilateral export control regimes like the NSG, MTCR, and the AG.<sup>54</sup>

Pakistan's contributions for nuclear safety and security can be reflected in its statement in 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) with following actions:

- Establishment of Pakistan Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security (PCENS)
- The establishment of National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS) under Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) in 2014
- Pakistan's initiative of Nuclear Security Action Plan (NSAP) in 2006, which is renewable after every five years

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<sup>51</sup> Seminar on "Pakistan's Non-Proliferation Efforts and Strategic Export Control System," organized by The Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI) on May 3, 2016.

<sup>52</sup> Kamran Akhtar, "India's NSG Politics".

<sup>53</sup> "Strategic export control system robust, effective: Pakistan," *The Nation*, December 15, 2016.

<sup>54</sup> Tariq Osman Hyder, "Pakistan's Non-Proliferation Efforts and Strategic Export Control System" (views expressed at a seminar of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI), Islamabad on May 3, 2016).

- Pakistan has also installed a Nuclear Security Cooperation Programme (NSCP)
- To enhance radiological safety, the country has established a Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Support Centre (NURESC) and a National Radiation Emergency Coordination Centre (NRECC)
- The National Detection Architecture deploys special nuclear material sensors at important entry and exit locations to prevent illicit tracking of nuclear related materials.<sup>55</sup>

Moreover, Pakistan is member of Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. It acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in March, 2016.<sup>56</sup> It has been actively involved in Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) Process from 2010 to 2016. In 2014 NSS, Pakistan's former premier, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif stated that;

“Pakistan's nuclear security is supported by five pillars – a strong command and control system led by the National Command Authority (NCA); an integrated intelligence system; a rigorous regulatory regime; a comprehensive export control regime; and active international cooperation.”<sup>57</sup>

Pakistan calls for an objective and criterion based approach with no-discrimination as basis for NSG membership. With a country specific approach as espoused by joint US-India diplomatic missions, Pakistan will be in a permanently disadvantageous position.<sup>58</sup>

Amb. ©Zamir Akram has argued for Pakistan's strong candidature for the NSG membership based on the following three factors:

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<sup>55</sup> “Pakistan National Statement at Nuclear Security Summit,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 26, 2014, <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/zahidan/pr-details.php?prID=1846>.

<sup>56</sup> “Pakistan,” *Nuclear Threat Initiatives*, last updated April, 2016, <http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/pakistan/nuclear/>.

<sup>57</sup> “Pakistan for global efforts against nuclear terrorism”, *The Dawn*, March 24, 2014.

<sup>58</sup> Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “India-Pakistan Candidacy for NSG”, 26.

1. Pakistan has an inbuilt separation between civilian and military nuclear weapons programmes,
2. All the civilian facilities of Pakistan are under International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards,
3. Pakistan's nuclear laws and safety and security measures are in line with the NSG guidelines and IAEA requirements.<sup>59</sup>

“For addressing the dichotomy of some states being elevated and others ignored, there should be a criterion based approach instead of country specific approach. If India is granted the NSG membership and Pakistan left alone, Pakistan's path for obtaining NSG concessions would greatly diminish.”<sup>60</sup>

The NSG membership for Pakistan is significant because of two reasons. First, Pakistan is becoming an active hub of economic activity which needs growing energy production. Nuclear technology provides a renewable and environmental friendly energy. Therefore, if new nuclear reactors are to be established, Pakistan needs support and cooperation of nuclear exporting countries. Second, Pakistan has been acting as a responsible nuclear state. Its entry into the NSG would strengthen the non-proliferation regime. It has more than forty years of experience in using and maintaining nuclear technology. It has deposits of uranium as natural resource. Its membership in the NSG therefore, is not only beneficial for Pakistan but also for the NSG.

### **Grossi's Formula**

Another interesting post-June 2016 development to secure NSG membership for India was that the two of the NSG troika, Ambassador Song Young-wan, chair of the NSG for the term 2016-17 and the chair for the term 2015-16, Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi were given mandate to

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<sup>59</sup> In-house Seminar, “27<sup>th</sup> NSG Plenary Meeting: Challenges and Prospects,” organized by Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad, May 29, 2017.

<sup>60</sup> Syed Adnan Athar Bukhari, “Indian Quest for Membership in the NSG: Prospects and Challenges”.

engage in consultation with all NSG governments to develop objective and equitable membership criteria for Non-NPT NWS.<sup>61</sup> The fact has been revealed by Daryl G. Kimball, Director, Arms Control Association, that Grossi circulated a two-page “revised version of a draft ‘Exchange of Notes’ for Non-NPT applicants.” This draft reads Grossi’s remarks as;

“...there is a unique confluence of ideas on clarifying the factors for consideration of the participation of non-NPT Parties. These ideas can be encapsulated into the areas of the IAEA safeguards regime, the NPT pillars, and halting nuclear testing, as well as clarifying how the NSG addresses violations of these commitments.”<sup>62</sup>

According to Kimball, Grossi gave a nine-point formula for consideration of membership for the non-NPT states. The non-NPT states would have to adopt the following proposed conditions to be eligible for NSG membership:

1. Make and enforce strict separation of current and future nuclear facilities from non-civilian nuclear facilities.
2. Declare to the IAEA all current and future civilian nuclear facilities.
3. Make and enforce a safeguards agreement with the IAEA covering all declared civilian facilities, and all future civilian facilities, eligible for safeguards.
4. Enforce the IAEA Additional Protocol.
5. Make a commitment not to use any transferred item from a NSG Participating Government in unsafeguarded facilities or activities.
6. Make a commitment not to conduct any nuclear explosive test.
7. Declare clear description of intentions, plans and policies in support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

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<sup>61</sup>Zamir Akram, “NSG Deadlock,” *The Express Tribune*, December 31, 2016.

<sup>62</sup>Daryl G. Kimball, “NSG Membership Proposal Would Undermine Nonproliferation”, *Arms Control Association*, December 21, 2016.

8. Make a commitment to support and strengthen non-proliferation and disarmament regimes.
9. Have an understanding that (non-NPT applicant) would join a consensus of all other Participating Governments on the merits of any non-NPT Party application due to the unique nature of the non-NPT Party applications.<sup>63</sup>

Commenting on Grossi's formula, Kimball pointed out that the wording of these points was vague and open to wide interpretation, and did not consider any further nonproliferation commitments from India beyond the steps to which it committed in September 2008.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, the Clause on banning further nuclear testing is also not stringent as it fails to incorporate the provision that any further testing would lead to automatic suspension or termination of membership. Grossi's formula also stipulates that one non-NPT member state should reach an understanding not to block consensus on membership for another non-NPT member state. According to Kimball, this Clause has been provided for India getting the membership first and Pakistan later on. This approach is detrimental for the non-proliferation regime and erodes the credibility of the NSG.<sup>65</sup>

Amb. (R) Zamir Akram criticized the proposed Grossi-Song formula and claimed that it was designed to harm Pakistan's application for NSG membership as it called for a sequential rather than a simultaneous approach for both the applicants. He argued that Pakistan's credentials for NSG membership are equally good if not better than India's and therefore, both countries' applications should be considered concurrently and simultaneously.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Zamir Akram, "NSG Deadlock".

A brief point-wise comments for the application of Grossi's formula in India-Pakistan cases, as deliberated in a seminar organised by Strategic Vision Institute,<sup>67</sup> are given below:

1. India has a separation plan; Pakistan does not have a plan (which is notified to the IAEA). For materializing the Indo-US nuclear cooperation, one of the requirements was to have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. India concluded such an agreement based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type safeguards agreement on July 9, 2008. India provided a separation plan under the India-IAEA safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/731 dated July 25, 2008). It was decided that India would place 14 out of a total 22 atomic reactors for international inspection by 2014.<sup>68</sup> The IAEA approved the agreement in August, 2008.<sup>69</sup>
2. India has notified existing and future civilian nuclear facilities; Pakistan has not done so. India for example has provided a list of 14 reactors for civilian purposes as mentioned in point no.1.
3. India has agreed on an India-specific IAEA safeguards agreement under 2008 NSG exemption clause; Pakistan does not have such agreement.
4. India has signed and ratified the IAEA additional protocol; Pakistan does not have concluded it yet.
5. India and Pakistan can give such commitment not to use any item transferred for proliferation.
6. Both India and Pakistan have unilateral moratorium of no testing but both have never signed the CTBT.

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<sup>67</sup> "Politics of NSG and Ballistic Missile Tests" (views expressed in a seminar organised by Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad, on December 29, 2016).

<sup>68</sup> Seiitsu Tachibana, "India-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation – Contentious Problems for NPT and Nuclear Disarmament" Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University, [www.home.hiroshima-u.ac.jp](http://www.home.hiroshima-u.ac.jp).

<sup>69</sup> "India Safeguards Agreement Signed," IAEA, February 2, 2013.

7. Pakistan has been calling for signing a bilateral test ban treaty with India or mutual signing of the CTBT; India has not shown any such signs.
8. Both India and Pakistan call for non-proliferation and disarmament.
9. This clause presumes India into the NSG as member should not object any other non-NPT NWS application. Critics say though India will not be acting against Pakistan's application, any other member on behalf of India may act this way.<sup>70</sup>

Prof. (R) Zafar Iqbal Cheema pointed out that "Pakistan does not qualify as per the first four points mentioned in the formula while the remaining five are applicable to both Pakistan and India."<sup>71</sup> He argued that the "Grossi formula is well suited to India while technically it excluded Pakistan." There was consensus in the seminar that it was done intentionally to accommodate India. Pakistan's case may not be entertained or excluded from agenda by India or any of its allies if it gets NSG membership.<sup>72</sup>

However, it is interesting to note that the matter of membership for Non-NPT states was discussed in 27<sup>th</sup> plenary of the NSG in June, 2017 in Switzerland; yet, the decision was not taken. It was concluded that an informal meeting of the NSG states would be held in November 2017 to discuss the matter.

## **Conclusion**

The paper discussed the evolution, objectives, procedures and current membership criteria of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The cartel aims at strengthening the non-proliferation regime and complements the NPT. The NSG works as a voluntary export control cartel which regulates the export of nuclear material and technology by nuclear exporting

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> "Politics of NSG and Ballistic Missile Tests," (views expressed at a seminar of Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad, on December 29, 2016).

states. In 2008, the cartel extended a specific waiver to India for export of nuclear technology which breached the normative spirit of the cartel.

In the last few years, India and Pakistan, the two non-NPT nuclear weapon states have been endeavoring to get membership of the 48-member NSG. Since India and Pakistan are enduring rivals, both have to be treated equally by the International community for the promotion of peace and stability. The paper discussed the Indian case which claimed that the country had also been enjoying overwhelming support from the former Obama administration. In continuation of the US-India strategic partnership, India was granted membership of MTCR. Now, India is looking for membership of other cartels including the NSG. For India, the membership of the cartel is only a matter of prestige as it is already benefiting from the fruits of nuclear technology and materials emanating from the 2008 NSG exemption. For Pakistan, it is a question of maintenance of balance and stability vis-à-vis its adversary. Pakistan also eagerly needs nuclear cooperation from advanced countries to cater to its energy needs and for fulfilling its long-term nuclear energy program which seeks to generate 40000 MW of electricity by 2050. It is on these grounds that Pakistan bases its case for membership of the NSG.

The paper evaluated three proposed criteria for the membership of the non-NPT nuclear weapons states i.e. India and Pakistan. The first approach requires signing the NPT for the NSG membership. This approach is too restrictive as either India, nor Pakistan is ready to give up possession of its nuclear weapons. Second approach calls for likeminded states which is mainly supported by the US to facilitate India to get the NSG membership and leaving aside Pakistan. Third approach considers general and acceptable criteria which places certain non-proliferation pledges and commitments from the non-NPT nuclear weapons states to accept their candidature for the membership of the NSG.

The paper also shed's light on the 9-point Grossi formula which mainly favours the Indian case. India has done most of the demands mentioned in Grossi formula and leaves aside Pakistan's case for



membership for future. Concurrent membership to the NSG would be the apt resolve, but unfortunately the US policy towards both is not even-handed. India has been enjoying fruits of nuclear trade ever since Indo-US Nuclear Deal of 2008 provided such exemption to its strategic partner. A non-discriminatory criterion-based approach should be adopted for all non-NPT NWS aspirants for NSG membership. This will not only strengthen the non-proliferation regime but also promote peace and stability in South Asia.

## Pakistan-US Relations Under Trump Administration: Opportunities and Challenges for Pakistan

Khurram Abbas & Muhammad Nawaz Khan \*

### Abstract

*Since 9/11, the US' policies towards Pakistan are constituted under organizational process. Continuation of drone strikes in the Pak-Afghan border areas is one of such examples of this organizational process. Trump's cognitive approach towards Pakistan seems relatively positive, as it has been observed through his books, speeches and initial executive orders. This paper largely predicts that state specific approach, i.e., conditional engagement with Pakistan, will gradually overwhelm the actor specific approach, i.e., cordial relationship with active stable role in the region. The paper will comprehensively address variables such as War on Terror, trade policy, relations with India as a balancer to China and Afghanistan war, etc. The study examines that factors like Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, geo-politics offer both opportunities and challenges due to different policies of leadership and state institutions. The hypothesis of the study is that though actor-specific approach is offering some opportunities to Pakistan, yet the organizational process will keep posing challenges in the strategic relationship between Pakistan and the US. The paper concludes that the future of Pakistan-US relations will be largely depending upon Pakistan's security policies and the terms of re-engagement, with wider geopolitical realities weighing in on the calculations by both countries. The study finds that*

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*there will be more challenges than opportunities for Pakistan under the Trump administration.*

**Keywords:** Pakistan-US Relations, Donald Trump, Cooperation, Challenges, Foreign Policy.

## **Introduction**

The 45<sup>th</sup> President of the U.S, Donald Trump assumed office on January 20, 2017. Unlike his predecessors, Trump has shown that he owns his words and often wants to fulfill promises, which he had pledged during his election campaign.<sup>1</sup> In the first month as President, he had decided to withdraw from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement,<sup>2</sup> devised new border security measures,<sup>3</sup> and repealed the healthcare system popularly known as Obamacare<sup>4</sup> (introduced by his predecessor) through executive orders. His firmness on the one hand has raised concerns among many states, for instance, Mexico and Iran etc, while some are looking into prospects of improvement of their bilateral relationship under the Trump administration, such as Pakistan, Russia and India etc. Donald Trump's strategy "Buy American" and "Hire American" has also raised various questions among academics about the US radical policy shift from globalization to protectionism. Trump's inauguration speech largely indicated to a strongly nationalistic approach and anti-globalization. His pledges to eradicate radical Islam<sup>5</sup> and eagerness to

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<sup>1</sup> Donald J. Trump, *Great Again: How to Fix our Crippled America*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016), 66.

<sup>2</sup> "Trump withdraws US from Trans Pacific Partnership deal," Al-Jazeera, January 24, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/trump-withdraws-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp-deal-170123170334145.html> (accessed January 26, 2017).

<sup>3</sup> "Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements," White House, January 25, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/25/executive-order-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements> (accessed January 26, 2017).

<sup>4</sup> "Executive Order Minimizing the Economic Burden of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Pending Repeal," White House, January 20, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/20/executive-order-minimizing-economic-burden-patient-protection-and> (accessed January 26, 2017)

<sup>5</sup> Robert Einhorn, *Non-Proliferation Challenges Facing the Trump Administration*, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Series Paper 15 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2017), 6. )

renegotiate North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)<sup>6</sup> will have broader security and economic implications around the world. Perhaps, his foreign policy issues, which would likely be linked with national impact targeting his white constituency such as trade, immigration, terrorism that he termed as Islamic extremism, Iranian nuclear deal, and relations with Israel. However, the remaining foreign policy endeavors, such as geopolitics and strategic issues, which would possibly have an institutional tang with overall influence of Trump on the whole range of foreign policy.

Pakistan and the US have had a fluctuating relationship, which has witnessed cordiality largely due to Pakistan's role in Cold War alliances including South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) 1954, Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 1955, Afghan '*Jihad*' 1979 and sourness due to Pakistan's nuclear programme. The two countries have diverse cooperation in various fields, ranging from energy to trade and economic to security assistance. During Fiscal Year 2016, US provided US\$255 million in terms of Foreign Military Funding (FMF) programme,<sup>7</sup> and US\$5 million under International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme.<sup>8</sup> According to the Pakistan Economic Survey 2015-16, the US is Pakistan's biggest export market, with a share of around 17 per cent of total exports and 4 per cent of total imports originating from the US. Pakistan enjoys a surplus balance of trade with imports from the US at US \$1.3bn against exports of US \$2.6bn in 2015-16.<sup>9</sup>

The Scholars have already predicted that Pakistan-US relations will likely be the same under Trump administration. For example, "Moeed Yusuf, Associate Vice President of the Asia Centre at the United States

<sup>6</sup> Donald Trump Poised to Pressure Mexico on Trade, Wall Street Journal, November 21, 2016; Trump says he is ready to renegotiate NAFTA, R.T world, January 23, 2017. For details see <https://www.rt.com/usa/374733-trump-nafta-agreement-negotiations-mexico-canada/> (Accessed January 26, 2017)

<sup>7</sup> US Relations with Pakistan, US Department of State, January 24, 2017. For details see <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm> (Accessed January 26, 2017)

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Afshan Subohi, "The ostrich in global concerns," Dawn, February 6, 2017, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1312954> (accessed February 21, 2017).

Institute of Peace, views the trajectory of Pakistan's relations with the US will likely remain the same for keeping the former as a partner in South Asia despite of the challenges.<sup>10</sup> In this context, "Daniel Markey, Senior Research Professor, Johns Hopkins University confirms this view as Pakistan is still important to the US, and a new administration would want to have engagement with it if it has a reasonable expectation that doing so would advance the US goals."<sup>11</sup> In addition, Dr. Rabia Akhtar, Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research, University of Lahore, indicates that "Trump administration will not likely disengage with Islamabad because geopolitics and its compulsions do not change with the change in administration."<sup>12</sup> However, this paper argues that the new regime's policies will likely be under state-specific approach-tougher and more conditional-under the Trump administration as indicated during President Trump's speech on August 21, 2017, while announcing the new strategy for South Asia and especially for Afghanistan. According to him, "the next pillar of our new strategy is to change the approach towards Pakistan and how to deal with it."<sup>13</sup> In fact, many believe that there is nothing new in his speech except to keep the US forces in Afghanistan for an 'indefinite' period. Rather, his policies will likely continue in the same manner without any sharp divergence in the favor of Pakistan.

How then will Trump engage with Pakistan during his presence in the White House? What sort of potential opportunities and challenges will Pakistan face during Trump administration? What type of role would the US would seek from Pakistan in the region generally and in Afghanistan particularly? What will be the future of bilateral trade, military and economic assistance? These questions are largely relying on Trump's perception about Pakistan and South Asia. As discussed earlier, Donald

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<sup>10</sup> Raza Rumi, "US Elections: What can Pakistan expect?" *Dawn*, November 8, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1294177> (accessed November 21, 2016).

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> "Full texts of Donald Trump's speech on South Asia policy," *TheHindu*, August 22, 2017, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/full-texts-of-donald-trumps-speech-on-south-asia-policy/article19538424.ece> (accessed November 20, 2017).

Trump seems a practical and a straightforward person in nature.<sup>14</sup> His executive orders in the very first week of presidency depict that his team had carefully drafted Trump's electoral campaign's pledges. The 58-page Republican Party manifesto mentioned Pakistan's name four times.<sup>15</sup> Unlike his previous rhetoric, the party seems friendly towards Pakistan.<sup>16</sup> It also stressed the need to continue a cordial relationship in order to secure the region.<sup>17</sup> However, the party manifesto clearly indicates that the future relationship between Pakistan and the US will be based on the security policies of Pakistan.

### **Theoretical Foundation of the Study**

International relations are often constituted according to specific domestic, regional and international structure. There are three levels of approaches, including actor-specific approach, state-specific approach and system-level approach, which often influence these bilateral or multilateral relations of states.<sup>18</sup> This study will rely on two (theoretical approaches) levels of analysis, including actor-specific approach and state-specific approach. For actor specific approach, it is pertinent to highlight that sometimes leadership deeply affects the policies of a state. It strengthens the state through its strong leadership abilities, such as Abraham Lincoln, Lenin, Mao, etc. On the contrary, sometimes policies of leadership have led nations into chaos and instability in the past, such as Hitler, Gorbachev, etc. Actor-specific approach is often dealt by cognitive analysis. It considers the role of beliefs and images in the policies of a leader.<sup>19</sup> However, sometimes, state structure, commonly known as organizational process, overcomes the leadership and affects the bilateral

<sup>14</sup> Donald J. Trump, *Great Again: How to Fix our Crippled America*, 66.

<sup>15</sup> Republican Platform 2016, GOP, [https://prod-static-ngop-pbl.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/DRAFT\\_12\\_FINAL\[1\]-ben\\_1468872234.pdf](https://prod-static-ngop-pbl.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf) (accessed January 30, 2017).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid,

<sup>17</sup> Ibid,

<sup>18</sup> Valerie M. Huson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, no. 1 (2005): 1-30.

<sup>19</sup> J.A. Rosati, "A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy", in *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation*, eds. L. Neack, J.A.K. Hey and P.J. Haney (Cambridge: Prentice Hall, 1995), 49.

or multilateral relationship.<sup>20</sup> In organizational process, the foreign policy of a state is often influenced by the organizational process or bureaucratic process.<sup>21</sup> It does not change with the leadership; rather it evolves according to national and international environment and interests. Sometimes, the world has witnessed difference in policy perspectives between leadership (actors) and institutions (organizations). For instance, former American President Clinton had signed Kyoto Protocol despite the fact that the US Senate had passed the Byrd–Hagel resolution<sup>22</sup>, and Obama’s veto of Restoring Americans’ Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015<sup>23</sup> are some glaring examples of difference in policies of individuals and state institutions. It usually happens due to weak leadership, strong institutions and international environment.

Donald Trump’s personality and American state structure will be the test case for academia to understand how the image and character of a leadership affects the organizational process or vice versa. US President Trump has claimed several times that he is different from his predecessor both in policies as well as in actions.<sup>24</sup> Most of his policies towards South Asia are not popular in Pentagon and State Department. For instance, he wants to reduce American overseas military commitments,<sup>25</sup> while

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid; M. Weber, “The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations”, translated by A. M. Henderson and

T. Parsons, edited by T. Parsons. New York: Free Press 1964.

<sup>21</sup> M. Weber, “The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations”, translated by A. M. Henderson and

T. Parsons, edited by T. Parsons. New York: Free Press 1964; Valerie M. Huson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, no. 1 (2005): 1-30.

<sup>22</sup> Jon Hovi, Detlef F. Sprinz & Guri Bang, “Why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and US perspectives”, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 18, no. 1 (2010): 129-150.

<sup>23</sup> “Restoring Americans’ Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015”, Bill no, H.R 3762, United States Senate, <https://www.senate.gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/ObamaBH.htm> (accessed May 31, 2017).

<sup>24</sup> Donald J. Trump, *Great Again: How to Fix our Crippled America*, 83. .

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 25.

recently the Commander of American-led coalition forces Gen. John W. Nicholson requested for troops surge in Afghanistan.<sup>26</sup> How will Trump deal with such kinds of policy differences? He hails from an economic background and has successfully built a business empire. Through his writings, speeches and actions, he has portrayed himself a strong candidate who can individually affect (either positively or negatively) the foreign policy of the US. However, he will have to face the state's approaches on various foreign policy matters towards South Asia. The impact of these two levels on Pakistan will be analyzed in this study. Largely, the focus of study will be on the question as to how the actor-specific and state-specific approaches will affect the Pakistan-US bilateral relationship under the Trump administration? In this backdrop, opportunities and challenges for Pakistan are as under:-

### **Actor-Specific Approach and Emerging Opportunities for Pakistan**

#### *Trump on Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Process*

Trump's predecessor had shown reluctance in resolving the Afghan issue through reconciliation. He had launched an offense against Afghan Taliban by sending 30,000 more troops in Afghanistan in 2009.<sup>27</sup> Later, the killing of Mullah Akhtar Mansour, leader of Afghan Taliban by a US drone strike during the Quad-lateral peace process, were two major indicators of Obama administration's unwillingness to see reconciliation in Afghanistan;<sup>28</sup> rather, he wanted continuation of a political government at centre. However, his policies prolonged the Afghan issue. Unlike his predecessor, during the election campaign, Trump stressed the reduction of US overseas military commitments. He time and again reiterated that

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<sup>26</sup> Micheal R. Gordon, "U.S. General Seeks 'a Few Thousand' More Troops in Afghanistan", New York Times, February 9, 2017.

<sup>27</sup> Tom Lansford, "9/11 and the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: A Chronology and Reference Guide", Santa Barbara: California, 2012, p. 184.

<sup>28</sup> Mansour's death message for Taliban, says Obama, Dawn News, May 24, 2016. For details see [http://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=24\\_05\\_2016\\_003\\_004](http://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=24_05_2016_003_004) (Accessed January 30, 2017)



his administration will end 'intervention and chaos' overseas.<sup>29</sup> Currently, 8400 US military troops are residing in Afghanistan.<sup>30</sup> Despite Over 15 years of military and security investments by the US, Afghanistan's grim security situation calls for national reconciliation. The politically fragile unity government of Afghanistan has remained unable to resolve security, economic and governance crisis in the country. On the other hand, the world community in general and major stakeholders in particular have shown their confidence in Pakistan's role in the Afghan national reconciliation process. The Quad lateral dialogue (the US, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan),<sup>31</sup> trilateral dialogue (Russia, China and Pakistan)<sup>32</sup> and trilateral strategic dialogue (China, Afghanistan and Pakistan)<sup>33</sup> etc have confirmed that Pakistan can play an active role in developing a channel between the warring parties of Afghanistan.

Pakistan has several times reiterated that its security and development are highly linked with Afghanistan's security and development. In this backdrop, Afghan national reconciliation process has become inevitable objective for both countries. Considering Pakistan's active role in facilitation of this process, it is most likely that Pakistan's significance will improve in the Trump administration due to the common goal of achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan. The US led NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan has created a security vacuum in the country. There might be a realization in Washington that this vacuum

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<sup>29</sup> Trump vows to end overseas 'intervention & chaos,' rebuild 'depleted' US military, RT World, December 07, 2017. For details see <https://www.rt.com/usa/369439-trump-military-plan-tour/> (Accessed January 30, 2017)

<sup>30</sup> Obama Says He Will Keep More Troops in Afghanistan Than Planned, New York Times, July 6, 2016. For details see <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/world/asia/obama-afghanistan-troops.html> (Accessed January 30, 2017)

<sup>31</sup> Tahir Khan, "Afghan peace talks: implications for Pakistan-Afghanistan relations," Conflict and Peace Studies, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 50.

<sup>32</sup> Russia-China-Pakistan: Third trilateral dialogue on Afghanistan, Daily Times, January 18, 2017. For details see <http://dailytimes.com.pk/blog/18-Jan-17/russia-china-pakistanthird-trilateral-dialogue-on-afghanistan> (Accessed January 30, 2017)

<sup>33</sup> First Round of China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Held in Kabul, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China, October 02, 2015. For details see [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjbxw/t1236606.shtml](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1236606.shtml) (Accessed January 30, 2017)

could be filled by Pakistani forces, mainly by eliminating the terrorists' sanctuaries along the Pakistan and Afghanistan border. Hence, bilateral military cooperation between the two countries under Trump administration will increase. Furthermore, this realization has been strengthened due to Pakistan Army's successful military campaign in North Waziristan Agency (NWA). President Trump will likely see continuation in counter-terrorism efforts by Islamabad along Pakistan and Afghanistan border. In October, Pakistan rescued American-Canadian family from Pakistan-Afghanistan border,<sup>34</sup> which was hailed by Donald Trump.<sup>35</sup> Such kinds of 'positive incidents' may likely improve the bilateral relationship based on actor specific approach. The suspension of quadrilateral dialogue due to killing of Mullah Mansour hampered the national reconciliation process. Currently, Afghan government is unwilling to resume this reconciliation process.<sup>36</sup> However, it is Trump's political manifestation to see the end of Afghanistan's political reconciliation. Hence, the world has witnessed that Quad-lateral Cooperation Group (QCG) meeting has been resumed after a long break. It is more likely that the Trump administration will likely facilitate a successful outcome of QCG meetings, which will ensure protection of its interests in the region and beyond.

#### *Trump's Willingness for Mediation in the Kashmir Dispute*

The Kashmir dispute has long been portrayed as a security threat to regional and international peace. The two nuclear powers are wary over this land with difference of approaches in solving this dispute. India wants to solve this dispute through bilateral dialogue with Pakistan, while Pakistan wants mediation of the US or any other major power. It

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<sup>34</sup> Ashifa Kassam and Haroon Janjua, "Canadian-American family rescued after five years as captives in Afghanistan", The Guardian, October 12, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/12/pakistan-rescues-canadian-american-family-hostages-haqqani> (accessed November 20, 2017)

<sup>35</sup> Dawn, "Trump hails recovery of Canadian-American family as 'positive moment' in Pak-US relations", October 12, 2017. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1363378> (accessed November 20, 2017)

<sup>36</sup> Mateen Haider, "No plans to revive peace talks with Taliban, says Afghan govt", Dawn, July 14, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1270797> (Accessed January 30, 2017)

considers that the Indian approach for resolving Kashmir dispute bilaterally is a tactic for prolonging the conflict. However, the US has also been inconsistent towards mediation over Kashmir dispute between the two nuclear neighbours. During Cold War, it had supported “Third Party”, but the US has always supported the Indian approach, i.e. the resolution of Kashmir dispute through bilateral dialogue.<sup>37</sup>

However, an unexpected breath of fresh air came when Donald Trump showed his willingness to resolve the longstanding territorial dispute between the two South Asian giants. He expressed twice his willingness for mediation over Kashmir dispute. Firstly, he had given an interview to “Hindustan Times”, and informed that he wants to see peace in the South Asian region. Therefore, he is ready “to play a mediatory role in addressing the “very, very hot tinderbox” of Kashmir between India and Pakistan.”<sup>38</sup> Pakistan welcomed Trump’s offer<sup>39</sup> as it had long raised voices for Kashmiris at international forums. Trump’s offer for mediation over Kashmir dispute did not restrict itself to his interaction with Indian media. In his telephonic conversation with Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif, he reiterated his stance, which was again welcomed by Pakistan.<sup>40</sup> Trump has fulfilled a longstanding desire of Pakistan, i.e.

<sup>37</sup> Shahzada Ashraf Maqbool, “Key Determinants of US policy towards Kashmir under President George W. Bush,” *Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research*, vol. 1, issue 5 (May 2016): 9-10, <http://www.ijrdo.org/International-Journal-of-Research-&-Development-Organisation-pdf/Journal%20of%20Social%20Sciences%20and%20Humanities%20Research/May-2016/Social%20Sciences%20and%20Humanities-2.pdf>

<sup>38</sup> Would love to see Pakistan and India get along: Donald Trump, *Hindustan Times*, October 16, 2016. For details see <http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/would-love-to-see-pakistan-and-india-get-along-donald-trump/story-n2DJQzBsLIVxXkTTjBt7DJ.html> (Accessed January 30, 2017)

<sup>39</sup> Pakistan welcomes US president-elect Trump’s offer to mediate on Kashmir issue, *Hindustan Times*, November 11, 2016. For details see <http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pakistan-welcomes-us-president-elect-trump-s-offer-to-mediate-on-kashmir-issue/story-D2M5bM6Oppe6QEA8hNhPxL.html> (Accessed January 30, 2017)

<sup>40</sup> Trump willing to play any role to help fantastic Pakistan, *CNBC News*, December 01, 2016. For details see <http://www.cnb.com/2016/12/01/trump-willing-to-play-any-role-to-help-pakistan-pm-sharifs-office-claims.html?view=story&%24DEVICE%24=native-android-mobile> (Accessed January 30, 2017)

showing willingness for mediation over Kashmir dispute. Donald Trump had emerged a strong leader with strong stance over various national and international issues. US Vice President Mike Pence further extended his hopes by saying that 'deal-making skills of Trump' can start a new era of peace between India and Pakistan.<sup>41</sup> Trump's willingness at mediation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir dispute offers an opportunity, which can strengthen bilateral relationship between the US and Pakistan and can strengthen regional peace. The history of brokering deals from Trump tower reflects that Trump has expertise in negotiating tough deals with clever and experienced businessmen.<sup>42</sup> Though difficult, yet it is hoped that his offer of brokering deal between the two countries will positively affect relations of the two major South Asian rivals.

### *Trump's Aspiration to Eliminate IS*

Islamic State (IS) has dominated the European and American security apparatus in 2016. The Obama administration failed to develop a long term and well organized strategy against the IS. During election campaign, Donald Trump severely criticized Obama's policy in Middle East. He also reiterated to deal with IS through a well-planned strategy.<sup>43</sup> In this regard, after assuming his office, Donald Trump's eagerness led to an order to security officials to form a strategy against IS in one month.<sup>44</sup> Recently, dropping of Mother of All Bombs (MOAB)<sup>45</sup> in Nangarhar, Afghanistan to eliminate IS presence in the Afghan province is a staunch example of his eagerness to curb this menace. He has also called Russian

<sup>41</sup> Trump's 'deal-making skills' can help resolve Kashmir: US VP-elect Mike Pence, Hindustan Times, December 05, 2016. For details see <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/trump-s-deal-making-skills-can-help-resolve-kashmir-vp-elect-mike-pence/story-H6qB6nAbTsus2mdoF0uIbL.html> (Accessed January 30, 2017)

<sup>42</sup> Donald J. Trump, *Great Again: How to Fix our Crippled America*, 36.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. 37

<sup>44</sup> Christopher M. Blanchard & Carla E. Humud, *The Islamic State and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service report (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service), i, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf>

<sup>45</sup> Al-Jazeera, "US says 'mother of all bombs' hits ISIL in Afghanistan", April 15, 2017. For details see <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/04/drops-mother-bombs-isil-afghanistan-170413174730383.html> (Accessed May 22, 2017)

President Vladimir Putin to form a joint strategy against IS.<sup>46</sup> On the other hand, IS is making its inroads into Afghanistan. Many terrorist groups and individuals have allegedly shown their allegiance to IS.<sup>47</sup> Spread of IS in Afghanistan will have larger security impact on Pakistan's security, particularly in Pakistan Afghanistan border area. Hence, a commonality of interest can be witnessed between Pakistan and Trump's apparent policies towards curbing terrorism in general and IS in particular. Furthermore, Donald Trump's approach to work with Vladimir Putin is also an encouraging signal for Pakistan, which provides a broader opportunity to Pakistan for cooperation with Russia in Afghanistan, against the IS and other extremist militant groups in Central and South Asia. The recent trilateral dialogue (Russia, China and Pakistan) had an objective to engage Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan in order to curb the threat of IS in the country.

#### *Trump's Policy Shift towards Russia*

Pakistan has always associated with the American alliance, ranging from South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), cooperation in Afghan 'Jihad', and Non-NATO ally in war against terrorism. In these almost seven decades, Pakistan could not enlist cooperation with Russia in the larger South Asian security complex. Security analysts believe that the major hindrance in cordial relations between Pakistan and Russia was largely the opposing policies of Russia and America in Afghanistan. The overt Pakistani and American support to Afghan *Mujahedeen* in Afghanistan 'Jihad' against Soviet Union widened the gap between their interests in Afghanistan and the region. However, fifteen years after the American invasion in Afghanistan, the emergence of new radical groups (particularly the IS) and American inability to establish peace and stability in Afghanistan has

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<sup>46</sup> Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin ready to hold Summit following historic call, The Telegraph, January 28, 2017. For details see <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/28/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-hold-historic-telephone-call/> (Accessed January 30, 2017)

<sup>47</sup> Maryam Nazir, "Daesh in South Asia," *Journal of Current Affairs*, vol. 1, nos.1&2 (2016): 1-17.

radically changed the security picture in the region and compelled America and Russia to cooperate with each other in Afghanistan. In the first call Trump made to his Russian counterpart, he was highlighting three factors including countering IS, enhancing trade and finding common solution in Ukraine.<sup>48</sup> Since, IS is increasing its influence in Afghanistan, which is a common enemy of the US and Russia, there is a possibility that both countries could work together in eliminating the IS factor in Afghanistan. Currently, Afghanistan's solution lies in a national agreement between the warring parties, i.e. Afghan government and radical groups (Taliban in particular). The future of IS in Afghanistan is also largely based on the failure or success of national reconciliation. On the other hand, Russian assertive approach in Eastern Europe and enhanced interest in Afghanistan shows its resurgence in world affairs. Russian interests in Central Asia and enhanced interests in Iran are also further broadening its stakes in Afghan stability. Hence, the US will likely not to have any concern in growing cooperation between Pakistan and Russia in Afghanistan. Thus, the convergence of interests between Russia and America in Afghanistan will likely promote Pak-Russia ties.

### *Prospects of CPEC and Trump Administration*

To larger extent, Pakistan's policies and politics are currently revolving around Pakistan-China Economic Corridor (CPEC). Robust economic and development activities are continuing under CPEC, which is a pilot project of Chinese One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. Pakistan has always desired to increase stakes of regional and extra regional countries into this mega trade corridor.<sup>49</sup> The projecting economic activities will not only serve Pakistan and China but it will be highly lucrative for regional and international countries.<sup>50</sup> However, this corridor will require a peaceful regional environment with strong support of major powers in

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<sup>48</sup> Putin & Trump signal new Russia-US partnership with 1st phone call on ISIS, trade & Ukraine, RT World, January 28, 2017; <https://www.rt.com/news/375416-putin-trump-telephone-call/> (accessed February 6, 2017).

<sup>49</sup> Ambassador (ret'd) Sohail Amin Muhammad Hanif & Khurram Abbas, "Preface," in *CEPC: Macro and Micro Economic Dividends for Pakistan and the Region* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute), ix.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid,

general and the US in particular. China has diplomatically maneuvered through Russia to restrain negative activities of India to sabotage CPEC.<sup>51</sup> Pakistan's dream of regional connectivity can offer lucrative ventures for the US business sector. Currently, trade deficit of the US with Pakistan stands at US\$1.3 billion.<sup>52</sup> Trump's slogan "America First" and "strong again" will likely stimulate American manufacturing industry, CPEC will offer it a competitive route to export manufacturing items to South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia. It will also help in decreasing trade deficit between the two countries. Trump's business mindset will also promote America economic relationship with other countries in the world. It is highly likely that Trump administration will not oppose CPEC and OBOR initiative as it would provide more markets to American businessmen, which is inherent in Trump's political slogans mentioned above.

### **State Specific Approach and Perceived Challenges for Pakistan**

#### *Afghan Conundrum*

Unlike, Trump's cognitive approach towards Afghanistan, the US' state institutions have different perceptions and approaches to the Afghan conundrum. During the Obama administration, the relations between Pakistan and the US were not warm<sup>53</sup> on issues such as the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the depth and extent of counter insurgency and counter terrorism struggle.<sup>54</sup> The former President stated that "it was always difficult to negotiate with Islamabad because the latter "would just repeat the same answers year after year without

<sup>51</sup>Panos Mourdoukoutas , 'China Wants Russia To Calm India And Save CPEC', Forbes, January 08, 2017. For details see

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/01/08/china-wants-russia-to-calm-india-and-save-cpec/#22a29eeb240f> (Accessed February 6, 2017)

<sup>52</sup>Afshan Subohi , "The ostrich in global concerns," Dawn, February 6, 2017, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1312954> (accessed February 21, 2017).

<sup>53</sup>Shahrbano Tadjbakhsh, *South Asia and Afghanistan: The Robust India-Pakistan Rivalry*, PRIO paper 2 (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2011), 35, <https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=389&type=publicationfile>

<sup>54</sup>Yousaf Rafiq, "The Trump era: implications for Pakistan," *Daily Times*, January 29, 2016, <http://dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/29-Jan-17/the-trump-era-implications-for-pakistan> (accessed February 27, 2017).

quantifying much.”<sup>55</sup> Under the new administration, it seems that Pakistan will face similar questions throughout the Trump administration as he has already indicated in his speech that “we can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond.”<sup>56</sup> Rather, his speech is an old rhetoric of blame game against Pakistan while accusing the latter for providing a safe heavens to the militants. This policy indicates that the institutional factor overcomes the personal cognitive approach of Trump. Hence, a radical shift can be seen in Trump’s approach based on the institutional input.

Earlier, President Trump while speaking to former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, considered Pakistan a great nation and talked high about Pakistan and its citizens. The US institutional approach towards Pakistan has always remained conditional. For instance, the US Congress imposed conditionality by tying up the release of US \$400 million aid to Pakistan government’s prompt action against the Haqqani network, reflecting the US establishment’s hard and close fisted approach towards Pakistan.<sup>57</sup> Most recently, the US Congress has approved reimbursement of up to US\$ 700 million in Coalition Support Fund (CSF) to Pakistan. According to that the latter will get US\$ 350 million of US\$ 700 million after the US Defence Secretary James Mattis certifies that Pakistan has taken demonstrable steps against the Haqqani network.<sup>58</sup> It seems that the Republican-dominated Congress is a little unhappier with Pakistan than usual owing to the non-fulfilment of the US ‘do more’ demands.

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> “Full texts of Donald Trump's speech on South Asia policy,” *TheHindu*.

<sup>57</sup> S Qamar Afzal Rizvi, “Trump’s optimism: Retuning Pak-US ties?” *Pakistan Observer*, December 15, 2016, <http://pakobserver.net/trumps-optimism-retuning-pak-us-ties/> (accessed January 6, 2017).

<sup>58</sup> “US Congress approves \$700m CSF for Pakistan,” *Pakistan Today*, November 11, 2017, <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/11/11/us-congress-approves-700m-csf-for-pakistan/> (accessed November 20, 2017).



Therefore, it has 'stopped the latter's F16 subsidy,'<sup>59</sup> 'reduced future military and economic aid and made Coalition Support Funds (CSF) for counter-terrorism cooperation conditional to certification,'<sup>60</sup> — with the potential to affect Pakistan's war effort — and even debated in the House whether Pakistan was a friend or foe.<sup>61</sup> The statement of James Mattis, Secretary of Defence in this regard is an open hint of US hard policies towards Pakistan's military assistance as he "warned that putting conditions on US security assistance to Pakistan has not always produced the desired results."<sup>62</sup> The US military assistance to Pakistan is likely to continue with a question mark under Trump's administration. In spite of Pakistan playing a glaring and prompt role in terminating terrorist networks, it seems that Trump administration will focus more on actions by Pakistan on dismantling the terrorist networks and cleaning infrastructure of jihadi organisations particularly against Haqqani network on its soil and less on spilling the beans. Consequently, there could be severe concern among military establishment of Pakistan over the continuation and sustainability of military assistance and release of defence equipment.

Keeping in view the organizational behaviour and perceptions towards Pakistan, one could estimate that Trump administration will probably continue its inherited policy coupled by more demands and conditionalities towards Pakistan in the context of Afghanistan. It is evident in his moderated stance by October 2015 that Trump has admitted the retaining of 9,800 US military personnel in Afghanistan. However, he asserted that these troops need to quit Afghanistan

<sup>59</sup> Fatima Raza, *Fresh Tensions in Pakistan-US Relations: The F-16 Conundrum*, issue brief (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 2016), 2-5, [http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final\\_IB\\_Fatima\\_dated\\_03-6-2016.pdf](http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Final_IB_Fatima_dated_03-6-2016.pdf)

<sup>60</sup> Abdul Basit, "Trump's Victory: Future of US-Pakistan Relations," Report no. 291, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, November 29, 2016, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/CO16291.pdf> (accessed December 21, 2016).

<sup>61</sup> Rafiq, "The Trump era: implications for Pakistan."

<sup>62</sup> Anwar Iqbal, "Conditions on security assistance to Pakistan failed to yield results: Mattis," *Dawn*, January 15, 2017, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1308504> (accessed January 15, 2017).

building aims and emphasize on fighting more looming security concerns. Furthermore, on the US SA policy, it is assumed that Moscow Conference on Afghanistan Peace on April 14, 2017<sup>63</sup> and especially the Beijing conference on "Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on May 14-15, 2017"<sup>64</sup> could be a tipping point to the US not only to retain its forces for 'indefinite period' in Afghanistan but also to the US troops surge in Afghanistan. This is reflected in Trump's Afghanistan strategy which looks like it aims to "keep an indefinite US military presence in the country indefinitely,"<sup>65</sup> thereby generating a concern to the geopolitical outlook of Pakistan with the US keeping an eye on CPEC and Pakistan's Nuclear programme.

In particular, Trump believes that the residual US military presence in Afghanistan is an effective check on Pakistan's nuclear weapons capabilities.<sup>66</sup> While responding in a Republican presidential debate, Trump indicated that "I think you have to stay in Afghanistan for a while, because of the fact that you are right next to Pakistan, which has nuclear weapons and we have to protect that."<sup>67</sup> In this context, in his radio address (during his election campaign) in September 2016, he "suggested the involvement of India in efforts to de-nuclearise Pakistan as he stated 'You have to get India involved. India's the check to Pakistan.'"<sup>68</sup> That is why he has intended an expansion of Afghanistan's security partnership

<sup>63</sup> "International Afghanistan Peace Conference starts in Moscow," Express Tribune, April 14, 2017, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1383473/international-afghanistan-peace-conference-starts-moscow/> (accessed November 20, 2017).

<sup>64</sup> Yamei, "Full text of President Xi's speech at opening of Belt and Road forum," Xinhua, May 14, 2017, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c\\_136282982.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/14/c_136282982.htm) (accessed November 20, 2017).

<sup>65</sup> "US Afghanistan policy is centered against Pakistan-China: Russian experts," *Times of Islamabad*, August 25, 2017, <https://timesofislamabad.com/us-afghanistan-policy-is-centered-against-pakistan-china-russian-experts/2017/08/25/> (accessed November 20, 2017).

<sup>66</sup> Samuel Ramani, "What a Trump Presidency Would Mean for Afghanistan," *Diplomat*, August 2, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/what-a-trump-presidency-would-mean-for-afghanistan/> (accessed December 27, 2016).

<sup>67</sup> Anwar Iqbal, "Trump says US troops needed in Afghanistan to protect Pak N-arms," *Dawn*, March 5, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1243642> (accessed January 30, 2017).

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

with India. This strategy could likely increase tensions between Islamabad and Washington. Whereas, Islamabad has repeatedly showed its concerns that US-Afghanistan-India security cooperation is not only meant at defaming the country but has negative implications for Pakistan's security,<sup>69</sup> which will ultimately and indirectly encourage the Afghanistan-based insurgent groups such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, etc. against Pakistan.

### **US Policies - Disequilibrium in South Asia**

During the Cold War, the US's institutional policy towards SA had mostly revolved around striking a balance between Pakistan and India. After the dismemberment of the former Soviet Union, the US' state institutions revisited their foreign policy focus in the region. Currently, successive American governments have been building India as a balancer to China, which has created an imbalance in the region. This disequilibrium in organizational behaviour of the US has directly affected Pakistan's security calculation. It is likely that the new administration will continue this organizational approach. Resultantly, Trump's tilt toward New Delhi will not make Washington able to adopt the balanced approach which Islamabad is seeking. It is likely that the Trump administration will further cement its relations with India showing the former's tilt towards New Delhi which Islamabad will have to deal with in the future. Keeping in view the US strategic interests in SA, the new regime will continue to see Pakistan through the Indian prism as evident in its new Afghanistan and SA policy after giving a larger role to India in Afghanistan at the cost of Pakistan's security concerns.<sup>70</sup> Like the Democrats, the Republican Party considers India as a geopolitical ally and a strategic trading partner.<sup>71</sup> The deepening US strategic partnership with New Delhi, especially in the

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<sup>69</sup> Brig Asif H. Raja, "Evolving Regional Security Dynamics and Impact on Pakistan's Security," *Veterans today*, December 29, 2016, <http://www.veteranstoday.com/2016/12/29/evolving-regional-security-dynamics-and-impact-on-pakistans-security/> (accessed December 30, 2016).

<sup>70</sup> "Full texts of Donald Trump's speech on South Asia policy," *Hindu*.

<sup>71</sup> India a 'geopolitical ally' of US: Republicans, "*Economic Times*, July 19, 2016, <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-a-geopolitical-ally-of-us-republicans/articleshow/53281248.cms> (accessed November 30, 2016).

backdrop of Indo-US defence cooperation such as nuclear defence deal and, the waiver granted to India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008, has generated a serious concern in Islamabad because such a partnership has disturbed the balance of power in the region. Moreover, Islamabad understands that its historical leveraging of the Washington's alliance against New Delhi could now be no more.<sup>72</sup> Although, the US-India partnership may also have an economic component but it is the military component that causes widening asymmetry in military capability, which is the real concern for Pakistan. That is why Pakistan hopes that the US-India relations should not come at the expense of Pakistan's security and regional peace.

Currently, there is a bipartisan approach in the US establishment towards South Asian policy which is to interact with New Delhi and Islamabad separately or have a de-hyphenated engagement with Pakistan. In this scenario, it is likely that the new regime will maintain in future the Indian position high in the US foreign policy priority list due to the commonality of goals and interests between the two countries, such as defeating terrorism, containing China and enhancing economic ties. Therefore, the US will continue its diplomacy in convincing the international community for making India a member of the NSG and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).<sup>73</sup> Consequently, the new US-SA policy under the new administration will directly add to India's hegemony and will contribute to a mistrust and classic security dilemma in the region, thus negatively impacting regional peace and cooperation. This will also enhance an unhealthy arms race, including nuclear weapons development between Pakistan and India. Accordingly, these moves would further expand Indian domination that would create a fear in the region of New Delhi's potential expansionism and unsolicited intrusion into their domestic affairs of the regional countries.<sup>74</sup> Eventually, the arms race will put further burden on

<sup>72</sup> Rumi, "US Elections: What can Pakistan expect?"

<sup>73</sup> Basit, "Trump's Victory: Future of US-Pakistan Relations."

<sup>74</sup> Kishore C. Dash, *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 199.

Pakistan's economy, as the country will also be compelled to deter Indian designs through improved arms capabilities.

### **Countering Terrorism – Common Objectives with Different Approaches**

Countering terrorism is a common goal of both Pakistan and the US, which they have realized, but the approaches to achieve that goal in handling the menace of terrorism could be different. Pakistan wants to take harsh measures against the miscreants according to its own priorities while keeping in view the security landscape and threat perception of the country. For this reason, it seems that it wants to adopt a step-by-step approach — instead of opening all fronts at a same time against all the terrorists — to avoid any severe backlash from the miscreants' side. The country had adopted this approach in the case of "Operation Rah-e-Rast (2009),"<sup>75</sup> and "Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009)."<sup>76</sup> During the same period the US establishment had been pressurizing Islamabad to start another operation in North Waziristan against terrorists. This US demand had caused mistrust between them because the US considered that delay in launching the North Waziristan operation would undercut its anti-terror efforts. Eventually, Pakistan launched "Operation Zarb-e-Azb" in June 2014<sup>77</sup> at a time when it felt that the previous two operations had achieved the desired results against the militants.

Moreover, the US establishment shows its concern regarding the Afghan Taliban, especially the Haqqani network, which it allegedly considers are enjoying sanctuary in areas along the Afghan border, whereas Pakistan reiterates time and again that Operation Zarb-e-Azb 2014 was launched in a bid to wipe out militant bases in North Waziristan

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<sup>75</sup> Ahmad Rashid Malik, "The success of the Operation Rah-e-Rast," *Jakarta Post*, August 4, 2009, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/08/04/the-success-operation-raherast.html> (accessed January 27, 2017).

<sup>76</sup> Asif Haroon Raja, "Achievements of operation Rah-e-Nijat," *People of Pakistan*, January 29, 2010, <https://thepeopleofpakistan.wordpress.com/2010/01/29/achievements-of-operation-rah-e-nijat/> (accessed January 27, 2017).

<sup>77</sup> Saima Ghazanfar, "Operation Zarb-e-Azb: Two years of success," *Nation*, September 6, 2016, <http://nation.com.pk/national/06-Sep-2016/operation-zarb-e-azb-two-years-of-success> (accessed November 15, 2016).

without any discrimination between good or bad Taliban<sup>78</sup> and same in the case of Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017). It seems that in the future also both countries would likely follow their same approaches in countering terrorism, which will be a cause in continuing their strained or mistrust relations even in the Trump administration. It is believed that what is happening today in Pakistan is the direct fallout of the extremist rise in Afghanistan, something that needs to be acknowledged by the US together with the fact that any change in Afghanistan will bring a simultaneous impact on Pakistan. However, Pakistan's future prospects are closely linked to the security situation in Afghanistan whereas for the US "trends in the regional and international politics indicate that great powers are least interested in restoring the peace in Afghanistan. They are more concerned about the transformation and realignment in the global politics and pursuit of their international strategic agendas."<sup>79</sup> Being a superpower, the US sees bilateral relations with Pakistan through the perspective of its global foreign policy priorities. Therefore, the former is probably using terrorism as an instrument of its foreign policy to improve its relations with the latter.<sup>\*\*\*</sup> While pursuing his global agenda of terrorism, Trump mentioned about cooperating closely with New Delhi to eradicate terrorism.<sup>80</sup> This counter terrorism cooperation between India and the US will enhance the former leverage on the US and India will exploit this leverage against Pakistan. It indicates that India will continue its efforts toward isolating Pakistan by spreading a narrative that Pakistan supports anti-India elements within the country. In such a

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<sup>78</sup> "Zarb-i-Azb is war of survival, says ISPR chief," Pakistan Defence Blog, June 6, 2014, <http://www.defenceblog.org/2014/06/zarb-i-azb-is-war-of-survival-says-ispr.html> (accessed January 30, 2017).

<sup>79</sup> Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Afghan quagmire: Options for Pakistan," Global Village Space, November 16, 2017, <https://www.globalvillagespace.com/afghan-quagmire-options-for-pakistan/> (accessed November 20, 2017).

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Whereas, on Pakistan's foreign policy priorities list, the US is on significant position because Pakistan seeks bilateral relations with the US.

<sup>80</sup> Dr Ahmad Rashid Malik, "Trump's impact on relations with Pakistan," Pakistan Today, November 15, 2016, <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/11/15/trumps-impact-on-relations-with-pakistan/> (accessed November 6, 2016).

scenario, the US might continue its policy of do more to further disturb Pakistan-US relations.<sup>81</sup>

In fact, India defames Islamabad of being an “epicenter of terrorism”<sup>82</sup>, and blames the latter in sponsoring terrorism in the country without producing any concrete evidence.<sup>83</sup> Rather, India has been involved in exporting terrorism to Pakistan through its RAW agents, specifically in Balochistan and Karachi. For instance, Pakistan’s intelligent operatives had arrested Kulbhushan Yadav who was involved in “imparting Naval fighting training to Baloch separatists in an attempt to target Pakistani ports.”<sup>84</sup> Therefore, it would be obvious that New Delhi will likely play a ‘negative-sum-game’ and it could try to pressurize Trump’s anti-terrorism policy by encircling Pakistan, which would have implications for Pakistan. Undoubtedly, South Asia is a serious victim of terrorism and out of that Pakistan is the most victim of it. The latter has to pay a huge price more than any other country in the world. It has suffered a total loss of US \$188 billion from 2001 to 2016.<sup>85</sup> In addition, it also suffered more than 80000 killings of civilian and armed forces personnel so far.<sup>86</sup> These sacrifices of Pakistan need to be acknowledged by the international community and that the former also needs

<sup>81</sup> Hassan Shahjehan, “Pak-US relations under the Trump administration,” *Pakistan Today*, January 25, 2017, <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/01/25/pak-us-relations-under-the-trump-administration/> (accessed 3, 2016).

<sup>82</sup> Dr. Sridhar Krishnaswami, “Pakistan To Be Major Foreign Policy Challenge For Trump Presidency,” *Eurasia Review*, January 25, 2017, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/25012017-pakistan-to-be-major-foreign-policy-challenge-for-trump-presidency-analysis/> (accessed January 30, 2017).

<sup>83</sup> “India Is Blaming Pakistan For Uri Attacks Without Any Concrete Evidence, Says Pak Home Minister,” *India Times*, September 24, 2016, <http://www.indiatimes.com/news/world/india-is-blaming-pakistan-for-uri-attacks-without-any-concrete-evidence-says-pak-home-minister-262299.html> (accessed January 30, 2017).

<sup>84</sup> Syed Ali Shah, “Arrested 'RAW agent' trained separatists to target Pakistani ports: security official,” *Dawn*, March 27, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1248254> (accessed February 27, 2017).

<sup>85</sup> “Pakistan suffered loss of \$188bn during war on terror, says Dar,” *Dawn*, June 4, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1262750> (accessed January 30, 2017).

<sup>86</sup> “80,000 Pakistanis killed in US 'War on Terror': report,” *Express Tribune*, March 29, 2015, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/860790/80000-pakistanis-killed-in-us-war-on-terror-report>

cooperation from the international community to eliminate the menace of terrorism from SA.

### **Pakistan-China Bilateral Relations' Factor**

In addition to military hardware, Pakistan has been seeking the US support for economic aid and for persuading the IMF for getting loans. It decided to leave the IMF programme, when the former's US \$6.7 billion three-year IMF programme ended in September 2016,<sup>87</sup> probably due to two reasons: a) Pakistan has made considerable improvement in fixing the economy which is why government of Pakistan does not want another package, b) it is reported that after launching the CPEC, there might be a possibility that China may likely replace the US as Pakistan's major strategic, economic and diplomatic partner,<sup>88</sup> which in fact has already been evolving since the beginning of the bilateral relations between Islamabad and Beijing.<sup>89</sup> In this regard, while Pakistan's relationship with the US keep fluctuating, the former has been actively transforming its defence-centric engagement with China into an economic and infrastructure development partnership under the CPEC, which connects Kashgar and Gwadar ports and has been considered as a game changer for the region.

Moreover, the construction of Gwadar Port has further increased the geostrategic importance of Pakistan in the Asia Pacific region. Although the US establishment has welcomed the CPEC but meanwhile it considers that the CPEC will increase Chinese influence in Pakistan that

<sup>87</sup> "IMF says Pakistan ready to go it alone when programme ends," *Dawn*, April 28, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1254986> (accessed December 15, 2016).

<sup>88</sup> Rumi, "US Elections: What can Pakistan expect?"

<sup>89</sup> Pakistan-China friendly relations are constantly moving on an ascending trajectory and gaining strength since last 69 years. Pakistan has always sought to maintain strong and cordial relationship with the US and China simultaneously. In fact, it was Pakistan which had bridged the diplomatic gap between the US and China. Hence, linking Pakistan's growing relationship with China due to the cold relationship with the US is unjustified. Trump's presidency offers both, challenges and opportunities for Pakistan. Currently, Pakistan is cooperating with the US in counter-terrorism, defence, economy and regional stability. It is hoped that Pakistan and the US will continue their cooperation under Trump administration



could limit Washington's historic domination of the region,<sup>90</sup> and which Trump administration may not possibly want to lose its influence over Islamabad. Markey views that there would be mix approaches in Washington about China's presence in Gwadar, as it would be mixed clearly provide an opportunity in future to a growing Chinese naval presence in the Arabian Sea,<sup>91</sup> thus creating a new complexity in Pakistan-China and Indo-US relations.<sup>92</sup> Eventually, the US looks towards India as a counter-weight against China,<sup>93</sup> which could translate into an increase in Indian leverage on the US and resultantly India employing it against Pakistan.<sup>94</sup>

The Washington inclination towards New Delhi is a clear product of the growing power of Beijing, as Beijing might consider that the US's 'Pivot to Asia' policy is China centric. In the worst-case scenario of squeezing China in the South China Sea, it would have implications for the Arabian Sea. If Trump administration reconsiders its severe rhetoric of the campaign trail and adopts a more realistic approach, as it showed in the case of withdrawing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, it could be a step that will likely bring Beijing and Washington closer to each other. But if the new regime with the help of India will continuously try to provoke China in the South China Sea, in that scenario Pakistan's sea shores may not remain peaceful<sup>95</sup> because the struggle to contain China's trade in the South China Sea by the US could be shifted from the South China Sea to the Arabian Sea. Resultantly, this scenario will put tremendous pressure on Pakistan Navy mainly for protecting the Pakistani ports and the CPEC-related trade.

Furthermore, there may be a consideration in the US establishment that Chinese growing relations with Pakistan could influence the latter's foreign policy. This is an unlikely scenario, as contrary to the US, China

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<sup>90</sup> Rumi, "US Elections: What can Pakistan expect?"

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Shahjehan, "Pak-US relations under the Trump administration."

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Ahmad, "How Trump will shape Pakistan-US ties."

believes in 'peaceful rise' and it never interferes into the internal affairs of any country. Rather, Beijing's growing role could stabilize SA.<sup>96</sup> There is a need to understand that the CPEC is mainly a commercial activity and, not a defence alliance against the US or a counterweight against an Indian threat. Rather, Islamabad's growing relations with Beijing is not a replacement for ties with the Washington. In fact, Pakistan adopts a balanced approach between Washington and Beijing. It would like to maximize its leverage that is offered by both allies for fulfilling its national interest instead of viewing its diplomatic relationships with Beijing on the basis of a zero-sum game.

### **Future of Iran-Pakistan Gas Pipeline Under Trump-Iran Relations**

Announcement of new sanctions by Trump against Tehran and punishing it for testing a ballistic missile programme<sup>97</sup> could be a step towards undoing the Iranian Nuclear deal, as Trump has criticized President Obama and John Kerry in his election campaign over the signing of the nuclear deal with Iran. He believes that the deal will not protect American interests and will be detrimental to the national security of Israel, the closest ally of America in the Middle East.<sup>98</sup> It seems that he will either undo the nuclear deal between Iran and P5+1 or pressurize the Iranian administration over the deal by threatening to undo it. Resultantly, this scenario will affect the Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline project, as it has already been delayed due to American sanctions on Iran. Currently both countries are hopeful of increasing their bilateral trade up to 5 billion dollars in next five years.<sup>99</sup> To meet this goal, Pakistan has already lifted all economic sanctions against Tehran during January

<sup>96</sup> Rumi, "US Elections: What can Pakistan expect?"

<sup>97</sup> Rachael Revesz, "New Iran sanctions announced by US Treasury department after ballistic missile test," Independent, February 3, 2016, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/new-iran-sanctions-announce-us-treasury-department-ballistic-missile-test-donald-trump-tweet-playing-a7561751.html> (accessed February 27, 2017).

<sup>98</sup> Donald J. Trump, *Great Again: How to Fix our Crippled America*, 31.

<sup>99</sup> Mehreen Zahra-Malik, "Pakistan, Iran aim to boost trade to \$5 billion," *Reuters*, March 26, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-iran-idUSKCN0WS0F5> (accessed February 21, 2017).

2017.<sup>100</sup> Owing to the uncertainty of imposition of international sanctions against Iran, it will affect Pakistan's prospects of bilateral trade with Iran in particular and the latter's trade with regional and international companies in general. Furthermore, in the recent US-Arab Summit, Trump has again criticized Iran and called for its isolation.<sup>101</sup> This announcement will have a long term impact on Iranian foreign relations and bilateral projects, particularly the IP gas pipeline. It is a fact that, without the consent of the US, no major international monetary institution and international company will enter into trade activities with Iran. This will negatively affect the trade activities between the two countries.

### **Trump's Protectionism and US-Pakistan Trade**

President Xi Jinping in his speech at Davos highlighted the necessity for free trade and globalisation. This speech has significance as the leader of a Communist state is speaking in favour of globalisation.<sup>102</sup> Contrarily, the newly elected leader of the "free world", President Donald Trump in his inauguration speech spoke of "America first", and the need to "buy American" and "hire American".<sup>103</sup> Pakistan stands at a critical juncture in global history. "With Brexit and Trump's election, the neo-liberal economic world order, to which the economy of Pakistan had grown so accustomed to, is being dismantled."<sup>104</sup> This economic world order believes in free movement of goods, free trade and free markets, limited protectionist pressure, and limited regulation of multinational enterprises; whereas, if high tariff barriers are imposed by the new administration, it will adversely impact Pakistani exports to the US. There is a deep concern among the Pakistani business community over the US

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<sup>100</sup> "Pakistan lifts sanctions against Iran," *Dawn*, February 19, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1240603> (accessed November 3, 2016).

<sup>101</sup> The Nation, "Frontline state mortified at anti-terror summit", For details see <http://nation.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2017-05-22/page-1/detail-4> (Accessed May 22, 2017)

<sup>102</sup> Yasser Latif Hamdani, "Pakistan's opportunities in the Trump-era," *Daily Times*, January 23, 2017, <http://dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/23-Jan-17/pakistans-opportunities-in-the-trump-era> (accessed February 15, 2017).

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

policy shift under the new regime. They see Trump's shift towards protectionism could have serious ramifications for Pakistan's trade and economy. "According to the Pakistan Economic Survey 2015-16, the US is Pakistan's biggest export market, with a share of around 17 per cent of total exports and 4 per cent of total imports originating from the US. Pakistan enjoys a surplus balance of trade with imports from the US at US \$1.3bn against exports of US \$2.6bn in 2015-16."<sup>105</sup> It is assumed that owing to Trump's protectionist policies, the volume of bilateral trade with US may fall, which could hit Pakistan's exports to the US market.

### Conclusion

Pakistan is likely to face more challenges than opportunities. The low profile US-Pakistan relations is likely to continue without facing any immediate fracture or downgrading. The trajectory of Pakistan's engagement with the new regime could be more challengeable and trend of favoring Pakistan in terms of Kerry-Lugar Bill for military and economic assistance could be reduced. The reimbursement of the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) has already witnessed delays and tough scrutiny by the US Congress. Chiefly, the US' engagement with Islamabad may rely on the organizational process.. To sum up, it can be argued that the new regime's policy will, in all probability, be tougher and more conditional than before. Unlike his predecessor, Trump has adopted a proactive approach toward numerous national and international issues. His innovative approach and ability to take bold decisions has laid a solid ground of opportunities for Pakistan. The White House in its statement said that it is not extending visa ban to Pakistan.<sup>106</sup> This is a highly encouraging development, which is likely to set the tone of relationship between Washington and Islamabad. The anti-Iran rhetoric by Trump further stimulates Pakistan's position in the White House on the Afghan question. To conclude, Trump's presence in White House presents both

<sup>105</sup> AfshanSubohi , "The ostrich in global concerns," *Dawn*, February 6, 2017, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1312954> (accessed February 21, 2017).

<sup>106</sup> US not extending visa ban to Pakistan: White House, Samaa TV, February 03, 2017. For details see <https://www.samaa.tv/pakistan/2017/02/us-not-extending-visa-ban-to-pakistan-white-house/> (Accessed February 6, 2017)

opportunities and challenges to Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan's role on key international issues will also determine the future of Pakistan-US relations.

## US Rebalancing Policy: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan

Khalid Chandio\*

### Abstract

*The Asian security environment is changing continuously due to the remarkable developments happening in and around Asia-Pacific region especially in consequent to the economic rise of China. This has created troubles not only for the United States (US) but also for its allies and partners in the region. It is perceived that a strong China may challenge the US global hegemony; first through economic rise and then by influencing the global politics through its military might. For the last two decades, the US has been engaged militarily in Iraq and Afghanistan but China interestingly kept on strengthening its economic and political might in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. In this context, the US ongoing "rebalancing" policy indicates its strategic priority regarding the threats it perceives from China as a strategic competitor. With this backdrop the paper tries to examine the "rebalancing" policy of the Obama administration by analysing its strategic rationale and anticipating China's response and highlighting its implications for the region with a special focus on the challenges and opportunities for Pakistan which is being the closest friend and neighbour of China on the one hand and the US non-NATO ally in War on Terror on the other.*

**Keywords:** Rebalance, Pivot to Asia, Asia-Pacific, US, China, Pakistan.

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## Introduction

The Asian regional security architecture is in constant change since the end of the “Cold War” in general and the post-9/11 period in particular. Currently, there exist many issues, which the Asian continent is facing, including alliance formation and balance of power, energy and maritime security, democracy and governance, the relationship between security and economics, terrorism, human security, pandemics, and the climate change. To comprehend the Asian regional security dynamics broadly, one has to concentrate on the “regional-global nexus”. In this regard, many policy analysts are of the opinion that the next power play will take place in the Asia-Pacific region. It has a great link with United States (US) security and prosperity, if the US holds a strong, reliable, and active participation in the regional military and diplomatic engagements<sup>1</sup> as the US has traditionally been a Pacific power, if one looks at the pages of history.

The rise of the Asia-Pacific region has been evidenced to be a particular geo-political transformation in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In this regard, Chinese growing power and extraordinary developments in its economy and soft power have allegedly created troubles for the US and its regional allies and partners in the said region, since a militarily and economically stronger China might challenge the US global hegemony. There is sufficient literature being written on this discourse by Western writers. For the last two decades, the US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan laid the foundations for China to strengthen its political and economic power in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The US “rebalancing” policy denotes its strategic priority regarding the diplomatic and economic threats, which China is being alleged with.<sup>2</sup> But, this connotation of China holds little evidence as China has never been a colonial power nor has

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<sup>1</sup> William T. Tow, *Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus?* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3.

<sup>2</sup> Hafsa Khalid, “Pivot to Asia: US Strategy to Contain China or to Rebalance Asia?”, *Washington Review*, February 2015, <http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/pivot-to-asia-us-strategy-to-contain-china-or-to-rebalance-asia.html> (accessed February 27, 2016).

waged war against any state in the region as an aggressor in the contemporary history.

John Hay, the former US Secretary of State had once said in 1900: "Mediterranean is the ocean of the past, Atlantic the ocean of present, and Pacific is the ocean of [the] future." His words have become more prophetic than ever, even after more than a century. Despite the current slowing, after a rapid economic growth, the Chinese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to eventually outshine the US in the next ten years, and this will be for the first time since George III that a non-English, non-Western, and non-Liberal democracy would become the world's largest economy. It will also indicate a significant transformation in the middle of the global geo-economic gravity. Along with this economic transformation, there will be a change in political spheres of influence too as the US unipolarity has already been challenged by a stronger China and a resurgent Russia on the Asian continent. Moreover, a US strategy for Asia that does not contemplate Pakistan's role is incomplete<sup>3</sup> as Pakistan is a neighbour of both China and India and has a role to play for smooth alterations in Asia, if any.

### **The US Rebalancing**

In 2011, the former US President Barack Obama announced "strategic pivot", a new policy rephrased as "rebalancing". At the start, the strategy was known as "pivot to Asia", but it was later renamed as "rebalancing" as the word "pivot" gave a temporary connotation as if the Asia-Pacific region was not important to the US in the past. "Rebalancing" in its essence means that the US is actually limiting its presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Middle East, Europe, and elsewhere in the world, while it has to invest and pay greater concentration to the Asia-Pacific region. According to the policy, the US proposes to reinforce security, economic, and diplomatic engagements in the region on bilateral and multilateral basis. Moreover, this policy hinges on the US commitment to its strategic

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<sup>3</sup> Report, "United States Should Include Pakistan in its Rebalance Policy toward Asia: Argues CFR Special Report", *Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)*, January 21, 2014.



reassurance to its allies, especially Japan, against the rise of China. The US also desires to reassure its allies and partners and the other regional countries that it will not retreat from the Asia-Pacific developments. To encircle China, the US has been applying several tactics and strategies, which include defense alliance, military power, and through arms race and diplomacy, thus, making hedges among China and its neighboring countries. “Rebalancing” policy remains a substantial, multi-faceted, and much praised initiative for the US and its allies in the Asia-Pacific. Other major powers’ enthusiasm and interest in the region, i.e. Russia is another advancement, which could affect the regional congruity. China’s “new concept of security” energized financial reliance, while the “US Asia pivot arrangement” is there for fortifying the US regional standing, heavily relying on the military component. In this way, the pivot/rebalance has demonstrated somewhat particular effect on the US-China relations.

The US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) withdrawal, however fractional, from Afghanistan has nearly been finished. The US and its partners are reordering their security paradigm and their dedication to the area. The reorientation in the dedication and the changing arrangements of the US and its allies would affect the territorial security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. Afghanistan and Pakistan, being the prime regional states, would confront the heavy repercussions in any tug-of-war between the two giants, i.e. China and the US. The beginning of a new “Cold War” between the US and its contenders, i.e. Russia and China could make the region a battleground for geo-political and geo-strategic interests. New regional alliances and regional identities may develop as well.<sup>4</sup> But, again the regional partners of the US have started witnessing the inability of the US to become an

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<sup>4</sup> Khalid Chandio, “US Rebalancing Policy in Asia: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan”, M.Phil Thesis, *School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR)*, *Quaid-i-Azam University (QAU)*, Islamabad, 2016, 22.

“external balancer”<sup>5</sup> under the Trump presidency. Trump believes in burden-sharing in terms of money when it comes to providing security to its partners. For example, he had asked major NATO allies in Europe to contribute more in terms of economy in the organization. This approach of Trump might be applied in the Asia-Pacific theater too, ultimately limiting the US “rebalance”.

### **Major Contours of US Rebalancing**

In terms of politics, below are the three cardinal elements of the US “rebalancing” strategy, which have been briefly evaluated, i.e. security, financial, and diplomatic aspects:

#### **Security Aspect**

The current changes in the US defense attitude disclose the significance of security components solely for the global hegemony. The US has assertively been positioning its troops and naval presence by encompassing the whole Asia-Pacific region with a view to meet its defensive engagements for ensuring an extensive presence of its troops, in case of any sudden aggression by China. This includes highly advanced and sophisticated military dispersion in Australia, the Philippines, and in other regional allies and partners. By doing so, the US will enhance and guarantee any coercive fusion in the region.<sup>6</sup> But under President Trump, in “a military-first rebalance, the administration will advance the security elements of President Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’, while attaching little importance to engagement with Southeast Asia or the rebalance’s original liberal internationalist goals”.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Expert Roundup, “What Future for the Asia Pivot Under Trump?”, *Council on Foreign Relations* (CFR), December 14, 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/test-future-asia-pivot-under-trump/p38581> (accessed January 3, 2017).

<sup>6</sup> Khalid Chandio, “US Rebalancing Policy in Asia,” 31.

<sup>7</sup> Ashley Townshend, “America first: US Asia policy under President Trump”, *The United States Studies Centre, University of Sydney*, March 16, 2017, <https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/america-first-us-asia-policy-under-president-trump> (accessed March 21, 2017).

### **Financial Aspect**

The US “rebalancing” policy includes an aim to increase economic and trade engagements with its partners and allies in order to establish a reliable framework. Therefore, a free trade accord had been introduced by former President Obama, known as Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), in which the US and other eleven member states are included, but it excludes China. Moreover, the financial aid to Asia-Pacific allies had also been doubled.<sup>8</sup> But, President Trump stands against the TPP, and according to him, the trade deal is not in favour of America and the US loses jobs under such type of arrangement. So, he “has signed an executive order formally withdrawing the country from the [TPP] trade deal, following through on a promise from his presidential campaign.”<sup>9</sup> This is good news for China, but what would be an alternative to the TPP is still not clear.

### **Diplomatic Aspect**

The “rebalancing” strategy had also enhanced the US military and diplomatic engagements of high-official visits in the Asia-Pacific. The agenda included strengthening of the strategic partnership, managing US-China hostility, engagement of multilateral institutions, and promotion of cooperation by building trust between the two global giants.<sup>10</sup> But the way President Trump has started annoying America’s partners in the region with the TPP decision and his burden-sharing approach when it comes to providing security to its partners in the region, it seems that the diplomatic aspect of the rebalancing has every potential of being legged behind.

### **Security Shift from Euro-Atlantic to Asia-Pacific**

The Asia-Pacific regional economies have great importance for the US exports of natural resources and manufactured goods. In this regard, the strategic and economic implications are much visible as its future security

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<sup>8</sup> Khalid Chandio, “US Rebalancing Policy in Asia,” 32.

<sup>9</sup> News, “Trump Withdraws US from Trans-Pacific Partnership Deal”, *Al-Jazeera*, January 24, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/trump-withdraws-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp-deal-170123170334145.html> (accessed February 2, 2017).

<sup>10</sup> Khalid Chandio, “US Rebalancing Policy in Asia,” 34.

and prosperity are informally entwined with the security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. The US has introduced an approach of “Air-Sea Battle”, an advanced operational doctrine for its arrangement of war with the regional giants like China.<sup>11</sup> Additionally, the increasing US-India strategic partnership occurred at a moment when Asia has been transforming towards bipolarity or even multipolarity after the last two decades. However, for maintaining its unipolarity in Asia, the US is putting in all its efforts as recently its power has been challenged by China particularly and India to some extent as these powers have been following their own national interests in the region. On the other hand, to counter the US “rebalancing” policy, Russia is actively building closer ties with China.<sup>12</sup>

Due to four main reasons, the US moved towards the Asia-Pacific region; first, the major change has been the US arrangement of diplomatic and strategic choices after contemplating the force withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, the cuts in the US budget, under former President Obama, demanded the necessity to put forward the top priorities of the country in order to avoid those policies, which possibly transgress the budget. Third, the military and economic rise of the Asia-Pacific region occupies a great importance and the coming century is marked as a defining feature, which also determines the destiny of mankind. Fourth, that is certainly the most important than all three, views the rise of China as its “perceived threat” in the future. Therefore, countering or limiting China’s rise is the key priority, which compelled the US to embrace such policy.<sup>13</sup>

### **Objectives of US Rebalancing**

If one looks closely at the US “rebalancing” strategy, one could find the overt as well as covert objectives. The overt objectives include to modernize and strengthen US alliances, develop and strengthen ties with

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<sup>11</sup>. Masud Jamil, “Impact of US Rebalancing Strategy on Asia Pacific”, *Defense Forum*, Autumn 2013.

<sup>12</sup> Khalid Chandio, “US Rebalancing Policy in Asia,” 11.

<sup>13</sup>Hafsa Khalid, “Pivot to Asia: US Strategy to Contain China or to Rebalance Asia?”



emerging partners, support effective regional institutions that strive to solve problems based on internationally-recognized rules and norms, increase trade and investment and expand broad-based economic growth, ensure military presence in the region, promote democratic development, good governance, and human rights, and finally expand people-to-people ties. But, the most important objectives are the covert ones, which include containing China and wooing India.<sup>14</sup>

### **China's Response and Counter Strategy**

There exists a widening trust-deficit between China and the US. Likewise, the strategic analysts in China have been anticipating ways how to counter the US "rebalancing" strategy. In this regard, strategies have been put forward such as "March West", which seeks China to shift its priorities from East Asia to "Westwards", i.e. from Central Asia to Middle East, from where the US has been moving away lately. Moreover, China has been adopting a robust strategy, i.e. the "Asia-Pacific Dream" in order to counter "rebalancing" policy. The US strategy is mainly concentrated on the securitization of the region as the US has been shifting "60 percent of its naval forces to the Pacific by 2020",<sup>15</sup> while China has been focusing on economic ties. Therefore, China announced a series of trade and economic corridors under the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI).

China has gathered twenty one countries to join the newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) by providing US\$ 50 billion in start-up capital for countering the US initiative of the TPP. Moreover, for the promotion of the "new-Silk Road", President Xi announced a fund of US\$ 40 billion for strengthening trade networks among the Asian countries. The Silk Road economic belt indicates the centuries-old caravan routes from Western deserts of China to Central Asia and Europe. Also, the new "Maritime Silk Road" would follow the old trade routes towards South Asia, Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Africa.

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<sup>14</sup> Khalid Chandio, "US Rebalancing Policy in Asia," 29.

<sup>15</sup> Samuel Ramani, "Joseph Nye on China and the US Rebalance to Asia", *The Diplomat*, June 10, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/interview-joseph-nye/> (accessed February 21, 2017).

These two routes of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are expected to meet in Venice, Italy eventually.<sup>16</sup>

China, in its counter strategy, would not afford any unimportant antagonism with Japan, India, Australia, Myanmar, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and Singapore. Here, Pakistan's role is important as China's close ties with Pakistan have brought strategic dividends for not only Pakistan but also for China. Because, the Modi government in India has focused on its antagonism with Pakistan having less attention towards China and Asian affairs, which is broadly permitting China to pay its full attention in East Asia. Moreover, through the Gwadar deep sea port, Pakistan gives access of the Indian Ocean and beyond to China under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

According to China's "2015 Military Strategy" and its first ever defense white paper, China has promised not to hit first, but will strike hard in return, if attacked. The white paper summarizes making China a strong maritime power by giving priority to the high seas.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, China has been acquiring anti-access and aerial denial (A2/AD) capability in order to weaken the US naval potency in the Western Pacific and East Asia.<sup>18</sup> The US "rebalancing" strategy does have a military component<sup>19</sup>, i.e. the US guarantees Japan in case of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute. As mentioned above, the US Air and Naval forces have introduced a new operational concept known as "air-sea battle" against the Chinese A2/AD

<sup>16</sup> Simon Denyer, "China Promotes 'Asia-Pacific Dream' to Counter US Pivot", *Washington Post*, November 11, 2014, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-promotes-asia-pacific-dream-to-counter-us-pivot/2014/11/11/1d9e05a4-1e8e-4026-ad5a-5919f8c0de8a\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-promotes-asia-pacific-dream-to-counter-us-pivot/2014/11/11/1d9e05a4-1e8e-4026-ad5a-5919f8c0de8a_story.html) (accessed March 1, 2017).

<sup>17</sup> Keith Johnson, "China's Military Blueprint: Bigger Navy, Bigger Global Role", *Foreign Policy*, May 26, 2015, [https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/26/chinas-military-blueprint-bigger-navy-bigger-global-role/?utm\\_content=bufferfcf1a&utm\\_medium=social&utm\\_source=facebook.com&utm\\_campaign=buffer](https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/26/chinas-military-blueprint-bigger-navy-bigger-global-role/?utm_content=bufferfcf1a&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer) (accessed March 2, 2017).

<sup>18</sup> Stephen Burgess, "A Pivot to India? The US-India Strategic Partnership and Multipolarity in Asia", *US Air War College*, the US Air Force, the Department of Defense, 2013.

<sup>19</sup> Samuel Ramani, "Joseph Nye on China and the US rebalance to Asia."

strategy, and opened an office in the Pentagon for practicability of the concept.<sup>20</sup>

### **Implications**

The US “rebalancing” policy has great implications for the region and in nature these are counterproductive as its military side includes two inter-related endeavours, i.e. capability “rebalancing” and geographical “rebalancing”. The US has been trying to sign different agreements with countries such as Vietnam, Singapore, Philippines, Australia, and Japan for its maximization of military presence. In terms of capability “rebalancing”, the US has been putting all its efforts to invest in military technological advancement and building a force structure to counter military challenges in the Asia-Pacific. This necessarily requires a shift from the counter insurgency attention in Afghanistan to the sea-borne, crisis in the Asian-Pacific region.

The US “rebalancing” policy helps in strengthening its position at the strategic level in the Asia-Pacific due to maritime disputes in East Asia particularly. There is a possibility of an increasing arms race, which might pressurize many countries to struggle for much sophisticated equipments, and to be prone for war against each other. In fact, the regional states do acknowledge the fact that war is a deadly business, which only brings a classical lose-lose result. But, the recent regional situation is probably more suitable for the US to be engaged in the region through its “rebalancing” policy. There will be an increasing possibility that the US would continue its dominance, if the region is destabilized by lingering political and historical tensions, territorial disputes, and strategic distrust among the East Asian countries. These objectives help in furthering the US military strategy for maintaining its military superiority along the Western Pacific lines, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and Middle Eastern maritime choke points, which may present the

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<sup>20</sup> Stephen Burgess, “A Pivot to India?”

US an innate elasticity to put constraints on the economic junctures of the competitors, such as China.<sup>21</sup>

The building of strong ties with India, Vietnam, and other regional countries gives the US power leverage, which further complicates the issues for China. This encircling by the US is believed to run the complete arc, as Japan and South Korea have formal military alliances with the US in the North Pacific region, while the US itself deals with Guam, Northern Marianas, and Hawaii. Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Philippine have been providing security in the South China Sea (SCS) and Malacca Straits. Also, New Zealand and Australia encompass the southern deep water straits. In this regard, Leon Panetta, the former Secretary of Defense, hoped that India would possibly act as a “swing state” including the US Central Command (CENTCOM) military element for joint actions in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea.<sup>22</sup> In addition, the US has been constantly supporting India in a way to disrupt an already fragile balance of power in the South Asian region. However, the Asian-Pacific issues would rather be aggravated and there will be a minor change of resolving those issues. Formation of new alliances would certainly take place in the region amid threats of economic backlash due to military engagements, which eventually would lead to the formation of new blocks.

The NATO states of Europe have been analyzing the US “rebalancing” policy with great apprehension and care, as they see the US shift from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region. Due to such a development, the NATO allies are much concerned. President Trump has already hinted that European allies should invest more in economy in the NATO. But, on the other hand, these states also see opportunities for strengthening trans-Atlantic ties with the Asia-Pacific nations since the 9/11 incident. If anything bad happens in the SCS, it would surely change the grouping’s (NATO’s) effectiveness in the “English Channel”. Leon Panetta, in his remarks at Kings College, London on January 8, 2013, while

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<sup>21</sup> Brig. Gen. Masud Jamil, “Impact of US Rebalancing Strategy on Asia Pacific.”

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.



keeping China's unmatched rise in mind and the following threats which the US has portrayed, had suggested that "Europe should join the US rebalancing Asia" policy.

### **Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan**

The US "rebalancing" policy presents challenges as well as opportunities to Pakistan. However, Pakistan will have to establish more opportunities with effective diplomatic ventures with the US and the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Due to its geographic location, it is not possible for Pakistan to remain neutral in the "rebalancing" policy, as it has cordial and friendly ties with China and engagement with the US in war on terror coupled with unsettled issues with India (with whom US has a strategic partnership lately). Pakistan has to re-establish its forgotten policy of "Vision East", as next global power play is going to take place in the Asia-Pacific region coupled with Indian exploitation of the US for influence in the region to sideline both Pakistan and China.<sup>23</sup>

Daniel S. Markey, Fellow in the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), is of the view that the US policy towards Pakistan at present is being mainly commanded by its war against terrorism. Nowadays, Pakistan and the US ties are in trouble due to reassessment, as the US has shifted its foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific with the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. However, he believes that a complete cut in ties between the US and Pakistan is not likely, despite disagreements over some issues. In addition, a full rapprochement also seems unlikely, but if the US prefers to do so, Pakistan would greatly play its role in advancing the US priorities in the region, along with its war against terrorism. In this regard, Markey suggests that the US needs to initiate a new diplomatic dialogue with Pakistan, China, and India for reducing the future tensions in the region, promote trade ties between Pakistan and India, re-allocate aid for improvement of trade and infrastructure in Pakistan, and consolidate Pakistan in the South and East Asian policymaking and

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<sup>23</sup> Khalid Chandio, "US Rebalancing Policy in Asia," 64.

deemphasize the Pak-Afghan linkages.<sup>24</sup>

If the Chinese economy suffers due to its military advancement or because of any future conflict with the US or its allies namely Japan in Asia-Pacific, it would certainly have impacts on the CPEC, as funding or investment from China might decrease over the years for the project. As Pakistan would not remain unaware about the Indian designs, it should remain focused and engaged in the Asia-Pacific affairs by active diplomacy. Regarding India, international analysts have different opinions. Through signing of the strategic partnership with the US, India will remain a significant player by exploiting the US and maintain its strategic maneuvering. But at the same time, India would hardly become a US ally against China. Although the US would direly need India to remain in its influence, but India would follow its own way.<sup>25</sup> Again, the US and India have a convergence of interests across Asia, and India is termed as the linchpin of the US “rebalancing” policy. In terms of India’s “Look East”, and the recent “Act East” policy, the two countries could play a vital role in the Indo-Pacific region.<sup>26</sup> In its department of “Defense Strategic Guidance Document”, the US has described India as an “active partner” and “economic anchor”, which offers security in the IOR and would preserve progress in South Asia respectively, while its “Look East” policy would certainly provide assistance in this regard. However, India will be trying to make efforts in making dents in the US-Pakistan relationship. Therefore, India has been trying to strengthen its ties with the US at any cost to counter-balance both Pakistan and China.”<sup>27</sup>

Pakistan, with a particular importance in the South Asian region, would possibly be affected either deliberately or unintentionally in case of any adventure in the South-East Asia region. However, as mentioned

<sup>24</sup> Report, “United States Should Include Pakistan in its Rebalance Policy toward Asia.”

<sup>25</sup> Suba Chandran, “US and Asia-Pacific: Pivot, Rebalance and What Next?”, *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS)*, India, March 13, 2014.

<sup>26</sup> S. Rajasimman, “India in US Strategic Rebalance in Asia-Pacific”, *Indian Defence Review (IDR)*, January 30, 2015.

<sup>27</sup> Hafsa Khalid, “Pivot to Asia: US Strategy to Contain China or to Rebalance Asia?”

earlier, Pakistan feels sandwiched in the middle of two giant powers, i.e. as mentioned earlier on the one hand, Pakistan has the closest ties with China, but on the other, it has a strategic alliance with the US in the war against terror. In fact, Pakistan desires to remain neutral on this issue, but the related conditions may possibly keep Pakistan in its hold. During the “Cold War” era, Pakistan played a vital role in the defeat of the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan, but recently it is much more difficult to keep equilibrium between the two powers, i.e. US and China as it cannot afford to take sides with either of them in any conflict between the two in the Asia-Pacific. In terms of realpolitik, Pakistan can have opportunities to counter India with Chinese assistance, and also counter the US efforts to woo India at the cost of an already fragile regional balance of power in South Asia. On the other hand, Pakistan can also get benefits from the US as it would not want Pakistan to strengthen its ties with China further and leave the US. Therefore, Pakistan can pursue its interests through engagement with both China and the US, as its geo-strategic position would keep on allowing Pakistan to remain a significant player in any regional equilibrium.<sup>28</sup>

India has proposed a plan to play an assertive role, which is also included in its “Look East” policy, aiming to further strengthen its ties with countries like Japan, Australia, and South Korea to counter China. But, if it looks towards the East, India loses its position in the West, such as Pakistan and China. Moreover, the US and Afghanistan look towards Pakistan and China for peace talks with Taliban and this may make dents in the Indian influence in Afghanistan and its future role in the country. After assuming office, President Ashraf Ghani had visited Saudi Arabia, China, and Pakistan first..<sup>29</sup> Through China, Pakistan can build closer ties with Russia and also acquire much sophisticated defence equipments from both the countries. This is so because Russia and China share the same views on countering the US “rebalancing” policy, and have a great

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<sup>28</sup> Khalid Chandio, “US Rebalancing Policy in Asia,” 66.

<sup>29</sup> Arif Rafiq, “How China and Pakistan are Beating India in the New Great Game”, *National Interests*, June 12, 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-china-pakistan-are-beating-india-the-new-great-game-13096> (accessed March 3, 2017).

concern regarding regional stability. Both view the US a cardinal factor in destabilizing the whole region..<sup>30</sup>

The Asia-Pacific region provides new markets for Pakistani merchandise which can reduce the reliance of Pakistani economy on the Western markets. Pakistan should make efforts in bringing investment from the Asia-Pacific states coupled with having more focus on further improving its relations with Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia particularly. Pakistan should support the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in combating terror and sharing necessary information, and play an active role in the solution of disputes in the SCS. This will enhance Pakistan's value for the ASEAN countries, resulting in the enhancement of their economic cooperation with Pakistan. If effectively characterized, geo-strategically, Pakistan is critical for exchange and business amongst South and Central Asia and East and West Asia. Pakistan could give a functional shape to China's proposition of giving "connectivity" to the ASEAN by means of Western China and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) by both land and sea through "Gwadar Port".<sup>31</sup>

China's response to the Asia pivot of the US is a BRI. It includes the network of the masses, area and maritime routes, trade and, most importantly, of brains which have not been explored before. It is an extension of remarkable nature and greatness. The Indo-Pacific and the South Asia regions need harmony between them as these regions are going to be instrumental in the economic domain of the changing world. Activities like Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and Maritime Silk Route (MSR) can possibly place Pakistan in the focal point of the monetary centers of the world. The rise of China is making another thrust in the Asia-Pacific region as China's strategies will settle instead of destabilize the world order. It additionally should be recognized now that, however excellent, the regional projects (for example, the "Maritime Silk Road"

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<sup>30</sup> "Russia will Take Part in Multinational Navy Drills in Disputed South China Sea", *RT*, June 1, 2015, <http://rt.com/news/263533-rusia-multinational-navy-drills/> (accessed March 5, 2017).

<sup>31</sup> Khalid Chandio, "US Rebalancing Policy in Asia," 68.

and the BRI) in their usage they will require region-wide participation, certainty, and trust. As mentioned above, there is a requirement for Pakistan to keep its attention on materialization of the CPEC to draw out the most financial and key advantages. The CPEC is not only a connectivity project but it is also a monetary venture, as well as a political and social project. The accomplishment of the CPEC needs attempts from China and Pakistan, as well as from the region. To accomplish this goal, Pakistan and China ought to improve communication with other countries to win their backing for the CPEC.<sup>32</sup> At the same time, Pakistan should have a balanced approach in dealing with the US and China as international relations, at present, donot preach leaving one country for the other.

### **Conclusion**

From its start, research analysts raised many questions regarding the “sustainability” of the US “rebalancing” policy as the support for it exists in the Asia-Pacific region, but questions linger about its execution. During the 2014 US government shutdown, doubts had increased regarding former President Obama’s cancellation of the trip to the region. There emerge other events which possibly impact Asian perception of the “rebalancing” policy such as the Islamic State (IS) and the Ukraine issue. The US regional allies and partners in Europe are greatly worried because its leadership is direly “required” in Europe and the Middle East. After the Ukrainian crisis, the European allies demanded the US for a pivot to Europe. In addition, Japan would like to see a US role in resolving its territorial issues rather than stationing its (US) troops in the Asia-Pacific and doing little except military exercises in the troubled sea. But the question arises as to why Japan and the other regional states worry about China’s alleged aggression. As mentioned earlier, if one looks at the pages of history, China has not waged wars as an aggressor against any country in the region, and neither has it been a colonial power.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.



There are a number of factors which suggest the US inability to acquire its objectives in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the trend in emergence of multi-polarity, the unavoidable flow of terrorism in the shape of IS, the resolution of nuclear issues such as North Korea and Iran, the revival of economies, and increasing Russian influence in restricting the US at global level coupled with Chinese rise at the regional and global level. These factors suggest that it will be difficult for the Asian countries to join a US-led counter strategy against China. However, the counterbalancing elements direct the long-term and mid-term US difficulties for acquiring its objectives to dominate the region.<sup>34</sup>

The US “rebalancing” policy is much focused on the military side as the US President Trump has increased the defence budget, while Chinese counter rebalancing strategy is focused on economic side such as the BRI. However, there already exists a decrease in the US economy and can be seen from the government shutdown in 2014. In this regard, questions arise whether the US can afford to lose economic cooperation with China and is the US ready enough to resolve the issues of its allies and partners with China, such as Japan? Is NATO really willing for any adventure against China?<sup>35</sup> The US “rebalancing” policy is unendurable in the long run. A shift in economic power has already started at the global level, where the Chinese presence in Europe, Latin America, and Africa has challenged US superiority. Moreover, the increasing political and economic rise of China is going to reshape the international norms and values in the future. Overall, the recent US-China ties have been described by Chinese analysts as “Mutually Assured Misperception (MAM)” and the international security would be dominated by this trend for quite some time.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Brig. Gen. Masud Jamil, “Impact of US Rebalancing Strategy on Asia Pacific.”

<sup>35</sup> Khalid Chandio, “US Rebalancing Policy in Asia,” 76.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

## **BOOK REVIEWS**

## **The Weapon Wizards: How Israel Became a High-Tech Military Superpower**

Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2017, 288 pages)

**Reviewed by Attiq ur Rehman\***

The mysterious story of Israel's largest strategic capabilities primarily against its territorially adjoining states is the core theme of the book written by two journalists. Yaakov Katz, editor-in-chief of *The Jerusalem Post* and a faculty member of Harvard University's Extension School, is an American citizen living in Jerusalem. Amir Bohbot is a military editor working for Tel Aviv based an online news network *Walla*, and is a renowned Israeli defence analyst. The combined work of both authors in the book focuses the genesis of technologically advanced and technically sophisticated armed capabilities of Israel. Both Israeli journalists try to justify the role of the persistently swelling weapon industry of their country and its worldwide undeniable commercial connections. In defence of Israel Defence Forces (IDF)'s offensive operations against bordering Arab nations, both writers attempt to construct the legitimate grounds for strategically conventional and nonconventional competences of their country.

The book divides into eight chapters and highlights the role of leaders, scientists, researchers, businessmen within and outside Israel in maintaining its largescale weapon industry. The first chapter starts with the discussion from Yishuv (the Jewish community before the creation of Israel). Yishuv initiated the clandestine efforts for the construction of an underground bullet factory known as Ayalon Institute which later renamed as Israel Military Industries (IMI). It was the Doctrine of Defence and State of Armed Forces which laid the formal foundation for the Jewish weapon industry (p.36). The subsequent chapters provide an

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inclusive detail of different weapon systems and their role in refining IDF's performance. The idea of drones was empowered with the help of American Jews in order to carry the 3D missions – dull, dirty and dangerous (p.67). Chapter second defines the performance of Israeli drones and their global reputation. The history of Merkva, main battle tank of IDF, is debated in the third chapter. Fourth and fifth chapters titled "Chutzpadik Satellite" and "Rocket Science" concentrate on the functions of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Rafael missile factory.

The interesting part of the book starts from the sixth chapter which carefully gives a glimpse of IDF's reconnaissance missions. Shabak-the internal security agency of Israel functioning in Gaza (p.175) is carrying out target killing raids. The debate of the intelligence missions of Israel cannot be completed without pinpointing the Mossad's covert worldwide network. Mossad's association with cyber warfare was thinly indicated in chapter seventh by arguing the Stuxnet report (p. 201). Final chapter of the book tells a fascinating record of Knesset members in the placing of their country among international community. Jewish diplomatic missions around the globe constantly struggled for the bringing of qualitatively improvement in IDF's performance by establishing their links with militarily advanced states.

Each chapter portrays an exciting picture of Israel's different weapon programs coupled with an interesting record of efforts carried out by overseas Jewish communities in developing Israeli military culture. A constant determination to manufacture advanced weapons of Jewish decision makers revolutionized the weapons industry and upgraded the notion of modern battlefield. In this way, Israel cultivated a remarkable popularity in international weapons market and successfully persuaded powerful nations by signing several deals. The contacts with foreign companies not only helped the Jewish leaders in becoming influential in international system, but it also boosted the Tel Aviv's economy.

The journey to progressively build advanced weapons capability in the book describes a parallel story of Arab-Israel wars. A chronological

survey of the main Arab-Israeli wars along with numerous biographic details of leading Jewish figures covers major parts of the book. Both writers reluctantly address the question of nuclear ambiguity adopted by Israel. More journalistic and less academic style of Katz and Bohbot narrates merely the journey of a tiny state which starts from a weapon-deprived status instead of revealing the impact of high-tech weapons on regional security environment. The book only traces the legitimate connections of Israeli Jews in upgrading the military industrial complex of their country.

Both writers glorify the role of technological advancement in upgrading the Israeli military-industrial complex and its worldwide extension. The efforts of two military journalists is an endeavour to sympathetically review how over a decade-long struggle of Jews provided highly sophisticated weaponry against the overwhelming wave of security upheavals originating from bordering states. It further improved the IDF's capabilities for carrying out major combat operations against Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas. On the basis of technologically innovative skills in addition to the implantation of an improved form of interoperability in the warfare domain, the different IDF units are now capable of working together in a highly coordinated manner, according to Katz and Bohbot.

The writers cautiously explain the Jewish leaders' quest for acquiring the status of an advanced armed state of the world while implementing its hegemonic designs in the Middle Eastern region. The book offers an insight into Israel's innovative technological advancement and its appropriate application in military affairs. Lack of a balanced approach and the absence of a scholarly enquiry in the book will probably make it a less interested reading for leading strategic circles of the international community. It is an appropriate piece of writing only to guess carefully the contemporary status of Israeli weapons. Furthermore, the detailed stories of different Jewish leaders, scientists, and politicians provide

unnecessary information to the reader. Main argument of both the writers emphasizes less the principal theme of the book, they more focus on the praising of the Jewish community in and outside Israel. The writers of the book are deliberately silent on addressing the question of how the application of cutting-edge technology in non-peaceful matters will deteriorate the regional security situation of Middle East.

## **Tightrope Walk**

Amanullah Khan (Islamabad: Khan Publishers, 2017, 227 pages)

**Reviewed by Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema & Baber Ali\***

Pakistan-United States relations faced multitude of ups and down since the establishment of their diplomatic relations but more so from the 1960s onward when Pakistan started improving its relations with the People's Republic of China. Both states became members of the anti-Soviet military alliances i.e. SEATO and CENTO, with diverse objectives: Pakistan sought security against India and the US sought to use Pakistan's territory and geostrategic location against the former Soviet Union. Pakistan-US relationship has been called a marriage of convenience that occasionally broke down; first time after the 1965 India-Pakistan war when the US imposed arms embargo apparently against both states, but that only affected Pakistan since India was not importing major arms from the US.

The book is a well-written and distinctly readable account of Mr. Ammanullah Khan's professional responsibilities, associations and working under various US ambassadors and diplomats; beginning with Mr. Edward Ingraham, Counselor for Political Affairs, and Ambassador Henry Byroade in 1973 to Ambassador Nancy Jo Powell in 2003. Mr. Khan joined the US Foreign Service in 1973 and was appointed as a political advisor.

Khan also shares his early childhood tragic experience in this book. His sixteen closest family members were brutally murdered by "Hindu Dogra Marauders" including his mother, sisters, young nephews and nieces when they shifted from Kashmir to Pakistan in the midst of migration at the declaration of independence of Pakistan 1947. It's

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\* Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema is the President / Executive Director and Baber Ali is Research Affiliate at the Strategic Vision Institute, Islamabad.

absolutely inspiring to read how boldly he recovers from that trauma of his early life.

The title of the book, *Tightrope Walk* appears an attempt to justify himself performing an almost impossible and diabolical role of being professionally honest to his US pay masters and simultaneously loyal to his country, Pakistan. Khan vividly describes the toughness of life as a person who chooses to be an honest and dedicated employee at the US Embassy and a patriotic citizen of Pakistan.

The book begins with a discussion on Indian Occupied Kashmir. Starting from 1947, it describes the turmoil of Kashmir and the injustice that led to its separation and distressful struggle for Pakistan. The later part of the book discloses the author's disconcerted and unsettled times, and reveals his restlessness and quest for tuneful and serene life. Thereafter, a detailed and comprehensive account of his personal experience at the US embassy in Islamabad has been flourished in the book.

Khan does not paint his job as bed of roses with ideal luxurious settings. He has been working in the US embassy under the constant watch of intelligence agencies which was psychologically stressful for him. In such an environment, it was an arduous task for him to convince his superiors to act upon his advice especially during the strained periods in Pak-US relations.

Besides the incidents and events, the book provides deep insights into the US policies and mindset of the US diplomats who are virtually considered at par with gods by the vast majority of Pakistan's political elite, which stoops to the lowest possible to beg ministerial positions in Pakistan from the US diplomats. He referred to a Muslim League Cabinet Minister whispering to author 'Khan Sahib, I sincerely hope you are sending good reports about us to your bosses in Washington' (Page No. 78, Ammanullah Khan). Mr. Khan called it the intellectual bankruptcy of our ministers. While mentioning the hypocrisy of politicians, the author



claimed that 'I am witness to what they said in public and how they behaved in private. There was a world of difference between their public and private postures.' (Page No. 139, Ammanullah Khan)

This book also explicitly underlines the changing US position on Pakistan from the time when Pakistan rapidly developed its nuclear weapon program to the nuclear explosions of 1998. His conviction that Pakistan would have been better off without carrying out nuclear explosions and becoming a nuclear weapons state in 1998 seems to be largely influenced by the US policy, no matter how subconsciously and despite the claims to the contrary ingenuity of his position. The author mentions that he used to beg the Pakistani ministers 'Look, time is not in your favour. For God's sake, do not go nuclear. What you are doing will lead the country to a total disaster' (Page No. 95, Ammanullah Khan). In his opinion, Pakistan's policy was dangerous, unnecessary and uneconomical. While discussing the US policy towards Pakistan, Mr. Khan mentioned that 'Pro-India lobby had more influence on the Capitol Hill. They became the determining factor of the US policy toward Pakistan' (Page No. 98, Ammanullah Khan).

However Khan's exoneration of the US government and its diplomats in the US Embassy, Islamabad, from general allegations of destabilizing Z.A. Bhutto's government in 1977 appears deliberate despite his sharp analytical skills. Mr. Khan mentioned that 'In my own view Bhutto was a very smart man but every smart man sometimes makes costly mistakes' (Page No. 44, Ammanullah Khan).

However, despite the enormous appeal and beauty of this book, somehow there are certain aspects which demand a rather critical approach. From the very first chapter, the reader commences to wait for a justification of the title which makes the reader to keep reading inquisitively. Till the end, the interest of the reader is upheld while waiting. It eventually does not meet the reader's expectations. Owing to the omission of key developments and moments from Pakistan's political

history, one finds that the climax is missing. The post-retirement part is not articulated well enough to make readers stick to the reading, thereby creating ambiguities. Countless letters of appreciation and numerous awards conferred on him by different US ambassadors in Pakistan are so recurring that it gives an impression of considerable self-praise. Khan keeps advising to both Pakistan and United States to change their policies for improvement of mutual relations, which is a recurring theme in the book.

Nonetheless, the book brilliantly highlights the social construct of Pakistani mindset and social inequalities, inhuman life and miserable picture of the system imbued with nepotism, hypocrisy, and materialism. Author also discusses the multiple aspects of poverty and the poorer financial status of most of the population, particularly people in the rural areas.

Author chooses a lucid and simple writing style to maintain interest in the narrative and impart maximum information to his readers. His highly eloquent skills of penning down various events make them come alive in the minds of the readers in graphic succession. His 30 years at the embassy provided him with an opportunity to work with a number of ambassadors and diplomats who all had stories to share which are well-articulated in his book. Khan also sheds light on inconsistencies of private and public life of high-ranking people in Pakistan. Over all, this book is a well-written memoir on the history of US-Pakistan relations through Mr. Khan's prism where he shared his first-hand knowledge of diplomacy.

# Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses



Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is pleased to announce the publication of its next issue of its Biannual Journal: *Security and Strategic Analyses* (JSSA), July-December 2017. *Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses* is a peer-reviewed journal focusing on contemporary issues of peace, security and strategic studies.

Research papers are solicited for publication in the JSSA. The papers should be research based academic policy analysis. No lengthy historical backgrounds are needed because our target audience at this stage is informed academic, diplomatic and policy-making community. We welcome papers under the following categories, with ballpark figures for word limits:

- Research Papers/Articles (6000-8000 words including footnotes)
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- 4 For Book Reviews, please describe the subject of the review clearly, including the author, title, publisher, year and pages of the book.
- 5 All work must be original. By submitting any work, the author is presumed to declare that the article is original and has not been published elsewhere.
- 6 All articles must be submitted only in MS Word format (.doc or .docx extensions).
- 7 No border cover pages or title pages are required. Mention the title of the submission once in the beginning of the piece, followed by the author's name.
- 8 British English spellings should be used.
- 9 References must be footnoted according to Chicago manual 16<sup>th</sup> edition. Please follow the link:  
[http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools\\_citationguide.html](http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html).  
All references must be cited in simple text. No formatting is required for the citations.
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