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RESEARCH ARTICLES

Introduction

Publication of the *Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses (JSSA)*, as a premier publication of the SVI, is a landmark achievement accomplished by the close of three years since its inception in 2013. *JSSA* is envisioned to present dispassionate analysis that is valuable for decision-making in the distinctive yet overlapping fields of security, foreign and strategic policy. An integral objective of the SVI vision is to contribute to the national policy narrative with the ideal to improve the quality of its various dimensions. Pakistan is considered facing a dilemma of being internationally regarded as an 'analysis deficient' country with a 'tunnel vision' on one hand and on the other hand, its media, especially electronic, generates a plethora of secondary source, unsubstantiated and poor quality literature that obfuscates a clear visualization of the current and future policy direction. This is demonstrated from the fact that there is no officially proclaimed national security policy to function as guidelines for autonomous decision-making, free from the influence of international propaganda /misinformation campaigns and disparage opinions proclaiming Pakistan as a failed state. *JSSA* also aims to contribute to the international discourse on peace, conflict resolution and global security. It is therefore essential to work for an environment that is conducive for the maintenance of international peace and is not hostage to conflict dynamics and endemic imperious threats to regional security and strategic stability.

It has been deemed imperative to scrutinize the contemporary issues simultaneously through the lens of strategic and security studies in order to promote a comprehensive conception of complex national and international strategic environment and to configure distinct discourse that would help in sound decision-making and policy formulation. This thought works as a driving force behind this journal. *JSSA* is envisaged to inculcate independent thinking and scholarship that supports human security and fundamental freedom.

The major areas covered in the research papers in this volume reflect upon a rapidly changing international security environment and primarily focus on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and non-proliferation/counter proliferation policy, deterrence and strategic stability. Some papers focus on strategy, statecraft, crisis management, regional security, conflict management and resolution, intelligence and the emerging spectrum of new and

complex security and strategic threats. Some others cover areas like internal ethnic, sectarian, and religious conflicts, governance failure, and resources mismanagement. The approach adopted by the authors has been both theoretical and policy oriented in historical and contemporary perspectives. Special emphasis has been laid on presenting a well researched analytical narrative that is substantiated with appropriate facts, figures and sources which lends authenticity to the views presented by the authors. SVI has always favoured and stood up for the promotion of strategic culture with firm roots in extensive research and scholarship. It's meant to generate a rich debate on issues that specifically carry vital importance for Pakistan, so that the intellectual input could be better utilized in the decision making process. Additionally, it is hoped that the narrative should reach out to a larger audience where the voice could be heard and registered in national and international policy circles. *JSSA* will also be a major contributor in bringing out effective counter narratives to any prevalent policy discourse that acts against the security and strategic interests of Pakistan, and threatens regional stability and international security.

JSSA conforms to the standard HEC guidelines/rules of publication and seeks to maintain the general quality of the contributions as per the international standard. It is aspired to become a top ranking HEC recognized journal. Even though this is the first issue, the quality aspect remained and will always be the prime concern by careful selection of the manuscripts wherein the readers will be able to find a collection of well written academically sound research papers that have attempted to methodically examine various strategic and security issues in detail.

It is being hoped that the readers will be able to benefit from the analyses presented in this issue. SVI plans to bring out subsequent volumes of *JSSA* on a regular basis and is looking forward to receiving high quality manuscripts exclusively written for *JSSA*.

South Asian Security: Current Political and Security Architecture of the Sub-Continent

*Hasan Askari Rizvi**

Abstract

The major dilemma of the South Asian security architecture is non-compatibility of the regional security visions of India and Pakistan. The security architecture in the Sub-continent has diplomatic and political dimensions which are no less important than the purely military issues and security framework and mindset. Although there is hardly any chance for the divergence in the security perspectives of India and Pakistan to reconcile in the near future, but Pakistan can improve its situation in the regional political and security architecture by increasing its positive relevance for the international community. This is possible when Pakistan's civilian leadership is able to manage political conflicts, increases internal political coherence, strengthens the economy and above all, controls religious extremism and terrorism.

Keywords: Ethnic/Linguistic Multiplicity, Hegemonic, Population, Territory, Sectarianism, Terrorism, Political/Security Architecture, Physical/Military Features, Diplomatic, Political and Economic Dimensions.

The South Asian Sub-continent has a complex political and security architecture. It is characterized by ethnic and linguistic multiplicity, over-population, underdevelopment and poverty, and a binary of the highly qualified people but a low literacy rate. There are territorial and political conflicts between India and Pakistan whose roots can be traced to the colonial rule, the partition process (1947), the Cold War and the divergent regional security and stability perceptions that have caused mutual distrust and non-congruent security dispositions.

There are two major aspects of the current political and security architecture in the Sub-continent: Physical, conventional military and

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nuclear-strategic issues, and diplomatic, political and economic dimensions.

Physical and Military Features

Geographical and physical features of a region impose certain compulsions but an effective diplomacy and a country's internal political and economic strengths help to turn physical constraints into advantages or reduce their negative impacts.

The whole of South Asia represents about 22 percent of world population. India and Pakistan have more population than the rest of South Asia. This region is India-centric in terms of India's geographic location, population, territory, economy, and military power. India's dilemma is how to turn its physical advantage and military and economic power into political and diplomatic clout within the region and at the global level.

India and Pakistan have a long border (international border, working boundary in the Sialkot sector and the Line of Control in Kashmir) and they are vulnerable to conventional military pressure from each other because a good part of the border has a plain or desert like topography. India and Pakistan view each other as an adversary, entertaining a lot of mutual distrust and pursuing conflict in their bilateral interaction. They periodically engage in bitter arguments at various international forums.

The major dilemma of the security architecture is non-compatibility of the regional security visions of India and Pakistan. There is no shared vision of regional security. Most of their security is against each other. India has often emphasized three regional security principles in the post-1971 period:

1. India has the right to protect its interests and intervene in a conflict in a neighbouring state if India's security is threatened.
2. India disapproves the practice of some South Asian states that seek support of the states outside the region for strengthening their security and obtain weaponry or get into security alliances. These states should approach India first. Any problems with India must be taken up with India at the bilateral level. There is no need of raising it at international forums or with other countries.

3. The relations of the states of South Asia with other states outside the region should not undermine India's national interest and security. One writer describes India's foreign policy in the post-1971 period, especially in the 1980s as “hegemonic” and “expansionist.”¹

Pakistan offers an alternate regional security framework to be evolved through a dialogue among the states of the region. It should take care of each other's security concerns, respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. They should resolve bilateral issues through dialogue and mutual accommodation. It is a participatory and cooperative security system rather than a bigger and powerful state setting the rules for the states of the region.²

Other features of the security and political architecture of the Sub-continent include underdevelopment and widespread poverty that has accentuated socio-economic inequities in both India and Pakistan; dissident and separatist movements, ethnic and religious/sectarian conflict; violence and terrorism; interference by a state in the internal strife of another state; and propaganda wars.

India enjoys superiority over Pakistan in conventional military forces and weaponry. The deployment of its military is focused on the India-Pakistan border and the Line of Control in Kashmir, although the official Indian statement describes China as a bigger security threat. Most of the new 'war ideas' explored by India's security community before and after the terrorist attack in Mumbai in November 2008 pertained to Pakistan, i.e., limited war, surgical airstrikes, a quick military operation across the Line of Control that does not trigger a full war with Pakistan. In the past, India's security community talked of what was described as the “Cold Start”, a swift joint services operation against Pakistan. They also talked about a covert military operation inside Pakistan against the militant groups, especially the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jamaat-ud-Dawa, on the lines of the US military

¹ Maya Chadda, *Ethnicity, Security and Separatism in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp.2, 5, 12.

² Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment* (London: Macmillan Press, 1993), pp. 21-22. See also Robert G. Wirsing, *Pakistan's Security under Zia: 1977-88* (London: Macmillan Press, 1991), pp.3-20.

operation against Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011. In October 2015, India's Air Force Chief, Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha said that his Air Force had the capability to target the militant camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir but such a decision is to be taken by the political leadership.³

The induction of nuclear weapons in the region in May 1998 has drastically altered the regional security environment. India's superiority in conventional security has lost its traditional salience because now both countries possess nuclear weapons and they are working on weapon-modernization and building delivery systems. Their leadership will have to ponder carefully about the prospects of escalation from a conventional war to a nuclear exchange. This calls for a new approach to conflict, war and security. On more than one occasion since 1998, nuclear weapons have deterred India and Pakistan from resorting to a full conventional war. However, this has not led the two countries to seek peace and stability on a permanent basis. It must be recognized that the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent cannot be taken for granted. It is cultivated through responsible diplomacy, avoidance of brinkmanship, effective command and control; keep up with technological advancement and security and safety of nuclear weapons.

Diplomatic, Political and Non-military Dimensions

The security architecture in the Sub-continent has diplomatic and political dimensions which are no less important than the purely military issues and security framework and mindset. In fact, with the end of the Cold War and especially the assignment of the highest priority to countering terrorism since September 2001, non-military aspects of security architecture have gained salience.

There is hardly any chance that the divergence in the security perspectives of India and Pakistan can be reconciled in the near future. India's BJP government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi (since May 26, 2014) has adopted a more strident approach towards Pakistan than was the case under the predecessor Congress government led by Dr. Manmohan Singh. The foreign policy and national security team of the Modi government is known for a tough disposition towards Pakistan. Another supporter of the "get tough"

³ *The Asian Age* (Delhi), October 4, 2015.

with Pakistan policy is India's top Army command that has joined hands with Prime Minister Modi's foreign policy and security team, embedded in the mindset of Political Far-Right and the 'Sang Pariwar.'

India's hardened disposition towards Pakistan manifested in the cancellation of the Foreign Secretaries level talks scheduled for August 25, 2015 on the pretext that Pakistan's High Commissioner in New Delhi had held a meeting with a Kashmir Hurriyat leader, Shabir Shah, which India described as unacceptable.⁴ It has been a common practice on the part of Pakistan's High Commissioner in Delhi to meet with dissident Kashmiri leaders from time to time. On occasions the visiting Pakistani dignitaries also met with them in New Delhi. This was for the first time that any Indian government decided to cancel a scheduled high level meeting on this ground.

It was in November 2003 that Pakistan and India agreed to observe ceasefire on the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. The LoC remained more or less stable and peaceful until the end of 2013. The firing incidents across the LoC began to erupt from time to time in January 2013 onwards. These incidents escalated from July 2014, within two months of Modi assuming the office of Prime Minister in India.

A large number of firing incidents on the LoC in 2015 are taking place in the area where, on the Indian side, it is the Jammu sector of Indian administered Kashmir but on opposite side is Pakistan's mainland in the Sialkot area. The Working Boundary which enables India to use Kashmiri territory to attack Pakistani territory rather than Pakistan-administered Kashmir. The two sides are firing bullets and bombs from their bunkers close to the Line of Control rather than going across it. This has avoided escalation against the backdrop of the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides.

The government of India has not been willing to revive the composite dialogue until recently that focused on 8 issue areas, including Kashmir and terrorism, in 2004-2008. Rather, it has refused to acknowledge positive gains of these talks. India wants to start a fresh dialogue process on its new conditions,⁵ which has been renamed as Comprehensive Bilateral negotiations.

⁴ Mariana Baber, "India Calls off Secretary Level Talks with Pakistan," *News* (Lahore), August 19, 2014.

⁵ For a detailed and first hand review of the Indo-Pakistan dialogue during 2004-2008, see Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove: An Insider's Account of Pakistan's Foreign Relations including Details of the Kashmir Framework* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp.155-382 (Chapters 3 and 4)

The Modi government's policy towards Pakistan has two major features. First, it has reduced the bilateral relations to a single-issue interaction. It wants Pakistan to satisfy India on its terrorism related complaints before other issues can be discussed. It is a unilateral determination of agenda that insists on Terrorism First. Second, India applies strong military and diplomatic pressure on Pakistan. The firing into mainland Pakistan from across the LoC in the Jammu sector is the manifestation of this policy. India's policy makers think that they can keep the military pressure on Pakistan without letting it escalate to a bigger war. The diplomatic pressure includes India's propaganda against Pakistan at the international level, blaming it for all terrorist incidents in India. It has been trying since 1992-93 to get Pakistan designated as a terrorist state by the United States and the United Nations.⁶

The stringent disposition of the Modi government convinced the Pakistani leadership in 2014-15 that it should view its relationship with India on the hold till the attitude of the Modi Government changes towards Pakistan. Such a freezing of the bilateral relationship was also needed for the Modi government to learn from experience that its Pakistan Policy will not resolve India's security and political issues with Pakistan. The government of Pakistan needed to wait for subsiding of India's religion-oriented ultra-nationalism.

Pakistan should focus on strengthening its diplomatic and economic interaction with the rest of the world. It should pursue strong and astute diplomacy, explaining its counter-terrorism policies since the beginning of the “Zarab-e-Azb”, the security operation in North Waziristan. Further active diplomacy and strengthening ties with other states holds the key to dealing with the situation of military and economic disparities, as these exist between Pakistan and India, to the disadvantage of Pakistan.

Pakistan needs to give special attention to strengthening its ties with Afghanistan for adopting a shared approach for countering terrorism and strengthening controls on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Pakistan must offer financial and technical support for Afghanistan's economic development. Similarly, economic and diplomatic interaction needs to be strengthened with Iran and the Central Asian states. Current plans to import electricity and gas from

⁶ Hasan Askari Rizvi, “No Hope for Peace and Stability” *Express Tribune* (Karachi), October 5, 2015.

Central Asian states through Afghanistan needs to be implemented on a priority basis. Similarly the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project should not be allowed to fizzle out. Another important project that needs to be taken up is the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline.

A new window of diplomatic opportunity is available to Pakistan because Russia has made a generous offer of cooperation in various political, economic, societal and security domains. Given the Western pressure on Russia on the Ukraine-Crimea affair (2014) and India's policy of cultivating the United States, Russia is expanding its diplomatic options to demonstrate dynamism in its foreign policy. Pakistan should avail of the latest Russian overtures by expanding economic, trade and cultural interaction. Russia and Pakistan are now working towards increased cooperation for controlling terrorism in the region. In April 2015, Pakistan and Russia agreed to joint military exercises.⁷ Russia also offered to lend Pakistan \$2 billion for building a pipeline from Karachi to Lahore for transporting liquefied natural gas.⁸

Russia has agreed to provide helicopters to Pakistan for boosting the latter's counter-terrorism capacity. Important negotiations have taken place between the two countries for providing Pakistan with more military equipment and transport and communication facilities. It was in 1968-69 that Russia (Soviet Union) provided helicopters and tanks and transport equipment to Pakistan. It also helped to set up the steel mill in Karachi. Now, Pakistan is getting helicopters and some military equipment in 2015-16 after such a long period of time. Pakistan has now been elevated from the observer's status to full membership in 2015 in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).⁹

Pakistan and China have started working on a grand economic and industrial cooperation project in 2015, described as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), linking Kashgar in the Xinjiang region of Western China with Gwadar in Balochistan by road, air and railways. This idea was first floated during China's Prime Minister Li Keqiang's

⁷ *News*, April 16, 2015.

⁸ See the statement of Pakistan's Petroleum Minister, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi: *Express Tribune*, April 18, 2015.

⁹ For a review of important development in the Pakistan-Russia relations in 2013-15 and its background, see: Hasan Askari Rizvi, "New Opening towards Russia," *Express Tribune*, June 15, 2014. Fahd Humayun, "Russian Opening," *Dawn*, February 26, 2015. Mehrunnisa Ali, "Soviet-Pakistan Ties since the Afghanistan Crisis," *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXIII No.9, September 1983, pp.1025-1042.

visit to Islamabad in May 2013 when China and Pakistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding for building such a road link.¹⁰ The notion of the CPEC was fully articulated during Chinese President Li Jinping's visit to Islamabad in April 2015, when the two countries signed 51 Memorandum of Understanding for extending bilateral cooperation; twenty of these MoUs are related to the CPEC which included a road link between the Xinjiang region of China and Gwadar, the development of Gwadar as a modern seaport as well as various projects for public service and infra-structure development, energy and industrial projects along the Corridor. The total value of these projects amounted to \$ 46 billion over the next 10 to 12 years.¹¹ The CPEC and the associated projects offered a major opportunity to Pakistan for economic and industrial development.

The CPEC is a part of China's vision of "the Silk Road and Economic Belt" and the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" meant for reviving China's old trading links with Asia, Africa and Europe. In today's modern context this connects China with Central Asia, Russia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf and the Europe as well as the ASEAN countries, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

In addition to working with China on the CPEC and the related projects, Pakistan should upgrade its economic, trade and political ties with the US, the European Union, Japan, East Asia and the Middle East. Pakistan's decision to use active diplomacy to cope with the current disharmony and conflict with India will enrich the security and political architecture of the Sub-continent.

Internal Political and Economic Dimensions

An important aspect of political architecture of the Sub-continent is internal political dynamism and the economy of a country. In today's international system, a country derives its main strength from how its political and societal mechanism functions and what is the nature of its economy.

If a country suffers from internal social and political incoherence and conflict and its politics is fragmented to such an extent that the

¹⁰ "Afghanistan Crisis," *Asian Survey*, Vol.XXIII No.9, September 1983, pp.1025-1042.

¹¹ *Pakistan Today* (Lahore), May 23, 2013; *Daily Dunya*, May 23, 2013.

For Chinese articulation of the CPEC, see Chinese President Xi Jinping's article entitled "Pak-China Dosti Zindabad," *Daily Times* (Lahore), April 19, 2015.

government is unable to ensure good governance and smooth political management, it is difficult for the country to play an effective role at the global level or withstand external pressures. Similarly, stable and viable economy that also ensures distributive justice for the common people is critical to the role of a country in regional power architecture and global power politics. A country heavily dependent on external financial support for sustaining itself will have limited options for pursuing foreign and domestic policies in an autonomous manner.

Pakistan can overcome its handicaps in the regional and global contexts by putting its political and economic house in order. Pakistan's domestic democratic political system is facing serious difficulties because of the growing conflict among the major political parties that find it difficult to come to an understanding for handling political affairs. Consequently, governance and political management on the part of the federal government has faltered. It has not been able to evolve conflict resolution mechanisms to cope with the political alienation and protest.

There is an urgent need to make Pakistan's economy self-sustaining and viable. Its dependence on external sources limits Pakistan's political and economic choices. The acute electricity and gas shortages have a crippling impact on the economy. Further, the price hike and inflation has increased economic pressures on the common people. The health and education facilities offered by Pakistan's federal and provincial governments are inadequate. Though Pakistan is not a food deficit country, a large number of people cannot have two meals a day and children die of mal-nutrition and a lack of health facilities.

Religious extremism and terrorism have become negative features of Pakistan's security and societal architecture. These two factors have caused more damage to Pakistani politics, society and economy than any other factor. The inconsistent and ambiguous government policies and a state of denial about the existence of extremist and terrorist outfits made it difficult to cope with these challenges. Extremism and terrorism have also adversely affected Pakistan's economy. Consequently, Pakistan faces greater threats to its survival as a coherent polity from within rather than from outside. Its reputation has also suffered at the global level because it is often described as the most dangerous place in the world by writers and analysts based

outside of Pakistan. Extremism has increased religious and cultural intolerance in Pakistan that has caused much polarization and conflict. Religious minorities often become target of religious extremist and hard line groups. The state is unable or unwilling to protect the rights and identities of religious minorities and other weaker sections of the society.

The decision of the Pakistan Army top brass to initiate a comprehensive security operation in North Waziristan and other tribal areas in mid-June 2014 was a delayed but much needed policy measure to counter terrorism and extremism. So far, this operation has produced positive results because the terrorist groups no longer have a safe-haven in the tribal areas; their command and training centres have been destroyed. This has weakened the terrorist groups. Similarly, the security operation in Karachi by the Pakistan Rangers and the Police has improved internal security situation there. However, the challenge of extremism, sectarianism and terrorism has not been fully eliminated. The on-going security operations in the tribal areas and parts of mainland Pakistan have to be pursued with consistency till the situation is fully under control. The success of these efforts by the security establishment and civilian governments will not only restore internal peace and stability in Pakistan, but will also improve the prospects of economic along with restoring Pakistan's credibility at the international level.

Positive Relevance to the International Community

Pakistan can improve its situation in the regional political and security architecture by increasing its positive relevance with the international community. This is possible when Pakistan's civilian leadership is able to manage political conflicts, increases internal political coherence, strengthens the economy and above all, controls religious extremism and terrorism. The key to Pakistan's capacity to cope with external pressures, especially India's strident policies, lies with addressing these issues in a satisfactory manner.

The most important relevance to the international system relates to the economy. How far a country is linked with the international economic arrangements that involve trade, market for goods and services and an attractive proposition for foreign investment? How far a country can serve as a transit route for movement of goods, services and energy?

The current military efforts to control terrorism also increase Pakistan's relevance to the international system. Pakistan's diplomatic position is strengthened by the statement of Pakistan's Army Chief General Raheel Sharif that the army is taking action in North Waziristan and other tribal areas against all terrorists groups in a non-discriminatory manner. This is being seen as a shift in Pakistan's counter-terrorism policy because one major complaint against the Pakistan government and the military-intelligence establishment at the international level was that these were selective in taking action against the terrorists groups. Now, the current military action in the tribal areas is targeting all groups based there.

Pakistan can strengthen its position in the security, political and economic architecture of the Sub-Continent/South Asia by pursuing active diplomacy, expanding its interaction at the global level, putting its political and economic house in order and addressing extremism and terrorism in a forthright manner. Pakistan needs to improve its positive relevance to the international system by becoming an attractive place for trade, investment and economic activity. It should be viewed at the international level as a part of the solution of the problem of terrorism and regional instability and incoherence.

Postscript

Three quick diplomatic interactions between Pakistan and India in November-December 2015 improved the prospects for revival of the bilateral dialogue on the contentious issues. This was partly because of the realization in India of the futility of its policy of building diplomatic and military pressures on Pakistan and not talking to it except on its terms. The first signs of change emerged when Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi talked to each other briefly on the occasion of the global conference on environment in Paris on November 30, 2015. This contact was followed up by the meeting of the National Security Advisers of Pakistan (Lt-General (ret'd) Nasser Khan Janjua) and India (Ajit Doval) in Bangkok on December 6, 2015. The Foreign Secretaries of both countries were present in this meeting. These two diplomatic interactions paved the way for the visit of India's Minister for External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, to Islamabad on December 8-9 to participate

in the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process meeting on Afghanistan. The bilateral meetings between her and Pakistani leaders resulted in a decision to revive the bilateral dialogue under a new name “Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue.” The Joint Statement issued on December 9 noted that “the National Security Advisers will continue to address all issues connected to terrorism. The Indian side was assured [by Pakistan] of the steps being taken to expedite the early conclusion of the Mumbai trial.” The Foreign Secretaries of Pakistan and India were directed in the Joint Statement to work out a schedule of meetings on “Peace and Security, CBMs, Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, Wuller Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, Economic and Commercial Cooperation, Counter-terrorism, Narcotics Control and Humanitarian Issues, People to People Exchanges and Religious Tourism,”¹² The Joint Declaration incorporates the major concerns of both countries and other problems. Hopefully, this will provide a basis for yet another revival of bilateral talks between Pakistan and India.

However the attack on the Indian Air Force base in Pathankot has once again disrupted the process of negotiations. India has asked Pakistan to hold an inquiry into the attack and communicate her the action Pakistan would like against the involved the attackers without allowing access to Pakistan inquiry team into the Pathankot base, which puts a question mark on the early resumption of the negotiations.

¹² For the full text of the Joint Statement: *Nation* (Lahore), December 10, 2015.

Pakistan: Indispensability of Nuclear Security

Zulfqar Khan*

Abstract

Pakistan and India's relationship is primarily based on a perception of mutual vulnerability. Furthermore, the US-India nuclear deal and the growing Indian conventional capabilities have also enhanced Pakistan's insecurity. Pakistan relies on its strategic assets to offset India's conventional advantage. Because of stability-instability paradox, the strategic stability is expected to remain elusive. South Asian nuclear security tangle could only be stabilized if the nuclear rivals formulate their strategies on balanced perceptions by realistically fathoming the perils inherent in the conception of a limited conflict posture under the nuclear overhang.

Keywords: Nuclear security, Neo-realist, Globalist, Regionalist, South Asia, Nuclear Deterrence, NPT, Indo-US Nuclear Deal, NSG, Kashmir.

Introduction: Security for Survival

In essence, the danger of widening gulf of conventional military and strategic asymmetry between India and Pakistan is naturally enhancing Pakistan's sensitivities regarding its national security. In fact, the concept of security was shaped during the heydays of the Cold War, and its referent point was 'both geopolitical and to a large extent, values and principles.'¹ In the realm of security, three theoretical perspectives came into vogue after the end of the Cold War: international security structure was premised on 'neorealist, globalist, and regionalist' principles.² However, the South Asian security complex, which had direct 'insecurities' that were linked to India's and Pakistan's domestic and external threat perceptions that consequentially 'not only maintained, but considerably escalated' due to their hostility toward each other. Mutual 'securitisations' between

*The author is Head of Department, Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Islamabad.

¹ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structures of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 283.

² *Ibid.* p 6.

India and Pakistan were later on 'bolstered by the nuclearization of the military rivalry.'³ Obviously, the nature of their relations exacerbated tensions, which gradually led to intensification of their rivalry that influenced both countries' nuclear policies. The parameter of Pakistan's nuclear security is intensely security-centric. Its nuclear capability and security are ostensibly directly linked to its survivability as a viable sovereign state. As security is correlated to its existence, therefore, it continues to influence its policies in a highly security conscious culture. Hence, Pakistan perceives security from multiple lenses – state, internal and external security, and securing of its strategic assets and infrastructure. In fact, the latter is a potent instrument in the hands of a state to ensure its existence in view of threats from its conventionally, economically and strategically much stronger rival – India. Therefore, nuclear security is a core pivot of Pakistan's strategic capability that is so essential in ensuring its sovereignty and independence.

The geopolitical environment and the growing spate of violence engineered by Al-Qaeda and its Taliban affiliates make the issue of security of its nuclear arsenal much more critical for the country. In the context of South Asia, the existence of nuclear weapons has made a total war less probable between India and Pakistan. But, both countries still devise divergent strategies to gain maximum advantages over each other. In addition, their regional strategy of deterrence has also created a situation of stability-instability on the subcontinent,⁴ which has made bilateral security relations of both states hostage to their bitter history. Because of stability-instability paradox, the strategic stability is expected to remain elusive. Secondly, nuclear security,⁵ which is directly linked to existence of a viable deterrence, does not operate only in crises like situation; in fact, it reinforces prudence and moderation in peace time as well. Thirdly, in the context of 'absence of security,' and living in 'fear, with dangers arising from one or more threats is further complicating the situation.'⁶ While in the realm of nuclear security, Pakistan already has export control system that was evolved 'over the last decade through indigenous efforts that have been informed by international best

³ Ibid.p 104.

⁴ See Glen H. Snyder, "*The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror*," in *The Balance of Power*, ed. Paul Seabury (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965).

⁵ See Terence Ball, '*Power*,' in *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, ed. Robert E. Goodwin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

⁶ See Frank Furedi, *Culture of Fear* (London: Continuum, 2005).

practices and cooperation' of US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).⁷

Post-9/11 World

In the post 9/11 world, Pakistan's threat perceptions and the general situation of the region had encouraged it not only to consistently, systematically, and physically combat the menace of terrorism, but also through a host of measures overhauled its safety and security architecture. Pakistan plugged the weaknesses in its existing non-proliferation and safety and security regimes. The principles of Pakistan's nuclear non-proliferation policy are based on adherence to the ideals and norms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) despite its refusal to sign the Treaty due to Indian rejection of the NPT. However, Pakistan is signatory to a number of regimes, including the Convention on Nuclear Safety since 1994. Pakistan, on January 22, 2001, established Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), under the obligations of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) programme of International Nuclear Safety. The PNRA functions on the pattern of IAEA's Advisory Group on Nuclear Security (AdSec), and it consistently re-evaluates and endeavours to improve its nuclear safety and security architecture.⁸ In fact, the Taliban activities in Pakistan generated negative perceptions and concerns over the security aspects of Pakistan's strategic arsenal. But, different US policymakers, including President Obama stated that, 'We have confidence that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is safe; that the Pakistani military is equipped to prevent extremists from taking over those arsenal.'⁹ Moreover, scores of US and Western leaderships, including US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Head of the US Central Command too have reposed confidence in the Nuclear security system of Pakistan. Pakistan takes its nuclear security seriously: as reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously,' writes Stephen Younger of Los Alamos National Laboratory.¹⁰

⁷ Michelle Marchesano, 'Meeting the Nuclear Security Challenge in Pakistan,' *Partnership for Global Security, February 21-22, 2008* (Washington, DC: U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, and John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 2008): 1.

⁸ See Zulfqar Khan, 'Pakistan's Non-Proliferation Policy,' in Islamization of Pakistan 1979-2009, *The Middle East Institute, Washington D.C.*, <http://www.mei.edu> (accessed on 22 May 2013).

⁹ Jon Meacham, 'A Highly Logical approach: A Conversation with Barack Obama,' *Newsweek*, May 16, 2009, <http://www.newsweek.com/id/197891> (accessed on May 19, 2013).

¹⁰ Stephen M. Younger, *Endangered Species: How we can avoid Mass Destruction and Build a Lasting Peace* (New York: Ecco, 2007), 93.

Most significantly, in case of Pakistan, the imperative of robust security plan and cordon around its critical strategic assets is much more vital in view of its security concerns vis-à-vis its adversary. As far as the security culture of Pakistan is concerned, its nuclear devices are unassembled and maintained under a stringent monitoring system, which includes its weapons-grade material as well.¹¹ Therefore, to believe that a few thousand Taliban could possibly 'terminally disrupt – or even manage to take over and control' of¹² its nuclear assets, despite a highly professional army, and robust safety and security architecture,¹³ is out of step with the ground realities. Now, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates are in a state of disarray, if not in obliteration, in the wake of massive onslaught by Pakistani and US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan,¹⁴ and operation Zarb-e-Azab. In addition, overwhelming majority of Muslims do not subscribe to the medieval ideology of Al-Qaeda and its Taliban associates, which consider themselves in a state of war with Pakistan, and other conservative Middle Eastern Muslim states as well.¹⁵

Mutual Vulnerability

Pakistan's and India's relationship is primarily based on a perception of mutual vulnerability. Apparently, the aggressive posture of India and the absence of arms control agreement mechanism between the two have created a security dilemma in the region. Furthermore, the US-India nuclear deal and the growing Indian conventional capabilities have also enhanced Pakistan's insecurity thereby strengthening its resolve to sustain a credible deterrence posture against India. However, the country will also have to upgrade its deterrence and safety and security capabilities regularly with the changing global and regional situation.¹⁶ Actually, Pakistan relies on its strategic assets to offset India's conventional advantage.¹⁷ Some of the recent geopolitical developments, which have destabilised uneasy relationship, include:

¹¹ John Mueller, *Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 167, 169.

¹² *Ibid.* p 167.

¹³ Zulfqar Khan, 'Pakistan's Non-Proliferation Policy.

¹⁴ Mueller, *Atomic Obsession*, 165.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, 'The Logic of Zero: Toward a World without Nuclear Weapons,' *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2008): 93.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

1. The Indo-US nuclear deal and scores of other science and technology transfer agreements, which are expected to qualitatively and quantitatively increase India's nuclear and scientific research and development potentials.
2. Nuclear Suppliers Group's (NSG) special exemption to India to acquire nuclear technology and materials despite India being a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
3. International Atomic Energy Agency's grant of India-specific safeguards.
4. India's acquisition of ballistic missile defence (BMD) system is considered a hedge against Pakistan's deterrence posture against economically and militarily much stronger adversary.
5. Non-resolution of Kashmir dispute and the uneasy concept of regional stability are impacting the whole gamut of issues, including security of nuclear arsenal.
6. Last, but not the least, India's signing of nuclear cooperation agreements with number of NPT/other states, is furthermore enhancing Pakistan's anxiety and sense of vulnerability.

In the strategic realm, the Indian restructuring of its doctrines and institution of offensive blitzkrieg-type strategies, unfortunately, threaten the occurrence of conflicts and wars on one hand; and on other, it would tantamount to deliberately destabilizing the existing fabric of nuclear deterrence between the two countries.¹⁸ Furthermore, it can lower Pakistan's conventional threshold level, in view of already widening gulf of asymmetry in the conventional force levels of two countries. This clearly negates the very concept of rational deterrence theory,¹⁹ which emphasizes the need for rationality in doctrine and policymaking spheres to sustain the strategic balance between nuclear adversaries. This crafting of

¹⁸ See Farzana Siddique, 'India Doctrinal Orientation: Causing instability in the Region,' *CISS Insight* (February-March 2013).

¹⁹ See Frank C. Zagare, "Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment", *International Interactions*, 21, no. 4 (1996):368: <http://cas.buffalo.edu/classes/psc/fczagare/Articles/Classical%20Deterrence%20Theory.PDF> (accessed on May 2, 2013).

offensive doctrines has enhanced mutual vulnerability,²⁰ but, at the same time, has increased the prospects of destabilizing the semblance of strategic posture between India and Pakistan. Secondly, it appears that, both countries are following the US-Soviet Union pattern of devising offensive 'doctrines of "strategic stability" through mutual vulnerability.' A contemporary strategist, Vipin Narang posits that presently the objective of nuclear weapons, especially in South Asian context, has three distinct aspects: 'a catalytic posture,²¹ an assured retaliation posture, and an asymmetric escalation posture.' First two aspects – catalytic and assured retaliation postures, were quite predominant during the Cold War, while the asymmetric escalation posture was not in the toolkit of Western policymakers during the Cold War. But unfortunately, the asymmetric escalation doctrine is embedded in the strategic perceptions and doctrinal moorings of contemporary India vis-à-vis Pakistan. Therefore, present day South Asian nuclear security tangle could only be stabilized if the nuclear rivals formulate their strategies on balanced perceptions by realistically fathoming the perils inherent in the conception of a limited conflict posture under the nuclear overhang. Operationalisation of coercive power potentials by a stronger country would spontaneously trigger a quantum response from Pakistan, to neutralize former's escalation dominance and compellence as instruments of policy. Nuclear deterrence, writes Samir Paul Kapur, is being pursued by Pakistan as a bargaining chip against India. Therefore, stability-instability paradox that sustained peace during the Cold War in Europe cannot be automatically applied to South Asian environment.²²

It is observed that the prospects of stability-instability paradox can too be made relevant to South Asian security situation, if, the predominant power demonstrates a cautious policy, especially with regards to employing strategies of escalation dominance and compellence, while pursuing bilateral diplomacy and confidence and security building measures. This would go a long way in stabilizing their deterrent postures and eventually could lead to resolution of bilateral disputes. Moreover, if the nuclear weapons could play a

²⁰ David S. Yost, 'Analysing International Nuclear Order,' *International Affairs* 83, no. 3 (May 2007): 549-74

²¹ Vipin Narang, 'Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,' *International Security* 34, no. 3 (winter 2009/10): 38-78..

²² Samir Paul Kapur, 'India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia is not like Cold War Europe,' *International Security* 30, no. 2 (2005): 127-52.

'stabilizing role in East-West relations' during the Cold War,²³ then, why it cannot perform the same role in contemporary South Asia. Furthermore, essentially both countries failure to transcend from their crises ridden past history, including non-resolution of disputes, and India's formulation of highly destabilizing strategies like the 'Cold Start Doctrine,'²⁴ is persistently impacting their relations and the regional peace.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

In the context of nuclear non-proliferation, following developments are also affecting Pakistan:

1. Since the signing of the NPT, Pakistan has demonstrated a commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation vision, which India had always claimed for itself and attached to international nuclear disarmament issues.
2. Pakistan had initially supported the draft NPT and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but, could not join these initiatives due to peculiar regional security imperatives and India's non-adherence on the pretext of discriminatory nature of these regimes.
3. During the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistan had proposed regional level nuclear non-proliferation initiatives, and none were accepted by India.²⁵
4. There is an ongoing debate and pressure on the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-NPT NWS, to fulfil the promise of nuclear disarmament (as enshrined in the Article 6 of the NPT), and to move toward "global zero" ideal, as envisaged by President Obama.²⁶

²³ Tanya Ogilvie-White, *On Nuclear Deterrence: The Correspondence of Sir Michael Quinlan* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, (2011), 37.

²⁴ See Walter C. Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine", *International Security* 32, no. 3 (winter 2007/08).

²⁵ Zulfqar Khan, 'The Politics of Nuclear Non-Proliferation with Particular Reference to South Asia,' *IPRI Journal* V, No.1 (Winter 2005): 86.

²⁶ See Daalder and Lodol, 'The Logic;' and Office of the Press Secretary, and The White House Press Release, 'Remarks by President Barack Obama,' April 5, 2009.

5. In the present security environment, it would be unrealistic to expect Pakistan to adhere to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS), to join the CTBT, or to accept the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in its present shape, in view of its prevalent threat perceptions and growing asymmetry between India and Pakistan.

Divergent Approaches: Regional-cum-International-Centric

In the South Asian context, Pakistan has always insisted for a regional-centric approach (ascending - bottom to top - from sub-regional to regional and then to international) in order to resolve the bilateral disputes and to stabilize the asymmetrical security architecture. On the contrary, India, due to its inherent desire to equate itself with the international arms control and disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation diplomacy, has persistently urged for a top to bottom (descending - from international to regional & sub-regional level) approach. Their divergent approaches to different regional issues have kept both countries apart and in a perpetual state of mistrust. This state of a mistrust prevented them to 'transcend past experience'²⁷ for a more pragmatic and realistic lens to tackle their bilateral issues. India and Pakistan's non-transcending of fearful and mistrustful past would continue to place both countries' relations on non-pragmatic edge. In fact, the security of a nation-state is quite a diverse subject, which encompasses political, socioeconomic, and societal to military security aspects. Therefore, it is imperative to view the subject in a comprehensive perspective, instead of viewing it from a single lens. However, transcending of mistrustful past could go long way in finding a constructive approach to resolve all their outstanding disputes.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, apparently, the dimensions of international security and violence/conflict roots have shifted toward the regional and sub-regional dynamics. Therefore, evolution of region-specific principles for the architecture of framework for arms control and non-proliferation would obviously stabilize the security situation of South Asia and impel India and Pakistan to head toward bilateral conflict resolution mechanisms. However, India, since

²⁷ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977), p.256.

independence had consistently insisted for a uniform approach to all international issues, and it refused to sign different non-proliferation regimes on the rationale of being discriminatory and 'apartheid,' including the NPT,²⁸ the approach it has abandoned while seeking a nuclear deal with the US and waiver to the NSG.

The zenith of regional-centric security and deterrence approach would be to institute a series of measures to streamline the whole gamut of both countries' foreign and security policy calculus. Additionally, whether tactical nuclear weapons or strategic weapons are integrated in their military doctrines, even then, there is a space to calibrate strategies that do not undermine each other's national security. As both countries' conventional war-fighting capabilities and other non-military elements of security are asymmetrical, therefore, testing of Pakistan's threshold level would be highly destabilizing and dangerous for peace and security. Institution of confidence and security building measures along with resolution of bilateral issues may minimize, if not remove altogether, the possibilities of India crafting a so-called limited war fighting-type plans under the nuclear overhang. Furthermore, it is argued that both countries should find a deterrence stabilization plan to balance the regional security equation.

Conclusion

It can be deduced that nuclear security, especially between NWS and Non-NPT NWS, in the rapidly fluctuating current international situation, is a resilient instrument in the hands of states to cope with the emerging challenges to their security. It's especially so in the wake of changing nature of world politics from the traditions and norms of Westphalia to post-9/11 hegemonic-driven political structure. Therefore, the imperative of nuclear security of Pakistan requires astute handling by its policymakers. Nowadays, complexity of world politics²⁹ is premised on multi-dimensional facets, where salience of nuclear weapons persists inspite of call for 'global zero' and institution of variety of regimes, treaties and measures, and commencement of Nuclear Security Summit initiative. Other elements of strategic competition between the states based on multidimensional aspects

²⁸ Zulfqar Khan, 'The Politics.'

²⁹ Christopher P. Twomey, 'Asia's Complex Strategic Environment: Nuclear Multipolarity and other Dangers,' *Asia Policy* 11 (January 2011): 56.

would also continue to be a force to be reckoned with in the coming decades. However, the significance of states' internal security and governance system would continue to persistently determine the states' capabilities, relative position in the hierarchical world, and its future direction in the foggy international political structure. In the realm of societal security, strengthening of socioeconomic fibre, system of governance, justice, and law and order, domestic stability, and other elements of non-military security, would enable Pakistan to sail through the morass and burden left behind by the previous regimes. Essentially, it requires multilateral, internal as well as external, approaches to security to robustly face the emerging security challenges of the 21st century.

Impact of SRBMs on Deterrence Stability in South Asia*

*Adil Sultan***

Abstract

Nuclear weapons play a pivotal role in overall military strategy of Pakistan. The presence of conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan along with India's Cold Start Doctrine, have urged Pakistan to increase its reliance on nuclear weapons. This nuclear posture has helped Pakistan in achieving sufficient deterrence against India and has restored the strategic stability in the region. However the future of regional politics is highly dependent upon India's disposition and whether it will continue to embark upon integration of its TNW into Cold Start Doctrine, in which case this could stimulate a nuclear engagement with serious consequences for the region

Keywords: NASR, FSD, Deterrence, South Asia, CBMs, Nuclear Weapons, Brasstacks, Kargil Crisis.

Introduction

The development of surface to surface short range ballistic missile (SRBM) 'NASR' (Hatf IX) by Pakistan to counter India's Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) has generated intense debate on the role of these weapons on South Asian strategic stability. The 'NASR' SRBM missile system that could also be categorized as a Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW), is now part of Pakistan's Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD)¹ nuclear posture, but is being misconstrued by some as a 'quantitative' shift from Pakistan's declared policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence. This understanding that is mainly based on the only available literature from the Cold War period, therefore, needs to be contextualized in the South Asian strategic environment, as there are significant differences and some similarities at the conceptual level and while operationalizing nuclear deterrence in the regional context.

This paper aims to briefly revisit the concept of deterrence and its

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¹ ISPR Press Release of 5th September 2013. Available at <http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2361>

applicability in the South Asian region, keeping in view the experience of past military crises between India and Pakistan during the pre and the post nuclearization periods. The paper then addresses the rationale behind Pakistan's decision to introduce SRBMs and the FSD and its role in restoring strategic stability in the region.

Deterrence and South Asia

The South Asian security environment has some distinct characteristics that differentiate its evolution of strategic thought from the Cold War period. Nevertheless, the nature of nuclear weapons and their potential to influence security policies of possessor states are intrinsically similar that helps in narrowing the gap in strategic thinking of all nuclear weapon states. If Brodie's statement made soon after the first nuclear test in 1945: "The chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them"² - remained relevant for the Cold War period; it remains applicable in the South Asian context, even after seven decades of nuclear learning process.

Based on this understanding of nuclear weapons and its deterrence impact, Collin Gray had identified four major differences between the pre and post nuclearized inter-state relations.³ First, no nuclear-weapon state (NWS) or a non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) would attempt a military campaign against a nuclear power to achieve total victory; Second, no NWS or NNWS would dare to press a military campaign against a close ally of a NWS to achieve total victory; Third, due to high cost of nuclear war any military campaign against a NWS would be conducted with extreme caution; and finally, NWS do not go to war with each other due to the fear of unlimited implications.

This largely explains the role of nuclear weapons, which is not only to prevent the use of nuclear weapons against each other by the NWS, but the imperative has been to prevent all wars,⁴ not just a nuclear war. The absence of war between nuclear armed adversaries leading to strategic stability has been defined by Podvig as: "[S]tate of affairs in

² Thomas G. Mahnken and Joseph A. Maildo (eds.), *"Strategic Studies: A Reader"*, (New York: Routledge, 2010), p.181.

³ Colin S. Gray, *"Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice"*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp.20-21.

⁴ Michael Quinlan, *"Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects"*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p.21.

which countries are confident that their adversaries would not be able to undermine their nuclear deterrence capability.”⁵

As there are no tools to measure how much or what strategies would be sufficient to maintain stability, or the requisite 'balance of power',⁶ strategic stability therefore largely remains an abstract concept and cannot be quantified in tangible terms. This is more important in South Asia where Pakistan with conventional disadvantage is seen reacting to emerging challenges and uses its nuclear capability to deter India's conventional as well as nuclear military doctrines.

Some scholars argue that nuclear deterrence is essentially a coercive strategy, as it is intended to persuade the adversary that; 'it must not act for fear of consequences.'⁷ On the other hand, if the nuclear capability is intended at preventing a conflict that could possibly escalate to a nuclear exchange – would nuclear deterrence still be categorized as a coercive strategy? This may not necessarily be true, especially if both adversaries are nuclear weapon states and there is a likelihood of an escalation.

Another misnomer about the nuclear weapons is that these are intended only for the purpose of deterrence and not for actual use. If one precludes the possibility of a nuclear use in a deterrence equation - will deterrence remain effective, especially if one of the parties decides to call the bluff and attempts to explore space for a conventional war under a nuclear environment? Quinlan has therefore aptly described the role of nuclear weapons as: no matter how remote we judge the possibility of a nuclear use, these weapons deter only by the possibility of their use and by no other route; and “a nuclear state is a state that no one can afford to make desperate.”⁸

⁵ Pavel Podvig, “The Myth of Strategic Stability”, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 31 October 2012.

⁶ According to explanation provided by Waltz about Balance of Power theory, states are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination. For more details see Kenneth Waltz, “*Theories of International Politics*”, (Boston: Mc Graw Hill, 1979), pp. 116-118.

⁷ Lawrence Freedman, “*Deterrence*”, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p.26.

⁸ Quinlan, p.30.

Role of Nuclear Weapons in India-Pakistan Past Crises

The 1986-87 military mobilization by India in the form of Exercise Brasstacks⁹ was the first military crisis that had overtones of a nuclear signalling. India had already tested its nuclear weapons in 1974 and Pakistan is believed to have conducted cold tests by the mid-80s. Once India mobilized its forces possibly to launch a full-fledged military operation, it is believed that Pakistan communicated its readiness to consider the possibility of a nuclear use. How real was the threat, and what kind of nuclear weapons Pakistan had at the time - is a subject that merit deeper analysis. Nevertheless, since India did not cross the international border despite having relative conventional and nuclear edge, one could possibly conclude that by conveying the nuclear threat, Pakistan may have used its nascent nuclear capability effectively to deter India.

The 'Brasstacks' crisis brought important lessons for both India and Pakistan. For Pakistan nuclear weapons became a strategic equalizer and an effective tool to deter a conventionally strong adversary; while India realized that full-fledged conventional war with Pakistan is no more possible without risking a nuclear exchange.

1999 Kargil Crisis

The Kargil conflict was the first military crisis after the overt nuclearization of South Asia. Some believe that nuclear weapons played significant role but largely through threat and bluster.¹⁰ Despite strong statements threatening each other with nuclear weapons the actual capabilities and the resolve on both sides remained doubtful. India's former Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh believed that; "nuclear angle to this [Kargil] conflict simply did not exist."¹¹ It was also later corroborated by the Indian government's Kargil Review Committee Report, which was silent regarding any nuclear threats

⁹ For detail study of the crisis and the role of nuclear weapons, see P.R. Chari, Pervez Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, *"Four Crises And A Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia"*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2007), p.119

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Jaswant Singh, *"A Call to Honour: In Service of Emergent India"*, (New Delhi: Rupa, 2006), p.227

¹² Kargil Review Committee Report, in Chari, p.139.

being operative during the hostilities from both the sides despite devoting an entire chapter to the nuclear background to this crisis.¹²

Interestingly, most of the reports of missile mobilization and mating of warheads suggesting the possibility of a nuclear use by Pakistan emanated from the Western sources and were based on intelligence leaks from within the US Administration. However, there is no evidence to validate these claims. Former President Pervez Musharraf, who was also the Army Chief at the time termed the accusation of a possible nuclear use by Pakistan as 'preposterous'. According to him, Pakistan's nuclear capability in 1999 was not yet fully operational,¹³ possibly due to absence of delivery systems.

Some of the lessons that could be drawn from the first nuclear crisis in the post 1998 period are: deterrence was effective without actually operationalizing the nuclear command structures; second, even if the Kargil crisis had a nuclear dimension, it remained limited mostly to war-gaming of nuclear deterrence without operationally deploying nuclear assets on both sides; third, both sides demonstrated a degree of restraint - India by not crossing the Line of Control (LoC) and Pakistan by not launching air operations; and lastly, Kargil conflict revealed the limits of nuclear deterrence to demarcate each sides red-lines, if not deter, war between the two adversaries.¹⁴

2001 - 2002 Crisis

If Kargil crisis was a triggering event for contextualizing deterrence in South Asia; the 2001-02 crisis was the first practical manifestation of nuclear deterrence between two new nuclear-armed neighbours. India, despite significant domestic and institutional pressures struggled for over eight months to get out of 'strategic paralysis' but was deterred from crossing the Line of Control (LoC). On the other hand, Pakistan being a relatively weaker state was able to communicate the credibility of its deterrent potential quite effectively and prevented India from initiating hostilities.

Unlike the Kargil crisis in 1999, nuclear war rhetoric during the 2001-02 crisis was more evident. Within days nuclear brinkmanship led both sides issuing strong statements asserting the credibility of

¹³ Former President of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf, "*In the Line of Fire*", (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 97-98

¹⁴ Chari, p.140.

their respective military postures. India and Pakistan were both engaged in a series of missile tests and deployed their nuclear forces as part of general mobilization, to signal their resolve. Some of the Indian scholars were of the view that India may have lost its nerves and confidence in its conventional capability to launch military offensive against Pakistan.¹⁵

India's military mobilization of 2001-02 in the garb of 'Operation Parakaram' failed to achieve its military objectives and brought important lessons for the Indian military planners. First, an all-out war with Pakistan is not possible without risking nuclear retribution. Second, full military mobilization for achieving limited political objectives is neither feasible nor economical and would be difficult to justify. Third, to meet similar challenges in the future, India needed to reconfigure its force structure, which should have quick reaction time and the capability to achieve its intended objectives without crossing Pakistan's perceived nuclear threshold. This led India to conceive new war fighting doctrine in the form of Cold Start.

Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)

Since the early 1980s Sundarji doctrine had been the guiding principle for India's development and employment strategy. According to this doctrine the bulk of Indian military formations were employed along the Western border to defend possible military incursion from the Pakistani side. These formations were mostly defensive in nature and were mandated to hold ground and allow sufficient time for the offensive strike corps that were located in central parts of India to mobilize and launch a counter-attack. To operationalize this military strategy, the Indian Air Force was required to enable air superiority, if not air supremacy to limit or prevent attrition of own ground forces.¹⁶

This strategy had inherent limitation. The slow mobilization time of the Indian offensive formations from the centre to the Western border afforded Pakistan sufficient time for defensive measures due to less geographical depth thus eliminating the element of surprise that is crucial for achieving quick gains in a conventional military conflict.

¹⁵ Kanti Bajpai, SumitGanguly and S. Paul Kapur ed., "Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb", (London: Routledge, 2009), p.171.

¹⁶ Walter C. Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Waters?: The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine", *International Security*, Vol.32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/08), p.160.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, pp.162-63.

In order to overcome this impediment, the Indian Army Chief in April 2004, unveiled the new Cold Start Doctrine (CSD).¹⁷ The objective was to develop a capability to launch a conventional military operation in the shortest possible time to achieve limited objectives without disturbing Pakistan's nuclear threshold. By keeping war objectives limited in a time compressed environment, Indian military planners had hoped to deny Islamabad the justification to respond through its strategic nuclear capability against the Indian cities.

India's CSD posited a new challenge for Pakistan, as it was intended to exploit perceived gap at the operational and tactical levels by launching limited military incursions across international border. The CSD envisaged reorganizing strike corps into at least eight smaller division-sized Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) that combined mechanized infantry, artillery, and armour on the pattern of the Soviet Union's operational manoeuvre groups.¹⁸ These IBG's would mobilize swiftly to make ingress into the Pakistani territory 50-80 km deep within a short time period of 72-96 hours.

If the challenge posed by the CSD left unaddressed, it could have challenged the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent and encouraged India to explore the possibility of a limited war under a nuclear overhang and assert its regional hegemony.

Pakistan's Full Spectrum Deterrence

To counter India's new war fighting doctrine, Pakistan introduced its SRBM labelled as 'NASR', which is a 'qualitative response' with a 'strategic' objective of deterring India from launching military offensive in the form of CSD. By developing these weapon systems, Pakistan aims to enhance the credibility of its deterrence at the operational and tactical levels, which could possibly be described as a 'Strategy of Assured Deterrence' – to cover full spectrum of threats, and has therefore been labelled as Full Spectrum Deterrence posture.

Earlier statements attributed to Pakistani nuclear planners indicate that there existed inherent flexibility and ambiguity in the nuclear doctrine to cater for various contingencies. In a statement attributed to Lt Gen (Retd) Khalid Kidwai, the former Head of Strategic Plans Division, it was stated that nuclear weapons would be used only

¹⁸ Y.I. Patel, "Dig Vijay to Divya Astra: A Paradigm Shift in the Indian Army's Doctrine," *Bharat Rakshak Monitor*, Vol. 6, No. 6 (May-July 2004), <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE6-6/patel.html>.

“if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake.” However, while describing the range of contingencies, he had stated that nuclear weapons are aimed solely to deter India. In case deterrence fails, these will be used if; India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of territory (space threshold); India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces (military threshold); India proceeds towards economic strangulation of Pakistan (economic threshold); and finally, if India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large scale internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization).¹⁹

These contingencies outlined by Gen Kidwai as early as 2001 indicate that while massive retaliation remained an option to deter India's all-out conventional attack, however, “there are options available in the nuclear response.”²⁰ The introduction of short range surface to surface multi tube ballistic missile HATF IX (NASR), with a range of 60 km that can carry a warhead of appropriate yield and accuracy, with shoot and scoot attributes could thus be viewed as part of options that Pakistan continues to develop in response to evolving threats from India. Pakistan's 'NASR' missile system could therefore be seen as an effort to “consolidate Pakistan's strategic deterrence capability at all levels of the threat spectrum.”²¹

NASR missile system due to its short range could also be termed as a battlefield missile system for tactical level operations. In addition to this, Pakistan had earlier declared that its other short-range missile system HATF II (Abdali), “provides Pakistan with an operational level capability.”²² Sources conversant with South Asian military lexicon argue that in the regional context, tactical level forces would constitute India's mechanized/ armoured brigades and infantry divisions; the operational level could include mechanized/ armoured divisions, strike corps and corps plus size forces; and strategic level forces could comprise of two or more strike corps.

Since Pakistan had effective deterrence capability at the strategic level, the development of SRBMs helped to plug the 'perceived' gaps at the tactical and operational levels - to cover the full spectrum of threats. The resultant 'Full Spectrum Deterrence' nuclear posture

¹⁹ Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan: A Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network – *Centro Volta*, available at <http://www.pugwash.org/september11/pakistaan-nuclear.htm>

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ ISPR Press Release, available at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?t=press_release=1721.

²² ISPR Press Release, available at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?t=press_release&id=1689

therefore aims to consolidate threat responses at different tiers by developing options at the tactical level (against limited incursions); operational level (to deter a sizeable military offensive); and strategic (to prevent an all-out war). These capabilities, once integrated into overall military strategy are bound to ease the pressure at the strategic level and would thus enhance the 'credibility' of overall nuclear deterrence posture.

Some of the Western scholars had earlier predicted this shift in Pakistani thinking due to the nature of evolving threat from its conventionally stronger adversary. According to Cohen (2009), "unclassified Pakistani military publications do include discussions of scenarios in which Islamabad orders tactical nuclear weapons to be used as warning shots, nuclear tests to be used as a signal of resolve, or a single weapon to be used against invading Indian armoured divisions."²³

This conclusion was nevertheless based on comparison of US nuclear posture during its early period but may have relevance in the South Asian context. However, there is one fundamental difference in the US and Pakistani thinking. While US made its transition from one nuclear use doctrine to the other mainly to maintain its edge over the Soviet Union - both in terms of superior concepts and capability; Pakistan on the other hand, seems to have moved from a strategy of deterring an all-out war to a more flexible response option to address range of threats.

The recent developments and excessive focus on Pakistan's SRBM while disregarding India's introduction of its own version of TNWs in the form of 'Prahaar',²⁴ is indicative of preconceived conclusions based on little understanding of the regional security environment.

Several Western scholars have raised concerns on the impact of Pakistan's 'NASR' on strategic stability and also issues related to command and control. Though similar concerns are also valid for India's TNWs and its submarine based nuclear missiles that may require pre-delegation of launch authority; nevertheless, these issues merit attention in the context of regional stability.

²³ Stephen Philip Cohen, quoted in Scott Sagan, (eds.), *Inside Nuclear South Asia*, (California: Stanford University Press, 2009), p.235.

²⁴ India tested its tactical missile Prahaar on 21st July 2011, within three months after Pakistan had tested its NASR tactical missile. According to India's official press release, Prahaar can carry different types of warheads. See <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=73407>

One of the criticisms is that Pakistan's TNWs to deter limited operations (CSD) may lead to instability, as it could lower the nuclear threshold and increase chances of a nuclear war. On the other hand, allowing space for a limited conventional war could be more dangerous in South Asia, as any military conflict between the two nuclear armed neighbours would have the potential to rapidly escalate to a nuclear war. Therefore, war prevention at all levels should be the primary objective between the two South Asian nuclear-capable states that Pakistan hopes to accomplish by integrating its SRBM capability into overall deterrence posture.

Since the purpose of SRBMs appears to deter aggression even at the lowest rung of a military conflict, therefore, range of capabilities offers the decision maker the flexibility of a proportionate response rather than relying solely on the strategic deterrent. For example, in response to a limited military incursion by Indian forces in the form of a Cold Start Doctrine the threat to destroy Delhi or Mumbai could have been incredible and disproportionate. On the other hand, failure to deter India from operationalizing its limited objectives war doctrine would have discredited Pakistan's nuclear deterrence, especially if India decided to expand the conflict to achieve its wider objectives.

Another criticism is related to command and control issues associated with battlefield nuclear weapons, as it may require delegation of authority to lower level field commanders at some point of time during crises. According to an official statement released from the Prime Minister Office, it was emphasized that Pakistan's nuclear missiles would be centrally controlled and monitored by the National Command Authority (NCA) at all times – during peace as well as crisis through its National Command Centre (NCC).²⁵ The Strategic Command, Control and Support System (SCCSS), which is the integral part of the NCC, provides state-of-art connectivity of country-wide strategic assets, and is designed to facilitate decision making centrally at the NCC. Apparently, such a system precludes the necessity to pre-delegate the launch authority for any nuclear capable missile, including the SRBM.

²⁵ Prime Minister Visits National Command Center, Prime Minister Office Press Release, 4th October 2013. Available at http://www.pmo.gov.pk/press_release_details.php?pr_id=160.

Conclusion

The growing conventional military imbalance between Pakistan and India, and latter's attempt to challenge the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent by exploring space for a limited war in the form of a Cold Start Doctrine may have forced Pakistan to increase its reliance on the nuclear weapons. Nuclear Weapons therefore now play pivotal role in Pakistan's overall military strategy.

Periodic statements emanating from the platform of Pakistan's NCA suggest that Pakistan's FSD is not a 'quantitative' shift, but a 'qualitative' response to the emerging challenges, and remains in line with the concept of Credible Minimum Deterrence nuclear posture. While 'NASR' may be categorized as a TNW, but the primary objective of these SRBMs remains strategic - to prevent India from initiating hostilities even at the lower spectrum of a military conflict, and by no means these weapon systems could be termed for nuclear war fighting.

Pakistan's deterrence capability, including the SRBMs, has helped Pakistan to restore the strategic stability in the region. However, if India decides to integrate its own version of TNW *Prahaar*, into its CSD as a tit for tat response,²⁶ this could lead to nuclear war fighting with serious consequences for the region.

²⁶ Ali Ahmed, 'A Nuclear Retaliation Alternative', *IDS Comment*, 3 Oct 2011. Available at <http://www.idsa.in>

A Rational Nuclear Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal

*Zafar Nawaz Jaspal**

Abstract

Pakistan transformed its nuclear posture from strategic to full spectrum deterrence to neutralize the possibility of a military incursion into Pakistani territory that could result from India's massive military build-up as envisioned in its Cold start Doctrine. This shift in its nuclear strategy is viewed risky by the Western strategic community. Therefore, attempts have been made to restrain qualitative and quantitative advancements in Pakistani nuclear arsenal. However, Islamabad prefers to maintain its tactical nuclear weapons instead of political and economic advantages.

Keywords: Nuclear, World Order, Strategic Environment, Full-Spectrum Deterrence, Rational Decision Making, Safety and Security, Brackets, Tactical Weapons.

Pakistan's nuclear posture has entered into a new phase since 2013.¹ The National Command Authority announced that the country has acquired 'Credible Minimum Full Spectrum Nuclear Deterrence' ability and capability.² It reassured the nation about the unbreakable defensive fence of Pakistan. Indeed, the shift in Pakistan's nuclear posture was an outcome of rational decision-making processes as well as qualitative and quantitative improvement in its nuclear arsenal. The transformation in Pakistan's nuclear posture was not surprising because the objective of its nuclear weapons was/is to deter India's bigger military machine. Though Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was established to deter Indian nuclear blackmail or nuclear aggression, yet the transformation in its posture during the recent

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¹ Press Release, "Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR)", No. PR133/2013-ISPR, Rawalpindi, September 5, 2013. http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2361, accessed on October 13, 2013.

² Credible minimum deterrence is a dynamic concept related to the strategic environment, technological imperatives and the needs of national security.

years called for critical examination of Pakistan's nuclear policy.

The national security paradigm and structural realist world view assist us in understanding the transformation in Pakistan's nuclear posture. Simultaneously, the international security paradigm and the discourse on the strategic stability alarm us about the probability of nuclear arms race in the region entailing strategic instability in South Asia. Therefore, the Western strategic community considers the transformation in Pakistan's nuclear posture risky for the international security and thereby continuously pressurizes Islamabad directly and indirectly to revamp its nuclear policy. A few security analysts have determinedly been recommending Islamabad to join the mainstream of the international nuclear order by revamping its declaratory 'credible minimum full spectrum nuclear deterrence posture'. Conversely, many security analysts believe that Pakistan's development of tactical weapons for the sake of full-spectrum deterrence is a rational choice.

Today, even the critics of Pakistan's nuclear posture admit the *raison d'être* of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. That's why, instead of recommending roll-back of the nuclear program, they are advocating restraint in Islamabad's nuclear policy. The shift in demand ranges from the nuclear restrain policy to stick with 'strategic deterrence' posture or 'commit to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons.'³ It was also reported in October 2015 that Washington is convincing Islamabad to accept 'brackets' on its nuclear arsenal in return for access to civilian nuclear technology.⁴ These developments manifest that the international community has accepted that Pakistan needs nuclear arsenal for its security.

Interestingly, despite realizing the rationale of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, many analysts oppose the qualitative and quantitative advances in its nuclear arsenal. They opine that addition of new weapons in Pakistan's nuclear arsenal would unleash nuclear arms race in South Asia having serious repercussions for the international security. Moreover, tactical nuclear weapons increase the hassle of

³ Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, *A Normal Nuclear Pakistan, Report* (Washington D.C: Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2015), p. 3.

⁴ David Ignatius, "The U.S. cannot afford to forget Afghanistan and Pakistan," *The Washington Post*, October 6, 2015. See also David E. Sanger, "U.S. Exploring Deal to Limit Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal," *The New York Times*, October 15, 2015.

maintaining safety and security of the nuclear arsenal. Theoretically, these concerns seem logical. Practically, however, the accommodation of these concerns is impossible for Islamabad. The critics fail to take into account the gradual transformation in South Asian strategic environment due to India's military doctrinal transformation and mega military hardware purchases. In addition, they are also ignoring the current trends in the nuclear world order which decisively influence the nuclear decision-making in Pakistan.

Pakistan's nuclear decision making is very much determined by its regional strategic environment. Therefore, both national and international nuclear pessimists' maligning and horrifying propaganda against Pakistan's nuclear program including United States and its like minded Western nation's economic sanctions had failed to thwart Pakistan's nuclear weapon program's evolution during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Today, the consensus persists that on May 28, 1998, Pakistan made a rational decision to conduct the five nuclear explosions for restoring the strategic equilibrium in the region that was unbalanced due to India's five nuclear weapons tests on May 11 and 13, 1998. Precisely, being a rational actor in the community of sovereign nations, Pakistan has concluded that without its indigenous nuclear weapon competence, it would not be able to check India's military blackmail.

The primary objective of this study is to critically examine both Pakistan's current nuclear posture and a few recommendations by international leading nuclear analysts within the framework of rational decision-making. It also deliberates on "A Rational Nuclear Pakistan" Vs "A Normal Nuclear Pakistan". Four interlinked questions would be answered in the following discussion, i.e. what are the trends in the prevalent nuclear world order? Are various recommendations to roll-back or cap Pakistan's nuclear weapons development rational? Is the transformation in Pakistan's nuclear posture acceptable as a rational choice? Has Islamabad addressed the safety and security challenges rationally? The article is divided into five sections. The first section spells out the trends in the current nuclear world order. The second section contains the assessment of the sub-continent's strategic environment. The third section briefly overviews Pakistan's nuclear policy. The fourth section deliberates on the shift in Pakistan's nuclear posture due to its full-spectrum deterrence strategy. The fifth section contains debate on the subject of Normal Nuclear Pakistan.

Trends in Nuclear World Order

The prevalent nuclear world order illustrates realists' worldview. Though, the idealists or nuclear abolitionists have succeeded in institutionalizing the nuclear non-proliferation regime, yet they have been ended up in serving the interests of the Great Powers on the strategic chessboard. The international nuclear non-proliferation regime has only been successful in limiting the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold war. The nuclear disarmament remains a wishful objective and thereby nuclear weapon states have been progressively modernizing their nuclear arsenals. The review of the nuclear doctrines of the nuclear armed states reveals the commencement of a new era of global nuclear force modernization and growth. The trends disclose that the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear armed powers would be improved qualitatively in the future. It's because, "nuclear powers feel the need to modernize their arsenals for three main reasons. First, in today's international security environment they still see nuclear weapons as necessary, mainly for deterrence purposes. Second, nuclear weapons continue to play a very important role in maintaining global strategic stability. Third, as long as nuclear arsenals exist, modernization is necessary in order to keep weapons safe and reliable."⁵ In addition, the confidence in the Missile Defence Systems' operational technologies definitely obliges the nuclear armed states to increase the quantity of their weapons.

Importantly, the twentieth century structured nuclear non-proliferation regime's overall record is a mixture of success and failure. It is gradually becoming a more fragile and a tenuous arrangement in the twenty-first century. The developments in the global politics in the aftermath of Cold War, the new strategic partnerships and increasing connectivity in the 21st century make many non-proliferation regimes arrangements vulnerable to the political, economic and strategic agenda of both: existing Great Powers and Emerging Nuclear Powers. The state-specific criterion that was adopted by the Nuclear Supplier Group members in 2008 to accommodate India and in reciprocity benefit from its growing economic market dividends severely undermined the credibility of the non-proliferation regime as well as

⁵ Lu Yin, "How to approach nuclear modernization? A Chinese response," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 71, Issue 3, May 2015, p. 8.

has germinated pessimism about the future of the Regime. Moreover, today, the nuclear powers have been pursuing their nuclear arsenals related objectives with vigour and firmness. They intelligently twist non-proliferation regime's censuring clauses or preventive arrangements to their advantage without realizing that these acts would put the regime in tatter.⁶

Consequently, the core items of Conference on Disarmament: Nuclear disarmament; A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; The prevention of an arms race to outer space; and Negative security assurances have failed to receive an affirmative response from the members of Conference on Disarmament.⁷ The Conference also failed to adopt a program of work for its 2015 session.⁸ Moreover, the 2015 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference (27 April to 22 May 2015) exposed the imperfections of the Treaty and the divisions among key parties instead of their collective efforts to help to advance the disarmament cause.⁹ The review conference ended without an agreement on a final document.

Today, the long-term nuclear force modernization or advancement programs are underway in all the nuclear armed states.¹⁰ According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2015, “all the nuclear weapon-possessing states are working to develop new nuclear weapon systems and/or upgrade their existing ones.”¹¹ The United States has planned to spend \$355 billion to modernize its nuclear

⁶ Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Emerging Nuclear Powers and International Non-Proliferation Regime,” *CISS Insight*, Vol. 1, No. 4, August–September, 2013, pp. 1-18.

⁷ The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, Switzerland is the world's only permanent multilateral disarmament treaty negotiating body.

⁸ <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/cd/2015/cd-reports/9532-cd-fails-to-adopt-a-programme-of-work-for-its-2015-session>, accessed on November 2, 2015.

⁹ Statement by Daryl G. Kimball to the 25th UN Conference on Disarmament Issues, Hiroshima, Japan, August 27, 2015. <http://www.armscontrol.org/events/Statement-to-the-25th-UN-Conference-on-Disarmament-Issues>, accessed on November 2, 2015.

¹⁰ Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2015,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 2015. <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/06/17/0096340215591247.full>, accessed on June 20, 2015. BASIC Trident Commission Discussion Paper 1, Published by *British American Security Information Council (BASIC)*, November 2011.

¹¹ “Nuclear weapons states upgrade warheads despite disarmament,” *The News International*, June 15, 2015. <http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-188056-Nuclear-weapons-states-upgrade-warheads-despite-disarmament>, accessed on June 15, 2015. See also “Nuclear force reductions and modernizations continue; peace operations increase - new Sipri Yearbook out now.” <http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/yb-june-2015>, accessed on June 15, 2015. [International campaign to abolish nuclear weapons](http://www.icanw.org/faqs-2/), <http://www.icanw.org/faqs-2/>, accessed on June 3, 2015.

arsenal 2014 and 2023.¹² Moscow had also disclosed similar plan to refurbish its nuclear arsenal. Russian Federation announced to add more than 40 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) to its nuclear arsenal during 2015.¹³ In addition to strategic weapons modernization, Moscow is also brandishing its tactical nuclear weapons capability. Similarly, British government announced “to spend £100bn-plus on a new fleet of four Trident nuclear ballistic submarines to provide a Continuous At Sea Deterrence.”¹⁴ India's nuclear posture is also entering in an important new phase with the development of several long-range ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and increase in weapon grade fissile material.¹⁵ Similarly, Pakistan continues to expand its nuclear arsenal. “With several delivery systems in development, four operating plutonium production reactors, and its uranium facilities, however, Pakistan's stockpile will likely increase over the next 10 years.”¹⁶

The realization that nuclear energy is a clean cum sustainable source of power generation has boosted the significance of nuclear power plants.¹⁷ Today, nuclear energy is viewed as a secure, reliable,

¹² “Reductions in US warheads envisioned under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will be offset by upgrades in the quality of the US arsenal.” Lu Yin, “How to approach nuclear modernization? A Chinese response,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol 71, Issue 3, May 2015, pp. 8-9. Matthew Kroenig, “How to approach nuclear modernization?: A US response” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 71, Issue, 3. May 2015. <http://thebulletin.org/2015/may/how-approach-nuclear-modernization-us-response8291>, accessed on June 27, 2015.

¹³ “Putin Says Russia Beefing Up Nuclear Arsenal, NATO Denounces ‘Saber-Rattling’,” *The New York Times*, June 16, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2015/06/16/world/europe/16reuters-russia-nuclear-putin.html?ref=world&utm_source=Saithru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2AMorning%20Brief&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&r=0, accessed on June 21, 2015.

¹⁴ Richard Norton-Taylor, “70 years after Hiroshima, nuclear weapons threaten us all” *The Guardian*, July 23, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/news/defence-and-security-blog/2015/jul/23/70-years-after-hiroshima-nuclear-weapons-threaten-us-all>, accessed on July 24, 2015.

¹⁵ “In addition to the Dhruva plutonium production reactor near Mumbai, India plans to construct a second reactor near Visakhapatnam, on the east coast. An unsafeguarded prototype fast breeder reactor is also under construction 650 kilometers (km) south at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR) near Kalpakkam, which will significantly increase India's plutonium production capacity once it becomes operational.” Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, “Indian nuclear forces, 2015”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 71, Issue 5, September 2015, p, 77.

¹⁶ Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, “Pakistani nuclear forces, 2015,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October 2015, <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/10/06/0096340215611090.full.pdf+html>, accessed on November 2, 2015.

¹⁷ The environmentally clean power-generators are solar, wind, and nuclear.

low-carbon solution.¹⁸ Therefore, there are 439 nuclear reactors in operation in 31 countries and 67 reactors are under construction in 13 countries. The majority of the operating reactors are located in United States, Europe and Russian Federation, but the most reactors on order or planned are in the Asian region.¹⁹ The current trends in the global energy politics are in favour of the atomic energy. Hence, the emerging economies in Asia have been approaching the nuclear reactor manufacturing nations for the purchasing of the nuclear reactor material as well as for the transfer of nuclear technology for the peaceful application of nuclear energy. United Nations is also encouraging and facilitating the development of nuclear power industry for the prosperity of less developed nations. On October 29, 2007 during the 62nd Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, a resolution appealing to Member States to continue to support the IAEA's indispensable role in 'encouraging and assisting the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful uses' was adopted.

The trends in the global energy realm indicate that nuclear energy share in the global energy market will gradually increase. According to the IAEA estimate, during the next two decades the use of nuclear energy would immensely be increased. It reported that "... the future of nuclear power forecast a projection of an installed global nuclear power capacity of about 510 giga watts [GW(e)] in 2030, a 40% increase over the 370 [GW(e)] installed in 2009. The IAEA's high projection foresees 810 [GW (e)], more than a doubling of 2009 capacity."²⁰ The Nuclear Energy Technology Roadmap, published in 2010 by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) estimates that almost one quarter of global electricity could be generated from nuclear power by 2050.²¹ This

¹⁸ According to the UK government, nuclear energy represents the lowest-cost low-carbon technology available at scale. Leda Betti, and Younes El-Ghazi, "Global Energy Security-The Way Forward," Conference Report- 2012, *Global Diplomatic Forum*, 2012. p. 31. <http://www.gdforum.org/> "Plans For New Reactors Worldwide," *World Nuclear Association*, March 2013. <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Current-and-Future-Generation/Plans-For-New-Reactors-Worldwide/>, accessed on February 19, 2014.

¹⁹ <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Current-and-Future-Generation/Plans-For-New-Reactors-Worldwide/>, accessed on February 19, 2014.

²⁰ The details about future nuclear energy were listed in footnote no.1 in Fred McGoldrick, *Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, May 2011), p. 2.

²¹ The details about future nuclear energy were listed in footnote no.1 in Fred McGoldrick, *Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, May 2011), p. 2.

anticipated role of nuclear energy persuaded many developing states to acquire nuclear technology to address their domestic energy needs. They have planned to construct new nuclear power plants with the assistance of nuclear supplier states. On December 10, 2010, the IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano pointed out that more than 60 countries “are considering introducing nuclear energy.”²²

The probability of an accident at the nuclear power plant, vulnerability of a nuclear facility, and terrorist group's sabotage are important puzzles.²³ Therefore, the safety and security of a power plant is a legitimate concern, yet is not irresolvable challenge. The security problem can be resolved by the development of a strong security culture-in which the relevant individuals hold a deeply rooted belief that insider and outsider threats are credible.²⁴ The 60-year-long recorded history of nuclear energy programs worldwide germinates confidence in the safety apparatus of nuclear power plants. Notably, during these six decades there have been only three major accidents leading to the release of radiation, i.e. Three Mile Island, Chernobyl nuclear power plant, and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants. Among these, the Chernobyl was the only one of these incidents that resulted in human casualties and significant damages to the environment.²⁵ Nonetheless, the Chernobyl accident formally introduced the concept of 'safety culture' to the vocabulary of nuclear safety.²⁶ The Chernobyl accident was the result of an old reactor design, compounded by gross safety mismanagement. Similarly, in the case of Fukushima, the Japanese operating authority failed to stick to the International Atomic Energy Agency's safety standards. Notably, in

²² Paul K. Kerr, Mark Holt, Mary Beth Nikitin, “Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, No. R41910, August 10, 2011, p. 2. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/171374.pdf>, accessed on July 12, 2012.

²³ Fukushima is the latest and oft quoted example of radioactive leakage. However, there was not a single radiation-related causality as a result of radioactive disaster.

²⁴ Hui Zhang, “How Beijing can help prevent nuclear terrorism,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 10, 2014. <http://thebulletin.org/how-beijing-can-help-prevent-nuclear-terrorism>, accessed on March 16, 2014.

²⁵ Jacqueline Koch, “Rethinking Asia's Energy Mix: Sustainable, Reliable Nuclear Power,” *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, March 14, 2012. http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=223#.UwF_l_mSxR8, accessed on February 16, 2014.

²⁶ Airi (Iris) Ryu1 & Najmedin Meshkati, “Why You Haven't Heard About Onagawa Nuclear Power Station after the Earthquake and Tsunami of March 11, 2011,” *Vitebi School of Engineering University of Southern California (USC)*, Revised and updated February 26, 2014, p. 17.

Fukushima four reactors were damaged instead of six. The two were saved from the Tsunami because the operators of the facility followed the IAEA safety guidelines.²⁷ The Chairman of the National Diet of Japan's Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, Dr. Kiyoshi Kurokawa pointed out that: "Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. It was a profoundly manmade disaster-that could and should have been foreseen and prevented."²⁸ Nonetheless, both Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents have prompted major improvements in nuclear establishment's approach to nuclear safety or 'nuclear safety regime'. Thus, the safety issue could be addressed by employing the available safety features properly and also by cultivating best safety practices in the trained workforce employed at the nuclear power plant to ensure its safe operation.

The nuclear energy advocates maintain that nuclear waste of nuclear power plant is manageable because it accounts only for a small fraction of nuclear spent fuel, approximately 3%.²⁹ Currently, countries such as France, China, India and the Russian Federation reprocess most of their spent fuel. Mohamed ElBaradei pointed out that: "The amount of spent nuclear fuel produced annually-about 10,000 tonnes - is actually small when contrasted with the nearly 28 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO₂) waste from fossil fuels that are released directly into the atmosphere."³⁰ The proper waste management requires that it must be stored in the geological

²⁷ Tepco, on the other hand, to make it easier to transport equipment and to save construction costs, in 1967 removed 25 meters from the 35-meter natural seawall of the Daiichi plant site and built the reactor buildings at a much lower elevation of 10 meters. Tepco's tsunami risk characterization and assessment was, in the judgment of one of the world's renowned tsunami experts, Costas Synolakis, director of the Tsunami Research Center at the University of Southern California, a "cascade of stupid errors that led to the disaster." Airi Ryu and Najmedin Meshkati, "Onagawa: The Japanese nuclear power plant that didn't melt down on 3/11," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 10, 2014. <http://thebulletin.org/onagawa-japanese-nuclear-power-plant-didn%E2%80%99t-melt-down-311>, accessed on March 16, 2014.

²⁸ Airi (Iris) Ryu & Najmedin Meshkati, "Why You Haven't Heard About Onagawa Nuclear Power Station after the Earthquake and Tsunami of March 11, 2011," *Vitebi School of Engineering University of Southern California (USC)*, Revised and updated February 26, 2014, p. 16.

²⁹ To make it a manageable issue, spent fuel can be reprocessed to reduce the nuclear waste to a very small amount, which can be stored safely, as is done in France and Russia. About 96% of spent fuel is unused enriched uranium and about 1% of the remaining spent fuel is plutonium, both of which can be used in nuclear power reactors after the reprocessing of spent fuel

³⁰ Mohamed ElBaradei, "Nuclear Power's Changing Picture," *IAEA BULLETIN* 49/1, September 2007, p. 20.

repository. Today no state in the world has a geological repository. Nonetheless, many states including Pakistan have plans to build their geological repositories.

The positive trajectory in the military application and peaceful use of nuclear technology make the nuclear terrorism a credible catastrophic threat to global security and prosperity. Therefore, the safety and security of nuclear facilities and materials have received serious attention to prevent the nuclear and radiological terrorism. Serious efforts have been made to prevent nuclear terrorism by securing the world's most dangerous materials. Since the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (April 28, 2004), the international community has been on record as calling on states to refrain from supporting non-state actors in their pursuit of WMD and to adopt and enforce domestic laws and controls towards this end. President Barack Obama declared on April 5, 2009 in Prague, “[W]e must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.”³¹ He launched the Nuclear Security Summits to galvanize world leaders in April 2010 at Washington. This initiative has taken the nuclear security issue to the highest political level. The primary objective of the Nuclear Security Summit process is to harmonize and strengthen the global nuclear security regime. During the third Nuclear Security Summit at The Hague, the leaders of 53 countries agreed to steps designed to improve the security of nuclear and other radioactive material.³² It was reported that “some 6,000 tons of nuclear material have been permanently secured as a result of the three summits, and participating countries developed other initiatives to strengthen nuclear security practices.”³³ A fourth, and most likely final, summit will be convened in the United States in March 2016.

The leaders participating in the fourth Nuclear Security Summit in 2016 would be expected to announce “additional voluntary proposals, along with a declaration that responsibility for further work on nuclear

³¹ Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradčany Square, Prague, Czech Republic,” April 5, 2009.

³² The First Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington in April 2010. Second in Seoul in March 2012. Third in the Hague in 2014.

³³ By Kenneth C. Brill and John Bernhard, “Closing the gaps in nuclear security,” *The Washington Post*, March 26, 2015. Ambassador John Bernhard, Ambassador Kenneth C. Brill, Dr. Anita Nilsson, and Dr. Shin Chang-Hoon, International Convention on Nuclear Security, Washington, DC March 2015, p. 3. <http://www.nsgeg.org/ICNSReport315.pdf>, accessed on October 29, 2015.

security issues will revert to the patchwork of institutions and mostly voluntary arrangements that predate the summit process, such as Interpol, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the G-8 Global Partnership, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.”³⁴

The members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also issued their support for strengthening global nuclear security measures and recognized the importance of closing the gaps in the international legal system in Agency's 59th General Conference.

Strategic Environment of the Subcontinent

The unsettled borders, irredentist claims, separatist movements, growing fatal radicalized non-state phenomenon, and above all India's derive to accomplish great power primacy in the region and Pakistan's commitment to sustain sovereign equality among the South Asian nations resulted not only in the Nuclearization of the Subcontinent but also have unleashed destabilizing nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan. Perhaps, the nuclear weapons presence in both the Indian and Pakistani arsenals have created a fatal balance of terror between the belligerent neighbours that caution them to act rationally and desist from tactics, which entail nuclear strike exchanges. At the same time, both New Delhi and Islamabad have been endeavouring to shift the prevalent equilibrium in one's strategic advantage by the introduction of new generation of weaponry in their arsenals and transforming their nuclear postures, i.e. “the incorporation of some number and type of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles into a state's overall military structure, the rules and procedures governing how those weapons are deployed, when and under what conditions they might be used, against what targets, and who has the authority to make those decisions.”³⁵ Indeed, the “nuclear postures are evolving in ways that fuel requirements for more

³⁴ By Kenneth C. Brill and John Bernhard, “Closing the gaps in nuclear security,” *The Washington Post*, March 26, 2015.

³⁵ According to Vipin Narang, “the term nuclear posture refers the capabilities (actual nuclear forces), employment doctrine (under what conditions they might be used), and command-and-control procedures (how they are managed, deployed, and potentially released) a state establishes to operationalize its nuclear weapons capability.” *Vipin Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 4. “Nuclear doctrine defines how, under what circumstances, and for what purposes a state will use its nuclear arsenal. A command and control system (C2) ensures that the state's nuclear weapons will only be used according to the principles of its nuclear doctrine.” Michael Clarke, “Pakistan and Nuclear Terrorism: How Real is the Threat?” *Comparative Strategy*, 32: 2, April 2013, pp. 98-114, 102.

weapons that will, in turn, exacerbate security dilemmas.”³⁶ The aggravation in security dilemma, undoubtedly, kick start the destabilizing arms race between the strategic competitors.

India and Pakistan's bilateral relations generate a classic military security dilemma involving proliferation of military technologies, arms racing and the interplay of national policies for defence and deterrence. Since 1947, generally, New Delhi has been introducing a new kind or generation of weapons in the sub-continent and Islamabad follows suit.³⁷ Michael Krepon pointed out that: “This dynamic has been characterized by another Western construct—the 'action-reaction syndrome.' Pakistan and India are now enmeshed in the action-reaction syndrome, despite their initial desire to be content with credible minimum deterrence. India considers deploying missile defences, making Pakistan feel less secure. Pakistan states a requirement for short-range delivery systems for nuclear weapons because of Indian conventional military advantages.”³⁸ Notably, India has been endeavouring to modernize its ham-fisted armed forces and institutionalize its new military doctrine—Cold Start Doctrine—since the beginning of the twenty-first century. The Indian Army Chief Gen Deepak Kapoor stated in 2010 that “Cold Start calls for cutting Pakistan into salami slices as punishment for hosting yet another Mumbai-style terrorist attack inside India.”³⁹ This Indian militaristic approach obliged Pakistan to revamp its defence strategy by developing tactical nuclear weapons.

Pakistan's development of tactical weapons may oblige India to revamp its nuclear doctrine. Especially when the current ruling political party in India-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-included in its

³⁶ Michael Krepon, Introduction, in Michael Krepon, Joshua T. White, Julia Thompson, Shane Mason, ed. *Deterrence Instability & Nuclear Weapons in South Asia* (Washington, D. C. Stimson Center, April 2015), pp.11-12

³⁷ Ravi Rikhye examined 97 systems induction into the armed forces of India and Pakistan in the 40-year period 1948-88. He concluded that on 76 occasions India was the first to introduce new military system; and on 21 occasions Pakistan introduced a new system prior to India. If one takes into account that some of the Pakistani 'firsts' were due to Indian delays in procurement—as was the case with the 155mm gun—and others were in such minuscule numbers that they could hardly alter the military balance between the two states, the number of Pakistani 'firsts' in Rikhye's analysis actually goes down to six. Amit Gupta, “Determining India's Force Structure and Military Doctrine: I Want My Mig,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 5, May, 1995, p. 442.

³⁸ Michael Krepon, “The Nuclear Myth,” *Dawn*, August 3, 2014.

³⁹ Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Win Pak-India nuke war?” *Dawn*, October 31, 2015.

http://www.bjp.org/images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf, accessed on October 30, 2015.

manifesto to “revise and update” India's nuclear doctrine “to make it relevant to challenges of current times.”⁴⁰ And also “maintain a credible minimum deterrent that is in tune with changing geostatic realities.”⁴¹ The complexity in the prevalent regional strategic environment is multiplying. Both India and Pakistan are endeavouring to amass large quantity of conventional weapons, nuclear capable ballistic and cruise missiles for tactical and strategic nuclear war-fighting. Moreover, since fall 2014 the disputed Line of Control (disputed Kashmir border between India and Pakistan) has heated up again.

The continuity of deterrence stability between India and Pakistan can only guarantee strategic stability in the region. Though, the latter has been giving an impression to alter its nuclear posture to sustain the deterrence stability in the region, yet the former is less inclined to trust on the positive signalling of Islamabad.⁴² The change in Islamabad's nuclear posture would be having a cascading effect on the Indian nuclear policy. Nevertheless, at least rhetorically, both New Delhi and Islamabad have been expressing their commitment to strategic stability. Paradoxically, both India and Pakistan are bent on efforts to dismiss or at least undermine the existence of strategic stability in the sub-continent. In addition, Islamabad's optimism in “mutual assured destruction” which has put an end to Clausewitzian concept of war in the nuclear era;⁴³ and at the same time, India's eagerness to create a space for successful military operation below the nuclear threshold in the sub-continent underscores divergence in the belligerents' strategic outlook. Indeed, the contrasting trends in India and Pakistan military doctrines have their own dynamics, which cannot be perfectly understood conclusively with the assistance of Cold War nuclear deterrence stability experience.

⁴⁰ “Ek Bharat Shrestha Bharat: Sabka Saath, SabkaVikas,” 2014 Election Manifesto of Bharatiya Janata Party (New Delhi: Excelprint, 2014), p. 39.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² India did not figure as an important variable in the last two general elections—2013 and 2008 of Pakistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif expressed his strong commitment to establish good relations with India. That's why, he visited New Delhi and attended the in the oath taking ceremony of the newly elected Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on May 26, 2014.

⁴³ The 2001-2002 Pakistan-India eye-ball to eye-ball (ten months) military standoff brought home the fact that the nuclear-armed neighbors risk mutual catastrophe, if they go to war. Despite India's ambitious arms buildup, this reality of “mutual assured destruction” is unlikely to change. Munir Akram, “Security is imperative,” *Dawn*, October 13, 2013. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1049433/security-is-imperative>, accessed on October 13, 2013.

The alarming puzzle for the regional strategic stability is that India's promising military doctrine and nuclear posture signal immense confidence in its 'massive nuclear retaliation' strategy. In 2013, Shyam Saran, the then head of the National Security Advisory Board (the apex body concerned with security matters) declared: "India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but if it is attacked with such weapons, it would engage in nuclear retaliation which will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its adversary. The label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is irrelevant from the Indian perspective."⁴⁴ It denotes that Indian strategic armed forces possess a capability through which they could decapitate Pakistan's strategic nuclear retaliatory strikes. Conversely, Islamabad has been demonstrating that it has acquired enough nuclear weapons due to which it is capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on India in any future military contingency. On August 23, 2015, Mr. Sartaj Aziz, Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs and National Security rightly stated: "Modi's India acts as if they are a regional superpower: we are a nuclear-armed country and we know how to defend ourselves."⁴⁵ Many strategic analysts misinterpreted Mr. Sartaj Aziz statement by claiming that he was threatening the use of nuclear weapons against India. Whereas, he was confidently articulating Pakistan's potential to defend itself. Importantly, announcing a person's confidence in one's defensive apparatus does not qualify to be declared his/her aggressive or offensive designs. Moreover, it is an open secret that Islamabad has been continuously increasing its fissile material stocks,⁴⁶ and also sharpening its small or tactical nuclear weapons in addition to its strategic nuclear weapons.⁴⁷

The preceding discussion highlights that both India and Pakistan are adhering to their policies of strategic competition and the enduring primacy of military security. The military security is primarily about the interplay between the actual armed offensive and defensive

⁴⁴ Quoted in Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Win Pak-India nuke war?"

⁴⁵ "We are a nuclear power, and know how to defend ourselves: Sartaj Aziz," *Dawn.com*, August 24, 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1202323>, accessed on September 19, 2015.

⁴⁶ Islamabad's stance on FMCT at Conference on Disarmament highlights that it is not ready to cap its nuclear fissile material production ability and capability. Many security analysts opined that Pakistan's nuclear weapons program is one of the fastest growing nuclear weapon programs. Conversely, officially Pakistan denies the fastest growing nuclear weapon program's perception. In reality, it is difficult to identify, which states nuclear weapons program is fastest growing program due the secrecy of the nuclear weapon programs.

⁴⁷ The three tests of NASR missile since April 2011, reveals that every NASR missile test demonstrates or discloses a new scientific dimension and advancement in the missile inventory.

capabilities of states on the one hand and their perceptions of each other's capabilities and intentions on the other. The Indian and Pakistani ruling elites and populations treat the armed forces of each other threateningly. It's because, there is a lack of trust and no constraints at all or only weak/limited constraints over the development and procurement of conventional and nuclear weapons. Consequently, India and Pakistan fell prey to 'security paradox'.⁴⁸

Pakistan's Nuclear Policy

Pakistan's economic situation has gradually worsened by the global war on terrorism. Despite the US and NATO drawdown from Afghanistan, the state of affairs at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border remains volatile. The situation in the Federal Administrative Tribal Areas due to the spill over effects of ungovernable Afghanistan is deplorable. Pakistani armed forces launched operation Zarb-e-Azb in June 2014 to eradicate transnational terrorist organizations sanctuaries in North Waziristan. Precisely, these negative developments have been severely taxing Pakistan's economy. The economic constraints and India's arms procurement spree from the militarily advanced countries have obliged Pakistan to increase its reliance on indigenous nuclear weapon capability as a cheaper alternative to purchase sophisticated costly military hardware from the United States and European military equipment supplier nations.

The National Command Authority of Pakistan, the apex nuclear program-related policymaking body, has declared it's "the national resolve to maintain 'Full Spectrum Deterrence Capability' in line with the dictates of 'Credible Minimum Deterrence' to deter all forms of aggression". Pakistan's full spectrum deterrence capability response is developed in the aftermath of India's announcement of offensive military doctrines such as Cold Start or Pro-Active Military Operation Strategy. Under its Cold Start Doctrine, India had moved its cantonments close to the Pakistani border that allowed India to move its conventional weapons close to Pakistan along with other vehicles and fuel supplies: "By drastically reducing the time required to launch an aggression against Pakistan." Praveen Swami pointed out that: "The Indian gamble is this: Air strikes and small military operations on the

⁴⁸ The complex situation in which 'more a country strives to be secure the less secure it becomes' is known as security paradox. For a detailed discussion, see Sujeet Samaddar, *Defence, Development and National Security* (New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2005), pp. 45-46.

LoC won't give Pakistan enough reason to escalate a conflict, mired as it is in a sapping internal war."⁴⁹ On October 20, 2015, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry categorically stated: "We have plugged the gap India had created. We have the right to do so."⁵⁰ He added: "Our nuclear program is one dimensional: stopping Indian aggression before it happens. It is not for starting a war. It is for deterrence." Precisely, India's attempt to create a gap for limited war through its Cold Start Doctrine prompted Pakistan to make low-yield nuclear weapons. Certainly, the development of low-yield nuclear weapons to bridge the gap, which India tried to create for limited war, is a rational choice in the prevalent complex South Asian strategic environment. Because these devices make war in the sub-continent unwinnable - and focused on enhancing confidence building measures to prevent both inadvertent and accidental limited war between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan's expanding economy, growing urbanization, and efforts to address underdevelopment in rural areas, in the recent years, resulted in acute power shortage. Moreover, the socio-economic trends of the Pakistani society manifest that the energy demand would increase in the country on a steady basis in the foreseeable future. Perhaps, the rising energy demand necessitated the ruling elite to chalk out a multifaceted energy policy. Intelligently, instead of relying on one or two sources of power generation, the government has devised as well as articulated a comprehensive energy mix strategy to resolve the current power shortage and protect the country from similar crisis in the future.

Full Spectrum Deterrence

Realistically, New Delhi's conclusion that its modernized military machine would enable it to successfully pursue its objectives through a limited-conventional-war without permitting it to escalate into a total war having probability of nuclear exchanges is too simplistic. It denotes that India's makers of modern strategy are not cognizant to both Pakistan's modern military thinking and its military doctrine or

⁴⁹ Praveen Swami, "Pakistan's nuclear weapons may not deter Indian retaliation, but destruction mutual," *The Indian Express*, October 28, 2015. <http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/pakistans-nuclear-weapons-may-not-deter-indian-retaliation-but-destruction-mutual/>, accessed on October 28, 2015.

⁵⁰ Anwar Iqbal, "Pakistan has built low-yield nuclear weapons to counter Indian aggression," *Dawn*. Com, October 20, 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1214157>, accessed on October 28, 2015.

war-fighting modern strategy, i.e. 'synchronization of its conventional and nuclear weapons capability.' Pakistani decision-makers are convinced that endeavour to create a space for conventional war in a nuclear environment is unattainable. In the words of Pakistan's Foreign Secretary: "Our argument is, when you are a nuclear power, you do not create spaces for war. War is no more an option."⁵¹

Pakistani military planners are vigilant about the Indian military machine advancement and its likely impact on the defensive fence of the country. Therefore, they have been chalking out as well as executing rational countermeasures to respond effectively to India's new military doctrine by vigilantly transforming its Military Doctrine in general and nuclear posture in particular. Consequently, today, Pakistan has developed tactical nuclear weapons (low-yield nuclear warheads to be delivered by short range missiles) having a localized impact or used in the battlefield, unlike big bombs designed to destroy cities. On September 5, 2013, Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA), chaired by Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif stated that: "Pakistan would continue to adhere to the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence, without entering into an arms race with any other country. Pakistan, however, would not remain oblivious to the evolving security dynamics in South Asia and would maintain a 'full spectrum deterrence' capability to deter all forms of aggression."⁵² On October 29, 2015, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry while elaborating the concept of Full Spectrum Deterrence stated: "Our conduct continues to be guided strictly by the principle of credible minimum deterrence. Full Spectrum Deterrence is by no means a quantitative change in our credible minimum deterrence; it is rather a qualitative response to the emerging challenges posed in South Asia."⁵³ This accentuates Islamabad's sincere desire to avoid an arms race with New Delhi without compromising on the credibility of its defensive fence.

The acceptability of chalking out a military doctrine which advances interplay of conventional and nuclear strategic and tactical

⁵¹ Anwar Iqbal, "Tactical N-arms to ward off war threat, says FO," *Dawn* October 20, 2015. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1214196>, accessed on November 2, 2015.

⁵² Press Release, "Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR)", No. PR133/2013-ISPR, Rawalpindi, September 5, 2013. http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2361, accessed on October 13, 2013.

⁵³ "Pakistan stresses conflict resolution in South Asia," *The News International*, October 30, 2015. <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-40469-Pakistan-stresses-conflict-resolution-in-South-Asia>, accessed on October 31, 2015.

or battlefield forces has brought about a gradual transformation in Pakistan's nuclear posture. Because, it would be more credible on all counts to develop nuclear weapons with ranges, yields, and targeting doctrine to threaten Indian conventional forces, while retaining strategic nuclear weapons (massive retaliation) options to deter further escalation. The declassified information about Pakistan's nuclear posture reveals that in a few areas transformation in the posture has already occurred. The rational decision making processes indicate that the current qualitative transformation gradually entails more changes in the nuclear posture in the near future. Today, one can conclude that at four distinct levels i.e. National Command Authority; Nuclear Deterrence Strategy; Nuclear Weapons Inventory; and in Nuclear Targeting Strategy, the transformation in the nuclear posture has occurred. Indeed, these transformations would have a decisive impact on Pakistan's nuclear posture. Therefore, the said transformations have been deliberated in the following discussion.

Pakistan's Nuclear Posture Matrix

| | |
|------------------------|--|
| <p>Nuclear Posture</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Minimum Credible Deterrence. - Full Spectrum Deterrence. - Shifting from a Catalytic Nuclear Posture to an Asymmetric Escalation Nuclear Posture. - First use of nuclear weapons against military and civilian targets. |
| <p>Objective</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To deter India's bigger conventional war-machine's intervention or penetration inside Pakistan (Cold Start Doctrine/Proactive Military Operation strategy). - To deter India's nuclear blackmail. |

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| <p>Logic</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - It is facing a conventionally superior proximate offensive threat. - It is not confident that it could compete with India in conventional arms race due to its financial constraints. - Its indigenous nuclear capability gives it a confidence of self-reliance in keeping its sovereign defence. |
| <p>Effectiveness</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Today, it seems effective. - Having de-jure National Command Authority |

Pakistan's repeated nuclear capable ballistic and cruise missile's tests reveal that it has gradually been perfecting its full spectrum deterrence requirements. It has been developing a triad of nuclear forces. Indeed, its air force and land based ballistic missile capabilities have been developed and tested. Whereas; its naval tier is in its formative phase. Therefore, the next step of Pakistan's nuclear posture "includes an effort to develop nuclear warheads suitable for deployment from the Indian Ocean, either from warships or from one of the country's five diesel-powered navy submarines."⁵⁴ The steady enlargement of country's nuclear arsenal resulted in a fictitious narrative that: "Pakistan has the world's fastest growing nuclear program."⁵⁵ Islamabad has repeatedly declared baseless the reports about Pakistan's fastest growing nuclear program. On October 29, 2015, Secretary Aizaz categorically stated: "such reports are aimed at diverting attention from the exponential increase in India's fissile material stockpiles as a result of nuclear deals with a growing number

⁵⁴ "Pakistan eyeing sea-based nuclear weapons: report," *Pakistan Today*, September 22, 2014. <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2014/09/22/national/pakistan-eyeing-sea-based-nuclear-weapons-report/> assessed on November 24, 2014.

⁵⁵ Sajjad Haider, "Pakistan has world's fastest growing nuclear programme: US think tank," *Dawn*, November 24, 2014. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1146584/pakistan-has-worlds-fastest-growing-nuclear-programme-us-think-tank>, accessed on November 24, 2014. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1216319/world-powers-urged-not-to-pressurise-pakistan-on-n-issue>,

of NSG countries and its destabilizing consequences for the region.”⁵⁶

A Normal Nuclear Pakistan: A Debate

The advancements in the nuclear capable delivery systems and miniaturization of the nuclear devices once again commenced a debate on Pakistan's nuclear program during the recent months. A few American nuclear experts expressed their distress over the modernization of the program and also made baseless claims such as the “fastest-growing nuclear program on earth” or “Pakistan might be on the verge of deploying a small tactical nuclear weapon.” They spelled out a few policy options to cap the quantitative as well as qualitative improvement in the program. They also listed a few benefits, such as membership of NSG, MTCR, A Normal Nuclear Pakistan, etc. that Pakistan would receive in the reciprocity of observing restraint in its nuclear program modernization. For instance, two senior American Journalists David Ignatius and David E. Sanger reported in *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* respectively in October 2015 that Obama administration is exploring a nuclear deal with Pakistan provided it accepts “brackets on Pakistan's short-range and long-range nuclear options” on its nuclear weapons developments.⁵⁷ The brackets' proposals seem centered on Pakistan's shortest-range ballistic missile-NASR having 60km range, so-called tactical nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile Shaheen-III having 2750 km range. The test of Shaheen-III marked Pakistan's potential to develop intermediate range ballistic missiles.⁵⁸ Indeed, acceptance of Washington's conditional civilian nuclear offer would give Islamabad access to a global marketplace for nuclear power plants, technology, services and fuel for civilian purposes. Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, two leading American nuclear analysts, also published a report titled “A Normal Nuclear Pakistan” in August 2015. Indeed, this report requires critical examination. Nevertheless, these writings have intensified debate on Pakistan's nuclear program in the international media.

⁵⁶ “World powers urged not to pressurise Pakistan on N-issue,” *Dawn*, October 30, 2015.

⁵⁷ David Ignatius, “The U.S. cannot afford to forget Afghanistan and Pakistan,” *The Washington Post*, October 6, 2015. See also David E. Sanger, “U.S. Exploring Deal to Limit Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal,” *The New York Times*, October 15, 2015.

⁵⁸ Peter Lavoy, a veteran intelligence and Pakistan expert cataloged Americans concerns on both NASR and Shaheen-III on March 23, 2015 during a conversation with Lt. General (retired) Khalid Kidwai, the former Director General of SPD at the Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015 (CINPC 2015) held at Washington D.C. The author was present in the audience during conversation.

Theoretically, these offers seem in the advantage of Islamabad. However, the norm of the real-politick, trends in the global nuclear order and above all the developments in the regional strategic environment due to India's gigantic military build-up refrain Islamabad from accepting these recommendations. Is this denial approach of Islamabad rational? Today, Islamabad seems prepared to negotiate a civilian nuclear deal with Washington without compromising on its 'credible minimum full spectrum nuclear deterrence posture'. Similarly, Pakistan expressed its desire to be a member of all international export control regimes, i.e. the NSG, MTCR, Australian Group and Wassenaar Arrangement. However, it is not ready to compromise on its nuclear posture by accepting unrealistic conditions on its nuclear weapon program. It's because, Pakistan's nuclear decision making is very much determined by its regional strategic environment instead of idealistic norms of nuclear non-proliferationists or nuclear pessimists conclusions. Moreover, Pakistan developed its nuclear weapons to defend itself from the Indian nuclear blackmail.

The review of Pakistan's nuclear program's evolutionary history reveals that Islamabad's nuclear policy has always been rationally perceived and logically executed. Despite it, a few strategic pundits question it prejudicially. Instead of examining Islamabad's nuclear policy objectively, within the context of South Asian strategic environment, they demand for the rollback of Pakistan's nuclear program. They deliberately ignore the Indian military doctrine transformation entailing colossal military build-up. Similar flaws or deliberate negations of Pakistani concerns can be noticed in Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon report-*A Normal Nuclear Pakistan*.

The Report is an interesting reading. The contributors diligently endeavoured to prove that presently Pakistan is an atypical nuclear weapon state. They also recommended Islamabad five nuclear weapon-related initiatives to become a normal nuclear weapon state. These recommendations warrant serious deliberation on the subject because speculatively these five proposals to Islamabad seem benign, but in reality these proposals are perilous for Pakistan's national security in general and defence in particular. The report fails to treat Pakistan on par with India. The objective analysis necessitates that each proposal ought to be examined systematically. Dalton and Krepon proposed five proposals are following:

1. Shift declaratory policy from “full spectrum” to “strategic” deterrence.
2. Commit to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons.
3. Lift Pakistan's veto on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations and reduce or stop fissile material production.
4. Separate civilian and military nuclear facilities.
5. Sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without waiting for India.⁵⁹

The aforementioned recommendations highlight that the complex strategic environment of South Asia has completely been ignored by the authors of the Report. In addition, they also disregarded India's colossal military build-up and transformation in its military doctrine. Indeed, today, for the Americans, India's military build-up is an advantageous development due to the Indo-US Strategic Partnership, New Delhi's potential to purchase American military hardware,⁶⁰ and strategic competition with China. The Indian strategic community has successfully been propagating that India would check China's rise in the Asian strategic environment. It's a debatable assertion that whether New Delhi checkmates China or only maintains a phony rivalry with Beijing. But it's an established fact that India's military build-up is perilous for Pakistan's defence. Therefore, Islamabad ought to chalk out a viable strategy to defend itself from the increasing conventional fire power of India.

Many analysts seem ignorant about the factual situation when they opined that Pakistan's nuclear weapon program is a fastest-growing program. The comparative analysis of India and Pakistan nuclear inventories reveal that latter's program is not fastest-growing. For instance, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris' findings

⁵⁹ Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, *A Normal Nuclear Pakistan*.

⁶⁰ India has emerged as one of the world's largest buyer of weapons systems during the recent years. Therefore, the United States has established “India Rapid Reaction Cell at the Pentagon” to streamline the coordination required for India's procurement of American arms in February 2015. Keith Webster, Director, International Cooperation Office of the Under Secretary of Defence for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, heads this cell. Importantly, India is the only country to have a specific cell of its kind inside the Pentagon. “Special cell in Pentagon for defence ties with India,” *Dawn*, September 17, 2015. “Regional Arms Buildup,” *Dawn*, September 18, 2015.

contradict Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon estimates about India's fissile material. They concluded that: "India is estimated to have produced approximately 540 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, enough for 135 to 180 nuclear warheads, though not all of that material is being used."⁶¹ The Pakistani estimates also contradict the authenticity of international analysts' estimates. It was reported that "Pakistani assessment is that India has enough fissile material, both reactor- and weapon-grade plutonium, for more than 2,000 warheads."⁶² In such a situation, certainly, it is difficult for Islamabad to alter its credible minimum full spectrum nuclear deterrence policy. The following table also reveals the asymmetry in India and Pakistan's fissile material.

| | HEU, tones | Non-civilian Pu tones | Civilian Pu Tones |
|--------------------------|------------|-----------------------|-------------------|
| Pakistan | 3 | 0.15 | 0 |
| India | 0.8 | 5.2 | 0.24 |

Source: <http://www.fissilematerials.org/>

The proposal about "committing to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons" seems partially acceptable. But it is only viable, if Islamabad is capable to spend billions of dollars to purchase conventional sophisticated military hardware from the developed world's military industrial complex. In simple words, Pakistan limits its nuclear weapons production and enters into an economically devastating conventional arms race with India. Indeed, it would be an economically disastrous option for Pakistan and thereby it ought to avoid conventional arms race with India. Another workable option in this context is a comprehensive arms control agreement between India and Pakistan. The former, however, seems least interested in negotiating an arms control agreement with Islamabad.

Importantly, Islamabad had not only expressed its aspirations, but had also endeavoured to keep South Asia free from nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, it had failed to keep South Asia free from nuclear weapons due to India's Great Power designs. Therefore, despite

⁶¹ Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, "Indian nuclear forces, 2015", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 71, Issue 5, September 2015, pp 77-83.
<http://thebulletin.org/2015/sepember/indian-nuclear-forces-20158728#sthash.HykdjJGa.dpuf>, accessed on September 5, 2015.

⁶² Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Broadest deterrence capability to be kept," *Dawn*, September 10, 2015.

Islamabad's earnest desire to keep South Asia free from nuclear weapons, it has refrained from joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970s. Subsequently, it developed its indigenous nuclear infrastructure. And, also has refrained from signing CTBT because the global nuclear environment is not conducive for the Treaty entry-into-force in the near future. The CTBT lost significant support in October 1999, when the Senate of United States refused to ratify it. Therefore, it is an erroneous conclusion that Islamabad is waiting for India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The practical approach for the entry into force of the CTBT is that the United States Senate ratifies the Treaty.

Islamabad's firm stance on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament is not acceptable to the United States and its like-minded nations. Therefore, the American analysts including the writers of the report-A Normal Pakistan-criticized Pakistan's FMCT stance. Despite the severe opposition Islamabad is disinclined to alter its stance on FMCT at CD. On February 13, 2015, it reiterated its stance that it cannot accept negotiations on FMCT with the Shannon Mandate, due to its security concerns. Ambassador Zamir Akram stated: "Other elements of the PoW (Program of Work) were acceptable to us. We were and are ready to negotiate on any or all of the other CD's agenda items except FMCT with the Shannon Mandate. Accordingly, we proposed amendments to your PoW."⁶³ Today, many nations are pressuring Islamabad to soften its stance on the FMCT. Conversely, Islamabad seems convinced that FMCT scope should include both arms and disarmament components as well as take into account the regional security environment. Secondly, the continuing policies of nuclear exceptionalism and discrimination for the sake of commercial gain and profiteering have also hardened its position on FMCT. Thus, it seems appropriate to focus and address the causes due to which Pakistan is reluctant to lift its veto on FMCT negotiations at the Conference. Moreover, the current trends in the global nuclear politics also reveal that the reduction or stopping of fissile material production is impossible. Thus, neither international nor regional trends support the demand of authors of the Report to reduce or stop fissile material production.

⁶³ Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN at the CD Plenary on 13 February 2015.

Conclusion

An objective analysis of Pakistan's nuclear posture reveals the rational decision-making thinking at the National Command Authority's echelon. The Authority realistically delineates both conventional and nuclear threats to the country; and thereafter vigilantly chalks out a Credible Minimum Full Spectrum Nuclear Deterrence posture. Notwithstanding, many strategic pundits are uncomfortable with the qualitative transformation in Pakistan's nuclear posture. They consider the shift in the posture perilous and destabilizing. Hence, they have recommended various proposals to administer Pakistan's nuclear decision making. These recommendations, however, were rejected by the NCA because Pakistan is confronted with a credible threat from India, which has been pursuing dangerous and provocative military doctrines such as Cold Start and Proactive Military Operation Strategy.

To conclude, the increasing complexity in the strategic environment of Pakistan due to India's conventional military build-up obliges the NCA to act rationally and advance its nuclear arsenal qualitatively to realize the requirements of its 'credible minimum full spectrum nuclear deterrence posture' to solidify country's defensive fence.

Strings in Strategic Reorientation: Evaluating the India-United States Strategic Relationship during Obama Administration

*Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari**

Abstract

The US strategic compulsions regarding its Asia-Pacific policy, India's primacy in Indian Ocean region containing China, and India's thirst for obtaining the major power status bound them together. However strategic shifts in states affairs always take time to yield the desired results. At the same time, realpolitik will continue to play a significant role in determining the course of relationship between the two states.

Keywords: MTCR, NSG, Indo-US Strategic Dialogue, UNSC, Indo-US Civil Nuclear Dialogue.

With the beginning of 21st century, India and United States sought to develop highly ambitious strategic partnership in various areas of mutual interests, which covered a lot of issues but the most significant with reference to the strategic relationship were the promises for civilian nuclear cooperation and defence related deals, which caused a lot of uproar in international politics indicating a shift in the US foreign policy as well as that of India. The United States pledged to help India to become a major power in the world and provide India an unconventional support in obtaining waivers from various international non-proliferation regimes with regard to nuclear trade with the US as well as other countries in the world. It helped India to get approved the country specific waivers from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Supply Group (NSG). The US itself had to modify its national laws for granting nuclear deal to India at the cost of decade long efforts for non-proliferation. At the other end, India too pledged to place some of its nuclear reactors under the IAEA safeguards and promised to help United States as significant partner in various areas of mutual interests.

Most of the significant developments in India-United States strategic relations took place under the President Barack Obama's

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administration for practical implementation of the strategic partnership, which was initiated by President Clinton and concluded by President Bush. Despite seven years since the nuclear deal, the corner stone of the Indo-US strategic partnership, the US yet awaits to reap the benefits it expected. After his election as President, Obama invited India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as the first state guest of his new administration on November 22-26, 2009. According to the website of Indian Embassy in Washington D.C.:

The visit focused on the common interests and shared values in a strategic partnership of global relevance and reflected the vision and resolve of the two leaders to embark upon a new phase in their bilateral partnership. In their meeting on November 24, Indian Prime Minister and the US President reviewed all aspects of the India-US bilateral relationship including the progress of the Strategic Dialogue that was announced during the visit of Mrs. Clinton to India on July 20, 2009. Eight MOU/MOIs were signed between the two sides during the visit.¹

Prior to the visit of Indian Prime Minister to the United States, Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, who termed India-United States Strategic Partnership as 'Partnership of Democracies';² paid a visit to India in July 2009 where she launched a new strategic dialogue with India. According to Teresita C. Schaffer, "she[Hillary Clinton] signed two important new agreements, a Technical Safeguards Agreement permitting US-licensed components to be used on Indian civilian spacecraft...The Indian government settled the end-use monitoring arrangements needed to permit major military sales from the United States and pledged to designate two sites for US companies to build nuclear facilities."³ During a reception for India-US strategic dialogue session on June 2010 in Washington D.C., President Obama said that, India is a leader in Asia and around the world. It's a rising power and a responsible global power. That's why I firmly believe that the relationship between the United States and India will be a defining

¹ Embassy of India. General Overview of India - US Relations. 2010. <http://www.indianembassy.org/general-overview-of-india-us-relations.php> (accessed February 22, 2011).

² Clinton, Hillary Rodham. "Partnership Of Democracies." *Times of India*, June 4, 2010.

³ Schaffer, Teresita C. Hillary Clinton's Visit to India. July 23, 2009. <http://csis.org/publication/secretary-state-hillary-clinton%E2%80%99s-visit-india> (accessed February 13, 2011).

partnership in the 21st century. The new National Security Strategy that I released last week makes this absolutely clear: A fundamental pillar of America's comprehensive engagement with the world involves deepening our cooperation with 21st century centers of influence, and that includes India.⁴

Significant developments were found in the US President Barack Obama's visit to India on November 6, 2010 and during second visit in January 2015. The US National Security Council spokesman, Mr. Mike Hammer, said about India on the eve of the US President's visit, "we have a strategic partnership which we're trying to develop. India is an indispensable partner; one that we recognize is rising on the global stage, one that we want to embrace." He added that "there are many things we can do together that advance both our countries' interests and also that provide for others."⁵ The most important event of Obama's 2010 visit to India was declaration of the US support in obtaining United Nations Security Council's permanent seat to India. Ashley Tellis said that it is important in a sense that "it communicates to the outside world that the United States values its relationship with India in ways that people did not appreciate before."⁶ According to Robert M Hathaway, Director of Asia program at Woodrow Wilson International Center, "It turns out that the sceptics were wrong. Historians will see the trip as an important milestone in the maturation and consolidation of what President Obama called 'the defining partnership of the 21st century'," ⁷ Lisa Curtis, the South Asia specialist at the Heritage Foundation said that "the visit sent a clear signal of the importance his administration attaches to India, highlighting both economic and security cooperation. Robust endorsement of India's global role can also be seen in other more concrete initiatives like the easing of export controls on Indian

⁴ "Remarks by the President Obama at US-India Strategic Dialogue Reception." *Washington DC: White House*, June 3, 2010.

⁵ The Economic Times. "Ahead of Obama's visit, US says India indispensable partner." *The Economic Times*. November 7, 2010. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-11-07/news/27580520_1_security-agencies-foolproof-security-high-profile-visit (accessed December 5, 2010).

⁶ Srinivasan, Dinesh Narayanan and S. "Ashley Tellis: The real meaning of Obama's visit." *Forbes*. November 23, 2010. <http://forbesindia.com/interview/close-range/ashley-tellis-the-real-meaning-of-obamas-visit/19452/1> (accessed December 5, 2010).

⁷ Deccan Herald. "Obama's maiden visit to India a triumph: Experts." November 9, 2010. <http://www.deccanherald.com/content/111232/content/217589/pension-scheme-nris.html> (accessed December 5, 2010).

organizations and support for Indian membership in non-proliferation groupings like the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.”⁸

According to a press release by the White House: “the two leaders reaffirmed that India-US strategic partnership is indispensable not only for their two countries but also for global stability...President Obama welcomed India's emergence as a major regional and global power and affirmed his country's interest in India's rise, its economic prosperity, and its security.”⁹ During his visit to India, President Barack Obama made trade deals of worth \$10 billion that could create 50,000 jobs for United States and announced to take measures to remove Indian space and defence companies from the “restricted entities list”. He also declared the US support to India in its efforts to obtain permanent seat in United Nations Security Council as well as membership of global non-proliferation regimes. According to the Obama-Singh Joint Statement, “the United States intends to support India's full membership in the four multilateral export control regimes (Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement) in a phased manner.”¹⁰ Based on the counter-terrorism initiative 2010 both states agreed to enhance cooperation in counter-terrorism capacity building and transfer of technology for this purpose. Regarding their role in international affairs, both sides declared their resolve to promote cooperation and consultation towards building a stable Afghanistan. Both states also acknowledged the importance of access to the sea, air, and space in an interdependent economic world and launched a dialogue to develop cooperation in these areas to enhance security and development. The leaders declared their resolve to enhance defence cooperation in multiple areas, i.e. defence equipment, military exercises and security issues.

According to the Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh: “United States welcomes India's decision to purchase

⁸ Deccan Herald. "Obama's maiden visit to India a triumph: *Experts*." November 9, 2010. <http://www.deccanherald.com/content/111232/content/217589/pension-scheme-nris.html> (accessed December 5, 2010).

⁹ "Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh." *Washington DC: White House*, November 8, 2010.

¹⁰ *Ibid*

US high-technology defence items, which reflects our strengthening bilateral defence relations and will contribute to creating jobs in the United States.”¹¹ They also welcomed the 'Memorandum of Understanding' for “cooperation in the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership being established by India.”¹² Both leaders also showed their satisfaction over the completion of initial steps towards the implementation of India-United States civilian nuclear agreement. According to the Joint Statement: “United States and India reiterated their commitment to build strong India-US civil nuclear energy cooperation through the participation of the US nuclear energy firms in India on the basis of mutually acceptable technical and commercial terms and conditions that enable a viable tariff regime for electricity generated.”¹³

President Obama also addressed the joint session of the Indian Parliament on November 8, 2010. During his address to the Indian Parliament, Obama termed the India-United States partnership as the defining partnership of the 21st century and put emphasis on joint Indo-US efforts to work in three main areas which include global partnership to promote prosperity in both countries by creating high-tech and high-wage jobs for each other, civilian nuclear cooperation to meet energy needs of India, partnership in high-tech defence and space areas. He also pledged to cooperate in agricultural development to spark the green revolution, weather forecasting, improving the health sector, educational cooperation through student exchanges, democratic development through strengthening democratic governance and human rights, while slightly mentioning Indian avoidance to involve in human rights issues at international forums.¹⁴ Another pledge was made by President Obama in November 2012 in a meeting with India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the East Asia Summit by stating that, “India is a big part of my plans.”¹⁵

¹¹“Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.” *Washington DC: White House*, November 8, 2010.

¹²“US-India Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement,” US Department of State. Office of the Spokesman. June 3, 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/142645.htm> (accessed April 9, 2013).

¹³“Joint Statement: Fourth US-India Strategic Dialogue.” US Department of State. Office of the Spokesperson. June 24, 2013. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/211084.htm> (accessed August 19, 2013).

¹⁴“Text of President Barack Obama's Address to a Joint Session of the Indian Parliament.” *US-India Friendship.Net*. November 8, 2010. <http://www.usindiafriendship.net/viewpoints1/obama-remarks-to-indian-parliament.html> (accessed February 23, 2011).

¹⁵“Sukhoi fighters to be equipped with Brahmos missiles.” *The Economic Times*. June 19, 2012.

Despite a lot of declarations, commitments and reiterations, pragmatic steps yet need to be taken for implementation of the cooperation promised under the strategic partnership. Although, both states claim to be cordial and indispensable for each other's strategic interests but at times are sceptical about other's intentions when it comes to the conclusion of various supplementary agreements required to materialize the strategic partnership. Search for strategic autonomy and mutual suspicion are the major hurdles that have yet stuck the implementation of strategic partnership in letter and spirit.

The Strategic Dialogues: Stepping Ahead

In order to channelize the strategic relationship, an initiative was taken in 2009 by the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton and Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna, who jointly set up a structure for developing ties in the core areas of mutual interests. They announced to conduct annual strategic dialogues in alternate capitals. According to the Joint Statement of Krishna-Clinton meeting 2009, "This dialogue will focus on a wide range of bilateral, global, and regional issues of shared interest and common concern, continuing programs currently under implementation and taking mutually beneficial initiatives that complement Indian and US development, security and economic interests."¹⁶ A series of annual strategic dialogues was started in 2010 with the first meeting at Washington D.C. when Indian External Minister S.M. Krishna visited the US in June 2010. The first round took into account the discussions related to Advancement in Global Security and Countering Terrorism, Disarmament and Non Proliferation, Trade and Economic Relations, High Technology, Energy Security, Clean Energy and Climate Change, Agriculture, Education, Health, Science and Technology. They also agreed to continue the process of strategic dialogue for further discussions and development.¹⁷ One of the significant developments made by the first dialogue was that it set the stage for President Obama's visit to India where he declared the promise to support India's bid for permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council in the linchpin.

¹⁶ "US - India Joint Statement." US Department of State. *Bureau of Public Affairs*, Office of the Spokesman. July 20, 2009. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126230.htm> (accessed April 9, 2013).
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/126230.htm> (accessed April 9, 2013).

¹⁷ "US-India Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement." US Department of State. Office of the Spokesman. June 3, 2010. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/142645.htm> (accessed April 9, 2013).

Second round of strategic dialogue took place at New Delhi on July 19, 2011 with visit of the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton to India. This round was mainly focused on the enhancement of bilateral issues encompassing Defence, Security and Counter-terrorism, Civil Nuclear Cooperation, Membership of Export Control Regimes, Export Control Cooperation, Nuclear Security, Strategic Security Dialogue, Education, Innovation, Science and Technology, and Space.¹⁸ This dialogue mainly reiterated the commitments made by the two countries regarding implementation of nuclear cooperation agreement and expressed satisfaction over the developments regarding India's full membership of various export control regimes including NSG, MTCR, Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement.¹⁹

The third round of Strategic Dialogue was conducted at Washington on June 13, 2012 with the visit of India's Minister of External Affairs, S.M. Krishna. This dialogue did not represent any significant progress in the India-US relations and relied traditionally on reiterating the commitments and promises made earlier and explored opportunities in further areas of mutual interests. However, this dialogue had a comprehensive discussion regarding Afghanistan and each aspect of upcoming transition in Afghanistan was taken into account. Both countries committed to cooperate not only with each other in the Afghanistan transition process but also talked about the possibilities of trilateral dialogue including Afghan government.²⁰ The analysis of discussions regarding Afghanistan suggests that the US wants to replace itself with India in Afghanistan as a guardian of the US interests. The first two dialogues were also significant regarding India-US collaboration in regional development and especially the US effort to encourage India for enhancing its role in Afghanistan. The US has been very ambitious in providing India the role of regional player, a security provider, and a key partner in the 'rebalancing' policy of the United States. The US looks at India as the security provider in the Asia-Pacific region while India is also ambitious to adopt this role but at the same time is sceptic in adopting the role of the US subservient for its policy in Asia. This strategic conundrum raises big questions for

¹⁸"India-US Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement." *The Hindu*. July 19, 2011.

<http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/indiaus-strategic-dialo>

¹⁹ Ibid

²⁰"Joint Statement on the Third US-India Strategic Dialogue." *US Department of State*. Office of the Spokesperson. June 13, 2012. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/192267.htm> (accessed April 11, 2013)

mutual cooperation between the two countries.

Fourth round of strategic dialogue was conducted on June 24, 2013 at New Delhi between the US Secretary of State John F. Kerry and his counterpart Mr. Salman Khurshid representing India. Discussing the regional strategic connotations, the dialogue focused on cooperating in Indian and Pacific ocean regions, which is seen as converging India's 'Look East' policy and United States' 'Asia-Pacific Strategy'. The regional strategic consultation also included cooperation in Afghanistan; both reiterated their commitments to support the transition process in Afghanistan, especially in building up the defence capacities of Afghan national security forces. It is notable here that Pakistan has always been sceptical about the enhancing Indian role in Afghan affairs and considers it instability catalyst for regional peace and security. Discussions on security and strategic cooperation welcomed the defence trade that reached \$9 billion and explored opportunities for technological cooperation including defence co-developments and co-production. Other issues of interest included counter-terrorism, partnership in commerce, education, energy and cooperation on various global issues.

The strategic dialogue, fifth in the series, was conducted at New Delhi on July 31, 2014 between the US Secretary of State John Kerry and the Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj. Dialogue started with positive expectations of further rapprochement in the India-US relations with the newly elected government in India. Discussion included issues related to commerce, combating terrorism, non-proliferation, cyber security, nuclear cooperation, defence cooperation, and extradition. The meeting welcomed the to-date developments in India-US cooperation in various areas and reaffirmed their commitments to enhance bilateral cooperation in the forthcoming summit meetings. The US delegation reiterated its commitment to support India's full membership in prominent non-proliferation regimes like NSG, MTCR, WA, & Australia Group. Another reiteration of commitment for full implementation of nuclear deal was pledged as usual. The delegations projected the India-US strategic partnership as truly significant element not only for regional peace and stability but also for global peace. Discussing the India-US role in various parts of the world, the meeting discussed about UN reforms introducing India as one of the permanent member in the UNSC, engagement in Afghanistan, promotion of stability in Iraq, Gaza & Israel as well as in Middle East, South Asian region, Asia and globally. In short, the fifth dialogue was also conducted in traditional manner that

focused on reiterations rather than introducing any breakthrough. The dialogue focused mainly on prospects for bilateral economic cooperation including commerce and investment. Most of the issues discussed were related to the non-traditional security cooperation.²¹

The regular conduct of strategic dialogue as designed is the only success yet but they failed to achieve the objectives that were conceived at the time the dialogue process was initiated. Five rounds of strategic dialogues have been conducted to date and all ended with the renewal of old commitments and hopes for further cooperation in strategic realm. A few defence trade deals that have been materialized are fraction of the volume expected. However, during President Obama's visit to India in 2015, leaders of the two states elevated the US-India Strategic Dialogue and converted it into the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue, reflecting the United States and India's shared priorities of generating economic growth, creating jobs, improving the investment climate, and strengthening the middle class in both countries.²² The inaugural meeting of the S&CD was held in the US in September 2015, which also ended with traditional commitments to enhance strategic partnership between the two countries and further strengthen the bilateral cooperation.

Strings in Strategic Reorientation

Although, both the states have committed to cooperate with each other in a variety of areas, the developments are at a very slow pace. An evaluation of cooperation in strategic realm suggests that despite claiming to become global partners, both are sceptic about each other for the conclusion of various agreements for the practical implementation of the strategic partnership. India has been reluctant in signing the end-use monitoring agreements, the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), the Logistics Supply Agreement (LSA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) that are prequalification for defence trade with United States, while the US reluctance to materialize strategic partnership agreement without Indian adherence to such agreements represents the US scepticism in dealing with India. An

²¹"Joint Statement on the Fifth India-US Strategic Dialogue." *The US Department of State*. July 31, 2014. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/230046.htm> (accessed August 10, 2014).

²²The US Department of State. "US-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue." *The US Department of State*. September 21-22, 2015. <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/ci/in/strategicdialogue/> (accessed October 26, 2015)

example of such scepticism can be seen in the National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, where the section 1279, related to the bilateral defence trade relationship with India, sub-clause (b) calls for the comprehensive 'policy review' regarding feasibility and assessment report for defence co-production and co-development with India. The said clause mentions:

Comprehensive Policy Review - The Secretary of Defence shall, in coordination with the Secretary of State, conduct a comprehensive policy review-- (1) to examine the feasibility of engaging in co-production and co-development defence projects with India; and (2) to consider potential areas of cooperation to engage in co-production and co-development defence projects with India that are aligned with United States national security objectives.²³

The first setback to India-US strategic relationship came to blow when India rejected the US offer of F/A-18 or F-16 fighter jets in Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition in April 2011. Describing Indian viewpoint on the MMRCA competition, Amer Latif writes, "For New Delhi, the MMRCA competition was never intended to account for 'strategic considerations' but rather sought a fighter platform that it perceived as a top-of-the-line performer with the latest technology and provided the required amounts of technology transfer, along with coproduction and co-development prospects."²⁴ Rejection of the US offer due to technology transfer and co-production prospects indicates not only India's priorities but also manifests the US scepticism regarding technology transfers to India.

Another issue of disagreement between the two countries is the 'India's Nuclear Liability Act', where both states seem to be at odds with each other's viewpoint. India passed its Nuclear Liability Act in 2010 which places liability of any nuclear accident potentially on the nuclear suppliers as well as to the operators of nuclear facility. Discussing the hurdles in implementation of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Geoffrey Pyatt said:

²³ "National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013." *govtracks.us*. December 28, 2012. <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr4310/text> (accessed April 6, 2013)

²⁴ Latif, S. Amer. "US-India Defence Trade: Opportunities for Deepening the Partnership. Wadhani Chair in US-India Policy Studies", *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 2012, 3.

India's nuclear liability law is not in line with the international nuclear liability principles reflected in the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage... Current liability law and regulations impose the risk of a heavy financial burden on equipment suppliers seeking to enter the Indian market and expose such companies to the risk of significant financial penalty in the event of a nuclear accident, neither of which is consistent with international standards... Without a law consistent with this Convention in place, companies from the United States as well as other nations will find it difficult to participate in India's nuclear power expansion plans.²⁵

The disagreement on 'nuclear liability' between the two countries hinders the implementation of nuclear deal, which was thought to be materialized steadfastly. Although, the US President Obama and Indian Prime Minister announced the settlement of differences over the Nuclear Liability Act during President Obama's visit to India in 2015,²⁶ the practical implementation yet involves too many complications, holding the nuclear deal yet plagued. The most recent development that supports the complexities in the nuclear cooperation between the two states is the statement given by Jeff Inmelt, the CEO of General Electric (American Company for Nuclear Trade with India) who spoke outlandishly against the Indian attitude over the nuclear liability issues with India. Inmelt said that "I am not going to put my company at risk for anything - there is no project worth it... India can't re-invent the language on liability."²⁷ Moreover, India has not yet ratified the CSC (Convention on Supplementary Compensation), which the US wants to be ratified by India. According to a report in Times of India, "India's liability law does not comply with the CSC, which would then put India in a quandary... If, after ratifying the CSC, other countries report India's domestic laws as being in violation of the CSC, India would be in the unhappy situation."²⁸ Seven years have been passed after the nuclear deal was inked but the US is

²⁵ "India's Liability Law not in Line with International Norms: US." *The Hindu*. December 1, 2012. <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/indias-liability-law-not-in-line-with-international-norms-us/article4153366.ece> (accessed April 6, 2013).

²⁶ The Guardian. "Obama and Modi agree to limit US liability in case of nuclear disaster." *The Guardian*. January 25, 2015. <http://www.ibtimes.com/obamas-india-visit-us-india-move-forward-operationalizing-stalled-civil-nuclear-deal-1794052> (accessed October 26, 2015).

²⁷ "GE CEO blows a fuse over India's Nuclear Liability Law." *Neutron Bytes*. September 27, 2015. <http://neutronbytes.com/2015/09/27/ge-ceo-blows-a-fuse-over-indias-nuclear-liability-law/> (accessed October 26, 2015).

hat-indo-us-nuclear-trade-has-stalled-says-washington-403342 (accessed August 19, 2013).

still waiting to benefit from the commitments made in 2008. As reported by Pallava Bagla:

The US says the nuclear commerce has not benefitted the Americans who did most of the global diplomatic heavy lifting... the US Director of Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security at the US State Department, Richard Stratford told, "The nuclear issue is complex, the US is not frustrated but India's nuclear liability law is a concern and it is unfortunate that nuclear trade has not commenced."²⁹

However, in the backdrop of India-US nuclear deal, India successfully obtained special treatment from NSG and IAEA, which helped India to conclude nuclear related agreements with other suppliers in international market. India managed to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with Canada after forty years of abandonment when it had clandestinely used the Canadian provided facilities for its first nuclear test in 1974. Canada is the second largest uranium-producer in the world that was earlier reluctant to supply uranium to India due to its nuclear weapon development. India and Canada had inked a nuclear cooperation agreement in 2010 but the Canadian demands for sufficient surety about non-use of Canadian produced uranium towards nuclear weapon development had stalled the negotiations. Canada wanted an end-user arrangement for the proper use of its uranium and wanted its uranium to be 'traceable' even after supplied to India. However, India succeeded in convincing Canada on the basis of its India-specific safeguards agreement with IAEA, which will be used by Canada as a monitoring mechanism. Both countries have signed the Appropriate Arrangements Agreement (AAA) on March 21, 2013, which will allow Canada to ship uranium to India.³⁰ Another benchmark for India's nuclear cooperation move was achieved when Australia (who had previously refused the nuclear cooperation with India) agreed to conduct talks for nuclear cooperation agreement with India. On her visit to India, Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan

²⁸ "US Wants India to Ratify CSC." *Times of India*. June 22, 2011.

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-06-22/india/29689595_1_convention-on-supplementary-compensation-csc-nuclear-liability-law (accessed April 7, 2013).

²⁹ Bagla, Pallava. "Unfortunate that Indo-US nuclear trade has stalled, says Washington." *NDTV*. August 9, 2013. <http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/unfortunate-t>

³⁰ "India Inks Nuclear Commerce Pact with Canada." *The Times of India*. April 13, 2013.

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-04-13/india/38510778_1_safeguards-agreement-sourcing-uranium-signed-npt (accessed April 14, 2013).

[ald.com/content/307958/india-hopes-restart-nuclear-talks.html](http://www.ndtv.com/content/307958/india-hopes-restart-nuclear-talks.html) (accessed April 14, 2013)

Singh declared in a joint statement that, "India and Australia would commence negotiations on a bilateral Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement which, for Australia, is a prerequisite for uranium sales to other countries."³¹ Apart from Australia, India is also seeking to have nuclear cooperation agreement with Japan and the negotiations for civilian nuclear cooperation are underway since June 2010.³²

Apart from various strings attached to the developing strategic relationship, the two countries have had military engagements as well as defence trade deals. Discussing the defence transactions between India and United States, S. Amer Latif writes, "The United States has made significant inroads with the induction of US military equipment into Indian military ranks... In fiscal year 2011, India became the third-largest purchaser of US arms, with contracts worth \$4.5 billion."³³ Discussing the India-US partnership, the ex-foreign secretary of India, Kanwal Sibal writes, "The US has bagged the largest number of arms contracts – about \$8 billion worth in the last five years – despite the stringent and intrusive end-use monitoring requirements... India is likely to order more C-17s and P-8I aircraft... The contract for attack helicopters and light howitzers could well go to the US too... India no longer allows fears of a cut-off of US arms supplies in the event of regional tensions to stand in the way of enhanced defence ties."³⁴ Referring to military engagements between the two countries, Yogesh Joshi writes, "Strategically India and the US have become extremely close... More than fifty joint defence exercises have taken place in the last seven years."³⁵ Another development in India's favour is the renewal of framework for defence relationship 2015 that enables India to extract further benefits from United States to strengthen defence procurements. Keeping in view the Tarapur fiasco 1984, Indians are much conscious this time in dealing with the Americans

³¹ "Joint Statement - Prime Minister of Australia and Prime Minister of India." *Prime Minister of Australia, Press Office*. October 17, 2012. <http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/joint-statement-prime-minister-australia-and-prime-minister-india> (accessed April 14, 2013).

³² "India Hopes to Restart Nuclear Talks with Japan Soon." *Deccan Herald*. January 26, 2013. <http://www.deccanher>

³³ Latif, S. Amer. "US-India Defence Trade: Opportunities for Deepening the Partnership. Wadhvani Chair in US-India Policy Studies", *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 2012, 3.

³⁴ Sibal, Kanwal. "The Arc of the India-US Partnership." *Indian Defence Review*. November 7, 2012. <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/the-arc-of-the-india-us-partnership/0/> (accessed April 7, 2013).

³⁵ Joshi, Yogesh. "Paying Dividends: The US-India Nuclear Deal Four Years On." *The Diplomat*. December 28, 2012. <http://thediplomat.com/2012/12/28/americas-strategic-bet-on-india-is-paying-off/?all=true> (accessed April 7, 2013).

and minutely focusing on the terms and conditions in each agreement required for implementation of the strategic partnership commitments. Despite a lot of American relaxations and special treatment, Indians seem to be reluctant in signing any agreement on rapid basis. India has refused to join any agreement based only on buyer-seller relationship, rather its is insisting on transfer of technology, co-development and co-production, which is contradictory to the US practices in dealing with foreign customers. Keeping in view the US strategic compulsions in Asia, Indians would be able to extract as much as possible benefits in dealings with Americans.

Conclusion

The evolution of India-US relations and the analysis of recent developments suggest that although both states desire to develop very enthusiastic relationship, but the realpolitik attaches a lot of strings to the strategic reorientation. Although, India has started to reap the benefits of the Indo-US deal through the auspices of NSG and IAEA, which helped it to start negotiations at the places where it was abandoned before, i.e. Australia, Japan, Germany, Canada etc., but it does not mean at all that India-US cooperation shall go into stalemate. The US strategic compulsions regarding its Asia-Pacific policy, India's primacy in Indian Ocean region, containing China, and India's thirst for obtaining the major power status bound them together. It is not an easy task to forget all the past differences in a moment and commemorate new relation. Unless the two states vow to help and cooperate with each other, since both have differences on a number of issues, the problems will not be easily settled. Strategic shift in states affairs always take time to provide the desired outcomes. Although, both the states declared their resolve to cooperate in the areas of defence, space, and nuclear cooperation in a very hurried manner but the practical implementation requires a lot of work yet to be done.

Paradigm Shift in the International Security Architecture and Regional Security in South Asia

*Shams-uz-Zaman**

Abstract

The change in international order from unipolar to multi-polar has resulted in change of US priorities. South Asia faces new challenges amid these changes. US concerns over a range of issues like terrorism, Islamic militancy and nuclear proliferation coupled with the rise of Russia and China have resulted in the US re-posturing towards the Asia Pacific. Economic incentives in Asia also offer the US and European powers an urge to adopt Asia centric economic policy. In this newly evolving security paradigm, India is encouraged by the US to play a critical role in the containment of China. Pakistan is therefore becoming less important for Washington and would have to seek new relationships with newly emerging powers namely Russia and China by offering lucrative economic incentives.

Keywords: Post 2014 Afghanistan, Asia Pivot, New Emerging Cold War, Islamic Militancy, Iran.

Introduction

At the end of the Cold war, international community suddenly confronted a new reality of unipolar World in which the US emerged as an unchallenged superpower. In this new global world order, Pakistan, which had enjoyed status of a frontline state in the West's war against Communism, suddenly found itself of insignificant status thus facing sanctions on account of running a 'clandestine' nuclear programme. Pakistan's position however suddenly changed after 9/11, once the military leadership in a spontaneous policy decision acceded to the US demands of again becoming the frontline state in the fight against terrorism. Three years later, the US decision to invade Iraq on a false pretext of weapons of mass destruction became a watershed event

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which changed overall Muslim perception towards the US as many considered it a war against Islam, thus compounding the problem of terrorism in the South Asian region.

This war, lacking the UN legitimacy, subsequently changed the global balance of power as well. Not only the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq cost the US billions of dollars but exposed the limits of US military prowess as well. According to some analysts, the US now is in a relative decline and the global world order is also in a state of transition which might not be peaceful.¹ These scholars argue that other power centres in the shape of China, Russia, India and South America are emerging to fill up the vacuum created after the US decline.² But the policy makers in Washington do not accept this viewpoint and have argued that the US is rallying itself to face the new global realities of rising economies in Asia by re-posturing itself to guard its strategic interests in the region where new power centres are also emerging. The US policy makers insist that this security policy is not aimed at confronting or containing China but rather is a dynamic shift towards Asia Pacific.³ Pakistan, a frontline state in this war on terror, after having paid a terrible price for its impulsive decision to join the US coalition, now again confronts new realities of being alienated in this new US security strategy which needs to be analysed critically.

Strategic Issues in Regional Security Matrix

US Strategic Rebalancing

The US military invasion of Iraq premised over the false pretext of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) encouraged wide spread anti-Americanism in the greater Middle East which significantly eroded the

¹ Alfred W. McCoy, "The Decline and Fall of American Empire", *The Nation*, December 6, 2010, <http://www.thenation.com/article/156851/decline-and-fall-american-empire#>. See also: Stephen M. Walt, "When Did the American empire start to decline?", *Foreign Policy*, August 2, 2011, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/01/when_did_the_american_empire_start_to_decline, both accessed July 15, 2014.

² John J. Mearsheimer, "Why China's rise will not be peaceful", September 17, 2004, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0034b.pdf>, accessed July 15, 2014.

³ Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century", *Foreign Policy*, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century. See also: Leon E. Panetta, "America's Pacific Rebalance", *Project Syndicate*, December 31, 2012, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/renewing-the-us-commitment-to-the-asia-pacific-region-by-leon-e-panetta>, both accessed July 16, 2014.

diplomatic and political influence of the US in the region. As a result of huge economic cost incurred on the military campaigns conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US economy currently is not in a position to sustain a large scale deployment in the Greater Middle East Region or anywhere else for a longer duration which has already been highlighted by the US policy makers from time to time.⁴ Besides the economic cost, extremely complex situation in the region has also frustrated the US policy makers to relocate their balance towards other regions.⁵ Therefore, the US is gradually shifting its focus away from the troubled region of Greater Middle East towards Asia Pacific to face new challenges elsewhere and grasp new economic opportunities. Main contours of this US policy shift involves:

Asia Pivot or Rebalancing in Asia Pacific Region

President Obama in November 2011 announced the US policy towards Asia Pacific a top priority for his administration.⁶ This policy is also seen in the context of American endeavours to reassure its allies in times once the US defence spending faces prospect of big cuts. This US re-posturing involves setting up new military bases and force deployments in Asia Pacific region besides defining new set of strategic priorities for the US policies which presumably would result in emergence of new alliances while forsaking few old ones. The "Pivot" has also irked China to forge a closer partnership with the Russia in a bid to reassert itself in the region.⁷ This multidimensional US rebalancing policy, apparently aimed at containing China and preventing a nuclear arms race in the region, has invited mixed reactions from the regional states. Countries like Australia, Japan and India have welcomed it, while Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are apprehensive that this US policy might increase tensions within the region.⁸ Pakistan being a close ally of China is likely to face compelling

⁴ Douglas A. Macgregor, "Thoughts on Force Design in Era of Shrinking Defense Budgets", *Joint Force Quarterly*, issue 63, 4th Quarter, 2011, pp. 21-22.

⁵ Pankaj Mishra, "America's Inevitable Retreat From the Middle East", *The New York Times*, September 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/24/opinion/americas-inevitable-retreat-from-the-middle-east.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed November 18, 2014.

⁶ BBC News, "Barak Obama says Asia-Pacific is 'top US priority'", November 17, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15715446>, accessed July 21, 2014.

⁷ J. Michael Cole, "Navigating the Pivot", *Strategic Vision*, vol.1, no.2, March 2012, pp. 9-10.

⁸ Richard C. Bush III, "The Response of China's Neighbor's to the U.S. "Pivot" to Asia", *Brookings*, January 31, 2012, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2012/01/31-us-pivot-bush>, accessed March 10, 2015.

choices in future amid the Asia Pivot policy, and is already in process of shifting its focus from Washington towards Beijing and Moscow.

Post 2014 Afghanistan

The US is in a process of waning down its operations from the Greater Middle East region. Sudden withdrawal of the US troops from Iraq in December 2011 created a vacuum for the non-state actors and replicating such a move in Afghanistan without a broad based government in power is likely to yield similar results thus creating an untenable situation for Pakistan on the western border. A weak Afghan government is not expected to withstand the pressure of armed insurgents, like Taliban, ISIS and warlord militias, who are already viewing the US withdrawal as their victory. Fall of Kanduz and several districts of Takhar, Baghlan and Badakhshan to Taliban insurgents and their re-emergence in provinces like Baghlan, Kunar and Nangarhar, Logar, Zabul, Kandahar and Helmand is seen as major setbacks to Afghan government.⁹ Pakistan's influence over Taliban would gradually erode due to ongoing full scale military offensive "Zarb-e-Azb" in tribal areas and Taliban's victories in Afghanistan. These achievements of the militant groups would also help Taliban's new leadership in fetching fresh recruits from South Asia, Central Asia and possibly from Middle East. The US departure from the region would profoundly reduce Pakistani significance in the US strategic calculus resulting in the rapid decline of foreign assistance to the former. Due to numerous internal issues, the foreign aid serves as an economic lifeline for Pakistan against the possibility of national bankruptcy besides providing a fiscal muscle to continue its military operations in the troubled regions of FATA and Baluchistan. Although Pakistan has been seeking financial assistance from Gulf countries and international donors like IMF and World Bank, yet the US had been the principal contributor of financial assistance. A scenario, in which Pakistan becomes less significant for the US, India would emerge as the biggest benefactor within the region. These circumstances would provide India with a gifted opportunity to settle scores with its nuclear rival by supporting anti-Pakistan non-state actors and militant groups located alongside Pak-Afghan border to cause internal destabilization in Pakistan. Possibility of a terrorist attack, either executed by these militants or orchestrated by the Hindu zealots under the aegis of

⁹ Bill Roggio, "Taliban claims it seized 3 districts in Takhar province", *Long War Journal*, September 29, 2015, <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/09/taliban-claims-it-seized-2-districts-in-takhar-province.php>, accessed September 30, 2015.

Indian intelligence agencies,¹⁰ to either blame Pakistan for bolstering a crisis, or to depict Pakistan as a failed state sponsoring terrorism cannot be ruled out altogether.

Newly Emerging Cold War

Since the end of Cold war, the US has been enjoying the status of an unrivalled superpower with an absolute global reach. This supremacy however, is now challenged by the new emerging global power centres in shape of China and Russia. Emergence of China, in the past, was more of an economic phenomenon rather than military which is now gradually changing in wake of the US new strategic priorities in the Asia Pacific region. Chinese rejection of Pakistani request to build a naval base at strategic port of Gwadar after the US raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in May 2011 was illustrative of this fact. This Chinese reluctance was presumably due to concerns that such an act would provoke the US to take countermeasures against the Chinese initiative. This policy however, was reversed in 2013, after the US announced its Asia Pacific rebalancing act.¹¹ China has also bridged its differences with Russia to enhance cooperation on economic and security issues in response to the US act of rebalancing in Asia Pacific region.¹² With Russia, the US has serious policy differences over the issues of Ukraine and Syria. Although there appears to be a cooperative arrangement between Russia, China and the US but in retrospect, great powers always view each other with contempt and engage in strategic competitions which carry inherent risks of leading to a conflict. Any sign of major conflict between the big powers doesn't appear to be on the horizon at the moment, but a new Cold war between the US and Russia/China is now in the offing.

Nuclear Proliferation Concerns

There are growing concerns within the Western world over the nuclear proliferation. Not only new nuclear powers like India, Israel,

¹⁰ The Express Tribune, "Startling revelations: 'Mumbai, Parliament attacks orchestrated'", August 15, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/577017/startling-revelations-mumbai-parliament-attacks-orchestrated/>, accessed October 20, 2014.

¹¹ Saibal Dasgupta, "China rejects Pakistan's naval base request", *The Times of India*, May 24, 2011, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-24/china/29577192_1_naval-base-ahmad-mukhtar-gwadar-port. See also: The Express Tribune, "Gwadar Port handed over to China", February 18, 2013.

¹² Kavi Chongkittavorn, "China, Russia respond to US pivot to Asia", *The Straits Times*, July 17, 2013, <http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-report/china/story/china-russia-respond-us-pivot-asia-20130717>, accessed October 21, 2014.

Pakistan and North Korea have emerged within last fifteen years or so but prospects of other states, like Iran, crossing the threshold remains plausible. US is not only concerned over the nuclear programme of Iran and North Korea but has also apprehensions with regards to Pakistani vertical nuclear proliferation. Pakistan on the other hand is sceptical of the US intentions over its nuclear programme and fears that under extreme circumstances, the US might launch an operation to seize or destroy Pakistan's nuclear assets. This mistrust is likely to continue in future as well.

Islamic Militancy

US is also fearful of the growing Islamic militancy in the region especially of ISIS and other non-state actors, perpetuated and inflated as a reaction to the US interventionist policies in the Middle East.¹³ The US concerns that, if not controlled, the Al Qaeda could again regenerate itself through ideological cohesion of these militant groups thus posing a serious challenge to the US strategic interests in the region. Emergence of ISIS is just a new manifestation and dimension of the old threat to the modern state system in the Greater Middle East region.¹⁴ Consequently, the US, in future, is likely to use its diplomatic and financial leverage on Pakistan for taking tangible action and doing more against the growing influence of ISIS, Al Qaeda and other affiliated groups by going after their sanctuaries located alongside the Pak-Afghan border. Current military operations, which previously were strongly resisted by Pakistani government, launched at a time once the US is pulling bulk of its forces out of Afghanistan, can probably be seen in the same context.¹⁵

¹³ Shams uz Zaman, "Rise of Non-State Actors in Middle East – Regional Dimensions, *IPRI Journal*, Vol. XV, No. 1, (Winter 2015), pp. 52-54.

¹⁴ Bruce Riedel, "Al Qaeda Is Back", *Brookings*, July 26, 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/07/26-al-qaeda-riedel>, accessed October 27, 2014.

¹⁵ Michael Kugelman, "Pakistan's Military Response: Too Little, Too Late", *The Diplomat*, February 3, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/pakistans-militancy-response-too-little-too-late/>, accessed July 10, 2014.

The Iran Factor

There has been a dramatic and sudden shift in the US policy towards Iranian nuclear programme even at the cost of Israeli annoyance.¹⁶ The Iran-US nuclear framework, known as Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), came as a surprise to many in a time once the threat of Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear installations was looming on the horizon.¹⁷ Saudis are also not happy with the deal because it illustrates shift in US priorities from Sunni to Shiite regional players. Consequently, Iran and its Shiite ally states could emerge as a counter balancing force to Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), subsequently to serve as a critical node for the US to exercise its influence against the rising asymmetric challenges of Sunni militancy.¹⁸ For Pakistan, which has already embarrassed the Saudis by refusing to deploy troops along the Yemen border, this situation has become extremely delicate as it might have to face the prospect of choosing between Tehran and Riyadh in future. Pakistani tilt towards Saudi Arabia risks alienating Iran while at the same time its inclination towards Iran could jeopardize its cordial relationship with Saudi Arabia, which has always rescued Pakistan in economic crises. Pakistan's dilemmas can only be mitigated in this newly emerging regional equation if it manages to secure a balancing and mediating role for itself amidst the growing Saudi-Iranian rivalries while at the same time avoiding becoming a proxy for the US newly articulated Asia-Pacific policy.

Indo-US Strategic Partnership

US considers India an indispensable partner in the containment of China policy.¹⁹ Besides its utility against China, India also presents a

¹⁶ William Booth, "Israel's Netanyahu calls Iran deal 'historic mistake'", *The Washington Post*, November 24, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israel-says-iran-deal-makes-world-more-dangerous/2013/11/24/e0e347de-54f9-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html, accessed January 10, 2014.

¹⁷ James M. Acton, "Why the Iranian Nuclear Agreement is a Good Deal", *Carnegie Endowment of International Peace*, November 26, 2013, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/11/26/why-iranian-nuclear-agreement-is-good-deal/guoz>, accessed January 20, 2014.

¹⁸ Alireza Ahmadian, "Saudi Foreign Policy Rendered Redundant", *Foreign Policy Association Blogs*, December 14, 2013, <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/12/14/saudi-foreign-policy-rendered-redundant/>. See also: George Friedman, "Strategic Reversal: The United States, Iran and the Middle East", *Stratfor*, January 5, 2014, <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/strategic-reversal-united-states-iran-and-middle-east>, both accessed February 5, 2014.

¹⁹ Rahul Bedi Richard Spencer, "US-India defence deal 'to counter China'", *The Telegraph*, February 26, 2008, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1579938/US-India-defence-deal-to-counter-China.html>, accessed May 10, 2014.

China” policy due to its vested economic interests in China, as these could run into jeopardy due to regional confrontation.²² Pakistan has immense economic opportunities to become a trade and economic corridor between these two Asian giants but the governance issues, corruption and ruling elite's apathy towards this aspect has so far deprived Pakistan to reap any benefits from this opportunity. Growing Pakistani frustration over Indian attitude towards meaningful talks for resolution of disputes and subsequent attempts of the latter to marginalize the former at regional forums has persuaded Pakistan to look for alternative options. Launching of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project promising investments of over \$46 billion can be seen in the same backdrop.

Pakistan in the New Security Paradigm

After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan may face a situation similar to 1990's once it was abandoned following the defeat of communism. Pakistan would become less important for the US due to diverging nature of interests on strategic issues. Consequently, the foreign aid would gradually diminish not only due to economic recession in the US and Europe but also because India is likely to replace Pakistan in the new US strategic calculus. Indian continuous provocations across the Line of Control illustrates that threat from the eastern border would remain a permanent feature in Pakistan's security policy. At the same time Pakistan would have to commit bulk of its troops on the western border for counterinsurgency operations, which are likely to continue in future and it looks certain that neither the Afghan government nor new Taliban/ISIS factions would have a favourable view of Islamabad. The opportunity to end the conflict on the negotiation table was lost somewhere in 2014 due to inept government and uninterested military. Pakistani society also remains divided along secular/liberal and religious/conservative fault lines which polarizes the society thus raising prospects for sectarian killings, terrorism and violence. Pakistan would be facing a three dimensional threat from east, west and internal. In other words, Pakistan, in foreseeable future, is likely to remain engaged in a low intensity war/conflict on three fronts, which brings good news for India. With the shrinking foreign aid and looming threat of economic bankruptcy, it would be imprudent for Pakistan to remain in a perpetual state of

²² Economic Times, “India will not join US alliance against China: Think Tank”, August 12, 2013, <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2>

war. Otherwise, this state of war would serve as a continuous drain on Pakistan's economy resulting in an economic meltdown. A weak economy would naturally mean a weak defence. In case the economic problems and issue like corruption, lack of law and order, militancy and terrorism are not eradicated in appropriate timeframe, not only political and institutional infrastructure in Pakistan would weaken but Pakistan's survival as a viable state offering economic incentives for foreign investors would also diminish.

The Way Forward

The West faces a dubious future with regards to economic growth due to multiple factors but Asia is emerging as a new global economic hub and largely remains immune from the Western economic recession. Asia also becomes strategically important as most of the economic players occupying the stage of global politics, like Russia, China, Japan and CARs are situated in the region. Pakistan would miss the economic and strategic opportunities if it remains entangled in the internal and external issues perpetuating internal instability and economic difficulty. This would necessitate the intellectually dwarf political leaders and egocentric security establishment to rise above the parochial prejudices and face the national challenges in entirety.

Pakistan needs to look within the region while strengthening its ties with China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey etc. to improve relations and build its economic base before the foreign aid dries out. Moreover, the situation in Afghanistan is also becoming untenable for Pakistan which adopted a reactive policy. Fears regarding civil war in Afghanistan are also shared by China, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States who are keenly interested in bringing stability to Afghanistan. Inviting a summit to involve neighbouring and regional stake holders like China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan etc to complete the ground work for the rebuilding of the war torn Afghanistan would therefore be an imperative. Visit of top Chinese security officials, especially Zhou Yongkang, to Afghanistan indicate that China is bracing itself to fill in the gap after the US pulls out of Afghanistan. This could also help in denying US some space in its containment of China policy as well.

Pakistani government's recent initiative to strengthen the trade and economic ties with regional states and economic corridor project with China is a step in the right direction which needs to be pursued

vigorously. Russian support to neighbouring states at this critical juncture would also be of immense value to the region. Russians have already shown their support to include Pakistan in Shanghai Cooperation Organization and few high level dignitaries have also exchanged their visits to each other's capitals which is a sign of growing trust and strengthening relations between the two states. Pakistan can also use this opportunity to invite Russians and Chinese companies to invest in IPI and TAPI pipeline projects which could turn into economic lifeline for Pakistan and key to economic stability in Afghanistan. Speeding up work on temporarily held up gas pipeline project with Iran would be another milestone towards overcoming energy needs, economic growth and prosperity which subsequently would lead to stability and peace.

Pakistan has experienced repeated embarrassments and disappointments in history from various states, both within and outside the region, due to its faulty premise of interstate relationship based on emotional and sentimental inclinations. Now it is time to revisit the old approach and establish new relationships with the US and other regional states on pragmatic and meaningful interests which must be based on actual shared common interests and not just hypothetical presumptions. Pakistani leaders must also be cognizant of the fact that credible partnerships between states cannot be established overnight but over a longer period of time. Therefore, while turning towards Russia and other Central Asian Republics etc., sight of other regional and global actors must not be lost till the time the state interests does not prescribe otherwise.

Conclusion

The policy makers and security establishment of Pakistan are, although, cognizant of remaining relevant to the global strategic environments and geo-political developments, which mostly has been erroneously interpreted and unconditionally surrendered to the dictates of a global hegemon and serving its interests even if the logic of national interests and economy defies the policy. Due to this submissive behaviour, Pakistan risks becoming less important state where law and order issues, security situation and economic bankruptcy would remain predominant concerns. If Pakistan continues to steer in the current direction and simultaneously facing three front war scenarios, any hope of early recovery from its self-inflicted woes would remain dim. The norm of remaining indifferent to

international developments while perusing partisan policy of US centric and India specific will have to be reviewed dispassionately. Pakistan will have to craft a multidimensional policy for every region while remaining cognizant of fluid geo-strategic and geo-economic realities. Newly emerging economic powers can always be embraced if they appear to be economically viable in spite of past troubled history. At the same time remaining engaged with old or declining powers should not be a priority if they seek for new strategic objectives elsewhere finding new partners. Thus looking for economic opportunities everywhere should be the Pakistan's core objective. Pakistan would have to vigorously pursue the CPEC project besides finding an early political solution to the US initiated war on terror which has become a continuous source of drain on its economy. All military conflicts ultimately end on the negotiation table and the current war is no exception. External investors world never be willing to take any risk in a war torn country therefore it would be imperative to effectively deal with the dissident/rebel groups and quickly infuse them back into mainstream society. Military solutions alone would perpetuate vicious and unending cycles of violence with or without external actor's support. Seeking political settlement under the current challenging environments by the myopic civil and military leadership would be no easy task. If Pakistan is able to keep the strategic destination in sight while avoiding tactical diversions, only then it can become economically and strategically viable for rest of the world.

BOOK REVIEW

Pakistan's Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence

Zafar Khan, *Pakistan's Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence*, (Routledge, 2015), 198 pages.

Reviewed by Adeel Mukhtar Mirza

Since 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan followed a policy of minimum deterrence. The essentials of minimum deterrence elaborate how a nuclear weapon state manages its nuclear force structure at the minimum, non-deployed, operational and declaratory levels. It also comprehends military and political priority of nuclear weapons, requirement of sophisticated technology and reinforced shelters, required framework for a command and control system and the need for arms control and disarmament measures. However, Pakistan could not sustain its policy of minimum deterrence in subsequent years, therefore, "the question remains: Why Pakistan gradually shifted from minimum deterrence it initially conceptualized to a broader policy orientation; that is, minimum credible deterrence."¹

Dr. Zafar Khan, currently teaching at the Strategic Studies Department, National Defence University Islamabad, in his book, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence," published by Routledge has provided an in-depth conceptual analysis of the evolution of Pakistan's post-1998 nuclear policy and the rationale for the shift from minimum deterrence to minimum credible deterrence.

The author begins by elaborating the conceptual dimensions of Pakistan's post-1998 nuclear policy in light of the essentials of minimum deterrence, which states:

The Pakistani concept of minimum deterrence includes that it would not indulge in an acute arms competition; it would not respond to its adversary's weapon-to-weapon tests; it would upgrade and maintain the credibility of deterrence forces; and these weapons are security oriented and not for fighting purposes.²

Minimum deterrence essentially focuses on the survivability of

¹Zafar Khan, *Pakistan Nuclear Policy: A Minimum Credible Deterrence* (London: Routledge, 2015),p.1

²Ibid., p.6

nuclear forces wherein even a small number of nuclear forces are sufficient to deter the adversary if survivable; therefore, a large number of nuclear weapons are not required. Moreover, "a triad can be achieved through smaller, survivable nuclear weapons; larger weapon sizes, higher numbers of weapons and complicated command and control systems are not necessary; the minimum emphasizes the political priority or political aspects of nuclear weapons, the mere existence of which would suffice to deter; and the minimum discourages nuclear weapon states from thinking of using nuclear weapons for military purposes."

The author attributes the nuclearization of Pakistan and its subsequent policy shift to its conventional weakness in comparison to India, failure of its alliances to provide security guarantees and India's nuclear test in 1974. In addition, the bloody civil war of 1971 that gave birth to Bangladesh made Pakistan revise its security policy. However, the author goes on to add: "Pakistan was slow in its nuclear development. The reasons were: 1) the Pakistani domestic socio-political environment, compared with India, was not conducive to launching a nuclear programme in its initial years of independence; 2) there was a lack of awareness of the use of nuclear technology in the fields of medicine, agriculture and energy; 3) Pakistan lacked a well-trained scientist and nuclear enthusiast political leader; and 4) Pakistan's rudimentary industrial infrastructure restrained the development of nuclear programme (p.21)". Consequently, realizing the need of nuclear deterrence, Bhutto initiated a clandestine nuclear programme, which was followed by subsequent governments even though Bhutto was ousted from the government.

Right after overt nuclearization, Pakistan followed the policy of minimum deterrence, which was realistic as Pakistan does not consider nuclear weapons for war fighting purposes, but only to deter its adversary, hence, fulfilling Pakistan's security needs. Later, Pakistani elites found that the minimum could not be quantified and sustained as a minimum because of changing South Asian security environment. In a similar vein, Pakistan's NCA, SPD and Foreign Ministry kept on issuing statements on maintaining the credibility of its deterrent forces. The Pakistani ambassador to the UN security Council stated in April 2004 that the country would 'continue to develop its nuclear missiles and related strategic capability to maintain the minimum credible deterrence against our eastern neighbour which has embarked on major programs for nuclear weapons, missiles, anti-missiles, and conventional arms acquisitions

and development'. According to the author, "it can be argued that it is India who triggers the arms race in the South Asian region",³ that makes minimum unsustainable for Pakistan.

The absence of an Arms Control Regime (ACR), Dr. Khan argues, is another reason for Pakistan to shift its policy from minimum deterrence to minimum credible deterrence. New Delhi's rapid up-gradation of its deterrence forces coupled with Indo-U.S nuclear deal, the development of Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) - a limited war-fighting doctrine, pursuit of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and increasing fissile material stockpiles lure Pakistan to vibrantly maintain its credible minimum deterrence. Similarly the absence of robust confidence building measures (CBMs) between these two nuclear adversaries augments mistrust and subsequently fuels arms race. Moreover, the author says, "the absence of an ACR and regular nuclear and military CBMs indicate that both the South Asian nuclear rivals are in the formative phase of a nuclear force build-up. Unless they are pulled out of this phase of arms competition, both Pakistan and India will continue to build their deterrent forces, even if they opt for a triad in order to achieve second-strike capability."⁴

Explaining the external factor wherein chain reaction of modernization of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states affects Pakistan's nuclear policy and becomes a cause for the up-gradation of its deterrent forces, the author moves on to the development and modernization of missile and delivery systems by Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan aims at ensuring its second-strike capability even if it has to develop a triad of deterrence forces or development of nuclear submarines.

Nonetheless, Pakistan retains a defensive approach to its nuclear weapons use, but rejects New Delhi's offer of a No First Use (NFU) owing to conventionally weak position in comparison to India. In the subsequent chapter, Dr. Khan examines as to where, when, how and why Pakistan would use its nuclear weapons under 'extreme positions' including the situations when: a large part of Pakistan is occupied, its enemy strangled and a large portion of its land and air forces destroyed. However, the author critiques the discussion

³ Ibid., p.36

⁴ Ibid., p. 137

between Pakistan's policy of 'FU' as well as 'a last resort' because these variables keep on changing and are subject to different interpretations. In addition, both counter-value and counter-force targeting options are on the table for Pakistan. Dr. Khan further explains "how the use of TNWs increases the Cold-War style worries of pre-delegation, command and control, and force protection. Besides, the use of TNWs against the adversary's armed forces could also hit nearly populated cities. The limited war could escalate to the nuclear level and might blur the distinctions between the two targeting options."⁵

Last but not the least; the author is of the view that it is unlikely that Pakistan would lift its non-adherence policy approaches to the NPT, the CTBT and the FMCT. Pakistan demands that it should be acknowledged and given the status of recognized nuclear state and be subjected to similar treatment by U.S and NSG as the one extended to India.

Dr. Khan's book hopefully will initiate an earnest debate on the future direction of Pakistan's nuclear policy. He also puts forward some open-ended questions for the readers to explore further. Those research questions include: What challenges Pakistan might confront in shaping an expansive deterrent policy and how would it impact the deterrence stability of South Asia? What would be the impact of the changing contours of Pakistan's deterrent policy on its command and control system? What could be the economic repercussions be of sufficient deterrent capability, and how could Islamabad ensure the safety and security of sufficient deterrent forces given the worldwide concerns of terrorism and extremism in Pakistan? What possible part Islamabad could play in wider multilateral disarmament process towards Global Zero, given its contemporary defiance of non-proliferation regimes? However, the literature largely lags at predicting the future contours of minimum credible deterrence for Pakistan and its implications on the strategic stability in South Asia. Overall, the book is one of the best research studies on Pakistan's nuclear policy and is very beneficial for those who closely monitor the debate about South Asian nuclear politics.

⁵ Ibid., p. 139.

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is pleased to announce the publication of its Biannual Journal: *Security and Strategic Analyses (JSSA)* as its first Volume. *Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses* would be a peer-reviewed journal focusing on contemporary issues of peace, security and strategic studies.

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Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is an autonomous, multidisciplinary and non-partisan institution established in January 2013. It is a non-governmental and non-commercial organization supervised by a Board of Governors (General Body) supervised under a Chairperson and administered by a Management Committee headed by a President / Executive Director.

SVI aims to project strategic foresight on issues of national and international import through dispassionate, impartial and independent research, analyses and studies. The current spotlight of the SVI will be on national security, regional and international peace and stability, strategic studies, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and strategic stability, nuclear safety and security and energy studies.



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