



VISION

VISIONARY INSIGHTS INTO THE STRATEGIC INQUESTS OF NATIONS

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Compiled by
Beenish Altaf

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)



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Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is an autonomous, multidisciplinary and non-partisan institution, established in January 2013. It is a non-governmental and non-commercial organization, administered by a Board of Governors (General Body) supervised under a Chairperson and administered by a Management Committee headed by a President/Executive Director.

SVI aims to project strategic foresight on issues of national and international import through dispassionate, impartial and independent research, analyses and studies. The current spotlight of the SVI is on the national security, regional and international peace and stability, strategic studies, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and strategic stability, nuclear safety and security and energy studies.

SVI Foresight

SVI Foresight is a monthly electronic journal. It has a multi-disciplinary perspective highlighting on the contemporary strategic and security studies. The issue is envisioned to be a collection of policy-oriented articles, written by its Research Associates, Visiting Faculty and professional experts. The idea is to provide the readership with a concise all-round and real-time discourse on contemporary strategic regional and international developments, highlighting their relevance to Pakistan.



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Editor's Note

The third electronic monthly issue of SVI Foresight brings with it another enlightening collection of opinion articles contributed by the SVI research team. The readers will find a rich mix of scholastic analysis on a wide range of topics. Keeping in mind the multidimensional implications of internal threats on the overall security dynamics of the state, the opinion articles have specifically been oriented towards internal security issues of Pakistan. State's governance policy loopholes and the resultant unrest as well as the recent positive turn of events in Baluchistan have been scrutinized along with the major developments taking place on the international front. The cost of confrontation and possibility of cooperation between China and the US, prospects of Afghan peace process, and a uniquely insightful debate pertaining to nuclear issues, can be found in this electronic monthly.

An overview of Indo-Pak nuclear installations in the backdrop of global nuclear order raises a significant question as to how can India ensure that its nuclear technology will only be utilized for civil purposes especially when the civil and military aspects in the Indian nuclear program are deeply interwoven and cannot be separated. A debate on a very contemporary issue related to nuclear normalcy in Pakistan can also be found in this volume along with an in-depth comparative analysis of South Asian and International discourse on changing nature of deterrence. The nuclear weapon inventories and how do they impact the global nuclear order has also been touched upon in this issue.

SVI has also taken another initiative where regular lectures exclusively by and for the In-house research team are being organized. The first session of this lecture series was held in September. This academic activity is purely aimed at enriching and broadening the understanding on various contemporary issues and to learn from each other through knowledge sharing and discussion process. The SVI Foresight also plans on providing its readers with the summary of the lectures on regular basis.

Once again the interested readers are encouraged to send in their article contributions and manuscripts for the future electronic publications. Any suggestions for further improvement are welcome at our [contact address](#). Please see [here](#) the copy of SVI Foresight electronic journal. You can find us on [Facebook](#) and can also access the SVI [website](#).



Syedah Sadia Kazmi

Senior Research Associate



1.Opinions

Got A Reason To Celebrate Defense Day?

Maimuna Ashraf

As the Defense Day was approaching, many outrageous accounts appeared, struggling to reveal a novel version that has not been presented before. Since 1965, a lot number of contradictory narratives have been told about the war, which baffles an ordinary individual to decide about the rational or prejudiced version of the war tale.

The reason is that all of us have been taught and told the splendid victory and outstanding performance of Pakistan in the war. But on the other hand, many skeptics call it an exaggerated tale and declare that it was actually a pinprick to arouse the slumber.

According to various dynamic views, it is pragmatically accepted that both states declaring an absolute victory is beyond the reality. The culmination of that war did not take place after establishing a one-sided victory; rather it was a cease fire.

Recently, the widespread perspective in most of our nationwide newspapers is that the 1965 war was not a good idea. It was triggered by Pakistani operation Gibraltar that sent radicals into the Indian-held Kashmir to foment revolution, about which the forces (other than few) were not even informed.

This perspective is based upon various references from history; one is taken from the famous memoir of Air Marshal Nur Khan which includes his conversation with Gen. Akhtar Hasan Malik, GOC Kashmir, the man in-charge of 'Operation Gibraltar'.

It quotes that in a discussion about the operation, Gen Malik said "don't worry, because the plan to send in some 800,000 infiltrators inside the occupied territory to throw out the Indian troops with the help of the local population, is so designed that the Indians would not be able retaliate and therefore the airforce need not get into war-time mode."

This according to Nur Khan, was very naïve and irresponsible because the operation was designed for self-gory rather than in the national interest. Moreover, as we were not expecting the war thus we were not ready for the war and this is how he called it an unnecessary war.

Another most recent narration published quotes the words of Lt. Gen. (retd) Mahmud Ahmed, "It was only after listening to an All India Radio broadcast in the evening of 4



September that the Pakistan C-in-C, Gen Muhammad Musa, reached the conclusion that Indian intentions were hostile.”

“Then too, the GHQ sent a rather ambiguous signal message to the formations. Apart from the sheer number of tanks involved, it is well worth asking if the armored battles were really great by any standard? The fact is both sides lacked skill in handling armor at the operation level”, explained Gen. Ahmed.

Notwithstanding what has been said by many, few comprehension are absolute that Pakistan started it in Kashmir and India tried to end it by attacking Pakistan on the southern border. India instead had planned to capture Lahore in a day but it failed to do so.

Both states, India and Pakistan, captured each other’s territories. India definitely was superior on numbers table, especially with its airforce, but both sides suffered heavy losses. India’s damage near Sialkot and Pakistan’s near Amritsar is noteworthy.

Now, do the above revelations suggest that 1965 is about solemn commemoration and there is nothing significant to celebrate? Is it the complete perspective which merely recalls vital lessons for Pakistan so all the ardor for the day should be abhorred?

If it is so then why the BJP government led Narendra Modi has decided to celebrate the golden jubilee of 1965 war? This is the first time that India has decided to celebrate September as ‘victory month’ in order to give an impression to the world that 1965 war was actually won by them.

Albeit, eyebrows have been raised over these celebrations in India too because even the defense ministry’s official war history describes its end as a stalemate.

Paradoxically, recently the highest-ranking Indian Air Force officer, Air Marshal (retd) Bharat Kumar stated in his book that India suffered much as compared to Pakistan in the war of 1965. He admitted Indian defeat in the war of 1965 in book, titled “The Duels of the Himalayan Eagle: The First Indo-Pak Air War” and acknowledged that Indian Air Force (IAF) “suffered disproportionately higher losses” than PAF.

The book also takes a candid look at the abysmal lack of coordination between IAF and the Army, a controversy that lingers on to this day, with the author admitting that “mistakes were made”. The Indian Army too is reportedly coming out with its new account of the 1965 war.

Evidently, mistakes were made on both sides in the war, so later what happened at Tashkent, Simla or Washington does not adhere that our soldiers and their sacrifices does not





deserve a tribute. Our forces especially Air Force performed much better despite the reality that they were not expecting the attack and were not fully ready for war.

Above anything, do we have to celebrate the day our Defense Day, when India is celebrating the whole month to declare their victory in the war?

In a time when many are in a race to display their intellectual superiority by coming up with narratives that negate basic reason, can I celebrate the Defense Day not because we may or may not have achieved great triumphs against India but for the supreme sacrifices of our great soldiers made?

<http://www.voiceofjournalists.com/got-a-reason-to-celebrate-defense-day/>

Need for a Long-term, Integrated and Cross-Sectorial Policy Planning

Zumra Nawaz Cheema

Most of the developing countries have a great dilemma, which is anticipatory-policy making issue. They do not have any proper institutionalized, procedural framework to formulate policies at higher level as well as at lower level. They are customary to devise policies at immediate basis, without examining the long-term repercussion and fallout of them. Resultantly, they are confronted with various socio-economic and political implications. A short-term, haphazard policy without proper prioritization of goals is only wastage of national resources and budget of a country. Budget and resource allocation without long-term policy planning is like going on a road trip without having the map. It is synonymous to willingly get lost.

Pakistan is also stuck off with such type of issue. In Pakistan, there is absence of long-term public and national policies owing to political instability, disparities among political parties, and distance among different decision-making bodies. Policies are formulated by some individual sectors without involving the personnel from each sector of the society. This unprofessional way of formulating policies have unproductive outcomes. When policies do not formulate and implement through an ordered way, then it will not continue for a longer period of time. They would have to confront with immediate opposition. Formulation of policies by any government on the basis of individual or self-interest at the cost of national interest brings a country at the brink of devastation.

Long-term planning is a prerequisite to success. Having a clear sense of your direction and goals, your existing resources and budget will allow you to reap out your expected results and goals in specified period of time. Developed countries and welfare-states made policies for the sake of human welfare and human security. Mostly they plan and invest in long-term projects, which will prove beneficial for their coming generations.

Pakistan is a secessionist country. From the very first day of independence, its national security and sovereignty remain at stake. Unfortunately, martial rule and military government, one after the other exploit the country in a worst way. Previous (Zardari) government was the first ever democratic government, who successfully complete duration of five years. But still, Pakistan is not as such mature to plan and prioritize its national interests properly. Here is the need of integrated, cross-sectorial and long-term policy planning. Policies should be planned through a systematic and integrated way, taking into account the interconnectedness of the economic, social, and environmental aspects of development, as well as country and sector-

specific issues. This put down the base for inclusive long-term, evidence-based policy planning. In this way sustainable and prolonged development could be possible. By evaluating the availability and adequacy of natural resources, policymakers would better able to bring natural resource consumption and production patterns into balance with a country's natural resource base.

If this matter would not get attention, thus Pakistan will remain indulge in wasting its resources on unnecessary projects. Those projects will remain failing due to higher intensity of opposition and less public acceptance. We have example of Metro bus project and Kalabagh dam. Metro bus project is really a good enough to provide transportation ease to the people, but that was a luxury not a necessity. If cost-benefit analysis carryout thus it would be clear that Pakistan was in immense need of a dam as an agrarian country. Every year Pakistan faces the issue of flood. Resultantly, Pakistan has to pays a huge economic, social and political amount. Socio-economically Pakistan goes back to such extent where it does not reach in five or ten year. Now Pakistan is going to work on China Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC), which is being considered very beneficial for wellbeing of the country. But the successful implementation of that project is also attached with the proper decision making, honesty of political elite and full public support. Otherwise the CPEC will also become the matter of controversy.

<http://www.lhrtimes.com/need-for-a-long-term-integrated-and-cross-sectorial-policy-planning/>



Time to Be Proactive, not Reactive

Beenish Altaf

It is time to convert our South Asian strategy from reactive to proactive.

Continuous firing on the Line of Control (LoC) by India, resulting in the death of several civilians, has finally caught the attention of the international community. There is speculation in Pakistan that the US National Security Adviser (NSA) Susan Rice's visit to Pakistan was aimed specifically to defuse India-Pakistan tensions, whereas contrary to this, according to Washington Times, she did not make an emergency visit to Pakistan in response to the rising tensions between India and Pakistan. Evidently Rice's visit had been planned for weeks as part of her trip to Asia, and was unrelated to the recent rise in tensions. Nevertheless, issues related to arresting the mounting tensions, highlighted by the cancellation of the NSA talks in New Delhi, fear of high scale military clashes, postponement of the Kabul-Taliban talks, attacks on Pakistani posts from the Afghan side and rising blame game were discussed on both sides.

The US State Department's spokesperson John Kirby said to an Indian journalist that there is no threat of using nuclear weapons as no such statement was seen from Pakistan. These speculations about the possibility of using nuclear weapons would not help in lessening tensions. He stressed that solutions to longstanding disputes between India and Pakistan are only possible through talks. Kirby emphasised that what really needs to happen is for both sides to sit down, dialogue, cooperate, talk through these things, and try to work through some meaningful solutions.

Khawaja Muhammad Asif, Federal Minister for Defence, Water and Power, has said Pakistan will respond against India strongly if it does not stop its hostilities along the Sialkot Working Boundary. He stressed that Pakistan will counter this situation at all levels. If war is forced on us, he said, we will take good care of them and that Pakistan has the right to retaliate, and retaliate in kind, retaliate in full force. He threatened that if India crosses the international border and aggression is committed again, we will defend our homeland and inflict much more damage than 1965. In addition, President Mamnoon Hussain said although Pakistan desires peaceful coexistence with India and all other neighbouring countries, any threat to its security will be thwarted.

Analytically, Pakistan's growing strategic and economic cooperation with China could be one among the reasons for India's aggressive posture. Or, the success gained in Operation Zarb-e-Azb could be causing anxiety for India. India cannot abide an internally stable Pakistan.



India is wrong if it still considers that under the nuclear overhang (Cold Start Doctrine), India can carry out some pre-emptive strikes. Given that India is playing with fire on the eastern borders, Pakistan should disengage from bilateral talks. As a matter of fact bilateralisms has been exposed enough by now. It is time for the international community to play a constructive role in this regard.

I wonder if the talks would have been carried on, whether the outcome would have been positive, whereas the cancellation of the talks resulted in at least some sort of gain. First, it increased the Pakistani people's support for their country. The entire nation is with the Pakistani government and considers the calling off of the talks a good and consequential move. It depicts that Kashmir is an important subject for Pakistan and nothing could proceed unless the long standing issue of Kashmir is resolved. Second, Kashmir has been effectively internationalized by this move.

Now Pakistan should respond effectively against ceasefire violations by India. It should play the role of an observer now by reporting such transgressions to the UN and formally protesting to the UN about the matter. It is pertinent to seek an answer to the question whether Pakistan should continue to act with restraint and rely just on reacting with words or is it time to take an initiative, show itself as more aggressive? Unfortunately, Pakistan has no action policy. It is time to reformulate such a policy. Pakistan needs a paradigm shift and a proactive policy. Consequently the opportunities that we consider our hurdle in taking some proactive steps will present themselves. It is time to convert our South Asian strategy from reactive to proactive.

<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/08-Sep-2015/time-to-be-proactive-not-reactive>

Reminiscing 1965: A Hard Earned Right to Celebrate

Sadia Kazmi

Going through the tales of 1965 war always brings a sense of pride to the whole nation. This 6th September marks the 50th anniversary of excellent gallantry displayed by Pakistani forces back in 1965. The unimaginable passion to offer sacrifices for the sake of one's motherland gave us legendary stories to be told and retold for the generations to come. Every single soul woke up to realize the true essence of unity and oneness. Despite insufficient logistics and relatively small sized army as compared to enemy's humungous force, the fierce defence put up by Pakistan made it impossible for India to achieve its political objective.

The war gave us some great national heroes who we honour through celebrations on Defence Day every year. And like every year, commemoration brings with it a debate about whether the episode of 1965 should be celebrated or be seen as a catastrophic misadventure. It is a fact that this victory did not come easy to us and made us learn some important lessons the hard way. For instance the question whether it was possible to avoid the loss of valuable human lives in the war if there was much competent political and military leadership, is raised time and again. Though civil-military equation greatly influences any decision making and implementation process, one also needs to keep in mind that errors and miscalculations are bound to happen since the strategic and tactical realms could be very different. The best that can be done is to minimize the gap between the two while dispelling the impact of errors on the battleground. Even then the possibility of a slip up cannot be completely ruled out. Therefore if the political and military leadership should be condemned for initiating operation Gibraltar then they should be lauded for operation Grand Slam and the excellent surge they made against India.

Despite some serious military and intelligence oversights, the defence of Pakistan effectively thwarted India's aggression, for which it should be commended wholeheartedly. Similarly any sensitive literature like the one written by Lt. Gen Mahmood Ahmad should not take away our hard earned sense of victory from us. He might have rightly pointed out the shortcomings but ultimately no one can deny the reality that Pakistani forces fought valiantly. The seventeen day war caused equal amount of casualties on both sides. However there is no harm in reflecting upon the weaknesses and learning from them. Such an approach will only help in avoiding the strategic lapses in the future.

Analyzing various aspects of war also puts a big question mark on Kashmir issue and should serve as an eye opener. Kashmir is undoubtedly the most important problem with strategic

significance for Pakistan and which it can never relinquish. But the question is whether the genuine efforts of Pakistan to raise and support the cause of Kashmiris is being appreciated by the Kashmiri leaders as well as the locals there? Why were the “oppressed” Kashmiris in IHK not ready for the insurgency even when they got the timely support in 1965? Shouldn’t they have considered it to be the God sent help that came for their rescue? An obvious lesson one can take from that particular event which actually became the triggering point of whole 1965 debacle is to see how mutually aligned the political objectives of Pakistan are with the cause of Kashmiris. This point was important to ponder back then and is much more relevant today. Since Kashmir continues to be a sore point between India and Pakistan and has direct implications for the regional peace and stability, it demands greater political commitment from all the stake holders.

Regular meetings with the Kashmiri leaders who enjoy the popular support of local Kashmiris and share the same cause and understanding with Pakistan will serve the mutual interest of both the nations. It will also help Pakistan in avoiding any misjudgments or unilateral initiatives in the future, which might not later find support from the “oppressed” Kashmiris. Also, diplomatic and political exchanges at the state level are part of a political process and state’s foreign policy, which cannot be dictated by anyone. Hence India has no right to dictate Pakistan or Kashmir on their diplomatic choices.

Another question that comes to mind when one looks at the countrywide enthusiasm and harmony during 1965 war is what happened to the national cohesion now? Today it is unfortunate to see the country almost at the verge of political, social and economic collapse. The social fabric of the state is badly torn apart along the ethnic, sectarian and nationalistic divides. It was a rare sight to see the whole nation united as one back then. The same spirit of oneness is required today to fight off the myriad of challenges including terrorism and militancy.

National unity and harmony will strengthen the state against the outside vulnerabilities while the lack of nationhood will provide a fertile ground to anti state elements not only from within but will also provide an easy opportunity to the external hostile actors who are bent upon destabilizing Pakistan at all fronts. Hence national unity is definitely a major ingredient for strengthening the national security.

Last but not the least we should pay a sincere tribute to the martyrs instead of using up the occasion to criticize the follies. The censure is better left to the enemy who is always eager to spread negative propaganda and malign Pakistan’s image. War of 1965 is the solemn demonstration of resilience of the whole nation and the unflinching resolve to defend the



motherland, for which Pakistan surely has earned the right to commemorate the 6th of September with pride and dignity.

<http://www.pstimes.com/2015/09/09/reminiscing-1965-a-hard-earned-right-to-celebrate/>

Indo-Pakistani war: Battles to Celebrate

Adeel Mukhtar Mirza

“Who wishes to fight must first count the cost” — Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Even fifty years after the 1965 war, people do not exactly know whether we won or lost and what national compulsions were, in sending raiders to Kashmir. If 1965 war were to be defined in one sentence, it would be that Pakistan, no doubt, won the battles but lost the war.

General (retd.) Mohammad Musa in his book, ‘My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965,’ writes, “The predominantly Muslim State of Jammu and Kashmir has been in dispute between India and Pakistan since the days of the partition of the subcontinent. However, in 1963, India started to integrate the disputed territory with the Indian Union, pretending that, as far as she was concerned, the issue was settled and was no longer negotiable. No Government in Pakistan could accept that position.”

Moreover, the succinct armed encounter between Indian and Pakistani armies in April 1965 resulted in what was in general perceived to be a triumph for the latter. The incident of Rann of Kutch was as a result, one of the chief formative factors in the ultimate choice of Pakistani government to go for a military solution to Kashmir issue as the results of the incidents proved the overall lack of Indian vigilance for an armed defence of the disputed areas.

In addition, as General writes, “in the late spring of 1965, Sheikh Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg were detained on their return home from abroad. Their arrest intensified the simmering agitation triggered by the Hazratbal incident and India’s generally oppressive behavior towards the Muslim population. She resorted to severe repressive measures against the people, which incited their long-suppressed passions further and aggravated the bitterness against her on both sides of the cease-fire line.” As a result, “The then Foreign Minister Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutti, and Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed, spurred in by Major- General Akhtar Husain Malik, who was commander of our troops in Azad Kashmir, pressed the Government to take advantage of the disrupted situation in the valley and direct the Army to send raiders into Indian-held Kashmir for conducting guerilla activities there and to help, on a long-term basis, the locals in organizing a movement with a view to eventually starting an uprising against the occupying power.” However, unfortunately, adequate preparations had not been made in the valley to start guerilla activity.

Therefore, basically, “The military aim of launching the guerrilla operations was threefold. Firstly, disrupt Indian civil and military control of the State. Secondly, to encourage, assist and

direct an armed revolt by the people of Kashmir against Indian military occupation, and thirdly, to created conditions for an advance by the Azad Kashmir forces into the heart of occupied Kashmir and eventual liberation of IHK,” quotes Cyril Almeida in his article, ‘Gibraltar, Grand Slam and war,’ from the Lt Gen (retd) Mahmud Ahmed’s book titled ‘History of the Indo-Pak War — 1965.’

More importantly, the ultimate aim of the operation was the solution of Kashmir conundrum wherein Pakistan Army failed, owing to the failure in devising proper strategy. It is the duty of defence forces to make strategy and remove unexpected loopholes in it, so it is illogical even to argue that violation of international boundary by India was not expected. When you are going into war, albeit insufficient intelligence information that increase the chance of failure, you should be prepared to defend any unexpected event without losing the core aim. Pakistani forces, brave sons of Pakistan, no doubt fought courageously, examples of which are found rarely and won battles in Lahore and Sialkot etc; however, it remained unsuccessful in winning the war-a solution of Kashmir.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/09/08/indo-pakistani-war-battles-to-celebrate/>

Changing Nature of Deterrence Discourse in South Asia vs. International Discourse

Beenish Altaf

Deterrence discourse in South Asia has been altering since the advent of nuclear weapons in the region. The concept of deterrence in South Asia has changed from what it was in the late 1990s, and has evolved according to the contemporary security and political architecture of the region. The security dilemma in South Asia “operates as a chain reaction that involves regional and extra-regional powers with competing interests,” namely China, India and Pakistan. Thus, while shaping the eventual policy direction in this regard, taking the perceived national interests of each state into account is of great importance.

There were various factors driving India to develop nuclear weapons. Internationally, New Delhi’s perspective is that its program was driven by its reservations about China, which had nuclear weapons, but experts also cite its desire to achieve “**great-power status**” as a powerful motivation. Realistically speaking, New Delhi’s nuclear program was **initiated** before China’s 1964 nuclear test. In fact, **Nehru** appears the architect of India’s doctrine of nuclear ambiguity, formulated to pursue a weapons course. The **groundwork** for nuclear weapons technology seems to have been laid as part of the civilian nuclear program during Nehru’s government, who was generally believed to be a staunch opponent of nuclear weapons. It was just after the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict that Dr. Homi Bhabha, came out **more openly in favor** of the Indian development of a nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, Pakistan’s troubled relationship with India explains its possession of nuclear weapons. Initially, the endeavor was just to generate a deterrence equation with arch-rival India, where minimum credible deterrence was considered adequate to deter the adversary, thus effectively guaranteeing deterrence stability.

But later, India devised a new doctrine called **Cold Start**, to respond to any discernible threat from Pakistan, motivating Islamabad to employ a new deterrent mechanism by introducing short range tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in the region. Pakistan felt the need to develop TNWs in order to **balance out conventional asymmetry** between the two nations, as per Lt. Gen Khalid Kidwai, an advisor to Pakistan’s National Command Authority. With this, tactical deterrence commenced in South Asia, after which many Pakistani analysts believe that testing and upgrading TNWs will need to continue, to balance out this conventional asymmetry.

According to Bernard Brodie, a nuclear bomb is a weapon of peace and not a weapon for use. Nuclear deterrence is all about war avoidance and not war-fighting strategy. Brig (Retd) Samson Simon Sharaf, political economist and a television anchor, has **called** deterrence “a

cost-benefit analysis of the gains and losses in credible, capable and hostile environments, with a common and well understood strategic concept and language between the adversaries warranting a constant appraisal of capabilities and vulnerabilities.”

Deterrence in South Asia has faced many challenges in its progression, in the same manner as the evolution of the U.S. and Russian deterrence relations faced during the Cold War. **According to Brig. Sharaf**, “Regarding the changing dynamics of deterrence in South Asia, Pakistan’s fear of becoming vulnerable to a first strike (and/or a desire to attain first-strike capability) gives technology a central role in deterrence, and tends to fuel a high-intensity qualitative arms race. Pakistan has to develop and adopt effective controls on the Graduated Escalation Ladder both in conventional and nuclear forces to retain the initiative of nuclear retaliation.”

The number of nuclear weapons enough to maintain/ensure nuclear deterrence has continued to trouble nuclear deterrence theorists, strategists and policy-makers in the post-Cold War period. Meanwhile, the world’s nuclear weapons stockpile is estimated to be at **15,850**, and all states possessing nuclear weapons, in one way or another, are constantly modifying and modernizing their nuclear inventories. No state will place a number or cap at what it considers to be a sufficient nuclear force for credible deterrence.

In South Asia, India and Pakistan, nuclear-armed neighbors and adversaries, have estimated stockpiles of 90-110 and 100-120 respectively, according to estimates from the **SIPRI Yearbook 2015**. Both countries have committed policies of minimum nuclear deterrence and no-nuclear arms race. While India seeks to maintain a nuclear force sufficient to deter mainly China and Pakistan, Pakistan maintains that it seeks a deterrent equilibrium vis a vis India and not nuclear parity.

Unlike the Western understanding of deterrence, South Asian states do not consider the use of force by nuclear states undesirable to achieve foreign policy objectives. This might be one of the reasons that the nuclear-armed, antagonistic neighbors are **not taking serious steps** towards crisis management, in terms of coming up with a doctrine. Instead, both use deterrent signaling to avoid potential conflict. It does not matter whether the adversary perceives that signal as weak or strong— it successfully ensures deterrence. Major wars between India and Pakistan have been avoided due to this nuclear signaling game (more specifically deterrence signaling game).

Hence, deterrence discourse depends on the strategic behavior of the state, as to how it perceives a supposed threat, and what measures it adopts to tackle it. “Thus, **strategic behavior** of states engaged in nuclear rivalries tends to be schizophrenic, treating nuclear



weapons sometimes as revolutionary and sometimes as conventional.” Nevertheless, despite the altering nature of deterrence, as George Perkovich **mentions**, it is “key to avoiding conflict and potential escalation to nuclear war.”

<http://southasianvoices.org/changing-nature-of-deterrence-discourse-in-south-asia-vs-international-discourse/>

Resuming the Stalled Peace Process Between Taliban & the Afghan Government

Nasurullah Brohi

The success or failure of any negotiations between two parties mainly depends upon the notion that each side is fully competent and authorized to implement the accords and the decisions amongst its followers.

The emergence of headship quandary between the fractions of the Afghan Taliban as a result of the news of Mullah Muhammad Omar's death was seen as initiation of the race to take-over as Taliban's leader. Though initially, a major segment of Taliban proclaimed that Mullah Akhtar Mansoor was their leader who also had dramatically managed to dominate the group's Supreme Council during the last few years. This divide between the Taliban was further deepened when Sayed Tayab Agha resigned from Qatar office as a result of his protest against the way Mullah Akhtar Mansoor was selected Taliban's leader and secondly, the opposition of Mullah Akhtar's leadership by one of the prominent Taliban figures and Commander Masnoor Dadullah whose views were Mullah Yaqoob (the son of the deceased Mullah Omer) was their actual leader.

Such voices against the credibility of the selection of Mullah Akhtar Mansoor put some sober question marks over the group's full consent and the success of recent talks hosted by Pakistan between the Afghan Government and the Afghan Taliban. Likewise, these drawbacks in the group brought serious implications for the ongoing peace talks between the Afghan government whereas, prior to that the first round of talks went smooth on July 7th in Pakistan and the second round was also scheduled on 31st July but due to the crisis of leaderships the talks were halted and it was strongly believed that the fraction between the Taliban would weaken and further divide the group into a main group led by Mullah Akhtar Mansoor and two or three splinter groups led by Mullah Yaqub and some other Taliban leaders and as a result, the feeble situation of Taliban would encourage some other insurgent groups to dominate the situation.

Previously, after the success of first round of talks on July 7, both parties had shown consent about the development of CBMS and agreed to come across with a cease fire agreement by the upcoming round of talks which was halted because of the death news about the Mullah Omer which resulted in the delay in talks and a discontent about the Taliban's new leadership. This crisis severely affected the ongoing peace process and particularly, after the



recent attacks and suicide bombings in Afghanistan, the future of talks has further become uncertain.

However, but the recent development by the deceased Taliban leader's family to declare their allegiance to Mullah Akhtar Mansoor is seen as a ray of hope for a political solution to a log-lasting core issue and resuming the stalled peace talks to end their internal discord that had divided the movement for months. Despite of all these issues, the United States and its Western allies have also been urging the Afghan government to resume the peace talks with the Taliban since an end to the talks would only encourage other groups like the Islamic State.

The previous peace talks hosted by Pakistan were some of the groundbreaking meeting that was also attended by the Chinese and the U.S officials. Pakistan has once again shown its willingness to facilitate the Afghanistan to settle down the core issues through political means and the process of peace talks. Before another round of Afghan reconciliation dialogue it should be made clear that the dialogue between the Taliban and Afghan government should be purely conducted and owned by the Afghan only, as it has to understand that the external parties could only smooth the process of Afghan reconciliation but cannot impose a solution of both parties.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/09/20/resuming-the-stalled-peace-process-between-taliban-the-afghan-government/>

China-US: Confrontation or Cooperation?

Zumra Nawaz Cheema

As China-US rivalry is getting intensified with the passage of time. US policy towards China is undergoing an abrupt change from the Kissinger's administration to the Obama's government, "to contain China to Cooperate China". Presently, US is really anxious upon China's rapid growth in terms of economics and military aspects. Competitive tensions between both powers are getting strong. if at the one hand China is emerging as world's largest economy, on the other hand US economy is heading towards downfall .

As China's economic and military innovations are oriented toward developing capabilities for displacing US influence in the Western Pacific and asserting China's status as a leading regional power and major world power, thus US as an existing superpower is worried of China's steady and precise progress and development. US is visualising China as an actual challenge to its hegemony and monopoly in anarchical international system. Under such state of affairs it seems that once again two ideologies Capitalist (US) and Communist (China) are getting involved in competition just like Cold War or that what would be consequences of this strategic competition, either confrontation or cooperation?

Presently American policies are going through a transformatory phase. US is trying to divert its strategic posture from so called anti-terrorist to any other direction. As an American analyst stated that "the US global strategy has basically completed a major transition shifting from anti-terror to dealing with emerging powers, from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific". Recently, US announced "Pivot towards Asia" to restore its declining economy. Accordingly US is building up economic and military ties with emerging powers i.e. India, China, Singapore, Indonesia etc. Moreover, US "twin trade" agreements, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are also the part of US agenda to rebalance its economy. Resultantly China is feeling a strong strain on itself. China sees all of these US initiatives against itself. China has view that US wants to hamper Chinese progress and development so it can keep its supremacy and hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. Accordingly, China is also taking steps to neutralize US impact in the regional dynamics. The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) strategy, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), the revival of the Free Trade Area of Asia and the Pacific (FTAAP) initiative, the intensification of bilateral partnerships with its neighbours and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are some counter initiatives adapted by the Chinese side.



Currently, there are two major flashpoints between China and US. First one is Cyber Warfare (CW). US and China both countries are headed toward an escalating cyber war. Recently few Chinese hackers have arrested in US, accused of masterminding government-led cyber hacking to steal trade secrets from six major American companies, working in the key power and metals industries. Now US decision-making elite is facing a critical issue that how the US will have respond to the cyber intrusion.

Second area of concern for US is Chinese military modernization especially in terms of Navy. China is the second largest arms exporter, the second largest arms importer and China's military budget is the second largest in the world after US. Currently China's improving naval capabilities posing a potential challenge to US naval capabilities in blue-water. It is the very first time, when US is facing a potential threat to its longstanding status as the leading military power in Asia-Pacific since the end of the Cold War. Now it is recommended that cooperation, rather than confrontation, would benefit both powers as well as enhance stability in the Asia-Pacific. While competition; resulted in confrontation would have disastrous outcomes i.e. global instability and insecurity.

<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=273953>

Global nuclear weapon inventories

Adeel Mukhtar Mirza

Order in international politics, as William Walker—a specialist in nuclear politics, in his book, “A perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order,” notes, is traditionally shaped by the occasion and conclusion of great wars. Nuclear Order in contrast, has been shaped and evolved in the absence of major wars between major powers. Moreover, giving away a proper definition of international nuclear order, Walker writes: “Given the existence of nuclear technology, the international nuclear order entails evolving patterns of thought and activity that serve primary goals of world survival, war avoidance and economic development; and the quest for tolerable accommodation of pronounced differences in the capabilities, practices, rights and obligations of states.”

In this vein, among several other factors, a decrease in nuclear weapons inventories of nuclear weapon states / disarmament is a critical step in maintaining Global Nuclear Order. However, on the contrary, secrecy prevails while defining exact number of nuclear weapons by a state that creates uncertainty, mistrust and misunderstanding. In addition, all the nations with the nuclear weapons continue to modernize or upgrade their nuclear weapons.

For instance, according to an article, “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2013,” jointly written by Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, some 125,000 nuclear warheads have been built since 1945 wherein about 97 percent by the United States and the Soviet Union and Russia. In addition, according to the calculations or estimates made in 2013 by the authors of the report, the nine nations with nuclear weapons now possess more than 10,000 nuclear warheads in their military stockpiles, with several thousand additional US and Russian retired warheads in storage, awaiting dismantlement. In other words, US and Russia retain 10 to 20 times greater nuclear arsenals than any other state’s. However, existing nuclear inventories of the nuclear weapon states are considerably lower than the numbers retained during Cold War, especially in the mid-1980s.

Moreover, according to estimates made by Kristensen and Norris in 2013, United States possessed approximately 4,650 warheads in the Pentagon’s stockpile and 2,150 of these weapons were considered deployed on missiles or bases with operational launchers. As of early 2015, the authors estimate that the US Defense Department maintains about 4,760 nuclear warheads in which 2,080 are deployed while 2,680 warheads are in storage. In a similar vein, Russia had approximately 8,500 intact warheads, of these; about 4,480 are in the military stockpiles, with the remaining 4,000 retired warheads awaiting dismantlement 2013, however,

Russia currently has 4,500 nuclear warheads, of which 1,780 strategic warheads are deployed on missiles and at bomber bases. China, in 2013, had an arsenal of approximately/roughly 250 nuclear warheads that goes up to 260 in 2015, according to report. Overall estimates shows a relative decline in US, Russia, France and Great Britain's nuclear inventories at a slower pace, but increase in the arsenals of China, Pakistan, India and possibly of Israel and North Korea.

No doubt, the total number of nuclear warheads in the world is on perpetual decrease; however, the constant up-gradation and modernization of nuclear arsenals by nuclear weapon states shows a disorder in Global Nuclear Order, as despite of years of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation struggles nuclear weapons remain integral to the conception of national security of nuclear weapon states. For example, China and India's decisions to equip some of their ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) could result in an increased arms race in Asia, Kristensen and Norris argues. In addition, Indo-US strategic partnership and Pakistan response to it could destabilize the strategic stability in South Asia with possible arms buildup. The case of North Korea, Israel and Iran augments similar tensions. In a similar way, the failure in conclusion of FMCT and CTBT represents clash of interests among nuclear weapon states.

Hence, it could be inferred that global nuclear inventories would keep on increasing and modernizing unless robust, rational and unbiased efforts are streamlined by major nuclear power states.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/09/29/global-nuclear-weapon-inventories/>

Positive Developments in Balochistan

Sadia Kazmi

Recently the province of Balochistan has seen some positive development. There has been robust international investment by China and more recently by the UK in the proposed CPEC project that promises huge economic and political dividends for Pakistan and for the province in particular. Iran has also expressed interest to be part of this multibillion dollar infrastructural project. One can also witness firm determination of both civil and military leadership to make this possibility into a reality. A remarkable policy of appeasement and general amnesty by the government for all the home based insurgents convinced a large number of rebels to voluntarily surrender and lay down the arms. Also for the first time the self exiled Baloch leaders have shown some flexibility and inclinations towards having negotiation with the Government and have hinted they might even forego their demand for independence. These significant developments are all interlinked and again have direct repercussions on the security structure of the country.

Nonetheless it is not yet time for celebration. Now the focus should be on how to keep the process going and how to further build up on the positive developments. The state authorities need to stay vigilant and be on guard against the separatist elements which are still at work. Even though Brahamdagh Bugti and Javed Mengal have responded positively to the government's invite for dialogues, the other tribal leaders need to be taken into loop as well. Harbiyar Marri, leader of Baloch Liberation Army is an equally important part of this puzzle or may be even the strongest one. One should remember that the responsibility of various hostile activities like killing of Chinese engineers, ambush on railroads, attack on Pakistan Army's installations in Balochistan, and the more recent attack on Jiwani airport have all been openly accepted by BLA.

It is important to engage all the stakeholders and earn their confidence in order to have a full spectrum win-win outcome. The lucrative amnesty scheme seems to be working for now but one also needs to remember that these insurgents have long been waging this war for their right and their cause is not only just but also sacred to them. Even though monetary incentives are being offered to them, this cannot put their real grievances to rest and might just provide a temporary solution to a much deep rooted socio-political problem. Along with expanding and strengthening intelligence network in Balochistan, more employment and business opportunities should be created in order to ensure sustainable economic, social, and political growth. Indian influence should be mitigated and intra-provincial skirmishes between Pashtuns and Baloch and sectarian killings should not be taken lightly as these could be exploited by RAW



that aims to create internal rifts, not just to divert the concentration of security forces from the borders to the internal disturbances but also to disrupt CPEC. To deal with this, internal security situation should be enhanced. So a balanced approach focusing simultaneously on social indicators as well as military operation should be adopted and should also work vigorously to dispel their misgivings.

<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=274063>

Development or Decay: Time for Baloch People to Decide

Shahzadi Tooba Hussain Syed

“For million of the years we were hunter-gatherers, and it was through the evolutionary pressures of that way of life that a brain so adaptable and so creative eventually emerged. Today we stand with the brains of hunter-gatherers in our heads, looking out on a modern world made comfortable for some by the fruits of human inventiveness, and made miserable for others by the scandal of deprivation in the midst of plenty.” (Richard E. Leakey)

Balochistan National Party-M chief Sardar Akhtar Mengal vowed to “resist every move against the interests of Baloch people”. His statements provoked me to go a bit in depth of the matter of the Baloch “deprivation”. I came to know that the “true” leader was in self-exile for so many years and so are many other Baloch leaders, protecting the rights of their people by protecting themselves first using funds from foreign ‘interest seekers’.

Mengal’s statements came at the time when the government of Pakistan formally awarded a multi-billion dollar contract for the construction and operation of Gwadar port to China aiming to improve the port and open the doors of development and prosperity for Pakistan, particularly Balochistan. Oil and gas pipelines will also be part of the economic corridor in the long run, benefiting economic activity in Balochistan.

Gwadar is one of the most generously endowed areas in the region having a 790-km coastal belt as well as a wealth of mineral reserves. Gwadar’s coastline, located on the shores of the Arabian Sea, is important to the shipping route into and out of the Persian Gulf.

This opposition is very much linked with the Indians. India has made no secret of its strong opposition to the CPEC project, and according to credible reports, is making covert efforts to sabotage it. Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj has said that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi “very strongly” raised the issue regarding China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) during his visit to Beijing, and called the project “unacceptable”. Swaraj said Modi was “concerned” about the \$46 billion project, adding that the Indian government had summoned a Chinese envoy to raise the issue over the corridor that is to run through Pakistani Kashmir.

Another factor of sabotaging this project is Indian involvement in Chabahar Port in Iran. As the strategically important port, could give India a sea-land access to Afghanistan and Central

Asia, bypassing Pakistan. New Delhi already pledged to build a container terminal and a multi-purpose cargo terminal on two berths at the Chabahar Port in south-eastern coast of Iran.

Pakistan's decision to transfer the management of the port to the Overseas Port Holding Company of China for 40 years sent jitters to India, which responded by moving fast on the Chabahar Port Project.

Dr. Amarjit Singh in his article published in Indian official Journal "Defence Review" describes the past involvement in the words that, "with RAW and RAD (Russian Intelligence) help, America trained some 30 Baloch fighters in 2002 that RAW helped select. Further he says that "Freedom fight and proxy war in Baluchistan is morally justified..... and is in India's strategic interest".

The motivation and the idea of weakening Pakistan is same among these separatist leaders and India. Former US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said in a speech that "India has always used Afghanistan as a second front against Pakistan. India has over the years been financing problems in Pakistan". BLA is being armed, trained and funded by India's RAW just as Mukti Bahini was in East Pakistan.

Could Mr. Mengal and the other 'leaders' like him tell us what they did for their people except to make them deaf and dumb that they are unable to decide right and wrong by themselves? Earlier, these Sardars who has always aligned with one government or the other, have robbed funds of Balochistan, collected the gas royalty for decades, ran private jails, kept their opponents for months and made them walk on the burning charcoals to prove their innocence and did not open even a single school in their reign.

This is what how they are serving their own "people".

Coming towards the prospective conclusion, Pakistan Army Chief Raheel Sharif showing a strong personal commitment said, "I reiterate our resolve that any attempt to obstruct or impede this (CPEC) project will be thwarted at all costs". In spite of Indian RAW's most determined effort to support the Baloch militants' campaign of murder and terror, the Baloch insurgency has been significantly weakened by the Pakistan Army campaign in the province.

<http://www.voiceofjournalists.com/development-or-decay-time-for-baloch-people-to-decide/>

Nuclear Normalcy and Pakistan

Maimuna Ashraf

“Normal is an illusion. What is normal for the spider is chaos for the fly.”

— Charles Addams

But if you disagree then “Well, normal is relative.”

— Anna Jarzab, Tandem

‘Normal Nuclear’ or ‘Nuclear Normalcy’ sounds paradoxical, understandable in lexical term yet lack a profound stipulative and chiefly a theoretical definition. Consequently, the status of ‘Normal Nuclear State’ is ‘codified’ rather than ‘conditionally allotted’. Lately, this modish term being found associated with Pakistan after a new report “A Normal Nuclear Pakistan” appeared, co-authored by Michael Krepon and Toby Dalton of Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment, simultaneously. Although, this recent outrage to make not-that-normal nuclear Pakistan a Normal Nuclear-State by the Normal-Nuclear-Club is not preliminary. Almost a year back, Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, proposed a ‘conditional’ layout to treat Pakistan as a normal nuclear country. Albeit the conditions offered by Fitzpatrick were not much dissimilar to those recently articulated by two authors but he was rather mild in this approach, with an acceptance that Pakistan has had enough paid a price of past and advocated to treat Pakistan similar to India.

Fitzpatrick suggested Pakistan to stick on its minimum deterrence by not increasing its fissile material stockpiles, delivery systems and quantity of warheads. He opined that Pakistan should sign CTBT and lift its veto against FMCT talks in order to abide by global non-proliferation regime and secure an NSG exemption or civilian nuclear deal akin to India’s. Conversely, authors of newly emerged report have proposed Pakistan to adopt five broad initiatives related to its nuclear weapon program which includes a shift from full spectrum to strategic deterrence, limit production of short-range warheads, lift veto on Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations, separate civilian and military facilities and sign Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is asserted in report that if Pakistan agrees to accept these suggestions it will be treated like a responsible and normal nuclear weapon state. It may sound logical to many that in return to few demands Pakistan will achieve the status of ‘normal state’ but does the acceptance of these recommendations advances Pakistan’s nuclear security? Would it reinforce Pakistan’s deterrence posture against India? How would it affect the deterrence equilibrium in South Asia? So should Pakistan agree to this proposal to bargain a status of normality?

The assertion to adhere a shift from full spectrum deterrence to strategic deterrence is thick because it is significant to understand how Pakistan defines its strategic deterrence. Pakistan's deterrence is dynamic because Pakistan perceives deterrence strengthen if it forcefully deters India. It implies that Pakistan will continue determining its nuclear deterrence requirements on the basis of Indian nuclear advancements or developments. As long as Pakistan sees the nuclear developments of its neighboring state destabilizing the region, it would continue responding them. Thus Pakistan is maintaining the deterrence which is minimum credible yet full spectrum to deter all forms of aggression. Consequently "it is confusing to separate full spectrum and strategic deterrence. The idea is probably to separate counter value and counter force but a deterrence that starts to fail even tactically will quickly fail strategically."

However it is wrong to say that Pakistan and India are engaged in a traditional arms race, where two actors try to outpace each other. In case of Pakistan, we appear rather to be engaged in a nuclear competition.

Conversely, highlighting specific numbers of nuclear warheads made by Pakistan weaker the argument. There is no evidence of Pakistan adding 20 warheads and India 5. Only assumptions that Pakistan is weaponizing its fissile material and India is not. It demonstrates that this strict proposal was recommended to Pakistan on the basis of hypothetical and questionable assumptions.

The article includes the paradoxical opinions that Pakistan cannot duplicate India's path to normalcy but then concludes that following the suggested path Pakistan will set a criteria for India's entry in NSG.

It is astonishing that this report would like Pakistanis to sign CTBT before India does to morally pressure India. Pragmatically, India would not be pressurized even if Pakistan signs CTBT, but for Pakistan to sign CTBT would further put Islamabad in an inferior position. It concludes that no offer of normalcy can succeed unless it addresses the underlying reasons for Pakistan's nuclear build-up. Pakistan doesn't compete with India in this domain to gain status, and acquiring the status of a 'normal' nuclear state will not lessen requirements until Pakistan feels safe and secure.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/09/29/nuclear-normalcy-and-pakistan/>

China-Russia Axis Towards A Global Ascendancy

Nasurullah Brohi

The complexity of the international realpolitik is a systematic process towards the struggle and competition for the creation of a balance to challenge the status-quo of dominant powers. Particularly, such balance is not often easily sustained by any single state, therefore; burden sharing and alliance formation becomes an imminent choice to achieve the desired goal.

The great powers always seek such opportunities, for centuries the Russia has also tried to become a member of the European family of nations. And even after the collapse the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation also looked forward towards the formation of an alliance with Germany; an alliance depending upon the German technologies and relying over Russian resources, this was primarily a notion based on the collective burden sharing and mutual cooperation to create a counterweight against the US dominance.

Particularly, after the German reunification, the Russia and Germany developed a strategic partnership concentrated mainly on the principles of interdependence in the fields of energy and investment. Interestingly, the long awaited ambition turned immensely against the Russia after the Ukraine crisis and the seizure of Crimea in 2014. Moreover, it was Germany, which played the leading role along with the Britain, France and the US in the imposition of the harsh economic sanctions against the Russia which badly affected the Russian oil and banking industries and also became a reason for the devaluation of the Russian ruble.

Eventually, for Russia, the partnership with China has always been a much easier task as both have many commonalities such as their lack of stronger relations to many of the European nations and both the countries also experience distrust against the United States which naturally binds these two countries in a close partnership for collaboration despite of having many varied interests. This relation is interdependent as Russia needs China for its economic interests and China needs Russian support to become a partner in Eurasia and these both have a common interest to become able to maintain an effective counterweight against the US and its allies.

China is an emerging global economic power that has produced solemn challenges for many powers like the United States and European Union etc. Many defence and security analysts believe that the strengthening of the SCO is a reaction against the US and NATO's antagonism in the China's neighbourhood that twisted a feeling against its interests and strategically

surrounded it from both Asia Pacific and Central Asian sides, therefore, the Organization was seen as an instrument to neutralize the military power of the United States in the region. The nonviolent entrée in the Eurasian region is also seen as another greater objective by China to get an equitable place in the international affairs.

The Sino-Russian axis under the SCO extends far from the question of just containing the US dominance in the region, but it also has a vision to control the extra regional involvement of other Western powers and institutions like the EU and NATO. This is particularly due to post Cold War era fears of Russia when the NATO combined all the Central Asian States in its Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and according to Russia's view point these states were also under Western pressure to participate in the Partnership for Peace Programs and the Conference on Cooperation and Security where the Western powers started to interfere with the internal policies of the Central Asian States.

The European Union was also one of the dominant factors in employing the Western strategies of controlling the Central Asian region and later on, Russia started to counter-weight the growing external involvement through collective security arrangements with its former Soviet bloc members. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) were reproduced to take place of the Western institutions involved in the region but unluckily these moves did not prove to be that successful to contain the Western involvement and control the Central Asian States with these instruments but however, with the support of viable SCO the Russian Federation might become successful and in such way it would again depend upon stronger partnership with China and this in turn would ultimately, provide a chance China and Russia to alter the current unipolar world and US dominance at the global level.

The Sino-Russia axis and its expanding influence beyond the region and is sometimes also termed as a gradual move towards the global ascendancy as both states are already in alliances and the purpose of their alliance formation is not primarily confined counter the expansion of NATO in the region, but actually these states sought to split some common interests and strategic partnership to avoid any bilateral conflict that would pave the way to invite any external player to dominate their sphere of influence and put their interests on stake.

The Sino-Russian relations in the shape of expanding SCO is an alarming message for many states that these can build a power bloc which has a prominent role in the international affairs by having their diverse policy than the West as they don't believe that power is hidden in the secrets of interference in other's internal affairs and dominating world through rouge means.



<http://www.eurasiareview.com/29092015-china-russia-axis-towards-a-global-ascendancy-oped/>

Pak-India Nuclear Installation and Global Nuclear Order

Shahzadi Tooba Hussain Syed

India's nuclear industry has been largely without IAEA safeguards, though four nuclear power plants have been under facility-specific arrangements related to India's INFCIRC/66 safeguards agreement with IAEA. However, in October 2009 India's safeguards agreement with the IAEA became operational, with the government confirming that 14 reactors would be put under the India Specific Safeguards Agreement by the end of 2014.

A clean waiver to the trade embargo was agreed in September 2008, when India and the United States finalized an agreement/deal, to restart cooperation on civilian nuclear technology. The new agenda of cooperation intended at preparing India as a new powerful state in the globe and it has also numerous aspects containing economic, strategic and energy components. On the other hand, the civilian nuclear deal which is component of the particular dialogue gained more consideration because of its adverse implications for the international Non-Proliferation regime efforts and on the security of South Asia. Because of the agreement, the India would gain the status of de facto nuclear weapon state and it would assist India to acquire civil nuclear technology from the US and other members of the NSG. The NSG is a 48-country network of uranium and nuclear technology-exporting and civil Nuclear power producing countries aimed at strengthening civilian nuclear markets while propagating a strict non-military purpose. After giving India an exemption it seems this group is following a non-criteria approach by giving exemptions to some (India) and objecting some of the others (Pakistan) on the same grounds.


The legislation allows for the transfer of civilian nuclear material to India. Under the deal India has committed to classify 14 of its 22 nuclear power plants as being for civilian use and to place them under IAEA safeguards. "Safeguards are the activities by which the IAEA can verify that a state is living up to its international commitments not to use nuclear programs for nuclear- weapon purposes". While pledging that any U.S. assistance to its civilian nuclear energy program will not benefit its nuclear weapons program, India committed to, among other things, separating its civilian nuclear facilities from its military nuclear facilities, declaring civilian facilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing them under IAEA safeguards.

A significant proportion of India's nuclear complex, including 8 PHWRs: Tarapur III & IV, Madras I & II, and Kaiga I—IV will remain outside IAEA safeguards, their joint capacity have

2350 MW of electricity generation capacity and could produce about 1250 kilograms of reactors-grade plutonium every year. Several essentially civil nuclear power reactors, the new 500 MWe fast breeder reactor at Kalpakkam, and the small enrichment plants for naval fuel remain outside IAEA safeguards. For almost 30 years, the U.S. legal standard has been that only nuclear safeguards on all nuclear activities in a state provide adequate assurance suddenly changed.

A significant question is how India, in the dearth of full-scope safeguards, can provide adequate assurance that U.S. nonviolent nuclear technology and uranium import from the other countries will not be sidetracked to nuclear weapons purpose, because apart from not being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India's dual-function nuclear program (military and civilian) is greatly interwoven. India has opted to not fully disclose the suspected dual-use nature of some of its reactors.

Indian Nearly Impossible Nuclear Separation Plan



The above figure shows the separation plan of Indian civilian and military nuclear program which is very much inter-woven that it is nearly impossible to be separated. The key elements of India's separation plan are, eight indigenous Indian power reactors (RAPS 3, 4, 5, 6; KAPS 1, 2; NAPS 1, 2) in addition to 6 already under safeguards; future power reactors may also be placed under safeguards, if India declares them as civilian. Some facilities in the Nuclear Fuel Complex (e.g., fuel fabrication) will be specified as civilian in 2008 and nine research facilities and three heavy water plants would be declared as civilian, but are "safeguards-irrelevant." Eight indigenous Indian power reactors (Kaiga 1, 2, 3, 4; MAPS 1, 2; TAPS 3, 4), Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FTBR) and Prototype Fast Breeder Reactors (PFBR) under construction, enrichment facilities, spent fuel reprocessing facilities (except for the existing safeguards on the Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (PREFRE) plant), research reactors: CIRUS, Dhruva, Advanced Heavy Water Reactor, three heavy water plants and various military-related plants (e.g., a prototype naval reactor) were not on the separation list.

Comparing it with Pakistan, the first nuclear power reactor of Pakistan is a small 137 MWe, Canadian pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) which started up in 1971 and which is under international safeguards – KANUPP. The second unit is Chashma 1 in Punjab province in the north, a 325 MWe (300 MWe net) two-loop pressurized water reactor (PWR) supplied by China's CNNC under safeguards. It started up in May 2000 and is also known as CHASNUPP 1. Designed life span is 40 years. Construction of its twin, Chashma 2, started in December 2005. A safeguards agreement with IAEA was signed in 2006 and grid connection was in March 2011, with commercial operation in May. Upgrades have added 5 MWe since (to 330 MWe gross). These are built using international design codes and standards.

Pakistan is not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but does have its civil power reactors and two research reactors (PARR 1&2) under item-specific IAEA safeguards. An agreement for two further 340 MWe reactors came into force in April 2011.

Experts say India could use the imported nuclear fuel to feed its civilian energy program while diverting its own nuclear fuel to weapons production. India has done similar things in the past; India claimed it was using nuclear technology for civilian purposes right up until its first nuclear weapons test in 1974. So, if IAEA get its way in India than all nuclear facilities should be under IAEA despite of selected cases by Indian nuclear authorities. Ever since the U.S. pressurized NSG in 2005 to create an exception for India, a non-NPT state, allowing U.S. to sign nuclear agreement with India, it has lost its credibility (both the NSG and the U.S.).

India's 14 ambiguous nuclear reactors in comparison with Pakistan's all reactors under IAEA Safeguards represents the validity of Pak commitment to global nuclear order, even which is a



system of inconsistent rules, and norms established by a selected powerful countries to serve their national interests.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/09/30/pak-india-nuclear-installation-and-global-nuclear-order/>

2.In-House Lecture Series

Militancy in Pakistan and Implications for its National Security

Sadia Kazmi

SVI organized an In-house Lecture on 3rd September 2015 at the institute as part of its monthly lecture series. Ms. Sadia Kazmi, Senior Research Associate, delivered a lecture on “**Militancy in Pakistan and Implications for its National Security**”. The lecture was attended by the research team of the institute.

Lecture Summary

The main theme of the presentation was that militancy is weakening the internal security structure of Pakistan and is exposing the state to external vulnerabilities. Pakistan’s diverse ethnic, linguistic and sectarian mix has long been suffered and continues to suffer today at social, economic, military and political level at the hand of this menace. Militancy in Pakistan can broadly be divided into two categories: Ethno-nationalistic militancy and Islamic militancy. Even though it is highly interwoven in the social fabric of the society which makes it quite difficult to deal with, it is not totally impossible to get rid of it. There is a need for proper measures coupled with strong political will.

Various socio-political factors can be identified as the reason behind ever growing wave of militancy, e.g. social deprivation, Zia’s attempt at Islamization of the country, Afghan refugees, poor internal security structure, injustices, religious exploitation by seminaries, and proxy wars as part of power politics at the international level. The aim is to destabilize state’s security apparatus and to weaken its hold on the militant dominated parts of country so that the hostile external elements that provide ideological and logistic support to the militants could infiltrate and install themselves in the target location. Influx of Afghan refugees particularly post 9/11, brought with it a surge of multilayered political and religious militancy in Pakistan. They took advantage of the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan coupled with poor internal political conditions, failed bureaucracy, ineffective performance by police and law and order agencies.

Familiarity with the geographical conditions, climate and terrain also favored them. Moral, financial and logistical support from outside actors further strengthened their position in the province. In Pakistan, sectarian militancy is much more widespread than the ethno-nationalistic

one. Punjab today is the den and breeding ground for religion-based militants, where they find open support from several political parties. Baluchistan which is hailed as an ethno-nationalistic struggle is not free from sectarian undertones either as can be seen from recurrent attacks on Hazara community. There has been intentional negligence as well as wrong assessment of this potential threat on part of state authorities. On the other hand militants demonstrated a focused and resolute agenda of undermining the prevailing system by propagating their own ideology of Islamic orthodoxy, displaying zero tolerance to “heretics”.

Nonetheless the counterinsurgency strikes have resulted in a large number of people being internally displaced. Anti-state forces like TTP found opportunity to spew anti Pakistan propaganda and invoke hatred among displaced youth against the government. Army too has been braving psychological and physical setbacks fighting against local population. The best way to deal with militancy and extremism will be to look into the real cause of the problem and to weed out corruption, and to make education easy and accessible to all. Efforts to eradicate poverty and strengthen nation building along with effective use of media to educate people about the state challenges, and to sensitize them about the exploitations by madrassahs is very important. Overhauling of educational system to propagate tolerance and acceptance is very necessary. Also justice should be made speedy and affordable.

De-radicalization should be given priority. FATA reforms should be implemented in order to integrate politically and economically deprived area of FATA with Pakistan. More social reforms should be made part of NISP and NAP. Along with security oriented approach an equally dedicated effort should be invested into uplifting of social sectors. Punjab should adopt more stern approach against the militants. NACTA should be made functional at the earliest. Ideological cleansing of the society is crucially important where terrorists and killers are being hailed as heroes. Indoctrination of masses is required with clear and firm condemnation of culprits. Last but not the least proper measures with strong political will is required. Ultimately writ of the state should be established, there should be no compromise on that.

The lecture was followed by a question answer session where all the scholars actively participated in the debate and made the discussion even more enriched with their input. Dr. Zafar Cheema also appreciated the effort and provided his invaluable feedback.