India’s recent launch of Agni-Prime (P) from a rail-based mobile launcher system aligns with its developmental goals for a rapidly growing missile program. This test was reportedly conducted in a fully operational environment. However, as the details are coming out, Prima facie, it is a demonstration test of the rail-based mobile launcher system.
Launching nuclear weapons from a rail-based mobile launcher is not a new technological development; the erstwhile Soviet Union had one such system code-named BZhRk (rail-mobile ICBM system). Each train had a launcher command post car, a regiment command post car, and a communication systems car and carried three missiles. The Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN) commanded these systems, while the authorization to launch the systems remained vested in the political leadership, ensuring centralized command. The extensive geography of the Soviet Union and low population density ensured the dispersal and concealment of the delivery system, thus making it a stable platform, strengthening deterrence.
India’s fast-tracked missile program is a manifestation of its hegemonic designs at the regional as well as global level. By diversifying its delivery platforms, India is trying to execute military dominance vis-à-vis Pakistan, as evident in the recent crisis. Indian aspirations to achieve a great power status are materialized by its ever-expanding missile program.
In the Indian case, rail-based mobile launchers may or may not stabilize deterrence, as the technology is yet to mature. Critical analysis of the launch video published by the Ministry of Defence reveals that the system lacked a command & control setup, communications, and crew maintenance cars. The arch structure behind the launch platform resembled a launch guide assembly. All these substantiate the aforementioned inference that it was a demonstration test of a rail-based mobile launcher system supported by a nearby launch guide facility and a ground command and control center.
As of now, India cannot deploy a fully operational rail-based mobile launcher system, as it lacks the essential components. Even if India develops the wherewithal to deploy any such system in the near future, it will be interesting to examine its impact on the Indian Command and Control (C-2) arrangements. Each train containing multiple launchers will require hardened communication systems to ensure positive control for the launch. Multiple trains containing numerous missiles passing through densely populated areas in a conflictual situation will definitely stress the C-2 arrangements. Furthermore, India’s dense population and large number of civilian trains will complicate the route vetting for rail-based launchers. For ensuring the dispersion and concealment of rail-based mobile launchers, railway tracks will need a major overhaul, as existing railway tracks will not be able to handle the load of such systems. In any such situation, if the mobility of rail-based systems is compromised, the dispersion and concealment will not be achieved.
Soviet rail-mobile ICBM systems were based in the garrison and conducted sorties up to 28 days to ensure the survivability and dispersion of systems. If India wants to adopt this system similarly, the maintenance costs will skyrocket, and it will be difficult to manage the crew and logistics on board.
Additionally, parading nuclear weapons on civilian railway lines through the cities will increase the likelihood of acts of terrorism. During peacetime, warheads are under the control of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. A recent test of Agni-P was conducted in a canisterized configuration. In a canister configuration, warheads are mated with the delivery systems. Ashley J. Tellis earlier described Indian nuclear posture as somewhat between a recessed deterrence to a ready arsenal. With the recent test, the Indian nuclear posture has effectively tilted towards a ready-to-use arsenal. If Agni-P is mounted on several trains, in the canister configuration with the solid fuel, its high readiness level might make it a suitable choice for executing swift pre-emptive strikes against Pakistan.
To configure Agni-P to be launched from the rail-mobile launchers, its motor casing was made from composite materials. Composite materials are lightweight and have high endurance compared to steel structures. Agni-P features an advanced navigation system comprising three layers: a ring laser gyro-based Inertial Navigation System, a redundant Micro-Inertial Navigation System, and an optional satellite guidance system. This aspect will greatly reduce its Circular Error Probability (CEP) and improve its penetration capability.
During the Cold War, the Soviet rationale for developing rail-mobile missiles was to overcome the vulnerabilities of ICBMs faced in silos from a US surprise attack. In the case of the Indo-Pak nuclear dyad, it seems far-fetched that Pakistan will be aiming to launch a first strike on hardened Indian missile silos, accounting for its doctrinal position of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD).
The argument that India has acquired rail-mobile missiles for strengthening Assured Second-Strike Capability (ASSC) sounds less plausible, as India has already developed and deployed K-15 (SLBM) on Arihant-class SSBN. Doctrinally, the Indian position on the No First Use (NFU) has been diluted, accounting for multiple statements stressing first use in evolving situations. Acquisition of rail mobile missiles in canister configuration with noticeably low Circular Error Probabilities (CEPs) indicates a high readiness level for engaging counter-force or counter military targets, likely in a pre-emptive strike.
However, from a deterrence standpoint, this move will be destabilizing for multitudes. Firstly, it will tempt Pakistan to develop a proactive strategy for denying India the advantage of targeting counterforce or counter-military targets. The likely path for Pakistan will be to develop super-sonic cruise missiles with conventional payloads having low CEPs and advanced navigation systems for engaging rail-mobile missiles. Additionally, tracking rail-mobile missiles will not be as difficult as locating submarines. Lastly, it will create a first-strike instability in the Pak-India nuclear dyad, as Pakistan might be pushed to strike first to avoid the “use it or lose it” dilemma.
Indian acquisition of rail-mobile systems as a fully operational capability remains a distant dream. However, the developmental trajectory of a rapidly growing missile program indicates a shift in Indian nuclear strategy from a recessed deterrent to a ready arsenal for war-fighting.
Publication Link: https://stratheia.com/missiles-on-rails-deterrence-off-track/
