The Pakistan-Saudi Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) is a consequence of not just regional developments but also the shifting sands in the global order polarity. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have longstanding ties covering diverse fields. In security terms, Pakistan has often supported the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) by employing its defence assets at the disposal of the Kingdom’s security, dating back to the 1960s. During the 1969 Al-Wadiah Wars, Pakistani ground personnel actively supported the Kingdom’s pilots against the communist South Yemen’s forces. Then, during the 1970s and 80s, the Pakistan Army sent contingents for the Kingdom’s security. Similarly, during the Gulf War, military contingents were placed in the Kingdom. These were comprehensive battle formations that included personnel from all arms, ranging from infantry to pilots, support staff, and medical corps officers.
This deep-rooted security relationship continues with a sizeable detachment of Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) personnel sent on annual deputation to the Kingdom for liaison, advisory and training roles. A lot is being written these days about the September 2025 development, where Prime Minister Shehbaz and the Saudi Crown Prince signed the SMDA. While the in-depth modalities have not been made public, pertinent inferences could be drawn about the outlined objectives, intent, and roadmap of this agreement. This article specifically highlights the potential the SMDA holds, focusing on the wider-ranging cooperation in industry, personnel training, and emerging technologies. These are crucial dimensions that are often overlooked in comprehending the Kingdom’s motivation to formalise the defence understandings with Pakistan.
Pakistan possesses the capabilities, talent pool, and experience for defence indigenisation that are on par with modern combat requirements. Riyadh, in turn, possesses the economic muscle to support and accelerate the establishment of its domestic defence base.
Referring to the text of the SMDA that states that an attack on one is an attack on both, it further “aims to develop aspects of defence cooperation between the two countries”. A Pakistani Federal Minister later added that the agreement is “very comprehensive,” covering “diffusion of technology, training of the forces, intelligence sharing, [and] preparatory work in terms of joint exercises.” This implies technology cooperation, training of the forces, joint exercises, and diffusion of technology (i.e., tech sharing, joint research and development (R&D)) as part of its scope. This is an often-overlooked part in the majority of analyses appearing in print and electronic media.
The Kingdom, for a greater part of its history, has relied on the United States (US) for its security needs, but that comes with conditions and less autonomy over the systems employed. Despite being the world’s sixth-largest spender on defence with a budget of around USD 75 billion, Saudi Arabia’s domestic defence industrial base is still in its infancy. It directly imports aircraft, tanks, and supporting equipment from the West, and its maintenance infrastructure is also based in the West. KSA has been steadily increasing its defence spending, but it has an underpinning: a renewed focus on the transfer of technology and a reliable defence industrial base with more localisation. Recall the ambitious “Vision 2030”; a part of its stated goal was defence localisation by nearly 50% by 2030. The Kingdom is yet far from reaching this goal, but it has made some progress. According to the Saudi Gazette, the rate jumped to 19.35% in 2024, surpassing the 2023 target of around 12.5%. That is a notable gain, considering that in 2018, local production in defence was only about 4%. This reflects a nearly fivefold increase in just a few years.
Saudi Arabia’s status as a petro-wealth-driven economic powerhouse and a leader among the comity of Muslim nations, coupled with geopolitical developments in the Middle East, have compelled Riyadh to seriously prioritise its sovereign decision-making ability, the majority of which would stem from an independent military posture that is not conditional to some other great power that would employ its assets as per its own will.
A cursory look at Pakistan’s and KSA’s defence industrial bases shows precisely why the latter will cooperate with the former. Pakistan’s indigenous capabilities, coupled with Saudi investments, create a mutually beneficial affair that will foster a robust, trustworthy ecosystem. Pakistan’s reliability in personnel provision, combat experience, and its defence industrial buildup, despite Western sanctions and technological restrictions, is precisely what the KSA needs to leverage. Considering this, Pakistan and KSA conduct defence collaboration meetings. In April 2024, the Saudi Assistant Minister of Defence visited Pakistan, and defence production and training were on the agenda.
Pakistan’s defence industrial ecosystem is surprisingly vast and often understated in comparison to the big defence suppliers like France, the US, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and Italy. Over the decades, Pakistan has raised an array of state-owned factories, research labs, and military engineering yards that together keep the country’s air arm, navy, and army supplied, maintained, and upgraded. Most importantly, Pakistan possesses thousands of technical, scientific and engineering experts who work in these fields. Pakistan’s industrial progress is anchored by key state-owned entities: Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) at Kamra focuses on designing, overhauling and maintenance of fighter jets, aviation equipment and electronics, flight testing and aircraft manufacturing. Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) is Pakistan’s oldest and largest defence producer of small arms, ammunition, explosives, propellants and assorted ordnance. Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) manufactures heavy armoured vehicles, tanks, artillery weapons, law enforcement vehicles, and their upgradation. Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KS&EW) provides services in engineering support, construction, upgradation, refit and maintenance of Naval equipment. National Engineering & Scientific Commission (NESCOM) has advanced engineering facilities and makes specialised equipment for air, land and ground domains, including drones, air-launched weapons, sonars, precision equipment and heavy guided munitions. National Radio & Telecommunication Corporation (NRTC) works on military communications, electronic warfare and jamming equipment, etc.
This only provides a general idea of Pakistan’s multi-domain defence industry, upon which the country’s army, navy, and air force have increasingly relied. Pakistan, in this case, is an interesting example of a developing country that has doctrinally focused on self-reliance in defence production after restrictions due to US sanctions and Western technological hindrances, all the while compelled to keep parity with a numerically superior India. The country manufactures fighter jets (JF-17), drones (Shahpar, Uqab), tanks (Al-Khalid, Al-Zarrar), APCs, ballistic missiles, bombs, cruise missiles, artillery shells, and tactical rockets, to name a few. Pakistani organisations are not just operating domestically; there is robust cooperation with other countries and Western firms that has enabled Pakistan to enhance R&D, obviate bureaucratic hurdles, and be on par with global standards.
In the last few years, public-private partnership endeavours and incubation centres have sprung up across Pakistan. Although still a state-dominated sector, a nascent private ecosystem is emerging that is being enabled by projects like the National Aerospace Science & Technology Park (NASTP), which focuses on raising a domestic ecosystem for emerging disruptive technologies in the defence domain, such as cyber, artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, and unmanned systems. This also includes efforts to blend academia with industry to further Pakistan’s skilled manpower in this domain. NASTP has set up centres across Pakistan. A dedicated campus of Air University has been established right inside PAC Kamra.
Pakistan’s defence industry has evolved to cater to domestic defence needs as well as to foreign clients. The state established Global Industrial & Defence Solutions (GIDS), a state-owned defence conglomerate. It offers a one-window solution to prospective clients to access Pakistan-made defence technologies. The product portfolio comprises an extensive range of systems in the domains of air, land and sea. GIDS also claims to specialise in after-market assistance, which is quite paramount in defence acquisitions and is a long-term endeavour.
A robust defence industrial base provides strategic autonomy in foreign policy and security, precisely how Pakistan manages to balance its relations between China and the US, all the while seeking its security imperatives without strings attached. Wartime sanctions by the US and end-user agreements hinder a country’s operational capabilities against adversaries. Pakistan learned this back in the 1960s, and Gulf countries have had a rude awakening more recently.
Saudi Arabia’s own defence industrial sector is still nascent and has a lot of strides to make. Over-reliance on direct import of defence systems and outsourcing their maintenance means that the Kingdom’s operational readiness is dependent upon American companies, not to mention the end-user constraints, data privacy concerns, and limited usage autonomy, because credible defence comes from one’s own defence. KSA has the Al Kharj Complex, General Authority for Military Industries (GAMI), Prince Sultan Defence Studies and Research Centre (PSDSARC), and multiple private entities working in the defence sector. Since 2022, the Kingdom has organised the World Defence Show as an effort to provide a platform to defence industry experts, with the latest one scheduled for 2026. This underscores the Kingdom’s entry into the defence industrial sector. Pakistan, in retrospect, has been holding the IDEAS defence exhibition for over a decade now, where most of the equipment showcased has a Pakistani industrial imprint and receives global attention.
KSA remains under the security guarantees of the US; however, analysts and experts working on Pakistan’s nuclear policy have outrightly debunked any potential for an extended nuclear umbrella. So what is it that the Kingdom seeks? This article has strived to provide an overview. Where once thousands of troops, advisors, and trainers came in the 1980s, now there will be systematic and more formalised collaboration among engineers, scientists, academia, the private sector, and governments. Pakistan’s testament to defence indigenisation and its unwavering commitment to Riyadh fosters a sense of reliance and credibility, now formalised via the SMDA. However, it will take a few years for steady development. Pakistan’s state-backed defence industries make it easy to deliver more numbers, upgrade quality, and infuse specialisation via synergy to any cooperating outfits, the latter would otherwise have to painstakingly spend years and resources to establish an ecosystem, which too is dependent on multiple other variables, and even more perplexing if it is multi-domain. Pakistani organisations are a one-stop solution in multiple domains (air, land, sea, munitions, and electronics). Additionally, Islamabad brings vast experience in terms of proven sustenance capability, focused partnerships, and technology transfer via co-development, and most importantly, an active battle-tested track record that augments Pakistan’s military’s reliance on its own acquisition doctrines.
Defence partnerships are dependent on operational compatibility. If Saudi Arabia seeks security assistance through Pakistan’s conventional deployment, it would naturally come with technological standardisation across all domains, precisely how NATO countries operate, train, and maintain defence equipment. Pakistan’s experience in conventional and sub-conventional warfare is the most crucial element: the ability to sync and synergise various platforms from different manufacturers into one seamless kill-chain is a valuable insight for the Saudis in the future of multi-domain operations.
Pakistan possesses the capabilities, talent pool, and experience for defence indigenisation that are on par with modern combat requirements. Riyadh, in turn, possesses the economic muscle to support and accelerate the establishment of its domestic defence base. In the coming months, we will witness a clearer picture of this defence collaboration as more high-level meetings take place, more specific agreements are signed, and more Gulf countries increase defence collaboration with Pakistan.
Publication Link: https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/pak-saudi-deal-forges-a-shared-defence-ecosystem/
