

SVI FORESIGHT
VOLUME I, NUMBER 1

JULY 2015

Compiled by
Beenish Altaf



STRATEGIC VISION
INSTITUTE

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

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Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this edition are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Strategic Vision Institute.

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is an autonomous, multidisciplinary and non-partisan institution, established in January 2013. It is a non-governmental and non-commercial organization, administered by a Board of Governors (General Body) supervised under a Chairperson and administered by a Management Committee headed by a President/Executive Director.

SVI aims to project strategic foresight on issues of national and international import through dispassionate, impartial and independent research, analyses and studies. The current spotlight of the SVI is on the national security, regional and international peace and stability, strategic studies, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and strategic stability, nuclear safety and security and energy studies.

SVI Foresight

SVI Foresight is a monthly electronic journal. It has a multi-disciplinary course highlighting on the contemporary strategic and security studies. The issue is envisioned to be a collection of policy-oriented articles, written by its Research Associates, Visiting Faculty and professional experts. The idea is to provide the readership with a concise all-round and real-time discourse on contemporary strategic regional and international developments, highlighting their relevance to Pakistan.

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Preface

SVI has successfully entered into the third year and though still in its formative phase, its pleased to introduce an electronic monthly titled: *SVI Foresight*.

The higher cause to promote national security and development, regional harmony and international peaceful cooperation inspires the SVI Associates to selflessly strive for providing an easy and ready access to its readers and audience to high quality scholarly research material and literature that is being produced at the Institute. Nothing is more apt than an electronic monthly issue to keep the audience informed on the regular basis.

This new electronic issue has been envisioned and founded to represent the growing need for connecting to the larger audience. In this age and time where one click of a button can generate plethora of information, we feel it is important to utilize all the available fora and media to disseminate the work which SVI has been continually performing and contributing in the diverse fields of strategic, security, and nuclear studies, including: nuclear security, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and strategic stability, with an ultimate aim of stimulating more debate and research in these vibrant areas.

SVI was conceived after my service tenure ended at the Quaid-i-Azam University as the Chairperson Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Meritorious Professor of Strategic Studies and Dean Faculty of Social Sciences. *SVI Foresight* aims to address and expand audience both at the national and international levels among the scholars, researchers, policy makers, thinkers, journalists and students who are eager to get the fresh perspective on the contemporary strategic issues.

SVI Foresight [aims](#) to improve the agenda of the Institute i.e., to provide futuristic commentaries by its Research Associates and contributing professional experts and scholars, with the aforementioned new dynamics, while maintaining required level of quality in the debate. However, the individual views are not necessarily endorsed by the Institute. We are also looking forward to entertaining as many manuscripts from other contributors in the future.

I would also like to mention that despite resource constraints and challenges in terms of time and limited research scholars already hard-pressed with several academic and administrative tasks, *SVI Foresight* had been made possible by the sheer dedication and self driven motivation of the SVI team and its sympathizers. We at the SVI feel very pleased to have achieved this milestone of initiating the monthly Foresight. I am sure the *SVI Foresight* will become part of the voice of a larger national, regional and global community addressing contemporary strategic and security issues and the discourse on these issues. We are looking forward to a mutually educative interaction and enriching experience through the SVI Foresight.



Any suggestions for further improvement are welcome at our [contact address](#). Please see [here](#) the copy of *SVI Foresight* electronic journal. You can find us on [Facebook](#) and can also access our official [website](#).

Zafar I Cheema

President/Executive Director SVI



Editor's Note

Since its inception in 2013, Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) has been regularly contributing to the discourse on the issues of strategic importance in the realm of national, regional and international security through capacity-building workshops, In-house seminars, conferences, roundtables and opinion articles, covering a wide range of audience. The SVI has now decided to enhance its contribution by publishing an electronic journal: *SVI Foresight*

SVI Foresight is the first initiative in this regard that will provide a monthly update about professional scholarly analyses and research. It aims to improve the agenda of the Institute i.e., to provide futuristic commentary, with the aforementioned new dynamics, while maintaining required level of quality in the discussion. The update is envisioned to be a compilation of policy oriented articles, written by the generation of new scholars. The idea behind the scheme is to provide the readership with a concise all-rounder of real-time security and political happenings especially of contemporary strategic importance to Pakistan. *SVI Foresight* is expected to be published on monthly basis and aims to contain quality articles and arguments. The views are not necessarily endorsed by the Institute nevertheless the scholarly arguments are thought provoking and important.

With anticipations, it shall be a good addition for enhancement of strategic awareness. We hope that our effort would help to fill the gap in electronic and all the other means of publication. Any suggestion for further improvement is welcome at the contact address cited at the end.



Crafting Deterrence for Nuclear Policies

If the purpose is just deterrence, then it is better to seek a balanced deterrent posture
“Deterrence is the art of producing, in the mind of the enemy, the fear to attack.” — Dr Strangelove, 1964.

Beenish Altaf

Essentially, every country has to maintain certain policies in order to meet its security concerns both globally and internally. While defining the tasks for adopting a certain set of principals or policies, Henry Kissinger stated that the aim of choosing certain policy options is to translate “the power into policy”, so that states know “what objectives are worth contending for and determine the degree of force appropriate for achieving them.”

In Pakistan’s context, it had two choices while shaping or designing its nuclear deterrence, one was the war denying deterrence and the other was the war fighting deterrence. Both choices had a different pattern of implications, including developmental strategies. War denying deterrence required the minimum number of weapons, while the war fighting deterrence needed large amounts of nuclear arsenal, a variety of delivery means and missile defence programs etc. Pakistan’s economy and strategic interests allow only the pursuit of the war denying deterrence. This is the reason the Pakistan does not believe in the need for nuclear parity and is just seeking to maintain a deterrent equilibrium or, more precisely, is just balancing the threat created by the conventional superiority of the enemy. Pragmatically, if one state has to adopt a war fighting nuclear doctrine, then it is desirable for that state to opt for nuclear parity with its adversary. However, if the purpose is just deterrence, then it is better to seek a balanced deterrent posture. Resultantly, Pakistan principally decided to adopt the option of credible minimum deterrence. Now, minimum deterrence and its credibility come into question.

While defining the minimum deterrence, Rodney W Jones stated that “the term minimum rapidly became a fixture of the public nuclear discourse in South Asia. Neither India nor Pakistan officially clarified what the term minimum means leaving this open to speculations. Does minimum imply the sufficiency of small numbers of nuclear weapons; Nuclear weapons held in reserve; low reading or alert rates of a nuclear force; renunciation of nuclear war fighting or mainly counter-value targeting? Or does the minimum merely make a virtue of today’s facts of life in the subcontinent — limited resources, scarce weapons material, unproved delivery systems, and still undeveloped technical military capabilities?”



Since Pakistan is a minor nuclear weapon state of the second atomic age, the term minimum is only used to send a satisfactory message to the international community. Depending upon smaller nuclear weapons is comparatively more manageable in terms of deployment, maintenance, command and control systems etc. Certainly the minimum minimizes the dangers of inadvertence and the misuse of nuclear weapons. The term minimum also mollifies the proliferation concerns of the international community. The term credibility has been added in order to add ambiguity, perhaps for psychological comfort or to leave room for modernizing the weapon inventories. Paradoxically, policy makers in Pakistan feel convinced that this ambiguity serves the purpose of deterrence well. A credible system would, in such circumstances, help keep a psychological check on the adversary. Also, it would provide the protagonist an additional cushion of comfort, as viewed by Ms Sadia Tasleem in her essay entitled “Towards an Indo-Pak Nuclear Lexicon-II: Credible Minimum Deterrence”. The emphasis on the word credible was meant to reinforce the importance of credibility. It does not suggest a shift from the minimum deterrence policy.

The posture of credible minimum deterrence has remained the principle option for Pakistan’s nuclear policy. This principle is based on the concept that Pakistan’s nuclear policy is driven by its perceived threat to its security from India and is therefore India-centric. Deterrence is the sole aim and a small arsenal is considered adequate to satisfy it. But ironically, the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons and battlefield weapons in the region is actually a modernized advancement in the inventories. These weapons are meant to balance out the inferiority complex. So, it could be concluded that it is only when states feel threatened that they opt to defend their territory and sovereignty, which actually compels them to maximize and enrich their security measures under the perceived threat of vulnerability. But to maintain a deterrent posture, according to my understanding, a large number of weapons is not necessary because the possession of a nuclear weapon is in itself enough for crafting deterrence. Even by possessing one nuke, nuclear aggression from the other state can be discouraged. So the question of numeric parity or nuclear sufficiency does not make sense in this case. Therefore, it would not be incorrect to conclude that credible minimum deterrence is different from nuclear parity and nuclear supremacy.

<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/26-Jun-2015/crafting-deterrence-for-nuclear-policies>

Why Pakistan does not sign NPT!

Maimuna Ashraf

The closing meeting of month-long ninth NPT Review Conference (RevCon) opened a novel debate about the future of non-proliferation regime. The four weeks long negotiations ended in dismay as the states party to the treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation could not reach on a consensus document to improve progress on non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and towards nuclear weapon free zone in Middle East. Since the first successful NPT RevCon in 2000, after every five years, the RevCon fits the zigzag pattern of success and failure. The 2015 RevCon reaffirmed the notion that the international mechanism to combat nuclear proliferation is becoming increasingly 'inadequate' not only to deal with potential proliferators, which are few but more determined, but also undermines objectives of the Articles I, II, IV and VI of the NPT. Although, until the 1980s, the international measures to prevent nuclear proliferation were relatively more successful, but later on the non-nuclear weapon states (Iran, North Korea, Libya and Syria) were not constrained by instruments of international non-proliferation regime. So far, nine states have acquired nuclear weapons while more than 30 states have technological capability to acquire them which poses serious challenges to NPT.

Notwithstanding the strengths of non-proliferation regime since 1968 with membership of 191 states and many non-proliferation agreements, yet an effective and efficient regime demands an in-depth re-evaluation of the non-proliferation regime and identification of the weaknesses for its restructuring and reformation. The major drawback of non-proliferation regime, which has reopened the debate about the limitations of non-proliferation regime, is that the institutional structure and process of the non-proliferation regime has by itself not been fairly adopted and therefore could not be successful in tackling issues like transfer of nuclear technology and fissile material from Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) to Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS). Though Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and Nuclear Safety and Security addressed through the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) have succeeded in creating institutional frameworks to address the problems but have yet to fully achieve their objectives.

In addition, the discrimination exercised in the implementation of the non-proliferation standards and employment of the Non-Proliferation Regime (NPR) as an instrument of great-power's foreign and strategic policies' objectives has raised questions about the sincerity behind its creation and subsequent application. The original and revived advancement of Indo-US Nuclear Deal undermines the non-proliferation efforts as it violates Articles I of the NPT and



defy its primary objective to prevent nuclear proliferation. Moreover, India's potential inclusion in Nuclear Supply Group (NSG), after the India-specific exemption to NSG guidelines, is disturbing regional nuclear equilibrium and triggering Pakistan to indulge in a nuclear arm race to ensure credible deterrence which is posing serious challenges to nonproliferation regime. Also, such a decision of illicit privileges by nuclear weapon state to a non-NPT state may result in further expansion of NSG.

Likewise, the country-specific safeguards display a discriminatory institutional mechanism of the nonproliferation regime and undermine the nonproliferation endeavors. Recently, India and the US renewed an enhanced Defense Framework Agreement for the next ten years and identified four key "pathfinder projects" for joint development and production including the next generation Raven mini UAVs and specialized kits for C-130 military transport aircraft. Both countries also agreed on a Working Group to explore aircraft carrier technology besides designing and development of jet engine technology. These developments not only raises question about discriminatory nature of Nuclear Proliferation Regime, India's speedy nuclear program but may instigate the signatory NPT NNWS to opt out of the Treaty or violate Treaty obligations and pursue acquisition of nuclear weapons. The withdrawal clause, Article X of NPT, already accepts the rights of member states to withdraw from the treaty. India's exemption from the NSG guidelines, potential NSG membership and India-specific IAEA safeguards renders the non-proliferation an extremely discriminatory regime. India's accumulation of uranium through deals with Australia, Canada (in the offing) and other countries based on NSG exemption will generate immense pressure on Pakistan to maintain strategic/deterrence equilibrium against India. Pakistan, the non-NPT state, entered into facility specific safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Over four decades of safe operation of nuclear power plants, perfect nuclear safety record, having an highly praised nuclear regulator, with all its nuclear power reactors under IAEA safeguards, and being a signatory to most of the international nuclear regimes and instruments, any criterion-based expansion of the NSG group must see the two neighbors together joining the group. On the contrary, India's entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) would disturb the region's strategic equilibrium, besides forcing Pakistan into arms race.

The international dual standards are also highlighted by the fact that Israel is accepted as the de-facto nuclear power in Middle East; hence the Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) remains a remote possibility as has been established from lack of consensus in the NPT RevCon 2015. In order to build a consensus in non-proliferation regime, U.S. needs to stop facilitating Israel.





The two important elements of the nonproliferation regime, CTBT and FMCT, have never come into effect which questions the status of nonproliferation efforts. Since the commencement of Conference on Disarmament sessions in 2012, many of the security observers have been saying that Pakistan is the only state blocking the CD Agenda, particularly FMCT. The prevailing notion is that Pakistan is the only state obstructing the other core items of the CD agenda 2015, including FMCT. Whereas Pakistan has repeatedly stated that it is ready to negotiate on any or all of the other CD's agenda items except FMCT with the Shannon Mandate, which collide Pakistan's security interests. Islamabad has also condemned the stance of some delegations for limiting the CD to a forum to only discuss FMCT. Therefore, the proper way to end the stalemate at the CD and resolve the asymmetries of fissile material stockpiles dilemma is to revamp the Shannon Mandate and address the security concerns of all states. Evidently, assorted propagandas have misconstrued Pakistan's justified national security concerns to divert attention from their own reluctance to make any significant move towards fulfilling their non-proliferation and disarmament obligations.

Conversely, the credibility of negative security assurances would have been a profound debate in review conference, whose credibility has been questioned after Russia's actions in Ukraine. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum pledged Ukraine's territorial integrity in return for Ukraine joining NPT and giving up nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is another critical sidelined issue on the UN disarmament and arms control agenda. The weaponization and militarization of space undermines the security of NNWS. The international non-proliferation regime can crumble due to the short sightedness of the NWS, who are reluctant to give up their hegemony and incessantly improving the quality of their nuclear arsenals. The nonproliferation regime needs to call the major power to re-examine their warlike doctrinal postures. Strangely, all non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT are required to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities under their control while the nuclear weapons states parties to NPT have no such obligation.

This is why NPT is widely seen in distress and Pakistan (beside other non-NPT NWS) has repeatedly refused to sign the treaty. To make the NPR progress and to seek the consent of states to sign it, reforms should be sought in NPT to address the state's concerns besides making it non-discriminatory.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/06/24/why-pakistan-does-not-sign-npt/>



Confines of Confrontational Statements and Conventional Deterrence

Maimuna Ashraf

The two subcontinent nuclear powers, Pakistan and India, have been very recently involved in a war of words and words of war which has reopened the debate on South Asian's nuclear and strategic stability. Predominantly, three official statements from India in scorching 'June' have further inflamed the traditional tensions between two nuclear neighbors. Pragmatically, beyond the strained relations, statements also advocate few confines of military threats, limited war and conventional deterrence posture in South Asian region.

While back in the preliminary week of June, Indian defense minister Manohar Parrikar, shared his strayed thought to "neutralize terrorists through terrorists only" as a retort to another attack on India by Pakistan-based non-state actors. Notwithstanding the well-known verbal diarrhea of Parrikar for making controversial statements, it proved a shocking development. His remarks were later followed by the Indian PM Narendra Modi's acknowledging statement in Dhaka about India's intervention in the breakup of East Pakistan in 1971. He applauded Indian military involvement in events of 1971 and admired India's triumph in conception of Bangladesh.

These blatant official statements from India establish two distinct and cogent understandings. First and widely discussed, it affirms Pakistan's accusation that India is infiltrating terrorism on its land and intensifying its fight to counter terrorism. Evidently, it was not the first time that someone from India explicitly advocated use of terrorism in neighboring state on the alleged reason of averting terrorism from that state. Before Parrikar and Modi, in the mid of April, former Indian Army Chief VK Singh and former Delhi Police commissioner Neeraj Kumar shared few 'considerations' while discussing the 26/11 at a book release event. Kumar said that at one time a 'plan was conceived to get a certain gentleman in Pakistan, which also included the use of non-state actors for the mission and all preparation were done for it but plan was not avenged because of political leadership '. Singh supported the Kumar statement by adding "given a task it (India) will execute it in a much better manner than the Americans did (referring to US operations to kill Osama Bin Laden)". Such blunt disclosures from India settled a stern impression that India does not want stability in Pakistan and the deteriorated law and order situation, especially in Baluchistan and Karachi, is reflection of Indian mindset.



Second and subtle understanding is that most likely India has diverted to exercise the sub-conventional techniques because she inadvertently recognizes the inefficacy of its conventional deterrence posture to frighten Pakistan. Although in last year referring to Kashmir scuffle, Indian defense minister warned Pakistan “our conventional strength is far more than theirs and therefore if they persist with this, the cost to them would be unaffordable”, yet the effectiveness of India’s conventional deterrence is questionable. Viewing back in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament in 2001, India unveiled Sundarji doctrine. Operation Parakram was launched with offensive and defensive formations of the Army being mobilized along the Pakistan-India border, with endeavors to coerce Islamabad to start operation against jihadi outfits and react aggressively against any emergency on border. However the Sundarji doctrine faltered due to dawdling Indian mobilization that permitted Pakistan to mount its reaction and beat Indian strategic designs. After the failure of operation Parakram, India announced a new limited war ‘Cold Start’ doctrine in 2004. The new Cold Start doctrine was resultantly aimed to mobilize quickly the eight division-sized armed battle groups towards Pakistan and to exterminate Pakistani armed forces before they could accumulate a response. Conversely, with Pakistan’s retort to use tactical weapons against such advancements and wide critique on cold start in India as critically escalatory, put question marks on the cold start capability to deter Pakistan.

In second week of June, following the surgical attacks inside Myanmar conducted by Indian forces as a reaction to militant attack on an Indian military convoy, India termed it “a message for all countries, including Pakistan.” Indian Minister for Information and Broadcasting Rajyavardhan Singh asserted to “carry out surgical strikes at the place and time of our own choosing”. Pakistan’s Interior Minister retorted, “India should not mistake Pakistan for Myanmar, our armed forces are fully capable of responding to any foreign aggression”. Apparently, Modi’s establishment boasts the aggressive posture towards Pakistan and seeking a strategic space to start a limited war with Pakistan, yet realistically, Indian military capacity to conduct a major attack against Pakistan is debatable. Any raid by Indian forces inside Pakistan would risk the nuclear war in South Asia as Pakistan nuclear policies are crafted exclusively to counter any aggression from one neighboring state, unlike India who has to balance its conventional and nuclear capabilities for two nuclear neighbors. Over the past, in the aftermath of Mumbai Attack, India inclination to launch a quick strike against Pakistan was called off viewing the “poor state of armory, both ammunition and artillery”. Yet again in 2012, Indian Army Chief painted a “grim and indeed alarming” picture of their operational capabilities in his letter to PM. The critical shortfall in ammunition reserves repetitively revealed in 2014 that India does not have enough ammunition to launch a full-blown war for even 20 days. Lately, the



Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India reported that country continues to face the severe ammunition shortage which is adversely impacting the operational readiness.

In the wake of all these realities, India's belligerent statements serve more the purpose of verbal strokes than validate schema. The stern response by Pakistani establishment to each statement substantiates the vainness of Indian conventional and nuclear threats to deter Pakistan. Nonetheless, by avoiding such futile confrontational statements in future, India should recognize the danger of nuclear escalation in a limited conflict between two nuclear armed states, which will take life of more than 20 million people and make the South Asian land barren for years to come.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/06/29/confines-of-confrontational-statements-and-conventional-deterrence/>

Pakistan, on the Firing Line

Adeel Mukhtar Mirza

Once again, the Western propaganda industry is barking up the wrong tree. In other words, they are keeping hold of the old tendency of beating around the bush. Apprehension is vis-à-vis the unjustified claims wherein Pakistan is indicted for probable nukes proliferation to Saudi Arabia in future. It has long been alleged that in return for bankrolling the Pakistani nuclear weapons project, Saudi Arabia has a covert claim on some of those weapons in time of need.

In the similar vein, such factious claims are also put forward by a person who just named his book, “Pakistan-China Nexus,” in order to attract readers and didn’t do the courtesy of comprehending it in the whole book except one line in concluding remarks. Yes! Mark Fitzpatrick says, “It is not a new story, of course...a Saudi belief that it could obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan at any time, and reported intelligence that Pakistan has prepared nuclear weapons for delivery to Saudi Arabia. The first part is probably true: The Saudis helped to finance Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and believe that they were given a promise that the weapons would be used to defend the Saudi kingdom if need be. The second part is probably false: I doubt that Pakistan is ready to send nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s reputation suffered greatly the last time they assisted other countries with nuclear weapons technology (i.e., the sales by A.Q. Khan, with some governmental support or at least acquiescence, to North Korea, Iran and Libya).”

Now, let us have some perspective here both practical as well as theoretical! First, Pakistan’s foreign secretary ruled out sharing nuclear weapons with Saudi Arabia. He said that any such speculations are “unfounded and baseless.” According to him, the sole purpose of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons is the safeguard of Pakistan national security and Pakistan will not sell or transfer weapons or advanced technology. Second, Zachary Keck of National Interest comprehended the puzzle with rationality. According to him, the existence of a Saudi-Pakistan nuclear pact is based almost entirely on speculation. Moreover, like the alleged Saddam-AQ nuclear nexus, the notion that Pakistan would supply Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons defies common sense.

After toppling Saddam Hussein in 2003, however, the U.S. gained extensive access to Iraqi documents and nuclear scientists, and conducted a large investigation into the history of Saddam’s nuclear-weapons program. None of what they found appears to have corroborated Khilewi’s claims about Saudi funding and scientific training. Nonetheless, he continues to be cited by reports claiming that there is a secret Pakistani-Saudi nuclear pact. On the other hand,



theoretically, it is the guardian of the norms of non-proliferation regime, who are violating the essence of their promises agreed by signing Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By blessing India with NSG waiver, United States herself violated the Article One of NPT. Pakistan, on the opposite, Pakistan despite being a non-NPT state is fulfilling her promises kept in Resolution 1540 and its all reactors are working under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Even in comparison to India, Pakistan case is much stronger no matter which yardstick is to be used.

Hence in these critical hours when Pakistan has somehow managed to bring Washington on table for civil nuclear cooperation, there is no way that Pakistan would even think about violating international set norms by proliferating nukes to Saudi Arabia.

<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=267033>



Nuclear weapons: The anchor sheet of peace and stability

Sidra Ajaib Kayani

The horrific detonation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused the evolution of a new era of politics in the world. It was the first time in the history of warfare that the scale of human casualties with a single strike of any kind of weapon became unthinkable. As we know that throughout history, the International Political System lacks a central authority which can actually govern and control the behavior of any State. They are like organisms seeking survival in this anarchic system by any and all means available at its disposal. Every State has a right to protect its vital interests.

Nuclear weapons have considered the anchor sheet of peace and stability in the world. Nuclear deterrence became a central theme throughout the Cold War. The possession of nuclear weapons acted like a firewall between the two superpowers, despite their continued efforts to develop maximum number of weapons. Similarly, during the late 1950s and 1960s three other nations, France, Britain and China also managed to develop their own nuclear weapons, adding more anarchy in the international system. But while nuclear deterrence didn't allow any nuclear state to attack another nuclear state directly, it certainly could not prevent them from indirect confrontations in non-nuclear states caught in this turmoil.

The presence of deterrence in the South Asia, where two arch rivals are neighbors, is a unique and completely different relationship than the US-former Soviet Union tussle. After the 1974 Indian PNE, Pakistan's nuclear program is directly related to Indian nuclear ambitions. Since then, the world has not seen any all-out war between two bitter rivals because deterrence relationship prevails among them. Such restraint was seen during the two decades of nuclear ambiguity since 1974 and overt nuclearization by India and Pakistan in May 1998. India's quest for prestige in the world with nuclear weapons and major power ambitions has been viewed as threatening behavior by Pakistan. The 1971 war left a bitter legacy in Pakistan, forcing it to make a twofold CMD' stance against Indian attempts to be dominant power in South Asia. The Indian military development in the regions has created a security dilemma for Pakistan. Pakistan started its nuclear weapons program in 1970s with a rational of securing its state against future Indian aggression as seen in 1971.

Despite having negative implications on the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan as well as in the region, the positive effects of South Asian nuclearization have been the prevention of any Pakistan-India wars since 1998. Despite having positive effects, the



relationship between India and Pakistan remains tense and full of mistrust. Both countries continuously allege each other by promoting terrorists against one another, especially India blames militant Islamist activity in the region as solely the fault of Pakistan. Many defence analysts believe that there is a 'Stability-Instability Paradox' that defines the Pak-India nuclear relationship. This continued mistrust has often resulted in tensions on the borders. However, due to possession of nuclear weapons by both the countries any conflict didn't convert into all-out war in the subcontinent since 1971.

Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons in response has not been taken kindly by India and much of the world. Pakistani nuclear weapons have hindered Indian hegemony in the region, with India accusing Pakistan of using nuclear deterrence as an excuse to continue sub-conventional low intensity conflict against it.

Pakistan has faced continued negativity in the international media and academia. Concerns are also being raised regarding Pakistan's nuclear safety and security. The international nuclear establishment coupled with pessimistic nuclear academicians and scholars in International media is consistently having a view that Pakistan making its nuclear weapons at a very fast pace.

To conclude, despite all the myths propagated against Pakistan's nuclear weapons, the above mention debate clearly illustrates that because of the existence of nuclear weapons in the peculiar environment of South Asia the region remained safe from any major conflict. This effectiveness of nuclear weapons would also hinder the way of nuclear disarmament in South Asia.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/06/29/nuclear-weapons-the-anchor-sheet-of-peace-and-stability/>



Indo-US Strategic Ties

Sidra Ajaib Kayani

The US tilt in South Asia is not a sudden development, in fact, after the demise of the Soviet Union there has been a gradual convergence of interests between New Delhi and Washington. Before Cold War any alliance between US and India remained out of the question due to Nehru's policy of nonalignment. However, US always recognized India's regional importance. The first step towards India came when General Claude Kicklighter visited India in 1991. Subsequent agreements that took place to develop the joint training exercises marked the first military-to-military cooperation between United States and India. Immediately thereafter, high level discussion on strategic interests took place in January 1992 in New Delhi. At that meeting, India was considered only country that can act as a regional stabilizing force against the spread of "Islamic fundamentalism".

In 1995, cooperation was further strengthened by Secretary of Defense William Perry's visit to India, where he and his Indian counterpart agreed to move beyond bilateral military issues to encompass a wide range of military, security and strategic interests. These advances were however imperiled by India's 1998 nuclear tests when sanctions were imposed by United States.

However, the trend of coming closer to India again started during the second term of President Clinton, who during the Kargil War of 1999 not only pressured Pakistan to withdraw its troops, but also chided Pakistan for its role in promoting terrorism. In the year 2000 President Clinton's visit to India was the turning point in the Indo-US relationship. During his visit, President Clinton admitted that the US had ignored India over the preceding 20 years and indicated that it would end the passive impact caused by nuclear issues in future.

Previously the US interests in South Asia have been important, but never been more vital. However, its War against Terrorism in Afghanistan has brought the region into focus. Considering the US interests in the region, the US approach to relations with India needs to be seen in the context of several identifiable areas in South Asia during the post-Cold War period: first, eliminating terrorism and curbing Islamic extremism in Pakistan and Afghanistan; second, development of a strong economic and strategic relationship with India for possible containment of China; and lastly, preventing a potentially dangerous nuclear arms race on the subcontinent.

In early March 2006, President Bush made a three-day trip to India. In a speech preceding his trip, the President called India a "natural partner for the United States" and identified the



broad areas of bilateral cooperation as: counterterrorism, trade promotion, environmental protections, and energy initiatives.

On December 2006, Congress under Bush administration passed the historic Henry J. Hyde, “United States-India Peaceful Atomic Cooperation Act”, which allows direct civilian nuclear commerce with India for the first time in 30 years. The very next year, on Jul 27, 2007, the US and India had reached an agreement on civil nuclear deal known as a 123 agreement. Americans have termed it as the “symbolic centerpiece of a growing global partnership between the two countries. This agreement governs civil nuclear trade between the two countries and opens the door for American and Indian firms to participate in each other’s civil nuclear energy sector.

After taking the charge of the presidential office, President Obama made two visits to India. On January 26, 2015, he visited India as the chief guest at India’s 66th Republic Day celebrations. During his visit he opened up more doors of bilateral cooperation between the two, including nuclear sphere.

To sum up, US unprecedented tilt towards India in the post Cold War era, even after the Indian nuclear test in 1998, has seriously undermined the cause of peace and stability in this region. Presently, US is hewing the NSG membership for India which will have serious implications for the stability of the region. The military relationship between US and India has added a new dimension to Pakistan’s security equation – thereby aggravating its security perceptions. By cultivating India for any balancing role in Asia US would endanger Pakistan’s security environment and destabilize the region. Unless this impact is contained, it could aggravate the strategic milieu of Pakistan. The US should understand the gravity of the damage they are committing to the cause of peace and stability by giving India country-specific special treatment by improving India’s position in the South Asian region that would ultimately disturb the regional equilibrium.

<http://dailythepatriot.com/indo-us-strategic-ties/>



Iran deal and its way forward

Beenish Altaf

World's six major powers, the US, UK, China, Russia and France plus Germany managed to conclude a nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) with Iran after the four missed deadlines and an extended negotiations of 20 months. Since the last deadline was also not met, therefore, the US Congress has 60 days to review and debate the deal. Congress could pass a resolution to approve or disapprove the agreement, which would be subject to a veto by Obama meaning thereby, he actually warned that he would veto any legislation that prevents the successful implementation of the deal. This historic agreement concluded to restrain Iran's nuclear development program in exchange for its sanctions relief.

Robin Wright in his write up, An Iran Deal, At Last, recounts that the agreement is the Obama Administration's boldest foreign-policy initiative. It marks the first success in dealing with Iran since its 1979 revolution and the prolonged convulsion of the American Embassy in Tehran. Whereas, Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu believes it to, be a 'historic mistake of the world,' giving the reason that the accord will allow Iran to work towards developing nuclear capabilities. 'The agreement would also lift a pack of United Nations restrictions on the nation's power including the arms embargo after five years, and the ballistic missile ban after eight, as long as the country abides by the terms of the deal.' This concept is second by the US Senate Democrats and top military leaders and rest of the critics also.

Moreover, it will also introduce broader UN inspections for monitoring, permanently on both declared and suspected nuclear facilities, including the military sites "where necessary, when necessary" if nuclear activity is suspected there even after the deal expires.

Even though, the US-Iran nuclear accord is aimed by President Obama to make the world a better place to live in, i.e., more safe and secure, but contrarily to it many other states believe the opposite of it. It sets off a furious political struggle in the US itself along with a diplomatic showdown with America's most important allies in the Middle East. Pragmatically, the neighboring countries of Iran have a vital role to play in this wake as the accord will have an impact on the regional stability also. For that matter, Israel and the Sunni powers like Saudi Arabia have concerns about the accord between the global six super powers and Iran that it will further destabilize the Middle East region, well undeniably that is for sure. On the other hand, it might be seen as Iran an emerging regional power in the Middle East with the support of the US and the rest of global community.



Senator Robert Menendez, a New Jersey Democrat and former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said, “We have gone from preventing Iran having a nuclear ability to managing it.” It would also minimize the number of centrifuges used to enrich uranium by two-thirds. ‘It cuts back on the number of facilities that enrich uranium—down to one—and requires the conversion of a facility being built to produce plutonium.’

‘The hope is that the deal will make another Middle East war less likely, at a time when the United States is engaged in air wars in Iraq, Syria, and Libya and selling arms to Saudi Arabia to wage its war in Yemen. It may stall or prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, the world’s most volatile region. As Congress and the American people review this deal, it will be important to consider the alternative,” Obama said. “Without this deal, there is no scenario where the world joins us in sanctioning Iran until it completely dismantles its nuclear program.’

Nevertheless, ‘this is a moment where Iran has an important opportunity to make a humanitarian gesture to bring Americans home.’ At the same time, the mentioned accord will no doubt allow some opportunities for Iran also to remove its mischaracterizations about its nuclear matter to fizzle off or fade off by the passage of time. ‘Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an extremely peaceful, indigenous nuclear program, in line with scientific and economic considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA, with a view to building confidence and encouraging international cooperation.’

In addition, it provides a positive and pragmatic prospect for Iran as it was already suffering from approx. four Billion Dollar monthly. At the same, ‘lifting various punitive economic sanctions will open up Iran’s consumer-hungry citizens to international markets. According to some sources, the country’s population has more than doubled since the revolution, to almost eighty million people.’

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/07/23/iran-deal-and-its-way-forward/>



Pursuing the Afghanistan Peace Process

Nasurullah Brohi

At the very beginning of his government, the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani had made the negotiation with the Taliban and the restoration of peace in his country a top priority agenda. In the regional political milieu, almost all of the surrounding states are particularly concerned about the future of the region in the wake of NATO forces drawdown and the reduced combat mission of existing ISAF troops in Afghanistan. Some countries in the region like China, Pakistan and Iran (particularly after coming out of the isolation as a result of Iran and P5+1 nuclear deal) have greater roles to play for the regional peace and progress.

Besides the fact that the Taliban are once again gaining significant momentum in almost 26 provinces out of 34 and the Unity Regime under President Ashraf Ghani is also facing staid divisions therefore, for Afghan Government it is the need of hour to conduct a series of result oriented talks with the Taliban and other stakeholders for a better progressive, peaceful and politically stables Afghanistan rather than still prevalent anarchic society and unstable political order only apt for chaos and the civil war.

Since taking office in September 2014, President Ghani has pursued Pakistan's special support to come across a peaceful settlement for his war-ridden country because Pakistan is particularly important for Afghanistan than any other country in the region due to various dynamics which are counted as eternal bounds at both sides. The commonalities like, religion, culture, language, geographic proximity, ethnic connections and many other factors which make their relations, interests and sufferings interconnected with each other, therefore it is also strongly believed that peace and progress in Afghanistan are indeed peace and progress in Pakistan.

Pakistan is currently hosting the negotiation process between the Afghan Government and Taliban and the first round of talks was held in Pakistan in the first week of July, 2015. The talks are a result of several informal meetings between the Taliban and Afghan government representatives which took place in Qatar and Norway through the high profile links on both sides along with special efforts of an international organization the Pugwash Conference- (a Nobel Peace Prize Winner private group).

After the successful conduct of the first round of talks on July 7, there are further prospects about the progress in the talks as both the sides strongly realized the need to develop confidence-building measures (CBMs) aimed at bringing peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. These rounds of talks are hoped to be strapping initiative towards the most



significant and fruitful impetus towards the point of reshaping the existing political and security discourse as these talks are also viewed as a major breakthrough and have been hailed by US, China, NATO and the UN Security Council. The supreme commander of the Afghan Taliban Mullah Mohammad Omer is also supporting the peace talks with the Afghan government with the endeavor to oust the foreign troops from their land.

The second round of the talks between the Taliban and the Afghan Government is also expected to be hosted by Pakistan at the end of this month intending at swiftly restoring the peace for the progress of Afghanistan through the participation and contribution by the major stakeholders in war-battered country. Moreover, a truce and the possible concur of the Afghan Taliban to join the mainstream will constitute the theme of the discussion in the upcoming round of talks, particularly during the second round of talks, the top agenda will be ascertaining options for a ceasefire but however, the most important part of the success of these talks mainly depends upon meeting the Taliban demands for release of their leaders detained in Guantanamo Bay and lifting the UN sanctions under Resolution 1267 against them.

Finally, the success of the talks will only be decided after both parties come up with a win-win solution and ultimately reach an agreement rather than keep indulging in an unending war and leaving no hope for the future generations. For many decades people have been living under the shadows of fear and uncertainty that needs to be finished once for all and now for a common Afghan, the stable Afghanistan means much more than his existence.

<http://www.eurasiareview.com/28072015-pursuing-the-afghanistan-peace-process-oped/>



Iranian Nuclear Deal and Prospects for Energy Starved Pakistan

Shahzadi Tooba Hussain Syed

Pakistan is currently facing a severe energy crisis. Besides electricity, the country also faces a growing shortage of natural gas that is the main source of energy especially for those who do not have access to electricity. In Pakistan, the gas shortfall is 2 billion cubic feet per day. In this scenario, easing of international sanctions on Iran by successful implementation of Iranian nuclear deal could play a critical role for easing energy insecurity of Pakistan in a short time span.

On July 14, 2015, a nuclear deal was struck to restrain Iranian nuclear program in Vienna. Some measures that Iran has agreed to include reducing the number of installed centrifuges, limiting all uranium enrichment to 3.67 percent for 15 years, redesigning and rebuilding the Arak heavy water reactor so it can no longer produce weapons grade plutonium, allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regular access to all nuclear facilities, allowing inspectors access to uranium mines and surveillance of uranium mills for 25 years and implementing the Additional Protocol of the IAEA.

At the face value, the outline of the sanctions relief is simple. Most sanctions against Iran will be lifted in exchange for Iran capping its nuclear program and accepting additional verification measures. Consequently, the lifting of sanctions national and international bank would be able to finance IP pipeline without the fear of international sanctions.

The 7.5\$ billion Iran-Pakistan (IP) was inaugurated with great fanfare in March 2013, however, owing to the international sanctions on Iran because of its aspiration for a nuclear bomb made it impossible for Pakistan to get money from national and international banks to build its side of the pipeline. As the Pakistan's Petroleum Minister, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi said in an interview that the advancement on the IP project was clogged because of international sanctions on Iran. He further argued that "now hopefully, as the sanctions are removed, it facilitates us to address our energy needs and also meet the contractual obligations." In fact, Pakistan missed the deadline to build its side of the pipeline last December and Iran under its "take or pay" obligation, asked Pakistan to pay penalties.

Iran has completed most of its part of the pipeline, but still needs to construct around 200 km long pipeline, which should eventually link its South Pars gas fields to the Pakistani city of Nawabshah, close to the economic capital Karachi. Once this is completed, Pakistan will build



the last 80 kilometers to Iran before the 2018 general elections. As part of a \$46 billion economic corridor linking western China to the Middle East through Pakistan, Beijing recently started work on the section of the pipeline between Nawabshah and the port of Gwadar, close to the Iranian border. The pipeline could then become part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

At the broader level, Russia also seemed to endorse Iranian nuclear deal and subsequently IP pipeline that would allow Russia to show the members of so-called quadrilateral relationship that he has other options too available on the table. Russia has had closer relations with India but is pivoting more to Islamabad as New Delhi and Washington become closer allies.

Last but not the least, Iranian nuclear deal would help Pakistan and energy starved Asia in the long term, as the deal would allow Iran to contribute to region's energy requirements in the shape of its gas and oil exports. Hence, the deal would also enhance and stabilize peace and economy of the region subsequently.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/07/30/iranian-nuclear-deal-and-prospects-for-energy-starved-pakistan/>



Nukes are not Nuts!

Maimuna Ashraf

Friday, July 24, 2015 - The stranglehold of Daesh (Daesh) in Middle Eastern states, expanding tentacles in Eastern Afghanistan and its wildfire movement across borders has lately pulled out several 'hypothetical scenarios' involving allegiance of it obtaining the most destructive weapon, the 'nuclear weapon'. Specifically, given the emerging monstrous face of group in Afghanistan, the footprints of Daesh has not merely alarmed neighboring countries including Russia, Pakistan and Central Asian states but also revived the debate on threats of nuclear terrorism. Lately, several stories emerged with epic claims of Daesh infinitely closer to buy or steal a nuclear bomb, precisely from Pakistan. Hopping on the bandwagon, Indian officials also recently sparked the likewise fears and supported the feasibility of Daesh purchasing or stealing a nuclear weapon from Pakistan. So here raises the question, rationally, how real is the threat?

Pragmatically, nuclear analysts believe that the terrorist organization may succeed in conducting a nuclear explosion if they succeed in: 1) Constructing or acquiring a warhead 2) Acquiring delivery means and 3) Having will to use it to a desired target area. Thus, to get successful in acquiring a nuclear weapon or delivery means, terrorists may adopt four ways. First, terrorists may attempt to produce the highly enriched uranium or plutonium to fuel a nuclear bomb.

This option is most difficult and less likely to happen because manufacturing fissile material is the most crucial and complicated phase to make a nuclear weapon. Second, the terrorist organization may look for a state-sponsor, already having nuclear weapons so that they can directly acquire nuclear weapon. This option sounds the easiest route to have a nuclear weapon but scholars believe it is not likely to happen, because neither any state will be agreed to share this valuable product with any non-state actor nor any state will take the risk to share nuclear weapon with terrorists which can be used against them. Even no state, thus far at least, has ever given another state (even friendly allies) a nuclear weapon. For instance, during cold war North Korea tried to acquire nuclear weapon from its close allies but was firmly refused. Third, terrorist organization can plan to steal nuclear weapon. This option is also not at all an easy task. Even if terrorists succeed in acquiring a nuclear weapon it would be impossible for them to break the security features of heavily guarded weapons. Charles Ferguson, President of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) stressed, "You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before weapon would allow itself to be armed, for fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You do not get it off shelf, enter a code and have it go off."



Conversely, if terrorists would seek people to help them in unauthorized explosion of a nuclear bomb, then there are only few persons in world who know the unauthorized detonation of a nuclear bomb. Every person working with nuclear weapons is trained for only few sets of functions and no one has the complete knowledge about how the weapon works and how to set it off. Fourth, there is a huge possibility that any terrorist group may seek to buy fissile material from black market or may seek to steal it from civilian or military facility to use it in nuclear weapon.

Most of the nuclear security analysts are of opinion that terrorist may pursue this option as it appears most suitable to manufacture a nuclear weapon. However, analyst Robin Frost opined “there seems to be no real commercial market for fissile material, each sale would be a one- time affair, not a continue source of profit like drugs, and there is no evidence of established underworld commercial trade in this illicit commodity”. On the contrary, any of the risks highlighted above, poses threat to all states possessing nuclear technology. Any country having nuclear weapons or running and operating NPPs share the same concerns and vulnerabilities around the world. Pakistan is not an exceptional case.

Notwithstanding the technicalities involved in stealing or unauthorized handling of nuclear weapon, Pakistan is frequently brought up in the context of nuclear sabotage by Daesh. Generally, the attacks on GHQ, Mehran and Kamra bases are portrayed as vulnerability to nuclear facilities to terrorists, but the physical security of nuclear installations is much stronger than any other area or defense installation. Even under chaotic conditions, nuclear weapon would remain under heavy guarded security. The nuclear installations are protected by multilayered security system and each one is no-fly zone, guarded by special trained forces and intelligence, monitored by most sensitive sensors, cameras and equipments. The impression that few thousands militants, from a distant or backward region can take control over a country with population of 190 million, which also possessed large army, sounds a movie script rather than reality. Any worst terrorist tragedy would require not only a failed state but insider involvedness and anti-state decisions. Such a scenario is less likely to take place.

Significantly, in order to enhance the secrecy and survivability, Pakistan reportedly has not revealed the sensitive information about its nuclear weapons. While, to avoid any escalation, accidental launch or nuclear sabotage, Pakistani nukes are stored in disassemble form and cores of fissile material are placed separate from nuclear weapons. Surely, Pakistan must have installed coded-secured devices too that demands access by entering a secret code to arm an assembled nuclear warhead, As Gen Khalid Kidwai explained Pakistan’s nuclear system as ‘functional equivalent’ of permissive action links (PALs). This means that other than coding,



Pakistan's nuclear weapons might also comprised of environmental sensing devices that would assure a specific environment before the warhead can set off.

On the security of Pakistan's nuclear program, Shaun Gregory opined, "In the fifteen years since Pakistan emerged as an operational nuclear weapons state in 1998 there has been no credible report of a terrorist seizure of nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons related material in Pakistan, nor of terrorists penetrating and holding space within a confirmed nuclear weapons facility such as might allow them to gain access to, or otherwise create a threat with, nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons related material".

<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=268836>



Pakistan Membership to SCO

Adeel Mukhtar Mirza

“Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif will lead the Pakistan delegation to the Meeting of the Heads of States Council of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Ufa on 9-10 July 2015,” the Foreign Office said in a statement. Both India and Pakistan would be elevated from the observer member status to full membership. Pakistan formally applied for the SCO membership in 2006; however, India followed pursuit in the last December. Mr. Nawaz Sharif would also attend the Outreach meeting of the leaders of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries, SCO Member and Observer States, Eurasian Economic Union Members, and Turkmenistan.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a Eurasian organization founded in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan wherein the major focus was on the cooperation on security, military activities, economic collaboration and cultural cooperation.

With the rapid political and economic growth, the world is rapidly moving towards multipolarity. Indeed, it is good development but contradicts with the Western interests. Disregard of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) norms by the West have already destabilized peace and security of developing nations. In the similar vein, control and supremacy over technology enabled some to impose their wills and hence increased information insecurity of other states. It is possible to find out a way forward for better world but the question remains the same that whether West wants to cooperate with others (China and Russia) or not. However, on the regional front, it is clear that the regional states are able to deal any kind of crisis-like situation by political as well as diplomatic means without any outside intervention.

In this regard, Pakistan and Russia are the members of same continent, have common understanding of realities. Issues of inter-faith terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, placement of destabilizing weapons in the region, economy and energy insecurity are some common threats that both countries are facing. Unfortunately, despite having bilateral understanding the relation between Pakistan and Russia are passive. There is the presence of inter-governmental commission on exchange of scientific technology, which also discusses a wide range of other issue including economy, terrorism etc. Overall, a positive change of perception is going on. However, a comprehensive strategy to curb the above-mentioned common issues is the need of the hour. It is also a well-known fact that President Obama could not show tangible result of War on Terrorism (WOT).



In a similar way, West remained unable to have consensus with Russia and China on the process of emerging multi-polarity, which needed to be taken into account as new centers of power are emerging. As far as Russia is concerned in this regard, all options including UN reforms seem to be there on the table. In return, Russia expects Pakistan to play an important role in this play. No doubt, India is also Russia's special strategic partner but as decisions are to be taken with consensus, in which Pakistan's importance cannot be negated.

The membership could serve multi-purposes for Pakistan. First, it can serve as a forum to address its security, economic and energy concerns. Second, it can help India and Pakistan to resolve their mutual problems as the relations between these two countries are not stable. Third, it can provide mechanism to deal with common problem with the help of initiatives like intelligence sharing etc. Four, it can help diminishing economic constraints by signing off economic agreements like that of Silk Road. Furthermore, this forum can also help in tackling issues like informational insecurity and prevention of arms race in outer space.

Last but not the least, With India and Pakistan's accession, the SCO will become symbolically important Asian forum for cooperation.

<http://epaper.pakobserver.net/201507/11/comments-2.php>