

## Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia: Pakistan's Rationale

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### Abstract

*The objective and aim of the study is to explain the Indo-US concerns and arguments regarding Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons and how far these concerns are justified. This study seeks to analyze the fears of western and regional states against Pakistan's TNWs and will endeavor to find the ways in which Pakistani policy makers and opinion makers can best respond to these challenges. It will draw on both sides of the argument and conclude whether Pakistan has efficiently tackled the concerns raised by the international community or it has failed to achieve the status of a responsible nuclear weapon state. The research is descriptive, explanatory, and analytical in nature, as it tends to explain the concerns and apprehensions of western and regional powers on Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons. The qualitative data collection method is used to gather information about the existing literature, important events, and reports. The research includes both primary and secondary data and has made use of a combination of content retrieved from journals, newspapers, interviews, and research articles. Pakistan's scientific and military establishment believed that acquisition of nuclear weapons would render India's conventional military superiority irrelevant. However, in less than a year, the 'irreversible accomplishment' was more or less reversed with the limited war in Kargil, Siachen. The*

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*aftermath of the military adventurism taught Pakistan Army the single most valuable lesson that would shape its policy in subsequent years: India's conventional superiority could very well assert itself within Pakistan's nuclear threshold. In order to tackle this, Pakistan decided to introduce a nuclear dimension to tactical warfare. The idea, as viewed by different analysts, is either absolutely genius or absolutely absurd. It has the potential to paralyze Indian Cold Start strategy as a deterrent or it has the potential to provoke a massive nuclear retaliation in the event of a limited war. While theoretically and historically evaluating the efficacy of Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) as a deterrent, the research paper has majorly found that Pakistan has no intension of using TNWs rather it is for deterrence purpose and for maintaining the strategic stability. Moreover, Pakistan has proved to be a responsible nuclear weapon state by inculcating changes within its security apparatus.*

**Keywords:** Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Nuclear Weapons State, United States

### **Historical Overview of Tactical Nuclear Weapons**

Non-Strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs), also termed as intermediate range, theatre or sub-strategic weapons and tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Strategic nuclear weapons are used to deter the adversary with the threat of huge damage whereas military targets are attacked by NSNWs. These low-yield nuclear weapons are considered in the category of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) which are designed mainly for battlefield contingencies. According to Sokov<sup>1</sup>, Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) refer to the short range weapons with the range less than 500 km including land-based missiles and a range of 600 km including sea and air-

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<sup>1</sup>“Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)”, NTI, May 1, 2002, accessed October 10, 2016, <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/tactical-nuclear-weapons/>.

based weapons. There is no universally accepted definition of these weapons but the US Office of Secretary of Defense defined NSNWs as nuclear weapons that are not part of the nuclear triad-Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMS), long range bombers and strategic nuclear submarine<sup>2</sup>. They have operational military war fighting capabilities and are more dangerous than strategic weapons.<sup>3</sup>

United States deployed thousands of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, South Korea and Japan throughout the Cold War. The purpose was maintaining deterrence and the defense of its allies in Europe and Asia. Additionally, they could have been used on the battlefield to slow or to stop the advancement of adversary's conventional forces. It did not rule out the possibility that these weapons can be used in contingencies with other adversaries even though they were deployed for defense of the allies from Soviet Union. They were part of NATO's flexible response strategy in Europe. This strategy was used to convince USSR that any kind of attack may lead to nuclear retaliation. The US maintained the capability of responding to any attack through nuclear weapons although it did not insist their use. Moreover this capability was maintained for escalation control. Due to the changes in the threats and the capabilities of the adversary, the US often altered the size and structure of its non-strategic nuclear forces during the Cold War. The US declined operational nuclear warheads from more than 7000 in the mid-1970s to below 6000 in 1980s and to fewer than 1000 by the middle of 1990s.<sup>4</sup> The reduction was due to the US and NATO belief that they can maintain deterrence even by fewer

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<sup>2</sup>“Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: The Next Step in Multilateral Arms Control,”

Australian Strategic Policy Institute, August 2013, accessed October 10, 2016, [https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/strategic-insights-62-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-the-next-step-in-multilateral-arms-control/SI62\\_nuclear\\_weapons.pdf](https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/strategic-insights-62-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-the-next-step-in-multilateral-arms-control/SI62_nuclear_weapons.pdf).

<sup>3</sup>“Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Debunking the Mythology,” United States Air Force Institute for national Security Studies, August 2002, accessed October 10, 2016, <http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/OCP46.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup>Usa Ibp, US Defense Policy Handbook, 1st ed. (International Business Publications, USA, 2005).

numbers but with modern weapons<sup>5</sup>. Similarly, Soviet Union also considered nuclear weapons to be important part of their military strategy but also assured that it would not be the first one to use them.<sup>6</sup> But according the Western analysts, Soviet Union had incorporated nuclear weapons into its warfighting strategies more than the US. According to Soviet analyst<sup>7</sup>, these weapons can be used for preemptive and surprise attacks. Under Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s, it began to reduce its emphasis on nuclear warfighting plans due to his belief that the use of these weapons would be disastrous. However, they remained a prime tool of deterring and fighting a large-scale conflict with the US and NATO. It deployed a wide range of delivery vehicles for NSNWs at nearly 600 bases located in throughout Russia, Eastern Europe and some non-Russian republics<sup>8</sup>.

Throughout the 1990s, US kept almost 1,100 NSNWs in active stockpiles. In the 2001 nuclear posture review, the Bush administration underlined the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons in regional contingencies acknowledging that it might use nuclear weapons in response to nations that have conventional, biological or chemical weapons<sup>9</sup>. It stated that it would deploy and develop those nuclear weapon capabilities to defeat any nation whether or not it possessed

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<sup>5</sup>CSIS Nuclear Strategy Study Group and Mazzarr, Michel J., 1965- *Toward a nuclear peace: the future of nuclear weapons in U.S foreign and defense policy: report of the CSIS Nuclear Strategy Group*. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 1993.

<sup>6</sup>Woolf, Amy F. "Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons." Federation of American Scientists. February 21, 2017. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup>Millar, Alistair, Stansfield Turner, Brian Alex, and Alistair Millar er. *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment*. Edited by Brian Alexander. Boca Raton, FL, United States: Potomac Books, 2003

<sup>8</sup>Millar, Alistair, Stansfield Turner, Brian Alex, and Alistair Millar er. *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Emergent Threats in an Evolving Security Environment*. Edited by Brian Alexander. Boca Raton, FL, United States: Potomac Books, 2003

<sup>9</sup>Kristensen, Hans. "Global Strike: A Chronology of the Pentagon's New Offensive Strike Plan." March 15, 2006. Accessed October 10, 2016. <http://fas.org/ssp/docs/GlobalStrikeReport.pdf>.

nuclear weapons. Many analysts argued that US was planning for tactical use of nuclear weapons.

During the Cold War era, the conventional asymmetry between the two rivals i.e. the US and USSR led to an arms race. Similarly the two South Asian rivals i.e. India and Pakistan have strained relations and are engaging in an arms race. Their relationship is rooted in the decades old rivalry which has continued until now in the form of a nuclear arms race. Like the Cold War period, both India and Pakistan also perceive threat from each other resulting in the enhancement and vertical proliferation of their nuclear weapons. The adoption of various nuclear weapons and doctrines was the outcome of this threat perception from each other. South Asian environment is analogous to Cold War rivals where both the US and USSR wanted to gain superiority over each other by increasing their weapons and to bridge the gaps of asymmetries. Although contrasting with the Cold War, Pakistan and India have lesser geostrategic depth which has more chance of misperception and unintentional use of weapons but considering the threat perception in both the situations, South Asian competitiveness can be considered analogous to Cold War.

### **South Asian Nuclear Environment and Doctrines**

Salik<sup>10</sup> in his book *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective* explains the characteristics of South Asia's nuclear environment. The nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan are still in an evolving phase which increases the likelihood of pre-emptive strikes. As the result of Indo-US nuclear deal, Indian expansion of fissile material production and the induction of ABMs (Anti-Ballistic Missiles) have increased strategic instability in the region and can consequently result in arms race. The infrastructure of command and control, intelligence and communication are also developing in both countries. There is also need for Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Moreover the politically weak

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<sup>10</sup>Naeem Salik, *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective*, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009).

governments and the inclination of general public of both countries towards risk taking will further create uncertainties of responses in crises and will have public pressure on decision making during crises.

After the nuclearization of South Asia in 1998, the deterrence equation was evolved between India and Pakistan forcing them to refrain from any conventional war but a limited war did occur. The Kargil Conflict was fought between them in 1999. After the war of 1971, both countries decided to resolve their disputes whereas the issue of the control of Siachen glaciers was left unresolved. So in April 1984, India launched operation to gain control over it and in the following years Pakistan also launched several operations to reclaim the occupied territory. Kargil was one of those military operations. In response Pakistani forces were attacked by Indian forces. For about two months Pakistan's bases were attacked by Indian jets. There was a heavy international pressure to end the war and due to this pressure this conflict came to an end. This limited war can be seen as the application of stability-instability paradox according to which when two nuclear weapons states attain stability at the strategic level, they tend to fight at low level or they indulge in limited conflicts. As both of them were aware of the risk of escalation, they kept the war relatively low even below the conventional level. Thus Kargil conflict comes under the category of marginal conventional conflict.

The next conflict between the two occurred in 2001-2002. It occurred in two phases. The first phase began in December 2001 when militants attacked Indian Parliament. Indian government stated the two Pakistani backed militant groups to be the reason behind the attack. In response to it, India launched Operation Parakram and mobilized 500,000 troops to the Line of Control and international borders. In response to the mobilization, Pakistan deployed its own troops. So, as a result approximately 1 million troops were confronting each other along the Line of Control. The conflict was deescalated by President Musharraf's efforts. However, the troops remained deployed.

The second phase of the crisis occurred in May 2002 when an Indian army camp in Kashmir was attacked by terrorists, killing 32 people. India planned of a military response more ambitious than the previous one. This time they decided to drive 3 strike corps from Rajasthan into Pakistan, engaging and destroying Pakistani forces and seizing Pakistani territory in the Thar Desert. Due to the US intervention, the crisis was diffused which had the possibility to escalate into a nuclear conflict. This was the second time after the nuclearization of both the countries that they engaged in limited conflicts. Thus, it can be argued that the first few years after the 1998 nuclear tests were result of the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation<sup>11</sup>.

After the Operation Parakram, India issued a document regarding its doctrine in January 2003 in which there were postulates of NFU policy, MCD and no use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state and retaliatory attacks to be authorized by civil political leadership through National Command Authority (NCA)<sup>12</sup>. It further stated that India will retaliate with nuclear weapons in case of any major attack on India or Indian forces anywhere by biological or chemical weapons and it will participate in Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations.

According to Khan<sup>13</sup>, Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) can be termed as a defensive-offensive posture of India due to the fact that previously it had strike forces with only three divisions but with CSD it intended to develop eight divisions and they will remain positioned close to the international borders India announced its CSD on 28<sup>th</sup> April 2004. According to Ladwig<sup>14</sup>, the CSD would give India the capability to launch a retaliatory strike

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<sup>11</sup>Kapur, S. Paul. "Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia." *International Security* 33, no. 2 (October 2008): 71–94.

<sup>12</sup>Naeem Salik, *The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective*, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>13</sup>Zafar Khan, "Cold Start Doctrine: The Conventional Challenge to South Asian Stability," *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 3 (December 2012).

<sup>14</sup>Walter C. Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," *International Security* 32, no. 3 (January 2008).

against Pakistan that would result in huge damage to Pakistan Army before the intervention of the international community. Meanwhile it would pursue narrow enough aims to deny Islamabad a justification to escalate the clash to the nuclear level. CSD doctrine once implemented will ensure that Pakistan has no time for inviting the interference of the US or of any other state for the resolution or the de-escalation of the conflict as it has done previously.

Four types of changes were made in the doctrine; transformation of force structure, emphasis on speed, limitation of objectives and focus on combined arms. First, the eight divisions sized Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs); forwardly deployed, equipped to operate independently on the battlefield, separately encompassed with armor, artillery, air support and infantry. Secondly, the doctrine stressed on the speed of the IBGs both in mobilization and maneuver. For gaining surprise element, IBGs would attack at unpredictable and different locations on the Pakistani territory. Moreover the IBGs would enter in Pakistan within 72-96 hours by quickly operating and this way the Indian Army would provide the political leadership the option of pre-emption without having any international pressure. Thirdly, the IBGs would penetrate 30-40 miles within Pakistan's territory. Fourth, to gain air superiority over the advancing battle groups and to support the army by providing close air support the doctrine would exploit combined arms by recruiting Indian Air Force (IAF) and Indian Navy (IN). The purpose of this is to have concentration of force with smaller volume of manpower<sup>15</sup>.

CSD represents a form of flexible response by providing various policy options to Indian leadership between doing nothing and crossing the nuclear threshold of Pakistan or provoking a full scale war. Pakistan perceived a threat from CSD and considered it aggressive and threatening. According to the former Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez

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<sup>15</sup>Shashank Joshi, "India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 4 (August 2013).

Kayani<sup>16</sup> the consequences of CSD would be ‘unintended and uncontrollable’. This is due to the fact that CSD will trigger response from Pakistan as it has the capability to cross Pakistan’s nuclear redlines. Once those redlines are being crossed, there is a possibility of using nuclear weapons by Pakistan resulting in a huge destruction. Due to the historical enmity, the conventional asymmetry, lack of strategic depth and other vulnerabilities, the doctrine which highlights limited war can be considered as a total war by Pakistan<sup>17</sup>. The geostrategic depth between India and Pakistan is lesser as compared to that of the US and USSR during the Cold War. The conflict of any kind has the capacity of escalating into a nuclear war because it can no longer be controlled once triggered.

The heightened threat perception of Pakistan was also indicated at its official level. NCA of Pakistan said “Massive induction of advanced weapons including installation of ABMs, building up of nuclear arsenals and delivery systems through ongoing and new programs, offensives like CSD and similar accumulations in the conventional realm tend to destabilize the regional balance”<sup>18</sup>. The strategic balance which was maintained by acquiring nuclear weapons by both the states has been disturbed by India because of the introduction of new technologies within the region. This increase has induced security dilemma within Pakistan and it has been facing threat because of the instability of the deterrence equation. This threat perception has been the cause of Pakistan’s introduction of TNWs within the region.

After the acquisition of nuclear capability Pakistan quickly moved towards formulation of its nuclear doctrine and to put in place an effective

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<sup>16</sup>“Welcome to ISPR,” ISPR, January 1, 2010, accessed October 10, 2016, [http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press\\_release&id=1082](http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1082).

<sup>17</sup>“Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia: Pakistan's Stabilisation-Destabilisation Dilemma,” Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, February 03, 2015, accessed October 10, 2016, <http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/3-Ghazala-Final.pdf>.

<sup>18</sup>“Welcome to ISPR,” ISPR, January 13, 2010, accessed October 10, 2016, [https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press\\_release&date=2010/1/13](https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2010/1/13).

command and control system. According to Salik<sup>19</sup>, Pakistan believes that ambiguity adds to the value of deterrence due to the weaker conventional capabilities and nuclear assets that is why it chose not to publicly pronounce its nuclear doctrine. One thing about Pakistan's nuclear doctrine which is not kept ambiguous is that it is India-centric and is driven by its security concerns. Due to the history both India and Pakistan share and a list of conflicts they have been involved into, Pakistan has kept its defense focus only towards India.

There are four important contours of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine. First, it is Indo-centric. Second, Pakistan maintained a posture of MCD. Third, the requirements for MCD are not fixed rather determined by changing threat environment. Fourth, due to India's conventional military advantage Pakistan reserves the option to use nuclear weapons first i.e. Nuclear First Use Policy<sup>20</sup>. These four contours explain how Pakistan has focused its policies towards countering India and also that it has no intension of inducing arms race in South Asia. Pakistan's doctrine depends on the threat environment it will face and can change according to it depicting the defensive nature of the doctrine.

Chakma<sup>21</sup> also elaborated other important features of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine i.e. the principle of massive retaliation and counter value nuclear targeting. Massive retaliation can be considered best because

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<sup>19</sup>“The Evolution of Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine,” Naval Postgraduate School, accessed October 10, 2016,

[http://my.nps.edu/documents/104111744/106151936/6+Nuclear+Learning\\_Salik.pdf/3457bf32-507c-4120-8c74-45d71d4340b7](http://my.nps.edu/documents/104111744/106151936/6+Nuclear+Learning_Salik.pdf/3457bf32-507c-4120-8c74-45d71d4340b7).

<sup>20</sup>“Deterrence Instability & Nuclear Weapons in South Asia,” Stimson Center, April 2015, accessed October 10, 2016,

<http://www.stimson.org/search/google/books%20reports%20deterrence%20instability%20nuclear%20weapons%20in%20south%20asia?mode=404>.

<sup>21</sup>“Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in the Second Atomic Age,” Institute for Regional Security, July 2006, accessed October 10, 2016,

<http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol2no2Chakma.pdf>.

having a weaker position with respect to India, this option can lessen the impact of strategic vulnerability of Pakistan. But it has not clearly stated that when the principle of massive retaliation will be used except this that Pakistan will use it in response of any pre-emptive strike by India. There are two options available for a nuclear weapon state i.e. counter force nuclear target and counter value nuclear target. In counterforce targeting the nuclear weapon state considers the military assets of the other state as a focus of its attack whereas in counter value nuclear target its focus is on the big cities and population of the adversary. Pakistan has only maintained minimum nuclear force that will result in unacceptable damage to India if it tries to harm the security of Pakistan.

Sultan<sup>22</sup> in his article wrote that in an interview, The Director General of SPD, Lt. General (ret.) Khalid Kidwai described the nuclear redlines of Pakistan. He says that the weapons are solely aimed at India and they will be used in case of deterrence failure. They will be used if India attacks Pakistan and conquers large part of its territory i.e. space threshold, if India destroys a large part either of land or air forces i.e. military threshold, if India proceeds to economic strangling of Pakistan or pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large scale internal subversion i.e. domestic destabilization.

### **Pakistan's Acquisition of Tactical Nuclear Weapons**

The successful test of Hatf IX – also known as Nasr – on April 21, 2011 marked the development of short-range or low-yield nuclear weapons which Pakistan plans to use to forestall the advances of Indian troops under New Delhi's "Cold Start" doctrine. Nasr is a Surface-to-Surface Multi-

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<sup>20</sup>“South Asian Stability-Instability Paradox: Another Perspective,” IPRI, 2014, accessed October 10, 2016, <http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Article-no.-2-dr.-Adil.pdf>.

Tube Short Range Ballistic Missile and is capable of carrying nuclear warheads of 'appropriate yield'<sup>23</sup>

With the developments of tactical nuclear weapons Pakistan has changed its nuclear policy from credible minimum deterrence to full spectrum deterrence which provides Islamabad with strategic and tactical tools to confront emerging threats such as offensive doctrines like India's Cold Start. Contrary to the belief that Pakistan is moving towards tactical nuclear warfare, Feroz Hasan Khan<sup>24</sup> in his book *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb* argues that Nasr is not a war fighting weapons rather it is meant to "deter assaulting forces at the tactical level" which depicts Pakistan's intension of using TNWs merely for deterrence purpose and not for fighting with the enemy.

To date, Pakistan's nuclear policy comprises an official transition from the doctrine of credible minimum deterrence to full spectrum deterrence, developed short-range delivery systems, continued production of fissile materials needed for the maintenance of its arsenal and advocated use of tactical nuclear weapons in its larger nuclear weapons policy. These developments have raised a wide range of criticism both at regional as well as international level. According to the Stability-Instability Paradox, having nuclear weapons ensures strategic stability but, at the same time, also increases the risk of tactical instability. This means that high level or full-fledged wars would be eliminated but the risk of low level wars would increase. In the Indo-Pak context, however, the acquisition of TNWs calls for a revision of the Paradox. The development of TNWs by Pakistan introduced another stability-instability paradox between the two rivals. With the strength of conventional defences more or less fool-proof, the enemy is more likely to revert to subversive or 4<sup>th</sup>/5<sup>th</sup> Generation Warfare. Since Pakistan has attained sufficient capability to deter India from

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<sup>23</sup>“Welcome to ISPR,” ISPR, April 19, 2011, accessed October 10, 2016, [https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press\\_release&id=1721](https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721).

<sup>24</sup>Feroz Hassan Khan, *Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb* (Washington, DC, United States: Stanford University Press, 2012).

asserting its conventional superiority, chances are that India would resort to subversive warfare, capitalizing on Pakistan's internal vulnerabilities. Taking advantage of the latter's domestic turmoil, India would now try to inflict harm indirectly. This could figure as increased support to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Balochistan insurgency.

India formulated its military doctrine of Cold Start in the face of so-called terrorist threats from Pakistan-based militants. Officially, it was a proactive strategy designed to counter potentially offensive threats in proxy operations at sub-conventional level. Development of this doctrine and the conventional asymmetry between the two rivals pushed Pakistan to add TNWs to its nuclear arsenal. There were other factors too that resulted in the acquisition of TNWs by Pakistan. The discriminatory Indo-US nuclear deal in 2005, favour given to India by the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) due to which India got an agreement for nuclear fuel supply, and the introduction of ABMs in the region raised prospects for India to gain an advantage over Pakistan and thus the balance of strategic equation between both of them was disturbed<sup>25</sup>. Due to these reasons, Pakistan moved towards other policy options like obtaining TNWs. The nuclear deterrence gap that was created by Indian Cold Start doctrine, has been minimized by acquisition of TNWs and by Pakistan. The objectives of TNWs were two-fold: to deter India from waging a war that could lead to nuclear exchange, and to put up an effective response in case of a limited war.

### **Regional and International Concerns**

The introduction of TNWs by Pakistan in South Asia has given rise to a controversial debate. It has raised concerns whether these weapons will increase stability or will further destabilize the region. Not only have these weapons alarmed the regional neighbor-India, but also the international community. Experts from around the world have been highlighting the risks that come with these weapons. Pakistan claims that the introduction

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<sup>25</sup>“Cold Start In Strategic Calculus,” IPRI, 2012, accessed October 11, 2016, <http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/art1asanw12.pdf>.

of TNWs was in response to India's CSD and the decision to lower the nuclear threshold is necessary in order to avoid a full-scale conventional war by India. Whereas responding to the introduction of TNWs, India says that the CSD has never been formally implemented by the Indian government<sup>26</sup>. Except a few military exercises conducted by India, there are no developments, which show that the doctrine has been fully employed. No official document is released and there is no change in the Indian posture regarding the doctrine. According to an Indian expert, Jaganath Sankaran<sup>27</sup>, Pakistan has exaggerated the threat of CSD and induced TNWs. He says that CSD is not as great a threat as the dangers produced by TNWs are. It is in Pakistan's best interests not to deploy them. Both the states need to have CBMs in order to avoid any kind of mistrust or miscalculation from any side.

In response to the threat of use of TNWs by Pakistan, India is also preparing itself for nuclear war. In April 2015, it has conducted a massive military exercise alongside the Pakistan's border-Rajasthan desert<sup>28</sup>. The exercise involved 30,000 soldiers, artillery, tanks, armoured personnel carriers for practicing real situation in case of nuclear weapon attack on the battlefield. Indian Army Chief General Dalbir Singh<sup>29</sup> said that high level of operational preparedness has become the part of Indian strategy because India realizes the nature of future wars to be short and would give limited warning time. The statements given by Indian officials depict their concerns as well as how they are preparing to counter the threat they perceive from Pakistan's evolving doctrine and TNWs.

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<sup>26</sup>Press Trust of India, *India Has No "cold start" Doctrine: Army Chief*, (NDTV), December 2, 2010, <http://www.ndtv.com/wikileak/india-has-no-cold-start-doctrine-army-chief-440926>.

<sup>27</sup>Jaganath Sankaran, "Pakistan's Battlefield Nuclear Policy: A Risky Solution to an Exaggerated Threat," *International Security* 39, no. 3 (January 2015).

<sup>28</sup>*More by INP*, (The Nation), April 25, 2015, <http://nation.com.pk/national/25-Apr-2015/indian-army-launches-exercise-on-pakistan-border-to-test-battle-readiness>.

<sup>29</sup>"Indian Army Chief Says Military Ready for Short, Swift War," newspaper, September 2, 2015, accessed October 11, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1204371>.

According to a retired vice admiral of Indian Navy, Vijay Shankar<sup>30</sup>, Pakistan's nuclear policy is in contradiction with India's policy. He supported Indian doctrine while criticized Pakistan's doctrine by asserting that it has given rise to challenges for India.

Along with the regional experts, international experts have been warning about the dangerous implication of TNWs since they are developed. United States and its allies have expressed their concerns through various statements given by their officials. They refer TNWs as a destabilizing factor in South Asia and are working on either reducing these weapons or reducing the effects of them. Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of Washington based Arms Control Association<sup>31</sup> claim TNWs to be a dangerous development that has destabilizing effects. Because of their small size they are easier to steal and transport which increases the anxieties of experts around the world<sup>32</sup>. It would enable the non-state actors to feasibly plot the theft. TNWs lower the threshold because they require deployment in the battlefield and in contrast to strategic nuclear weapons they produce small explosions. But even these small low yield explosions could lead to escalation and retaliation from the adversary.<sup>33</sup>

### **Pakistan's Narrative over Tactical Nuclear Weapons' Possession**

The main source for public information regarding Pakistan's stance over TNWs can be concluded from ISPR press releases. A large number of Pakistan's strategists are of the view that Pakistan's acquisition of TNWs is

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<sup>30</sup>“Challenges to India's Nuclear Doctrine,” The Atlantic Council, October 11, 2016, accessed October 11, 2016, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/past-events/challenges-to-india-s-nuclear-doctrine>.

<sup>31</sup>“Pakistan Builds Low Yield Nuclear Capability, Concern Grows,” Reuters, May 15, 2011, accessed October 11, 2016, <http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-57022820110515>.

<sup>31</sup>“Risks in Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons Policy | GRI,” Global Risk Insight, November 12, 2015, accessed October 11, 2016, <http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/11/risks-in-pakistans-tactical-nuclear-weapons-policy/>.

<sup>33</sup>“Emerging Cracks in South Asian Nuclear Deterrence - Harvard Political Review,” Harvard Political Review, December 24, 2015, accessed October 11, 2016, <http://harvardpolitics.com/world/emerging-cracks-south-asian-nuclear-deterrence/>.