



# VISION

VISIONARY INSIGHTS INTO THE STRATEGIC INQUESTS OF NATIONS

## SVI FORESIGHT

### VOLUME I, NUMBER 5

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NOVEMBER 2015

**Compiled by**  
**S. Sadia Kazmi**

**Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)**



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**STRATEGIC VISION**  
I N S T I T U T E

**Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)**

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# Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

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Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is an autonomous, multidisciplinary and non-partisan institution, established in January 2013. It is a non-governmental and non-commercial organization, administered by a Board of Governors (General Body) supervised under a Chairperson and administered by a Management Committee headed by a President/Executive Director.

SVI aims to project strategic foresight on issues of national and international import through dispassionate, impartial and independent research, analyses and studies. The current spotlight of the SVI is on the national security, regional and international peace and stability, strategic studies, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and strategic stability, nuclear safety and security and energy studies.

## SVI Foresight

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*SVI Foresight* is a monthly electronic journal. It has a multi-disciplinary perspective highlighting on the contemporary strategic and security studies. The Journal is envisioned to be a collection of policy-oriented articles written by its Research Associates, Visiting Faculty and professional experts. The objective is to provide the readership with a concise all-round and real-time policy oriented discourse on contemporary strategic regional and international developments, highlighting their relevance to Pakistan.

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## Editor's Note

The fifth volume of SVI Foresight for the month of November 2015 presents an anthology of policy analyses focusing on contemporary national and international security strategic and nuclear issues.

In this volume, the readers will be able to find a very interesting and timely counter narrative reflecting Pakistani perspective vis-à-vis Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment's Report authored by Micheal Krepon and Toby Dalton titled 'A Normal Nuclear Pakistan.' This counter narrative has effectively pointed out the biased disposition and discrimination against Pakistan demonstrated by the authors of the Report which profess to restore Pakistan's status as a normal nuclear state. It obviously suggests that the Report is premised on a deliberate misconstruction that Pakistan is not a normal nuclear state and therefore creates a rationale to integrate her in the Non-Proliferation regime. The Stimson and Carnegie Report adopts two opposite indexes for comparing Pakistan's '*potential*' capacity to produce 20 nuclear weapons per year with India's '*actual*' production capacity of 5 nuclear weapons per year to draw what otherwise would have been a false deduction that Pakistan's greater fissile material capacity makes it the world's third largest nuclear weapons (producing) state. The Report sets five brackets / conditions for Pakistan to accept for its so-called 'restoring' as a normal nuclear state: I) Pakistan to return to "strategic" deterrence instead of "full spectrum deterrence", II) commit to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons; III) lift Pakistan's veto on Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and reduce or stop fissile material production; IV) separate civilian and military nuclear facilities; and V), sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without waiting for India. With the help of concrete facts and figures, a unique and fresh perspective has been brought to the contemporary security discourse by the SVI scholars.

A thought provoking evaluation of evolving trends in South Asian nuclear paradigm, highlighting in detail the myths and realities of Indo-US deal and its impact on regional balance of power and strategic stability, but specifically on Pakistan, has also been included in this volume. Another article stresses upon the need for conceptually understanding the idea behind Pakistan's full spectrum deterrence, arguing that Pakistan's ultimate objective is to maintain deterrence equilibrium in South Asia unlike India which only has designs for regional supremacy and great-power ambitions. Closely linked to this issue is a debate about the logic behind the first use doctrine adopted by Pakistan. The prevalent humongous conventional disparity between India and Pakistan provides a sufficient rationale to Pakistan's first use policy while the Indo-US deal and the recently extended offer of NSG waiver to India further validates Pakistan's concerns. Another article gives an overview of IAEA safeguards, their criteria and status in South Asia and a detailed comparative analysis of item specific and comprehensive safeguard

agreements. This article specifically brings to notice the discriminatory provisions of nuclear facilities, materials and technology that have been offered to India and have essentially become the reason to further bolster the arms race in the region instead of curbing it.

Another area which needs an equal amount of attention along with the traditional security concerns is the lack of lobbying which has led to Pakistan's diplomatic failure at several occasions and most recently may also have been the reason behind Pakistan's defeat in the UNHRC re-elections. An article exclusively examines all the probable reasons behind Pakistan's exclusion including alleged KSA's estrangement and importance of lobbying to gain sufficient international clout. A brief overview and comparison of Pakistan's security and strategic relations with China and the US has been presented in yet another very informative article with recommendations and options available to Pakistan. The US' growing interest in Asia Pacific and tilt towards India as a pivot to its Asia Pacific policy, and strengthening it as a counterweight to China, makes it quite evident that the power balancing among major states continues to dictate and shape world politics. The same opinion has been voiced in another article wherein the role of US and China with regards to NSG membership for India and Pakistan has been evaluated respectively. CPEC is a project not just important for China and Pakistan but has captured massive worldwide attention. It projects huge dividends for the stakeholders while at the same time raises concerns among others in view of its potential to bring geo-economic and geopolitical shifts on the world stage. In this regard, a dedicated commentary on the geostrategic importance of CPEC can also be found in this volume.

The SVI organized an In-house Panel discussion in order to build a more professional counter narrative on Normal Nuclear Pakistan and have it formally registered through print and electronic media. The press coverage of the event along with a set of recommendations framed by nuclear experts comprising Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema, President of SVI, and National Defence University professors Dr Zafar Khan and Dr Rizwana Abbasi, can also be found in this volume.

It is being hoped that the readers will find this volume analytically captivating and will add to their knowledge.

The SVI Foresight team invites and highly encourages the contributions from the security and strategic community in form of opinion based short commentaries on contemporary political, security and strategic issues. Any suggestions for further improvement are welcome at our [contact address](#). Please see [here](#) the copy of SVI Foresight electronic journal. You can find us on [Face book](#) and can also access the SVI [website](#).

Syedeh Sadia Kazmi

Senior Research Associate

## 1. Opinions

### The Debate on Nuclear First Use and No First Use: The Case of Pakistan.

*Adeel Mukhtar Mirza*

*“Nations plan for war not by listening to their rivals’ commitments but by looking at their capabilities.”-Josef Joffe*

The debate on nuclear First Use (FU) and No First Use (NFU) is as old as the Bomb itself. It formally started when the United States adopted the policy of FU from the onset of the Cold War, especially in the early 1950s. First Use policy is adopted by a state to make its deterrence more credible, keeping in mind the prevailing challenges to the national security of a state in the strategic environment as well as one’s relevant superiority or inferiority in this context. The case of Pakistan’s reliance on a FU option is no different. Pakistan’s nuclear program aims at thwarting adversaries’ (mostly India’s) conventional and potential nuclear attacks. Owing to its conventional inferiority in comparison to India, Pakistan’s decision to retain nuclear FU makes its deterrence credible, a dynamic that helps to avoid any adventurism by the aggressor. In this vein, in order to comprehend Pakistan’s rationale of nuclear FU effectively, it is essential to skim through the historical background of the doctrine, and especially the debate between the ‘Gang of Four’ and ‘Four Horsemen’.

In the early days of the Cold War, the United States enjoyed conventional military superiority over the Kremlin. In fact, the United States was able to deter any aggressor with the help of its advanced conventional forces without necessarily using nuclear weapons. Despite this, the United States relied on the policy of nuclear FU. This is because of two reasons as stated by Dr. Zafar Khan in his book, *Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy-A Minimum Credible Deterrence*. First, indeed the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not require the FU option, but due to the need of making the United States’ security assurances and guarantees to its allies credible, the United States had to retain the FU option. Second, adoption of the FU policy option by the United States could have increased its vulnerability against possible chemical and biological attacks from adversaries.

Opponents of the FU option, as described by Dr. Zafar Khan in his book, and especially the ‘Gang of Four,’ wrote in favor of NFU on the following grounds:



- 1) It would lessen the probability of all-out nuclear war in a war-like situation.
- 2) It would allow the United States and NATO to focus more on the modernization and advancement of conventional forces for the purpose of retaliation.
- 3) The United States could retain an option of 'no early first use' that would not mean U.S. departure from its security assurances to its allies.

However, the proponents of FU were of the view that U.S. policies of massive retaliation, flexible response, and assured destruction remained successful in maintaining the credibility of U.S. deterrence as well as security assurances against Soviet conventional and nuclear forces. Having said this, Pakistani security planners decided to adopt a FU policy option after analyzing the Cold War debate on FU and NFU, wherein the proponents of NFU failed to convince the United States to renounce FU policy. Pakistan adhered to a FU option to make its minimum deterrence credible due to its conventional weakness in comparison to India. Similarly, according to a Pakistani nuclear security establishment, a quest to ensure credible deterrent is also a major factor in Pakistan's refusal to sign a 'no-first strike' pact with India.

Pakistan's ambiguous position of first use as a last resort, on the one hand, shows caution and a tendency of Pakistan to not use these weapons. On the other hand, the issue of proximity, conventional weakness, and fear of pre-emption from Indians are some key reasons that restrict Pakistan to maintaining a FU option. Besides historical enmity and four wars between South Asia's nuclear states, India and Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute is one of the more critical reasons that make Indo-Pak relations intense. Moreover, India's proactive response plans under its Cold Start doctrine (CSD), like that of Operation Parakram, increase the probability of nuclear war in the region.

India's conventional war-fighting doctrine, CSD, was first presented in April 2004 by the then Indian Chief of the Army Staff, "which aims at launching a retaliatory conventional strike against Pakistan that would inflict significant harm on the Pakistani Army before the international community could intercede, and at the same time, pursue narrow enough aims to deny Islamabad a justification to escalate the clash to the nuclear level," Watler C. Ladwig III quotes in his article, *"A Cold Start for Hot War? The Indian Army, New Limited War Doctrine."* Covering the justification on the failure of Operation Parakram and salient parameters of the Cold Start doctrine, the author prescribed the perceived advantages of this doctrine to India. However, he remained rational to some extent while describing the implications of this doctrine by providing that, "As the Indian military enhances its ability to implement Cold Start, it is simultaneously degrading the chance that diplomacy could diffuse a crisis on the subsequent."

This is especially true in light of Pakistan maintaining the option of using tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs), because of its conventional inferiority when its national security is threatened. This is also evident from Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry's recent statement: "Pakistan is fully capable of answering any aggression from India as it has developed 'short-range tactical nuclear weapons'." He further stated, "Pakistan knew how to show India the right path as it has developed small tactical nukes to convert any 'adventure into misadventure.'" In fact, it could be inferred from Pakistan's ambiguous policy of FU as a last resort that Pakistan follows a policy of no-early first use like that of the United States to achieve its political and military goals. In sum, FU policy is inherent to Pakistan's deterrence assumption and therefore essential for Pakistan's national security in the contemporary strategic environment.

<http://southasianvoices.org/the-debate-on-nuclear-first-use-and-no-first-use-the-case-of-pakistan-3/>

## To Be A “Normal” Nuclear State

*Maimuna Ashraf*

Since its inception, Pakistan’s nuclear programme has always been entangled in new proposals constantly provided by the US. First it was “rollback”, then “revised” highly enriched uranium (HEU), and now it is all about us “normalizing” our nuclear programme.

Pragmatically, the term ‘normal nuclear’ sounds paradoxical, understandable in lexical terms yet lacking a profound stipulative and theoretical definition. Consequently, the status of a ‘normal nuclear state’ is ‘codified’ rather than ‘conditionally allotted’. Lately, this modish term has been associated with Pakistan after a new report ‘A Normal Nuclear Pakistan’ appeared – co-authored by Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton of the Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment.

This recent attempt – to make not-that-normal nuclear Pakistan a normal-nuclear-state by the normal-nuclear-club is not new. Almost a year back, Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, proposed a ‘conditional’ layout to treat Pakistan as a normal nuclear country. Although the conditions offered by Fitzpatrick were not much different to those recently articulated by the two authors, he was rather mild in this approach, accepting that Pakistan has paid a price in the past’ and so he advocated treating Pakistan the same as India.

Fitzpatrick more likely suggested to Pakistan the same five broad initiatives, offered by the authors of a newly emerged report, which includes a shift from full spectrum to strategic deterrence, limited production of short-range warheads, lifted veto on Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations, separate civilian and military facilities and signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is asserted in the report that if Pakistan agrees to accept these suggestions it will be treated like a responsible and normal nuclear weapon state.

It may sound logical to many that in return for a few demands Pakistan will achieve the status of a ‘normal state’. However, does the acceptance of these recommendations advance Pakistan’s nuclear security? Would it reinforce our deterrence posture against India? How would it affect the deterrence equilibrium in South Asia? Should Pakistan agree to this proposal to bargain a status of normality?

The most recent idea to normalise nuclear Pakistan in the international nuclear order, after restricting its nuclear programme to weapons and delivery systems, came into limelight more resiliently in a recent article by David Ignatius. This was followed by the statement of Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Pakistan's nuclear policy is shaped by evolving security dynamics of South Asia, growing conventional asymmetry, provocative doctrines and aggressive posturing by India, which obliges us to take all necessary measures to maintain a full spectrum deterrence capability in order to safeguard our national security, maintain strategic stability and deter any kind of aggression from India".

What is full spectrum deterrence and why is Pakistan reiterating its national resolve to maintain full spectrum deterrence? In 1998, when the country detonated its nuclear weapon in response to India's nuclear weapon explosions, it declared it would retain its capability as minimum credible deterrence to avert security threats from its eastern neighbour. This posture meant that Pakistan would not use its nuclear weapon unless the opponent crosses our nuclear thresholds.

Conversely, after the 2001 Indian parliament attack, the Indian Military Command developed an offensive military strategy – 'Cold Start Doctrine' – in 2004 to replace the outdated 'Sundarji Doctrine'. Although the complete doctrine is classified, the declassified concept is to reconstitute the existing three Indian army's strike corps into eight integrated battle groups that could be deployed quickly to strike the narrow pieces of Pakistan's territory through limited incursion in response to a terrorism event involving Pakistan.

The doctrine was designed on the assumption that Pakistan would not resort to the use of nuclear weapon in response to a limited incursion that does not cross its nuclear threshold.

Pakistan's nuclear establishment thus argues that CSD would provide India the space for conventional or limited conflict in a nuclearised region. For an appropriate reactionary response to CSD, which excludes massive nuclear retaliation, Pakistan developed the low-yield, short range, tactical battlefield 'Nasr nuclear missiles'. These tactical nuclear weapons were part of our full spectrum deterrence, which provides a qualitative response to the conventional threats and asymmetry perceived by India. Moreover, it offers a range of options since Pakistan will not be forced to retaliate with strategic nuclear weapons as a first response to conventional force.

Additionally, the assertion to adhere to a shift from full spectrum deterrence to strategic deterrence is important because it is significant to understand how Pakistan defines its strategic deterrence. Pakistan's deterrence is dynamic because we perceive deterrence is strengthened if we forcefully deter India. That implies that Pakistan will continue determining its nuclear

deterrence requirements on the basis of Indian nuclear advancements or developments.

As long as we see the nuclear developments of India destabilising the region, we will continue responding to them. Thus Pakistan is maintaining minimum credible deterrence which is full spectrum to deter all forms of aggression. Consequently “it is confusing to separate full spectrum and strategic deterrence. The idea is probably to separate counter-value and counter-force but a deterrence that starts to fail even tactically will quickly fail strategically.”

Therefore, it is wrong to say that Pakistan and India are engaged in a traditional arms race, where two actors try to outpace each other. In the case of Pakistan, we appear rather to be engaged in a nuclear competition to maintain strategic stability and deter all form of aggression.

<http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-349879-To-be-a-normal-nuclear-state>

## Raheel Sharif's Visit to US: What Lies in Store?

*Maimuna Ashraf*

Once again, before the visit of Army Chief Gen Raheel Sharif to US, various Pakistani platforms are buzzing with debates surrounding the Western proposals for Pakistan's nuclear mainstreaming. Similar reports were revolving before the Pakistani PM's visit that asserted that the US will be exploring a nuclear deal with Pakistan in order to put limits on its nuclear program. Notwithstanding several official statements that no deal would come out of these visits, the recurring denials have generated an impression that something is afoot. Eyebrows have been raised by the many over the recent revelations in newspapers that "Pakistan will not discuss the issue of its nuclear weapons and even if the US side brought up this issue Pakistan will politely remind them that it was India's so-called cold-start doctrine that created the current situation". The statement hints at the possibility of dialogue over Pakistan's nuclear program during the visit. Pakistan, as being quoted to not discuss the issue of nukes, will probably not be the one to gear the agenda of dialogue. It would rather be in an 'act in response' position when the issue comes up. The military's public relations authority also stated that Army Chief will meet civil and military authorities of US and 'security' will be the main agenda of the visit, indicating that 'nuclear security' won't likely be ignored by the US.

Recently, many debates have been conducted by country's leading think-tanks and media houses to discuss the US proposals about mainstreaming Pakistan in the global nuclear order after accepting 'brackets' on its nuclear programme. It surprisingly remained an issue over which the wide consensus prevails. About the possibility of civil nuclear accord explored by US, many experts in Pakistan are of the view that 'regional security paradigm has been manipulated in a manner that intends to maximize India's conventional and strategic security as pivot to the US Asia-Pacific strategy, while minimizing Pakistan's security at the same time. It is illogical to ask Pakistan to revert from Full-Spectrum Deterrence to Strategic Deterrence and unilaterally sign the CTBT that the US itself had not ratified whereas India was not only left free to augment its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities but in fact was being offered advanced nuclear technologies and systems like BMD that would undermine strategic stability in the region.'

Pragmatically, Pakistan's treatment of full-spectrum deterrence is different from what others perceive. Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) was clear on this that full spectrum deterrence, in its qualitative term rather than quantitative response to entire threat

spectrum, was to fill the gaps in deterrence and address all forms of aggressions. Pakistan was confronted with a credible threat from India, which was pursuing “dangerous, provocative and irresponsible doctrines like Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) and Proactive Strategy and whose conventional military build-up was Pakistan specific”. Pakistan’s nuclear establishment thus argues that CSD would provide India the space for conventional or limited conflict in a nuclearized region. For an appropriate reactionary response to CSD, which excludes massive nuclear retaliation, Pakistan developed the low-yield, short range, tactical battlefield ‘Nasr nuclear missiles’. These tactical nuclear weapons were part of our full spectrum deterrence, which provides a qualitative response to the conventional threats and asymmetry perceived by India. Moreover, it offers a range of options since Pakistan will not be forced to retaliate with strategic nuclear weapons as a first response to conventional force.

Another hypothetical statement that has been largely rejected by Pakistan’s nuclear experts is about Pakistan’s nuclear programme being the fastest growing in the world. Such statements were said to be ‘aimed at diverting attention from the exponential increase in India’s fissile material stockpiles as a result of nuclear deals with a growing number of NSG countries and its destabilizing consequences for the region as the reports take into account the potential of Pakistani facilities while declaring it to be the fastest growing in the world, but in case of India they consider the current production of warheads instead of following uniform criteria in both cases.’

It has been widely viewed that experts in these discussions declare Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal as weapons of deterrence and India’s nuclear arsenal as weapons of prestige. Consequently, many regret that the discriminatory nuclear cooperation agreements being signed by NSG member countries with India and the waivers being granted to it are undermining strategic stability in South Asia. The country’s nuclear establishment firmly rejects any deal that restricts Pakistan’s nuclear program and insists that international community must understand Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns. Moreover, US should adopt a comprehensive non-discriminatory approach towards the region and bring Pakistan in nuclear mainstream. Eventually the hot debate before army chief’s visit to US and over potential nuclear accord concludes that ‘Pakistan desires to be a member of all international export control regimes – the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australian Group, Wassenaar Arrangement. However, it is not ready to compromise on its nuclear posture by accepting unrealistic conditions on its nuclear weapon programme because Pakistan’s nuclear decision making is very much determined by its regional strategic environment instead of idealistic norms of nuclear pessimists’. Accordingly, it seems that as any negotiations between Pakistan and US on mainstreaming would take a long time before any agreement is reached. No matter whether a deal is likely to come to fruition through these visits or not, but

the voices in country pronounce that 'Pakistan should continue behaving like a confident nuclear-power'.

<http://nation.com.pk/blogs/14-Nov-2015/raheel-sharif-s-visit-to-us-what-lies-in-store>



## Mainstreaming the Global Nuclear Order

*Dr. Shahid Bukhari*

Non-proliferation concerns in contemporary international politics have emerged as a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives by leaders of the so-called global nuclear order. The Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have monopolized the rules of the game in such a way that pretend to save international peace, but actually serve strategic interests of major powers. The pragmatic approach in international relations suggests that morality has nothing to do with state affairs and, with this reference, an analysis of the India-U.S. nuclear deal has shown that international non-proliferation regimes work in accordance with the Realist perspective under the guise of Liberalism to serve the strategic interests of major powers. Pakistan has also been a candidate for treatment similar to what was adopted for India, but it could not gain the same treatment despite having a longstanding partnership with the United States in various endeavors from Containment Policy against the USSR to the War on Terror in Afghanistan. Discussing the prospects for Pakistan's accession into the fragile global nuclear order, Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon pretend to advocate for Pakistan's entrance into the global nuclear order suggesting some streamlining measures if Pakistan agrees to take on the recommendations suggested in their article. The case built by Krepon and Dalton appears to ignore Pakistan's strategic imperatives as well as tries to change its entire national security discourse in a manner that ultimately serves the strategic interests of India, whom the United States is overwhelmingly supporting due to her surge for containment of China.

Krepon and Dalton have suggested that Pakistan rely on strategic deterrence rather than out-competing India through full spectrum deterrence if it wants to achieve a place in the emerging nuclear order of the world. Outlining a comparison of India-Pakistan nuclear warheads production capabilities, the report has neglected to compare the national security imperatives of the states, where Pakistan has always been in search for defense against aggressive Indian postures, as well as direct threats. Pakistan's strategic developments in each field including its nuclear program cannot be analyzed without reference to its strategic rivalry with India, who has been hesitant to accept the reality of Pakistan as an independent state in the region. Pakistan's strategic policies have emerged as a reaction to Indian threats, including the 1971 Dhaka debacle and Indian nuclear test in 1974, nuclear tests after the Indian test in 1998, and the development of tactical nuclear weapons in response to India's Cold Start doctrine. Pakistan's nuclear weapons cannot be de-linked from Indian developments. Pakistan's current defense strategy of full spectrum deterrence (FSD) is aimed to reduce the dangers of

nuclear escalation which may emerge from India's superiority in conventional war-fighting capacity combined with adventurous intentions for regional hegemony.

FSD is an expression of deterrence optimism in South Asia entailing the contours of strategic stability based on nuclear deterrence and aims to neutralize the negative outcomes of the regional strategic developments in Asia where India is obtaining unprecedented help from the United States for modernization of its armed forces, which is aimed to launch India as the regional sheriff. Escalation control over the ongoing tensions on the Line of Control (LoC) and the international border between India and Pakistan is the most recent example which manifests the contributions of tactical nuclear weapons for restraining even a conventional war in South Asia, and therefore, a positive indicator for maintenance of peace in the region. India is already pursuing an ambitious program for modernization of its conventional war-fighting capacity; therefore, Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons do not contribute to arms-race by India. India has been finding out the ways that may provide an opportunity to launch a conventional war against Pakistan, including the Cold Start Doctrine for example. The qualitative development of strategic weapon systems has been a normal course of action for any state that needs to maintain its security in accordance with the advancing requirements for strategic objectives; therefore, it cannot be abandoned. The development of FSD in Pakistan is also a part of such qualitative developments which carries the offshoot of quantitative enhancement in its arsenal, but limiting the manufacturing of such arsenals to a minimum required number (calculated through operational strategy) can reduce the chances of an arms race and keep the FSD within the ambit of credible minimum deterrence, where the FSD plugs-in the lacuna in conventional warfare deterrence carrying qualitative development that enhances the state's capacity to deter aggression ranging from limited conventional aggression (like Cold Start) to nuclear threats. Therefore, it should not be synonymic with an arms race in terms of quantitative development.

It shall be a Herculean task to convince a sovereign state to halt the production of strategic assets that are detrimental to her national security. Pakistan's stance on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is also integrated with its national security imperatives, which do not allow it to even negotiate FMCT because of evident discriminatory policies of the global nuclear regimes whose policies can be amended to accommodate a particular state by introducing country-specific arrangements. The fragility of an emerging nuclear order that serves the strategic interests of major powers guides security-stricken states like Pakistan to ensure her survival based on the principles of self-help. The over-sightedness of international nuclear non-proliferation regimes and of U.S. policymakers about the history of Indian nuclear as well as missile development programs has apprehended Pakistan's will to reduce fissile material production. U.S. assistance to India coupled with defense cooperation along access to

advanced U.S. technology in nuclear, space, and missile defense proved to be an eye-opener for Pakistan in the contemporary strategic environment. The only way to accept arrangements like the FMCT is to make it a supplementary part of a treaty among all South Asian states for 'Nuclear Disarmament and South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.' Based on the premise cited above, Pakistan signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without waiting for India is also out of question. Although Pakistan is not in favor of conducting nuclear tests again and again, it cannot afford to forego its right to conduct tests in case a situation like that of 1998 emerges again.

Above all, what is the maximum Pakistan can extract if it agrees to take on the steps suggested by Krepon and Dalton? Mainstreaming in the fragile global nuclear order and nuclear cooperation is not yet guaranteed. Even if some states agree to cooperate with Pakistan on civilian nuclear technology, that too will be dependent on mutual strategic interests of the states concerned. Therefore, the analysis of measures suggested by Krepon and Dalton for mainstreaming Pakistan into a global nuclear order suggests that such measures, if taken, shall cripple Pakistan's nuclear program, which shall prove to be a departure from Pakistan's national security imperatives based on nuclear deterrence, and therefore, perilous for Pakistan's security. Desires for a normal nuclear Pakistan, as suggested by Krepon and Dalton, can be fulfilled only through equal desires about India as a normal, nuclear regional player. Pakistan's adherence to the suggested measures alone cannot strengthen the global nuclear order unless a uniform policy, as well as commitment by the entire international community regarding use and regulation of nuclear technology, is sought. A global nuclear order run by weak nuclear non-proliferation regimes with state-specific discriminative policies based on strategic interests of the major powers shall always remain fragile.

<http://southasianvoices.org/mainstreaming-the-global-nuclear-order/>

## **IAEA Safeguards, Criteria and Status in South Asia: Item Specific vs. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements**

*Shahzadi Tooba*

The focus of the international community has always been to ensure that nuclear energy is used peacefully and safely. The ultimate objective of the international community is the fulfillment of general and complete disarmament on global level. Concern about the potential military use of nuclear material, the development of international trade in nuclear material and related equipment, and the entry into force of certain international treaties have led to the establishment of systems of international safeguards.

The IAEA is an independent intergovernmental organization consisting of over 150 Member States and a Secretariat headed by the Director General. The fundamental objective of the IAEA, as set out in Article II of its Statute, is to “seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world,” and to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. Through safeguards, the IAEA is able to provide credible assurances that States are honoring their international obligations to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes. Its independent verification work allows the IAEA to play an indispensable role in deterring the spread of nuclear weapons. Through early detection of any diversion of nuclear material or misuse of technology, the IAEA can alert the world to potential proliferation. The safeguard is basically a set of measures against the use of nuclear material, facilities and equipment for the development of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. IAEA has served as a focal point so as to accelerate and enlarge contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and to ensure so far as it is able, that the assistance provided by it or on its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose through the implementation of its safeguards system.

However, the safeguards provisions of the Statute are not self-executing. A State is not bound to accept safeguards simply by virtue of becoming a Member of the IAEA. For that matter, safeguards can be implemented in States which are not Members of the IAEA. What is required for the implementation of safeguards is the consent of the State concerned, and that consent is most commonly manifested in the conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the

IAEA. The type of safeguards agreement concluded with the State depends on the nature of the State's basic undertaking.

There are mainly three types of Safeguards Agreements in the IAEA Safeguard system including: (i) 'Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements' (CSAs), which are also known as 'Full Scope Safeguards' Agreements, (ii) 'Item-specific' or 'facility-specific' Safeguards Agreements, and (iii) 'Voluntary Offer Agreements' (VOAs). In addition, to strengthen the overall safeguards system, another legal document known as 'Additional Protocol' has also been introduced in the 1990s.

The CSAs follows the structure and content set out in Agency document INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) and cover all nuclear material in a State. Under such an agreement, the State undertakes to accept Agency safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. Almost all the Non-Nuclear Weapon States pursuant to their obligation under the NPT have concluded the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. Comprehensive safeguards agreements are also required under other bilateral or multilateral arrangements such as the States, which come under Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.

Based on the provisions in the IAEA document, INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, 'item-specific' or 'facility-specific' safeguards agreements are applied only to specific items such as the nuclear material, facilities, equipment and/or materials specified in an agreement. These agreements are more stringent than the CSA: Safeguards applied to non-nuclear material, as well (e.g. heavy water, reactor grade graphite), heavy water production plants and applied in perpetuity. Only three countries, namely, Pakistan, India and Israel who are also not party to the NPT have item-specific safeguards.

The NWS or P-5 (namely, China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States) have concluded safeguards agreements under which they have voluntarily offered nuclear material and/or facilities. These agreements are called 'Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreements' (VOAs). VOAs follow the format of agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), but vary in the scope of materials and facilities covered, e.g. excluding those with national security significance. Under the VOAs possibility of withdrawing of nuclear material and facilities from safeguards also exist.

To further strengthen the safeguards measures and to provide the legal basis to the IAEA for verification of the correctness and completeness of States' declarations under comprehensive safeguards agreements the concept of Additional protocol was introduced in 1990s. The Additional Protocol (AP) is thus complementary to the aforementioned safeguards

agreements. The AP provides access to IAEA inspectors to all components or segments of a State's fuel cycle—including uranium mines, fuel fabrication and enrichment plants, and nuclear waste sites – as well as to any other location where nuclear material is or may be present. Under the AP, a State is required to provide the IAEA inspectors, access to all buildings on a nuclear site on a very short notice of about 24 hours. The AP also has provisions for wide area environmental monitoring. Further provisions include the use of internationally established communications systems, including satellite systems and other forms of telecommunication; issuance of multiple entry visas (valid for at least one year) for IAEA inspectors; provision of information about the research and development activities in a State related to its nuclear fuel cycle, and on the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related technologies.

Pakistan is amongst the category of States that are not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The rights and obligations of the IAEA and Pakistan under the safeguards agreements for this category of states are based on guidelines contained in Safeguards Document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 or its earlier versions) adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors. Agreements in this category cover only specified facilities and materials. Assurances by the IAEA are necessarily limited to the Safeguarded facilities or materials and do not extend to cover the totality of the State's nuclear activities. As per this model the item-specific safeguards are applied to Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Pakistan has the following facilities under IAEA safeguards:

S.#	Facility	Agency Publication	Type of Agreements	Date of Signing
1.	Pakistan Research Reactor-1 (PARR-1)	INFCIRC/34	Trilateral	March 5, 1962
2.	Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP)	INFCIRC/116	Trilateral	June 17, 1968
3.	Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP)	INFCIRC/135	Trilateral	October 17, 1969
4.	Fuel Reprocessing Plant	INFCIRC/239	Trilateral	March 18, 1976

S.#	Facility	Agency Publication	Type of Agreements	Date of Signing
5.	Hawks Bay Depot	INFCIRC/248	Bilateral	March 2, 1977
6.	Pakistan Research Reactor-2 (PARR-2)	INFCIRC/393	Bilateral	September 10, 1991
7.	Chashma Nuclear Power Plant-1 (C-1)	INFCIRC/418	Bilateral	February 24, 1993
8.	Chashma Nuclear Power Plant-2 (C-2)	INFCIRC/705	Bilateral	February 22, 2007

India initially indicated that it would only accept voluntary safeguards agreements for civilian nuclear facilities of the type that the IAEA had in place in the five NPT- recognized nuclear weapon states. The voluntary arrangement would allow India to add and remove at will facilities that were subject to IAEA facility- specific safeguards. This would keep open the possibility that a civilian nuclear facility could be reassigned to the country's military program. It would also help to overcome the reluctance of India's nuclear establishment to place more of the country's nuclear facilities under civilian safeguards.

India-specific safeguards agreement is based on the IAEA document, INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. This Agreement (INFCIRC/754) is not only "India-specific" but is also an 'Umbrella' Agreement in the sense that all nuclear activities and plants (including the current and future) have been covered in one document. Usually a safeguards agreement with the IAEA is concluded for a single type of plant—e.g., nuclear power plants, fuel enrichment plants, or reprocessing plants, etc. However, India managed to lump together in one single document all the safeguards provisions of different programs and facilities including nuclear power plants, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. An Annexure to the Agreement has been agreed upon whereby India would inform the Agency about its facilities which would be brought under safeguards. The India-specific Safeguards Agreement acknowledges that India "shall file with the Agency a Declaration, based on its sovereign decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under agency safeguards in a phased manner."

Furthermore, “India on the basis of its sole determination, shall notify the Agency in writing of its decision to offer for Agency safeguards a facility identified by India...”. While formulating its separation plan for civil and military facilities and activities, India had declared that it will only bring 14 out of 22 NPPs under IAEA safeguards. It may be inferred that the remaining 8 NPPs could be used to generate weapon-grade plutonium. Furthermore, India refused to bring the fast breeder reactors and related activities under IAEA safeguards. India also did not agree to bring all future nuclear power plants under IAEA safeguards. Only those NPPs will be subjected to IAEA safeguards, which India would submit for such purpose, leaving India the option to keep some of its future NPPs for military purposes.

IAEA, if not fully but somehow failed to achieve the main objective of these safeguards agreements. If India didn’t deceive the world that it is using its program for peaceful purposes this nuclear race wouldn’t have started in South Asia. Now it would be very difficult for IAEA to enforce the agreements without discrimination.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/11/22/iaea-safeguards-criteria-and-status-in-south-asia-item-specific-vs-comprehensive-safeguards-agreements/>



## Pakistan's Full Spectrum Deterrence

*Beenish Altaf*

Discussing Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) needs conceptual understanding. Conceptually, Pakistan's treatment of FSD has been different from what others perceive. Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema, the president/executive director of the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) maintains that Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) is clear that full spectrum deterrence, in its qualitative term, exists to plug the gaps in deterrence and address all forms of aggressions.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Stimson Centre report, titled 'A normal nuclear Pakistan', authored by Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton, urged Pakistan to shift its declaratory policy from "full spectrum" to "strategic" deterrence, commit to a recessed deterrence posture, limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons, lift Pakistan's veto on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMNCT) and reduce or stop fissile material production, separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without waiting for India. It is discriminatory in nature just to maximise India's position vis-à-vis Pakistan.

In an international conference, few confessions were made public by a prominent Pakistani figure in order to convey to the international community our ensured minimum deterrence capability. The Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015 was held from March 23 to 24 in Washington DC, where Lieutenant General (retd) Khalid Kidwai, who is advisor to Pakistan's NCA and was the pioneer Director General of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which he headed for an unprecedented 15 years till December 2013 (with an unheard of 12 extensions after his retirement from the army) was in attendance. As the head of SPD, Kidwai is credited with conceiving, articulating and executing Pakistan's nuclear policy and deterrence doctrines into a tangible and robust nuclear force structure.

The development of Pakistan's Shaheen-3 missile having a range of 2,750 km has the objective of preventing India from gaining second-strike nuclear capability from the Andaman and Nicobar islands. It is suspected that India was developing strategic bases on its Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Bay of Bengal. Pakistan was also confronted with a credible threat from India, which was pursuing "dangerous, provocative and irresponsible doctrines like the Cold Start Doctrine and Proactive Strategy, and whose conventional military build-up was Pakistan specific". It is absurd to ask Pakistan to revert from FSD to strategic deterrence when Pakistan aims only for ensuring equilibrium and not a quantitative balance to India.

More specifically, Pakistani officials define our full spectrum minimum deterrence as India-specific. To put it simply, the strategic calculus is narrowed down to deterring a militarily and economically stronger India. But officials have articulated that Pakistan's nuclear weapons' programme is not open-ended. In the Washington conference Lieutenant General Kidwai explicated Pakistan's quest for the Nasr shoot-and-scoot missile system, saying that it was in response to concerns that India's larger military could still wage a conventional war against the country, thinking Pakistan would not risk retaliation with a bigger nuclear weapon. Since these tactical nuclear weapons are mounted on short distance missiles, their command and control is delegated to lower levels in the military. It is a well-known fact that these short-range, tactical nuclear weapons are a defensive response to India. More precisely, the development of Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons is actually in response to India's Cold Start Strategy.

Rakesh Sood, the former Indian special envoy for disarmament and nonproliferation, views that it is extremely destabilising for any country to develop tactical nuclear weapons. He asserted that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is "cloaked in ambiguity", which undermines confidence between the two countries. Ironically enough, how will Prahaar be perceived here: as a stabilising or destabilising factor? Prahaar is a solid fuel rocket surface-to-surface guided short-range tactical ballistic missile by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) of India. It will be equipped with omni-directional warheads and can be used for striking both tactical and strategic targets. Besides, why is the Indian space programme with Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) potential, India's nukes or its missiles' programme troublesome for anybody, particularly to the international community?

Taking into account the fact that India is operating a nuclear submarine, the INS Chakra, and is currently testing another indigenously developed nuclear submarine, Lieutenant General Kidwai also revealed that Pakistan's sea-based second strike capability is a "work in progress" and will come into play in the next few years. Ruling out nuclear submarines for Pakistan, he said, "I will not say nuclear submarines but if broadly talking about a second-strike capability, for which submarines are a platform, then yes."

However, Lieutenant General Kidwai also revealed that while Pakistan had already moved from minimum deterrence to full spectrum deterrence, the current arsenal size would be sufficient for the next 10 to 15 years. As per the estimates of the Arms Control Association, Pakistan currently has between 100 to 120 nuclear warheads as compared to India's 90 to 110 warheads.

Nevertheless, Pakistan believes that the rising conventional disparity with India fetched its inherited security dilemma from the eastern borders, lowering its nuclear thresholds and

forcing it to bolster efforts to play the much anticipated numbers game. It also gauged the efficiency of Pakistan's credible minimum deterrence, termed as FSD. The full spectrum deterrence, as being implemented by Pakistan, is a little different than that perceived by others, specifically the west. For that matter, it needs coherent literature and elucidation on the subject. It would be helpful in neutralising the international community's concerns regarding the concept that Pakistan aims for nuclear parity with India. Factually, Pakistan does not seek parity; it only aims for balance. The opposite could be true for India because its programme is neither for balance nor parity but rather for prestige and supremacy.

<http://www.dailyitmes.com.pk/opinio/24-Nov-2015/pakistan-s-full-spectrum-deterrence>

## Defeat in UNHRC Re-elections: What Led to Pakistan's Exclusion?

*S. Sadia Kazmi*

The defeat in the re-elections of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is being viewed as a humiliating failure of Pakistan. However one should try to decipher as to what went wrong. Is it actually a diplomatic failure or is there something more to the whole episode?

The fact that Pakistan had been successfully holding the membership for past three terms and was considering running for the council's presidency, signifies that Pakistani representatives were riding high on the confidence quotient. Why, then, despite this confidence, Pakistan ended up losing the seat? Couldn't it foresee the possibility of losing or was it just simply unimaginable for Pakistan? Was it being overconfident or was it lagging somewhere? May be not enough of lobbying was done before the elections to gather the sufficient support. Who among the member states decided to withdraw their support for Pakistan and left it in a lurch? All of these speculations need to be scrutinised in order to not only find the reasons but to learn from them to avoid the mistakes in the future. However, it is quite difficult to disentangle the knots and reveal what and who among these is the real culprit since the whole procedure of casting the votes is done through secret balloting.

Nonetheless the repercussions are manifold. Pakistan is dealing not just with a diplomatic failure but a psychological shock as well. The humiliation has caused Pakistan to lose confidence in international community where Pakistan despite holding the seat for three terms is suddenly not seen eligible for the membership by the majority. It also points to the decline in the international prestige. Most of all Pakistan fears that its voice on the issues related to human rights violation in Kashmir done by India, might not be given due hearing at the international forum. This might weaken Pakistan's case against India on the Kashmir issue.

Looking at the possible reasons, one commonly being quoted is that the defeat is the result of Saudi Arabia's estrangement in the backdrop of Pakistan's neutral stance over the Yemen conflict. Although it might sound logical but one also has to keep in mind that GCC states have always had a give and take relationship with Pakistan. Indeed they have been a major block supporting Pakistan on various regional and international issues but simultaneously Pakistan had been returning the favour by committing to their interests more than it possibly could. Pakistan sent thousands of soldiers to safeguard KSA in 1980s. Similarly KSA extended

huge financial help for Pakistan's nuclear programme. Hence a single incident of Yemen conflict cannot possibly damage the long history of trust and partnership between the two. In fact there is no concrete evidence that the relationship has fallen victim to the Yemen Conflict. However, if one buys the argument that there came a cool patch in the relationship as being dubbed by the Saudi media, then there is some lesson for Pakistan to learn from this. Pakistan needs to work towards mending the relations but not at the expense of its own national security interests. Pakistan should try to convince the Saudi counterparts about the genuine inability to spare forces as they are already engaged in FATA, as well as along the border of Afghanistan, and in war against terrorism.

It is also said that Pakistan is being targeted for legalising the hangings of convicted criminals, which didn't sit well with the proponents of human rights. In this context, again, two main points are needed to be kept in mind. One, executions are not prohibited under any law, they are only largely discouraged. Otherwise, membership of states like KSA should have been revoked long time ago for the record number of executions which are continuously on the rise and where punishments like flogging and stoning are considered legal and effective punitive measures. Secondly, despite having a long history of sufferings at the hands of terrorists, Pakistan lifted the moratorium on death penalty only early this year after the devastating attack on a school in Peshawar.

Hence the international community needs to realise that Pakistan is not doing anything illegal or unjustified rather it should support Pakistan for taking concrete measures against terrorist elements. Therefore, this very fact cannot and should not by any means be used against Pakistan at forums like Human Rights Council.

Also, GCC states only amount to a few countries in a huge pool of 193 member states of the council, out of which Pakistan could hardly get 105 votes. This shows that either Pakistan's performance on the whole has been deemed unsatisfactory collectively by most of the nations or Pakistan did not do enough lobbying for the elections, an important area that should not have been neglected.

Only KSA's estrangement, if there is any, cannot be taken as a sole reason behind the defeat. Pakistan needs to work on the lobbying dimension too. No one can deny that Pakistan is hosting a large number of refugees, and Pakistan can reclaim its position by highlighting this point more effectively.

<http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/11/25/comment/defeat-at-unhrc/>

## Geostrategic Importance of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

*Zumra Cheema*

At the end of cold war, with the emergence of multi-polar system at international arena, process of globalization got impetus. Resultantly, interdependence among states increased and now states have begun to develop their diplomatic relations with each other on the basis of their geostrategic and geopolitical interests. Likewise, Pakistan and China, who are considered as two “all weathered” strategic and diplomatic partners in South Asia, decided to enlarge their relationship in broader spectrum. In the past, generally they did cooperate with each other in political and military affairs but over the time, they felt the need to develop economic ties with each other to gain compatibility in the changing dynamics of the international milieu. Therefore, they started cooperating with each other in commerce and trade. The bilateral cooperation in almost every field of life strengthened the relations to get deeper with the passage of time and both countries celebrated year 2011 as “Pak-China friendship year”.

Recently, Pakistan and China signed a mega project called as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as an endorsement and continuation to the enhancing bilateral friendly ties between the two countries. The CPEC project is being viewed as very beneficial not only for the states involved but also for the region as well. Regional connectivity and economic development are two major aspects of the project. Furthermore, the land-locked Central Asian countries and Afghanistan will get short and easy access towards the warm-watered Indian maritime under the implementation of CPEC. The project will prove helpful to tackle the menace of terrorism from the region as well, which is a major risk for the security and stability of the region. Moreover, through the economic uplift of Pakistan under CPEC, there are chances for the betterment of India-Pakistan relations. Likewise, there is probability of stability in Afghanistan, because China would easily access and invest in Afghanistan through the stability and improved infrastructure of Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan’s President Nawaz Sharif called CPEC as a “Game-Changer” and “Corridor to Peace” for the region.

The project has tremendous importance for a weaker country like Pakistan. Pakistan and China signed 51 agreements worth of \$46 billion under CPEC, The four main areas of collaboration between the two countries are; infrastructure, transportation, energy, and industrial cooperation. The route of the CPEC has not yet been confirmed, and all that is certain for the moment is its reach from Kashgar to Gwadar.

The CPEC also has immense importance for China. China considers CPEC as “flagship project” because through this project China will get easy and short routed reach towards the

Middle East, Africa and Europe. Additionally, China's market will further boost up, and it will become economically stronger.

China can also counter the US dominance in the region through the accomplishment of CPEC. China can play a significant role in the Asian region in terms of economic uplift and regional stability being emerging as an economic giant and future super power. China will also get the chance to develop its North-western province Xinjiang, which is an under developed area. In Xinjiang separatist movement has started by Uyghur's Muslims. Thus, China wants to develop the socio-economic framework of that region. Only in this way, China can curtail aggressive sentiments against its central government.

China sees US "pivot to Asia" strategy against its fundamental interests. China has view that US wants to hamper its progress and development by improving cooperation and making alliance with rising powers (India, Singapore, Malaysia, North Korea and other East-Asian countries) so that it can keep its supremacy and hegemony in the South-Pacific region. Another Chinese concern over CPEC is to find an alternative to Strait of Malacca. The South-China Sea, which is a rich source of resources and a way towards Strait of Malacca, is being disputed among China and other Southeast Asian countries. China imports largest part of its oil supply through the Strait of Malacca, so it has some reservations that, if other East Asian countries make alliance against China, then they can impose naval blockade on narrow Strait of Malacca and can choke China economically.

Along keeping in view the importance of CPEC, both the countries should keep various challenges and constraints under consideration. Administrative issues, political instability, militancy problems and resentment in the domestic labor force in Pakistan are some of the major challenges, which could impede the proper execution of CPEC. All of these issues need to be address for smooth implementation of the project. In the past, Pakistan and China have achieved various difficult plans, which were appeared unattainable due to the involved challenges and risks.

The Karakorum Highway is an exemplary to the fact. Currently, there is a need to have better understanding between both participant countries to achieve expected results. Both countries would have to join hands to assure security situation at the workplace of the project. Moreover, there is a need to achieve proper public support; therefore, both countries should make clear to their people that the project has huge importance for both countries. This will further catalyze the speedy and timely completion of the CPEC.

<http://www.foreignpolicynews.org/2015/11/25/geostrategic-importance-of-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/>

## The US' Strategic Bet on India

*Nasurullah Brohi*

The geo-political, geo-strategic and economic significance of the Asia-Pacific region makes it the apple of everybody's eye, which can be seen by the many powers struggling for dominance in this region. Extraordinary trade and business opportunities have engaged many competitors like the US, Russia, China and Japan. India also continuously attempts to become comparable with the great powers in the region so as to shine under the global political spotlight.

For political and economic reasons, the US considers and collaborates with Japan as a major stakeholder in the region. The US' strategic plans of rebalancing the Asia Pacific, stated in the Department of Defence release of 2012 with the title of 'Sustaining US global leadership: priorities for 21st century defence' involve some of the ambitions concerning a pivot strategy towards the Asia Pacific region covering key policy objectives for the century.

Russia and Japan are already engaged in a dispute over the control of the northern territories of the Kuril Islands that consist of approximately 56 islands and minor rocks. The Russian military build-up and the re-arming of the islands causes plenty of unease for Japan and, according to the new Russian Naval Doctrine, it considers China as its core ally to counterbalance Japan and the US in the Asia pivot strategy. Russia thinks of the US as a major factor in destabilisation of the Asia-Pacific whereas the US plans of allocating 60 percent of its troops under the Pacific Command would further demand Japan's contribution to counter China in the region. Japan, for the first time in the post-war era, has taken a shift in its security policy and, through its new security doctrine, its forces can be deployed overseas, even without any direct threat to the country or its citizens. Such moves to collaborate with the US in its Asia pivot strategy will of course drag Japan into direct conflict with many other competing powers in the region.

The US under President Obama's administration has particularly focused on the Pacific region and, in the post 2010-2011 era, a remarkable decline of US military involvement can be seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. The focus has shifted to the Asia-Pacific and the US has explicitly responded to Chinese ascendancy in the region. After the nuclear tests carried out by North Korea, the US started outright supporting South Korea and, despite the strong objections by China, it carried out naval exercises with South Korea and signalled warnings to Pyongyang, the capital city of North Korea.



The situation became further complicated after India's role in countering China. The US considers India a key partner and the long-term security investments of the US in India are some of the concerns related to the enduring goals of enabling it as a regional economic anchor and strategic partner in the Indian Ocean region. This defence cooperation with India has been on the main agenda of US policy mainly because of two reasons: first, the expanding Indian defence market and increasing business opportunities, and, secondly, the US considers India a genuine Asian competitor that can challenge China's rise. With its naval power and the defence pacts with five Asia-Pacific powers, the US incorporates itself into an alliance with China's immediate neighbourhood.

To counter the growing military posture and the militarisation of the South China Sea, China has tried to explore a variety of ways to respond to these threats particularly its strategic partnership with Pakistan. Pakistan is a nuclear power and India's rival state, which enjoys a considerable place in the South Asian region. Moreover, Pakistan's access through its Gawadar port to China enables and strengthens China's strategic position, and is viewed as a major security and economic challenge by many countries in the geo-strategic scenario.

<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/26-Nov-2015/the-us-strategic-bet-on-india>

## Why Pakistan Should Not Sign the CTBT, Unless?

*Adeel Mukhtar Mirza*

As Pakistan did not start developing nuclear weapons until India forced Pakistan through its actions, similarly, Pakistan should not sign CTBT unless India do. One must inquire, why? How signing CTBT without waiting for India to sign it, could affect Pakistan's national security?

CTBT: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons in the end. As a first step, a ban on further nuclear test was discussed during the ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1954. In 1996, the international community introduced a practical step in the form of CTBT draft.

According to the proponents of the treaty, CTBT will make it harder for any nation to develop advanced nuclear weapons. Universal applicability, if ratified by all, will halt further testing and consequently world will move towards total elimination of nuclear weapons as by agreeing on CTBT, nations will be at better position to enhance their capacity and will to cooperate with each other. At the May 2005 NPT review conference, Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg of Brazil said, "Brazil has consistently called for the universalization of the CTBT, which we consider to be an essential element of the disarmament and nonproliferation regime." In addition, it would also strengthen the norm against their use-Nuclear Taboo. In favour of the United States, the proponents were of the view, at its initial stages especially, that it would enhance the credibility of U.S nuclear deterrence, as it would have allowed it to amplify its lead in nuclear weapons technology owing to overall more number of nuclear tests conducted by U.S in comparison with all other nations. On monitoring and verification difficulties, the ratification of the treaty will help in accumulating data and on-site inspection to investigate suspicious activities, which allows to curb proliferation or weapon development activities. Ratification for CTBT by U.S, resultantly, will result in delegitimizing other states' concerns of building nukes.

The opponents of the treaty, on the contrary, were hesitant to agree with the arguments that treaty could help eliminate nuclear weapons. According to them, CTBT will not be helpful in halting proliferation activities as nations who want to develop nukes would easily do this by not joining NPT or CTBT or leaving it as North Korea did. Moreover, real-time confidence on the deterrent capability could only come from real time testing. Similarly, although a much progress have been made in the U.S Stockpile Steward Program as in 2002, a U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel determined that U.S. warheads could remain safe and reliable without testing if the United States could meet certain conditions, among

them maintaining a high-quality workforce, using the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) to examine weapons components, and refurbishing old weapons by remanufacturing them to original specifications but US, until now, is reluctant to move on.

South Asian Case: Strategic balance between South Asian nuclear states, India and Pakistan, is an indispensable prerequisite for peace and stability in South Asia. Owing to the utility of prevailing strategic balance, both states successfully avoided full-scale wars especially since overt nuclearization, however, dangers of asymmetrical arms, both conventional as well as nuclear, acquisition are looming over South Asia.

Some key reasons for this asymmetry are India's military advancement and modernization under the umbrella of Indo-US nuclear strategic partnership, India's economic imperatives, India's proactive military strategies, its conventional superiority and biased policies of the West as far as Fissile Material Cutoff treat (FMCT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) are concerned especially in reference to South Asia.

In this vein, India as the third largest conventional military power is a serious challenge to Pakistan's national security. Indian defense spending has doubled since 1997, growing at an average rate of 6.3 per cent per year. In 2011-2012, India surpassed China as the biggest importer of the state-of-the art major weapon systems. In addition, Narendra Modi's government announced 11 per cent increase in 2015-2016 military budget that becomes \$39.8 billion. Similarly, Indian Army and Air force has advantage of 2:1 and 1.9:1 ratio over Pakistan forces respectively, according to, "The Military Balance 2015," of International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). In addition, Indo-US nuclear deal helps India engage in rapid development of strategic/nuclear military power and threatens deterrence equilibrium and strategic stability as, "contrary to the claims of its advocates, the deal [Nuclear] fails to bring India further in conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of the member states of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Unlike other countries, India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It continues to produce fissile material and expand its arsenals," Ambassador (R) Jayantha Dhanapala and Daryl G. Kimball argues.

More recently, India successfully launched an upgraded version of the interceptor missile against an electronically simulated target missile over the Bay of Bengal. The Hindu further claimed that the conditions similar to the launch of a target missile from the Indian city of Balasore were electronically simulated and upon receiving its coordinates, the interceptor missile, travelling at a supersonic speed, engaged and reportedly destroyed the 'virtual target' in mid-flight.

In Sum, India has conventional superiority. She has economic superiority. She too has Prahaar, a tactical nuclear weapon. She is developing ABM system. And, now India also has computer simulation technology for testing purposes. India could also test a thermo nuclear device in future and sign CTBT, which would leave Pakistan no choice other than being blackmailed if it signs the treaty before India.

Pakistan, in this sense, is left with no other choice than not to sign CTBT, improving its defence capabilities and more importantly, it should advance in technology. There is no other way around if preserving of Pakistan's national security in the ultimate aim.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/11/27/why-pakistan-should-not-sign-the-ctbt-unless/>

## Realities belong to Article 370 of Indian Constitution

*Zumra Cheema*

Article 370 of the Indian constitution is a law that grants a special, autonomous status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The article is drafted in Part XXI of the Constitution, as temporary, transitional and special provisions. It was included into the Indian constitution in 1947 and came into enforcement in 1950. Basically, this article was a trick to satisfy Kashmir's people. The Indian real intentions behind article 370 are very much clear from the statement of Indian Home Minister Gulzar Lal Nanda's in December 1964 "the only way of taking the Constitution (of India) into Jammu and Kashmir is through the application of Article 370... It is a tunnel. It is through this tunnel that a good deal of traffic has already passed and more will". Thus, only on the basis of this article Jammu and Kashmir has link with India and later claims Kashmir as it's "integral part".

In 1947, as the British were leaving India they gave the various Indian princely states the right to choose their destiny. Princely states had two options; either to join India or Pakistan. Ruler of the Jammu and Kashmir, Maharajah Hari Singh decided to stay alone, completely unaware of the geopolitics around him. India had intentions to forcefully take control of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) alike various other princely states specially Junagadh and Hyderabad. In the meanwhile, some tribal groups from Pakistan entered into Kashmir. Resultantly, the Maharaja of Kashmir wrote to India, asking for military assistance, so an Instrument of Accession was signed between Kashmir and India and article 370 was added in Indian constitution temporarily to satisfy the Sheikh Abdullah which was Prime Minister of J&K at that time.

According to the article Kashmir gained the special, autonomous status from the central government of India. It was understood that centre will not interfere in state's issues other than defence, foreign affairs, finance and communication and India's Parliament will have to take the permission of the state legislative assembly to apply other laws. Moreover, as J&K is a disputed territory, thus any Indian citizen from all the other parts of India would not have right to purchase land and property in J&K. Indian central government and all the political parties in India accepted all the terms and conditions at that time. Later on, Indian military troops entered into the Kashmir and first war between India and Pakistan began on Kashmir issue. Indian prime minister took the issue to United Nation (UN) to get support and attention from international community, therefore conflict ended over at ceasefire with the arbitration of

United Nation Security Council (UNSC) but The northern and western portions of Kashmir came under Pakistan's control in 1947 and remaining part went under the control of India.

From last six decades central Indian government is continuously violating the basic human rights of Kashmir's people contrary to providing them right of self-determination. Furthermore, India is trying its best to alter the demography of Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) and turn Muslim majority areas into Hindu majority areas just like Jammu, which was the area with Muslim majority in the past..

Now Hindu extremist government in India wants to abrogate or erode the article 370 from the Indian constitution to abolish kashmir's autonomous status. Amendment or abrogation of article 370 remained a part of Indian Prime Minister's political agendas. But, Indian government should keep in mind that in result of any amendment or erosion of article 370 will raise question on the so-called Indian Instrument of Accession on Jammu & Kashmir. Furthermore, Indian government would have to arrange plebiscite in Kashmir. Thus, whole of the world community and India is well aware of consent and will of the Kashmir's population. Any offensive and anticipatory step from the Indian government towards the issue of article 370 could bring very devastated consequences in the region. Not only there would be a huge reaction from the Kashmir's people but there are chances of India and Pakistan's confrontation as well.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/11/29/realities-belong-to-article-370-of-indian-constitution/>

## Picking Sides

*S. Sadia Kazmi*

The world politics is a theatre of ever changing interests and partnerships. The recent visit by Chinese president Xi-Jinping to the United States signifies that China and the United States are looking forward to enforcing normalization of relations between them. Even though the task looks daunting especially because of their competing interests in the South China Sea, the way has been opened for talks and deliberations. The meeting of the two Presidents is being hailed as quite important not just for the two states but for their respective allies as well.

While the two major powers are engaged and working on finding an amicable solution to their outstanding issues, Pakistan is faced with a serious question which probably is not new but needs a more immediate attention than ever before, i.e. In wake of the changing regional dynamics, which of the two states should Pakistan be focusing on while contemplating on its future strategic alliances; China or the US? The answer might seem obvious but is not very easy to follow through despite the realization that US has been exploiting Pakistan's dependency in return for all its "favors". It is specifically difficult for Pakistan to decide because it continues to be an important ally for both the states. Nonetheless, looking closely at the emerging regional realities might help Pakistani officials to arrive at some logical decisions.

China is a re-emerging power, and the most trusted partner of Pakistan. It has always been inclined on developing Pakistan to give it a stable economic, military and political foothold in the region, and views Pakistan as an effective counterweight against India. Pakistan has also been able to reap huge benefits in terms of its economic and security interests. China continues to support Pakistan on Kashmir issue. Both share a long history of cooperation in various sectors including, defence and energy. At present China is the biggest investor in Pakistan, committed to the infrastructural developments through CPEC. Another significant dimension to consider is that both Pakistan and China have never been skeptical of each other's intentions even when they are pursuing parallel relations with the US and India respectively.

US on the other hand also has been instrumental in providing assistance in multiple areas such as: development assistance, economic support, food aid, human rights and democracy, and coalition support fund (CSF) to fight against terrorism etc. However most of the time the assistance has only benefitted the US, making Pakistan compromise on its national interests. The continued drone strikes on Pakistani soil, terming Pakistan a strategic key ally in US' war against Terrorism while making it suffer unimaginable number of casualties fighting Al-Qaeda and Taliban since more than a decade now and still asking Pakistan to "do more", all of

this implies that US remains skeptical of Pakistan's efforts and commitment. Moreover in the wake of US forces leaving Afghanistan, the coalition support fund is also being suspended despite the fact that Pakistan would need it more than ever before to fight against the extremist elements inside and outside its borders, a byproduct of WOT.

History seems to be repeating itself where during the Cold War, after having achieved its objective against Soviet Russia, the US left Pakistan on its own to deal with Jihadis, drugs and Kalashnikov culture. On top of all this US is now actively forging strategic alliance with India, further weakening Pakistan's position in the region. At the same time the US is offering nuclear concessions and NSG waiver to India even though it is not an NPT signatory. This discriminatory policy by the US provides sufficient rationale for Pakistan to seek much closer ties with China.

In the light of these facts, it seems Pakistan might have already made a decision where it is gradually tilting more towards China, aiming to decrease its reliance over the US. At the same time the closeness between US and India and suspension of CSF further indicates that Pakistan may not be required as a front line ally by the US; however the CPEC project on the other hand naturally puts Pakistan in the front seat with China. No doubt Pakistan needs to re-visit its strategic relationship with the US and find a better alternative, which in this case is China.

However the "obvious" does not mean "easy". The fact that US has infiltrated deep into Pakistan, physically and even diplomatically, and that financially Pakistan is liable to IMF, being under the huge burden of debt, makes it nearly impossible to break away from these multi layered shackles. Pakistan needs to tread carefully in line with its national interests. China is an anchor against which Pakistan has always found support and it is looking more promising than ever.

Once this understanding has been developed, the diplomatic machinery needs to churn out plausible route through which Pakistan can create more robust economic linkages with China and work towards charting a mechanism of reaping swift economic and strategic dividends. That's the only option available to Pakistan as it cannot possibly afford a public breakup with the US despite having the right to do so.

<http://nation.com.pk/columns/30-Nov-2015/picking-sides>



## **Pakistan-China Time-Tested Relationship: NSG Membership and Civil Nuclear Cooperation**

*Shahzadi Tooba*

China has assured Pakistan of support in the country's bid to become a member of the 48-nation multinational body (Nuclear Suppliers Group NSG) that aims to reduce nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapon development and by improving safeguards and protection on existing materials.

The assurance was given during the visit of a high-level delegation led by President Mamnoon Hussain to Beijing recently. The Pakistan delegation underscored the country's need to get entry into the group to quench its need to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The issue was discussed at length and Pakistan highlighted its point of view saying that it has equal right to join the group for fulfilling its requirement for peaceful use of nuclear technology. Keeping in view the double standards of the West, Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton suggested some of the steps/initiatives in their report (based on assumptions) few months ago to mainstreaming Nuclear Pakistan. On the other hand Krepon also said that "Pakistan does not have the money to buy a nuclear plant while India has". It is believed that the US and the West would not give loans to Pakistan to buy a nuclear power plant while the Civil Nuclear cooperation depends upon the mutual strategic interest of the states concerned. Even they would not grant loans for Bhasha dam, a hydropower electric generation project, then why would they give loans of \$4 to \$6 billion dollar for a nuclear power plant?

China, being member of the group and holding the veto power, assured Pakistan that it will take all measures so that it also becomes the member of the NSG. Pakistan has been saying that if it is deprived of NSG membership while India is accommodated, it would be taken as discrimination and lead to an imbalance in the region. China replied that "if India is allowed to join NSG and Pakistan is deprived of the membership of the group, Beijing will veto the move to block Indian entry."

China's participation in the construction of Gwadar port, 180 nautical miles from the Strait of Hormuz through which 40% of world's traded oil passes, and up-gradation of KKH amply speak of China's realization of the value of linkage with Pakistan. To undergird the strong strategic ties in political and defence production fields, it has been agreed to step up cooperation and coordination in space science and technology, maritime security, climate

change, food, and UN reform. What is equally significant is China's offer to help Pakistan in overcoming its crippling energy crisis. An Energy Cooperation Mechanism is to be established to promote cooperation in conventional, renewable and civil nuclear energy. Pakistan and China already agreed to continue bilateral cooperation in civil nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards, in line with their respective bilateral and multilateral commitments.

China has assisted Pakistan in building six nuclear reactors with a total installed capacity of 3.4 million kilowatts. The upcoming 2200MW nuclear power plants – K-2 and K-3 – in Karachi are also being set up with Chinese assistance. Pakistan has set the target of generating 8800MW from nuclear power and has been eyeing Chinese cooperation. China declared the first two reactors it already agreed to construct for Pakistan – the Chashma-1 and Chashma 2 – at the time it joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004, with the expectation that no new deals would follow. But in 2010, the China National Nuclear Cooperation announced it would export technology for two new reactors, Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 because it argued that these projects were already grandfathered in under previous agreements rather than being fresh proposals.

China is combating the Indo-US policy to tackle the “Rise of China” in South Asia. According to Rober D. Kaplan, writing in the New York Times of 12 November; 2010, President Obama's visits (2010) to India, Indonesia, South Korea and Japan were “about one challenge: the rise of China on land and sea.” India's exemption and membership to NSG is also part of that policy. Well only time will tell how much China's assurance matters.

<http://www.eurasiareview.com/30112015-pakistan-china-time-tested-relationship-nsg-membership-and-civil-nuclear-cooperation-oped/>

## **Eurasian Economic Union and Pakistan-Belarus Free Trade Engagements**

*Nasurullah Brohi*

The newly created Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) has shortly got the momentum as an economic hub for the countries of the region. The EEU includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia as its members, whereas; the Organization is a continuation of contemplation for establishing the integration projects by the Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia since 2007. The Organization fundamentally promotes the ideas of streamlining the flow and transportation of services and goods between the member states, therefore, it greatly attracts the interests of many stakeholders and according to the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, many international organizations and the economic giants like China has shown great interest in the creation of free trade zones through the EEU.

The present political and economic importance of the South and Central Asian region along with free trade and economic potential across the Eurasian region greatly appeals almost every regional and international country, whether may they be developed or developing nation seems eager to come in bilateral and multilateral engagements with these organizations and the states in the region. The cooperation that is vital to the many states' national interests consists of the fields of security, economic, energy, bilateral, free trade, scientific education and cultural interactions. Most particularly, the Russian Federation and China have leading ambitious roles in region's economic and infrastructural developments. In addition, the growing significance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the present scenario has further enabled China and Russia to become a dominant player on the global economic and political arena. This in turn has also provided small or developing nations to benefit from the mutual benefit efforts of the SCO, EEU and other forums for their industrialization and national economic development goals.

The security issues in Afghanistan are the main obstruction in EEU's direct trade with South Asia. Alternatively, there are two other options which connect the free trade activities with the regional market either through the North-South corridor between Russia-, Iran and India by way of the Caspian and then the Arabian Sea and or the China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Pakistan is also ardent to benefit from the free trade engagements of the EEU and willing to sign free trade agreement with the EEU. Given its geopolitical location, Pakistan

could gain huge economic and trade benefits. Pakistan has also offered Belarus to sign a Potential Trade Agreement (PTA) to facilitate trade connections between the two countries.

Belarus is a landlocked and one of the most industrialized countries located in the heart of the Europe and because of its significant geographic position Pakistan could achieve better access to the Eurasian and Eastern European markets through its free trade engagements with Belarus and the EEU. In addition, both the countries can also generate huge revenues through the industrial cooperation, agriculture, pharmaceuticals and other trade cooperation, therefore, for the reason Pakistan has invited the Belarusian side for a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) and hopefully both the countries will soon reach the accord. Apart from that, the Belarus has also a Custom Union with the Russian Federation and the Kazakhstan which is a growing free trade entity and a major trading partner of the near future. Pakistan also zealously seeks Belarusian support for Pakistan's entry in the EEU and later on conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

The bilateral trade between both countries also demands increase and Pakistan's exports to Belarus in 2014 were only \$15.23 million. Despite of the fact that there are immense bilateral economic opportunities for the two sides, but its need of hour to explore the variety of ways for further extending their bilateral trade relationship as Pakistan has exceptional potential to meet Belarusian demands of textile, food commodities, chemicals and many other domestic products. Whereas, Pakistan can also benefit from the Belarusian industrial expertise and it can import tractors, synthetic fiber, and oil and energy resources. Besides vast trade and development opportunities there is a dire need of cultural interactions and educational exchanges.

Other than its extraordinary trade and economic potential, the EEU also faces the challenges to its further enhanced role and enlargement, though it has been unsuccessful in integrating the former Soviet satellite states but still it seems eager to attain this goal. The Organization however needs to strictly ensure its political sovereignty otherwise, the objectives of rapid expansion in current geopolitical scenario despite of lack of any reasonable framework and structure makes EEU prone to make it a partial success like its predecessors.

<http://www.eurasiareview.com/30112015-eurasian-economic-union-and-pakistan-belarus-free-trade-engagements-oped/>

## *2. Press Coverage of SVI Event*

### ***“Proposal for Adding Pakistan to Nuclear Mainstreaming are Unacceptable”***

#### *Dawn*

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan wants to join the nuclear mainstream, but the cost of achieving that status, at least according to what is being suggested by western think tanks, could be prohibitively high in terms of the country's security.

“Expecting Pakistan to compromise for being mainstreamed is wishful,” said Zahir Kazmi, a director at the Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA) section of the Strategic Plans Division at a roundtable organised by Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) on Wednesday.

The roundtable was held to discuss the various proposals made by American think tanks for admitting Pakistan into the nuclear mainstream.

Pakistan and the US had earlier in June agreed on “continued outreach to integrate Pakistan into the international nonproliferation regime”.

According to media reports, the two sides would further dwell on this issue during the meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Thursday.

Kazmi says two future courses are being clearly suggested to Pakistan – keep competing with a well resourced India and eventually lose because of its bigger economy or agree to an arrangement where as a quid pro quo to some restrictions on the nuclear and missile programme Pakistan gets its status as a nuclear power normalised.

“The cost that is being suggested is too high,” he said and added that any Pakistani decision in this regard would be informed by the “history and threat calculus”.

Therefore, he suggests that Pakistan should reject these conditions and continue behaving like a “confident nuclear power”.

Kazmi believes that any negotiations between Pakistan and US on mainstreaming would take a long time before any understanding is reached.

Dr Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, director School of Politics and International Relations Quaid-i-Azam University dismissed the reported offer of a waiver for Pakistan for admission into nuclear cartels like NSG, terming it 'lollipops'.

"Pakistan desires to be a member of all international export control regimes - the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australian Group, Wassenaar Arrangement. However, it is not ready to compromise on its nuclear posture by accepting unrealistic conditions on its nuclear weapon programme," Mr Jaspal said.

"It's because Pakistan's nuclear decision making is very much determined by its regional strategic environment instead of idealistic norms of nuclear non-proliferationists or nuclear pessimists' conclusions," he added.

The recommendations from the roundtable rejected the proposals coming from American think tanks and writers and said that they were a reflection of Indian security interests.

President SVI Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema said that the proposals put forward by American think tanks were discriminatory because they aim at limiting Pakistan's nuclear capability, besides freezing the range of ballistic missiles up to the level of Shaheen-III. No such limitations, he noted, were included in the waiver granted to India as part of the nuclear deal.

He further said that it was absurd to ask Pakistan to revert from Full-Spectrum Deterrence to Strategic Deterrence, whereas the nuclear deal given to India did not affect its programme.

Dr Cheema regretted that western researchers deliberately make a misconstrued comparison of Pakistani and Indian programmes.

The American researchers, he said, take into account the potential of Pakistani facilities while declaring it to be the fastest growing in the world, but in case of India they consider the current production of war heads instead of following uniform criteria in both cases.

SVI recommended that US should adopt non-discriminatory criteria for Pakistan's entry into nuclear mainstream.

<http://www.dawn.com/news/1214779/proposals-for-admitting-pakistan-to-nuclear-mainstream-unacceptable>

## ***Pakistan Be Included in N-mainstream on Same Terms as Other Non-NPT States: Think Tank***

### ***Dawn***

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan should be included in the nuclear mainstream on same terms as were offered to other non-NPT states, said Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), a think tank that works on strategic issues.

The Islamabad-based think tank also rejected proposals made by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Stimson Centre, which had called on Pakistan to return to “strategic” deterrence instead of “full spectrum deterrence”, commit to a recessed deterrence posture and limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical nuclear weapons; lift Pakistan’s veto on Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and reduce or stop fissile material production; separate civilian and military nuclear facilities; and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without waiting for India.

The SVI recommendations that cautioned against compromising on national security were framed by a group of nuclear experts comprising Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema, President of SVI, and National Defence University professors Dr Zafar Khan and Dr Rizwana Abbasi.

Debate surrounding the Western proposals for Pakistan’s nuclear mainstreaming has once again started ahead of Army Chief Gen Raheel Sharif’s visit to US from Nov 15-20.

While launching the recommendations Dr Cheema said that proposals for “mainstream(ing) Pakistan into the international community are purposefully discriminatory because they aim at limiting Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability, besides freezing the range of ballistic missiles”.

Dr Cheema criticised reports that emerge from time to time that Pakistan had the fastest growing nuclear programme and the country could be on the way to having the world’s third largest nuclear stockpile saying that authors of these reports mischievously use different criteria for Pakistan and India while making such assessments.

The American researchers, he said, had taken into account the potential (future) of Pakistani stockpiles while declaring it to be the fastest growing in the world, but in case of India they consider the actual production of warheads currently being produced instead of following uniform criteria in both cases.

Dr Cheema further said that regional security paradigm was being manipulated in a manner that was intended to maximise India's conventional and strategic security as pivot to the US Asia-Pacific strategy, while minimising Pakistan's security at the same time. He rejected the proposals floated by western think tanks for Pakistan's nuclear mainstreaming and advised the government against falling for the inducements being offered.

Dr Cheema further said that it was absurd to ask Pakistan to revert from Full-Spectrum Deterrence to Strategic Deterrence and unilaterally sign the CTBT that the US itself had not ratified whereas India was not only left free to augment its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities but in fact was being offered advanced nuclear technologies and systems like BMD that would undermine strategic stability in the region.

Dr Zafar Khan and Dr Rizwana Abbasi, from National Defence University, spoke about the Full Spectrum Deterrence.

Conceptually, Pakistan's treatment of full-spectrum deterrence was different from what others perceive, they said, adding that Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) was clear on this that full spectrum deterrence, in its qualitative term, was to plug the gaps in deterrence and address all forms of aggressions.

<http://www.dawn.com/news/1218693>