

SVI FORESIGHT
VOLUME I, NUMBER 4

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Compiled by
S. Sadia Kazmi

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

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Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is an autonomous, multidisciplinary and non-partisan institution, established in January 2013. It is a non-governmental and non-commercial organization, administered by a Board of Governors (General Body) supervised under a Chairperson and administered by a Management Committee headed by a President/Executive Director.

SVI aims to project strategic foresight on issues of national and international import through dispassionate, impartial and independent research, analyses and studies. The current spotlight of the SVI is on the national security, regional and international peace and stability, strategic studies, nuclear non- proliferation, arms control, and strategic stability, nuclear safety and security and energy studies.

SVI Foresight

SVI Foresight is a monthly electronic journal. It has a multi-disciplinary perspective highlighting on the contemporary strategic and security studies. The Journal is envisioned to be a collection of policy-oriented articles written by its Research Associates, Visiting Faculty and professional experts. The objective is to provide the readership with a concise all-round and real-time policy oriented discourse on contemporary strategic regional and international developments, highlighting their relevance to Pakistan.



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Editor's Note

The electronic monthly issue of SVI Foresight for the month of October is here. The opinions in this issue can loosely be categorized into three main areas: Nuclear and strategic issues, contemporary International Security problems including the Afghan scenario and Syrian crisis, and the internal security matters pertaining to water shortage and a general debate on global misrepresentation of Islam. This distribution not only reflects the conscious effort by the researchers to present diverse opinions on a wide range of topics but also points to the increasingly interconnected nature of sub-fields of Strategic and Security Studies.

We highly appreciate and encourage the interested writers to send in their short article contributions and we would like to mention that this particular issue showcases opinions from not just the researchers at the Institute but from other established professional experts and academicians as well.

A substantial space has been dedicated to nuclear related subject as it was the intentional focus of the researchers at the Institute to come up with a diverse and distinctive opinion in response to a jointly published controversial report by Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015, titled “A Normal Nuclear Pakistan” by Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon. Therefore this electronic monthly includes an extensive debate with convincing argument on Pakistan’s full spectrum strategic deterrence, contemplating if and how Pakistan should separate its civil and military programs. A unique counter narrative to the article by Sumit Ganguly and Christine Fair titled “An Unworthy Alliance”, is also featured in this issue which the readers will surely benefit from. The nuclear safeguards in South Asia with a specific focus on India’s stance on these safeguards have been scrutinized as well. The status of fissile material stockpiles has also been dealt with in one of the opinions where the real facts and figures have been substantiated to establish the factual position. A proficient commentary about Western discriminatory nuclear policy in the South Asian region will provide the audience with much needed insight into the nuclear politics in the region.



Three different opinion articles address the contemporary Afghanistan scenario, each highlighting a unique dimension. Afghanistan continues to be an area of concern not only to the international community but also for Pakistan. One can find an exclusive commentary stressing upon the need for Pakistan to reevaluate its relations with Afghanistan especially in the wake of recent statements coming from President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah. One article critically evaluates and terms the whole episode of Kunduz capture as a



strategic failure of US policy in Afghanistan. It discusses at length how this incident has shattered the myth about stability, security and peace in Afghanistan, which is what the US and ISAF claim to have achieved in the country. Another article exclusively examines the Russian attack on Syrian rebels and how it has essentially changed the dynamics of international political scenario causing concern for the US and the West, and their allies.

With regards to internal security problems, water shortage can be termed as the biggest challenge that Pakistan is facing today, having direct implications for human security and ultimately for the state's national security. One of the articles in this issue very pertinently highlights the lack of civic responsibility as the major reason behind the prevailing crisis and stresses upon the need for an immediate attention to this matter. The readers can also find an analysis of how Islam is being misinterpreted by the West and the growing Islamophobia from Western perspective.

The SVI Foresight team highly encourages the contributions in form of opinion based short commentaries on contemporary political issues, which could be part of the future electronic publications. Any suggestions for further improvement are welcome at our [contact address](#). Please see [here](#) the copy of SVI Foresight electronic journal. You can find us on [Facebook](#) and can also access the SVI [website](#).

Syedah Sadia Kazmi
Senior Research Associate





Worth & Betrayal: Managing the US Strategic Thinking in South Asia

Dr. Shahid Bukhari

Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has been struggling to ensure its survival as an independent state. Pakistan was carved out of the British India; therefore, it was natural for remaining Indian forces to wish for reuniting India. In their surge for greater India, the governments in New Delhi never left any stone unturned to destabilize Pakistan. Due to its vulnerable position against India in the formative phase, Pakistan joined the US bloc during the Cold War by entering into western alliances like SEATO and CENTO. Both Pakistan and the US have been involved in various junctures from the Cold War to the War on Terror. Pakistan was the key ally in the US containment policy against the USSR and as a Non-NATO Ally in War on Terror against the Taliban. Pakistan has always been lauding the US due to the one and only objective; to deter or counter Indian aggression against its security. In sum, Pakistan's threat perception is India centric. New Delhi's strategic policies in the region have always been the central tenet of Pakistan's foreign and strategic policies.

The current strategic environment in South Asia has drastically transformed where the US has now become the strategic partner of India and its policies toward Pakistan are routed through New Delhi. The policy makers in Washington D.C. are repeating the history what they had done after the Cold War. The pro-Indian set of mind has pronged the US intelligentsia as well that has lost its principles of objective analysis while producing their policy recommendations toward Pakistan. Commenting on the US obligations to help Pakistan in 1971, in a recent article against Pakistan, Christine Fair and Summit Ganguly argue that "In fact, even though sanctions imposed on both India and Pakistan after the 1965 war legally prohibited the United States from helping Pakistan when conflict with India reignited over East Pakistan in 1971, the Nixon administration nonetheless came to Islamabad's assistance." This argument about justifying the US defiance in 1971 can be refuted on the basis that under the rules of International Law, a state cannot enact such legislations which may prohibit her from fulfilling her internationally committed obligations rather states are supposed to adjust their municipal laws in accordance with their international obligations. Supposedly, we accept this argument; will United States allow India to refrain from its international obligations under the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement through an amendment in Indian Laws, which may surpass all the obligations agreed bilaterally between the US and India under the framework of strategic partnership?



Another false claim is about Pakistan's own interest in Afghanistan through Islamist militants in 1974 and pretends that the US had only joined in 1979. It needs to be assessed through a brief overview of the US containment policy given by George F. Kennan in 1946-47. The US had started its containment policy through the Truman Doctrine in 1947. As part of the US Policy of Containment, SEATO and CENTO were designed and Pakistan had joined them due to Indian inclination toward the USSR bloc with a so-called claim of non-alignment. The original puzzle for the US in 1971 was the India-USSR Treaty of Friendship signed in August 1971 prior to the Indian intervention in East Pakistan. It was actually the communist threat (Under the guise of India-USSR Treaty of Friendship 1971) that had deterred the US from helping Pakistan. The dismemberment of East Pakistan was, in fact, the Soviet success against the US who had refrained from fulfilling its legal as well as moral obligations to defend its ally.

Discussing the US non-proliferation concerns regarding Pakistan, Christine Fair and Summit Ganguly their self nullify their claim about the 'Pakistan bringing the US Wallet in Afghanistan' by stating that "Others in the White House and Congress, as well as those running the CIA's covert operations in Afghanistan, maintained that Washington should continue to set aside its nonproliferation goals in favor of countering the Soviet threat in Afghanistan". This statement manifests the US policy about proxy-war in Afghanistan. Since the US containment policy was formed in 1947, the US had been eager to counter Soviet dominance anywhere in the world from the Korean War to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan until it got success through Pakistan's assistance in collapse of the USSR. Pakistan's importance in the current US drawdown in Afghanistan cannot be ignored or replaced with Indian presence. Ignoring Pakistan's geographical significance and installing New Delhi in Kabul shall leave Afghanistan into another enigma.

The enactment of Pressler amendment 1985 in 1990 is also one of the examples about dubious US policies for Pakistan. Such amendments have always served the US national interest because they give the US President a loop to oversight his obligations in order to adjust the national security interests. The need for certification that was declined by George H.W. Bush in 1990, were later proved to be wrong when his son George W. Bush agreed to sell F-16s to Pakistan. It was again the US national interest which compelled them to oversight their non-proliferation concerns. Is it a coincident that the US sanctions are always enacted when they have no major interests with Pakistan? Sanctions have been one of the most efficient instruments of the US foreign policy not only with Pakistan but also with the rest of the world.



An advice to Obama Administration regarding 'Pakistan's misdeeds' referring to the 2009 white paper on the US policy towards Pakistan is a typical expression of Indian thinking



about Pakistan. Perhaps, Christine Fair and Summit Ganguly have overlooked Pakistan's sacrifices for the sake of the US interests regarding terrorism. Pakistan has sacrificed more than any country in the world by joining the US war against terror and has been a real-time front line ally of the US that proved to be the first line of the US defense against terrorism. It is also noteworthy that Pakistan's role in this regard has been acknowledged for several times by the US State Department as well as the US Secretary of State and the US President. The strategic demands of the contemporary South Asia has not changed yet. Pakistan is yet one of the major states that are pivotal to the US interests in the region, if managed properly. The current Obama Administration as well as the upcoming new US Administration in 2016 should not defy what Pakistan has been doing for the US and must not annoy it by repeating the same policy what it had adopted after the Cold war. The overwhelming US tilt towards India is one of the major concerns for Pakistan where it feels to be betrayed by the US administrations. Although, the US tilt towards India is aimed at to contain China, why can't the US adopt a policy of engagement with China where Pakistan can be a better facilitator like it did in the past by bridging the diplomatic relations between the US and China? The US strategy to build India shall prove to be a counterproductive which shall induct intensity in the regional instability because of aggressive Indian ambitions as well as postures that can never be acceptable to both Pakistan and China. Pakistan's strategic position is yet intact and cannot be over-sighted through the Indian lenses by the US policymakers. It shall not be in the US interest to adopt aggressive policies toward Pakistan as desired by India who has left its time-tested friendship with Russia and can later defy the United States as well.

Denying support to Pakistan's military shall not be a good strategy due to military's vital importance for the national security of the country along with mass-support by Pakistani public. The US refusal to replace or repair the already supplied strategic weapons shall do nothing with Pakistan's defense capabilities rather would add fuel to already burning sentiments of Pakistani public towards the US. Moreover, Pakistan has now acquired the capability to fulfill such needs at home. Recent repair of AWACS aircraft by the Pakistani engineers, at half cost than American estimates, is the best example for the purpose. As it is evident that Pakistan has a well-established missile development program as well as nuclear weapon capability along with manufacturing of JF-17 Thunder fighter jets (supposed to be an alternate of F-16 for Pakistan), it shall be no more dependent on the US supplies in the near future. Despite the US efforts to stall Pakistan's nuclear as well as missile development program, it could not avert Pakistan from achieving her national security objectives. The denial of military assistance to Pakistan shall also prove to be counterproductive because of the available potential market for the purpose around the world as well as the resilience of Pakistani nation to meet the challenges to their national security. Linking the US provided military equipment with a condition to use only



against terrorism, is unrealistic. How is it possible to instruct your ally about the usage of provided weapons only to serve your interests but not in case of threat to his own security? Moreover, the US provided weapon systems are irrelevant in case of Pakistan's national security imperatives regarding India. Pakistan's security measures against India are not dependent on conventional arms provided by the US rather Pakistan meets the challenge of Indian aggression through nuclear deterrence. After the nuclearization of South Asia, the US military assistance to Pakistan has become less vital at the moment as it has been in the past.

The so-called posture of democratic partner (Democratic India) also needs to be evaluated. The US stance about democracy does not rest only on electoral system of democracy rather it is accompanied with the principles of human rights as well as protection to minorities and provision of social security at the doorsteps of the masses. Except holding elections in-time, no more requisite of a democratic nation can be found in India. At the moment, there are several freedom movements in India that aim at to save themselves from the gross-misconduct by the Indian governments. Absence of basic social services in the larger part of India, Human Rights violations in Kashmir and forced conversion of minorities into Hinduism are the modern-day evidences of so-called democratic posture of India, which is not, in any case, compatible with the US democratic values and therefore, not eligible to claim the democratic partnership with the United States.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not meant for coercion to any country in the world except for India which is not a loop as well. It is a well known fact that Pakistan's nuclear program is India centric and Pakistan has always developed its capabilities in reaction to Indian aggressive postures and doctrines. Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under the best security arrangements in comparison with any country in the world that is acknowledged by the renowned people in the field as well. Suggesting air strikes on Pakistan's nuclear facilities is an immature ambition that can never be materialized due to the competence of Pakistan's armed forces to defend their homeland. The desires about non-intervention from the US in India-Pakistan crises shall also prove to be self-defeating for Indians because the US intervention has always benefited the New Delhi's interests. Perhaps, New Delhi is yet hesitant to accept the reality of Pakistan's defense capabilities and want to deliberately live in the fool's paradise that they can overcome Pakistan through their aggressive postures. New Delhi must now come out of Utopia to subordinate Pakistan and learn to co-exist on equal footings. It is in the best interest of India to remain in peace with a Nuclear Pakistan. Undermining Pakistan's capabilities and will to defend itself shall bring only suicidal outcomes. A stable and secure Pakistan is necessary for the region. <http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/10/11/worth-betrayal-managing-the-us-strategic-thinking-in-south-asia/>



Reality Check on Pak-Afghan Relations

S. Sadia Kazmi

The acrimonious element in Pak-Afghan relations is nothing new. The trust deficit between the two has a long history. While the porous nature of border is a constant source of trouble, the Indian factor makes the equation even more volatile. Nonetheless Pakistan recently had been able to garner worldwide approval for facilitating and playing an instrumental role in Afghan peace process. Yet once again the relations seem to have suffered a severe setback.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani during his interview with BBC issues a statement that relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are not brotherly but like two states. This rhetoric appears at a time when the relations between the two neighbors are highly tensed. Both sides are actively condemning and accusing each other for supporting and sponsoring recent terrorist attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In such an environment where regional security is already in a state of doldrums, such proclamations are not void of severe regional implications.

First and foremost an unmistakable shift in the mindset is quite evident. President Ghani is generally seen by Pakistan as less vindictive than his predecessor Hamid Karzai. He comes across as a person who is willing to recognize that terrorism is not just endemic to Pakistan. He is ready to take measures against the non state actors operating from his country. However the recent statement leaves no place for any doubt that Pakistan needs a reality check on its perception of Afghan leadership. This new stance means that the distrust has crept back in between the two or may be was never completely gone. Chief Executive Abdullah Abudllah implicating Pakistan at UNGA with regards to takeover of Kunduz by Taliban further strengthens this argument. Such statements irrespective of their credibility are sure to get in the way of any efforts towards improvement of bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Also Pakistan's ambitions to serve as a regional peacemaker and a facilitator between Taliban and Afghan government may have to suffer a hard blow. It appears that all the hard work by Pakistan to initiate Afghan peace process has been forgotten and multiplied by zero. Sentiments are equally hurt on both sides. Pakistan cannot take Badhaber attack lightly; the tragedy of Peshawar school attack can never be forgotten. The need is to further accelerate the joint approach towards curbing terrorist outfits instead of disowning each other at this crucial time. Getting bitter and exhibiting suspicions about each other's sincerity will only allow the hostile elements to take advantage of the situation. Both sides need to consider this aspect and





act wisely. In the present scenario it will not serve any side to indulge in the blame game. Also Pakistan needs to be more cautious and needs to take such rhetoric very seriously. This is not to suggest that Pakistan should exhibit an equally toxic gesture. If taken in literal sense then a brotherly relation might have some margin for compassion and compromise, otherwise in state to state relations usually a realistic approach centered on pursuing one's own interests at the expense of the other is a preferred and justified line of action. Afghanistan surely wouldn't provoke Pakistan to adopt a "non-brotherly" stance and act discompassionately with regards to millions of Afghan refugees settled on Pakistani soil. Hence Afghanistan should probably revisit its present approach while Pakistan definitely should demand a rational explanation of this statement from Afghanistan or take an initiative to clear the air out and win the trust back, as no side can afford to lose the other. Pakistan should also try to identify and make public all the possible factors which might have caused this 180 degrees change in Ashraf Ghani's behavior.

Having said all that, it is true that Pakistan needs to do some self analysis too. Does the distinction between good and bad Taliban really work for Pakistan's national interests? It is clear that officially Pakistan has maintained that it will never allow, sponsor, and abet terrorism anywhere in any form. Then why did the peace efforts which started off on a positive trajectory ended up in skepticism? What really went wrong? It is convenient and sometimes logical too to put blame on India but this can't work every time. Both sides need to learn to take responsibility of their actions. While Pakistan needs to be more stringent when it comes to its position on Taliban and Haqqani group, Afghanistan should also stop putting all the blame on Pakistan and refrain from issuing irrational and irresponsible statements on international forums. Why should such sentiments be broadcasted and highlighted when the exploiters are waiting to get a chance to further spoil the situation? This might be seen by them as an open invitation to intercede and spew out anti-Pakistan sentiments in Kabul. Wouldn't such assertions jeopardize the regional security situation? I wonder if Afghanistan can afford to pursue this whimsical and impulsive diplomacy.

As George Simmel very aptly put it in 1955 that International society is "sewn together" by cross cutting conflicts. Hence clashes are inevitable but how to recover from them and handle the situation amicably is the real test of nerves. The only solution to resolve distrust is through mutual concerted efforts.

<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=274510>





Inconsistency in Global Nuclear Order

Shahzadi Tooba

India's nuclear industry has been largely without IAEA safeguards, though four nuclear power plants have been under facility-specific arrangements related to India's INFCIRC/66 safeguards agreement with IAEA. However, in October 2009 India's safeguards agreement with the IAEA became operational, with the government confirming that 14 reactors would be put under the India Specific Safeguards Agreement by the end of 2014.

A clean waiver to the trade embargo was agreed in September 2008, when India and the United States finalized an agreement/deal, to restart cooperation on civilian nuclear technology. The new agenda of cooperation intended at preparing India as a new powerful state in the globe and it has also numerous aspects containing economic, strategic and energy components. On the other hand, the civilian nuclear deal which is component of the particular dialogue gained more consideration because of its adverse implications for the international Non-Proliferation regime efforts and on the security of South Asia.

Because of the agreement, the India would gain the status of de facto nuclear weapon state and it would assist India to acquire civil nuclear technology from the US and other members of the NSG. The NSG is a 48-country network of uranium and nuclear technology-exporting and civil Nuclear power producing countries aimed at strengthening civilian nuclear markets while propagating a strict non-military purpose. After giving India an exemption it seems this group is following a non-criteria approach by giving exemptions to some (India) and objecting some of the others (Pakistan) on the same grounds.

The legislation allows for the transfer of civilian nuclear material to India. Under the deal India has committed to classify 14 of its 22 nuclear power plants as being for civilian use and to place them under IAEA safeguards. "Safeguards are the activities by which the IAEA can verify that a state is living up to its international commitments not to use nuclear programs for nuclear- weapon purposes". While pledging that any U.S. assistance to its civilian nuclear energy program will not benefit its nuclear weapons program, India committed to, among other things, separating its civilian nuclear facilities from its military nuclear facilities, declaring civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing them under IAEA safeguards.

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A significant proportion of India's nuclear complex, including 8 PHWRs: Tarapur III & IV,



Madras I & II, and Kaiga I—IV will remain outside IAEA safeguards, their joint capacity have 2350 MW of electricity generation capacity and could produce about 1250 kilograms of reactors-grade plutonium every year. Several essentially civil nuclear power reactors, the new 500 MWe fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam, and the small enrichment plants for naval fuel remain outside IAEA safeguards. For almost 30 years, the U.S. legal standard has been that only nuclear safeguards on all nuclear activities in a state provide adequate assurance suddenly changed.

A significant question is how India, in the dearth of full-scope safeguards, can provide adequate assurance that U.S. nonviolent nuclear technology and uranium import from the other countries will not be sidetracked to nuclear weapons purpose, because apart from not being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India's dual-function nuclear program (military and civilian) is greatly interwoven. India has opted to not fully disclose the suspected dual-use nature of some of its reactors.

The above figure shows the separation plan of Indian civilian and military nuclear program which is very much inter-woven that it is nearly impossible to be separated. The key elements of India's separation plan are, eight indigenous Indian power reactors (RAPS 3, 4, 5, 6; KAPS 1, 2; NAPS 1, 2) in addition to 6 already under safeguards; future power reactors may also be placed under safeguards, if India declares them as civilian. Some facilities in the Nuclear Fuel Complex (e.g., fuel fabrication) will be specified as civilian in 2008 and nine research facilities and three heavy water plants would be declared as civilian, but are "safeguards-irrelevant." Eight indigenous Indian power reactors (Kaiga 1, 2, 3, 4; MAPS 1, 2; TAPS 3, 4), Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FTBR) and Prototype Fast Breeder Reactors (PFBR) under construction, enrichment facilities, spent fuel reprocessing facilities (except for the existing safeguards on the Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (PREFRE) plant), research reactors: CIRUS, Dhruva, Advanced Heavy Water Reactor, three heavy water plants and various military-related plants (e.g., a prototype naval reactor) were not on the separation list.

Comparing it with Pakistan, the first nuclear power reactor of Pakistan is a small 137 MWe, Canadian pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) which started up in 1971 and which is under international safeguards – KANUPP. The second unit is Chashma 1 in Punjab province in the north, a 325 MWe (300 MWe net) two-loop pressurized water reactor (PWR) supplied by China's CNNC under safeguards. It started up in May 2000 and is also known as CHASNUPP 1. Designed life span is 40 years. Construction of its twin, Chashma 2, started in December 2005. A safeguards agreement with IAEA was signed in 2006 and grid connection was in March 2011, with commercial operation in May. Upgrades have added 5 MWe since (to 330 MWe gross).



These are built using international design codes and standards. Pakistan is not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but does have its civil power reactors and two research reactors (PARR 1&2) under item-specific IAEA safeguards. An agreement for two further 340 MWe reactors came into force in April 2011.

Experts say India could use the imported nuclear fuel to feed its civilian energy program while diverting its own nuclear fuel to weapons production. India has done similar things in the past; India claimed it was using nuclear technology for civilian purposes right up until its first nuclear weapons test in 1974. So, if IAEA get its way in India than all nuclear facilities should be under IAEA despite of selected cases by Indian nuclear authorities. Ever since the US pressurized NSG in 2005 to create an exception for India, a non-NPT state, allowing US to sign nuclear agreement with India, it has lost its credibility (both the NSG and the US). India's 14 ambiguous nuclear reactors in comparison with Pakistan's all reactors under IAEA Safeguards represents the validity of Pak commitment to global nuclear order, even which is a system of inconsistent rules, and norms established by a selected powerful countries to serve their national interests.

<http://epaper.pakobserver.net/201510/10/comments-1.php>



Water Crisis and Human Security

S. Sadia Kazmi

It is a fact that no country can be fully secure unless its people are protected from external as well as internal threats. No wonder the concept of security has expanded beyond the limited realm of nation state to include the human dimension. It is the individuals and their safety that has been realized to hold the central position while determining the security of the state. While the developed countries are exploring avenues to deal with issues like climate change, and to devise countermeasures to ultimately uplift the social conditions, the policy makers in Pakistan are unfortunately still wrestling with the state security in purely traditional sense, not as much by choice, eventually resulting in the deplorable human condition at the home front.

According to World Resources Institute (WRI), Pakistan will be the most water stressed country in the region by the year 2040. Despite having world's most extensive irrigation system, water crisis has hit various cities of Pakistan and continues to aggravate by the day. Several factors have contributed to this problem. From siphoning of water through illegal connections, tanker mafia having support of corrupt officials, negligence and lack of accountability on the part of government, exponential growth in the size of population, lack of proper water storage facilities, massive influx of migrants, to the drastic climate change with fewer annual rainfalls, can all be blamed for the present dire conditions. These sure are the real issues but there is more to it. The problem is that we are quick to blame and not ready to take the responsibility of our actions. A very important dimension which is usually overlooked is the civic responsibility. The callousness with which the wastage of water on daily basis is observed is shameful. One can see pipeline leakages, running taps left unattended, overflowing motor operated water tanks for domestic usage. While everyone has the right over basic commodities this privilege comes with the right to use them responsibly. Before such laxity leads to worst water drought, the need is to inculcate sense of responsibility at the national level. A country which is already suffering from water scarcity in several of its cities cannot afford this kind of insensitivity.

The authorities should also work on alternative energy resources more vigorously. Even though the increase in Industrial growth is a good economic indicator but at the same time consumes the lion's share of electricity which is generated from water resources, needed to run the machinery. It leads to frequent power outages causing monetary setbacks by failing to meet export targets and ultimately damaging the foreign exchange earnings. The prospects for Wind energy can be explored as Pakistan has at least 50,000 MW of wind energy potential. The government can reduce over dependency on water by initiating extensive water storage plans



and regulatory framework, with the consent of all stake holders while making sure that they get implemented too. Building dams and reservoirs should be seen as life saving projects in the best interest of national security aiming to ensure human security. Another important area of concern should be the internal social crisis which tends to provide ground for crimes to flourish. It is important to keep a check on the hostile elements who might try to gain support of the common people by exploiting the situation e.g. banned extremist groups trying to gain political and social support by raising slogans of “water terrorism” against India.

Interestingly enough the recognition is there but it largely lacks implementation. One gets to hear officials reiterating time and again that Pakistan soon will have to face worst water crisis. It is quite paradoxical that the narrative signifies as if the crisis has not already hit the state. The whole country is suffering from extreme water scarcity. Karachi is bone dry and even in the federal capital Islamabad; the condition is not very encouraging, same is with Baluchistan and KPK. Instead of just looking at the lopsided supply and demand equation, it is important to take into account the fact that even the available water is unfit for human consumption resulting in deadly diseases. The need is to reevaluate our economic policies and work towards improving the water governance before the situation hits rock bottom. Corruption should be condemned otherwise even the MoUs like the one between KSWB and China would fail to yield any favorable results.

It is an essential part of national policy to identify as to “whose security” ultimately has to be ensured. State’s primary objective is to make its people feel safe and free from the fear of want and need. Unless and until this approach is adopted, the value of human life will always be compromised. Not just that, it will in turn directly affect security of the state. One cannot deny that militancy and terrorism etc. are looming threats which need extensive military and financial resources but an equal amount of attention is needed to alleviate social sufferings, of which water is the prime challenge. Otherwise there is actually no point in spending so much on defence when there will only be barren arid land and no population left to be defended.

<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=275479>



Western Policies Towards Nuclear S ASIA

Zumra Cheema

There is no permanent friend or permanent enemy in international politics but permanent interests, a friend of today may be the enemy of tomorrow and enemy of today may be the friend of tomorrow. International system is anarchical and entirely based on realism. Global order is characterized by the principle of “Might is right”, in which there is no place for humane and moral values. Power and interests are two main drivers of states’ behaviors.

Weaker and smaller states in hierarchical system are constantly getting exploit by great powers. There is no universal judiciary system which can curtail such trend in international arena. Existing framework of rules and laws is getting ridiculed by its own founders. A just, rules-based global order has long been touted by powerful states as essential for international peace and security. Yet there is a long history of major powers using international law against other states but not complying with it themselves, and even reinterpreting or making new multilateral rules further server their interests.

US and other P5 states claim themselves founders of Arms Control and Disarmament initiatives, while they are not acting in accordance with the terms and conditions of the major main apparatus of non-proliferation efforts i.e. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pakistan and India are two defacto nuclear weapon states in South Asian region. Owing to pursuing nuclear weapons, both of the states went through huge criticism and economic and military sanctions from the world community.

Western policies towards both of the states have been remained so inconsistent and fluctuating. if someone looks at the western policies toward nuclear India and Pakistan then he will get to know that major powers particularly US the present super power, is being used both the countries, manly Pakistan for its own interests. As Pakistan adapted US alignment policy since the time of its independence in 1947. US remained using Pakistan against Russia and China but at the time of necessity US withdrew to support Pakistan i.e. in the wars of 1965 and 1971, but contrary to support it imposed heavy arm embargo on Pakistan.

Later on, when India detonated its atomic bomb in 1974 then again Pakistan came under the military and economic sanctions. While during 1979 to 1988 America provide strong



support to Pakistan to fight on its behalf against Soviet's forces in Afghanistan. In the meanwhile, US intentionally overlooked the Pakistan's nuclear programme as well. Afterwards, at the end of Afghan war US imposed strict sanctions on Pakistan under Pressler amendment.

Moreover, in 1998, once again sanctions imposed on Pakistan. Later on in 2001, with the terrorist attack in US, again America coerced Pakistan to fight against terrorism.

If someone noticed Indian side, then he will come to evaluate that India did not confronted with as much aggression and criticism as Pakistan did from world community. Although, after nuclear explosions in 1974, and 1998 India also came under international sanctions but those sanctions were not endorsed by the various great powers i.e. Russia, France and Britain etc. Moreover, since 9/11 US is being inclined towards India rather than Pakistan. Currently India is becoming the largest arms importer and its defence budget is constantly increasing but US and other western powers do not have any concern about it. US considers India more favorable to serve its interests in South Asia because India is an emerging power, with second largest population rate and having vibrant democratic system.

Thus under 123 agreement, India had been given by various such nuclear waivers by Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which did not provide to any other non-NPT signatory state. Resultantly, India was able to get material and technology from 48 member of NSG for its nuclear power programme. Furthermore, India is signing different accords with Russia, Britain, Australia, Canada and many other states and can increase its fissile material. Although Pakistan has proved itself enough mature and rational state to safe and secure its nuclear programme after A.Q Khan case but still remained unable to get any wavier like India by NSG.

Dichotomy and diplomacy of international community does not ends here, but still Pakistan is at the epicenter of criticism and apprehension from global powers. Many international defence analysts have expressed unnecessary and unjustifiable anxiety on the country's nuclear programme. They are persistently spreading baseless and wrong narratives with respect to Pakistan nuclear capabilities. A recent report published by two American think tanks is symbol to this fact. The authors of the report claimed that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal may become the world's third largest over the next five to 10 years.

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Moreover, at the same time western scholars and security experts recommend various suggestions to halt arm race with India. By thanking to those scholars, I will want to raise some questions by the global powers that why those world powers do not have any concern about their own military advancements? Why they do not question the Israeli nuclear capability? Why



they do not bring the land and naval military modernizations of India under consideration?
They are only focusing on Pakistan nuclear programme! Why?

<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=275979>



A Smart, Devastated Propaganda of the West

Zumra Cheema

“The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and obsessed with the inferiority of their power”
(Samuel Huntington)

Islamophobia is a term used for fear, prejudice, and hatred against Muslim community in the world. It is a part of Eurocentric propaganda on the basis of religious discrimination and racism (Defining Islamophobia). The term is not new and firstly used in the 1925 and became famous in the 1980s and 1990s by British magazine Q-news. It got international fame by a British report on Muslims “A challenge for all of us”. It is aimed to spread Muslim terror and threat through the preservation and expansion of existing disparities in economic, political, social and cultural relations, while rationalizing the necessity to use violence as a tool to achieve “Civilization Rehab” of the target communities (Defining Islamophobia). “War on terror”, “Operation Enduring Freedom” like terms are the part of glittering generalities used by the Europeans to demand public support without any opposition.

Stereotypes fear and prejudices against Islam is as old as the religion of Islam. Islam and Christianity were caught up in the Crusades during the Turkish and Moorish rule in Europe. Islam spread very rapidly in the West on the basis of its universal virtues i.e. Justice, equality, humanity and tolerance, thus it threatened the power of Church and elite class. Resultantly, they began to oppose Islam, not only through physical force but also through its vilification in front of the world by using different tactics (Korhan).

Currently, Mass Media is more influential than ever before. The Media has almost turned the world into a global village. Media plays a significant role in shaping, controlling and manipulating the opinions, thoughts and views of the people and different parts of world are inter-connected with each other by mean of it. Thus, racist Western governments are using it as a major tool of its political agenda to spread anti-Muslim sentiment among its non-Muslims masses since the end of Cold War (CW).The writings like ‘Clash of Civilization’, ‘End of History’, and ‘Coming Anarchy’ seem to be the part of the Western propaganda to set a platform, in the advance to prove legality and legitimacy of their future violent acts against Muslims. In a thesis “The Clash of Civilizations”, Samuel Huntington argued that the underlying problem for the



West is not 'Islamic fundamentalism', but 'Islam' itself. Resultantly, Muslims get suffered with various forms of discrimination, stereotype, and human rights violation furthermore, profiled as "potential terrorists" and "supportive of extremism" in the Western world

A major factor which played a significant role in creating anti-Islam or anti-Muslim sentiment in the West is the media's selection of words, i.e. fundamental Islam, radical Islam, Islamic Jihadist, and extremists etc, to describe the Muslims and Islam. Actually, wars in the battlefields are the collective actions of what planned, designed, discussed, and propagate through media. Media is being used as a vehicle to manipulate public opinion. Western governments are consistently spreading Islamophobia to spread hate and prejudice against Muslims to such extend so they can satisfy their own public, World Humanitarian Organizations (WHOs), and atheist groups to remain silent on their interference in the Muslim world, to contain their political, religious and territorial sovereignty.

Various Islamic and Qur'aanic terms and verses are vastly misinterpreting, mistranslating and misunderstood by the Westerns. They are using some concepts of Islam as card staking by disseminated or omitting them. Muslims cannot blame anyone because Muslims themselves are responsible for creating opportunity for others in number of ways, which are as follows:

- Firstly they have left to live under the light of proper teachings of Islam, so they are unable to represent the real image of its religion in front of the world.
- Secondly they have failed to spread true Islamic picture and virtues in the world through advanced technologies and vast projects.

Jihad, which is usually associated with Islam and Muslims, but in the fact, the concept of Jihad is found in all religions including Christianity, Judaism and all the other ideologies. Islam defines Jihad as determination and struggle for development as well as to defend one's honor, assets and homeland. The term "terrorism" does not exist in the Quran or Hadith. If the terms "terrorist or terrorism" are derived from a verb used in the Quran, such as 5:33 describes disapproval to terrorist and terrorism and accordingly prescribes severe punishment. Jihad also interpreted as the struggle against evil, internal or external of a person or a society. Islam is a code of conduct of life that does not separate politics from religion. Islam is a religion of mercy, unity and most importantly peace and harmony. However, the Western media often misuses or misperceive the meaning of jihad by referring it as a holy war where Muslims irrationally kill non-believers. But the fact is that, word jihad could be use for a numbers of acts that a Muslim does for the sake of God, while the Western often takes the word "jihad" out of context to propagate negative views against Islam. . An example of this kind of misconception is that the



Western and some historian scholars often say that Islam is a religion, mainly spread on the basis of sword, but it is not true. Islam was totally spread on the basis of its humane and moral values.

The religious terrorist groups which consider themselves as the true believer of religion, and want to impose laws and rules accordingly to their own will on the whole world could be from any religion, not only from Islam. Actually these terrorist organizations can misinterpret some specific teachings of different religions. It is true that some Muslims are terrorists. It is true that some Muslims are fanatics but the same is true for the believers of any other religion, the Christians, the Jews or other then these.

In post cold war era, war became an act of great immorality and high of cost due to the invention of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Resultantly, it was difficult to enhance power and resources by waging the war and moreover, a Balance of Power (BOP) like situation established among the greater powers. Thus Western capitalist nations laid down the foundation that conflicts will emerge on the basis of civilizations in the near future. Additionally, Islam was rapidly spreading in the Western world and they felt a danger for their religious, cultural, political and economic values, so they were finding an excuse to invade Muslim states.

Islamophobia in the West mainly spread after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre (WTC). Prior to this, various terrorist activities were being happened in the different parts of the world through different terrorist groups, but incident of 9/11 was given with extra publicity and Western media very cleverly set stage for invading Muslim countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya etc on the name of “War for Safety against Violence”. They spread anti-Muslims sentiments through movies, (Fitna, Obsession, and Innocence of Islam, Body of Lies), cartoons, leaflets, official statements etc

Western used different mediums of propaganda to deteriorate image of Muslims and Islam. They presented different terrorist activities, atrocities and damage by magnifying and glorifying in front of the masses to ensure them that all of this is being done by radical Islamists organization, and all of the involved terrorist actors with beard and veils are Muslims. They try to show that Islam taught and allow such kind of killings and Islam is a religion of violence, aggression and intolerance for non-believers of Islam. Thus, it is necessary to fight against such violent and cruel civilization. As most of the Western public is unaware of the proper teachings of Islam thus, following the 9/11 attack, Western countries got chance to start state violence against innocent Muslim people. There are a number of Western organizations, individuals and



media channels which are being projected Muslims and Islam in the way, they want. Western countries have a significant role in intra-state and inter-state conflicts among Muslim states. They do not want stability and peace in the Muslim world to fulfill their own interests i.e. to sell their arms, to enhance their power and resources and to weaken the Muslim community and to spoil the image of Islam.

In Short, Western Nations have very smartly arranged a ground (War against Terrorists i.e. Al-Qaeda, Taliban, ISIS etc) in favor of their own interests, therefore, Muslim world should have to join hand against their mission. All of Muslim countries should jointly take steps to project and propagate true thoughts of Islam in front of the whole world. Moreover, Muslims should try to become true Muslim by practicing the real teachings of Islam as well. Muslim countries have to prepare campaigns to fade up the negative image of Muslims and Islam from the minds of the non-Muslims. As Europeans are using media as a tool to spread anti-Muslim sentiments, likewise, Muslim would have to adapt counter measures in the same way. If Muslims do not take measures to counter Islamophobia thus in future, they will have to confront with severe consequences.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/10/18/a-smart-devastated-propaganda-of-the-west/>



Kunduz: a Political and Strategic Failure

Nasurullah Brohi

The recent siege and takeover of Kunduz from Afghan forces showed a political victory over the Afghans and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF); in fact, it was seen as an indication of strategic failure on their part though it happened in a period of less than one year of the drawdown of US troops and allies' forces. Most alarming is the fact that only 500 Taliban fighters drove over 7,000 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) out of Kunduz in a very short period time — less than a day — without any sturdy resistance. This, in a broader spectrum, raises questions about the success of the US and Afghan forces in the coming future. Many analysts believe that the fall of Kunduz has unveiled many lies about the promises of delivering stability, security and an inclusive peace process.

This takeover also proves that the Taliban are still highly effervescent and that they can easily capture many other major cities. The northern province of Kunduz has always remained a stronghold of the Afghan Taliban. The Kunduz incident dramatically erupted at a time when US military strategists were exploring a variety of options about keeping troop presence beyond the withdrawal deadline of 2016. However, Afghan security officials claim that the Taliban insurgents have been pushed forward and that parts of Kunduz city have been cleared. The northern Kunduz police Chief Quasim Jangal Bagh claimed that the clearing operations were still underway and that the Taliban were being pushed forward to the Takhar-Kunduz highway and the Dasht-e-Archi district of Kunduz.

The vice president of Afghanistan, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, also claimed that the government was aware of the plans of the Taliban to attack Kunduz, Faryab, Helmand and Kunar provinces; he further claimed that the people in these areas should not think that the government was careless and that obviously it is ready to prevent any further penetration in other areas in the coming future. During his recent visit to Russia, General Dostum emphasised that Russia should help by providing military equipment such as attack helicopters, long-range mortars and other latest weaponry to the Afghan security forces in order to counter Islamic State (IS) and Taliban militants.



Previously, Taliban insurgents assaulted a prison in Ghazni province and released more than 350 most wanted Taliban insurgents and commanders, and as a consequence further aggravated the situation, bringing serious concerns about the prevalent security situation in the country. For some reasons, the partial failure of the Afghan strategy is also because of the US and its allies who had been largely relying on their alignments with corrupt warlords, drug lords and corrupt politicians whereas the current unity government under President Ashraf Ghani is still divided on many issues.

The matter of peace in Afghanistan in the near future seems obscure because of the breakdown in the peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government, the Taliban demands of a complete withdrawal and the revoking of all military and security accords with the foreign troops in Afghanistan. The other side of speculation is also based on the hypothesis that the US and its allies are not all that serious about the complete withdrawal of ISAF forces and, therefore, the 'dragging on' policy will hardly bring complete peace to Afghanistan. Most importantly, the Afghan government and the Taliban have been engaged in a process of peace talks this summer and another round of talks under the mediation of Pakistan was also expected whereby it was strongly believed that the two sides would reach a consensus about a ceasefire and develop confidence building measures (CBMs). Unluckily, the process was also halted with the revelation of the news of the death of Taliban leader Mullah Omer and consequently the leadership crisis among the Afghan Taliban. It is worthwhile to note here that a delayed peace process between the two parties will further fuel the ongoing tension in the country and, of course, will encourage some other militant groups to make their place in the country. As an immediate neighbour, for Pakistan it is also the need of the hour to play an effective role to revive the stalled peace process.

<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/22-Oct-2015/kunduz-a-political-and-strategic-failure>



Post-Kunduz Afghanistan's Security Situation

Dr. M Sheharyar Khan*

For the first time ever since their fall in 2001, Taliban recaptured the strategically important Kunduz city on September 28, and held it for two weeks before the governments troops with the help of US special operations forces could recapture it. The fall and recapture of Kunduz was unprecedented as the Taliban insurgents had never been involved in urban warfare with the government forces before. The reasons and significance of the brazen attack and sudden fall of Kunduz need thorough explanation.

The fall of Kunduz was hardly surprising given that Taliban had already made inroads into the north. They had earlier made push against Kunduz last year but were repulsed. This time around Taliban had already consolidated their position in three different directions of Kunduz. Before their attack on Kunduz, Taliban had already ruling the adjoining districts of Chahrdara and Dastht-e-Archi. They had also made their way into the remaining eastern district of Khanabad. Taliban attacked Kunduz from all these three directions.

The reasons of Taliban making their way into these districts are the failure of security and governance in these regions. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) had little footprint in the districts except for district centers and establishing check posts on highways. The local security is handled by different militias who are mired in their own turf games, and manhandling of locals. Locals are heavily taxed by these different militias. The government too has done little to deliver services and provide good governance. The result is the increasing dissatisfaction of locals with the national government. Taliban could easily find sympathizers there too given the fact that these areas have sizeable Pashtun population with pockets of support for Taliban.

Soon after the fall of Kunduz the US president Obama announced that the US residual troops will stay in Afghan beyond 2016 in support of ANDSF. Given the rapid resurgence of Taliban and inability of Afghan government to fill the void left by NATO/ISAF and the failure of Afghan government to deliver good governance, it can be predicted that the longevity of US troops stay will not solve the deep problems. This minor contingent of the US troops would not be able to change the security equation in a big way. They will depend on the performance of ANDSF.

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The fall and recapture of Kunduz highlight the fast emerging security situation of Afghanistan. The successful takeover of Kunduz consolidated the new Amir of Taliban Mullah Akhtar Monsur and diluted the rift that emerged after the announcement of the death of Mullah Omar. It's symbolic significance could be seen as the strengthening of Mullah Mansur hold on Taliban. This emboldens Taliban to expedite their offensive. Taliban are now eyeing victory and want to salvage the situation into better bargaining position if there are peace talks. For Western alliance, this bodes a predicament. After 15 years of investing in Afghanistan, they are back to square one.

Afghan government, on the other hand, seems bogged down in power wrangling of unity government between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah. While Pakistan, is watching the situation with caution. It seems to be the only actor which recognizes the importance of Taliban as political reality and lobbies for inclusivist policy in any future political dispensation in Afghanistan.



Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Recessed Deterrence or Ready Response

Adeel Mukhtar Mirza

Dynamics of nuclear deterrence in South Asia have always been very complex. On the one hand, Deterrence aims to persuade the enemy not to initiate any aggressive action; otherwise punitive actions would be taken without any hesitation. Recessed deterrence, however, prohibits the mating of warheads from delivery systems. Mainly the form of deterrence a country possesses depends upon its threat perception or foundational rationale for the development of a weapon. Therefore, before discussing Pakistan nuclear posture it is also imperative to know the reason for the pursuit of these weapons by both states.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, its nuclear weapons were developed only to avoid Indian nuclear blackmail or aggression in case of any future conflict. For India, however, nuclear weapons have also been the currency of power other than its security needs.

According to Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema in his book, *“Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its Evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security,”* the central edifice of Indian foreign and security politics was the primacy of Indian national interests. Similarly, he further explains, “India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, economic development, industrial progress, and adequate military strength *for a great power role* were the primary objective of these policies.” Contrarily, according to Hasan-Askari Rizvi in his article, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Testing,”

Pakistan had to cope with notable geographic and security handicaps, a weak military and civilian industrial base, and resource constraints. For Pakistan, the nuclear weapons were the only source for compensating India’s conventional superiority, maintaining strategic equilibrium in the region and neutralizing Indian nuclear blackmail.

Keeping in view the historic enmity with India and considering it as need of the hour, Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold to become a declared nuclear weapon state on 28 May 1998 after it detonated five nuclear devices in the Ras Koh Hills in Chagai, Balochistan. Although, Pakistan’s decision-making elites were satisfied with nuclear ambiguity and had no interest to become an overt nuclear power but Indian nuclear explosion forced Pakistan to enter herself into the domino effect. As a result, strategic equilibrium prevailed.



Soon after overt nuclearization, Pakistan followed a policy of minimum deterrence. National Defence University Pakistan Professor Dr. Zafar Khan in his book, *“Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy: A minimum credible deterrence,”* published by Routledge provides an in-depth analysis of the evolution of Pakistan’s post-1998 nuclear policy and the rationale for the shift from minimum deterrence to minimum credible deterrence. According to him, *the Pakistani concept of minimum deterrence includes that it would not indulge in an acute arms competition; it would not respond to its adversary’s weapon-to-weapon tests; it would upgrade and maintain the credibility of deterrence forces; and these weapons are security oriented and not for fighting purposes.* Nonetheless, Pakistan retains a defensive approach to its nuclear weapons use, but rejects New Delhi’s offer of a No First Use (NFU) owing to conventionally weak position in comparison to India. Later on, Pakistan shifted its policy of minimum deterrence to Minimum Credible Deterrence (MCD) and subsequently Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD).

In a similar vein, Pakistan remained successful in responding to India’s quantitative and qualitative arms buildup and Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) with qualitative buildup of its military might in the shape of NASR and FM 90 missile system. Therefore, Pakistan’s retains a defensive approach to its nuclear weapons first-use and rejects New Delhi’s offer of a No First Use (NFU) owing to conventionally weak position in comparison to India.

Now coming to the main point, in a joint article, *“A Normal Nuclear Pakistan,”* by Toby Dalton and Michael Krepon, it is demanded that Pakistan to be able to become a mainstream normal nuclear state should commit to recessed deterrence posture and limit production of short-range delivery vehicles and tactical weapons. Recessed deterrence, from definitional point of view, prohibits mating of nuclear weapons with delivery vehicles and allows a very low level of readiness.

Recessed deterrence or non-weaponized deterrence is two decades old policy option that is not rational to be adopted in current strategic environment by Pakistan. In other words, why the West think that Pakistan is not a mainstream nuclear state? Pakistan has the best non-proliferation record. Its nuclear reactors have proved the safest through their performance. Its relations with nuclear states like China and Russia etc are even better than USA. In fact, Pakistan’s demand of incorporating her into Non-proliferation regime and export control cartels is based on its non-proliferation records, not on the desperate needs of uranium like that of India. Putting simply, Pakistan cannot admit Western demands even if it is offered civil nuclear cooperation as so-called ‘Brackets’ would surely in one way or another disturb strategic equilibrium of the region and consequently make Pakistan’s national security vulnerable. Therefore, Pakistan should have a ready-response nuclear policy, if not yet has one as



propagated by the most, to deter India and avoid its possible future adventurism. In this vein, last but not the least, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's visit to Washington holds much importance as Pakistan's position in this regard should be presented with strong inertia.

<http://epaper.pakobserver.net/201510/22/comments-1.php>



Global Fissile Material Stockpiles Lime Lighting South Asia

Beenish Altaf

To ascribe a ballpark figure to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear inventories has become a matter of predicament since the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests. Especially stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated weapons-grade plutonium of both countries are under apprehension since then. Fissile materials are the key ingredients to formulate a nuclear weapon. Access to these estimates provides a direct indication of countries' nuclear stockpiles along with their capability of developing nuclear warheads. Therefore, the matter is always maintained as highly classified.

Stockpiles of both civil and military fissile materials have to be taken into account. The International Panel on Fissile Material has been compiling information regularly largely on global stocks of fissile materials. According to SIPRI, global stocks as of 2014 include highly enriched uranium at 1,345 tonnes, wherein the separated plutonium divided into military stocks and civilian stocks separately are 223 and 270 tonnes, respectively.

Generally, discussing materials that can sustain an explosive fission chain reaction are essential for all types of nuclear explosives, from first-generation fission weapons to advanced thermonuclear weapons. As already narrated, the most familiar of these fissile materials are HEU and plutonium. For that reason, the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China have produced both plutonium and HEU in order to fulfill their nuclear weapons demands.

Contrary to de facto nuclear powers, Pakistan has been using HEU mainly for its nuclear program whereas India, North Korea, and Israel have been relying mainly on plutonium for their nuclear programs. As a matter of fact, all the states pursuing civil nuclear industry have minimal capabilities (owing to their enrichment and reprocessing plants) to divert fissile material for military purpose or its weapons-graded programs. But India for instance, already has large amounts of reactor grade plutonium, enough to manufacture up to 350 plutonium-based warheads (as of 2010).

Besides, the reactors granted to India in the India–U.S. nuclear deal support more than just its civil nuclear industry. Few of these are said to be under safeguards, but the rest of the ones that are already in operational condition are questionable. This is in view of the fact that India has been asked to halt the production of fissile material for its weapons development program by working mutually with the United States to the conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). This was



a pre-requisite condition in the India – U.S. nuclear deal, but regrettably the condition was unable to be met. So it could be inferred that India would employ the fissile material obtained from its already installed reactors for military purposes, which are not under safeguards. Also according to calculations by the RAND Corporation, “commercial reprocessing operations in France, Britain, Japan, and India are separating about 25,000 kg of plutonium per year from spent power reactor fuel.” Further, this would ultimately be a proliferation concern as it could give birth to the vertical proliferation and up-gradation of weapons.

Today, India is the world’s largest arms importer. According to *The Express Tribune*, “the Indian defense budget is set to hit a record high of \$40bn, whereas Pakistan’s budget is just \$6.002bn.” Between 2005-2009 and 2010-14, India’s imports increased by 140 percent. In 2010-14 according to SIPRI, India’s imports were three times larger than those of either of its regional rivals – China and Pakistan. Although it is unaffordable for Pakistan to erect sufficiency level with Indian conventional capabilities, the endeavor is just to maintain an equilibrium vis-à-vis the central dilemma with Pakistan’s deterrence posture that does not allow it to halt expansion. Ironically, if a state knows the limit of its threshold, only then can it halt the expansion of its nuclear arsenals or more precisely, beyond which a state does not need to expand its nuclear arsenal. Consequently, it is Pakistan’s response to India’s major arms build-up and expansion and modernization of its capabilities, both qualitatively and quantitatively. It is necessary to clarify the misconception regarding Pakistan’s position amongst the other nuclear states. Pakistan’s former ambassador to the UN, Munir Akram, very appropriately said, “Pakistan is not the fastest growing nuclear arsenal. In fact, with the revival of their Cold War post the Ukraine crisis, the United States and Russia have deployed the largest number of additional nuclear weapons last year.”

Pakistan has approximately 120 nuclear warheads – HEU for 100 and plutonium for 20 warheads. India has approximately 110, with weapons grade plutonium for more than 100. India’s HEU stock is believed to be for naval purposes. New Delhi has approximately 520 kilograms of plutonium available for nuclear weapons – enough for 100 to 130 warheads – and up to another 11.5 metric tons of reactor grade plutonium in spent fuel, which could be reprocessed for developing bombs. In regard to HEU, Pakistan and India has 2.7-3.0 and 2.4 metric tons, respectively. Also, the India – U.S. nuclear deal is of great benefit to India, since it has mammoth capacity to produce uranium that could be used for military purposes.

Akin, Kazakhstan signed a similar sort of nuclear accord with India recently that aims at supplying 5,000 tonnes of uranium over the next five years to India. Similar cooperation has been carried out with Japan, Australia, and Canada too. Hence, all of these nuclear deals show India’s



eagemess of uranium acquirement. Accordingly, military fissile material production capabilities would nurture vertically, increasing global stockpiles of fissile material.

<http://southasianvoices.org/global-fissile-material-stockpiles-limelighting-south-asia/>



Pak-US Security Chess: Carrots and Brackets

Maimuna Ashraf

Notwithstanding several official clarifications, curiosity continues. The repeated rejections that no deal would come out of Sharif's visit to Washington have flaunted a certain impression. Albeit, it was already being expected that any deal would not be likely to come to fruition during Sharif's visit and the post-dialogue preliminary reports also avowed that US officials had denied the news of negotiations with Pakistan on a civil nuclear deal akin to the one given to the Indians. Yet, it is projected by nuclear experts that dialogue may have ended up on the issue of the deal. Peter R Lavoy, a long-time intelligence expert on the Pakistani nuclear programme and currently serving in the US National Security Council, had opined that "a deal like the one that is being discussed publicly is not something that is likely to come to fruition next week and I anticipate that dialogue would include conversations between the leaders of the two countries."

The revelation about the possibility of a civil nuclear accord with Pakistan being explored by the US came to light following a recent article by David Ignatius. The undiplomatic narrative by Ignatius disclosed that the "deal offered by Obama's administration limit the scope of Pakistan's nuclear programme in return for civil nuclear cooperation and an entry into the NSG that regulates global trade." These trends nullify the apprehensions that Sharif went to beg for a civil nuclear deal because if the deal were negotiated then it was offered and not demanded. Moreover, such a scenario also represents US recognition of Pakistan's nuclear arsenals being safe. Reportedly, US officials have told Congress they are increasingly convinced that most of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is under good safeguard, with warheads separated from delivery vehicles and a series of measures in place to guard against unauthorized use.

Conversely, even if the deal has not been negotiated, the context of few recent developments including this visit shows significant shifts in policies. After the Indo-US nuclear deal, Pakistan sought a civil nuclear deal as well. Nonetheless, following the recent reports about mainstreaming Pakistan in the global nuclear order after accepting 'brackets' on its nuclear programme, the policymaking body of Pakistan's strategic programme, the National Command Authority (NCA), explicitly rejected 'brackets' by reiterating the "national resolve to maintain full spectrum deterrence capability". A Pakistani official was also quoted saying "We want a nuclear deal and are candidates for NSG membership but there is no desperation for this." If this is the first time the US has seriously made a move to discuss Pakistan's nuclear



programme, Pakistan's confidence is also for the first time apparent in refusing any deal that is not as suitable as the one offered to India.

This shift on both sides is connected with several shifts in the international security order. The probable strongholds of Islamic State (IS) in western Asia and Afghanistan has yet again underlined a reason for the US to uphold stable relations with Pakistan viewing its strategic significance in the region. On the other hand, Russia's renaissance in the west-Asian landscape, from Ukraine to Syria, has exhibited serious challenges for the US. In addition, the multi-billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has evidently enhanced the geostrategic importance of the region and has forced the US not to let China become the dominant strategic player in the region. Possibly, the Obama administration may also want to offer a deal to score another diplomatic blockbuster after the Iranian nuclear deal.

Apart from the above mentioned diplomatic and security pressures, the timing about the deal's revelation, just before Sharif's visit, is also interesting. As said by a US senior official, "the idea is to try to change the dynamic, see if helping them on the NSG would be a carrot for them to act in this other area". As the comprehensive agenda discussed during the visit predominantly demanded cooperation in counter-terrorism, such an offer could be an effort to relate strategic weapons with terrorism.

Pragmatically, a civil nuclear deal offered to Pakistan would bring the US to a crossroads. A senior Indian critic on the potential US-Pak deal said "it will show how hollow is the strategic relationship between India and the US, and why it would not be wise to trust the U.S. The India-US nuclear deal will be eroded of much of its strategic importance bilaterally as a result." Henry Sokolski, the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre said: "When it comes to things nuclear, the prospects for getting Pakistan to do something are pretty slim because you cannot expect them to do something unless we are willing to treat them identically with India." Accordingly, Pakistan will not and should not accept limits on its nuclear programme because India is purchasing nuclear technology under the Indo-US nuclear deal without limiting its nuclear programme. Pakistan is already engaged with China on civil nuclear cooperation and steadily improving its relations with Russia. Evidently, in the transforming geostrategic landscape, the carrot to mainstream a nuclear Pakistan in the international order is a 'need' misunderstood by the US.

<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/E-Paper/Lahore/2015-10-27/page-7/detail-0>



Pakistan's Shift from Deterrence to Credible Minimum Deterrence

Adeel Mukhtar Mirza

Deterrence is defined or explained differently by the states keeping their own personal nature of threat or policies to counter certain coercion.

Keeping in mind the Pakistan's perspective, it had two choices while designing its nuclear deterrence, 'one was the war denying deterrence and the second is the nuclear war fighting deterrence.' Both choices had a different pattern of implications including developmental strategies. War denying deterrence required minimum number of weapons while war-fighting deterrence needed large number of nuclear arsenals, variety of delivery means and missile defense programs etc. Pakistan's economy and strategic interests allow only the pursuit of war denying deterrence.

That is why Pakistan does not believe the need of nuclear parity and is just seeking to maintain a deterrent equilibrium. Pragmatically, if one state has to go for a war fighting nuclear doctrine then it is desirable for that state to opt for nuclear parity from its adversary but if the purpose is only to serve the deterrence then it is better to seek a balanced deterrent posture. Resultantly, Pakistan principally decided to adopt the option of 'Credible Minimum Deterrence'.

Rodney W. Jones, an expert on the subject defined minimum deterrence as the term minimum rapidly became a fixture of the public nuclear discourse in South Asia. Neither India nor Pakistan officially clarified what the term minimum means leaving this open to speculations. Does minimum imply the sufficiency of small numbers of nuclear weapons; Nuclear weapons held in reserve; low reading or alert rates of a nuclear force; renunciation of nuclear war fighting or mainly counter-value targeting? Or does the minimum merely make a virtue of today's facts of life in the subcontinent – limited resources, scarce weapons material, unproved delivery systems, and still undeveloped technical military capabilities?

The then Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, spoke at the ISSI seminar about the matter of Minimum Deterrence taken by Pakistan is, largely seen as a dynamic concept. He said "Minimum cannot be quantified in static numbers. The Indian build up would necessitate review and reassessment....but we shall not engage in any nuclear competition or arms race." Whereas, since Pakistan is a minor nuclear weapon state of the second atomic age, the term



minimum is only used to signal or to send a satisfactory message to the international community and also that depending on smaller nuclear weapons that are comparably be better managed in terms of deployment, maintenance, command and control systems etc. Certainly the minimum minimizes the dangers of inadvertence and misuse of nuclear weapons. The term Minimum also mollifies the proliferation concerns of the international community.

Whereas, Credibility has been added in order to add ambiguity, may be to have a psychological comfort or to leave room for modernizing the weaponry inventories. Paradoxically narrating, policy-makers in Pakistan feel convinced that this ambiguity serves deterrence well. Credible would in such circumstances help keep a psychological check on the adversary. Also, it would provide the protagonist an additional cushion of comfort as viewed by Ms. Sadia Tasleem in her write-up titled “Towards an Indo-Pak Nuclear Lexicon – II: Credible Minimum Deterrence”. The emphasis on the word ‘credible’ was meant to reinforce the importance of credibility. It does not suggest a shift from Minimum Deterrence.

Nevertheless, posture of Credible Minimum Deterrence has remained a principle option of Pakistan’s nuclear policy. This principle is based on the concept that Pakistan’s nuclear policy is driven by its perceived threat to its security from India and is therefore India centric. This is also a fact that with the introduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the region is actually a modernized advancement in the inventories. Therefore, it could be concluded that it is only when states feel threatened they opt for defending their territory and sovereignty that actually compels them to maximize and enrich their security measures under the perceived threat of vulnerability. Hence, it would not be in correct to conclude that credible minimum deterrence is something different then nuclear parity and nuclear supremacy.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/10/30/pakistans-shift-from-deterrence-to-credible-minimum-deterrence/>



Future of Nuclear Energy in Pakistan

Shahzadi Tooba

Over the years, fuel prices of fossil fuel (oil, gas and coal) have raised significantly and Pakistan is one of the affectee of this rising/inflated fuel prices at international level. As thermal power is providing a major chunk of power in Pakistan, so once the international prices of fuel are increased, the cost of power is also increased.

One of the latent sources of energy in Pakistan is its hydro potential. It is estimated that its latent source of energy—hydro—can produce 60,000 MW of power every year if properly explored. However, for last 15 years, only 1,890 MW of power is being produced from this vast source of energy. Besides the advantages of this source, there are inbuilt discrepancies in building new hydro projects. Most of the potential is located in mountainous region, away from load centers. Therefore, it will cost heavily (high investment cost and losses in electricity transmission) for the transmission of power the generation plants. Similarly, one the biggest challenge in building new dams for power generation is socio-political issues i.e. water allocations among the provinces, resettlement of people and heavy project investment. Most likely impact of building new hydro projects is in the form of climate change. Climate change through building new hydro projects could be the alteration of seasonal flow in Indus River System, increase flow in the rivers for a few decades which could cause decline in the flow leading to serious impacts on hydro power production.

Pakistan has significant reservoirs of oil, gas, and coal. The following table shows the amount of power which can be produced through these proven reserves sources of energy in Pakistan. It is also estimated that Pakistan is stated to have potential of shale oil (9 Billion Barrels and shale gas resources. However, these resources are not yet reassessed and discovered.

Fuel Unit	Proven Reserves
Oil, Million Barrels	3,421
Gas, Trillion Cubic Feet	2,714



Fuel Unit	Proven Reserves
Coal (Proven reserves), Billion Tons	432
Total resource	1,861,750
Hydro Megawatt	54,000,543

Currently, thermal power (oil and gas) is contributing a chief amount of power in the overall energy mix graphs of generation in Pakistan. Although, Pakistan has significant reservoirs of oil and gas which are still to be uncapped, but right now power generation in Pakistan is mostly from imported oil. The country meets its more than 82 percent of oil requirements through imports. Oil based generation has increased to 35 percent leading to increased cost of electricity generation mix. It has also increase government subsidies, as a result the balance of payments (Circular debt) are becoming worst due to oil imports.

The demand and supply gap could increase by 17 billion cubic feet per day by 2030. However, the import options from Iran (Iran-Pakistan Project IP) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project (TAPI) are consideration projects to meet the future demand of power in Pakistan.

Pakistan has considerable coal reservoirs, which can be exploited to power generation. At Thar (Sind) 95 percent of coal resources are located. Current resource classification of Thar field is total 186 billion tones.

Several projects on imported coal are in planning stage. However, these reservoirs are of lower quality. Thar coal is lignite with more than 40% moisture. Power plants at mine mouth because of high moisture and low energy contents, resulting in large investment on electricity transmission. One of the adverse effects of energy production through coal is its impact on global climate change. Pakistan stands in the list of those countries that contributing least amount of Green House Gases (GHG) internationally, and Pakistan is producing least amount of energy from coal. However, in future the countries which are utilizing coal from energy production are more focusing on the alternative of the fossil fuel (Coal), as it produces more CO₂, which is causing climate change effects (Global Warming).



Theoretically, speaking the potential of wind energy to produce power is approximately 100,000 MW and its capacity factor is approximately 23-28 percent. In this regard, some of the projects are completed e.g. FFC energy limited (49.5) has been completed. Similarly, the installation of wind fans project (56 MW) at Jhimpir is near completion. Three other projects of 50 MW each are also under construction.

Likewise, solar energy potential in Pakistan is high, but Research and Development (R & D) in this regard needs further explorations. Punjab government has signed an agreement with Canadian solar company to set up a 500 MW project at Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park in Cholistan. Besides the advantages of alternative sources of energy, wind and solar are energy saver not capacity saver.

Nuclear contribute 700 MWs to the overall electricity generation in Pakistan. Currently, Pakistan has three operational nuclear power plants, KANUPP-1, CHASMA-1 and CHASMA-2, which are the main contributor to the national grid. Independent Power Plants (IPPs) are producing 37.9 percent of electricity in Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) is only contributing 3.2 percent of electricity in the overall power production in Pakistan. So, the question arises here is whether Pakistan has the potential to explore the nuclear energy to end its unending power crisis?

Right now, Pakistan is building its fifth nuclear power plants KANUPP-2 (1100 MW) at Karachi. Pakistan has also completed the construction work of CHASMA-3 (C-3) and CHASMA-4 (C-4), which will start pouring 655 MW of electricity into the national grid till 2016.

Power Plant	Capacity (MW)	Year of Commissioning
KANUPP-1	137/100	1972
CHASMA-1	325	2000
CHASMA-2	325	2011
Power Plant	Capacity (MW)	Year of Commissioning



Power Plant	Capacity (MW)	Year of Commissioning
KANUPP-2	1100	-
CHASMA-3	325	2016
CHASMA-4	325	2017

Nuclear Vision 2050 envisages greater than 40,000 MW nuclear power by 2050 or about 15% of the projected capacity of the country.

Currently, energy demand in Pakistan during summers is 18000 MW and supply of power is 13000 MW, which cause 5000 MW of gap in the demand-supply chain. It is estimated that in next 10 years the demand will grow exponentially making the current demand to twice of present level. The existing installed capacity is 21000 MW which includes thermal, hydro, and nuclear capacities. Here, nuclear option can be best employed to meet the future challenges of demand in Pakistan. Nuclear power plant development in next 17 years can produce 7370 MW of energy and the expansion of nuclear power plants till 2030 will enable the country to raise nuclear power level from 750 to 8,800 MW.

Pakistan is long being denied by its legitimate right of acquiring nuclear technologies to expand its civil nuclear program. China has cooperated with Pakistan to construct nuclear plants in Pakistan. Pakistan is facing discriminatory standards at international level to have civil nuclear technologies. On other hand, India is being benefited by Indo-US nuclear deal through 123 nuclear agreements at various levels e.g. a special waiver was given to India to enter into Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and country specific International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

Moreover an American think tank, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has released its comparative nuclear security indexation encompassing worldwide nuclear material security. This study has assessed Pakistan as the 'most improved' country among nine nuclear armed states. The white house has acknowledged in the way like "Pakistan is engaged with the international community on nuclear safety and security issues and is working to ensure its strategic export controls are in line with international standards."



Although, no one can deny the fact, other sources of energy are also reliable and existing power infrastructure is most based on hydro and thermal power generation, but expansion in the existing nuclear infrastructure can bolster and foster its aims to end the power crisis. Right now, to end the energy crisis in Pakistan seems to be not plausible, but the future investment on nuclear infrastructure can reduce the power crisis.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/10/30/future-of-nuclear-energy-in-pakistan/>



Pakistan: Why Full Spectrum Deterrence?

Maimuna Ashraf

Since its inception, one after another, Pakistan's nuclear programme has always been entangled in a new proposal contrived by US. First it was 'roll back', then 'revised highly enriched uranium (HEU)', and now 'normalizing' its nuclear programme. Pragmatically, the term 'Normal Nuclear' sounds paradoxical, understandable in lexical term yet lack a profound stipulative and chiefly a theoretical definition. Consequently, the status of 'Normal Nuclear State' is 'codified' rather than 'conditionally allotted'. Lately, this modish term being found associated with Pakistan after a new report "A Normal Nuclear Pakistan" appeared, co-authored by Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton of Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment, simultaneously. Although, this recent outrage to make not-that-normal nuclear Pakistan a Normal Nuclear-State by the Normal-Nuclear-Club is not preliminary. Almost a year back, Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, proposed a 'conditional' layout to treat Pakistan as a normal nuclear country. Albeit the conditions offered by Fitzpatrick were not much dissimilar to those recently articulated by two authors but he was rather mild in this approach, with an acceptance that Pakistan has had enough paid a price of past and advocated to treat Pakistan similar to India.

Fitzpatrick more likely suggested Pakistan the same five broad initiatives, offered by the authors of newly emerged report, which includes a shift from full spectrum to strategic deterrence, limit production of short-range warheads, lift veto on Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations, separate civilian and military facilities and sign Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is asserted in report that if Pakistan agrees to accept these suggestions it will be treated like a responsible and normal nuclear weapon state. It may sound logical to many that in return to few demands Pakistan will achieve the status of 'normal state' but does the acceptance of these recommendations advances Pakistan's nuclear security? Would it reinforce Pakistan's deterrence posture against India? How would it affect the deterrence equilibrium in South Asia? So should Pakistan agree to this proposal to bargain a status of normality?

The most recent idea to normalize nuclear Pakistan in international nuclear order, after restricting its nuclear program to weapons and delivery systems, came into limelight more resiliently in the recent article of David Ignatius. This was followed by the statement of Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Pakistan's nuclear policy is shaped by evolving security dynamics of South Asia, growing conventional asymmetry, provocative doctrines and aggressive posturing by India, which obliges us to take all necessary measures to maintain a full spectrum deterrence capability in order to safeguard our national security, maintain strategic stability and deter any kind of aggression from India,".



What is full spectrum deterrence and why is Pakistan reiterating the national resolve to maintain the full spectrum deterrence? In 1998, when Pakistan detonated its nuclear weapon in response to the India's nuclear weapon explosions, it declared to retain its capability as minimum credible deterrence to avert security threats from eastern neighbor. This posture adhered that Pakistan would not use its nuclear weapon unless the opponent crosses Pakistan's nuclear thresholds. Conversely, after 2001 Indian parliament attack, Indian Military Command developed an offensive military strategy, 'Cold Start Doctrine', in 2004 to replace the outdated 'Sundarji Doctrine'. Although the complete doctrine is classified but the declassified concept is to reconstitute the existing three Indian army's strike corps into eight integrated battle groups that could be deployed quickly to strike the narrow pieces of Pakistan's territory through limited incursion in response to a terrorism event in Pakistan involving Pakistan. The doctrine was designed on assumption that Pakistan would not resort to the use of nuclear weapon in response the limited incursion that does not cross its nuclear threshold.

Pakistani nuclear establishment thus argue that CSD would provide India the space for conventional or limited conflict in nuclearized region. Thus for an appropriate reactionary response to CSD that excludes massive nuclear retaliation, Pakistan developed the low-yield, short range, tactical battlefield 'Nasr nuclear missiles'. These tactical nuclear weapons were part of Pakistan's full spectrum deterrence, which provides a qualitative response to conventional threats and asymmetry perceived by India. Moreover it offers range of options as Pakistan will not be forced to retaliate with strategic nuclear weapon as first response to conventional force.

Additionally, the assertion to adhere a shift from full spectrum deterrence to strategic deterrence is thick because it is significant to understand how Pakistan defines its strategic deterrence. Pakistan's deterrence is dynamic because Pakistan perceives deterrence strengthen if it forcefully deters India. It implies that Pakistan will continue determining its nuclear deterrence requirements on the basis of Indian nuclear advancements or developments. As long as Pakistan sees the nuclear developments of its neighboring state destabilizing the region, it would continue responding them. Thus Pakistan is maintaining the deterrence which is minimum credible yet full spectrum to deter all forms of aggression. Consequently "it is confusing to separate full spectrum and strategic deterrence. The idea is probably to separate counter value and counter force but a deterrence that starts to fail even tactically will quickly fail strategically." Therefore it is wrong to say that Pakistan and India are engaged in a traditional arms race, where two actors try to outpace each other. In case of Pakistan, we appear rather to be engaged in a nuclear competition to maintain strategic stability and deter all form of aggression.

<http://www.sguardian.org/2015/10/why-full-spectrum-deterrence/>



Nuclear Exports and Discriminatory Approaches

Beenish Altaf

The South Asian Nuclear security situation is different from that in other regions of the world. The credibility of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is under severe scrutiny. Nuclear non-proliferation is an integrated network of treaties and other standard-setting arrangements that provide a comprehensive framework for the behaviour of states, international organisations and other actors in the nuclear power realm. This brief illumination on the subject gives a comprehensive understanding of what the nuclear non-proliferation regime has to do with the situation on the ground. In this sphere, efforts to bring India to the forefront as a member nuclear supplier state simply distorts the image and meaning of all the standards put in place.

The materialisation of the Indo-US nuclear deal posed stern questions for the non-proliferation regime and nuclear trade worldwide. It managed to secure the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver without accepting the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In addition, the deal also excluded eight Indian nuclear reactors from the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) safeguards that are well suited for 1,250 kilograms plutonium upgrade for weapons purposes "which has the ability to produce 240 nuclear weapons a year". Consequently, this amplifies regional instability and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The US cannot in any terms call the step an advantage for the global non-proliferation regime.

Paradoxically speaking, the creators of the non-proliferation regime and its cartels have created room for nuclear mishandling within the group itself. Countries, namely the US, UK, Canada, France, Japan, West Germany and the Soviet Union got together to form the NSG in response to Indian diversion of plutonium from the Canadian-Indian reactor that was given for peaceful use. The NSG's objectives or purpose was to regulate nuclear commerce so that further diversions could not take place again since India used it for military purposes, which resulted in the Indian Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974.

Evidently, New Delhi is being pushed forward for the legal certification of the NSG's membership by the recognised NSG member states. France, Russia, the UK and US are now at the forefront towards making India a member of the NSG, facing resistance from China and a few other states. In this regard, the UK has said that India should be allowed to join the global body that controls atomic exports, even though it has refused to join the pact. The UK has stepped up many efforts to let India join an influential global body controlling nuclear exports.



Resultantly, this move will boost the country's standing as an atomic power in the international arena. The keepers of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime are persisting on embracing a non-NPT nuclear weapons state for nuclear commerce, hence being discriminatory towards the other South Asian non-NPT but nuclear weapons state (Pakistan) from obtaining the same status.

On one side, nations such as the US, UK, Japan and Russia are engaged in nuclear trade with India and on the other side they strongly oppose China's assistance to Pakistan in building nuclear power plants under the IAEA's umbrella. Such a discriminatory approach damages the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Even though Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state, it faces acute energy shortages and lacks the nuclear power infrastructure to produce satisfactory electricity. Therefore, its nuclear infrastructure needs substantial foreign assistance to increase nuclear power generation. If 'diversion fear' is the justification for not granting Pakistan the same technology — even if one accepts the excuse — how can the Indian intention, plan or motive be rationalised? With a history of civil to military diversion, how can India be trusted again? However, India does not fall into the standard criterion for NSG membership since it has a poor proliferation record with no interest in the international NPT.

This depicts a barefaced violation of nuclear non-proliferation norms and laws by the international community in general and the NSG in particular. It would not be wrong to analyse from the above that the move would lead other NPT states to withdraw from the NPT, keeping themselves legally authorised for civil technology as well as creating space for military diversions.

It is a fact that the US and western countries are trying to prop up India as a regional superpower. They look at it from the perspective of nuclear terrorism at the global level rather than it being India-specific, necessitated by the legitimate security concerns of Pakistan. If there had been any wisdom in their intentions, instead of coercing Pakistan to abandon its nuclear programme, the international community should have made efforts for the resolution of the disputes between India and Pakistan in conformity with the spirit of UN resolutions. Once the Kashmir issue is resolved, relations with India are normalised and India signs the NPT, Pakistan surely would have no hesitation in signing the NPT and removing its objections to the initiation of dialogue.



One-sided pressure tactics and arm-twisting will not help the cause. Pakistan is a sovereign and self-respecting country and will never ever take dictation from anyone in regards to its security.

<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/31-Oct-2015/nuclear-exports-and-discriminatory-approaches>



The Russian Intervention In Syria: The Beginning Of A New War

Nasurullah Brohi

The protests and the unrest of local groups against President Assad's regime since 2011 have created a frenzied situation and involved many militant groups to make their place in Syria. The unrest and then the consequent civil war in Syria encouraged many others to struggle for dominating the crisis ridden state. Ever since then, though massive crackdowns were carried out to curtail the rebels, but the situation has become even worse.

The Assad regime blames Western powers for their clandestine role in fuelling the chaotic situation of his country. Some analysts also strongly believe this is apparently a continuation of Western policy similar to the recent multi-regime revolutions in the Middle Eastern region. For instance a fleeting look over the fall of many recent regimes in Arab Spring like Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and many others depicts a parallel result where the long-standing regimes could not survive even through strong resistance against the will of the great powers.

The Arab Spring was partially different move than the Autumn of Nations of 1989 that swept through the Eastern Europe and almost the whole of the Second World but the Arab Spring was triggered through modern technological communication means and has been termed as social media or Facebook Revolution where the revolutionists gathered through the social media on a common agenda of ousting the long-standing and so-called democratic-dictatorships.

The armed groups have got significant momentum and strongholds in various parts of the Syria, particularly; the Al-Nusra Front with the support of Al-Qaeda is believed to be very strong in the northwestern part of the country. This complexity of the Syrian war has attracted the concerns of many powers in the civil war, predominantly from last two years the ISIL with the support of Jaysh Al-Jihad, Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade and many other small militant groups has significantly dominated the momentum and has become the strongest challenge to President Assad's regime.

Initially, President Assad relied upon partially unsuccessful tactics of using state military against these rebels, but a significant move was made through the composition of local



volunteer groups in 2014 known as National Defence Force of Syria mainly supported by the Hezbollah, Iran and Russia.

The war noticeably became further intricate after Turkey and Russia's direct engagements apparently pursuance of strategic goals for Syria. Similarly, through such moves there are likely chances of further involvements by many other Gulf countries that would of course fuel the conflict. It is also important to note here that since the fall of the Soviet Union, this is the first time when great powers have also come face to face to contain each other.

The direct involvement of Russia in the conflict since 30 September 2015 has created a sagacity of proxy war between the U.S and the Russia and as a consequence, there are likely chances that this proxy war may shortly transform into a pro-world war involving many other countries in Syria. The crisis is slowly drawing the sketch of Cold War era like situation when the Great Powers often came across certain circumstances where they only supported the proxies against each other in achieving their vested interests and repeatedly this containment was only possible by lending a hand of their allies but when it was felt their interests do not fulfil the required level of goals they never even avoided the direct involvements.

Besides, Russia is a front line supporter of President Assad's regime and has also blocked many serious Security Council resolutions against him, but apart from the political support, the direct involvement of Russia through military installations along Syria's Mediterranean coast and fierce aerial attacks against ISIL is believed to be an escalation towards a greater involvement of many other countries in this war.

Notably, the use of Turkish bases by the US forces and the limited roles of Canada, Turkey, Australia and France in the war, though at the moment seems symbolic, but it definitely demonstrates that the US is not only involved in the operation, but there are many others waiting for the right time and the war in Syria has now become a playground of many competing players. After Georgia and Ukraine, the West tries hard to contain the Russia in Syria through a proxy war that gradually increasing towards a new Cold War with their allies in a global confrontation.

<http://www.eurasiareview.com/01112015-the-russian-intervention-in-syria-the-the-beginning-of-a-new-war-oped/>