



VISION

VISIONARY INSIGHTS INTO THE STRATEGIC INQUESTS OF NATIONS

SVI FORESIGHT

VOLUME 4, NUMBER 11
NOVEMBER 2018

Compiled & Edited by:
S. Sadia Kazmi

Strategic Vision Institute
Islamabad

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STRATEGIC VISION
I N S T I T U T E

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

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Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

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SVI Foresight

SVI Foresight is a monthly electronic journal. It has a multi-disciplinary perspective highlighting on the contemporary strategic and security studies. The Journal is envisioned to be a collection of policy-oriented articles written by its Research Associates, Visiting Faculty and professional experts. The objective is to provide the readership with a concise all-round and real-time policy oriented discourse on contemporary strategic regional and international developments, highlighting their relevance to Pakistan.

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Editor's Note

November issue of the *SVI Foresight* presents an insightful overview of various political and strategic developments at the global, regional and national levels. Articles included in this volume among other topics, touch upon the November agenda of the NSG plenary. The writer believes that the group of 'haughty' countries are set to yet again behave biased under the pretext of setting up an agenda and aiding the matters of the June's NSG Plenary meeting especially with regards to the induction of non-NPT states issue. Another article looks into various dimensions of the US withdrawal from INF treaty in October last month, which is essentially the part of US intentional and well thought out strategy to withdraw from all the international agreements that put equal obligations on it. The article maintains that while a breakdown of the INF Treaty would nourish bilateral distrust and ruin the other important nuclear arms treaties, such as the New Start Treaty, which is up for renewal in 2021, it will also encourage global arms race and will push other countries to acquire nuclear weapon for their supreme interests.

Another significant development having regional implications for South Asia has been the first patrol of Arihant. An analytical commentary included in this volume critically evaluates this development and tries to explore whether it should be a matter of concern for Pakistan or is it just another hyped up story being overly highlighted by India. After the successful completion of the first deterrence patrol of Arihant, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed that now India possesses "credible nuclear deterrence". The article while agrees that with INS Arihant, India has sufficiently acquired the capability to fire nuclear ballistic missile from sea but so far it has only been able to fire smaller range K-15 successfully from Arihant, with only 750 km range. Furthermore, India still needs to test its longer range missiles of K-series from Arihant. This deterrent patrol got all the hype because of the statement from Indian Prime Minister who believes that now India possesses "credible nuclear deterrence", however question arises: against whom? In a complex security environment of South Asia it is always propagated by India that it is facing two tier threats from China and Pakistan. However, Arihant with its K-15 small range ballistic missiles lack the capability to target China. Thus, India is acquiring credibility against only Pakistan.

This volume also offers a detailed debate on the role of external actors in nuclear politics of South Asia. Geo-strategic positioning of the region and introduction of nuclear arsenal by the regional states has played central role in transforming the relations among South Asian states and great powers. The conflicting national interests, historic rivalries, states objective to enhance conventional and strategic forces quantitatively as well as qualitatively, and role of great powers in regional politics has increased the complexities of South Asian strategic environment. The recent trends, such as Trumps offensive rhetoric against Pakistan, Indo-US nexus, Russia's role in strategic calculus of India and Pakistan, and China's expanding strategic interests and economic investment in the region have collectively identified the profound changes in the South Asian politics. Significance of South Asia in the strategic calculation of great powers i.e. US, Russia and China cannot be ignored. Hence one of the articles in this volume explores as to why the South Asian region is important for the great powers?

Other articles included in this issue are: a critical appraisal of Nuclear Security Index 2018, and cyber securitization and threat of cyber terrorism in Pakistan. It is hoped that the issue will help readers in staying updated with the current political environment and they will find the analyses useful. The SVI Foresight team invites and highly encourages the contributions from the security and strategic community in form of opinion based short commentaries on contemporary political, security and strategic issues. Any suggestions for further improvements are welcome at our [contact address](#). Please see [here](#) the copy of SVI Foresight electronic journal. You can find us on [Face book](#) and can also access the SVI [website](#).

Senior Research Associate
Syedah Sadia Kazmi

Nuclear Suppliers Group and its November Agenda

Beenish Altaf

With the impending of the month of November, the group of haughty countries is once again ready to exert their energies for behaving biased. The meeting of special group of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is expected in mid-November, 2018. This is an already scheduled activity of the group members for setting up an agenda and aiding the matters of the June's NSG Plenary meeting. The induction of non-NPT states would be on the agenda once again.

Besides, several other dynamics could be weighed out in this regard including the criteria issue, the evolving global nuclear order, the South Asian strategic stability; the regional strategic environment all would have an impact on the South Asia's nuclear future mainly. Along with this, the P-5 state's guarding behavior and the global nonproliferation norms would also be questioned directly.

Admittedly, the recent Indian government of Narendra Modi has stepped-up efforts on its diplomatic front since the June 2018, NSG plenary meeting in Seoul, South Korea. It is working hard to secure its entry to the cartel of nuclear trade. Several bilateral meetings and interactions at senior level have been reported to be on record in this regard, which includes meetings and interaction with China at senior levels.

It has been reported that Indian senior officials tried to convince Chinese officials to revisit their stance on the Indian membership bid. They held threadbare discussions in an attempt to narrow down differences over India's aspirations to become an NSG member. However, analytically the situation has not changed much, as by large the Chinese position over India's NSG bid is the same; a criteria based approached.

On the other hand, Pakistan while submitting its application for the NSG membership outlined its credentials such as harmonisation of its export control lists with those of the international export control regimes, its efforts to ensure nuclear security and safety, and its adherence to NSG guidelines. Likewise, Pakistani Ambassador at Vienna stated that "seeking participation in the export control reflects Pakistan's strong support for international efforts, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery."

The nuclear politics of twenty-first century is kept in an ambiguous state, deliberately. The induction of more members, especially the states that are not party to the NPT into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) realm is believed to be the most notable concern of today. The utmost controversial — but of vital importance — is the membership quest of India and Pakistan in the NSG. It is an open surreptitious that the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974, was the cause of the NSG formation. But it would be more surprising to notify here the revised NSG's guidelines of 2013, hitherto did not mention India directly as its basis. This reveals that the membership goal is more of a political game rather than a need based initiative.

The next, special group meeting of the NSG is likely to be held in the coming two days. It is paradoxically narrating the chances of any breakthrough on India's entry into the elite group as slim. Since the revised NSG's provisions talk about the criteria-based principles based on the unanimous consensus between the members, in the upcoming meeting, it would be challenging how the NSG could induct non-NPT states particularly possessing nuclear weapons into the NSG.

There are certain criteria that could be followed, for instance, the NSG could follow its principles and allow only non-NPT states to become part of the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) before they join the NSG respectively. However, this strict criterion may not be acceptable to India or Pakistan which are nuclear weapons states. They have never joined the NPT rather these states would like to be recognized; obtaining a formal nuclear legitimacy like the P-5 major nuclear weapons states before they could become part of the NPT.

The other option is that NSG could relax the conditions through mutual consensus that are acceptable for both India and Pakistan. It is to be noted here that non-NPT members allowing both India and Pakistan in the NSG, is similar to them agreeing to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under the IAEA. The IAEA has comprehensive safeguards without compromising on their nuclear weapons status. Conversely creating an exception for one state and not the other could jeopardise the credibility of the NSG globally, while directly affecting the strategic stability of South Asia in particular. The conclusion of relevant authorities on the matter will by next week, may affect global nuclear politics on a whole.

<https://dailytimes.com.pk/321386/nuclear-suppliers-group-and-its-november-agenda/>

US Withdrawal from INF Treaty – Part I

Sonia Naz

The US announced dismissal of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty on October 20, 2018. This decision indicates that great powers are investing enormously in modernizing their military capabilities. The Soviet Union and the US signed the INF treaty in December 1987. In this treaty the US and Soviet Union agreed they would ban ground ballistic and cruise missile with ranges between 500 to 5500 kilometres (300 to 3400miles). This ban would be applied to conventional and nuclear warheads, but not to sea- based and air delivered missiles.

The article III of the treaty listed the US and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles that present at the time of treaty signing. This list included the SS-20 intermediate-range missile, and the SS-4 and the SS-5 shorter-range missiles of the Soviet Union. The list of prohibited missiles included the new Pershing II ballistic arsenals and ground-launched cruise arsenals along with several hundred older Pershing I missiles that were in storage in Europe for the US. Both states demolished 2692 missiles, which were deployed in Europe in compliance with the INF treaty. The launchers connected with the controlled missiles were also to be eliminated.

Apparently, the US withdrawal from the treaty in October 2018, is a response to Russia's INF Violation. Realistically, it is not the only reason because the US is more concerned about China's growing intermediate-range and shorter-range missile capabilities, which, according to US data, are approximately half the total number of their nuclear missile carriers. The US former commander, Adam Harry Harris, said in March that the US has no ground-based capability that can threaten China due to its rigid adherence to the INF treaty.

The US knows that Russia and China, meanwhile, both countries have long since signed joint documents in which they agree not to use nuclear weapons against each other and adhere to the principles of peaceful coexistence in general. In fact, the US wants to bring new states, particularly China in the INF treaty through pressurizing Russia because it perceives the threat from China. According to some experts INF constrained the Washington's ability to counter its rival nuclear states as China and nuclear aspirants like Iran.

The dilemma is that Moscow is not only state which is violating the treaty, but the US is also not complying. For example, if Moscow developed two battalions of the SSC-8 cruise and shifted first battalion from the test site to an operational base in the state and second is still located at Moscow's missile site. The US is also operating different types of aerial vehicles, drones to do surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance missions. Some drones have been prepared to bear precision-guided weapons to attack ground targets. While, the sizes and ranges of the US drones are different as some of them can deliver weapons and some of them can fly to ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. The US not only blames Russia, but Moscow also claims that US armed drones infringe the INF treaty because they are related to the ground-launched cruise missile which is banned with the treaty's definition.

According to the INF treaty that signatory states “have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have endanger its supreme interests.” Although, according to the US Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul J. Selva violation of treaty would not give military benefits to Russia in Europe given the location of the specific arsenals and deployment. However, the US and Russia now both are spending vast sums of money into upgrading strategic bombers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and shiny new objects like hypersonic glide vehicles and anti-satellite systems.

The US decision of withdrawing from the INF treaty is the part of the its strategy to withdraw from all those international agreements that put equal obligations on it and make fragile its concept of its own exceptionalism. While, a breakdown of the INF Treaty would nourish bilateral distrust and ruin the other important nuclear arms treaties, such as the New Start Treaty, which is up for renewal in 2021. The violation of the INF treaty by two strong nuclear power states would not only encourage an arms race between both states, but push other countries to acquire nuclear weapon for their supreme interests.

<https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/11/21/us-withdrawal-from-inf-treaty-part-i/>

America's Mood Swing Diplomacy

Waqas Jan

Much has been written, both within and outside the US, on the extremely polarizing and divisive nature of Mr. Donald Trump's presidency. Controversial, sensational and often the center of headlines himself, President Trump has left in his wake a plethora of shattered norms and conventions that have otherwise long been associated with the US presidency. Of all these shattered conventions however, none are more apparent than his purportedly unique take on US Foreign Policy characterized by his mantra, 'America First.'

Be it the United States' long-standing allies as part of NATO, neighboring trading partners such as Canada and Mexico, or even its more complex web of relations with countries in key regions such as the Middle East and South Asia; President Trump's 'America First' policy has led to a radical reevaluation of the way the US is pursuing its overseas interests with widespread repercussions.

This radical shift is perhaps most apparent in President Trump's own statements and comments on countries as diverse as France, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan where leaders have been often left flabbergasted by the unpredictability, obtuseness, and grave implications of a sitting US president's sudden barbs against their countries. These include rancorous statements on for instance, France's contributions to NATO, illegal immigrants from Mexico, Saudi Arabia's importance as an arms importer (despite their deteriorating human rights records), and the most recent insinuations on how Pakistan 'hasn't done a damned thing for the US.'

These statements have been made amidst a series of off the cuff interviews and out of perhaps Mr. Trump's own compulsion to tweet official US policy stances from his personal twitter account. Specifically with regard to Pakistan, these include the President's tweets from earlier this year in January where he accused Pakistan of providing safe havens to terrorists, and giving the US nothing but lies and deceit in return for billions of dollars of US aid.

Despite the tenuous nature of Pak-US relations over the last few years, President Trump's statements while characteristic of his over the top nature, mark a fresh departure from the fine line that had previously characterized US diplomacy towards Pakistan. The US's previous overtures of asking Pakistan to 'do more' via a measured carrot and stick approach seems to have been wholly done away with, replaced by public outrage and vitriol by none other than the president himself.

However, apart from the President's statements the US has still shown a willingness to engage and move forward as apparent by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's visit to Islamabad earlier in September, followed by his meeting with Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi at the sidelines of the UN summit in New York. These were followed by another recent visit by a mid-level US delegation to Islamabad earlier this month. These meetings still underscore the key role Pakistan is expected to play in the Afghanistan peace process, as well as in a number of key security issues that remain at the center of US interests across the wider region.

Hence, while the US President appears to have taken an overtly hard-line against Pakistan, other key officials and spokespersons have continued to employ a more measured tone that while setting clear expectations from the Pakistani government, still nevertheless acknowledge Pakistan as a key partner with an important role to play in the region.

This discrepancy between the President's apparent hard-line stance versus the State department's 'business as usual' tone towards Pakistan, does make one wonder then the extent to which the President's statements are in fact representative of actual US foreign policy. While many observers, even in his own government, have accused him of continuously pandering to his constituents even in the face of key issues pertaining to US National Security and Foreign Policy, there is consequently a definite lack of structure and cohesiveness that has so far differentiated other arms of the US government from the White House during this Presidency. Not to mention the unending intrigue currently plaguing the White House; the revolving door that has seen a number key staffers and officials being fired and replaced and the President's own increasingly fragile hold over power in the face of an ongoing Federal investigation, that carries with it the threat of impeachment. US Foreign Policy under Donald Trump has thus so far veered from routine practicability to outright nonsensicality, all with major repercussions for the entire world.

Based on these observations, one can imagine how difficult it must be for the numerous government officials, specialists and advisers pervading throughout the US bureaucracy to be continuously managing the international fallout from the President's numerous gaffes and impulsive statements. After all, there have been numerous reports of divisiveness and major disagreements within the White House and key departments within the US government. Instead it seems that the few lobbyists and close advisers that have the President's ear these days are the ones who are using his persona as a loose cannon and propensity to deliver over the top statements to their advantage; helping push their own agendas at the expense of wider US interests. For a US president that lacks objectivity and is so easily swayed, it has become increasingly difficult for countries such as Pakistan that have earned his ire, to meaningfully engage with him on any level directly.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2018/11/27/americas-mood-swing->

Arihant First Patrol: Dawn of the New Era or Nothing New but a Hyped Political Statement

Ahyousha Khan

Few days ago on the successful completion of the first deterrence patrol of Arihant, which is SSBN (Ship Submersible Ballistic Missile Nuclear powered) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave statement that now India possesses “credible nuclear deterrence”. There is no doubt that with INS Arihant, India now possess a capability to fire nuclear ballistic missile from sea but so far it has only been able to fire smaller range K-15 successfully from Arihant, which is only of 750 km range. Furthermore, India still needs to test its longer range missiles of K-series from Arihant.

This deterrent patrol got all hyped because of the statement from Indian prime minister who believes that now India possesses “credible nuclear deterrence”, however question arises here is against whom? In a complex security environment of South Asia it is always propagated by India that it is facing two tier threats from China and Pakistan. However, Arihant with its K-15 small range ballistic missiles lack the capability to target China. Thus, India is acquiring credibility against only Pakistan.

The phrase “credible nuclear deterrence” used by Indian PM is significant because it reinforces the general believe that India is moving away from the strategy of credible minimum deterrence towards credible deterrence. One essential component which should not be missed here is that BJP government had hinted towards changing the nuclear doctrine of India before coming to power. So, this time when election in around the corner, statements which reflects the drift from strategy of credible minimum deterrence are coming again by none other than the PM himself.

Arihant successful deterrent patrol cannot be considered as the dawn of the era in technology or the end of de-mated nuclear weapons in South Asia because these technological developments were under pipeline for quite some time now. However, concerning issue in this regard is that who will be controlling these weapons in sea. So far, civilian leadership had the control of nuclear weapons in India, but with nuclear submarine sole control of civilian leadership is not feasible. Communication on submarines is only possible on very low frequency of extremely low frequency and nuclear submarines also cut-off their communications while in enemy areas for its safety. Thus, in such circumstances civilian control of nuclear submarine is nearly impossible. But, what is alarming in this situation is that control of India’s nuclear arsenal by its military which is naïve and ambitious enough to believe that Pakistan’s strategic capability is just a bluff and they can call it whenever they want.

Analysis of Indian prime minister’s statement shows that it was nothing but a much hyped political statement. But, concerning matter in this regard is Indian political leadership’s disappointing attitude, where they deliberately ignite sentiments of general population to gain votes. Later on, because they come in power on war mongering views they take measures which are more offensive and far from nuclear confidence building measures. This trend in Indian political stage is alarming in the context of offensive civilian leadership’s control of nuclear weapons as well.

There is no denying the fact that rapid nuclearization and militarization of Indian Ocean by India is alarming for Pakistan because it challenges the fragile state of strategic stability in the region. To counter India in Indian Ocean Pakistan under the policy of full spectrum deterrence has developed Babur-3 cruise missile to achieve second strike capability. However, so far, Pakistan is also far from achieving credible second strike capability because of the lack of nuclear powered submarines. But, future of South Asian nuclear stage depicts that both of the states will be competing each other in Indian Ocean as well.

Lastly, with arms race taking the pace in the region it is essential to understand the difference between political statements and emerging new technologies with capability to tilt the strategic pendulum in one's favor. One cannot categorize every development as game changer, other factors must be taken into account as well.

<https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/11/27/arihant-first-patrol-dawn-of-new-era-or-nothing-new-but-a-hyped-political-statement/>

US Withdrawal from JCPOA, Nuclearization of North Korea and Non-proliferation Efforts

Asma Khalid

Nuclear proliferation pessimists and arms control experts' aims to limit the nuclear weapons states to the possible lowest number. For this purpose, major Powers and traditionally pessimistic has created a multiplicity of legal tools aimed at preventing nuclear WMD including legally binding treaties to recommendations to voluntary agreements and regional committees. There is abundance of individual safety initiatives and dedicated groups aiming towards the prevention of nuclear threats including the NPT. NPT being the shadow of the NPR is working towards gaining universality. The global Non-proliferation regime is under stress due to the recent developments in global nuclear order. The unilateral withdrawal of US from the JCPOA, the nuclearization of North Korea as well as US and Russia's aspirations for strategic force modernization has posed serious implications on the global efforts of arms control and nuclear on-proliferation regime.

Two events in recent years are likely to have far reaching implications: First, President Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA and decision to impose sanctions on Iran; Second, withdrawal of North Korea from NPT and its successful nuclear test.

Iran's nuclear deal or JCPOA was negotiated and inked in July 2015. The deal was signed between five permanent members of UNSC and Germany (P5+1) and Islamic Republic of Iran. Nuclear deal was viewed as hallmark agreement and marked as "win-win" situation for all the concerned parties and global non-proliferation efforts. Under the JCPOA, it was ensured that Iran's nuclear program will be peaceful and for civilian purposes. The reports by IAEA have indicated that after the implementation of nuclear deal Iran has not engaged in any prohibited activity and there is no question mark on Iran's compliance with the nuclear deal. The full implementation of JCPOA was considered as positive addition to the efforts of non-proliferation in order to ensure international peace and security. However, President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the deal in May 2018 and it is considered as major setback to global Non-proliferation efforts. Because due to withdrawal from the JCPOA, achievements of the Iran deal, i.e. two-thirds dismantling of centrifuges, 97 per cent destruction of uranium stocks, intrusive IAEA monitoring and Tehran's commitment to not acquire nuclear weapons has been lost.

Other JCPOA signatories, i.e. Britain, Germany, France, China and Russia have unanimously opposed the US decision. The unilateral withdrawal of US from the nuclear deal has not only created the frictions between global powers but it has also severely undermined the credibility of major powers role in non-proliferation efforts. In Middle East; Israel's support to President Trump's decision shows the monopoly of Israel in the region. According to the nuclear security analysts, Iran may also withdraw from the NPT under the article X of the treaty. According to article X of NPT, states have legitimate right to withdraw from the treaty if state feels that its "supreme interests" and "sovereignty" are in jeopardy.

Additionally, withdrawal of Iran from NPT (if happened) is viewed as a major setback to the international dialogue and efforts of global non-proliferation.

In the Case of North Korea, coercive diplomacy of US has faced serious blow. In 2017, North Korea detonated the hydrogen bomb that is capable to carry Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). President Trump wants the North Korea to convert its nuclear program into civilian use program but Kim Jong-un is reluctant to end its nuclear and missile program as nuclear weapon capability is a tool to ensure sovereign defense of state. On April 27, 2018, a summit meeting took place between two Korean leaders and at the end of the summit meeting; the denuclearization of Korean peninsula was announced by the two Korean leaders. Though North Korea has started working on its denuclearization commitments and its step to close the nuclear reactor situated at Yongbyon nuclear complex is significant breakthrough. But the secret reports have revealed that North Korea had covertly constructed another facility to produce highly enriched uranium. Thus closing one nuclear complex may slow down the North Korea's capability to manufacture nuclear weapon but nuclear analysts are of the view that it will not completely suspend the production of weapon grade uranium. The review of current US policies and US-Russia's aim to modernize nuclear weapons demonstrates that nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty has failed to gain attention of even those states that are enjoying the security under nuclear security umbrella. In this scenario, expecting the complete denuclearization of North Korea is unrealistic approach.

The Iran's and North Korea's case demonstrates that, international structure being anarchic in nature is subject to manipulation by those in power. To attain political momentum and eventual universal acceptance of NPT agenda, it is imperative for NPT-NWS to move away from ambiguous discriminatory approaches and make lasting commitment towards reducing the governance gap and achieve nuclear disarmament under the article VI of the NPT instead of using NPT as a tool to serve own objectives.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2018/11/27/us-withdrawal-from-jcpoa-nuclearization-of-north-korea-and-non-proliferation-efforts/>

US Withdrawal from INF: Implications for Nonproliferation Regimes and European States - Part II

Sonia Naz

The US announced on Oct. 20 that it would pull out from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It is a major arms control treaty that destroyed an entire category of nuclear weapons in the final year of Cold war. The US withdrawal comes in the light alleged Russian violations of the treaty by developing and deploying missiles banned by the treaty.

Nevertheless, it is not the only reason, but the US also wants to include China in the INF because the emergence of China is a potential threat to the US. China has deployed intermediate range ground missiles and withdrawing from the INF would make US enable to develop the means to counter these arsenals with land based missiles. China, while also not seems happy with US decision as Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said that “Unilateral withdrawal will have a multitude of negative effects.” The US wants to prevent Russia from gaining a military advantage and it is interested to put all blame on the shoulders of Russia If the treaty collapses. It is a smart strategy of President Trump to weaken the Russian economy by involving it in the arms race. Moving back from the INF would leave the New START treaty as the last robust pillar of the nuclear security structure between the US and Russia. Though, the Russian President has called on the US to negotiations on extending the treaty (owing to expire in 2021). According to the senior nuclear expert Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal the Russian President Vladimir Putin looks interested in avoiding an arms race with NATO because its economy cannot bear the burden.

The US move would have a significant impact on the nuclear security arrangement between the US and Russia. The dissolution of the treaty will slag NATO members into an arms competition with Russia. They also would be forced to finance the development of short – range and intermediate ballistic missiles, which would be deployed in Europe after the termination of the treaty. While NATO’s communiqué planned this year that the alliances would be stronger against Russia by spending 20 percent of their defence budget on military modernization. Steven Pifer, a former US ambassador to Ukraine, stated that once the US withdraws from the treaty, there is no reason for Russia to follow any limit. Russia would be free to deploy the 9M 729 cruise missile and an intermediate-range ballistic missile if it wants, without any restraint. The US pullout would also trigger an arms race among the US, Russia and China with destabilizing consequences for the US and its allies.

Mostly, Western European states in favor of retaining the INF and they want to push Moscow for compliance. The German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas described the Trump’s announcement as “regrettable” and has urged Moscow to resolve its acquiescence issues. While, British Defense Secretary Gavin Williamson declared Britain stands with the United States, but also hopes the treaty will “continue.” The European states officials statements indicate that no European state is happy with the unilateral decision of the US because they don’t want to host ground-launched ballistic and cruise

missiles on their soil. The European Union's top diplomat, Federica Mogherini stated on 20 November 2018, that they are extremely worried about the future INF treaty as the Trump administration threatens to withdraw. She said that treaties are important and they need to be respected. If there are issues and problems, European Union believes that there should be proper implementation rather than withdrawal. European Union still hopes that there is space for strengthening its implementation rather than dismantling it". In fact, they want to preserve the treaty by asking both sides to continue their dialogue to avoid arms race.

In a nutshell the US withdrawal from the treaty would replenish the US nuclear arsenal and it would undermine the arms control and non-proliferation regimes. It would not only undermine the credibility of non-proliferation regime, but it would also force European states to build nuclear weapons to secure themselves.

<https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/11/28/us-withdrawal-from-inf-implications-for-nonproliferation-regimes-and-european-states-part-ii/>

Role of External Actors in Nuclear Politics of South Asia

Asma Khalid

The strategic landscape of the South Asia is comprised of India and Pakistan's equation connected with the role of other great powers in region. Geo-strategic position and introduction of nuclear arsenal has played central role to transform the relations among South Asian states and great powers.

The conflicting national interests, historic rivalries, states objective to enhance conventional and strategic forces quantitatively and qualitatively and role of great powers in regional politics has increased the complexities of South Asian strategic environment. The recent trends, such as Trumps offensive rhetoric against Pakistan, Indo-US nexus, Russia's role in strategic calculus of India and Pakistan, and China's expanding strategic interests and economic investment in the region has identified the profound changes in the South Asian politics.

Significance of South Asia in the strategic calculation of great powers i.e. US, Russia and China cannot be ignored. It is important to explore that why South Asian region is important for the great powers? In the case of US: involvement of US in Afghanistan, existence of Chinese strategic and economic presence in the region and non-proliferation concerns has played important role in evolution of relationship between US and South Asia. Russia's role in the South Asia is increasing due to two factors: First, strategic interest including evolving Afghan situation; Second, economic benefits from regional states. Consequently, driving factor for China's role in South Asia's politics is its strategic interests in the region as well as South Asian states are viewed important to fulfill its objective of economic integration.

Strategic co-operation of India and the US has changed the pattern of relationships between the India, Pakistan and US. South Asia is important for the US due to its interests in Central and West Asia. Since August 2017, Pakistan-US relations are on critical stage due to the criticism of Trump administration on Pakistan's role in war in terror. On the other side, the positive trajectory of Indo-US relation: growing bilateral ties in defence and economic sphere, geopoliticising of nuclear cartels including NSG, and American support in multilateral international agreements such as STA-1 and COMCASA has dramatically changed the South Asian nuclear politics . Therefore in the US, India is viewed as stable economy, special ally in reconstructing Afghanistan, and counterbalance to China. Pakistan is seen differently with opposite lens. Additionally, Strategic role of China in the Indian Ocean Region and construction of CPEC are grave concerns of US in the region. Existing trends in South Asia, demonstrates the existence of focused regional strategy of the US in South Asia.

Russia is major defence partner and primary supplier of conventional and strategic weapon systems to India. Russia has provided cruise missiles, combat jets and battle tanks to India. Both states have recently signed the S-400 missile system deal. At the same time, Russia is expanding its defence sales in South Asia and provided the Mi-35M to Pakistan in 2017. Pakistan and Russia are enhancing defence and military ties and conducted the two joint exercises between Russia's forces and Special

Forces of Pakistan. These developments have indicated that Russia is diversifying its defence and economic interests in region.

China's policy in South Asia is comprised of two rationales: First, economic interests based on the objectives of economic integration; Second, strategic interests to maintain stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as enhancing its diplomatic and economic influence with other state of South Asia.

South Asia is indispensable region for great powers due to its political, geo-strategic and economic significance. Power play of super powers in the region has negatively affected the strategic dynamics of south Asia especially the balance of power has been disturbed between south Asian nuclear neighbors due to the polarization between China, Russia and US. Significantly, region is essential for great powers to pursue their strategic interests in Asia. In recent years, a major shift has been observed in the South Asia policy of the US. Offensive rhetoric of Trump administration shows that India-US strategic ties are getting stronger. The US is using the India's card to counterbalance the China in the region. In this regard, US is playing key role in modernizing the conventional and strategic forces of India. Indo-U.S Nuclear deal, special NSG waiver, membership of WA and MTCR to the India has potential to disturb the strategic balance in South Asia. These nuclear politics has negatively affected the South Asian strategic dynamics as well as global non-proliferation efforts. In order to maintain deterrence equilibrium and stability in the region, it is imperative for Pakistan to modernize its conventional and strategic forces. Pakistan has maintained the credibility of its deterrence through development of sophisticated battle field weapons such as "Nasr" and "Ababeel". But still, growing ties of India and US, expanding defence acquisitions of the India and emerging security and strategic environment of South Asia, necessitates Pakistan to increase strategic ties with China and Russia to ensure interests at national, regional and global level.

<https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/11/29/role-of-external-actors-in-nuclear-politics-of-south-asia/>

Nuclear Security Index 2018: A Critical Appraisal

Beenish Altaf

Since the end of the Cold War, where the nuclear weapons and related technologies have decreased histrionically, the new states are acquiring the technology with momentum. The proliferation is now a fact and nuclear rollback is a remote prospect at best. The famous theoretical debate between Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz over whether proliferation is a good, bad could be debated relevantly for analyzing about the strategies in this growing era of nuclear states.

Since the numbers of such new states with atomic bomb are increasing year by year, there is little chance that these countries will disarm in the foreseeable future. The recent entrants' states include India, North Korea, Pakistan. The rare alignment between domestic and international conditions that prompted disarmament in South Africa is unlikely to happen again. There are reports published by renowned platforms mentioning the likelihood of more states into the realm, whether in civil or military terms.

A book titled *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age* by Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes is a thorough articulation of the strategies, causes and repercussions of the nuclear ages and their eras.

The need to accept the reality of a post-proliferation world represents our key conceptual rise. All three states have moved on to the next phase of proliferation and thus they are devising nuclear doctrines. One has to acknowledge here the fact that the ground situation of all these states may vary in one or the other way, obviously accordingly to their national interests.

“India on 5th November announced said its first ever indigenously developed/ built nuclear-powered submarine that had recently completed its first patrol. India plans to build three more nuclear subs. It aimed at completing a “triad” and give India the ability to deliver nuclear payloads from land, air and sea”. Pakistan on the other hand has assumed a stance predicated on nuclear ambiguity with working to response on an equal basis. North Korea has—evidently—expanded its modest arsenal while exploring creative basing options for its missile force. In the case of Iran, a key component of its strategy is to make a breakout impervious to domestic and international pressures to roll back. In short, one might expect these nuclear players to optimize their strategies and doctrines to suit their local circumstances.

The quantitative dimension of nuclear strategy stands out as another stark contrast to the Cold War. Admittedly, force size is a relative concept that must be compared with other factors, including adversaries' force structures and a country's own financial and economic wherewithal to develop nuclear weapons. The twin pillars of deterrence: the capability and credibility of nuclear states' arsenals may be modestly compared with Cold War standards. Nuclear newcomers' notions of sufficiency may differ radically from those of the Cold War. Considerations of reputation and moral stature could apply a brake on arms buildups, particularly in democracies like India. Even a nuclear state like China allowed

its nuclear forces to remain small, more or less static in size and technologically stagnant for decades until recently.

Many new players possess nuclear infrastructures and doctrines for employing nuclear forces that are unusual to their local circumstances. For their part, the established players covered in this oped are developing hardware and doctrines that are so at variance with past approaches that they may as well be starting anew.

However last but not the least, the second nuclear age is propelled by competition between regional states possessing roughly similar nuclear capabilities. Most newcomers are likely to assume recessed nuclear postures, which keep their forces at low readiness during peacetime. In the case of China, Beijing sought to deter both the United States and the Soviet Union. The rivalry between India and Pakistan by engaging in low-intensity conflicts attracts the most attention at present. An unfamiliar but no less dangerous competition involves China and India.

The pressure to rely on nuclear weapons as a stopgap is perhaps most acute in South Asia. The situation got worse by the adoption of 'Cold Start Doctrine' for limited war by India. New Delhi and Islamabad are thus engaged in a two-level game of nuclear and conventional interactions that could fan instability during a crisis. Size matters in nuclear deterrence, but it is clearly no guarantee of success.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2018/11/30/strategic-dimension-of-the-second-nuclear-age/>

Cyber Securitization and Threat of Cyber Terrorism in Pakistan

Ahyousha Khan

One of the biggest threat of 21st century is terrorism, all states whether developing or underdeveloped are equally getting affected by it. The alarming new component of terrorism is its spread in cyber space. Cyber space is a virtual world where all essential sectors of national life of state have presence and thus, it makes it an attractive target for terrorist groups which are driven by political agenda. The common difficulty in identification of terrorist is that they blend in with general population and are thus harder to identify. This benefit of anonymity is also present in cyber space that terrorist are utilizing all over the world to spread their ideology, carry out their recruitment process and to generate funding.

In this era of globalization cyber space allows a person sitting in one end of the world to carry out action in other part of the world without even being identified. All person might need to carry out such an action is access to information technology and knowhow. Owing to the fact that information technology is easily accessible and its knowhow is not some secret, makes it excellent medium for state and non-state actors to carry out malicious activities against other states and non-states actors. Threat of terrorism or cyber terrorism is from which no country is safe, even most secure countries with world largest armies. However, countries such as Pakistan which are unfortunate to be located in a region that is prone to all types of conflicts whether they are traditional or non-traditional; are more exposed to threats like cyber terrorism. According to scholars cyber terrorism could be defined as “Cyber terrorism is socially or politically illegal attack on computers, network systems and stored information for political gains”. Although, there are no mass events of cyber terrorism reported in Pakistan but according to former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, Pakistan is the second most spied on country and NSA has intercepted more than 13.5 billion pieces of information from Pakistan. But, if one talks about cyber terrorism specifically in Pakistan, many terrorist organizations are running their recruitment pages and financial set-up electronically.

These groups and their online presence is serious issue because through these pages, websites, blogs and video they spread hate, sectarianism, violence and messages to overthrow the governments. Absence of strong filters and blocking mechanisms is helping these organizations to carry on their malicious activities. Pakistan is already fighting against terrorism by conducting military operations on state level. In future when it would become harder for terrorists to launch physical activities against state they will move towards the unguarded territory of cyber space. So, it is necessary for Pakistan to nip the evil in the bud.

So far to stop the cyber terrorism different govt. in Pakistan have taken few actions but most of these actions are to regularize different crimes that are taking place in realm of cyber space. Such initiatives include Pakistan Telecommunication Reorganization Act 1996, Electronic Transaction Ordinance 2002, Payment systems and Electronic Fund Transfer Act 2007, Electronic Crime Ordinance 2007, Cyber Security Strategy Bill, Prevention of Electronic Crime Bill and National Action Plan.

However, due to lack of proper institution handling emerging threats in cyber space implementation of these legislative measures is very weak reason being the politicization of the issue of cyber security rather than its securitization. It is true that security measures taken by states in arena of cyber security fall under the grey area where they step on the human liberties but security comes with the price. To securitize Pakistani society from the evil of cyber terrorism it is necessary that strong executive measures shall be taken; separate institutions shall be made to handle all threats emerging from cyber space because one small branch under one federal investigation authority is not dynamic enough to handle threat of cyber terrorism.

<https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/11/30/cyber-terrorism-and-its-securitization-in-pakistan/>

SAARC: A Lost Cause?

S. Sadia Kazmi

The long due SAARC summit is still in limbo and there is no confirmed date as to whether it will take place in 2018 or 2019. A regional arrangement initially planned to establish peace in South Asia by building a structure of interdependence among the regional states, SAARC was founded in 1985 in Dhaka, with its Secretariat in Kathmandu, Nepal. The idea was to promote development and progress, which it still stands for, mainly by resolving as well as preventing the conflicts. The goal of achieving sustainable peace and long-lasting cooperation was to be based on the understanding of each others' insecurities and instead developing on the potentials in order to build a mutually peaceful future. Lucrative ideas for trade agreements, poverty alleviation, and reduction of arms maneuvered the motivation behind this setting. Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan constitute its members states with varying degree of development and progress. It is important to note that the geographical landmass covered by this organization is almost 3 percent of the global land mass, the collective population of eight countries makes up to about 21 percent of the world's population and contributes roughly 9.12 percent of the global economy.

Instead of becoming an engine of growth, the organization mainly remained ineffective in face of jarring realities confronted by the South Asian region at the political, economic, social, diplomatic, and military front. The widespread poverty rampant throughout the region, low intra-regional trade, lack of infrastructure for regional connectivity etc. continued to act as a source of divergence among the member countries. Most of all SAARC has mainly suffered due to Indo-Pakistan rivalry, political and military competition, and never ending blame game. A huge lack of trust between these two states and among the other states of the region is yet another reason which couldn't let the SAARC countries come together on the same page. While the EU model is often looked upon as a success story having France and Germany putting off their difference and coming together for the larger benefit of the region, unfortunately same couldn't be replicated in the South Asian region. Here the two nuclear rivals could never put their differences behind and continue to stay embroiled in the ever prevalent security dilemma. Although the SAARC charter requires for the head of the states to convene a meeting every year, this hasn't been happening regularly. In fact this particular activity has come to a standstill since 2014 after the 18th SAARC summit. Owing to the unfortunate Uri attacks in 2016, the 19th SAARC summit scheduled to be held in Pakistan was called off by India alleging Pakistan for orchestrating the attacks. Other member states including Bhutan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Maldives also boycotted the summit and have rendered the meet to be postponed for indefinite period of time. It is being hoped that the SAARC summit should be convened in the running year in Pakistan but the year has almost come to an end now without any positive response from India. The latter sticks firm to its stance of having no possibility of opening dialogues with Pakistan unless it stops 'terrorist activities' in India. Indian External Affairs Minister while addressing a conference in Hyderabad stated that "the Centre chose not to respond positively to Pakistan's invitation. That invitation has already been given but we

are not responding to that positively. Until and unless Pakistan stops terrorist activities in India, there will be no dialogue and we will not participate in SAARC”.

This raises a pertinent question as to whether SAARC has been a lost cause and completely dysfunctional? Would it be better to dissolve it instead of disrespecting the charter owing to whatever justified reasons? If a progress can be made in case of Kartarpur corridor between India and Pakistan, why can't same be adopted in other matters of differences. India essentially appears to be stubborn playing mostly on its whim and avoiding to open channel for dialogue. This is intentionally putting not just the bilateral relations but the whole region into turmoil. How can one expect the issue to be resolved unless there is a talk or discussion about it. Not letting the SAARC summit happen or boycotting it would definitely not achieve anything, instead will only nullify any prospects of positive development and progress for the region. This is ironic that the Kartarpur corridor could still happen despite India's grievances with Pakistan, and while the ceremony for laying the foundation stone was underway on both sides of the border, India still doesn't shy away from harping the same stubbornness of giving no chance to dialogues with Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan has been extending various invitations to Indian leadership, offering a hand of peace only to be refused every time. External Minister Sushma Swaraj's emphatic No to attending the SAARC summit raises serious concerns especially when other countries do want to give peace a chance. While this whole scenario represents quite a despondent state of affairs, on the other hand it is good to see that other states are willing to improve things at the regional level and want to give peace and development a chance. One good recent example in this regard is Sri Lanka, the leadership of which early this year in March held talks with the Pakistani counterpart on issues of interests and specifically expressed commitment to making SAARC fully functional. Nepal also showed willingness for its support to SAARC and expressed hopes that the SAARC summit takes place in Pakistan on time. This shows that India is the only one disrespecting the very charter and objectives of SAARC owing to its own ulterior motives. It is only adding to the already difficult situation in the region instead of discussing and addressing the problems and challenges.

It is extremely important that all the member states put in their dedicated efforts to pull SAARC out of its current dire state. It is equally important for India to realize that it also stands to suffer if the regional peace is made hostage to its own self interests. India is very much part of this region much like other seven states and this reality cannot be changed. Hence, any positive step collectively taken at the regional level will benefit all and causing hindrances would only take away any such opportunity. Indeed, Pakistan is under a lot of international pressure to do more with regards to the alleged terrorist havens on its soil, but SAARC should be taken as a platform where such problems and challenges should be deliberated upon to find a way out. There is also a need to understand that Pakistan is not alone in this, it is the one country which has borne the maximum casualties in the war against terrorism. Nonetheless, SAARC should not be rendered dysfunctional owing to the political differences. It should play an effective role in creating interdependency among the member state, which could be one way to establish trust and making everyone a stakeholder. There are several potential areas of cooperation including the field of science and technology, infrastructure building, working towards regional connectivity, terrorism, poverty alleviation, tourism, university exchange programs etc. if SAARC remains hostage to the bilateral politics, it will never be able to deliver on the ideals it was established for

decades ago. Proposal can also be extended to other states in a closer geographical proximity to be part of it and making it a more active as well as effective organization, free from the hegemony of just one country. Therefore, the possibility of expansion of SAARC should not be ruled out.

Last but not the least, SAARC is a good platform which still holds a hope for the regional states and should not be allowed to be wasted off. The states should work together with the differences, focusing on relatively less grave socio-economic issues first.

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