



# VISION

VISIONARY INSIGHTS INTO THE STRATEGIC INQUESTS OF NATIONS

## SVI FORESIGHT

VOLUME I, NUMBER 2


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AUGUST 2015

**Compiled by**

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**Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)**



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**VOLUME I, NUMBER 2**  

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# Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

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Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is an autonomous, multidisciplinary and non-partisan institution, established in January 2013. It is a non-governmental and non-commercial organization, administered by a Board of Governors (General Body) supervised under a Chairperson and administered by a Management Committee headed by a President/Executive Director.

SVI aims to project strategic foresight on issues of national and international import through dispassionate, impartial and independent research, analyses and studies. The current spotlight of the SVI is on the national security, regional and international peace and stability, strategic studies, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and strategic stability, nuclear safety and security and energy studies.

## SVI Foresight

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*SVI Foresight* is a monthly electronic journal. It has a multi-disciplinary perspective highlighting on the contemporary strategic and security studies. The issue is envisioned to be a collection of policy-oriented articles, written by its Research Associates, Visiting Faculty and professional experts. The idea is to provide the readership with a concise all-round and real-time discourse on contemporary strategic regional and international developments, highlighting their relevance to Pakistan.



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## Editor's Note

*SVI Foresight* garnered quite an encouraging feedback on its first issue from the readers, for which we are really pleased. The second monthly edition is here now with an update on various tasks and activities that were carried out in the month of August, 2015.

As this monthly issue of *SVI Foresight* reaches you, the world politics witnesses a range of developments and transformations. In an effort to keep the audience abreast with the fluid patterns of national and international dynamics, this monthly issue will specifically provide the readers with an insight into the internal security challenges that Pakistan is facing today. The focus has been expanded to include discourse on non-traditional security issues as well.

The Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) has been holding regular workshops, roundtables, conferences, seminars and lectures. The [aim](#) is to develop a perspective and generate a substantial debate in the prevalent political discourse. The electronic journal titled “*SVI Foresight*” aspires to carry the torch forward seeking a wider circulation and outreach.

The *SVI Foresight* strives to bring fresh scholastic perspective on national and international political discourse to its diverse readership, on monthly basis. We will also encourage the readers to send in their article contribution for our forthcoming issues

Any suggestions for further improvement are welcome at our [contact address](#). Please see [here](#) the copy of *SVI Foresight* electronic journal. You can find us on [Facebook](#) and can also access our official [website](#).

Syedah Sadia Kazmi

Senior Research Associate





# What if the Deterrence Fails?

Maimuna Ashraf

The world first observed the devastation of mass destruction during the last days of World War II in August 1945, Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Two Japanese cities) were hit by two different nuclear bombs. The nuclear bomb was never tested before and for the first time it was tested during World War II. Human beings and infrastructure at Ground Zero immediately vanished away. After these nuclear bombings, the word 'nuclear' stirred up with alarming fright.

On August 6, 1945, first nuclear bomb named as 'Little Boy' was dropped on Hiroshima by the US aircraft. President Harry S Truman announced next day that the bomb was more powerful than 20,000 tons of TNT. The nuclear bomb was dropped at an altitude of about 600 meters above the ground to assure maximum devastation. The city was having military centers and industries in abundance. On August 9, 1945, the second bomb named 'Fat Boy' was dropped on Nagasaki. The Nagasaki was an industrialized city with some important ports. The bomb was dropped at an altitude of about 500 meters above the ground and it was more powerful than 22 kilotons of TNT. The bomb that was dropped on Nagasaki was plutonium bomb. In Nagasaki, about 270,000 people were living at the time of explosion. When the nuclear bomb was dropped, about 74,000 people died immediately. The instant casualties in both cities were around 200 thousand while more people lost their lives due to wounds or various diseases, while many other lived with lifetime disabilities. As due to immediate and short term causes of radiations, 15–20 percent lost lives due to radiation sickness; 20–30 percent died because of fire burns and 50–60 percent was killed from other injuries. In total, about 300 thousand people were exposed to radiation. Moreover, other loss includes high damage to infrastructure and environment while long term sequels are still continued.

The subject of nuclear war has changed in recent years as compared to cold war because the technological and political environment has changed. The nuclear danger has shifted from the quantity to quality. During the recent times nuclear bombs are more powerful than those dropped on Japan in 1945. The nuclear war or danger of dropping a nuclear weapon on other state is interrelated to the number of countries having nuclear arsenals, which are increasing in 21st century.



In addition to P5, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea became a nuclear weapon state. Iran is also likely to enter into the nuclear club in a decade or more. Moreover, it is opined that those having civil nuclear program possess a potential to produce nuclear bomb in the future. The increase in number of countries possessing nuclear technology reinforced debate about the dangers of nuclear war.

McGeorge Bundy, President John F. Kennedy's national security advisor, said in 1969, "Any decision that results in even a single hydrogen bomb explosion on one city of one's own country would be declared as a calamitous mistake; while explosion of ten bombs on ten cities will be resulted as a tragedy far beyond history, whereas a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are beyond imagination." The interdependency of intentions and capability between nuclear states makes the nuclear crisis harder to handle than a conventional war and this is what happened in Cuban Missile Crisis.

In WW-I, about 20 million people were killed and the killings in WW-II doubled and tripled this number. After both world wars, the humanity restored but the horrors of wars still prevails. General Douglas MacArthur said in 1960s, "World war will wipe out both sides, if you lose you will be destroyed and if you win you stand to lose. In either case it is double suicide." Similar views were expressed by a Former US Defense Secretary that "If deterrence fails and crisis emerge, the whole western civilization will be annihilated." Many researches presume that the deaths in WWII are unthinkable, it is estimated that such a conflict can be resulted in 80 to 160 million deaths in US in first month and additional deaths of 20-30 million if the targeting strategy changes (hitting urbanized areas, nuclear power plant and military installations will cause more deaths). In addition to it, millions will die due to injuries, radiation effects and lack of medical assistance. Other than human killings, the ecological concerns are high in such a scenario, scientists believe that firestorm caused by the nuclear explosion can lead to nuclear winter which can erase 'homo sapiens' from earth forever.

The recent studies says that even a limited nuclear war between India and Pakistan would be threatened for all mankind and will result in devastating ecological aftereffects due to ash and fire storms on urbanized cities. Another study by few analysts on this scenario articulated that if Pakistan and India drop about fifty nuclear warheads on each other which is approximately 0.4% of the total warheads than the destruction would be unpredictable for us.

At least 20 million people can die in first week moreover the environmental effects globally would be more calamitous because the firestorm would strike 5 million tones of dust in air which will be resulted in blockade of sunlight and substantial drop in temperature for many years to come. The sudden decline in temperature would highly effect the food production



across South Asia. It will also wipe out the corn production in China and US. Hence in case of war the temperature around the world will drop by 10-20 degrees Celsius which means that food production will stop to starve the humans globally. The history is full of wars but the aftermath of a nuclear war (accidental or escalating) or dropping nuclear bomb (adventent or inadvertent) would be unthinkable catastrophic. Thus, the states threatening each other with dropping nuclear weapon (especially Pakistan and India) and spending big junk of their budgets on nuclear arms race need to think the unthinkable on the 70th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki A-Bombings.

<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=270532>



## NPT Role in Non-Proliferation

Beenish Altaf

The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 represents the strong will of the majority of signatory states to work on creating a non-proliferation regime that makes the cost of non-compliance high enough to deter potential violators. Since then, the NPT has been the most adhered to arms control arrangement up until recently. Signatories recently met at the 2015 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, but could not come to an agreement. The question of why the 2015 RevCon could not produce a workable concrete document for the adherence to nuclear non-proliferation regime will be taken into account in this op-ed.

Reasons for disagreement over the final document Andrey Baklitsky narrates the reasons for the NPT Rev Con's failure to produce any final document in his article titled "The 2015 NPT Review Conference and the Future of the Nonproliferation Regime." (1) Concluding the NPT RevCon without an agreement is nothing unusual. Since 1970 –when the treaty entered into force – the parties could not reach a multilateral consensus at four of the last nine RevCon: 1980, 1990, 2005, and 2015. Indeed, this is a poor record for a treaty that is considered to be a universal treaty. The conclusion of 2015 NPT RevCon is assessed to be disappointing because it could not wrap-up into a final document especially in the field of non-proliferation. On the other hand, even though the implementation is still debatable, the 2000 and 2010 review conferences are considered to be successful as they agreed on two concrete documents: 13 "practical steps" and the 64-point action plan RevCon in 2000 and 2010 NPT respectively.

(2) Since 1985, the outcome of NPT review conferences has not been changed much. The world order changed from the bipolar world and also a few countries got nuclearized by conducting their nuclear weapon tests, i.e., Pakistan, India and North Korea but the focus of attention of the NPT RevCon remained on the Article VI of the treaty related to disarmament. On the other hand the blazing issue of the creation of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone free (NWFZ) in the Middle East debated a lot in the 2015 NPT review Conference remained a subject of concern back from 1974.

(3) It is evaluated in the NPT RevCon that both countries, Russia and the US still criticize each other over the suspected disobedience with the international agreements despite of implementing few arms control agreements still, e.g., the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty



and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. There is another positive sign that Moscow and Washington also continue to work together in the P5 process.

Talking about the disarmament initiative, the contemporary situation of Russia and the US initiatives was assessed. The point of concern is Russia's apprehensions on the reduction of nuclear warheads from their countries to 1000 warheads apiece. Since it is the strategic stability in between both countries, a precondition to reduce or cut down the number of nuclear warheads, Russia apprehends that the US is violating or undermining it by developing prompt global-strike systems, expanding its ballistic missile defence and opposing the draft treaty banning weapons in outer space. So, for initiating the disarmament talks again whether bilateral or multilateral, one needs to deal with it through new inter-governmental dynamics or by use of a creative diplomacy; this would positively add on from the non-proliferation perspective too.

Lack of consensus at the NPT review conference is hardly new, but the willingness to cooperate or reconcile differences and find consensus is fading. As a result, states that cannot find satisfaction from this forum are beginning to look towards other alternatives to fulfill their disarmament and non-proliferation demands. There have been suggestions to shift non-proliferation discussions that make decisions by majority instead of consensus, such as the United Nation General Assembly or another ad hoc body. Leaving the outcome aside as if whether such a move results in the desired change or not, it would definitely weaken the NPT review process and consequently the nonproliferation regime itself.

Despite any short-comings of the 2015 review conference, no other nuclear disarmament arrangement has made substantial progress in restraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Progress over the next five years and at the next NPT RevCon will be crucial for the permanence of this vital piece of international law.

<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=270846>



# SCO as a Dominant Regional Player and its impacts on Pakistan-India Bilateral Relations

Nasurullah Brohi

The Council of the Heads of States of SCO members has approved the full membership for Pakistan and India in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization after fulfilling certain statutory and legal requirements and hopefully by the year 2016 both Pakistan and India would become permanent members of the Organization. Previously, along with Iran and Mongolia both, India and Pakistan already had status of observer states in the SCO but the recent approval of becoming permanent members has raised many hopes about the future of cooperation and tenacity of many persisting disputes and the critical issues which have been a bone of contention in the South Asian region.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, initially, the Shanghai Five was created by China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan in 1996 with the aim to resolve the border disputes among its member states. Later on, Uzbekistan was also granted full membership in 2001 and the Organization was named as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The Organization promotes and beholds the objectives for creating an environment of mutual respect, trust and friendly ties with neighboring and member states based on enhanced support for the progressive cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, education, scientific technology, power, communication, energy and environmental protection issues. Right from its very inception, the Organization has also remained unpredictable due to its nature as it often conducts military drills of its member state troops and has a collective response force and a Regional Anti-terrorism Structure (RATS) with a remarkably dedicated number of personnel.

For its part, if the Organization effectively resolves the historical hostility amongst states in the troubled region, then it would not be less than a watermark in the history of diplomacy and multilateral alliance- an alliance that would possess significant influence in the coming future than any other state, alliance or multilateral organization in the world. Especially after Pakistan and India's joining, if the SCO successfully managed to play its significant role in bridging relations of both rival neighbors then it would definitely be a sign of turning point to jot down a new history which will of course, encourage and attract many other states to come under the SCO umbrella. The region already attracts attention of many states as due to the rapid industrial and economic growth that has dramatically managed to shift the power dynamics in the Asian region. The power being multi-dimensional in its nature has many countenances that



are not bound to the explanations of military might only, but the economic, political and the military power are some examples which are also in gradual growth in the region.

The member states of the SCO like China, which is a dominant global economic hub while Russia has also a huge industrial strength along with immense energy resources. Likewise, the Central Asian member states of the SCO like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan and Kazakhstan possess approximately 40% of oil and natural gas resources of the world. In addition, the membership of India and Pakistan in the SCO would prove it an ever strengthened organization by significant economic, political, industrial, military and many other opportunities. Many analysts also believe that the SCO is a counterweighted to the NATO and also have termed it as NATO of the East that would someday transform into a military alliance. Such speculations are mainly because of the way of conduct and the framework of the Organization by which it involves the member states in military drills and created a Regional Anti-terrorist Structure.

Apart from SCO's role in the region's economic development and member states' security issues, a particularly significant emphasize for the fruitful efforts is essential to the settlement of potential state-state issues, otherwise both India and Pakistan are already members of the SAARC but it has hardly played any effective role in overcoming the existing hostility and the resolution of disputes. Besides the business opportunities for the member states, a real-time framework is also need of hour to further extend SCO as an influential player in the regional and international affairs, otherwise even after granting permanent membership to Pakistan and India, the outcome would be no more than a further divide in the Organization particularly by crafting the conception of organization within the organization where two sides would be supported by their respective favoring member states of the Organization.

<http://www.lhrtimes.com/sco-as-a-dominant-regional-player-and-its-impacts-on-pakistan-india-bilateral-relations/>



# Western Propaganda against Pak Nukes

Shahzadi Tooba Hussain Syed

British Home Secretary Theresa May warned that if ISIL consolidates its control over the land it occupies, “We will see the world’s first truly terrorist state” with “the space to plot attacks against us.” Its seizure of banks and oil fields gave it more than \$2 billion in assets. If ISIL could make the right connection to corrupt officials in Russia or Pakistan, the group might be able to buy enough highly enriched uranium (about 50 pounds) and the technical help to build a crude nuclear device. Militants recruited from Europe or America could help smuggle it into their home nations.

This news and whatever written in the above mentioned article, is not so shocking or new for Pakistan as we are use to all of it since the inception of our nuclear program. But the concerns over security of Pakistan’s arsenal after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Western nations, particularly their think tanks and the media, started to propagate about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets.

On September 18, 2001, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) raised concerns that “increased instability in Pakistan could make Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and stocks of nuclear explosive material dangerously vulnerable to theft by militant groups.” The report also highlighted the possibility of an armed attack on Pakistani nuclear installations by extremist groups linked to Osama bin Laden or the Taliban, and the role of security forces personnel sympathetic to the Islamic fundamental cause.

Gist of all the above statements quoted and thousands similar unquoted, and the “thrilled scenarios” by the Western media their officials emphasize that there is an outsider threat: an armed group or individual from outside of a facility gains access to nuclear weapons and an Insider threat: a person from within the setup gets control on nuclear weapon and sells or gives it to outsiders, as the Pakistani government could become weaker due to growing instability in the country, the command and control of nuclear weapons could become vulnerable. That could increase the risk that terrorists acquire a nuclear weapon or material. So the West, particularly the U.S., should secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

The constantly evolving nuclear safety and security culture in Pakistan is now almost 12 years old. Although there is still a need for further improvement, Pakistan has, over the years, made its nuclear weapons as secure as other nuclear-weapon States have done. Since the 1998



nuclear tests, Pakistani authorities have taken different measures to safeguard the country's nuclear assets. In this regard National Command Authority (NCA) 1999 was being created, formally announced in 2000, to manage and safeguard nuclear assets and related infrastructures. The NCA has a three-tiered structure with two committees, the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC), constituting one tier; another tier is the permanent secretariat of the NCA, Strategic Plan Division (SPD); and the three services Strategic Force Command, the 3rd tier. The Employment Control Committee is the NCA's main policymaking organ. With the establishment of NCA and SPD, the management of nuclear weapons acquired "institutionalized capability", with the reassurance that everything is under control.

Recently Pakistan has been told to focus on its non-proliferation credentials against Pakistan's request to get access to civilian nuclear technology, similar to India-US civilian nuclear deal from the US. US is in no mood to see Pakistan progressive by making the old allegation still alive. The actions of Abdul Qadeer Khan from the late 1980s through the 1990s that resulted in the transfer of sensitive technologies to Iran and Libya, among other activities, was due to flaws and in the previous oversight system. Prior to the Abdul Qadeer Khan's black market scandal, Pakistan's nuclear export control framework was governed by statutory regulatory orders and ordinances. In 2004, Pakistan consolidated most of the previous regulations in a single legislation: the "Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material, and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Means Act, 2004." The 2004 Export Control Act was established to strengthen controls on the export, re export, transshipment and transit of goods and technologies, material and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and missiles capable of delivering such weapons. The Act extends to whole of Pakistan and maintains a control list which is consistent with the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group.

Pakistan does follow strict rules and regulations for the foolproof security of its nuclear weapons and a number of initiatives have been taken in this regard. The weapons are apparently kept separate from their delivery systems just to minimize chances of any catastrophe. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's former President affirmed that Pakistan warheads and missiles are not ready to fire with a button in hand. The concerns regarding the accidental launch of nuclear weapon are also addressed by attaching nuclear warheads with a code-lock device 'Adaptation of Permissive Action Links' (PALs). By doing this any nuclear launched decision is not plausible unless of two or three men decision. Such a strictest procedure shows Pakistan maturity and competent of keeping nuclear weapons safe.



In order to neutralize and deter conventional superiority and nuclear capability of its traditional rival India, Pakistan was left with no choice except to go nuclear on 28 May, 1998. On November 12, 2007 in response to comments by former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., John Bolton, and two reports published in the Washington Post and the New York Times on November 11, 2007, which stated that the U.S. had made contingency plans to stop Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands, Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesman, Mohammad Sadiq, said that Pakistan had sufficient "retaliatory capacity" to defend its nuclear weapons. He also said that there was no risk of the weapons being taken by any group, and if another country tried to intervene, Pakistan is ready to defend its nuclear arsenal.

The nature of the Western societies is to get sensation and thrill out of everything whether its news, movies or their ideas, and they apply it in International politics. They come up with their thrilled ideas and then start collecting all the scattered puzzle pieces to make their ideas into a tangible threat to the world. They are still in the denial phase or in shock that how an Islamic state (way too far from the developing states even) can get this technology? Well except all the other factors it is in the best of Pakistan's own survival to take care its nukes. We know how to maintain this pride of being "atomic" even.

<http://epaper.pakobserver.net/201508/20/comments-2.php>



## What happened with the CTBT?

Maimuna Ashraf

“Now we are all sons of b\*\*\*\*\*”, an immediate response of Dr Kenneth T Bainbridge, the physicist who directed the first atomic bomb test, on the first ever detonation of nuclear weapon. “Trinity” was the codename given to the world’s first nuclear explosion by Dr J Robert Oppenheimer, known as the ‘father of atomic bomb’ for leading the World War II Manhattan Project that produced the first atomic bomb. His reaction to Trinity Test, in which he recalled line from Bhagavad-Gita is also remarkable; “Now I am become death, the destroyers of worlds.” ‘The foul and awesome display’ of this plutonium implosion device was seen on July 16, 1945, at a site known as “Jornade del Muerto” located in the New Mexico desert at Alamogordo, some miles south of Los Alamos. The world lately observed the 70th anniversary of the dawn of nuclear age.

Since this first nuclear explosion till now, 2,053 nuclear test explosions have been recorded at dozens of test sites around the world by eight states: P5, India, Pakistan and North Korea. US detonated 1,030 atomic bomb. Russia, the second nuclear power, tested 715 nuclear tests. UK carried out 45 nuclear weapon tests, France 210, China 43. India tested its first nuclear device in 1974, while reportedly 6 other nuclear tests were conducted in 1998. Responding to India’s nuclear weapon explosions, Pakistan detonated 6 nuclear devices at Chagai. North Korea exploded 3 nuclear weapons in 2006, 2009 and 2013 respectively. To ensure the protection of people’s lives and environment, most of the atomic tests are conducted underwater or underground, however almost 528 tests in early years were detonated in the atmosphere, resulting in spread of radioactive material. Often the underground nuclear explosions also vent radiations into the atmosphere and leave radioactive contamination in soil.

To advocate the banning of nuclear tests and to educate the world about the legacy impacts of nuclear detonation, UN unanimously approved a draft resolution on December 02, 2009, to declare 29 August the “International Day against Nuclear Tests”. The resolution was initiated by the Republic of Kazakhstan with a view to commemorate the closure of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear test facility on August 29, 1991, which was the world’s largest underground nuclear test site containing 181 separate tunnels and almost 460 nuclear explosions were conducted there, few reportedly resulted in dispersion of plutonium in the environment. The facility was closed by Kazakhstan government after dissolution of USSR in 1991. After the establishment of International Day against Nuclear Test, all states parties to NPT committed themselves to “achieve peace and security of world without nuclear weapons” in



May 2010. The inaugural commemoration of the International Day against Nuclear Tests was marked on August 29, 2010.

Therein lies the question as to why states detonate nuclear weapons if they jeopardise human health and environment. And is it enough to celebrate an international day against nuclear tests or what other international mechanism has been placed in this deference? Pragmatically, states conduct nuclear tests to evaluate new warhead designs and to create more sophisticated weapons. An international instrument to ban all civilian or military purposed nuclear tests in all environments is not novel agenda of nuclear arms control. In August 1963, Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), signed by US, UK and USSR, entered into force and banned the nuclear testing of signatory states in the atmosphere, outer space, underwater but not underground. Though underground, not only the nuclear weapons testing continued but the quantity also increased.

Later, PTBT became redundant with the signing of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, which bans all nuclear explosions in all environments. Before CTBT, all treaties entered into force limit but not ban the nuclear tests. Nonetheless, CTBT will enter into force only after the 44 states listed in the treaty ratify it. Of which 41 signed the treaty, 36 ratified, while DPRK, India and Pakistan have neither signed nor ratified. Interestingly, five nuclear-capable states Egypt, Iran, Israel, including two NPT signatory states China and US, have signed but not ratified CTBT. Eight conferences on facilitating entry into force of CTBT have been held and ninth will take place this year on September 29, 2015. Since 1996, India, Pakistan and DPRK have tested their nuclear weapons while many states including US and Russia claim they have not tested nuclear weapons since this timeframe.

Although, in 2009 President Obama outlined his vision of a world free of nuclear weapons but later he forged new treaties to reduce the number of and spread of nuclear arsenals. On the contrary, he promised in his 2010 Nuclear Posture Review to uphold the triad of nuclear arsenals supported by every former US president. At the end of 2010, US ratified New START agreement with Russia to limit both sides' arsenals to 1,550 but again no advancement ensued on a treaty which puts a permanent ban on nuclear tests.

Notwithstanding that US and Russia did not explode nuclear weapons after signing CTBT, since 1997-2014, US has held twenty-eight 'subcritical, sub-zero tests in the form of computer simulations' at the Nevada National security site. Conversely, Russia has also been conducting subcritical experiments involving both uranium and weapons-grade plutonium at Novaya Zemlya test site near Arctic Circle. It means that in the absence of an option for underground testing which previously provided assurance about the reliability of deployed nukes, the



designers of nuclear weapons now depend on computer simulations along with laboratory level nuclear tests to ensure and enhance the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons.

Los Alamos National Laboratory was the first to conduct the subcritical experiment in 1997. The website of US Department of State on computer simulation says, “Today, weapons designers benefit from better simulation tools and computers capable of running highly detailed calculations. Successes to date indicate that a cadre of world-class scientists and engineers can employ physics-based simulations, modern experiments, validations against collections of re-analysed data from previous underground nuclear explosive tests, and peer reviews to support stockpile decisions well into the future without the need to return to nuclear explosive testing. These computer simulation advances provide the United States with the ability to monitor and maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear explosive testing.”

Evidently, keeping an option by not ratifying CTBT and conducting subcritical tests shows that the US aims to improve its arsenals qualitatively and want to maintain its option or ability to conduct onerous underground nuclear testing if it becomes indispensable. Inevitably, Russia would also change its attitude towards CTBT although it has ratified CTBT in 2000 if the safety or readiness of their nuclear would no more comply with the treaty. CTBT is a zero-yield ban but US and UK held “hydronuclear” tests with yields up to four pounds, whereas Russia, France, and China chose yield limits of 10 tons, 300 tons, or an exemption for peaceful nuclear detonation, respectively. Such yield limits are unacceptable to many NNWS while a preference for peaceful nuclear explosion exemption has been rejected by almost every NNWS.

Thus the contour of subject is that there is still a possibility to modernise the nuclear warheads components, verify the reliability of aging nuclear stockpiles and stimulate the environmental effects even if all 44 states ratify CTBT because it does not stop from hydronuclear, subcritical test through computer simulation and allows NWS to qualitatively improve their arsenals at sub-zero. A grim reminder on International Day against Nuclear Test is that a discriminatory CTBT would not fulfill the nuclear-test-ban ethos till it removes any escape routes including explosives or non-explosive tests.

<http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/08/29/comment/what-happened-with-the-ctbt/>



## Nuclear Game in South Asia

Beenish Altaf

Deterrence in South Asia has faced many challenges in its progression exactly in the same manner as the US and Russian deterrence evolution faced during the Cold War.

The concept of deterrence in South Asia in the late 1990s has been modified in the contemporary arena according to the ongoing security and political architecture of South Asia. As a matter of fact, the security dilemma in the South Asian region has maneuvered as a chain reaction that includes regional and extra-regional powers with competing interests, such as China, India and Pakistan respectively. While shaping eventual policy direction in this regard, the perceived national interests of each state are of great importance.

For that reason, there were various national and international factors behind the evolution of the Indian nuclear programme. India's reservations about its neighboring state, nuclear-armed China, and its quest for great power status have proven to be powerful incentives. On the other hand, Pakistan's uneasy and troubled relationship with India explicates its possession of nuclear weapons. Initially, the endeavor was just to generate a deterrence equation with its nuclear archrival, India. At that point, only one nuclear weapon was considered adequate enough to deter the adversary, effectively guaranteeing the deterrence stability of the counterpart.

However, later India formulated its new doctrinal policy as the Indian Proactive Strategy, formally termed as the Indian Cold Start Doctrine, which was designed to respond to any alleged or superficial threat from its western rival. Pakistan, in contrast, has come up with its own new war-fighting concept that envisages rapid deployments of conventional forces, coupled with introducing short range Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) to achieve strategic effects. Factually, following the conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan, Pakistan considered the need to develop TNWs in order to balance out the conventional threat posed by the high number of conventional weapons in India. By this, the evolution of conventional deterrence commenced in South Asia after which Pakistan's concerned officials quite often stated that Pakistan would continue to test and upgrade its TNWs so as to balance out superior conventional asymmetry.



According to Bernhard Brodie, a nuclear bomb is a weapon of peace and not a weapon for use (super bomb). So, nuclear deterrence is all about war avoidance and is not a war-fighting strategy. Brigadier (retd) Samson Simon Sharaf, a political economist and a television anchorperson, called deterrence a cost-benefit analysis of the gains and losses in credible, capable and hostile environments, with a common and well-understood strategic concept and language between adversaries warranting a constant appraisal of capabilities and vulnerabilities.

Deterrence in South Asia has faced many challenges in its progression exactly in the same manner as the US and Russian deterrence evolution faced during the Cold War. Regarding the changing dynamics of deterrence in South Asia, Pakistan's fear of becoming vulnerable to a first strike (and/or a desire to attain first-strike capability) gives technology a central role in deterrence and tends to fuel a high-intensity qualitative arms race. Pakistan has to develop and adopt effective controls on the graduated escalation ladder both in conventional and nuclear forces to retain the initiative of nuclear retaliation.

Paradoxically, the number of nuclear weapons enough to maintain/ensure nuclear deterrence continues to trouble nuclear deterrence theorists, strategists and policymakers in the post Cold War period alike. Meanwhile, the world's nuclear weapons' stockpile is estimated to be at 16,300 and all the nuclear armed states, in one way or the other, are constantly modifying and modernizing their nuclear inventories. No state will place a number or cap at what it considers to be a sufficient nuclear force for credible deterrence.

In South Asia, India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons' possessing neighbors and adversaries have estimated nuclear weapons' stockpiles of 90 to 110 and 115 to 120, respectively (according to estimates from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2014 and the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists). Both countries have made policies of minimum nuclear deterrence and a no-nuclear arms race. While India seeks to maintain a nuclear force sufficient to deter mainly China and Pakistan, Pakistan maintains that it seeks a deterrent 'equilibrium' with India and not 'nuclear parity' with India.

While analyzing the South Asian deterrence discourse with the western model of deterrence the first and foremost thought is that like the western perception the use of warfare, according to the strategic cultures of India and Pakistan also, is not well thought-out as a foreign policy tool. This might be one of the reasons that both nuclear, antagonistic neighbors are not seriously taking steps for doctrinal preparations and crisis management for a supposed limited nuclear escalation. One has to take into account here that it does not matter how the



adversary perceives the signals (as weak or strong), it is a key to success in the nuclear signaling game.

Hence, the deterrence discourse depends on the strategic behavior of the state as to how one perceives and what measures it adopts to the supposed threat. “Thus, the strategic behavior of states engaged in nuclear rivalries tends to be schizophrenic, treating nuclear weapons sometimes as revolutionary and sometimes as conventional.” Nevertheless, apart from the altering nature of deterrence, it is the only effective key to avoid conflict and potential escalation to nuclear war that safeguards deterrence stability.

<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/30-Aug-2015/nuclear-game-in-south-asia>



## Prospects of development: Pakistan's Relations with Central Asia

Nasurullah Brohi

The geo-strategic, political and economic significance of the Central Asia makes it one of the most important regions in the world which connects the South Asia, West Asia, Russia, China and other parts of the world through the historic Silk Route which always has served as a crossroads in terms of trade between Europe and the Asia.

The Central Asian region is also immensely rich in oil and natural gas resources and has a compelling attraction for all the regional and international countries to get into the closer interaction through bilateral or multilateral relation with the Central Asian Republics CARs.

For Pakistan, the geographic proximity and many commonly shared features along with eternal religious bounds are some of the reasons which bring two sides closer to each other, but despite of these factors unluckily due to the political instability, poor law and order situation, an unstable economy and lack of transport infrastructure-essential to connect both sides has badly affected the opportunities of mutual benefit.

The recent visit of Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Kazakhstan is seen as a step to overcome the existing obstacles which deprive the region from its due right of prosperity and progress in spite of having remarkable prospects. The current pace of trade turnover between Pakistan and Kazakhstan is also limited to \$33 million in a year, which indicates the exceptional setbacks at the part of two countries, and seriously need to be addressed as both sides have immense economic and trade potential and can easily exploit the available means particularly by Kazakhstan crucial role to enhance the trade interface with Pakistan through the WTO.

In addition, recently, the United Nations has also accepted Pakistan's request to access the Customs Convention on International Transport of Goods (TIR Convention) and is expected to be enforced by January, 2016. The TIR Convention is a tax and custom duty-free setup which involves the traffic-in-transit of the goods across the border. The TIR has been working since 1978 with 68 member states and the European Union as parties to the Convention providing a framework of free trade within the ECO region but prior to this all the member states of the ECO had acceded to the TIR convention except Pakistan.



The TIR Convention can prove as a momentous prospect for Pakistan in enhancing its trade with Afghanistan, Central Asian States and with the European countries. One of the main hurdles for slow cooperation in the past was principally due to the lack of transport infrastructure which is always essential for the bilateral trade between the two countries and the current China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project will relatively overcome the issue and will bring immense opportunities for the Central Asian countries in the economic fields.

The Kazakh government is also deeply interested to become part of Pak-China Economic Corridor project and has offered for an alternative access route to the sea, whereas; Pakistan has already planned to be connected with Central Asia via Tirmiz, the southern city of Uzbekistan and the landlocked CARs can hugely benefit from an access route to the international markets through CPEC. In addition, the recent development of Pakistan's permanent membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization further enhances the chances of huge economic opportunities for the whole region.

Afghanistan is also one of the countries in the region whose importance can never be overlooked. The security situation in the wake of 9/11 brought a colossal snag for many countries which adversely affected the regional trade and other mutually benefiting opportunities. Notably, for all of the countries in the region a peaceful Afghanistan will become a ray of hope and a sign of progress because it is the only easiest land route which connects the Central Asian region with the other parts of the world.

Moreover, the CARs and the Afghanistan are mainly dependant on Pakistan due to its exceptionally important geographic location and the sea ports like Gawadar and Karachi but all that is needed for progress and prosperity in the region is a collective move by Central Asian Republics CARs, Afghanistan and Pakistan to firmly address the security issues, weak law and order situation, and internal instability. Particularly, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, almost all of the CARs passed through serious challenges due to terrorism, religious extremism, separatism, drug trafficking and organized crimes which were some of the major reasons that seriously hampered the economic progress and development of these countries.

The visit of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to Kazakhstan is also seen as a foresighted move towards the greater aspirations for further strengthening the bilateral relations and increasing the economic and the trade cooperation with the CARs therefore, the two sides also realized the importance of extraordinarily accentuate for exploring the variety of options to further boost up their cooperation in the fields of engineering, infrastructure, agriculture, medicine and many MoU were also signed particularly aiming to focus on defence and strategic research, trade development and the exchange programs for the training of diplomats.



<http://www.voiceofjournalists.com/prospects-of-development-pakistans-relations-with-central-asia/>



# Changing Dynamics of Asian Security Architecture: Russia Pakistan Bilateral Defence Ties

**Shahzadi Tooba Hussain Syed**

While Modi was making deals with UAE and Indians gloating over “filling the vacuum,” Pakistan went ahead and bought defense equipment from the traditional Cold War rival of Pakistan and an ally of India, Russia. The strategic realities are changing and decisive shifts occurring to shape the future Asian security architecture.

Pakistan and Russia on Wednesday signed a landmark defence deal that includes the sale of four Mi-35 ‘Hind E’ attack helicopters to Pakistan. In addition, Russian state-owned firm Rostekh Corporation is planning to build a 680 mile gas pipeline in Pakistan in 2017 at an estimated cost of \$2.5 billion. Pakistan currently has a number of Mi-17 helicopters delivered by the United States to assist in the fight against militancy.

Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif had also visited Russia in June, after which a draft contract for the delivery of four Mi-35M ‘Hind E’ combat helicopters was sent to Pakistan from Russia. Both countries were negotiating the deal for the past year, signalling a major thaw in relations between the two cold-war rivals.

The Mi-35 helicopter is an exceedingly modernized version of the Mi-24 (Hind) combat helicopter with new onboard equipment and avionics. Avionics play a critical role in modern combat and this is why the electronic core of Mi-35 underwent numbers of fundamental modifications. Wide spectrums of latest avionics were incorporated in the cockpit.

The Mi-35M is fitted with improved sensor package as well including a night vision system which has turned this helicopter into a deadly prey during the night missions. To enhance the operational freedom and combat accuracy, Mi-35M is fitted with electro-optical rangefinder/targeting system with thermal imaging guidance channel, satellite positioning and navigation system, electronic multifunction displays, onboard computer and new generation jam-proof communications equipment.

All these modifications have made this system a natural attraction for Pakistan Army in its long pursuit of a reliable and affordable gunship to be used in ongoing counter-insurgency and



counter-terrorism operations all across the country. It also has a more powerful engine and a different tail rotor.

The main feature of this multirole versatile helicopter is that can also carry 8 fully loaded army troops. Four helicopters can drop 32 SSG troops and then can provide them with aerial cover as well.

To test the machine robustly in mountainous regions especially in FATA, initially Pakistan has placed a smaller order of only 4 machines. Pakistan Army is likely to place a larger follow-up order depending upon the outcome of the performance of these machines.

The deal had to be followed by another ‘technical cooperation agreement’ to pave the way for sale of defence equipment to Pakistan. Besides helicopters, Pakistan also appears interested in other Russian hardware as well.

After the US drawdown in Afghanistan and lessening the influence in the region these ties after Tehran Pakistan It's the best time to have such relations in the region when US is Russia is an alternate source for Western military technology and energy supplier and Pakistan despite its structural problems is a growing economy with young population in need of both energy supplies and defense equipment.

Historically Pakistan has the reputation of being a strong ally of USA and India towards Russia. Pakistan should realize now the Henry Kissinger's statement that "America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests".

Sanctions-hit Russia will have a new market for its defense equipment and now it is not willing to wait and watch. It needs a new, powerful friend in the region who can act as a supporter, if not necessarily an ally against the threat of Western (US + NATO) hegemony in the region.

<http://dailythepatriot.com/changing-dynamics-of-asian-security-architecture-russia-pakistan-bilateral-defence-ties/>



# Dangers of Asymmetric Arms Acquisition

Adeel Mukhtar

Conventional military balance between India and Pakistan is an indispensable prerequisite for the continuance of peace in South Asia. Since overt nuclearization, India and Pakistan remained successful in avoiding any major war owing to the nuclear deterrence; however, stability-instability paradox prevailing in the region hampers growth of peaceful relations between two countries.

The concept, “Stability-Instability Paradox,” was defined by Glen Snyder, according to which, the greater the stability of ‘strategic’ balance of terror, the lower the stability of the overall balance at its lower levels of violence. In addition, Michael Krepon’s “The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia” gives convincing arguments. According to him, there are two tenets of stability-instability paradox. First, the offsetting nuclear capabilities will increase tensions between adversaries. Second, despite increase tensions and severe tensions, nuclear armed adversaries will avoid a major conflict or a nuclear exchange. According to him, both tenets are relevant in South Asia in the shape of Kargil conflict 1999 and the fortunate of both nations to avoid a nuclear exchange respectively.

Furthermore, according to Michael D. Intriligator and Dagobert L. Brito, arms race instability is tantamount to instability against the outbreak of war. In the formal model of an arms race, each side attempts to deter the other, and, at the same time, each believes that other is attempting to acquire arms race stability or planning a pre-emptive strike. Each side, nonetheless, seeks to acquire additional weapons, reinforcing the suspicion of the other and prompting even further weapon acquisitions. These arms race acquisitions results in a situation of mutual deterrence, in which there is a great stability against the outbreak of war due to the fear of potential retaliation. They also provide insurance against technological breakthroughs that could reduce the effectiveness of weapons. Arms race involving nuclear weapons ironically provide a way to avoid nuclear war. In this sense, nuclear weapons are part of the solution, as well as part of the problem, of avoiding nuclear war.

Theoretically, the case of South Asia is not strange from the above-explained situation. However, the most dangerous aspect of the current arms situations is neither the presence of nor the increasing levels of weapons, which, in fact, create the stability of mutual deterrence but rather the dangers of asymmetric arms acquisition pattern in the region.



In this vein, India as the third largest conventional military power is a serious challenge to Pakistan's national security. Indian defense spending has doubled since 1997, growing at an average rate of 6.3 per cent per year. In 2011-2012, India surpassed China as the biggest importer of the state-of-the art major weapon systems. In addition, Narendra Modi's government announced 11 per cent increase in 2015-2016 military budget that becomes \$39.8 billion. Similarly, Indian Army and Air force has advantage of 2:1 and 1.9:1 ratio over Pakistan forces respectively, according to, "The Military Balance 2015," of International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).

The fears of Indian military modernization also goes beyond South Asia as according to Peter Lavoy, "India's military modernization program has led to a growing disparity between the Indian and Pakistani conventional military capabilities, which will result either in regional arms race and/or lowering of the nuclear threshold."

Unfortunately, owing to socio-economic hurdles, Pakistan remained unable to reach at the level of Indian conventional forces, therefore, has to embrace the utility of tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan also faces the pressure of United States that is less in the case of India as evident from the Russia-Pakistan deal for the sale of MI-35 helicopters. Actually, according to HIS Jane's, Pakistan was supposed to buy nearly 20 helicopters from Russia, however, owing to U.S pressure, the deal stuck at four.

Last but not the least, the question remains, whether Pakistan still possess the capacity to deter India both conventionally as well as strategically or it need to opt for offensive-defense posture as some deterrence optimists of Pakistan are suggesting?

<http://epaper.pakobserver.net/201508/29/comments-2.php>



# Slum Demolition: Security Fortified or Compromise?

S. Sadia Kazmi

Security concerns remain at the forefront of Pakistan's policy agenda. Whether it is the internal or external security issues, the state authority is continuously grappling with the task at various levels. In a bid to remove all types of security risks in the capital, the Islamabad High Court recently sanctioned the clearing of slum settlements.

A look at the CDA operation against the slum dwellers reveals that the eviction plan is driven by the need for security measures to be ensured in the federal capital. These slums are seen as a source of potential risk for the peace and security owing to the fact that most of these people are not the local citizens but unregistered and unidentified immigrants who have overstayed their welcome and have turned into a menace by refusing to leave their semi permanent abodes built on someone else's land. Hence not only could they serve as a likely place of refuge for miscreants and criminals but can also be a potential breeding ground for the population with the same attributes. In such a scenario, they don't leave any other option to the authorities but that they be razed and removed forcefully so that peace and security could be maintained.

The operation might be justified on the legal grounds but the way the plan is being carried out raises serious questions: Will it actually help achieve the targeted goal or will it just be another cosmetic measure aiming at restoring the pristine look of the capital? What significant points were overlooked by the authorities? How is the state going to deal with the possibility of the displaced poor population becoming a pawn in the hands of terrorists? Lastly, could this operation back fire and further aggravate the security situation?

Lack of proper planning can inadvertently impact the security environment. The policy implementation should always be preceded by a process of securitisation i.e., to create awareness about the existence, nature and intensity of a particular threat. Since no such measures were taken, the general public was left wondering as to why the poor residents living in deplorable condition were being uprooted. The action meant for the protection of larger population only served to antagonise them against the authorities. Unfortunately this nontraditional "social" dimension of security is usually overlooked by the authorities in Pakistan who fail to recognize the potential of its negative ramifications. Such non kinetic security



challenges could be dealt with if the government makes efforts to sensitize the masses through a step by step process of identification of risks, its reinforcement and securitization through the speech act.

A large number of Pakistani citizens belonging to Christian minority class also reside in these slums. The state has a responsibility to provide them with alternative shelter. But no resettlement plan has been announced. This problem could be addressed if the government and the private sector come together for the quick and early relocation of the displaced citizens. The state is already finding it hard to deal with the ethnic and sectarian problems and cannot afford to further alienate the minorities.

Media's responsible role is also very important in such cases. It should not just be "covering" the story but should also convey the right message through to the people. Showing one side of the picture without laying out the facts could be rather damaging for the general health of the society. The people saw on their television sets how big bulldozers went about demolishing dozens of one-room mud and thatched houses in sector I-11. Tear gas was used and the unarmed protestors were chased after by the baton wielding police. They were beaten, dragged and arrested, while the women were left crying and wailing. Such had been the media projection, which only led to invoking sympathies in favor of squatter settlers.

No doubt these immigrants and illegal settlers have been an economic and demographic burden and an eye sore for an otherwise immaculate landscape of the capital, but after having them displaced they are now even more dependent on others for shelter, food and water, hence a bigger burden for the government to deal with.

Also previously the suspected potential risk elements were present at one place, now they are more dispersed and much harder to manage and locate.

There is also a huge possibility that the extremist organisations might try to cash in on the opportunity and win support of this vulnerable populace by offering them means and incentives for their sustenance. Desperation may lead these people to grab on to any option they may come across that guarantees their survival, hence creating bigger security risks for the state.

The state authority needs to realise that the heavy cost will not only be paid by the slum dwellers but by the state too. Comprehensive security will be guaranteed only if the demolition plan is paired with a legal framework and post operation rehabilitation.



At the moment it looks like a poorly thought out eviction plan aimed at displacing the population. One ends up wondering if this attempt at ensuring the internal security would create much bigger security risks. May be it is not too hard to tell after all.

<http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/08/22/comment/slum-demolition/>



## India's Mounting Uranium Stash

Adeel Mukhtar

The nuclear relations between India and Pakistan have always been a victim of historical enmity as both countries share a history of conflicts and border disputes. In these circumstances, the Indo-U.S nuclear deal has been a topic of hot debate in Pakistan as well as in the international strategic community. Owing to the fact that India's eight out of 24 reactors (under the deal) are out of IAEA safeguards, it is likely to disturb deterrence equilibrium in the region because of expected quantitative as well as qualitative advancement of India's military might.

Two contradictory forces have always engulfed Indian nuclear program including the country's hegemonic aspiration wherein India is determined to project itself as a major power in the region and its limited uranium stockpiles.

On July 18, 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a framework for nuclear cooperation. Resultantly, three decades-long sanctions against India in the backdrop of its 1974 nuclear tests came to an end. Subsequently, the final agreement was signed at last on October 10, 2008.

On the international level, the proponents of non-proliferation came forward in defense of Non-Proliferation Regime (NPR). As according to Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala and Daryl G. Kimball of Arms Control Association, "contrary to the claims of its advocates, the deal [Nuclear] fails to bring India further in conformity with the nonproliferation behavior expected of the member states of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Unlike other countries, India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It continues to produce fissile material and expand its arsenals."

In addition, according to George Perkovich, "The U.S-India nuclear deal and its transformation into the NSG-India nuclear deal involved making and unmaking international rules. By exempting India from rules, the deal amounted to selective non-enforcement...by ignoring moratorium route, the U.S and India further undermined the cause of nonproliferation...and it enables India immediately to import fuel and sign reactor construction contracts with foreign suppliers."

In 2005, Indian nuclear reactors were on the brink of collapse owing to the insufficient amount of uranium stockpiles. However, because of NSG waiver granted to India for successful Indo-U.S nuclear deal, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Canadian Prime Minister



Stephen Harper pronounced a deal, wherein Canada's Cameco Corporation will supply India with 3,000 metric tonnes of Uranium over the next five years. Interestingly, the deal comes 45 years after Canada officially banned all exports of uranium to India in 1974, following India's "Smiling Buddha" nuclear test.

Moreover, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott has sealed a civil nuclear deal to sell uranium to India as well. In a similar vein, Kazakhstan, recently, signed an agreement with India to supply India with 5,000 tonnes of uranium over the next five years.

In this way, Indo-U.S nuclear deal have provided India with surplus uranium that could easily be converted for military usage that would surely disturb strategic equilibrium in Asia, specially South Asia. Under the Nuclear Deal, India would also be eligible to buy U.S. dual-use nuclear technology, including materials and equipment that could be used to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, potentially creating the material for nuclear bombs.

The India-US nuclear deal is very significant to Beijing because it is perceived as a tactic of the US grand strategy to contain China's rise. Pakistan's nuclear policy has always been India-centric since beginning. As there are no sufficient safeguards that halt any possible uranium diversion for military purposes and if India went for the advancement of its nuclear weapons either quantitatively or qualitatively, then Pakistan would likely follow the path, consequently, aggravating nuclear arms race in the region.

<http://www.voiceofjournalists.com/indias-mounting-uranium-stash/>



## NSA Level Talks and US, what's missing

S. Sadia Kazmi

Stalemate is not a new phenomenon between India and Pakistan neither is the cease fire violations along the LOC. Talks have been stalled before, visits have been canceled earlier, violent official rhetorics have been exchanged on regular basis, and the world generally has raised concerns over the enraged sentiments of nuclear tipped neighbors in South Asia.

This whole pattern, in more or less the same order and intensity has been witnessed many times before. While one cannot deny the importance of measures like CBMs, attention to cross border terrorism, enhanced trade, and people to people contacts, to create a climate for constructive development, but ignoring the centrality of Kashmir issue will always hamper the prospects of stability. Attempts at creating durable peace have always been unproductive and will continue to be so if the Kashmir issue is not addressed. It is as simple and as obvious as that.

In the present scenario when the most awaited NSA level talks have been called off and the situation at the border is more effervescent than ever, India and Pakistan both need to reevaluate their options. Harping on the same blame game against each other will do no good to any side.

No doubt Kashmir is not an easy problem to tackle but India's insistence on leaving it out of the talks in the hope for avoiding deadlock over other bilateral issues is reflective of its diplomatic immaturity and stubbornness of the highest level. India needs to understand that "negotiations" cannot be held on terms of just one party and definitely cannot begin with "pre-conditions".

Both India and Pakistan have enormous stakes in unresolved issue of Kashmir. The acts of violence, hostilities, terrorism, which Ufa agreement hoped to address, have their roots in this very issue. One then fails to understand how India expects to address the problem of terrorism without tending the core issue of Kashmir. How can India be so naïve not to realize that Kashmiris are an inalienable part of Kashmir dispute and that Indian opposition of not including them in bilateral talk only shows the lack of proper judgment and sincerity on India's part. Why does India feel the need to pick and chose which "type" of terrorism is to be discussed and which is off the agenda? India must let go of its arrogance and accept this reality. In order to dispel the charged up emotions on both sides, Kashmir needs to be discussed and addressed



with genuine efforts as this is the only way to achieve peace and prosperity in the South Asian region.

The US National Security Advisor's emergency visit to Pakistan is of utmost importance in this regard. On one hand it shows how closely the US is observing the development on Ufa agreement, and on the other hand it also reflects upon US acknowledging strategic importance of Pakistan. The visit gives out the message loud and clear, that any effort to bring about peace in the region will require an equal amount of participation from both the states. However it raises some serious questions too. Does Pakistan need to be "told" if the talks should be resumed or not? Does the US think that Pakistan is not aware of what is important for its National Security? Will the US suggest Pakistan to resume the talks as per India's terms and conditions? There is a hope that the US National Security Advisor Susan Rice doesn't come with an authoritative tone with regards to the mandated bilateral and regional issues.

The US also needs to show serious and honest efforts if it is genuinely committed to peace and stability in South Asian region. It knows that the security dynamics between India and Pakistan will never favour a bilateral solution to their problems, and that the third player will always be required who would bring the two sides on the negotiation table while itself staying impartial. Only paying visits and issuing statements that the two countries should hold talks and later expressing disappointments when they are canceled, is useless. Standing on the sidelines as a spectator and hoping to see the positive outcomes is rather foolhardy on US' part.

US should also realize that India cannot just have these talks resumed on its terms but will have to take Pakistan's concerns into considerations too. Any attempt by the US to convince Pakistan for the resumption of talks while ignoring this crucial aspect will only reveal its hypocrisy.

Pakistan should also make the most of the visit by Susan Rice. It should clearly state the importance of Kashmir issue for Pakistan and for the region and should stick to it. Also the copy of the dossier that was prepared to be presented at NSA level talks between India and Pakistan showing India's interference should now be presented to Susan Rice. Not just that but it should also made public with concrete facts and figures so that right picture is portrayed globally. US is required to play the role of an active, responsible, and impartial mediator.

All core issues important to each side should be laid out openly on the tables otherwise talks will continue to be derailed, peace process will continue to be hampered, and bloodshed and violence will continue to further worsen the political stability in the South Asian region.



Pakistan has the political will and eagerness, and now same is required from India and the US. This is what has always been missing.

One simply cannot expect different results by employing same “formula” every time.

<http://epaper.pakobserver.net/201509/01/comments-2.php>