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STRATEGIC VISION
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Is the United States still the World's only Superpower

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Regional Security Complex Theory

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Ahyousha Khan

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Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is an autonomous, multidisciplinary and non-partisan institution established in January 2013. SVI aims to project strategic foresight on issues of national and international import through dispassionate, impartial and independent research, analyses and studies.

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ACRONYMS

AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defence
BRICS	Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
ADB	Asian Development Bank
CAF	Civil Armed Forces
CAI-Asia	Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities Centre
CC	Climate Change
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CPEC	China Pakistan Economic Corridor
CSS	Critical Security Studies
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
ERNR	Enrichment and Reprocessing Nuclear Technology
ETIM	East Turkestan Islamic Movement
EU	European Union
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FSA	Free Syrian Army
HFCs	Hydro Fluorocarbons
HREC	High Representative and the European Commission
HS	Human Security
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IGMDP	Integrated Guided Missile Development Program
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
IPCC	Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change
IRS	Irrigation Water Requirement
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISK	Islamic State Khurasan
LEAs	Law Enforcing Agencies

NACTA	National Counter Terrorism Authority
NAFTA	North America Free Trade Agreement
NAP	National Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authority
NDB	New Development Bank
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
PAD	Prithvi Air Defence
PEPA	Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency
PAV	Prithvi Air Vehicle
PRC	People's Republic of China
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
SA	South Asia
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
TMD	Theatre Missile Defence
TPP	Trans Pacific Partnership
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
VAT	Value-Added Tax
WB	World Bank
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

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PREFACE

The Journal of Security and Strategic Analysis (JSSA) endeavors to critically analyze the contemporary security and geo strategic environments at national, regional and global level to offer comprehensive, impartial and unbiased description. The SVI brings the second issue of its forthcoming volume (Vol. IV, No 2) of its premier publication with an aim to serve as a primary source of discussion & formulation of academic research on the current political, strategic and security discourse.

This issue includes six research papers and two book reviews written by academicians, eminent scholars and skilled researchers. This issue covers research areas, non-proliferation regime (NSG), un-conventional security threats, climate change, changing international security environment, deterrence and strategic stability of South Asia.

The first research paper focuses on Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) debate that is going on in the international political circles. It deliberates upon the possibility of India and Pakistan getting a membership for this nuclear cartel. While closely scrutinizing all the dynamics and trends, the author establishes that both India and Pakistan might encounter tough resistance in getting the membership of NSG in the near future. The article presents an in-depth analysis of the whole situation and attempts to analyze various proposed criteria and assess the prospects of NSG membership for the non-NPT nuclear weapon states. The readers are surely going to find the debate and analysis very informative and useful.

The next research paper digs deeper into the question that whether the United States still the World's only superpower or not. The author determines that as long as the United States maintains

its dominant position, it is in Pakistan's interest to remain a close ally and thereby reap benefits in security, trade, investment and foreign assistance. The growth in the power and presence of rivals, including China and Russia, however, presents Islamabad with a fundamental decision, viz., to remain close to the United States or to develop stronger military, political and economic ties with nations aspiring to attain superpower status. This article examines the evidence on both sides of the question, concludes that America remains the world's only superpower and makes recommendations for Pakistan's foreign policy makers based on this finding.

The next paper explained regional security complex theory with the help of a case study of Afghanistan. The rationale of this research paper is to analyze if Afghanistan fits neatly into the given constructivist framework proposed by Regional Security Complex Theory; to examine subjective nature of security threats to Transatlantic Alliance in Afghanistan through discourses they maintained overtime in order to investigate the validity of the securitization process. This paper addresses (i) that penetration of external great powers in the region (ii) The securitization process, politicizing the issues, and to take effective measures to tackle challenges. The readers will find it a good resource material for the future study on this subject.

A very significant issue of Climate Change (CC) is also part of this journal. The author associates climate change as one of the critical issue of South Asia. To justify this statement, this paper first discusses the relationship between climate change and security. CC could result in inter and intra state conflict, the "spill over" of these effects could result in divergent regional implications. In this context, the paper moves on to discuss the impact of CC in general and on South Asia in particular, by discussing effects on Pakistan specifically.

The Islamic State (IS) Wilayat-e-Khorasan, affiliated in the borderlands of Afghanistan has expanded at fast rate. However, because losses, at the hands of both the Taliban and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, IS's future in Afghanistan was somewhat jeopardized. The research paper exclusively looks at the Islamic State in Afghanistan and its ongoing challenges for Pakistan. It aims to generate an autonomous and rich debate on the recent efforts by Pakistan to safeguard its borders in the form of military operation and fencing it. Using qualitative data, this paper aims at analyzing Daesh as a potential threat to Pakistan.

Last paper included in this issue talks about the new dimensions in nuclear arms race of South Asia. The author explains that India and Pakistan are intertwined in a complex security structure where one's defence is other's offense. Thus, in this security dilemma, development of Ballistic Missile Defence by India is threatening the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. Consequently to maintain deterrence stability and strategic balance Pakistan under the guidelines of its policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence has opted for MIRVs. This article explains that though MIRVs are ideal counterforce weaponry but they were develop to strengthen offense-defense balance and resultantly strategic stability and nuclear deterrence. Fundamentally, the article presents an in-depth analysis of the South Asian new technologies, which the readers are going to find very informative and useful.

The JSSA conforms to the standard HEC guidelines/rules of publication and seeks to maintain the general quality of the contributions as per the international standard. It is aspired to become a top ranking HEC recognized journal. The quality aspect remains and will always be the prime concern of the SVI, supplemented by careful selection of the manuscripts wherein the readers will be able to find a collection of well written academically sound research papers that have attempted to methodically

examine various strategic and security issues in detail. It is being hoped that the readers will be able to benefit from the analyses presented in this issue. SVI plans to bring out subsequent volumes of *JSSA* on a regular basis and is looking forward to receive high quality manuscripts exclusively written for *JSSA*.

RESEARCH PAPERS

NSG Expansion for Non-NPT States: Criteria and Candidacy

Dr. Zafar Khan*

Abstract

Although Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) came into existence after a year against India's nuclear test in 1974, its powerful members possessing nuclear weapons appear to be creating exceptionalism while at the same time attempting to encourage and support Indian membership at the NSG. This article argues that major powers Party to the NSG undertake these potential measures without realizing collective normative posture of the NSG and the subsequent challenges this could create for South Asian deterrence stability when India, once becoming an NSG member, could then utilize its Veto power to prevent Pakistan from even becoming part of the NSG. This article finds out that in addition to the normative posture of the NSG as a rising influential cartel group, it is observed that India appears to have a greater support by eventually getting NSG's membership because of its growing strategic partnership with leading powers more particularly with the predominant player, the US in the Asia-Pacific region. As part of its offshore balancing/Pivot to Asia strategy against the rising potential regional power, say China, that the US is closely working

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with India in its rise to either balance or contain the spread of China in the Indian-Ocean region. Therefore, this article concludes that the NSG's future decision-making processes with regard to its expansion policy could be fraught with certain policy decision largely influenced by the growing geopolitical reasons between the major/leading players and like-minded power aspirant states in the Southern Asia region.

Keywords: Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Normative Posture, Potential Member-States of NSG, Nuclear Powers, Geo-Political Interests.

Introduction

Although Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created as a consequence of the Indian nuclear test, it is surprising to observe that even the NSG's revised guidelines June 2013 does not mention India directly, whose nuclear weapon test became responsible for the creation of NSG in the first place.¹ One may question why NSG hides the fact of its origin when it currently exempts India as a self-declared nuclear weapon state, not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that conducted more nuclear weapons tests in May 1998? Is not this the violation of the NSG's norms for which this was created in the first place? Or is it legitimate for the NSG to remain flexible in its policy guidelines creating exceptionalism to a nuclear weapon state not party to the NPT? Should the future NSG's members, not recognized as nuclear weapon states (i.e. India and Pakistan) need to become party to the NPT first before being

¹"The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role and Activities," *INFCIRC/539/Revision 6*, IAEA, January 12, 2015, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infirc539r6.pdf> (accessed April 2, 2018).

accepted by the NSG? This becomes one of the critical issues when it comes to the growing normative posture of NSG and its proposed expansion plan.

It is imperative to note that the NSG works with consensus by following the two prominent sets of its normative posture. One, it is responsible to strictly follow the guidelines for nuclear exports. Two, it also relates to nuclear related exports.² However, the third plausible imperative that goes beyond the NSG's normative posture is the direct and indirect influences of geo-political environment that in turn affects the certain decision making processes with the NSG framework. It may not be wrong to argue that although India has never been the member of the NPT and the NSG was created one year later after India's nuclear tests in 1974, but major powers particularly possessing nuclear weapons influences the decision making process, therefore, affecting the normative provisions of the NSG by trying to accommodate India as part of NSG. This is potentially carried out due to the growing geo-political interests of major powers when they would in turn require India to play a significant offshore balancing role to contain China as rising regional power. Arguably, the principle stand of the NSG is gradually becoming fraught with loopholes because of the possible exploitation by the major powers that would favor their geopolitical interest much more than that of the normative posture of the NSG.

That being noted, however, the first set of NSG's guidelines deals with elements such as a) nuclear materials, b) nuclear reactors and equipment's) non- nuclear materials for reactors, d) plants and equipment for the reprocessing, enrichment and

²"Guidelines for Transfer of Nuclear-Related Dual-use Equipment, Material, Software, and Related Technology," *NSG Part 2 Guidelines –INFCIRC/254/Rev. 10/Part 2*, November 8, 2016, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r10p2.pdf> (accessed April 2, 2018).

conversion of nuclear material and for fuel fabrication and heavy water production, and e) nuclear technology for each of the above nuclear export elements. Also, the second set of NSG guidelines largely deals with nuclear export related materials such as fuel cycle and nuclear explosive for industrial purposes only.³ Both of these two sets of NSG guidelines are consistent with the provisions of internationally binding treaties in the field of nuclear non-proliferation such as the NPT, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), and the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Semipalatinsk).⁴ Nevertheless, the third aspect of the NSG is gradually marking the benchmark – that is, how major states possessing nuclear weapons could influence the decision making processes of the NSG by successfully favoring states not-party the NPT due to their growing geo-political and/or geo-strategic relations. In doing so, this could become one of the major challenges for member-states in general and the NSG normative approach in particular.

One of the major challenges that may fall within the critical issues of the NSG that it confronts in the 21st century nuclear politics is the induction of more members especially states not Party to the NPT but possessing nuclear weapons. Since the revised NSG's provisions talk about the criteria-based principles based on the unanimous consensus between the members, it would be challenging how the NSG could induct non-NPT states particularly possessing nuclear weapons into the NSG. There can be two plausible options. One, the NSG could follow its principles and allow

³Ibid., 1.

⁴Ibid., 2.

only these non-NPT states to become part of the NPT first, before they join the NSG respectively. However, this strict criteria may not be acceptable to, say, India and Pakistan who are nuclear weapons states, but they have never joined the NPT rather these nuclear weapon states would like to be recognized; that is, obtaining a formal nuclear legitimacy like the P-5 major nuclear weapons states before they could become part of the NPT.⁵ Two, the NSG could relax the conditions through mutual consensus that are acceptable for both India and Pakistan as the non-NPT members permitting both India and Pakistan simultaneously into the NSG enjoying the similar rights for peaceful uses of nuclear technology under the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards without compromising on their vital interest on nuclear weapons status. In contrast, creating exceptions for one state against the interest of another could jeopardize the credibility of the NSG in general and affect the strategic stability of South Asia in particular.

This policy paper talks about the plausible options/criteria the NSG may opt, not only to sustain the credibility of NSG and the international non-proliferation, but also allow the induction of more states especially nuclear weapon states, not Party to the NPT. It concludes that NSG that rises up as one of the leading international non-proliferation cartel regimes would lose its credibility if it creates discrimination and promotes exemptions by allowing one state at the expense of another. However, its credibility could be restored if it makes endeavors ensuring either a specific criteria for all states or relaxing the bar of restriction in order to accommodate new states without compromising on its credibility. First, it talks about the normative aspects of the NSG

⁵Mark Hibbs, *The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), 17.

that in turn could eventually pave the ways for its proposed expansion plan.

NSG Norms

The formation of the NSG is based on normative principles that it would promote the ideals of non-proliferation while encouraging member states to strictly follow the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The NSG would make sure that its principles are not violated and that even if it has to increase its membership, it will be based on criteria it sets for. For example, any decisions the NSG members would take will be based on unanimous agreement ensuring its normative principles. Any exemptions or country specific decision because of geo-political interest while without meeting the provisions of the NSG could undermine the credibility of the NSG in general and international non-proliferation regime in particular. It is observed that India appears to have a greater support by eventually getting NSG's membership because of its growing strategic partnership with leading powers more particularly with the predominant player, the US in the Asia-Pacific region. As part of its offshore balancing/Pivot to Asia strategy against the rising potential regional power, say China, that the US is closely working with India in its rise to either balance or contain the spread of China in the Indian-Ocean region. Therefore, NSG's future decision with regard to its expansion policy could be fraught with certain policy decision largely influenced by the growing geopolitical reasons between the major/leading players and like-minded power aspirant states in the Southern Asia region. Nevertheless, when it comes to the normative posture of the NSG, the revised guidelines based on unanimous agreement make few important provisions binding upon the NSG members.

First, one of the important factors taken into account by the NSG for its membership is that a participant or a member needs to

adhere to one or more treaties such as the NPT or other international treaties on nuclear weapons free zones with full compliance with obligations of such agreements. This factor can simply be interpreted that the NSG requires a participant/member to become part of the NPT or other international treaties with full compliance of the provisions of these treaties when it comes to the NSG's membership in the first place.

Second, when it comes to the special controls on sensitive exports that largely include the Enrichment and Reprocessing Nuclear Technology (ERNR), the NSG's revised guidelines clearly show that the Suppliers should not authorize the transfer of these sensitive materials if the recipient does not meet at least all of the following criteria:

- 1) the recipient is a Party to the NPT and is in full compliance with the NPT provisions;
- 2) the receipt is not identified breaching the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s safeguard agreement;
- 3) the recipient follows the NSG's guidelines and implement effective export controls as identified by Security Council Resolution 1540;
- 4) the recipient has concluded an inter-governmental agreement with the supplier including assurances regarding non-explosive use, effective safeguards in perpetuity (lasting) and retransfer;
- 5) The recipient has made a commitment to the supplier to apply physical protection of the transferred nuclear technology based on the current international guidelines as agreed between the Suppliers and Recipient;
- 6) The recipient has committed to the IAEA's safety standards and adheres to the international safety conventions.⁶

⁶"Guidelines for Nuclear Transfer," *NSG Part 1 Guidelines INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1*, November 8, 2016, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r13p1.pdf> (accessed April 2, 2018).

Third, in addition to these criteria based provisions, the NSG's guidelines also mention that the Suppliers should not transfer the enrichment and reprocessing nuclear materials that enable the recipient to produce greater than 20% of enriched uranium. To satisfy the non-proliferation measures, the NSG's guidelines for the Suppliers that their transfer of these nuclear technologies would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or be diverted to acts of nuclear terrorism. The NSG makes sure that the Suppliers have legal measures when it comes to the effective implementations of the NSG's guidelines including "export licensing", "enforcement measures" and "penalties for violations."⁷

As part of its normative posture, it argues to expand its membership on the basis of mutual consensus. However, the NSG is not substantially clear whether the principle for future membership be based on criteria or country specific (exceptions) with special exemptions granted. For example, if India goes into the NSG, it will be a nuclear weapons state, not Party to the NPT. In doing so, this will go against the NSG's revised guidelines when it comes to norms and specific criteria of the NSG unless the NSG brings some structural reforms for new members especially that are nuclear weapon states, not party to the NPT. It is not clear how this could affect the norms of the NSG in the 21st century nuclear politics when a nuclear weapon state such as India would be accepted by the NSG without first getting into NPT. This creates many more questions than we might really require appropriate answers: Will this be appropriate enough for NSG or a failure for international non-proliferation regime which would in turn undermine the strategic stability of South Asia in general and international security in particular? What options the NSG will then

⁷Ibid.

have in order to restore the balance making sure that India's inclusion into the NSG alone could not trigger new arms race? Can Pakistan's smooth inclusion into the NSG as it prepares itself to be possible after India gets in? Has the NSG thought of the strategic consequences about India's inclusion into the NSG as a non-NPT member leaving Pakistan behind?

That's all being asked NSG plays absolutely essential role that govern the set provisions for both nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports. Gradually, the NSG makes sure that it keeps itself updated, effective, and credible even if it gradually expands by accepting the membership of nuclear weapon states not Party to the NPT. Currently, NSG seems to have increased its credibility by making sure that its members would follow the strict guidelines by not exporting nuclear related technology if they are sure that these nuclear related items/technology/materials could be diverted for nuclear weapons program. Despite the normative endeavors NSG members attempt to make, NSG confronts critical issues with regard to its long lasting efforts for meeting the principles of non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear technology. These are discussed in the subsequent section.

NSG and the Critical Issues

The NSG currently confronts critical normative issues as majority of its members have already provided special exemptions by providing nuclear technology to India. Most of the NSG major powers possessing nuclear weapons have shown significant leniency to India including the recent Ambassador Grossi's nine-point Formula paving the ways for India to secure a smooth entry into the NSG.⁸ It

⁸Anwar Iqbal, "Formula for new NSG members leaves Pakistan out: US group," *Dawn*, December 28, 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1304941> (accessed May 1, 2018).

creates exceptions in most of the cases for India whilst ignoring the set criteria by lowering the restriction bar. In doing so, this could further undermine the credibility of the NSG in general and the international non-proliferation regime in particular. Since the NSG rises up as one of the important cartel groups in the field of non-proliferation, it is not free from the critical issues it confronts.

First, many observes in Pakistan would consider that the US-India nuclear deal and the NSG's nuclear exemptions to India has become a critical issue for the NSG that in turn could challenge the credibility of the NSG. This indicates that NSG may drift away from the provisions it sets and undermine its own set guidelines if and for how long the NSG would continue to follow the criteria and guidelines making the provision that any new state would become Party to the NPT first before joining the NSG. Although India theoretically claims to follow the IAEA's additional protocol by accepting its safeguards, it is not clear whether or not India is following the comprehensive safeguards. India argues that it would follow the principles in phases in terms of bringing its nuclear reactors under the IAEA's safeguards.⁹ It is not clear whether or not India could actually follow the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards when it comes to various stages for bringing India's nuclear reactors under the IAEA's safeguards. Presumably, India could exploit and create greater opportunity for it to cheat without successfully being caught.

Various Phases stage by stage could provide India opportunity to exploit the IAEA's additional protocol, therefore, undermining the credibility of the NSG and the IAEA's safeguard agreement when India would have already acquired much fissile materials for making nuclear warheads out of its currently 8 nuclear reactors not

⁹Kamran Akhtar, "NSG Membership of Non-NPT States," *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad*, no. 4 (August 2016): 6-8.

under the IAEA's safeguards. India also claims to retain its nuclear moratorium, but the evidences show at Karnataka that India could go for more nuclear weapons tests including building more nuclear reactors for its nuclear submarines. Nuclear moratorium is not legally-binding and that can be broken as France did in 2005 by carrying more nuclear weapons tests for its deterrent force modernization undermining the provisions of the NPT and its normative posture towards the international non-proliferation regime.¹⁰

If India goes for more nuclear weapon tests, as it desires so, it would undermine the set provisions of the NSG amidst its struggle for its membership. The NSG is not clear on the implications for India if it conducts more nuclear tests after becoming member of the NSG as to how this could affect the credibility of international non-proliferation regime linked with this particular rising cartel (NSG). Despite the NSG's exemptions, India tends to remain outside the CTBT and the NPT at large. It tends to keep many of its civilian nuclear activities outside the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards reflecting that it could acquire more deterrent forces.¹¹ India has already aspired for a grand nuclear strategy and such a grandiose journey would require India to build more nuclear reactors and produce more fissile materials that could suffice its aspiration for a regional rising power status by building more deterrent forces bolstered with sophisticated delivery systems. This development would have implications for strategic stability of South Asia where there could be a new arms race between India and Pakistan. Also, this could increase the prospects for security dilemma in the South

¹⁰Oliver Meier, "Chirac Outlines Expanded Nuclear Doctrine," *Arms Control Today*, March 2006, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_03/MARCH-Chirac (accessed February 11, 2019).

¹¹Adeela Azam, Ahmed Khan, Syed Muhammad Ali and Sameer Ali Khan, *India Unsafeguarded Nuclear Program: An Assessment*, Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad 20, no. 5 (December 2016): 68-69.

Asian region¹² because of increased mistrust between India and Pakistan.

Second, NSG is not clear how and when it would need to expand its membership despite its plans for its expansion while urging new members to join the NSG. Whether or not, it would include India as a nuclear weapon state, not party to the NPT. Also, it is not clear if it intends to bring both India and Pakistan into the NSG simultaneously by widening its scope of nuclear politics, not Party to the NPT. As both India and Pakistan prepare the grounds for joining the NSG, NSG needs to bring Pakistan when and if India becomes part of growing cartel group. However, it is feared that this could make Pakistan's membership into the NSG more complex, painful, and hard because then India will have veto power to block Pakistan's chances for membership completely once India becomes its member while preventing Pakistan to secure the NSG's membership. That means that Pakistan may not be able to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes as its energy needs would require Pakistan do so. If the NSG shows flexibility while accepting India as its member while India is not yet a member of the NPT, then the NSG might need to allow Pakistan too simultaneously to help prevent the strategic consequences for a broader Southern Asian region. Favoring one at the expense of other could have a damaging regional implications and the burden of responsibility could be on the NSG for its discriminatory approach, incorrect direction, and decision making mechanism.

The recent two-page Grossi formula prepared by the former Chair of the NSG Ambassador Rafael Mariano Grossi has been

¹²Zafar Khan, "India's Grand Nuclear Strategy: a Road towards Deployment of Ballistic Missile Defense System," *Regional Studies* XXXIV, no. 1 (2016): 48-64.

rejected by Pakistan¹³ because the so-called Grossi formula remains discriminatory that lowers the restriction bar and paves ways for India that can theoretically claim to have a smooth entry into the NSG without adhering to the existing provisions of the NSG.¹⁴ The Grossi formula is not only considered discriminatory, but it is largely presumed to frame the basis for exceptionalism. However, it is also imperative to note that accepting India and Pakistan could also drift the members of the NSG into a complex decision making dilemma. Because, once India and Pakistan are accepted by the NSG, then this could open a Pandora box for other states too. They would then argue the nuclear status of India and Pakistan and challenge the NSG's criteria for allowing nuclear states not recognized by the NPT in the first place. However, unless otherwise the NPT accepts India and Pakistan as recognized nuclear weapons states, it could be painful decision for India and Pakistan to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states in order to secure a membership in the NSG. Since the NSG's guidelines create a significant bar for both India and Pakistan to become members of the NSG without being Party to the NPT, there can be some plausible policy options for the NSG regarding the proposed plan for its expansion.

Plausible Policy Options on the NSG Expansion

There can at least a couple of plausible options the NSG may undertake to further enhance its normative posture and credibility

¹³Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Pakistan rejects new formula for NSG membership," *Dawn*, December 30, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1305297/pakistan-rejects-new-formula-for-nsg-membership> (accessed April 4, 2018).

¹⁴Daryl G. Kimball, "NSG membership proposal would undermine nonproliferation," *Arms Control Today*, December 21, 2016, , <https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/ArmsControlNow/2016-12-21/NSG-Membership-Proposal-Would-Undermine-Nonproliferation> (accessed April 6, 2018).

as one of the rising cartels in the field of international non-proliferation.

One, the NPT should recognize both India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states before they join the NSG. Presumably, as India and Pakistan enhance their nuclear maturity after two decades of South Asian nuclearization, the NPT and NSG could eventually recognize these South Asian nuclear weapon states with the ultimate motive to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Nevertheless, there are both merits and demerits to this perspective. For instance, bringing Pakistan and/or India into the NPT as nuclear weapon states would strengthen the prospects of nuclear non-proliferation regime rather than keeping them outside for indefinite period. By keeping the South Asian nuclear weapon states away from the NPT and/or other important non-proliferation regimes could further encourage these nuclear weapon states to continue to develop more warheads and delivery systems. Presumably, the more India and Pakistan, as nuclear weapon states, remain outside the NPT, the more there is a risk of consistent arms race in South Asia affecting the deterrence stability in the South Asian region. And the more this could risk major military escalation leading to a nuclear level. Yet, it may not be guaranteed that India and Pakistan would completely get out of the vicious cycle of security dilemma even if they are recognized by the NPT. Both the Soviet Union and the US being recognized as nuclear weapon states since the inception of the NPT continued to live under a long shadow of security dilemma and the same persists even after the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, it would still be a better option rather than to live with zero option to encourage India and Pakistan by providing them opportunities to become part of the NPT and other important non-proliferation regime such as NSG.

However, the more international non-proliferation regime makes serious endeavors bringing both India and Pakistan into these non-proliferation regimes, the more the international community could emphasize on a global nuclear disarmament that major nuclear states pledged to follow suit eventually. But, there are still those who could argue that the induction of both India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states party to the NPT could encourage other nuclear weapon states, say, North Korea and Israel to get recognized by securing their nuclear weapon status by the NPT. This dilemma would continue to persist unless a major structural reform is brought into the international non-proliferation regime both sustaining the life and spirit of the international non-proliferation regime and encouraging India and Pakistan to ultimately become part of the NPT/NSG.

Two, the NSG may create flexibility in its guidelines by allowing these two states as nuclear weapon states, not Party to the NPT, but of course agreeing to international treaties and safety conventions. Currently, it may not be acceptable for both India and Pakistan to join the NSG as non-nuclear weapons states, Party to the NPT. When it comes to international politics in general and nuclear politics in particular, states would always opt for effective cost and benefit analysis as to how much they are winning and losing before becoming part of any treaty. In the realist paradigm, states would prefer to have maximum gain in those proposed treaties. That being said, neither India nor Pakistan could agree to a stringent criteria proposed by the NSG that would not allow by consensus or by the revised guidelines both India and Pakistan to become part of the NSG unless they join the NPT. Rather India would desire to have a nuclear legitimacy by joining the NSG to enjoy the acquisition of nuclear technology. The inclusion of India and Pakistan into the NSG as nuclear weapon states including that of all major nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT would

enhance the NSG's stature as one of the strongest cartel groups when it comes to the field of non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The prospects for turning the NSG as a cartel into a formal legally-binding treaty could also get enhanced. Therefore, the expansion plan could benefit both the new nuclear weapon states even if they are not party to the NPT and enhance the overall stature of the NSG within the growing prospects of international nonproliferation regime. This in turn could further enhance NSG's normative posture and its credibility that is currently challenged by when few of its member states attempt to create special exceptions and space for India to join the NSG, even though this could be contrary to the existing provisions of NSG.

Conclusion

The rise of the NSG as a one of the important, but influencing cartel groups promoting the cause of non-proliferation intends to encourage India alone to become part of it by passing the historical fact that the NSG was created against the Indian nuclear weapon test. The major powers possessing nuclear weapons have already given certain exemptions to India in terms of trading with India in the field of nuclear technology transfer. However, these special exceptions by the NSG members are not consistent with the so-called provisions of the NSG that does not allow a state unless it is party to the NPT. This goes against the revised provisions of NSG which in turn could undermine its normative posture and credibility as one of the important rising cartel groups. These special exceptions to India reflect the nuclear politics in the broader field of nuclear non-proliferation where political and economic interest and even geo-political interest could undermine the set provisions of any treaty. If this remains the case, the international community needs to look into this growing matter of concern that may not simply be wished away when India has an arch rivalry with Pakistan that is also a nuclear weapon state and also strongly presents its

case for the NSG membership. Nevertheless, it appears to be that a discriminatory approach is played against Pakistan where NSG becomes a criterion specific for Pakistan and a country specific when it comes to India's bid for joining the NSG.

It is encouraging that the NSG could expand its membership by inducting more states that may include state either Party to the NPT or those who have not yet joined the NPT. One, it could allow India leaving Pakistan behind, but then this complex decision could have critical consequences for arms race and increased over reliance on nuclear weapons in the South Asia. This may not be in the best interest of the NSG members when their geo-economic and geo-strategic stakes are high in the South Asian region. Two, the NSG could relax its provisions unanimously agreeing that it could eventually pave the ways for both India and Pakistan to join the NSG. However, both would remain legitimate and responsible nuclear weapons states by following the essential parameters of the international non-proliferation regime including that of the additional protocol of the IAEA. Three, the NSG becomes strict to its provisions without showing any flexibility by not allowing both India and Pakistan to become part of the NSG unless they comprehensively meet the guidelines of the NSG particularly joining of the NPT. However, this may not be favorable to the NSG as this would show NSG too rigid, discriminatory, and limited by not increasing its membership. Plausibly, expanding its membership and promoting the cause of non-proliferation, the NSG could further enhance its credibility in the field of non-proliferation by making both India and Pakistan obligatory to the essential imperatives of the non-proliferation.

Is the United States still the World's only Superpower: Implications for Pakistan's Foreign Policy

Dr. Kenneth Holland*

Abstract

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international structure shifted from bipolar to unipolar. The United States was left as the world's sole superpower. No other country could even approach America in terms of military and economic might. Pakistan wisely allied itself with the United States and joined the global war on terror at America's request after the terrorist attack on New York City in 2001. As long as the United States maintains its dominant position, it is in Pakistan's interest to remain a close ally and thereby reap benefits in security, trade, investment and foreign assistance. The growth in the power and presence of rivals, including China and Russia, however, presents Islamabad with a fundamental decision, viz., to remain close to the United States or to develop stronger military, political and economic ties with nations aspiring to superpower status. This article examines the evidence on both sides of the question, concludes that America remains the world's only superpower and makes recommendations for Pakistan's foreign policy makers based on this finding.

Keywords: Super-Power, European Empire, Economy, United States

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Introduction

In recent years, many analysts have argued that the economic and military rise of Russia and China has challenged the long-standing status of the United States as the world's only superpower. China, with an 11 trillion dollar growing economy, seems to be an especially strong challenger.¹ If this assertion is true, the shift from a unipolar to a multipolar international system has profound implications for Pakistan's foreign policy. In a unipolar environment, nations do not need to choose sides since there is no great power conflict; in a world of multiple great powers, however, countries are forced to join one of the competing coalitions in order to obtain protection from the rival dominant powers.

As the evidence demonstrates, the predictions of America's decline are premature, and the international structure remains as it has been since the collapse of the Soviet Union, characterized by a single dominant power, the United States. Pakistan, therefore, risks losing the benefits of its traditional role as America's key ally in South Asia if it seeks an alliance with Russia or China motivated by a desire to balance American strength. Replacing America with Russia or China as the principal ally is also risky. Both countries suffer serious weaknesses as potential allies and competitors for global influence with the United States.

What is a Superpower?

A superpower as "a country that has the capacity to project dominating power and influence anywhere in the world, and

¹Jonathan Adelman, "The United States Will Be the World's Lone Superpower for Decades to Come," *HuffPost*, April 10, 2017, <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-united-states-will-remain-the-worlds-only-e4b081da6ad0064f> (accessed April 8, 2018).

sometimes, in more than one region of the globe at a time, and so may plausibly attain the status of global hegemony."² This state projects power on a global scale through several means, including military, economic, technological, cultural, and diplomatic.

The term “superpower” was first coined to describe the three great powers that emerged victorious in the Second World War—Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, however, Britain could have been described as the world’s sole superpower in the period 1815-1914.³ England’s industrial revolution preceded that of America and other European states by several decades. As a result of its industrial prowess, Great Britain acquired superior economic, military, and diplomatic power that allowed it to achieve global hegemony, symbolized by the size and range of the British navy and merchant fleet and the role of the British pound as the standard of exchange in the international economy. Britain established a chain of bases and strategic strongpoints along the principal trade routes. Its chief rivals, France, Germany and Russia, could not overcome Britain’s advantages and its global hegemony.

In the 19th century race among European powers to establish colonies in Africa and Asia, motivated by the need to find markets for manufactured goods and sources of raw materials for the manufacturers, Britain emerged victorious. The need for expansion was motivated by a Second Industrial Revolution after 1870 that produced cheap consumer products in massive quantities. Britain

²Lyman Miller, “China an Emerging Superpower?,” *Stanford Journal of International Relations* 61, no. 1 (Winter 2005), https://web.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.03_miller.html (accessed February 11, 2019).

³“The Age of Imperialism (1870–1914),” <https://www.tamagua.k12.pa.us/cms/lib07/PA01000119/Centricity/Domain/119/TheAgeofImperialism.pdf> (accessed April 8, 2018).

dominated the globe not only politically but also in science, technology, and industrial production, as evidenced by its leading position in the development of the railroad, the internal combustion engine, and electrical power generation. Britain's industrial prowess was showcased for the world to admire in the 1851 Crystal Palace Exhibition in London.⁴

The empire on which the sun never set was accidental, in that British statesman, seeking trade and opportunities for investment, did not initially seek to control territory. The instability of these undeveloped regions, however, forced British hands and led to the building of the largest European empire. The goal of the founders of the English East India Company, chartered in 1600, was to exploit trade between London merchants and East Asia, Southeast Asia and India. The company's motives were entirely commercial, but necessity led its leaders to exert political control over its trading partners, and this control became the foundation of the British Empire in Asia. The British mercantile class sought to trade with and invest in the entire world and built the largest fleet of merchant ships ever known. The weakness of the emerging states in Latin America, Africa and Asia and the lack of international order, however, exposed these ships to peril and resulted in the deployment across the seven seas of the largest navy ever known to protect the oceans' trade routes. At the onset of the Second World War in 1939, the Royal Navy, still the biggest in the world, consisted of more 1,400 vessels, including seven aircraft carriers (with five more under construction), 15 battleships and battle cruisers (with five more under construction), 66 cruisers (with 23 more under construction), 184 destroyers (with 52 under

⁴"Importance of the Great Exhibition of 1851," *UK Essays*, November 2013, <https://www.ukessays.com/essays/architecture/the-importance-of-the-great-exhibition-1851.php> (accessed April 15, 2018).

construction, 45 escort and patrol vessels (with nine under construction) and 60 submarines (with 9 under construction).⁵

America Replaces Britain as the World's Hegemon

The end of the war, however, marked the beginning of the rapid decline of Great Britain as a major power. The moment of loss of superpower status is 1956, when the United States refused to support London's effort to reclaim the Suez Canal from seizure by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. British decline meant that only two superpowers remained the United States and the Soviet Union, whose conflict during the Cold War dominated world affairs.

America, in fact, assumed, in many respects, the mission of the British Empire after 1945. Just as the London merchants had sought to trade with the world, U.S. manufacturers sought to export to global markets and import raw materials, and U.S. banks looked for opportunities to finance international intercourse and invest in foreign markets.

America's Role in Building the Global Economic and Trading System

The United States led the establishment of international diplomatic and financial institutions at the Bretton Woods Conference, attended by 44 nations that met in July 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. The delegates agreed to set up a rules-based international monetary system and established two new institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

⁵"British and Commonwealth Navies at the Beginning and End of World War 2," *Naval-History.Net*, last modified on August 7, 2011, <http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignRoyalNavy.html> (accessed April 10, 2018).

U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt shared the belief of former President Woodrow Wilson that free trade promoted both international peace and prosperity. As a result of America's leadership, international markets became more transparent and were governed by rules to ensure fairness and openness.

These principles worked, and the years following the establishment of the Bretton Woods system witnessed a sustained economic boom. The United States, Soviet Union and the countries of Western Europe and East Asia all experienced a sustained high level of growth including substantial increases in employment. One of the keys to this sustained recovery from the devastation of the Second World War was the Marshall Plan for the rebuilding of Europe. In 1948 alone, the United States provided more than \$12 billion to Western Europe. One of the plan's principles was promotion of free trade through international cooperation, which resulted in the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), the foundation for the European Union (1993).⁶

In 2000, the IMF identified four basic aspects of globalization: trade and transactions, capital and investment movements, migration and movement of people, and the dissemination of knowledge.⁷ The logic of economic globalization is the process of increasing economic integration between countries, leading to the emergence of a global marketplace or a single world market. Even with the success of the Bretton Woods system and the economic boom that followed the Second World War, American

⁶"The history of the European Union," *European Union*, last modified on January 25, 2019, <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history> (accessed April 10, 2018).

⁷"Globalization: Threats or Opportunity," *International Monetary Fund*, 12 April, 2000, <https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200to.htm> (accessed April 20, 2018).

manufacturers and banks did not have access to much of the world's land mass and population, which was under the control of Marxist regimes led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and People's Republic of China (PRC). The economic reforms initiated by Chinese president Deng Xiaopeng in 1978 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, allowed many more countries to join the global economy. China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 and the Russian Federation in 2012. With Russia's accession, the international trading system came to embrace nearly the entire globe.

Economic liberalization was accompanied by political reform. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall came a surge in the number of democracies. In 1974, nearly three-quarters of all countries were dictatorships; by 2008 more than half were democracies.⁸ The liberal democratic state fueled by a market economy became the world's preferred regime. Marxism and fascism had been discredited by the failings of Nazi Germany, the Chinese Cultural Revolution and Soviet Russia. The unprecedented growth in the global economy was facilitated by America's ability to project power anywhere in the world to protect the trade routes formerly secured by the British navy. This Pax Americana was made possible by the enormous and dominant power of the United States.

The Chinese economy has prospered due to access to the global economy (trade and investment). U.S. merchandise exports to China grew from \$22 billion in 2002 to \$116 billion in 2015.⁹

⁸Larry Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World* (New York: Henry Holt and company, 2008), 171-180.

⁹Jon Talton, "China's 15 years in the WTO: assessing the costs, benefits," *Seattle Times*, January 31, 2017, <https://www.seattletimes.com/business/economy/chinas-15-years-in-the-wto-assessing-the-costs-benefits/> (accessed June 2, 2018).

Pakistan, China and Russia all have a strong interest in the health of the international financial, monetary and trading system, undergirded by the Pax Americana.

Just like Britain in the 19th century, the United States used its dominant position in the world in the last half of the 20th to promote worldwide peace and prosperity. America continues to play this role in the 21st century. The claim that America remains the world's sole superpower is based on its global dominance in multiple areas, including military, economic, technological, cultural and diplomatic.

America: Still the Sole Superpower

Military Dominance

The United States is the dominant military power in the world and has been since the end of the Second World War. After 75 years, America's military superiority remains unrivaled. The United States accounts for 37% of global military expenditure, spending more than twice what China, the world's second largest spender, does-- \$610 billion compared to less than \$250 billion. Russia spends less than one-eighth what America spends on the military, about 66 billion dollars. The American navy, with 11 aircraft carriers, has over 100 bases and ports abroad. By contrast, Russia has a weak navy with one aircraft carrier and less than a dozen overseas ports. China also has a single aircraft carrier and only a few overseas ports.¹⁰

The U.S. dominates across land, sea, air and space. The American military has been almost constantly at war since 1941, fighting the Second World War and smaller subsequent wars in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Afghanistan and Iraq. With the exception of a disastrous war with Vietnam in the 1970s and one with India in

¹⁰Op.cit., Adelman (2017).

1962, China's military has been largely idle. Russia's combat troops have been slightly more active, with engagements in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. Russia and China did fight a border skirmish in 1969. The United States has demonstrated in both actual conflicts and war games with its allies an ability to project military force in multiple locations around the world simultaneously. The nuclear strength of the United States deterred war with the Soviet Union and sheltered Japan and Western Europe under a nuclear umbrella that gave them the space they needed to grow some of the leading economies of the world.¹¹ Moreover, American military might is enhanced by that of its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, three of whom, France, United Kingdom and Germany, are among the ten greatest spenders on defense.

¹¹Ian Bremmer, "These Are the 5 Reasons Why the U.S. Remains the World's Only Superpower," *Time*, May 28, 2015, <http://time.com/3899972/us-superpower-status-military/> (accessed June 6, 2018).

Table 1: Military Spending, 2017, Top Ten Countries, in Billions of US Dollars

Country	Military Spending	Percent of US Spending
United States	610	100%
China	228	37%
Saudi Arabia	69	11%
Russia	66	11%
India	64	10%
France	58	10%
United Kingdom	47	8%
Japan	45	7%
Germany	44	7%
South Korea	39	6%
Brazil	29	5%

Source: "The 15 countries with the highest military spending worldwide in 2017 (in billion U.S. dollars)," *Statista: The Statistics Portal*, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/262742/countries-with-the-highest-military-spending> (accessed June 7, 2018).

With regard to weapons systems, the number of American aircraft carriers dwarfs those of all other nations. These gigantic ships, with their hundreds of sophisticated combat aircraft and missiles, are one of the major means for projecting American force anywhere on the globe. With regard to nuclear warheads, Russia and the United States are in a class by themselves, with Russia having a slight edge in quantity and the U.S. in quality.

Table 2: Number of Nuclear Weapons, 2018, Country Wise

Country	Nuclear Warheads
United States	6,550
France	300
United Kingdom	215
Russia	6,850
India	135
China	280
Pakistan	145
Israel	80
North Korea	15

Source: "Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance," Arms Control Association, June 2018, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat> (accessed June 10, 2018).

Economic Dominance

America's military might is matched by its economic prowess. The United States remains the wealthiest nation in the world. Although China's economy has been growing at an impressive rate since the economic reform of 1978, per capita gross domestic product lags far behind that of the United States. GDP per capita in the US was \$62,152 in 2018; in China it was just \$10,088. China's economy is hampered by massive state-owned enterprises which tend to be inefficient, while the U.S. economy is powered by private businesses. The average citizen in America benefits from the growth of the economy, while massive poverty, especially in the rural areas, persists in China.¹²

The American economy, moreover, remains the foundation of the global financial system. More than 8 out of 10 of all financial

¹²Ian Bremmer, "These Are the 5 Reasons Why the U.S. Remains the World's Only Superpower," *Time*, May 28, 2015, <http://time.com/3899972/us-superpower-status-military/> (accessed February 11, 2019).

transactions worldwide are conducted in dollars, as are 87% of foreign currency market transactions.

Table 3: World Ten Wealthiest Nations, 2018, Projected, by Gross Domestic Product, Billions of USD

Country	Gross Domestic Product	Percent of US Economy	GDP per capita
United States	20,413	100%	62,152
China	14,093	69%	10,088
Japan	5,167	25%	40,849
Germany	4,212	21%	50,842
United Kingdom	2,936	14%	44,177
France	2,925	14%	44,934
India	2,848	14%	2,135
Italy	2,182	11%	35,914
Brazil	2,139	11%	10,224
Canada	1,799	9%	48,466

Source: Statistics Times, "Projected GDP Ranking (2018-2023)," *International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database*, April 2018, <http://statisticstimes.com/economy/projected-world-gdp-ranking.php> (accessed June 9, 2018).

The United States has a growing population, fueled by immigration. The population grew from four million in 1790 to more than 325 million in 2018. Russia and China, by contrast, have or will have soon shrinking populations, with large numbers immigrating to other countries, including the United States. More than ten million Russians have migrated to other countries since 1991, and one quarter of Russians admit to thinking of emigrating. Recently, Russia has averaged a decline of 700,000 people per year. It is expected that beginning in 2023 China's population will also begin to decline, due to a low birth rate and emigration. A recent

Chinese poll showed that 62% of rich people want to move to other countries.¹³

Technological Dominance

The United States is the world's leader in technology and innovation, leadership symbolized by the size and impact of Silicon Valley in California. Eight of the top nine technology companies in the world are based in the United States. The valuation of companies such as Apple, Google, Microsoft, Amazon and Facebook are greater than the gross domestic product of many countries. America's research universities and scientific institutions are the world's best. The United States boasts the largest number of Nobel Prize winners. One third of all research and development dollars are spent in the United States. American investors are the largest single source of global venture capital. The spirit of innovation explains in large part why the United States is home to over half of the largest companies in the world.

The Russian high technology sector, by contrast, is small and undeveloped, and China's relies on copying American innovations. Strong universities have been vital to America's technological edge. Almost three quarters of the world's best universities are located in the United States. By contrast, less than one percent of the world's top 500 universities are in Russia and two percent of the top 100 universities are in China.¹⁴ American domination of the technology sector has changed the way the world works and is in no danger of being curtailed anytime soon.

¹³Xin Haiguang, "China's 'Wealth Drain': New Signs That Rich Chinese Are Set on Emigrating," *Economic Observer/World Crunch*, June 11, 2011, <https://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2077139,00.html> (accessed February 11, 2019).

¹⁴Op.cit., Adelman (2017).

Cultural Dominance

Since the First World War, with the spread of American ragtime music and Hollywood movies, American popular culture has come to dominate the world, to the point that some nations, including France and Canada, fear that it is damaging their own national cultures.¹⁵ No matter where one travels across continents, one confronts American music, films, dress, consumer products, and fast food chains. Even France, known for being protective of its national culture, hosts a Euro Disney theme park. In the 1950s many nations began to imitate America's consumer economy and sought to make the American lifestyle accessible to the masses.¹⁶

The English language is one of the most powerful vectors of American culture. American English has supplanted British English as the global lingua franca and is spoken by an estimated two billion people. Today, close to 70% of all native English speakers are American. American television, films, songs, computer games and websites have spread American English throughout the world. American dominance in these media is due to many factors, including the size of the U.S. domestic market, which provides incentives for their production and makes possible their export at affordable prices. The United States has a domestic market of over 300 million and a potential global market of more than two billion English speakers. The personal computer and worldwide web were American innovations that have accelerated the spread of American cultural influence. What all these cultural products have in common is that they are made for the average consumer and

¹⁵"America's Cultural Role in the World Today," last modified 28 July, 2008, <https://accessinternationalvg2.cappelendamm.no/c951212/artikkel/vis.html?tid=385685> (accessed June 11, 2018).

¹⁶Ian Bremmer, "These Are the 5 Reasons Why the U.S. Remains the World's Only Superpower," *Time*, May 28, 2015, <http://time.com/3899972/us-superpower-status-military/> (accessed February 11, 2019).

appeal to a universal audience. For example, two thirds of the movies shown in Europe are American while less than five percent of those shown in the United States are European. In a typical year, all top twenty grossing films in the world are American.

American authors, such as Stephen King, Anne Tyler, Michael Crichton, Jacqueline Susann, John Grisham, Toni Morrison, Dan Brown and Alice Walker, dominate popular literature around the world, in both English and translation. American popular music--ragtime, blues, jazz, swing, country western, rhythm and blues, rock and roll, hip-hop and rap--have swept across the globe. In the 1950s and 60s New York City came to rival Paris as a hub for modern art and American artists, including Roy Lichtenstein and Andy Warhol who came to symbolize the international Pop Art movement. The postwar years have demonstrated that American popular culture, appealing as it does to mass tastes, is an exportable commodity in demand across the globe.

Diplomatic Dominance

Undoubtedly, the hegemony of the United States in global affairs cannot be supported without the strong pillar of the U.S.-led alliances that have held control of crucial areas worldwide since the end of World War II. The United States has strong allies in Europe (England, France, Germany, Italy), the Middle East (Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) and Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia). The strength of America's alliances is illustrated by reaction to President Donald Trump's decision to launch missile strikes on a Syrian airbase in April 2017 in retaliation for the use of chemical weapons against insurgents by Syrian forces

that killed an estimated 86 people, including 27 children.¹⁷ The countries that announced their support for the U.S. strike were Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and United Kingdom. Opposed were China, Indonesia, Iran, Russia and Syria.

Soft-Power Influence

In addition to hard military power, America also exercises “soft power,” the ability to attract rather than coerce. The currency of soft power is lifestyle and political principles. The universal attraction of the American way of life and the democratic principles on which the American polity is based are strong pulls, especially in the developing world. Key to American success are the institutions of democracy, capitalism and the rule of law. The United States has the world’s oldest written constitution and one of the most stable regimes, with presidential elections taking place every four years since 1788.

Joseph Nye coined the term in a 1990 book, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. In this book, he wrote: “when one country gets other countries to want what it wants-might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of ordering others to do what it wants.” He further developed the concept in his 2004 book, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*.¹⁸ America excels in its ability to exert soft power. The 2016/17 Monocle Soft Power Survey ranks

¹⁷Jane Onyanga-Omara, “U.S. allies praise Trump's strikes on a Syria airbase,” *USA Today*, April 7, 2017, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/04/07/us-allies-praise-trumps-strikes-syrian-airbase/100161498/> (accessed June 10, 2018).

¹⁸Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 26-46.

the United States as the leading country in soft power. The Elcano Global Presence Report scores the United States first among sovereign states.¹⁹

China, on the other hand, has a huge soft power deficit, given the weak appeal of its political system.²⁰ Russia also has little appeal to those aspiring to a better life. Russia and China remain politically authoritarian with state-run economies and weak legal and judicial systems. The Russian and Chinese states, moreover, suffer from widespread corruption.

Interestingly, the Chinese leadership understands the importance of soft power in the Information Age. In 2011, Xi Jinping, the incoming General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, devoted a whole plenary session at the party congress to the issue of culture. The final conference communiqué declared that it was a national goal to "build our country into a socialist cultural superpower."²¹ And in 2014, Xi announced, "We should increase China's soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China's messages to the world."²²

An effective tool of soft power is foreign assistance, and here the United States is also a leader. In 2013, the U.S. provided \$32.7 billion in financial assistance; second was the United Kingdom at

¹⁹"Real Instituto Elcano", *Elcano Global Presence Report 2015*, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/f36b5f004830c24a8e3b8fe0dd72d861/Global_Presence_2015.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (accessed February 11, 2019).

²⁰Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "China's Soft Power Deficit: To catch up, its politics must unleash the many talents of its civil society." *The Wall Street Journal Opinion*, May 8, 2012, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1842> (accessed February 11, 2019).

²¹"The red carpet, China's film industry," *The Economist*, December 21, 2013, <https://www.economist.com/news/c-red-carpet> (accessed August 12, 2018).

²²David Shambaugh, "China's Soft-power Push," *Foreign Affairs*, June 6, 2015, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-06-16/china-s-soft-power-push> (accessed August 12, 2018).

\$19 billion.²³ An indicator of the effectiveness of soft power is the number of people seeking to migrate to a country. Almost 50 million people living in the U.S. today were born in a foreign country. That is more than four times higher than the next highest country. For many people around the world, America remains the ideal place to start a new life.²⁴

Table 4: Countries Hosting the Largest Numbers of International Migrants, 2017

International Ranking	Country	Number of Migrants (Millions)
1.	USA	49.8
2.	Saudi Arabia	12.2
3.	Germany	12.2
4.	Russian Federation	11.7
12.	India	5.2
18.	Pakistan	3.4

Source: International Migration Report 2017", *United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/en/docs/MigrationReport2017> (accessed February 11, 2019).

²³Ian Bremmer, "These Are the 5 Reasons Why the U.S. Remains the World's Only Superpower," *Time*, May 28, 2015, <http://time.com/3899972/us-superpower-status-military/> (accessed February 12, 2019).

²⁴"International Migration Report 2017", *United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration> (accessed February 11, 2019).

Table 5: Largest Countries of Origin of International Migrants, 2017

1.	India	16.6
2.	Mexico	13.0
3.	Russian Federation	10.6
4.	China	10.0
5.	Bangladesh	7.5
6.	Syrian Arab Republic	6.9
7.	Pakistan	6.0

Source: International Migration Report 2017", *United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/en/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017> (accessed February 11, 2019).

The Trump Administration and the International Cooperation Agenda

Some of America's allies have questioned the degree of commitment by U.S. President Donald Trump, elected in November 2016, to the Bretton Woods system and its principles of free trade, based on rules made and enforced by international organizations. During the election campaign and following his inauguration in January 2017, Trump criticized the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other trade deals, which he claimed were unfair to the United States. He withdrew the United States from the process of establishing a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and re-negotiated NAFTA with Canada and Mexico. In further blows to free trade and international institutions, Trump introduced punitive tariffs on imported steel and aluminum and openly attacked the system of global trade that has been in place since the end of World War II. "The WTO has been a disaster for this country," he said in March 2018 before imposing the punitive tariffs. Trump has also threatened the European Union and Germany especially, with automobile tariffs and has slapped \$50 billion worth of duties on Chinese goods while threatening additional tariffs worth \$200 to 400 billion more.

It is important, however, to place the president's hostile rhetoric and actions in the context of his desire to appeal to his electoral base. In the November 2016 election, Trump, the Republican Party's candidate, received fewer popular votes than his Democratic opponent, Hillary Clinton. He won because of the electoral college, which gives a disproportionate weight to the fifty states. He narrowly carried the traditionally Democratic states of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin because of the fears of industrial workers, many of whom had lost jobs when manufacturing plants closed. Although automation was the largest single cause of the de-industrialization of the American Midwest, Trump won votes by blaming the factory closings on unfair foreign competition.

If one looks more closely at the President's cabinet, however, there is much evidence that American commitment to the international trading system remains strong. In July 2018, for example, U.S. Secretary of State James Mattis stated that the United States remains 100 percent committed to the NATO alliance.²⁵ Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stressed that America's goal in its trade war with China is to force China to conduct trade in accordance with the rule of law, the key principle of the international trading system. Pompeo justified the pressure that the United States was placing on its trade partners by pointing out that the United States seeks the elimination of all obstacles to trade, including non-tariff barriers. America's partners, he said, "need to accept our vegetables, our beef, our fruit, our machine products. These are non-tariff barriers that ought not to exist if free

²⁵Richard Sisk, "US '100 Percent' Committed to NATO, Mattis Says," *Military.com*, July 12, 2018, <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/07/12/us-100-percent-committed-nato-mattis-says.html> (accessed August 20, 2018).

and fair trade is to be achieved.”²⁶ President’s Trump’s belligerent statements on the unfairness of many current trade agreements, thus, can best be understood as a continuing commitment to the principle of free trade based on rules enforced by international institutions accompanied by an insistence that the agreements themselves be fair to the United States and give American producers access to markets that have long been closed to them. Trump’s tough negotiating style is consistent with the teachings in his book, *The Art of the Deal*.²⁷

Why China and Russia Are Not Superpowers

By all measures of international power, China has a long way to go to rival the power in international affairs of the United States in the manner that the Soviet Union did.²⁸ A high percentage of the wealthiest Chinese are leaving the country, causing a wealth drain and a loss in tax revenue and investment. A large portion of the Chinese economy, about 30 percent of total assets, is still owned by the state. State ownership is associated with corruption, inefficiency and lack of innovation.²⁹ China’s high-tech sector cannot compete with that of Japan, the European Union and the United States. The Chinese socialist state faces increasing difficulty in generating sufficient revenue to maintain the large subsidies

²⁶Joel Gehrke, “Mike Pompeo to G-7 trade critics: ‘It’s a simple moral principle’,” *Washington Examiner*, June 18, 2018, <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com> (accessed February 11, 2019).

²⁷Donald J. Trump, with Tony Schwartz, *Trump: The Art of the Deal* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2015), 45-54.

²⁸Lyman Miller, “China an Emerging Superpower?,” *Stanford Journal of International Relations* 6, no. 1 (Winter 2005), https://web.stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.03_miller.html (accessed February 11, 2019).

²⁹Gao Xu, “State-owned enterprises in China: How big are they?,” *The World Bank*, January 19, 2010, <http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/state-owned-enterprises-in-china-how-big-are-they> (accessed February 11, 2019).

needed to placate an aging population.³⁰ The one-party state lacks the will to reduce the government's power and liberalize the economy, steps needed for Chinese industry to be globally competitive. The Chinese military lags behind the U.S. military in terms of equipment and training. It is especially difficult for the Chinese armed forces to access new technology. The military is subject to meddling by the Chinese Communist Party and lacks combat experience.³¹

China can make a claim that it is stronger than Russia and, therefore, more deserving of superpower status. China is a far wealthier nation than Russia. The People's Republic of China has a gross domestic product of 12 trillion dollars compared to 1.5 trillion for the Russian Federation. It spends \$228 billion on its military, compared to \$66 billion for Russia.³²

On the other hand, Russia has a stronger case than China to be considered a superpower. It is self-sufficient in natural resources, including huge energy reserves; it has a substantial space program; it has world-class scientists and mathematicians; it surpasses both China and the United States in number of nuclear warheads; and it has aspirations to be a global leader. The Kremlin has displayed a willingness to intervene militarily in both Europe and the Middle East, including the countries of Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. Russia's

³⁰Sean Cowan, "Top 10 Reasons China Won't Be The World's Next Superpower," *Listverse*, September 6, 2017, <http://listverse.com/2017/09/06/top-10-reasons-china-wont-be-the-worlds-next-superpower/> (accessed April 04, 2018).

³¹Michael S. Chase et al., "China's Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)", *RAND*, February 11, 2015, <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ChinaIncompleteMilitary%20Transformation2.11.15.pdf> (accessed April 4, 2018).

³²Wes Frank, "Has China become stronger than Russia in military power?", *Quora*, December 17, 2017, <https://www.quora.com/Has-China-become-stronger-than-Russia-in-military-power> (accessed April 10, 2018).

energy exports remain high. In 2017, Gazprom generated total revenue of \$104 billion. Gazprom controls 35% of Europe's energy market, control that gives Russia political influence over Central and Western Europe. In 2017, Russian arms exports were worth \$17 billion, second in value only to the arms sales of the United States. In Europe, Russia is the single largest defense spender and purchaser of major combat systems.³³

Russia's economy, however, is not intertwined with the American economy as is China's and, therefore, lacks the capacity for rapid growth. Russia lacks the economic strength to be a global leader and is vulnerable to retaliation from Washington. The Russia has suffered a great deal from the sanctions imposed by the United States and its NATO allies following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. The United States and its NATO allies evicted Russia from the G7 and imposed sanctions that have had a measurable harmful impact on the Russian economy and the Putin's ability to maintain political support through the distribution of wealth. America's ability to weaken economies through sanctions is proven not only by the case of Russia but also that of Iran. By the end of 2017, Russia's GDP was almost two percentage points lower because of the cumulative effect of sanctions on capital inflows. The Kremlin was forced to take austerity measures, including raising the retirement age and increasing the Value-Added Tax (VAT).

Both Russia and China, moreover, lack soft power and do not offer an alternative to Western liberal democracy based on a free-

³³Alexey D. Muraviev, "Russia not so much a (re)rising superpower as a skilled strategic spoiler," *The Conversation*, February 19, 2018, <http://theconversation.com/russia-not-so-much-a-re-rising-superpower-as-a-skilled-strategic-spoiler> (accessed February 11, 2019).

market economy. The Cold War was a struggle between two political and economic systems striving to win the hearts and minds of people around the globe. The triumph of democracy in 1991, however, meant the end of history, i.e., the end of ideological struggles.³⁴ Both Russia and China, although possessing national wealth and growing militaries, lack all the elements needed to qualify as superpowers. As large authoritarian states, they face the threat to stability that comes with struggles over succession to power and regional separatist movements.³⁵

Implications for U.S.-Pakistan Relations

The Limits of China and Russia as Allies

To make a wise choice, Pakistan must assess the relative advantages and risks of an alliance with either, the United States, Russia or China. China has difficult and sometimes hostile relations with a number of countries, including Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, Taiwan, Japan, India, South Korea and the United States. Several of these conflicts stem from China's territorial claims in the South China Sea. If Pakistan is perceived as too close to China it risks alienating these important Asia-Pacific countries. On the other hand, through the Belt and Road Initiative, China is making allies with a number of countries, including Pakistan. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is also tying Pakistan to China. Based on the experience of other nations participating in the Belt and Road Initiative, however, Pakistan must be careful not

³⁴Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1992), 201-255.

³⁵Erik Khzmalyan and Armen Sahakyan, "Russia and China Aren't Full Allies—Yet: And here's what Washington can do to keep it that way," *The National Interest*, October 4, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-and-chinaarentfullallies%E2%80%94yet-32637?page=0%2C1> (accessed April 04, 2018).

to undertake unsustainable debt while China reaps the benefits.³⁶ It is estimated that Pakistan would be required to repay principal and interest of approximately \$3.5 billion per year over a period of 20 years.³⁷ There is also concern that the debt could give China leverage over Pakistan's sovereignty, including its foreign policy.³⁸

Russia, like China, has few allies, including Serbia, Cuba and Syria, and difficult relations with many countries, including the United States and the member states of the European Union. Russia has historically been a strong ally of India. In 2017 India was the largest purchaser of powerful, sophisticated weapons from Russia, with purchases totaling \$1.9 billion. India purchased two Russian A-50eh1 AWACs in 2017, and has purchased MiG-29SMTs, as well as light and transport helicopters, some of which were delivered in 2017. In 2012, India purchased 42 Russian Su-30MK fighter jets for \$1.6 billion, 25 of which were delivered in 2016 and 2017. India has purchased nearly 1,000 T-90 tanks in the last few years from Russia. India also selected five Russian S-400 missile defense systems for \$5 billion in 2017. It also selected an Akula class Type 971 submarine.³⁹ This powerful arsenal poses a major threat to Pakistan.

³⁶K. S. Venkatachalam, "Can Pakistan Afford CPEC?", *The Diplomat*, June 16, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/can-pakistan-afford-cpec/> (accessed April 05, 2018).

³⁷Ilaria Maria Sala, "Pakistan's new government is trying to walk back from alarming Chinese debt", *Quartz*, September 10, 2018, <https://qz.com/1384295/pakistan-is-trying-to-back-away-from-a-debt-trap-with-china/> (accessed April 05, 2018).

³⁸S. Akbar Zaidi, "Has China taken over Pakistan?," *The News*, June 18, 2017, <http://tns.thenews.com.pk/china-taken-pakistan-cpec/#.W9c9o5MzZhE> (accessed April 05, 2018).

³⁹Daniel Brown, "The top 10 countries that bought Russia's most powerful weapons in 2017," *Business Insider*, October 06, 2018, <https://www.businessinsider.com> (accessed April 07, 2018).

Why a Superpower Makes a Good Ally

While prosperous democracies such as Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan have chosen to ally themselves with the United States, aspiring great powers Russia and China have not. What advantages do the superpower's friends obtain and what costs do its rivals pay? The first benefit is defense. America's enormous military might shield its allies from attack. Article 5 of the NATO treaty says that each member state will treat an attack on another member as an attack on itself. The NATO states and Japan are so dependent on the American nuclear umbrella that they spend relatively little on their own militaries. American presidents have tried to cajole and coerce them into spending at least two percent of their GDP on defense but with little success.

The second benefit is peace, enforced by American military might. There have been no wars between the world's major powers since 1945, a state that has allowed America's allies to focus on economic growth and building welfare states--achievements that have resulted in a relatively content citizenry enjoying a high standard of living.⁴⁰ A unipolar world is even safer than the bipolar system that characterized the Cold War. Proxy wars fought indirectly between the Soviet Union and the United States in places such as Korea, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Angola and Afghanistan ended with the collapse of the USSR. The former client states of the Soviet Union have rushed to join both NATO and the European Union to reap the benefits of the Pax Americana.

⁴⁰“Does the world benefit from having a single superpower?,” *Debates wise organization*, <https://debate.wise.org/debates/2920-single-superpower-benefit-of/#yes1> (accessed April 07, 2018).

America's wealth and international presence provide the means to support democratic movements in autocratic states and to provide foreign assistance to developing countries. It is a blessing to the world if the dominant nation supports the struggle for human rights, opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons and leads the fight against terrorism. America's strength and commitment to principles led it to intervene, along with its allies, in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya and is currently working to stifle the development of atomic weapons in Iran and North Korea.

As September 11, 2001, demonstrated, many non-state actors are hostile to peace and security. America serves as a powerful leader to direct the global war on terror. Fragile states, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, need a protector to prevent them collapsing under pressure from extremist groups. America shoulders the burden of military intervention to protect human rights and leads the formation of coalitions to protect them when most individual countries would be reluctant to take action. During the Cold War, the United States was compelled to support dictatorships that were anti-Communist but in the current unipolar environment America is freer to encourage democratic reforms across the globe. Development assistance, led by the generous example of the United States, is no longer a tool in the Cold War but can be tailored to help developing countries achieve greater peace, stability, democracy and prosperity.

Conclusion

In a multipolar or bipolar international system, the competing superpowers need allies in order to strengthen their position relative to their superpower rivals. During the Cold War, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union used a variety of

means, including coercion and economic assistance, to entice as many nations as possible to join its coalition. The American bloc consisted of such associations as NATO and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). A key organization in the Soviet bloc was the Warsaw Pact. Pakistan chose to join the American bloc and India the Russian. The change from a bipolar to a unipolar environment following the collapse of the USSR, however, greatly reduced America's need for allies since it could affect its will by exercising its dominant military and economic power without worrying about threats to its security and prosperity. Nations, no longer courted by the superpower, nevertheless have an incentive to seek its good will, given its hegemony. Pakistan, thus, chose to ally itself with the United States after the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, in the global war on terror. If, however, Russia and China have reached superpower status, Pakistan is in a much different position. It will be courted by each of them as well as the United States to join its bloc.

If, however, as the evidence above demonstrates, America remains the world's hegemonic power, Pakistan will have an incentive to earn the military and economic support of the United States even if the effort leads to friction with Russia and China. The trade-off of an alliance with the world's most powerful nation in exchange for lost opportunities in its relationship with Russia and China is a rational choice. A concrete manifestation of this pro-American policy would be for Pakistan to cooperate fully with U.S. efforts to defeat terrorism in Afghanistan and help bring about reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban.⁴¹ The realities of uni-polarity explain both the Trump administration's

⁴¹Aakanksha Nehra, "US-Pakistan relations under the Trump Administration," *The Pioneer*, June 22, 2018, <https://www.dailypioneer.com/2018/columnists/us-pakistan-relations-under-the-trump-administration.html> (accessed February 11, 2019).

South Asia policy, with its pressure on Pakistan not to provide safe haven for Afghan insurgents, and its trade policy, which is based on criticisms of long-time American allies, including Canada, Mexico and Germany, for taking unfair advantage of the United States in past trade deals. During the Cold War, U.S. allies had to make few sacrifices to qualify for American bounty, but in the current unipolar environment, these same nations have to make a much greater effort to obtain and maintain economic and military assistance. Pakistan, for example, must show concrete results in helping to end the war in Afghanistan, while Canada and Mexico must make concessions regarding revisions to the North America Free Trade Agreement. Just as it is in the interest of Pakistan to examine its relationship with China in the light of future U.S. aid and access, it behooves India to view its ties to Russia through the American lens. Procurement of supplies for its nuclear weapons from China and Russia by Pakistan and India, respectively, for example, risks retaliation from Washington.

Pakistan is at a crossroads in its foreign policy. If it chooses to become a close ally with China and scale back its ties to the United States, it risks becoming like North Korea, which is saddled with heavy debts from its long alliance with China and isolated from the West. By choosing America, Pakistan will be positioned to benefit both economically and militarily and to play a central role in the resolution of the long-running conflict in Afghanistan.

Regional Security Complex Theory: A Case Study of Afghanistan-Testing the Alliance

Dr. Lubna Sunawar*

Abstract

Since 2001 onwards, the US led coalition of NATO and the European countries have invested heavily in politics, economy, and defence areas of Afghanistan. The transatlantic alliance has created an effective institutional framework by utilizing a wide range of both political and military instruments at their disposal. The rationale of this research paper is to analyze if Afghanistan fits neatly into the given constructivist framework proposed by Regional Security Complex Theory; to examine subjective nature of security threats to transatlantic alliance in Afghanistan through discourses they maintained overtime in order to investigate the validity of the securitization process. This research addresses (i) that penetration of external great powers in the region do not necessarily require geographical proximity factors but the nature of perceived threats invite their attention. (ii) The securitization process which includes non-state actors can play a crucial role in identifying the level of threat, politicizing the issues, and to take effective measures to tackle challenges.

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Keywords: Afghanistan, Civil Wars, Terrorism, NATO, Securitization, Alliance, Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), Central Asia, South Asia.

Introduction

Afghanistan is described as an insulator state and it is also known as a connector¹ due to its unique geostrategic location at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East.² Pakistan shares a long porous border with Afghanistan- the Durand Line which is considered the most contentious, dangerous and poorly demarcated at most places.³ The deployment of international troops in Afghanistan in 2001 brought new challenges for Pakistan to deal with. The question arises where the border was and Pakistan's responsibilities for maintaining peace, law and order in its own territories acquired international attention.⁴ Since the Taliban's ouster in 2001, Afghan militant groups have found safe havens in Pakistan. In fact, the US has yet to declare Afghan Taliban group founded by Mulla Omar as terrorist and has continued efforts to hold peace talks with it. It has certainly declared Haqqani network as terrorist but still wants to hold talks with it.

Western media and political narrative shapes the story for the world to believe that the command and control structure of the three main militant groups – Mullah Omar's Shura (council), and the al-Qaeda-linked Haqqani network terrorists are not only given shelter by Pakistan but they can operate in neighboring Afghanistan

¹Kristian Berg Harpviken, "Afghanistan in a Neighborhood Perspective," *Peace Research Institute Oslo*, (2009): 8-9.

²Jon Schiller, *Internet View of the Arabic World* (Charleston: BookSurge Publishing, 2009), 188.

³Natasha Underhill, *Countering Global Terrorism & Insurgency* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 54.

⁴Lubna Sunawar, "Stopping Illegal X-border Movement: A Must for Peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Hilal Magazine*, 2014, 104.

with great ease. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-elIslami used to enjoy the same protection and safe asylum in Pakistani territory but since 2017 Hekmatyar made a peace deal with Afghan government, stopped fighting and shifted to Kabul. These terrorists continue to undermine the U.S. led European coalition efforts for peace, democracy and stability in Afghanistan.⁵ In addition to this, these terrorists have associations with religious parties based in Pakistan⁶ from where they receive ample support. In the wake of 9/11, the EU-U.S. relations can be characterized as competitive cooperation but both have strengthened this partnership in the non-military areas related to counter-terrorism as well.⁷ Francois Heisbourg argues that the transatlantic relationship can survive if the European Union assumes more active military role in the global conflicts.⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the first time invoked Article 5 in the wake of 9/11 terror attacks and chose to send ground troops to Afghanistan, making it NATO's first out-of-area- ground operation. NATO is a multinational actor that works in high-pressure environments, making it well suited to operate in zones and areas that are culturally, geographically, and politically diverse.

Theoretical Framework

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and its related concept of Securitization form the basis of this research. Buzan, Waever and Wilde define the RSCT as: "a set of units whose major

⁵Ibid.

⁶Talat Masood, "Pakistan's Fight Against Terrorism," *Defence Against Terrorism Review* 4, no. 1 (Spring & Fall 2012): 13-14.

⁷Christian Kaunert, "The External Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations," *Terrorism and Political Violence* (Publisher: Routledge, 2009), 42-50.

⁸Francois Heisbourg, "The Defence of Europe: Towards a new transatlantic division of responsibilities," in *All Alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO* edited by Tomas Valasek, *Centre for European Reform* (2012): 27-44.

processes of securitization and de-securitization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another.”⁹ The regional states are interconnected in such an amalgamated manner that the matters related to domestic security of one state have a major and profound impact on the other. Buzan and his colleagues have expanded the scope of the security complex by including non-military aspects thus giving rise to constructivist methodology.¹⁰

The basic concept which RSCT underlines is: “political and military threats are more potent to create the sense of insecurity as compared to other threats. The insecurity of the state is closely interlinked with the proximity factor.”¹¹ In the international system, states that are located on the border of regions, for instance, Afghanistan is a political weak country that has shaped great power politics despite its’ relatively weak potency and resources in international affairs. Realist approaches have sidelined these states by calling them ‘buffer or proxies.’ Mainstream IR has lacked a central framework for the analysis of regions and put emphasis on great power politics. Similarly, neo-liberalists have generally ignored states which despite having a significant impact on international relations and peculiar geo strategic location are disproportionate in terms of economic wealth and institutional engagement.¹²

Based on neo-classical realism and globalism, Buzan and his colleagues Waever build up ‘a three-tiered system of the

⁹Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde et al., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 201.

¹⁰Raimov- Yrynen, “Regionalism: Old and New,” *International Studies Review* 5, no. 1 (2003): 39.

¹¹Nadine Godehardt, *The Chinese Constitution of Central Asia: Regions & Intertwined Actors in Int’l Relations* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 31.

¹²Ersel Aydinli & James N. Rosenau (ed), *Globalization, Security, and the Nation State* (State University of New York, 2005), 155.

international security structure in the post-Cold War world with one superpower (US) and four great powers (EU, Japan, China and Russia) acting at the system level and regional powers at the regional level.¹³ The conceptualization of the (RSCT) requires the clarification of three key concepts used here: regional security complex, securitization, and amity/enmity pattern.

The fundamental purpose of this research paper is to determine the applicability of RSCT and its related concept of securitization to Afghanistan. By employing RSCT, this research applies to the military sector of multidimensional security focus as envisioned by the Copenhagen School. "During the Cold War, regional security and stability were defined largely in terms of the place that a region occupied in the strategic calculation of the United States or the Soviet Union."¹⁴ Unlike the Cold War period, today many important actors have shaped the international system that replaced superpowers with regional or great powers. Today, regional powers are more influential with military, economic, demographic, political, and ideological resources for power projection.¹⁵

RSCT explains Afghanistan as an insulator state which is being surrounded by South Asia, Middle East and Central Asia. In addition to this, many factors contribute to Afghanistan's new security paradigm such as so-called Islamic extremism, terrorists' affiliation with regional states, and great powers presence in Afghanistan, etc. The South Asian (RSC) can be best understood when states feel

¹³ "State Failure in a Regional Context", *Stefan Wolff*, http://ainstud.at.ua/Id/0/29_Wolff_State_Fai.pdf (accessed December 8, 2018).

¹⁴ James Sperling, "Regional Security. Oxford Bibliographies," 2015, http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/abstract/9780190266550_015 (accessed December 8, 2018).

¹⁵ Detlef Nolte, "How to Compare Regional Powers," *Review of International Studies, British International Studies Association*, (2010): 893.

threatened and form a security network, it might be with the regional powers or great powers.¹⁶

In recent political and scholarly debates, most of the academic scholars have applied RSCT on Afghanistan with relation to Central Asian Republics^{17, 18}. However, very thin literature is available on the applicability of RSCT of Afghanistan within South Asian framework¹⁹. In addition to this, very little attention has been paid to other aspects of non-state actors in the securitization process, for instance counter-terrorism and threat perception with regard to the transatlantic alliance in Afghanistan, these themes still remain open for investigation.

Kristian Berg Harpviken believes Afghanistan is not a part of the Middle East, South Asia or even Central Asia. "Afghanistan has historically been in between all these regions."²⁰ The regional security complex includes cooperative and confrontation relations. The study of regions has received significant attention in contemporary international order but major differences have been central and disagreements arise on what comprises regions, how do they originate, how do they influence, and what happens when they interact within the larger international system. Regions do not define only different actors' interaction within the system but it is

¹⁶Irina Chernykh and Rustam Burnashev, "Conditions for Securitization of International Terrorism in Central Asia," *Quarterly Journal*, (March 2005): 131-142.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Praha, "Afghanistan and Tajikistan in the post-Cold War Era: A Sub-regional Insecurity Complex?" *Diploma Dissertation, Univerzita Karlova V Praze Fakulta Socialnich Ved Institut Politologickych Studii*, 2006.

¹⁹Melanie Hanif, "Indian Involvement in Afghanistan in the Context of the South Asian Security System," *Journal of Strategic Security* 3, no. 2 (Summer 2010).

²⁰Kristian Berg Harpviken, "Geopolitical Fault Lines – The Case of Afghanistan", *The International Relations & Security Network*, December 05, 2011, www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital Library/Articles/Special (accessed February 11, 2019).

where national and global security interplay.²¹ International relations scholars emphasize the importance of regions regarding policy-making and the differences among them. Regions play a vital role in shaping and constructing the post-Cold War order.

In fact, Stein and Lobell have argued that regional security was not globalized even during the Cold War. Throughout the Cold War period, the U.S. was a significant player in most regional security arrangements, but on the other hand, it remained hesitant to engage itself in African and Asian conflicts because these conflicts were not posing major threat to its interests in these respective regions.²² Regional power hierarchies are equally important to explain regional security complexes, for instance Buzan and Waever have made a clear distinction between superpowers and great powers in the framework of RSCT. Superpowers exert influence in the international system which can be felt by other states in the system but the regional powers have minimal influence to exert which 'may be large in their regions but have less of an impact at the global level. This category of regional powers includes Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.'²³

Destradi argues regional powers pursue different strategies for different causes and consequences. Regional powers follow different strategies in order to obtain same objectives. On the other side of the debate, neoliberal institutionalists such as Nye and Keohane put emphasis on economic and institutional

²¹Saeid Naji, "Levels of Analysis in International Relations and Regional Security Complex Theory," *Journal of Public Administration and Governance* 4, no. 4 (2014): 168-169.

²²Raimo V - Yrynen, "Regionalism: Old and New," *International Studies Review* 5, (2003): 28.

²³Detlef Nolte, "How to compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics," *Review of International Studies, British International Studies Association* 36, (2010): 886-887.

integration by including the European Union (EU), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and NAFTA for regional analysis.²⁴ These frameworks presented by realists and liberalists fail to address loopholes within the international system “especially in relation to states that do not fit within a natural geographically congruent region, and whose positions often have influence on the international system disproportionate to their military and latent capabilities.”²⁵

The end of the Cold War and bipolarity provided more room to local powers for maneuvering their strategic objectives. The U.S. being left as the sole power and other great powers like China, Japan, and Russia are not interested to enter any strategic competition and intervene in security affairs outside their own regions because their domestic capabilities are not enough to take on these ventures. They chose to leave regional powers on their own to deal with strategic and military issues within their respective regions.²⁶

Afghanistan can be seen as the ‘core’ of a larger conflict formation which has brought many trans-national networks to work across the borders, for instance Al-Qaeda and ISIS, Islamic and ethnic networks which are actively exporting terrorism to the neighboring countries. However, Afghanistan relations with neighboring countries depend on how they formulate ‘their

²⁴Wayne McLean, “Regional Security Complex Theory and Insulator States: The Case of Turkey,” *University of Tasmania*, (2011): 6-11.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Saeid Naji, “Levels of Analysis in International Relations and Regional Security Complex Theory,” *Journal of Public Administration and Governance* 4, no. 4 (2014): 168-169.

perception of threats coming from non-state actors, especially trans-boundary ones.²⁷

The political and security transition uncertainties have already had a pronounced effect on Afghanistan's fragile economy. Predictably, the levels of financial assistance and the presence of foreign military and aid personnel will decline over time. But deserting Afghanistan may not be a prudent option for the United States and others. To deprive Afghanistan of humanitarian and development aid would be cruel in light of how the country has suffered and sacrificed. Realpolitik would also dictate that this resource-poor country should not be left vulnerable. Without a visible international involvement, there exists a strong possibility of domestic political turmoil and economic failure that could condemn Afghanistan to become a narco-state, and leave it prey to rapacious neighbors. Once again, Afghanistan could easily become a breeding ground for an Islamic militancy that is regionally and globally contagious. A nuclear-armed Pakistan and the dangers of its becoming a jihadi state also raise the regional stakes for the international community, and especially the United States. The investment of the international community in keeping Afghanistan from becoming a narco-state has more immediacy than any of the other threats facing Afghanistan. As a direct consequence of a broken economy and a weak state system, opium poppy cultivation has spread across the entire country and criminalized much of its economy and governance. It has created a community of interests among dealers, local militias, government officials, and anti-regime militants that defies the enforcement efforts of the Kabul

²⁷W. Sean McLaughlin, "The Use of the Internet for the Political Action by Non-State Dissident Actors in the Middle East," *First Monday*, <https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1096/1016> (accessed December 13, 2018).

government and those assisting it. The country's weak judicial institutions also stand as a major impediment.²⁸

Discussion

If the states are weaker in the system, the trans-national networks will have a certain destabilizing effect not within the state itself but across the region. With this in mind, this research paper evaluates whether Afghanistan fits the 'category of an 'insulator'—part of RSCTs categorization intended to fill the 'outlier' gap.' The topic requires to be studied because RSCT has no updated account on Afghanistan with regard to terrorism and non-state actors in the post 9/11 period. This research paper has three major contributions to the RSCT: First, unlike its authors who put emphasis on security threats emerging from the states within the region; I argue, in the post 9/11 period, security threats come from terrorist organizations and non-state actors. Second, the previous work done on South Asia within RSCT framework mainly focuses on Pakistan and India but I incorporate Afghanistan to give a complete picture of how the regional security complex is effecting at the ground, which has been a neglected theme. Third, this paper provides a guideline for policymakers on Afghanistan supported by scientific evidences for improving regional security.

The RSCT is applied on two threats studied, i.e. uncertain security environment as a decade long War on Terror remains an unfinished agenda in Afghanistan, second, rise of Islamic terrorism. In the first place, the US and European leaders have 'politicized the

²⁸Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: An Ever Dangerous Neighborhood," *United States Institute of Peace*, June 01, 2006, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/06/afghanistan-and-its-neighbors-ever-dangerous-neighborhood> (accessed December 14, 2018).

threat by highlighting the regional security dimension, either by making reference to the dimension of military security of NATO, or by securitizing the strategic values and interests of the Alliance.²⁹

The US led NATO military alliance in Afghanistan remain focused on the military dimension of security. Al-Qaeda emerged as a global threat for the US and its European allies which led to the 'creation of a large coalition that supported boots on the ground in Afghanistan and which involved NATO. Invocation of article 5 by NATO was another step in the legitimization of WoT securitization.³⁰ On the other hand, in recent years, despite the U.S. insistence, European countries are quite reluctant to send their troops to Afghanistan due to multiple reasons and security is one of them.

RSCT emphasizes geographic factors. It explains that states at regional level make more security arrangements with each other rather than forming this relationship with states located in other regions. In other words, proximity plays a central role and causes threats to travel more easily. 'Only superpowers have the capability of having wide-ranging interests over the whole planet.'³¹ RSCT has historical as well as contemporary dimensions that enable to provide a link to pre Cold War, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War developments in the international system. It also gives a

²⁹Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, "Extraordinary Measures: Drone Warfare, Securitization, and the War on Terror" *Global Security Studies* 6, no. 2 (Spring 2015): 2.

³⁰Ibid., 9.

³¹Saeid Naji, "Levels of Analysis in International Relations and Regional Security Complex Theory," *Journal of Public Administration and Governance* 4, no. 4 (2014): 168-169.

framework of regional security that helps to analyze, predict, and explain major events within any region.³²

Anarchy is the central feature of international system, where Regional Security Complex (RSCs) not only have mediating effects but also determine the respective roles of great powers in the international system. From a systemic perspective, regions form subsystems because states interact and interconnect with each other. Unlike larger international system which is determined by the interactions of major powers, regional subsystem analyzes the interaction of regional powers where major powers have the ability to exert influence and get involved in regional affairs. In such a situation, a great power active in the region through military and economic incentives may become a part of regional security complex by taking positive and negative measures.³³

Barry Buzan's concept of "regional security complex" offers a useful tool to investigate regional security in the contemporary international system which emerged after the end of the Cold War era. It is worth mentioning that this theory makes two significant contributions in the field of international relations. First, it shows relative importance of the regional security and the role of a great power in the international security system. Second, and most important factor is, "regional security complex" is embedded in security interdependence and not by following common and systematic factors which determine the nature of the contemporary international security system.

³²Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 40.

³³T. V. Paul, "International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation", Cambridge, 2012, <http://www.cambridge.org/catalogue/> (accessed December 14, 2018).

The end of the Cold War period brought Third World conflicts to the limelight. Today, regional states are more concerned to tackle dominant regional power which they considered as the main threat to their security and survival. Based on their colonial experiences, the principle of non-intervention has assumed greater significance to Third World states. In addition to this, alliances, for instance, SEATO and CENTO with superpowers during the Cold War did not yield any productive results and Third World states remained vulnerable to domestic opponents or subversion. The practice of intervention carried out by superpowers during the Cold War period and great powers in the post-Cold War period has only aggravated already fragile political conditions and posed a direct threat to the security of the regional states.

Buzan and his colleagues argue that RSCT facilitates scholars to get better understanding of new structure of international politics which emerged after the end of the Cold War. RSCT explains the distribution of power by combining both neo-realism and securitization in the Copenhagen School. However, RSC does not accept global level structure in international politics and emphasizes on regional level and that is what makes it different from the neo-realism.³⁴

‘This social constructivist method of conceptualizing security known as ‘securitization’ was first presented by the so called Copenhagen School in 1989 Working Paper “Security the Speech Act: Analyzing the Politics of a Word” by Ole Waever.³⁵ Hayes identified three elements of a successful securitization process

³⁴Saeid Naji, “Levels of Analysis in International Relations and Regional Security Complex Theory,” *Journal of Public Administration and Governance* 4, no. 4 (August 2016): 168-169.

³⁵Catherine Charrett, “A Critical Application of Securitization Theory,” *International Catalan Institute for Peace*, (2009): 10.

(existential threat + referent object + means for resolving the threat)³⁶ “Copenhagen School argues that an issue is transformed into a security issue (securitized) after a securitizing actor presents it as an existential threat and this ‘securitizing move’ is accepted by the audience.”³⁷ “Securitization means ‘the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.’”³⁸ The ‘securitization theory’ defines ‘security’ not as an objective condition but as the outcome of a specific social process.”³⁹ ‘This has on the contrary been criticized by those of the Critical Security Studies school of thought, which itself is set in contrast to the assumptions of neo-realism and realism.’⁴⁰

According to the securitization theory, security is socially and inter-subjectively constructed. This theory states, political actors securitize things as threats to legitimize their objectives. The main objective of the theory is to explain who, why, and under what circumstances political actors securitize issue. An issue becomes a security issue once it is presented as a threat to the audience. Thus Copenhagen School terms ‘securitization’ as an inter-subjective process which can be institutionalized, for instance, military

³⁶Jarrod Hayes, “Europe and America in the War on Terror: Transatlantic Security Relations after 9/11,” *Georgia Institute of Technology*, (2013): 6.

³⁷Christian Kaunert and Sarah Leonard, “Re-conceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory,” in *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, ed. by T. Balzacq (London: Routledge, 2011), 57-76.

³⁸Edwin Ezeokafor, “The securitization processes and West African Security,” (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Dundee, 2015), 16.

³⁹Goran Popovic, Thesis: “Securitization of EU Development Policy” (Dissertation, Lund University: Department of Political Science, 2007), 14-15.

⁴⁰“The Regional Security Complex Theory Politics Essay,” *UK Essays*, March 23, 2015, <http://www.ukessays.com/essays/politics/the-regional-security>(accessed December 20, 2018).

issues.⁴¹ In order to present an issue as a security concern, it must be presented and accepted by an audience. 'Indeed, Buzan, Waever and Wilde further clarify that securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience.'⁴²

In other words, the process of securitization is a speech act in which the audience plays a central role in determining different obligations, rights, and responsibilities and not the securitizer. 'Kaunert and Leonard have made an important contribution by identifying loophole in the securitization theory 'as a problematic and under-theorized aspect of the securitization framework... it is important for the framework to offer a clear conceptualization of who constitutes the audience and how its acceptance is assessed'.⁴³

It has been questioned whether securitization can be conceptualized as both a speech act and an inter-subjective process at the same time?⁴⁴ Barry Buzan claims a successful securitization is decided by an audience and not by the securitizer who launches the process, but who could be the audience? Both scholars are of the view that there is no clarity when it comes to define what makes 'an audience' and how its' acceptance is evaluated in the process. This is where Leonard and Kaunert have tried to fill the gap by presenting a valid argument that without determining exact nature of an audience, the process of a securitization would remain an

⁴¹Saeid Naji, "Levels of Analysis in International Relations and Regional Security Complex Theory," *Journal of Public Administration and Governance* 4, no. 4 (2014): 168.

⁴²Op.cit., The Regional Security (2015).

⁴³Christian Kaunert and Sarah Leonard, "Re-conceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory," *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (London: Routledge, 2011), 57-60.

⁴⁴Ibid., 60-76.

ambiguous exercise. They demand more clarity about the given concept for further investigation.

The global security calculus is changed for the U.S. and its key allies after the events of 9/11. Terrorism was securitized as the top most priority and existential threat to contain in the post-Cold War era. 'According to the securitization framework of Buzan, an issue becomes securitized when it is presented and accepted as an existential threat that requires emergency measures outside the normal bounds of politics.'⁴⁵

The articulation of a successful speech act by a securitizing actor can manipulate the situation to get the audience support for his actions. For instance, President Bush through his speech act on September 20, 2001 articulated 'War against Terrorism' and declared: Our War on Terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.'⁴⁶

The U.S. political and military leaders convinced U.S. public and European allies that they needed emergency military action against perpetrators who were responsible for executing these terror attacks against the US mainland. The logic provided by the leaders was accepted by the public thus giving way to the US to intervene in Afghanistan by leading the Global war on Terror (GWoT). For the first time in history, NATO invoked Article 5 by declaring this security threat as an immediate threat against all member states. This in turn, invited the US and its European coalition to take extraordinary measures- in the form of retaliation and invasion of Afghanistan through Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 to tackle

⁴⁵Necla Tschirgi, Roger Mac Ginty (eds), *Routledge Handbooks of Peace Building*, (2013): 201.

⁴⁶Ibid., 202.

the threat beyond the normal democratic boundaries. This research primarily focuses on the successful securitization of threat perception and related security dynamics regarding the War on Terror in Afghanistan. This research explores the subjective nature of security threats confronted by the US and its European allies and resultantly how this has made securitization a successful process. 'Thus, as the threat presented by al-Qaeda was securitized by the US, a number of measure were moved out of the realm of politics and became entered the realm of security politics.'⁴⁷

The securitization of War on Terror is embedded in discourse at official level thus enabling the US and its allies to carry on with their respective policies in Afghanistan. In the post-Cold War era, the US' unbalanced and unchecked power projection has invited conflicts in different parts of the globe and potential for conflict cannot be routed out in future too. The Bush administration articulated, interpreted and manipulated these potential threats in order to get wide scale acceptance to justify its military engagements all across the globe. The Copenhagen School's Theory of Securitization reveals how a threat is constructed through a speech act it is to be understood as a process "of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat."⁴⁸ This research paper highlights official discourses and the articulation of political threat as a base of justification regarding the ongoing War on Terror in Afghanistan. This also explains future implications of the US led European allies' decisions on regional security in general and Afghanistan's security in particular.

⁴⁷Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, "Extraordinary Measures: Drone Warfare, Securitization, and the War on Terror", *Global Security Studies* 6, no. 2 (Spring 2015): 3.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 4.

In contract to the realist and neo-realist assumption who believe that security is primarily defensive, Critical Security Studies take a different view by conceptualizing security not as an absolute characteristic 'but as a constructed quality which is dependent on shared ideas rather than state-centric gain.'⁴⁹ Apart from sharing this traditional military understanding of security with traditional security scholars, Critical Security Studies (CSS) and Copenhagen theorists do not define security in terms of military strength but equally emphasize on other sectors which have potential to become security issue- 'a mix of neorealist and social constructivist concepts – differs immensely from their traditional colleagues.'⁵⁰

The Copenhagen theorists have expanded the debate on security by involving other schools of security studies. The CS school is of the view that 'anyone who classifies an issue as a security problem makes a political rather than analytical decision.' The basic issue is not to deal with the threat but to know how, when, by whom, under what conditions some issues can be labeled as existential threats but no other issues fall in the same category.

CSS differs from the Copenhagen School in two ways. Firstly, CSS scholars have criticized CS School for dividing security in sectors and they hold the view that not only security but objects are socially constructed. Secondly, a CSS scholar, such as Ken Booth, seems more interested in defining the respective roles of threat and security objects arise from the process of social construction resulted from security dilemma. 'Thus, CSS scholars emphasize the

⁴⁹Ibid., 5.

⁵⁰Ali Diskaya, "Towards a Critical Securitization Theory: The Copenhagen and Aberystwyth Schools of Security Studies," *E-International Relations*, February 1, 2013, <http://www.E-IR.Info/2013/02/01/Towards-A-Critical-SecuritizationTheory-TheCopenhagen-And-Aberystwyth-Schools-Of-security-Studies/> (accessed December 16, 2018).

possibility of major change in world politics because things are socially constructed.’ Lene Hansen points out the Copenhagen School have ignored individuals and group society by primarily focusing on societal security and the state. ‘For CSS theorists, on the other hand, individual humans are the ultimate referent and security is not only survival but living a life without fear.’⁵¹

Rita Floyd critically examines ethical dimension of securitization process. She believes that neither securitization nor de-securitization are good or bad processes. ‘Floyd argues that the moral rightness (or wrongness) of a securitization finally depends on its consequences.’ It is important to evaluate the performance of the securitizer through results in order to see if s/he has achieved the required objectives.⁵²

In Regional Security Complexes, states interact with each other on the basis of amity and enmity pattern and both aspects are used as independent variables in order to determine the character of security relations.⁵³ The dominant regional powers determine rules for other states in the Regional Security Complex and also for the global powers to intervene.⁵⁴ In another sense, this theory provides valid reason to have constructivist roots, because patterns of amity and enmity make regional systems dependent on the actions and interpretation of other actors in the region. ‘Wendt, for example, makes the connection explicit, pointing out that his social theory can be applied to regional security complexes.’⁵⁵

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Saeid Naji, “Levels of Analysis in International Relations and Regional Security Complex Theory,” *Journal of Public Administration and Governance* 4, no. 4 (2014): 168.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, “South Asia and Afghanistan: The Robust India-Pakistan Rivalry,” *Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO)*, (2011): 1-2.

Geo-geographical proximity is also relevant to explain security paradigm between states within region as threats pass through more easily over short than long distances. This bordering relationship is significant in all the security sectors including military, political, societal and environmental sectors except economical sector. The RSC highlights the importance of balance of power that serves as a bridge to connect the regional to the global level. Global powers can intervene in the RSC when states within RSC make security alignments with powers outside the RSC. Regional Security Complex (RSC) approach put emphasis on geographic proximity as most states in the region feel threatened from neighboring states more than distance powers and this is equally true for South Asian Regional Complex.⁵⁶

The regional states actually invite the intervention of great powers in order to balance power in the region thus making security dynamics different from the region which does not have great power intervention 'The RSCs may be unipolar, bipolar or multipolar; the kind of polarity affecting the security dynamics.'⁵⁷ Within South Asia, the regional powers relations with are based on amity/enmity patterns to exert influence. In Afghanistan, India and Pakistan are not competing over the country's resources, but rather to prevent each other from using Afghanistan against their respective interests and strategies.⁵⁸

Likewise Iran, which never established diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime in 1990s, now has developed an economic

⁵⁶Patric Fahlander, Thesis: Regional Security in the Persian Gulf: Indications of change in a Regional Security Complex, *Lunds universitet Statsvetenskapliga institutionen*, (2011): 7-8.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Bhashyam Kasturi, "India's Role in Afghanistan," *State of Pakistan*, February 20, 2012, <http://www.stateofpakistan.org/indias-role-in-afghanistan> (accessed December 20, 2018).

sphere of influence in Afghanistan's west⁵⁹ but its primary aims remain preventing Afghan soil from becoming a launch pad against Iran. China, an emerging global economy, has also invested in Afghanistan in the Aynak copper deposit⁶⁰ but is quite reluctant to under-take any further investment due to uncertain political climate and security concerns particularly to protect its Xin-jiang province from militancy from Afghanistan based Taliban elements. Though, China has developed friendly relations with Afghan Taliban even if it is wary of them. Also, China is more concerned about the presence of militants from ISIS, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and more so from East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) of Uighur Chinese Muslims in Afghanistan. As the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) are allies, China has more concern about these two groups even if they are small. Many of the issues affecting Afghanistan and other neighboring countries like economic cooperation, cross-border problems such as refugees, drugs smuggling and safe havens for militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan border areas are entangled and cannot be analyzed separately from a security perspective. For instance, 'Paradoxically, if the Afghan Taliban gains even a limited victory in Afghanistan, it will strengthen and empower the Taliban forces in Pakistan too, and this victory would give them a chance to get closer and work together in joint collaboration.'⁶¹

This situation to fight against common dangers bring states closer to each other to minimize the possibility of conflicts and enhance co-operation in mutual fields 'the patterns that govern the

⁵⁹Mohsen M. Milani, "Iran's Policy towards Afghanistan," *Government and International Affairs Faculty Publications*, (April 2006): 251-254.

⁶⁰Michael Wines, "Uneasy Engagement: China Willing to Spend Big on Afghan Commerce," *New York Times*, December 29, 2009, www.nytimes.com/2009/12/30/world/asia/ (accessed December 20, 2018).

⁶¹Lubna Sunawar, "The 2014 U.S. Withdrawal: An unsettled Quagmire for Pakistan," *Regional Studies* XXXII, no.4 (Autumn 2014): 109.

region would naturally lead more toward amity and cooperation than enmity between states.’⁶²

Conclusion

The (RSCT) put emphasis on the regional dimension by highlighting the interplay between regional countries which are interconnected in such a way that their national securities cannot be considered separately. RSCT also claims that geographical proximity invites more security interaction between states at regional level as “many threats travel more easily over short than long distances.”⁶³ Different parts of the case study are interrelated and fit together to explain historical and contemporary developments in South Asia particularly after the U.S. and NATO drawdown from the region. From the above mentioned definition, this research paper highlights two theoretical gaps: First, RSCT does not elucidate the role of external great powers in the regional context, for instance, the U.S., NATO and the EU respective roles in Afghanistan as these global powers are not geographically, socially, culturally, or economically adjacent to South Asian Regional Security Complex but have had a profound impact on the global politics taking place in Afghanistan in the post 9/11 era. Lake and Morgan define geographic proximity as an unnecessary limitation for a state to be a member of a regional security complex. “This suggests that great powers not geo-graphically located in the region but with the ability ‘to project force over distance’ should be considered constituent members of the regional security complex.”⁶⁴ Second, security threats do not necessarily confine at regional level but have the potential to travel even with faster pace from regional to transnational level and are equally potent for the security of great

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Op. cit., Patric (2011).

⁶⁴Bertil Nygren, *Putin's Foreign Policy towards the CIS Countries* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 10.

powers beyond regional borders. The process of Securitization takes place when “actors identify an existential threat that requires emergency executive powers, and, if the audience accepts the securitizing move, the issue is depoliticized and is considered a ‘security’ issue outside the rules of normal politics.”⁶⁵ The Securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School as an attempt to re-evaluate the concept of security, has received much scholarly attention. No doubt, CS has widened the scope of security, but it has theoretical limitations as well, for instance, what is the exact nature of the audience.⁶⁶ difference between politicization and securitization is not clear for theoretical discussion, “Stritzel also highlights that the emphasis on the semantic side of the speech act articulation undermines the role of social and linguistic influences,”⁶⁷ and its focus on western liberal societies thus making it more Eurocentric, which put emphasis on much of the experience results from European security concerns and does not say much about its applicability of the societal sector analysis of other parts of the world. Securitization theory still needs revision in order to be utilized to regimes outside the liberal western model. The very definition has made the securitization process a state centric act thus neglecting other important non-state actors and their respective roles, for instance, media organizations, religious parties/organizations, NGOs, terrorists groups, civil society, etc. The non-state actors have the potential to exert influence and “are often highly active in identifying, raising and/or dealing with non-military challenges which have in recent times been widely acknowledging as having security consequences for groups other than (but not excluding) the state.”⁶⁸

⁶⁵Mark B. Salter, “Securitization and de-securitization,” *Journal of International Relations and Development*, no. 11 (2008): 321–322.

⁶⁶Op.cit., Christian (2011).

⁶⁷Sagarika Dutt, “Theorizing Regional Security,” *South Asian Security* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 134-164.

⁶⁸Ibid., 174.

In addition, securitization theory does not explain the role of non-state actors in securitizing issues which they perceive as threats on national level, for instance, population support to terrorists, *madrasah* culture (so-called religious institutions for the teaching of Islam) in border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, drugs/weapons trafficking, refugees, Taliban detainees in Pakistani jails, etc; but this securitization process of the non-state actors carries very little significance and exert very minimal influence on the state level regarding policy formulation. In addition to this, non-state actors act beyond the state defined policy areas which make them securitizing agents/practitioners.

The United States is frequently accused of lacking a holistic approach to this turbulent region. Its regional policies on security, democracy, and development are said to be often inconsistent if not contradictory. The decision by the U.S. State Department to incorporate Central Asia's Islamic states into the same bureau as Afghanistan can contribute to a strengthened region-wide perspective. Along with the international community, the United States might also begin to address how it can benefit Afghanistan's quest for security and recovery through aid projects and other policies specifically intended to promote regional cooperation and integration. For this to occur, U.S. priorities that are now so unidimensionally focused on counterterrorism must be better aligned with the aspirations of citizens of Afghanistan and those of its neighbors.⁶⁹

⁶⁹Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: An Ever Dangerous Neighborhood," *United States Institute of Peace*, June 01, 2006, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/06/afghanistan-and-its-neighbors-ever-dangerous-neighborhood> (accessed February 11, 2019).

Using the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), proposed by the Copenhagen school, as a preferred theoretical perspective, the thesis conclusion is congruent with the logic of this concept. According to its logic, all regional states are deeply involved in security dynamics of their own regional security complexes and hence do not perceive Afghanistan as their top priority. In most cases, Afghanistan has served as a playground for their extended security dynamics, such as in case of India-Pakistan or Saudi-Iranian rivalries or, on the other hand, the states of the complex are too weak to project their security dynamics beyond their own complex, as in case of the Central Asia complex. Very often, Afghanistan is perceived as an insulator, by the RSC theory and generally accepted as such, between its three adjacent regions – Middle East RSC or more specifically Gulf states sub-complex, Central Asia as a Post-Soviet RSC sub-complex, and South Asia.

However, Afghanistan has been increasingly involved in South Asia security dynamics through, on one hand, Pakistan's involvement that has being long term, but also India's increased engagement in Afghanistan since 2001. This has led to increased tension between the two key actors of the South Asia complex due to mutual securitization of involvement in Afghanistan, but particularly by the Pakistani side. Afghanistan has been perceived as a proxy war although not through conventional means. Based on these increased interactions between Afghanistan and the South Asia complex, in particular after 2001 by both key actors of the complex, analyzing the possibility of external transformation in terms of Afghanistan gradual inclusion in the South Asia security complex was my second objective. My conclusion confirms my initial assumption. Although Afghanistan still possesses a great deal of features of an insulator state, its increased security interactions with the South Asia complex, which are much more intense than with the other two surrounding complexes, has led to my

conclusion that Afghanistan is gradually becoming a part of this complex. However, given the uncertainty about Afghanistan future and the scope and form of regional states engagement, this conclusion is not definite and can be also interpreted differently if using different lens.⁷⁰

⁷⁰Iva Zahálková, "Post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan from the perspective of Regional Security Complex Theory", *Charles University Digital Repository*, 2014, <https://dspace.cuni.cz/handle/20.500.11956/67878> (accessed February 11, 2019).

Nexus between Climate Change and Human Insecurity: Implications for Pakistan

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Abstract

Climate Change (CC) is a critical issue for South Asia. To justify this assumption, this study first discusses the relationship between climate change and security. In most of this CC and security nexus work, however, primary efforts to find ways that connect CC and security especially non-traditional security have been made by scholars like Homer-Dixon and Myres. Generally, two assumptions have been made by most of these scholars. One, according to them, CC or environmental degradation could lead to instability by disrupting social and administrative relations and, therefore, could result in “civil turmoil and outright violence”. Second, CC-induced insecurities will evenly be engendered internally as well as externally. Fears are also there over the possibility of the emergence of “failed state” as a result of which CC could nurture extremist ideologies. Finally, CC could result in inter and intra state conflict whose “spill over” effect could result in divergent regional implication. It is in this context that the paper moves on to discuss the implications of CC in

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general and on South Asia in particular, discussing effects on Pakistan specifically. In the similar vein, it further endeavors to comprehend some particular CC induced effects together with the explanation of the effects of CC on Human Security (HS) in South Asia (SA). To ensure HS, the study concludes, tackling effects of CC is need of the hour.

Keywords: Climate Change (CC), Human Security (HS), South Asia (SA), Conflict, United Nations (UN), United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

Introduction

Climate Change (CC) is a critical issue for South Asia (SA).¹ According to numerous publications of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), South Asian states are vulnerable to decline in crop yield; a hike in climate-induced diseases; food and water insecurity; floods especially because of higher intensity of glacier melting, loss of coastal ecosystems and dangers to fauna and flora. The international community, however, has been struggling to find a connection between CC and security. The question whether CC is a threat to national security, regional security and international security gave way to the development of CC as a non-traditional security threat² and shed light on the Human Security (HS) domain. That is why; CC is presented as a threat multiplier, in various

¹Neil Bhatiya, "Why South Asia Is So Vulnerable to Climate Change," *Foreign Policy*, April 22, 2014, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/22/why-south-asia-is-so-vulnerable-to-climate-change/> (accessed January 12, 2018).

²Tariq Waseem Ghazi, A.N.M Muniruzzaman and A.K. Singh, "Climate Change & Security in South Asia: Cooperating for Peace," *Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change* 4, no. 2 (May 2016), <http://gmacc.org/wp-content/2016/05/ClimateChangeandsecurityinSouthAsia> (accessed February 11, 2019).

instances, capable of diminishing societies' robustness against political instabilities and violence, by supposing, "climate change could create risk of major disruptions to economic and social activity, on a scale similar to those associated with great wars and economic depression of the first half of the twentieth century."³ These disruptions could easily escalate sources of social tensions and unrest and other similar pressures.

To justify these assumptions, this paper first discusses the relationship between CC and security. The focal point of this section is to find out that whether any relation between CC and security exists or not. If yes then what is the type of relationship and in how many ways it affects HS. After this, the paper moves on to discuss the implications of CC on HS in SA in general and on Pakistan in particular. The paper concludes that it is need of the hour to step up against the effects of climate change to ensure human security in SA as well as in Pakistan.

Climate Change and Security Nexuses

In the past, there have been clash of opinions among different academics and policy makers; whether climate change should be even considered as a security threat or not. Today, however, a number of reports, speeches and initiatives from the late 1980s and onwards are available on the table to argue that climate change is no doubt a security concern.

Though CC and security nexus is not present in the initial global discourse over CC but in June 1988 a conference held in Toronto, Canada on the topic titled, "The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security," pointed out CC-induced major

³Stern N, *The economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review* (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 2007), xv.

threats to international security.⁴ The statement on the outcome of conference further added that “the potentially severe economic and social dislocation” as a result of changing climate “for present and future generations would worsen international tensions and increase risk of conflicts among and within nations.”⁵ Later in 2000, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan referred “environmental disasters” such as more droughts and increased intensity of storms, as “one of the threats to human security.”⁶ Moreover, according to a 2004 report of the UN titled, “High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,”⁷ preventive actions are need of the hour to avoid and tackle environmental degradation and CC respectively. As a result, UN Security Council, for the first time, talked about security implications of climate change wherein UN members of international community shed light over possible security and survival dangers because of climate change.⁸

In the wake of IPCC’s fourth assessment report, later on, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) organized a debate captioned, “Climate Change as a Global Challenge.” The conference was very important as it followed by the adoption of a resolution focusing on “to intensify their (UN agencies) efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including its possible security

⁴ Peter Usher, “World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security,” *Journal Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development* 31, no.1 (1989): 292-295.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Kofi A. Annan, *Reports of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, General Assembly Official Record Fifty-fifth session Supplement No. 1-A/55/1* (New York: United Nations, 2000), 4.

⁷“A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, Reports of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,” *UN 2004*, vii-x, <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/> (accessed January 12, 2018).

⁸“Security Council Holds First-Ever Debate on Impact of Climate Change on Peace, Security, Hearing over 50 Speakers,” *United Nations*, April 17, 2017, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9000.doc.htm> (accessed January 15, 2018).

implications.”⁹ Secretary General also submitted a report on the ‘climate change and its possible security implications’ as requested in the resolution adopted by the member states and sponsored by the Pacific Island countries at the 64th session of the General Assembly (64/350).¹⁰

The report was basically an amalgamation of IPCC’s assessment report and concerns and inputs by member states, mainly focusing over climate change and security nexuses. More importantly, the report pointed out five threats to human, regional and international security due to changing climate. However, prior to mentioning those five CC-induced security threats, it is pertinent to mention that though the report regarded CC as a “threat multiplier” but it also enlisted numerous “threat minimizers” that could reduce climate-induced insecurity. Threat multipliers, on the one hand, are: one, extreme events, such as floods and droughts, usually result in decreasing agriculture production and severely affecting human health, thereby, directly resulting and increasing human insecurity simultaneously. Two, CC could also diminish socio-economic gains of a state. As a result, states become ineffective in properly managing internal stability owing to deteriorated law and order situation. Three, CC-induced population displacement, migration, resource, such as land and water, competition could heighten the risk of domestic conflict by instigating violence. Four, small island developing countries may even suffer from loss of territory or arable land because of rise in sea-level as a result of CC; therefore, threatening state security and

⁹“Climate Change: the Science, the Impact and the Adaptation Imperatives & Mitigation Strategies in the context of sustainable Development,” *UN*, August 1, 2007, <http://www.un.org/ga/president/61/follow-up/thematic-climate.shtml> (accessed 15 January, 2018).

¹⁰“Climate Change and its possible security implications,” *United Nations General Assembly*, September 11, 2009, <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ad5e6380.pdf> (accessed January 20, 2018).

sovereignty. Five, trans-boundary conflicts, hence, become inevitable between states, sharing water and other resources. On the other hand, timely initiatives on “climate change mitigation and adaptation, economic development, democratic governance, strong local and national institutions, international cooperation, preventive diplomacy and mediation, timely availability of information and increased support for research and analysis to improve understanding of climate change-security inter-linkages” could mitigate the climate change effects. Furthermore, the report also recognized the need for “a comprehensive, fair and effective global agreement (to) help stabilize our climate, protect development gains, assist vulnerable nations adapt to climate change and build a more secure, sustainable and equitable society.”¹¹

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has also repeatedly divulged his concerns vis-à-vis CC and its dangers. For example, at a meeting of youth delegates at United Nations (UN) headquarters in New York in March 2007, the Secretary-General was of the opinion that “in coming decades (climate related) changes in our environment and the resulting upheavals-from droughts to inundated coastal areas to loss of arable lands-are likely to become a major driver of war and conflict.”¹² Similarly, two years later in August 2009 at global environment forum in South Korea, the former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned international community that unsuccessfulness in acting to tackle CC could lead to deteriorating social structure that will lead to

¹¹Ibid., 8-27.

¹²Ban Ki-Moon, “Address to the United Nations International School-United Nations Conference on ‘Global Warming: Confronting the Crisis’,” *UN*, March 1, 2007, www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=70 (accessed January 12, 2018).

social unrest and violence.¹³ This was a clear indication to the severity of the situation that CC is bewildering.

Lorraine Elliott and Mely Caballero-Anthony's edited work titled, "Human Security and Climate Change in Southeast Asia: Managing risk and resilience," comprehends required history, implications and the general way forward to CC. According to Elliott and Anthony, "climate change is implicated in threats to security and particularly to human security... that taking a human security approach to climate security will actually help to deliver more secure peoples, societies and states."¹⁴ Rattan Lal in, 'Climate Change and Food Security in South Asia,'¹⁵ discusses CC-induced temperature rise, change in precipitation level, rise of the sea level, melting of glaciers and degradation of the environment in SA, arguing that CC is a major concern in SA because of its impact on alterations in temperature and precipitation, rise of the sea level, melting of the Himalayan glaciers, and degradation of natural resources and the environment. Quentin Wodon in their edited book titled, 'Climate Change and Migration: Evidence from the Middle East and North Africa,'¹⁶ revolves around the impact of CC on household living. The authors believe that the people being affected by CC are opting for such coping strategies that can be used in case of CC and extreme weather shocks.

Moreover, posing an alarmist situation the *Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* set the Doomsday clock from seven to five

¹³Ban Ki-Moon, "Remarks to the Global Environment Forum," UN, August 11, 2009, www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/speeches/statmentsfull.asp (accessed January 17, 2018).

¹⁴Lorraine Elliott and Mely Caballero et al., *Human Security and Climate Change in Southeast Asia: Managing risk and resilience* (New York: 2013), xii.

¹⁵Rattan Lal et al, *Climate Change and Food Security in South Asia* (London: Springer, 2011), 13-30.

¹⁶Quentin Wodon et al, *Climate Change and Migration: Evidence from the Middle East and North Africa* (Washington: The World Bank, 2014), 237-265.

minutes to midnight, inferring that “global warming poses a dire threat to human civilization that is second only to nuclear weapons” in its report of January 2007.¹⁷ In September 2007, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) qualified CC as an “existential security threat” in its annual Strategic Survey.¹⁸ It suggested that “the security dimension [of climate change] will come increasingly to the forefront as countries begin to see falls in available resources and economic vitality, increased stress on their armed forces, greater instability in region of strategic import, increase in ethnic rivalries, and a widening gap between rich and poor.”¹⁹ In a similar alarmist tone 2004 report commissioned for the Pentagon predicted that CC would result in, “nuclear conflict, mega-droughts, famine and widespread rioting.”²⁰ There are many similar instances where CC is presented as a grave danger to human race but the most convincing was the awarding of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize jointly to former US Vice President Al Gore and the IPCC for their valuable work on CC, which left little room for critics that CC does not lie in security domain. While announcing the Noble Peace Prize, the Norwegian Noble Committee said that CC has made HS vulnerable as it “increased danger of violent conflicts and wars, within and between states.”²¹

¹⁷“Doomsday Clock’ Moves Two Minutes Closer to Midnight,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 17, 2007, www.thebulletin.org/minutes-to-midnight/board-statementshtml (accessed February 1, 2018).

¹⁸ “Strategic Policy Issues, Strategic Survey 107”, *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, no. 1 (2007): 47.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 68.

²⁰M. Townsend and P. Harris, “Now the Pentagon Tells Bush: Climate Change Will Destroy us,” *Observer*, February 22, 2004, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2004/eb/22/usnews.theobserver (accessed December 24, 2017).

²¹Norwegian Noble Committee, “Announcement: The Nobel Peace Prize for 2007,” *Oslo*, October 12, 2007, http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/laureates/laureates-2007/ (accessed January 12, 2018).

After the UNSG report's (64/350), as discussed before, warm support by UNGA and subsequent debates over CC and security nexus in UNGA led to the addition of a sub-section on HS implications of CC in the Fifth assessment Report of the IPCC (2013-14). According to the report, CC-induced migration, displacement of people, resources competition and extreme weather conditions such as heat waves usually result in poverty and economic downfall, which has the ability to instigate violent inter as well as intra state conflicts. The report went on to allude that "trans-boundary impacts of climate change such as changes in sea ice, shared water resources and pelagic fish stocks have the potential to increase rivalry among states... throughout the 21st century climate change impacts are projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty reduction more difficult, further erode food security and prolong existing and create new poverty traps." Furthermore, Mark Lynas in his famous book titled, "Six Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet," argues that "any crisis in food production could quickly escalate into a crisis for the whole Pakistan economy... Farmers across the country may find themselves outmatched in turn by big cities like Lahore, Hyderabad, and Karachi, which each support populations in the millions."²²

Collectively, all the IPCC reports warned that CC would eventually result in resource scarcity for an increased world population, vulnerability to extreme weather patterns, food and water insecurity and , thus, leading to infectious diseases. Simply, CC is expected to result in unrest and violence specially in those countries that are more vulnerable to resouces scarcities, share territorial disputues and has hostile past in their buckets.

²²Mark Lynas, *Six Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet* (USA: National Geographic Society: 2008), 162.

In most of this CC and security nexus work, however, primary efforts to find ways that connect CC and security especially non-traditional security have been made by scholars like Homer-Dixon and Myres. Generally, two assumptions have been made by most of these scholars. One, according to them, CC could lead to instability by disrupting social and administrative relations²³ and, therefore, could result in “civil turmoil and outright violence”.²⁴ Second, CC-induced insecurities will evenly be fathered internally as well as externally. Fears are also there over the possibility of the emergence of “failed state” as a result of which CC could nurture extremist ideologies.²⁵ Finally, CC could result in inter and intra state conflict whose “spill over” effect could result in divergent regional implication.

Resultantly, numerous states started taking actions to tackle the effects of CC. In March 2008, the High Representative and the European Commission (HREC) published a paper for the Council of European Union on the topic climate change and international security.²⁶ In September 2009, the British government appointed Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti as a climate and energy security envoy on the reference that “climate change will act as an increasingly powerful amplifier of instability across some of the most volatile regions of the world.”²⁷ The United States too in its 2010

²³T. Homer-Dixon, “On the threshold: Environmental changes as causes of acute conflict,” *International Security* 16, no. 2 (1991): 91.

²⁴N. Myres, “Environment and Security,” *Foreign Policy* 74, (1989): 24.

²⁵CAN Corporation, “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,” (2007), https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/national%20security (accessed January 21, 2018).

²⁶“Climate Change and International Security,” *Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council*, March 14, 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports (accessed February 12, 2018).

²⁷“Climate Security: Visit of Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti to Oslo,” *British Embassy Oslo*, November 20, 2009, (accessed February 1, 2018).

“Quadrennial Defense Review Report” referred CC as a potential security threat as it have the ability to instigate future conflicts.²⁸ Moreover, a 2007 report captioned, “National Security and the Threats of Climate Change”, holds CC as “a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world.” However, according to 2014 report the projected impacts of CC will be more than threat multipliers; they will serve as catalysts for instability and conflict.²⁹ Also, according to a statement by US Secreatry of State John Kerry, CC is “a global threat of the same magnititude as terrorism, epidemics and weapons of mass destruction.”³⁰ Last, but not the least, “climate change-induced increase in the frequency and or intensity of extreme weather events... would lead to econmic and political instability which can have dangerous national security implication.”³¹ Hence, the security and CC nexus is obvious globally as well as in case of South Asia.

Climate Change in South Asia

SA comprises sub-Himalayan countries including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. These countries are part of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The region, comprising less than 4% of the world’s land area and home to more than 1.7 billion people representing 21% of the world’s population, is already one of the

²⁸ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, 2010), XV-7.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

³⁰ Dylan Adler, “The Changing Climate of Security”, *State of the Planet*, December 9, 2015, <http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2015/12/09/the-changing-climate-of-security/> (accessed March 2, 2018).

³¹ “White House Report: The National Security implications of a Changing Climate,” *The White House*, May 20, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/20/white-house-report-national-security-implications-changing-climate> (accessed March 2, 2018).

most environmentally challenged parts of the world.³² The region is usually characterised by diverse climates. In this vein, CC is going to hit SA the hardest among other regions. This is because of the fact that climate of the region is compounded with higher temperatures, extreme weather, floods and mounting sea level and cyclonic activities in the Bay of Bangal and the Arabian Sea. According to a report by the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre “Bangladesh is already under pressure from increasing demands for food and the parallel problems of depletion of agriculture land and water resources and an overburdening of local or national governance capacities.”³³ According to a joint report by Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities Centre (CAI-Asia) and Cities Development Initiative for Asia (CDIA), in the similar vein, Bangladesh is vulnerable to frequent and severe tropical cyclones, heavy and erratic rainfall, higher river flows in warm months, river bank erosion, increased sedimentation in riverbeds, increased saline intrusion, increased droughts, rising sea level and warmer and more humid weather; India will be implicated by CC through its water resources, agriculture and food production, health, forests, climate events (such as cyclones, flood, droughts) and coastal areas; Pakistan is vulnerable to loss in biodiversity, water insecurity, rise in sea level and frequent cyclones, droughts and abnormal shifts in weather patterns; and Sri Lanka can be impacted by climate change through increase in the frequency and intensity of

³²Tariq Waseem Ghazi, A.N.M Muniruzzaman and A.K. Singh, “Climate Change & Security in South Asia: Cooperating for Peace,” *Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change* no. 2 (May 4, 2016), <http://gmacc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/> (accessed March 4, 2018).

³³Arpita Bhattacharyya and Michael Werz, “Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict in South Asia,” *Centre of American Progress*, December 2012, <https://www.americanprogress.orgclimate-change-migration-and-conflict-in-south-asia> (accessed March 7, 2018).

disasters, landslides, variability and unpredictability of rainfall patterns, increase in temperature and sea level rise.³⁴

Hereunder are the specific signs and impacts of CC on SA, such as rising temperature, extreme weather events, glacier melting, sea level rise, infectious diseases and black carbon.

Rising Temperatures and Extreme Weather Events

Rising temperatures have rigorous distress on SA. According to a press release by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on March 21, 2016 “many countries saw intense heat waves. The most devastating ones in terms of human impact were in India and Pakistan. Asia, as a continent, had its hottest year on record in 2015.”³⁵ In Southern Pakistan, Sindh province and Karachi that is Sindh’s capital, approximately 2,000 people lost their lives because of dehydration and heat strokes.³⁶ Indian States of Rajasthan, Punjab, Gujrat, Odisha and Bihar are also suffering from continuous rise in heat waves since last five years wherein almost 2,500 people were killed alone in May 2015 owing to rising temperatures and subsequently extreme weather conditions.³⁷ In April 2016 in India, moreover, at least 300 people died due to heat-related complications.³⁸ Furthermore, a rise of 1°- 2° C will reduce rice and wheat production yields in Pakistan and India.

³⁴“Climate Change and Infrastructure in Asian Cities,” *CIA-Asia and CDIA* (April 2012): 3-33.

³⁵“WMO Report: 2015 shattered temperature records,” *UN*, March 23, 2016, <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/03/wmo-report-2015-shatteredtemperature-records> (accessed March 10, 2018).

³⁶Kamran Haider and Khurram Anis, “Heat Wave Death Toll Rises to 2,000 in Pakistan’s Financial Hub,” *Bloomberg News*, June 24, 2015.

³⁷“Heatwaves Hits Thailand, India,” *NASA Earth Observatory*, May 4, 2016, <http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=87981&src=eoaiotd> (accessed March 12, 2018).

³⁸*Ibid.*

According to the words of Asif Shuja³⁹, former Director-General of Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (PEPA), scarcity of weather prediction technology is the root cause of such human-loss incidents as it not only restrains government efforts in tackling such calamities but also negates people fair chances to adapt themselves to upcoming threat. Therefore, according to Asif Shuja, it is pertinent to establish a robust mechanism for exchange of data (e.g. water flows and temperature shifts etc.) among CC-affected countries for mitigation and adaptation measures against CC-related weather variation. In this vein, preparation of Heat Action Plan⁴⁰ by the Municipality of the commercial centre Ahmedabad, Indian State of Gujrat, to cope with these challenges is a welcome initiative.

Intimately related to the impacts of rising temperatures, moreover, extreme weather events like that of hurricanes, tornados, blizzards, heavy rain and snow fall, floods, dust, storms and droughts have been order of the day in SA. Low rainfalls in 2014, on the one hand, impinged upon food security in Pakistan while, and on the other hand, heavy monsoon rains and floods costed 367 human lives and almost 1 million acres of cropland.⁴¹ Almost 150 people of unsettled territory of Jammu and Kashmir were killed by these floods. In a similar way, 2014 Cyclone Hudhud caused human deaths and destruction in many villages of

³⁹Tariq Waseem Ghazi, A.N.M Muniruzzaman and A.K. Singh, "Climate Change & Security in South Asia: Cooperating for Peace," *Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change*, no. 2 (May 9, 2016).

⁴⁰Anjali Jaiswal, "From Austin to Ahmedabad: Building Heat-Resilient Cities on the Frontlines of Climate Change" *NRDC*, October 15, 2015, <https://www.nrdc.org/experts/anjali-jaiswal/austinahmedabad-building-heat-resilient-cities-frontlines-climate-change> (accessed February 11, 2019).

⁴¹Sönke Kreft et al., "Global Climate Risk index 2016: Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events? Weather-related Loss Events in 2014 and 1995 to 2014," *German Watch briefing paper*, <https://germanwatch.org/en/download/13503.pdf> (accessed February 11, 2019).

India.⁴²Worrisome, in this regard, is the prediction of IPCC's fifth assessment report which notes that Pakistan is expected to remain among the 10 most affected countries by extreme meteorological events.

Glacier Melting and Sea Level Rise

Continuous melting of glaciers and snow caps in the Tibetan Plateau owing to CC is the key concern of mounting CC-induced worries in SA. The Himalayas-Hindu Kush, Kunlun Shan, Pamir and Tien Shan mountain ranges are known as 'water towers of Asia' as these mountains provide water to much of Asian people through glacier-fed rivers. Almost 40 percent of the world population depends on the waters of these rivers wherein these rivers are the source of household water, food, fisheries and subsequently power and jobs for the people. However, in spite of this world's largest water supply from any single place, chronic seasonal water scarcity is worsening the issue.

IPCC's scenarios regarding glaciers' retreat in the region predict that rising mean annual temperature would diminish the glacier coverage by 43 to 81 percent by the start of next century, which would result in reduced water flows severely affecting water and food availability. Various articles predict "dramatic loss of glacier accumulation area on Tibetan Plateau" and connected regions⁴³ wherein Brahmaputra and Indus rivers are hypersensitive to reduction of water flows.⁴⁴ Moreover, traditional fuel sources for mountain and foothill inhabitants resulted in deforestation, making hillsides indefensible to landslides. Continuity of these practices will

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Kang, S., et al., "A.: Dramatic loss of glacier accumulation area on the Tibetan Plateau revealed by ice core tritium and mercury records", *The Cryosphere* 9, (2015): 1213-1222.

⁴⁴WW Immerzeel, LP van Beek and MF Bierkens, "Climate change will affect the Asian water towers", *Science* 328, no. 5984 (2010): 1382-85.

not only reduce the livelihood effectiveness for the people but also endanger their lives in case of flash floods and landslides. Furthermore, given the hydrological role of the glaciers for the rivers flowing in Asia including Tarim, Syr Darya, Amu Darya, Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Yangtze and Yellow rivers, almost 1.3 billion people; in China 516 million; in India and Bangladesh 526 people; Central Asia and Xinjiang province of China 49 million and Northern India and Pakistan 178 million people are vulnerable to mounting water shortages. However, these statistics only show the vulnerability of those people living in watershed, whereas water scarcity will obviously also result in reduced agricultural production.⁴⁵

Recent UNDP study on Pakistan's climate challenges divulge a "decrease in glacier volume and snow cover leading to alterations in the seasonal flow patterns of Irrigation Water Requirement (IRS); increase in the formation and burst of glacial lakes; higher frequency and intensity of extreme climate events coupled with irregular monsoon rains causing frequent floods and droughts; greater demand of water due to increased evaporation rates at elevated temperatures."⁴⁶

Unfortunately, glaciers melting not only results in water and food insecurity but also in other inevitable impacts of CC in the region like that of rise in sea level. It usually results in the loss of fertile land, the trespassing of salinity and making people move away from coastal areas because of acute cyclones and unavailability of fresh water. To avoid the implications, people start migrating inwards. For example, climate refugees have almost

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶"Pakistan: Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (CPEIR)," *UNDP*, (April 2015): 1-4, <http://www.pk.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/Environment> (accessed February 11, 2019).

reached to 2,000 per day in Bangladesh.⁴⁷ In this vein, Sea level rise is suspected to affect the lives of people from Balochistan in Western Pakistan to coastal regions of Myanmar in the East.

Infectious Diseases

CC-induced implications usually are water scarcity, diminishing food production and rise in the level of migration, which threaten HS. Because of these, people start moving inwards, usually toward main cities; hence, urbanization takes the toll. With rising internal traffic coupled with intense weather events and minimal adaptation measure, infectious diseases start spreading. According to historical facts shown in the case study “effects of climate change on human health especially South Asia” by Sudhakar Patra, Ravenshaw University Cuttack, Odisha, India, substantiates that vector-borne diseases like that of malaria, dengue and schistosomiasis fever spread more in warmer and wetter places. These diseases also usually become the cause of one’s death. As CC is resulting in temperature rise and heat waves, it is susceptible to also result in health related deaths in South Asian countries. In India and Sri Lanka, wet zones are likely to change into breeding zones of malaria. Nepal is already grappled with kalaazar and malaria. Deaths from heat waves and long summers in Pakistan are also no secret. In sum, the health of the people of SA is vulnerable to CC-induced infectious diseases.

Impact of Black Carbon

The Hydro Fluorocarbons (HFCs), black carbon, tropospheric ozone and methane are usually known as short-lived climate pollutants.

⁴⁷Poppy Mc Pherson, “Dhaka: the city where climate refugees are already a reality,” *The Guardian*, December 1, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/dec/01/dhaka-city-climate-refugees-reality> (accessed February 11, 2019).

Still, these are much more chronic than carbon dioxide (CO₂) in resulting of global warming. Black soot, black carbon and organic carbon, basically absorbs sunlight and speed up the warming process. Depending upon black carbon quantity, it steps up the glacier melting process and adds in to global warming.

Climate Change Induced Human Insecurity in South Asia

Though United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been at the forefront in germinating HS debate but the genesis of HS approach goes back to the two reports of the Brandt Commission titled “North-South: A Program for Survival” and “Common Crisis” published in 1980 and 1983 respectively wherein the key concern have been the survival of human being on a fragile planet.⁴⁸ According to another report by the Commission on Global Governance “threats to the earth’s life support system... challenge the security of people far more than the threat of external aggression.”⁴⁹ In a similar way, according to late revered Dr. Mahbub ul Haq of Human Development Centre of Pakistan, HS can be regarded as the security of income, employment, food, health, education and environment, including insecurity emanating from violence within the household, by the community and the state against women, children and minorities.⁵⁰ According to his words:

Human Security, in the last analysis, is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a woman who was not raped, a poor person who did not starve, a dissident who was not silenced, a human spirit that was not crushed. Human security is not a

⁴⁸“Common Crisis,” The Brandt Commission 1983, <http://files.globalmarshallplan.org/inhalt/coc2.pdf> (accessed February 7, 2018).

⁴⁹“Commission on the Global Governance”, *Our Global Neighborhood* (Oxford University Press, 1995), 79.

⁵⁰Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, *Human Development in South Asia 2005: Human Security in South Asia* (Oxford University Press, 2006), 1.

concern with weapons. It is concern with human dignity.⁵¹

Moreover, the IPCC Working Group's Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) includes a separate report on HS wherein it is defined, in the context of CC, "as a condition that exists when the vital core of human lives is protected, and when people have the freedom and capacity to live with dignity."⁵² Though, the vital core of human lives are numerous including various material and non-material aspect but poverty, many kinds of discriminations and extreme weather events or environmental disasters such as hurricanes, droughts and floods undermine HS the most. Subsequently, these effects exacerbate from individuals to the community level, threatening political stability of the country.⁵³

The Human Development in South Asia Report 2005 captioned following key elements causing human insecurity in SA pertaining to CC:⁵⁴

- 1) Disconnect between economic growth and human development and fragile economic policies of South Asian states have resulted in human insecurity.
- 2) Inter-state conflicts are owing to deep-rooted historical feelings of prejudice.
- 3) The key cause of conflicts among South Asian states is economic vulnerabilities.
- 4) South Asian states need to improve their health infrastructure.
- 5) Decisive actions are need of the hour to hamper environmental degradation and disasters subsequently.

⁵¹Ibid., 7.

⁵²Adger, WN; Pulhin, JM; Barnett, J; et al., "Human Security", *College of Life and Environmental Sciences*, December 1, 2014, <https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10871/20276> (accessed February 11, 2019).

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid.

- 6) Women and children are more vulnerable to climate change-induced consequences in South Asia.
- 7) There is also a need of institutionalization of good governance in the region for the betterment and protection of people.

Food Insecurity and Water Stress

Food insecurity refers to the scenario where there is shortage of food items or high food prices or both that makes the poorest the most vulnerable. According to 1996 World Food Summit, “food security exist when all people, all the times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”⁵⁵ Food insecurity is usually the result of land degradation, soil infertility usually owing to deforestation, abundance of chemical usage over soil, inefficient irrigation and water-logging, unequal distribution of food and market failure in controlling of food prices, overexploitation and over-capitalization of fisheries and coastal pollution that destroys production grounds. Food insecurity, in a similar manner, result in heightening poverty, intensifying domestic injustices and social commotions.

IPCC AR5 (IPCC Fifth Assessment Report) points out eight key dimensions where CC have critical impacts wherein four of them directly or indirectly relates to food security; one, loss of rural livelihoods and income; two, loss of marine and coastal ecosystems; and three, loss of inland and terrestrial ecosystems, and breakdown of food systems. In SA, similarly, the situation is not different from the rest of the world.

⁵⁵“World Food Summit”, *Rome Declaration on World Food Security* (Rome: FAO, 1996), <http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/w3613e/w3613e00.HTM> (accessed February 11, 2019).

Bangladesh is already vulnerable to the reduction of cultivable land to the sea. Rise in temperatures and subsequent altered monsoon patterns had lessened agricultural production, thereby, threatening livelihood of many citizens of Bangladesh.⁵⁶ According to agriculture scientists, Bangladesh's rice and wheat production is expected to fall by 2050 to 8 per cent and 32 per cent respectively.⁵⁷ Given the increasing CC impacts on agriculture and existing food insecurity as nearly 30 million women and 12 million under 5 children are suffering from malnutrition,⁵⁸ it is rational to infer, giving the growing frequency of CC that these statistics are going to increase further in time to come. Pakistan is vulnerable to increase in desertification over the next five decades. Moreover, Pakistan is already a victim of food insecurity as 48.7 per cent population⁵⁹ is suffering from malnutrition and increasing food insecurity will result in unemployment, rise in poverty and economic destabilization. In this sense, CC will not only result in food insecurity but also threaten the lives particular linkages between CC and conflict has been another inevitable challenge. However, despite these challenges there is no excuse for not of (rural) people in Pakistan.⁶⁰ Almost 330 million Indians have been

⁵⁶Fatima Siraj, "Bangladesh: Striving for food security," *South Asia Global Affairs*, last modified 2012, www.saglobalaffairs.com/back-issues/1319-bangladesh-striving-for-food-security.html (accessed February 11, 2019).

⁵⁷M Abdul Latif Mondal, "Challenges to our food security," *The Daily Star*, last modified November 23, 2010, <http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-163215> (accessed August 15, 2018).

⁵⁸"Bangladesh: Unemployment, food prices spur growing hunger," *IRIN*, last modified July 22, 2010, www.irinnews.org/report/89920/bangladesh-unemployment-food-prices-spur-growing-hunger (accessed August 14, 2018).

⁵⁹Dr. Syed Aamer Abdullah et al., "Common Country Assessment Pakistan 2011," *UNDP*, January 31, 2012, <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/Legal%20Framework/UNDP-PKCommon%20Country%20Assessment> (accessed February 11, 2019).

⁶⁰Samina Khalil, "Climate Change Impacts; Disasters and Conflicts," *Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics* 24, no. 2 (2014): 195-214.

the victim of droughts in 2016.⁶¹ Shortage of water owing to changed patterns of monsoon rainfall resulted in water scarcity for irrigation purpose, thereby, affecting Indian farmers which constitute more than half the population of India. These farmers try to migrate to Mumbai where they had no shelter as well jobs. In India, statistically, western state of Maharashtra is one of the worst hot areas in the region as nearly 9 million farmers⁶² are going through water insecurity and subsequent implications.

Climate Migration and Refugees

Water stress and food insecurity often led people to migrate. Such migration could be inward as well as outward. In the case of inward migration, pressure on the main cities usually gives birth to unemployment, poverty and social evils. However, whether it is large-scale migration within the country or across the borders, it is “perhaps the most worrisome problem associated with rising temperatures and sea levels... [and one which] could easily trigger major security concerns and spike regional tensions.”⁶³ Besides security concerns, the HS perspective worries about the dangers to those whose homes, livelihood and lives becomes vulnerable to sea-level rise, desertification and loss of arable land, extreme weather events and natural disasters. Moreover, CC-induced disasters also cause displacement on a major scale. In the floods of 2009 nearly 1 million people of Bangladesh and 1.5 million of India

⁶¹Vidhi Doshi, “India’s drought migrants head to cities in desperate search for water,” *The Guardian*, last modified April 27, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/apr/27/india-drought-migrantshead-to-cities-in-desperate-search-for-water> (accessed August 15, 2018).

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Cambell et al., *The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change* (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies/Centre for a New American Security, 2007), 8.

were internally displaced. In Pakistan, too, approximately 20 million people were displaced in 2010 floods.

Conclusion

SA, as a whole, is going to face the major challenge of climate refugees. According to IPCC, environmental disasters might result in the increase in climate refugees in Bangladesh.⁶⁴ In a similar vein, World Bank estimates predict that CC could bring 62 million people below the extreme poverty line in the South Asia region by 2030, owing to agricultural impacts of CC.⁶⁵ The situation becomes more acute if geostrategic rivalries among South Asian nations especially India and Pakistan are taken into consideration. Massive displacements would generate country-wide displacements, which would take no time in spiraling outwards. Moreover, resource conflicts may also erupt. For example, earlier in 2016 protesters in the northern state of Haryana cut off the supply of SyL Canal to Delhi for the fulfillment of their demands.⁶⁶ Pakistan and India being low and middle riparian countries could be the ground zero of resource conflicts, in this regard. In such scenario, the influx of climate refugees could add fuel to the fire of security issues.

The discourse covering climate change and conflict has been mired with uncertainty owing to ambiguous ways connecting them. The uncertainty has mostly been because of innate intricacy of CC

⁶⁴Xinhua, "Bangladeshis under threat of climate-change induced migration," *China.org.cn*, last modified November 29, 2012, http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2012-11/29/content_27270955.htm (accessed August 15, 2018).

⁶⁵"Climate Change Action Plan," *World Bank Group*, April 7, 2016, <https://www.ontario.ca/page/climate-change-action-plan> (accessed August 15, 2018).

⁶⁶AFP, "Delhi faces water crisis after canal sabotaged in deadly protest," *The Guardian*, last modified February 22, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/22/india-caste-protesters-accept-offr-to-end-riotsand-water-crisis> (accessed August 15, 2018).

projections. Moreover, the complexity in accurately mapping population growth, identifying the outbreak of conflict accurately and determine the taking initiative to adapt to and tackle CC and its implications.

CC is, for sure, happening and generating the conditions for water stress and food insecurity. Both water stress and food insecurity could lead to conflict or violence. In case of migration, usually occurring due to extreme events like that of droughts, heat waves, floods, changing rain/monsoon patterns, sea level rise and subsequent decreased soil fertility and storms or cyclones, it is not certain whether conflicts would occur during the migration or displacement process or afterwards. However, what is known for sure is the consequences for human beings. It does not only affect human lives through water stress, food insecurity, heat waves, malnutrition and vector borne diseases but could also instigate violence through conflict over scare resources, outward migration, and street agitation owing to unemployment, poverty and in worst case scenario deaths of vulnerable peoples.

Islamic State in Afghanistan: Challenges for Pakistan

Asad Ullah Khan & Arhama Siddiqua *

Abstract

The Islamic State (IS) Wilayat-e-Khorasan, expanded at an alarmingly fast rate. However, because of losses, at the hands of both the Taliban and U.S.-backed Afghan forces, Islamic State's future in Afghanistan was somewhat jeopardized. Nonetheless, seeing as the IS claimed responsibility for two deadly attacks on the Christian community in Pakistan's south-western province of Balochistan among other such incidents it is no wonder that Pakistani counterterrorism officials are concerned about the spill-over of this faction of IS into their country. The recent efforts by Pakistan to safeguard its borders in the form of military operation and fencing have shaped a scenario in which the threat level for Pakistan is now on minimum level. The threat for Pakistan is more ideological in nature and needs to be defended with credible de-radicalization programs. It is pertinent to note here that Daesh is at the back foot and is adopting the tactics of negotiation instead of violence. Using qualitative data, this paper aims at analyzing Daesh as a potential threat for Pakistan, after considering the internal efforts done by

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Pakistan to counter this imminent threat; to what extent these efforts have secured Pakistan from this evil threat and what is still needed to be done. It will also aim to showcase that even though Pakistan must take the necessary measures, Daesh has not and will not be able to expand in Pakistani territory.

Keywords: Daesh, Afghanistan, Zarb-e-Azab, Radd-ul-Fasaad, Khorasan, Balochistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, NACTA

Introduction

Extending from Mosul to Paris, Ramadi to London, Yemen to the United States, the world has been sanctified from the cruel touch of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh. Their capability to attract thousands of people (irrespective of background or social class) to join a cause known particularly for its ruthless practices of beheadings, suicide bombings and stabbing is a sign of not only their savagery but also of their power to persuade, radicalize and recruit. In recent years the Taliban fraction has split up, mainly due to ideological differences. This has given cause to Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) factions which are hiding out in Afghanistan to find a new group to pledge allegiance to in order to reformulate. Daesh offers them just that.

At the end of 2017 a black-and-white flag was seen fluttering near a highway in Islamabad. It bore the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) symbol and at the base were the words: "Khilafat is coming".¹

¹"Police Remove Islamic State Flag Waving in Islamabad," *New Age Islam*, September 24, 2017.

The Islamic State's (IS) Afghan wilayat, known as the Islamic State in Khorasan, originally grew alarmingly fast. It is pertinent to note here that it is not Afghanistan that is responsible for the growth of ISIS instead political grievances, ideological and sectarian divide and uncontrolled porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the major cause of the footprints of ISIS in the region. However, the fast rise was hindered by losses, at the hands of both the Taliban and U.S.-backed Afghan forces. This has somewhat endangered Daesh's future in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, seeing as the IS claimed responsibility for two deadly attacks on the Christian community in Pakistan's south-western province of Balochistan among other such incidents it is no wonder that Pakistani counterterrorism officials are concerned about the spillover of this faction of IS into their country.

According to the fourth wave of terrorism, any terrorist outfit wants to continue their expansion albeit in short spurts. They try to achieve this through opening up new branches. David C. Rapaport who crafted the waves of terrorism theory explain the wave as " It is a cycle of activity of activity situated in different time periods and is characterized by having both expansion and contraction phases. A defining feature of wave is that it is international in character: similar activities would occur in different countries in a specific period of time, all with a predominating energy that shapes the groups characteristics and relationships with each other." Rappaport linked fourth wave with religious fundamentalism. In fourth wave the major causes of terrorism were identified in overlapping area of religion and politics. However with the rise of Al-Qaeda and ISIS the dimensions started changing and the scholars are forced to think about fifth wave of terrorism and its new dimensions of violence.

The concept of fifth wave of terrorism is new but cannot be ignored because of its relevance in today's conflicts. The tactics of violence adopted by ISIS such as rape, killing and use of children in violent activities are identified in fifth wave of terrorism. In addition to this international groups act more legalistic and pluralistic which is the main concern and imminent threat for Pakistan.

It is thus imperative for Pakistan's security establishment to ensure that all measures are taken to counter this threat. Especially since, the downfall of the Daesh in its strongholds in Iraq and Syria are almost complete, they will look to expand and gain foothold in other voids that are usually created because of instability and civil war. The recent efforts by Pakistan to safeguard its borders in the form of military operation and fencing have shaped a scenario in which the threat level for Pakistan is now on minimum level. The threat for Pakistan is more ideological in nature and needs to be defended with credible de-radicalization programs. It is pertinent to note here that Daesh is at the back foot and is adopting the tactics of negotiation instead of violence.

This paper aims at analyzing Daesh as a potential threat for Pakistan, after considering the internal efforts done by Pakistan to counter this imminent threat; military operations securing the Pak-Afghan border and creating a social resilience in society; to what extent these efforts have secured Pakistan from this evil threat and what is still needed to be done. Using the overlapping theories of both the fourth and fifth waves of terrorism, It will aim to answer, what are the implications of IS presence for Pakistan and what measures should be taken?

Presence of Daesh in Afghanistan

If historic events are analyzed the roots of ISIS can be traced back to 1999 but its activities came into prominence during the Iraq

invasion in 2003. Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian jihadist of the Salafi school of thought came to be known as the father of ISIS.² As the number of attacks increased on the coalition forces with a new wave of suicide bombings and beheading of hostages, it attracted more fighters to join the militant group. Due to its effectiveness on field it Al-Qaeda took the militant group under their umbrella.³

Afghanistan became source of concern since 2001 because of US foreign policy shift towards this region. In response to 9/11 attacks when US started military action against Al-Qaeda, Taliban government decided to give their unconditional support to Al-Qaeda. The long war of almost more than 16 years US government has lost around 2000⁴ lives of its soldiers and spent around 120 billion dollars for reconstruction and rehabilitation in Afghanistan.⁵ The threat from Al-Qaeda was not over yet when all of a sudden Islamic state started appearing on screen in Afghanistan in late 2014. Islamic State is trying to expand in Afghanistan to gain the strategic objectives in the region. IS's main objective is to capture all historic Muslim lands and unite them under the rule of caliphate and then to start a war with the west.⁶ External affiliated groups of the IS from all around the world is facilitating in establishing a transnational caliphate outside the borders in Iraq and Syria. IS is aiming to expand itself in the region of Greater Afghanistan commonly known as Khorasan as this region holds a significant

²Hassan Hassan, "The Sectarianism of the Islamic State: Ideological Roots and Political Context," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, June 13, 2016.

³Ibid.

⁴James Fallows, "The Tragedy of the American Military," *The Atlantic*, November 23, 2015, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military> (accessed August 13, 2018).

⁵Idrees Ali, "Taliban Gains in Afghanistan Threaten Costly U.S. Reconstruction," *Reuters*, June 09, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-reconstruction> (, accessed August 13, 2018).

⁶"What's the Appeal of a Caliphate?" *BBC News*, October 26, 2014, <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29761018> (accessed August 13, 2018).

importance because of its Islamic historic background.⁷ Currently, IS presence in Nangahar province is a matter of concern for Pakistan because this presence is growing in terms of military capability and social interaction.⁸

However the rise of ISIS was the failure of major political strategies designed by the United States to manage the invasion. From the day the Saddam Hussein statue, the symbol of power & control was brought down Iraq only worsened. IS presence in Nanagahar and aim for establishing Khorasan has some serious implications for Pakistan. After Operation Zarb-e-Azb and Operation Raddul Fassad the splinter groups of Pakistani militants are seeking support of Organizations like IS. The militants hiding in Afghanistan are reuniting under a new brand. This consolidation makes IS a threat beyond borders. Although US military has launched a drone attacking campaign against the presence of IS and attached many IS leaders during 2016-17.⁹

Presence of Daesh in Pakistan

The geopolitics and conflicts in the Middle East are increasing the sectarian identities and ideologies of particular groups of Sunnis and Shiaa Muslims all over the world. For Pakistan too, this is not a good omen. Primarily 20 percent of the country's population is Shia.¹⁰ The attacks on Barelvis claimed by the Islamic State (IS) and

⁷"Religion and Secularism in the Middle East: A Primer," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, (2015), <https://www.fpri.org/article> (accessed August 13, 2018).

⁸"Analysis: Why Is Russia warming up to Pakistan?" *Dawn*, February 27, 2018, , <https://www.dawn.com/news/1392060> (accessed August 13, 2018).

⁹"America Launches Drone Attacks on Islamist Terrorists in Niger," *Express Tribune*, July 30, 2018, <https://www.express.co.uk/996296/us-launch-drone-attack-islamist-terrorist-niger-africa> (accessed August 13, 2018).

¹⁰"Pakistan: How Shia Muslims differ from Sunnis; treatment of Shias, particularly in Lahore and Multan; government response to violence against Shia Muslims (2010-December 2013)," *Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada*,

its allies; such as the attack on the Shrine of Shah Noorani in Balochistan in November 2016¹¹ and Lal Shahbaz Qalandar¹² in Sindh in February 2017, is evidence of the growing sway of IS and its message of declaring all those who do not adhere to its message as heretics. The emergence of IS in Pakistan and IS-linked attacks in league with anti-Shia militants, such as JuA, Jundullah and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami (LeJ-A), are dangerous developments, especially where Sunni-Shia sectarian relations are concerned.¹³

In 2014, when IS declared the Islamic state, after capturing significant territory in Iraq and Syria, it also had impact on far right wing and militant organization of Pakistan. Later on, they announced their 'Plans for Pakistan', as a part of new province under their caliphate, Khorasan.¹⁴ This raised alarms bells in security agencies, but on other hand, the weakened extremist militants groups saw this as lucrative opportunity to restart the fight under new banner. This has been further corroborated by Zahid Hussain, an expert on the Middle East: "The Islamic State (Daesh) might not have a strong organizational structure in Pakistan but we have thousands of members of banned groups sympathetic to the (their) ideology. They subscribe to the Islamic

January 9, 2014, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/52eba0284.html> (accessed February 12, 2019).

¹¹"Attack on Shah Noorani Shrine in Pakistan Kills Dozens," *Al-Jazeera*, November 13, 2016, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/dozens-casualties-attack-pakistan-shrine-161112141000715.html> (accessed August 14, 2018).

¹²Mohammad Hussain Khan, Qurban Ali Khushik and Imtiaz Ali, "At Least 70 Dead as Bomb Rips through Lal Shahbaz Shrine in Sehwan, Sindh," *Dawn*, February 16, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1315136> (accessed August 14, 2018).

¹³Najibullah Quraishi, and Jamie Doran, "ISIL and the Taliban," *Al-Jazeera*, November 01, 2015, <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2015/11/islamic-state-isil-taliban-afghanistan-151101074041755.html> (accessed August 14, 2018).

¹⁴Sd Muni, and Vivek Chadha, "Report: Terrorism Emerging Trends, Asian Strategic Review, 2016", *Institute for Defence Studies & Analysis* (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2016), 189-209.

State (Daesh) world view". His words can be evidenced by graffiti that appeared in the areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Karachi in 2014.¹⁵ Even though the perpetrators were immediately dealt with it signaled alarm bells for the security forces.

Noreen Leghari's¹⁶ disappearance from her hometown of Hyderabad in February 2017 was registered as a kidnapping until she reached out to her parents through social media and confirmed her allegiance to Daesh: "I'm in Syria for jihad. Stop searching for me."¹⁷ Unknown to everyone, she was still present in Lahore and planned to detonate herself in a crowded church in April. Fortunately her plan was foiled by security forces. It was a major example of IS's growing reach in Pakistan. Even young Pakistani women and educated youth from liberal families have proven responsive to the IS brand of extremism. In June 2017, China has expressed "grave concern" over reports that Daesh had killed two Chinese teachers in Pakistan.¹⁸ In March 2018, Iran warned Pakistan of the threat of Daesh along its borders.¹⁹ Russia also

¹⁵Javed Aziz Khan, "Daesh Graffiti Appears in Peshawar," *The News*, February 07, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1387889> (accessed August 15, 2018).

¹⁶"Noreen Leghari Confesses to Involvement in Terrorist Activity," *Geo News*, April 17, 2017, <https://www.geo.tv/latest/138420-Noreen-Leghari-confesses-to-involvement-in-terrorist-activity> (accessed August 14, 2018).

¹⁷Fatima Bhojani, "Isis is on the Decline in the Middle East, but Its Influence in Pakistan Is Rising," *Washington Post*, May 5, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/05/isis-is-on-the-decline-in-the-middle-east-but-its-influence-in-pakistan-is-rising/?utm_term=.3658522233a2 (accessed August 15, 2018).

¹⁸"China 'gravely Concerned' as IS Reportedly Kills Two Teachers in Pakistan," *Pakistan Today*, June 09, 2017, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/06/09/china-shows-grave-concern-as-teachers-reported-killed-in-pakistan/?fb_comment_id=1160627100710423_1160639167375883 (accessed August 13, 2018).

¹⁹"Iran, Pakistan Stress Fight against Common Border Threats," *Pars Today*, June 01, 2018, <http://parstoday.com/en/news/iran-i89182iranpakistanstressfightagainstcommonborderthreats> (accessed August 13, 2018).

raised security concerns and together with Pakistan plans to establish a commission on military cooperation to counter the IS threat in Afghanistan.²⁰

IS does not have direct territorial access inside Pakistan, but conducts activities through proxies. Most of these local militants groups with ties to IS are second generation jihadist, who emerged after 9/11 and had ideological similarities with Al Qaida and TTP. They were also and heavily involved in spurring on sectarian conflict with the aim of creating a Sunni Islamic state in Pakistan. Security analyst and Director of Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Amir Rana, state that "These terrorist outfits usually play a bluff. Daesh has a nexus with other terrorist organizations like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) in the country so they don't completely play the bluff here. The security report 2017 by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies also pointed towards increasing footprints of IS on the Pak-Afghan border."²¹

A deadly mix of violent Sunni militant groups, many belonging to banned groups that are thriving under new names, have cloaked themselves under the banner of Daesh. On 25 April 2017, an attack carried out by a pro-IS terrorist group Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) killed fourteen people.²² The targets were Shia Muslims. JuA, which splintered from the Pakistani Taliban in 2014, is a strong advocate of anti-Shia ideology and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State

²⁰ Ayaz Gul, "Russia, Pakistan Form Anti-Terror Military Cooperation Commission," *VoA News*, February 20, 2018, <https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-pakistan-military-cooperation-commission-against-islamic-state/4262801.html> (accessed August 13, 2018).

²¹ Pakistan Security Report 2017 Full Report, Report: *Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies*, 1st ed., 10 (2018), <https://www.pakpips.com/article/book/pakistan-security-report-2017> (accessed August 14, 2018).

²² "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing," *UN*, July 06, 2017, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/?type=All&page=1> (accessed August 13, 2018).

Khurasan (ISK) in 2014. In the last two years, JuA has merged with the IS to target Shia Muslims across Pakistan.

Another important group affiliate of IS which is still active in Pakistan is Lashker-e-Jhangvi- Al-Alami. They harbor an extreme anti-Shia ideology and have been involved in killing of Hazara Shia community. They were also responsible for numerous terrorist activities in Balochistan, such as the 2016 attack on the Police Academy in Quetta.²³ Lashker-e-Jhangvi is also extremely important because it is heavily invested in the political sphere of the country. Along with LeJ, many other groups have also pledged allegiance to IS, such as Jundullah, a group formally associated with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. More importantly members of TTP who escaped after Operation Zarb-e-Azab have also joined IS, and now work under the IS banner.

According to former National Security and Foreign Affairs Advisor Sartaj Aziz: "Daesh is not a major threat for Pakistan...the threat of Daesh can be suspected in the tribal areas where the government believes that it has significant military operations in place to combat it".²⁴ Daesh presence comes at a time when counter-terrorism operations in Pakistan are in full force and there has been a decline in violent activities. Given that nearly 160,000 troops are stationed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), it would be a miracle for Daesh-linked militants to gain any semblance of control in the region.²⁵

It must be kept in mind that even though the ongoing counterterrorism operations in Pakistan have resulted in terrorist

²³"Pakistan: LeJ behind Police Academy Attack in Quetta." *Al-Jazeera*, October 26, 2016, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/pakistan-lej-police-academy-attack-quetta-161025160102452.html> (accessed August 13, 2018).

²⁴Maryam Nazir, "Daesh in South Asia," *Journal of Current Affairs* 1, no. 1&2 (2015): 1-17.

²⁵Ibid.

asylums and terror command and being demolished, the detente of Daesh can provide fractured militants and groups, immunity to enter its fold for the purpose of reviving. "Pakistan still faces the threat of Daesh but Afghanistan is the prime location of the group where its fighters get arms and training,"²⁶ as stated by Mohmand, a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army.

In June 2017, the Pakistan Army announced that they would launch operations in the tribal areas of Rajgal and Shawwal to flush out Daesh militants which were trying to get a foothold in Khyber Agency.²⁷ According to DG ISPR, Major General Asif Ghafoor, Daesh had no organized infrastructure in Pakistan and the Army would not allow them to take foothold in the country.²⁸ This is not to deny that the group does have a network in Pakistan in the form of ideology adaption by already present military groups in the country. In addition to this the element of this ideology is such low in Pakistani society that they can barely survive. It is salafi school of thought that welcomed their ideology in Pakistan and this is the weakest point of the ISIS. This weak point is further aggravated in Pakistan because of the diverse sectarian mix of the society. There are two major sectarian groups in Pakistan commonly known as Barelvi's and Deobandi.²⁹ According to ISIS ideology the major group Barelvi's is the idolaters and should be eliminated. Therefore

²⁶Tahir Khan, "The Rise of Daesh in Afghanistan Is Raising Alarm in Pakistan, Say Experts," *Arab News*, April 1, 2018, <http://www.arabnews.com/node/1277356/world> (accessed August 13, 2018).

²⁷Saad Sayeed, "Pakistan Launches Military Operation in Tribal Areas Targeting Islamic State," *Reuters*, July 16, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-militants/pakistan-launches-military-opera> (accessed August 15, 2018).

²⁸"Daesh, JuA Have Access to Pakistan's Educational Institutes: DG ISPR." *Samaa News*, April 06, 2017, <https://www.samaa.tv/news/2017/04/daesh-jua-have-access-to-pakistans-educational-institutes-dg-ispr/> (accessed August 15, 2018).

²⁹Ashok K Behuria, "Sects Within Sect: The Case of Deobandi-Barelvi Encounter in Pakistan," *Strategic Analysis* 32, no. 1 (2008): 57-80.

one can argue that the ideological grounds in Pakistan for the expansion of ISIS are not as soft and perceived by international community. Infact ISIS may face opposition by certain strong sectarian groups as ISIS destroyed sacred shrines in Syria and Iraq. There are many reasons: firstly, Ahl-e-Hadith or Salafis are a minority group in Pakistan; secondly, they are not likely to swear loyalty to a group that has been declared as heretics by scholars and thirdly, Jamat-ud-Dawah (the largest non-political Salafi group) has defied Daesh ideology and modus operandi. Hence, regardless of being political or otherwise, Ahl-e-Hadith organizations have been facing continuous decreasing ranks and will continue to remain paltry to such an extent that Daesh will not be able to take authority.

It must be noted however, that the above converse does not entail that Salafis are the only group that have pledged allegiance to Daesh. The first leader of the Khorasan Chapter, Hafiz Saeed Khan was a Deobandi is evidence enough.³⁰ He had previously headed the TTP Orakzai Agency (FATA) and had joined Jamatul-Ahrar before ensuring support to Abu Baker Al-Baghdadi. Henceforth, the situation is a complex one. Clusters that are battling to withstand the Pakistani military operations are pledging allegiance to Daesh in Afghanistan in order to survive. Aside from Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi factions, renunciations have taken place in the Jamat-e-Islami as well. Individuals from the Jamat-e-Islami sister chapter in Afghanistan, the Hizb-e-Islami also have been defecting to Daesh. Desertions from TTP, Jamat-ul-Ahrar and Afghan Taliban are now a commonality.

³⁰"IS Leader in Afghanistan Killed, US Believes," *BBC News*, August 12, 2016, http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant (accessed August 15, 2018).

The Salafi commanders do not have full authority over the Khorasan chapter. This is an indication of the fact that the group has adopted a tailored policy in Afghanistan to attract Deobandi fighters. Despite this since the group has not been able to adjust to the tribal norms which prevail in Afghanistan, a bigger effect could not take place.

Keeping all things in mind, this is not to say that Pakistani authorities need to keep a watch on any signs of influence of Daesh in the country. On February 22, 2017, Pakistan Army announced the launch of a nationwide military operation- “Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad”, according to the statement issued by Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the army’s media wing. The ISPR Press Release 87/2017 (Pakistan Defence) stated: “Pakistan Army launches “Operation Raddul-Fasaad” across the country. Operation aims at eliminating residual/latent threat of terrorism, consolidating gains of operations made thus far and further ensuring security of the borders. Pakistan Air Force, Pakistan Navy, Civil Armed Forces (CAF) and other security / Law enforcing agencies (LEAs) will continue to actively participate/intimately support the efforts to eliminate the menace of terrorism from the country.

All the security agencies of the country are united on the point after Army Public School attack that all the operations done across the country can normalize the situation only for a limited time period and once they are concluded the sleeper cells will again get activated as we have observed that the militants have done a significant damage during the recent elections of 2018. All the sympathizers who provide support to militant groups in any form must be dealt with iron hands. Many investigations reveal that the masterminds of many attacks in Pakistan are planned by such people who are apparently living a normal life. The issue of radicalization in varsities is another issue in this regard. For all

these concerns raised National Action Plan (NAP) seems to be the only document which can provide some relief to the society if implemented in true spirit. In the starting phase of implementation it seems like NAP is actually taking a nap but the situation changed when National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) released its first progress report of NAP in December 2017. According to the statistics of that report all 20 points of the NAP showed a progress, the only point that has been ignored in this plan is the point of legal reforms. This point is the base of all and needs to be taken on the serious note.

Even though there is a least to none chance of Daesh being able to operate within Pakistan, authorities need to monitor the group's activities in Afghanistan primarily because any expansion will in all probability start from the porous Pak-Afghan border. Operations like Zarb-e-Azb complemented by National Action Plan are the main source of preventing evils like IS from entering in our society.

It is pertinent to note here that the threat of ISIS for Pakistan is not of ideological in nature rather it is because of ISIS growing in Afghanistan. Also the splinter groups of TTP hiding in Afghanistan trying to rebrand them are a matter of concern for Pakistan. To control this threat leaving scars on Pakistan's society Pakistan will have to develop a strategy on two fronts. Internally, Pakistan's strategy and its progress is quiet impressive in the past few years as a nose dive decline in terrorism is explained in the graph mentioned above. There is still a room of improvement; Pakistan will have to deal with the problem of home grown extremism. Externally, the most immediate threat is from Afghan side. The porous border with Afghanistan needs the attention. Fencing of Afghan border and surveillance has been doubled but the mistrust and level cooperation from Afghan side is very low. The recent government though is trying to negotiate with Afghans but still the

international community needs to play its role as well. A stable Afghanistan is in the interest of both Pakistan and the region.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In Iraq, IS found a void in the marginalization of the Sunni Muslim population. Presently, Pakistan is faced with internal disenfranchised groups who have pledged allegiance to IS. Sectarian fault lines which can be exploited by these groups exist in Pakistan. In February 2017, the armed forces of Pakistan launched an operation 'Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad'³¹ across the country — a country-wide crackdown against terrorists and extremists. Hence, security is on the foremost priority list of the Pakistan Government. Following are the recommendations for consideration of the government:

- 1) FATA reforms as per the will of National Action Plan must be implemented in true spirit so that the political and economic uplift of the area may result in the solution of the problem.
- 2) Beside security oriented measures the government should also focus on the agenda of social reforms.
- 3) Main problem is extremism, which leads to terrorism. Extremism can only be dealt using widespread strategies that challenge the ideology and mind-set of the militant organizations. The literature needs to be modified and the fading values of tolerance and patience are needed to be taught so that the young minds do not grow up with a 'jihadi' or 'radical' mentality.
- 4) In March 2018, Pakistan's National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) launched a drive to eradicate social media platforms of

³¹"Pakistan Army Launches 'Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad' across the Country," *Dawn*, February 22, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1316332> (accessed August 15, 2019).

Daesh recruiters targeting the youth. Similarly, content on madrassas is required.

- 5) Madrassa reforms are the need of the hour. The immediate solution may be that all rules and regulations for NGO's are applied on Madrassas to control the situation.
- 6) Prison reforms should also be introduced. Prisoners are educated about the extremism and terrorism.

Ballistic Missile Defence and Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles: Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia

Ahyousha Khan*

Abstract

In South Asian security dilemma by the development of Ballistic Missile Defence by India is threatening the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. Consequently, to maintain deterrence stability and strategic balance, Pakistan under the guidelines of its policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence, has opted for Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV). Development of MIRV by Pakistan is cost-effective measure instead of developing its own BMD systems. Pakistan's development of MIRV in response to Indian BMD will create the offense-defense balance and enhance the nuclear deterrence in the region.

Keywords: Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV), Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), Nuclear Deterrence, Minimum Credible Deterrence, Offense-Defense Balance

Introduction

South Asian region is famous for rivalry between two nuclear neighbors India and Pakistan reason being deep rooted mistrust, ongoing un-resolved disputes such as Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek issue, and Indus Watery Treaty. This has resulted in

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conventional/non-conventional military buildup by both states. After their overt nuclearization in May of 1998, both India and Pakistan have been involved in militarization including missile proliferation, conventional and naval build-up, which is intensifying arms race in the region. Though hostility between both states is unending but nuclear weapons have brought stability to a great extent. Since nuclearization, India and Pakistan have not ventured into all-out war because of the fear of unacceptable damages by nuclear armed adversary. According to Bernard Brodie deterrence “is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires”. Thus, deterrence warns adversary not to take such an action that would invoke immediate response.

So, nuclearization has created deterrence stability in South Asia, which is consequential in prevention of an all-out war. Nuclear deterrence as a concept came forward during cold war. It relies upon the logic of benefit in not waging a war due to fear of unacceptable damage in response. Even though nuclear deterrence forbids adversaries to jump into conflicts, but maintaining it to minus the incentive for enemy to attack is quite an arduous task.

Often nuclear deterrence is taken as a hurdle by conflicting parties, as it deters them to destroy the enemy completely, which results in the constant attempts of defiance by one or all parties in the conflicting relations.

For India, it is not easy to accept that small adversary like Pakistan can become hurdle in its way of being a regional power. Overwhelming militarization – conventional and non-conventional – to amplify arms race in the South Asia by India is destabilizing deterrence equation in the region. Indian military build-up is directly proportional to its strategic ambitions of being a global

power. So, to achieve its hidden but evident ambitions of being a global power, India is continuously building up its nuclear facilities, increasing its stockpiles of missiles (sea and land based) and modernizing its conventional military. These all conventional and non-conventional military developments are done under swiftly changing doctrinal imperatives. Development of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) Agni V (land based), K4 and K 15 (Sea based) is representation of Indian hegemonic ambitions because these missiles cannot only be used against Pakistan but against other states as well.

So, India which aims to be a global player, never wanted its arsenals to be used as leverage. Hence, to acquire invincibility for its nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in crisis, India is developing Ballistic Missile Defence to ensure survivability of Indian metros, nuclear silos and essential military installations; to reduce the credibility of enemy's attack that is trying to inflict the damage. As Ballistic missile defence have capability to destroy the incoming enemy missile in the air.

Therefore, to enforce credibility of its nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis India, Pakistan ventured into Multiple Independently Target Vehicle (MIRVs); as it is nearly impossible by BMD to destroy all the independently guided payloads. With this development Pakistan develop answer to Indian BMD that was questioning the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence. On the other hand nuclear deterrence is also a very dynamic concept that relies upon various factors to work effectively; it relies on nuclear doctrines and postures, developments in conventional and non-conventional military build-up, actions taken by export control regimes in International system.

In this research Pakistan's decision to acquire MIRV is seen under the prism of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, it is debated in

the paper that MIRV is by product of Indian Ballistic Missile Defence rather than a new trend in missile proliferation in the region. This paper is an attempt to extrapolate the impact of such arms build-up on the deterrence equation and strategic stability in South Asia. Even when development of MIRVs are considered as destabilizing move by international critiques, there is need to understand the security imperatives in which Pakistan took the decision.

Indian Ballistic Missile Defence (BMDs)

Theory of deterrence gain importance in Cold war after invent of nuclear technology. It denies the logic of war by Carl Von Clausewitz; war was no longer gain of political objective by other means because nuclear war is illogical mean to gain political gains. This theory presumes actors decide rationally and perform certain cost and benefit analysis before launching attack, so if cost and benefit analysis can be manipulated by one side, the other side would show restraint in launching an attack. Bernard William Kaufmann (1954), Henry Kissinger (1957) and Bernard Brodie (1959) are considered important advocates of deterrence. In words of Bernard Brodie “thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win the wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose”.¹ Thus, deterrence ensures that state must not attack because cost of attack is more than benefits. Moreover it revolves around the fact that wars are unthinkable in nuclear environment.

Deterrence is “Ability to dissuade a state from embarking upon a course of action prejudicial to one's vital security interests/core values, based on a demonstrated capability”. According to this particular definition nuclear deterrence is a proficiency of state

¹Bernard Brodie, et al., *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946), 76.

which is based upon its demonstrated capabilities to counter its enemies from attacking one's security and its vital interests. Thus, nuclear deterrence is not just to dissuade enemy from attacking physical boundaries but also stop it to harm one's core interest (economic, political and basic values). Another important aspect in this definition is "demonstrated capability," which means to uphold deterrence. It is necessary that state acquire credibility in delivery of its nuclear arsenals and communicate it to the enemy by actual display of its power. Although deterrence is a psychological effect yet it depends upon tangible factors for its validity. It cannot be upheld without capability, credibility of the capability and effective communication of one's capability to enemy. Deterrence is never static, it requires validation from certain variables; these variables include conventional capabilities of state, missile developments, space and cyber capabilities, submarine launched nuclear missiles, command-control systems and ballistic missile defence.² Moreover, development of new technologies play significant role in evolution of nuclear deterrence because they ignite action-reaction model. Nuclear Deterrence is established by a state through formulation of strong defence or through the threat of extreme retaliation/punishment,³ which means that deterrence can be of two types; offensive deterrence and defensive deterrence. Technological developments by state validate the fact that whether state is relying on offensive deterrence or defensive deterrence. In classic interpretations deterrence through denial is defensive deterrence and through retaliation is offensive deterrence and

²"21st Century Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defence," *U.S. Department of Defense*, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/21st-Century-Nuclear-Deterrence-and-Missile-Defense/> (accessed July 12, 2018).

³Alexnadar.A. Ghionis, "Limits of Deterrence in Cyber World – An Analysis of Deterrence by Punishment," *Academia*, http://www.academia.edu/7464076/TheLimitsofDeterrence_in_the_Cyber_WorldAnAnalysisofDeterrencebyPunishment (accessed July 12, 2018).

states rely on deterrence by retaliation until they develop better strategic defence.⁴

Since 1998, India is a declared nuclear weapon state, but history of its nuclearization can be traced back to 1974. Some of the scholars like Dhruva Shinkar debated that India is a reluctant nuclear state, which developed its nuclear program due to threats from China.⁵ However, empirical evidence goes against the claim that India is a reluctant nuclear state because India first tested its nuclear weapon under the guise of “peaceful explosion” in 1974 after extracting plutonium from spent fuel at CIRUS and its reprocessing at Trombay under the supervision of Homi Jehangir Bhabha⁶, which was an ambitious decision rather than reluctant initiative. Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheem in his book mentioned that Indian nuclear program was conceived and designed by Bhabha in a manner that nuclear option was formed within the civilian structure of the Indian nuclear program, which enabled the expansion of weapon program along with the civilian program.⁷ This ambitiousness of Indian scientists and politician change the strategic and political discourse of South Asia. Moreover, it compelled Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapon as well under the guidelines of its security imperatives. So, it was Pakistan that could be considered as reluctant nuclear state not India. But, after 1974 test, it took India more than two decades to test its nuclear weapon

⁴Kim R. Holmes, “Basing Deterrence on Strategic Defense,” *The Heritage Foundation*, December 2, 1987, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/basing-deterrence-strategic-defense> (accessed August 01, 2018).

⁵Dhruva Jaishankar, “Decoding India’s Nuclear Status,” *The Wire*, April 03, 2017, <https://thewire.in/120800/decoding-india-nuclear-status/> (accessed August 02, 2018).

⁶Ibid.

⁷Zafar Iqbal Cheema, *Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its evolution, development and Implications for South Asian Security* (Oxford University Press: Pakistan, 2010), 685-686.

overtly in 1998, which created a ripple effect in the region. Resultantly Pakistan tested its nuclear weapon in the same month of 1998 to acquire credible nuclear deterrence against India as well. Even before overt nuclearization of South Asia deterrence was used twice in crisis situation to avoid an all-out war; it was used in the Brasstack crisis of 1986-87 and in the Sprig crisis of 1990 over Kashmir. However, since 1998 nuclear deterrence is overtly practiced in South Asia. But as explained earlier that deterrence is never static and its volatility increases if importance of fear is denied or ignored by even one of the conflicting party through pursuit of offensive technologies, policies and doctrines.

In South Asia, Indian Ballistic Missile Defence Program challenged the prevalent deterrence equation by inducing false sense of security, under which India might be tempted to go for pre-emptive strike. As the false sense of security acquired through BMD systems will eliminate the fear of annihilation which forbids states to even consider a war in nuclear environment. Development of BMD systems by India is considered as a defensive move because they ensure deterrence by denial. However, amalgam of offensive deterrence and defensive deterrence in the back drop of technological developments requires careful analysis that whether certain technology is facilitating defensive deterrence or offensive deterrence.

Ideally the ballistic missile defence system should have the capability to detect, track, intercept and destroy the incoming missile during its three stages of flight i.e. boost, mid-course and terminal phase. Boost phase is the starting point where missile still hasn't exited the atmosphere or entered into outer space and is normally thrusting to gain velocity; this phase lasts only for 1 to 5

mints depending upon the range of missile.⁸ During Midcourse phase missile shed its rocket motors and begin coasting or freefalling towards its target⁹. It is relatively easier to intercept missile in midcourse phase because in this phase missile is no longer under power and it follows predictable path; moreover, there is more time window in this phase to intercept and target. Terminal phase is the last phase and in it missile reenters in to the earth atmosphere and it lasts less than 1 minute. Thus, because of limited time to engagement it is harder to target enemy missile in this phase. The ballistic missile defenses are deployable at land, sea and space

Indian Ballistic Missile defence program is rooted back to 1983 when Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) was initiated.¹⁰ Development of missiles like Agni and Prithvi are the efforts of IGMDP. Moreover, under this program India developed offensive missiles like Akash (Surface to Air) for air defence with capability of being converting in to Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) as well.¹¹ Later, in coming decades India went ahead with the idea of missile defence systems¹² and developed the capability that could intercept missiles not only in endo-

⁸"Ballistic Missile Defence Challenge," *Missile Defence Agency: MDA Facts, Nuclear Threat Initiative*, <https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/105.pdf> (accessed August 1, 2018).

⁹"Three Stages of the Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Flight," *Pathfinder*, no. 305 (March 2008), <http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/mediaFiles/Pathfinder/PF305-Three-Stages-of-the-Inter-Continental-Ballistic-Missile> (accessed August 2, 2018).

¹⁰Frank O' Donnell and Yogesh Joshi, "Indian Missile Defense: Is the game worth the candle," *The Diplomat*, August 2, 2013, <https://thedi diplomat.com/2013/08/indias-missile-defense-is-the-game-worth-the-candle/> (accessed August 2, 2018).

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "The Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia: Implications on Strategic Stability," *Nuclear Learning: the next decade in South Asia*, (2013), <https://www.nps.edu/documents/104111744/106151936/.11+Nuclear+Learning+Jaspal> (accessed August 3, 2018).

atmosphere but also in exo-atmosphere. At start Indian ballistic missile defence faced quite a back lash due to lack of technological capacity and strict non-proliferation measures in international community.

However, as ties between US and India grew, Indian access to sophisticated technology increased tremendously. Two sectors of Indian military that benefited the most from the Indo-US partnership are Indian ballistic missile program and Indian Space program; for instance Glide Path Agreement signed on 19 December 2003 is enabling India in space, nuclear and missile defence fields. Before that, in 2002 India was also invited by US to attend a BMD Workshop in Colorado.¹³

Currently, Indian Ballistic Missile defence system is a two layered system based on Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) and Advance Air Defence (AAD).¹⁴ On February 17, 2017 India successfully tested its indigenous Ballistic Missile defence system on Abdul Kalam Island, in the Bay of Bengal.¹⁵ With this test India successfully converted its Prithvi Air Defence in to Prithvi Air Vehicle (PAV). Prithvi Air Defence with its Pradyumna ballistic missile interceptor has a maximum interception altitude of 80 km¹⁶; now PAD is replaced with PAV whose minimum interception altitude is 50 km and is

¹³Zafar Iqbal Cheema, *Indian Nuclear Deterrence: Its evolution, Development and Implications for South Asian Security* (Oxford University Press: Pakistan, 2010), 67-76.

¹⁴Asma Khalid, "Implications of BMD, MIRV tech in South Asia," *Pakistan Observer*, May 9, 2017, <https://pakobserver.net/implications-bmd-mirv-tech-s-asia/> (accessed August 05, 2018).

¹⁵Franz-Stefan Gady, "India Successfully Tests Prithvi Defense Vehicle, A New Missile Killer System," *The Diplomat*, February 15, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/india-successfully-tests-prithvi-defense-vehicle-a-new-missile-killer-system/> (accessed August 05, 2018).

¹⁶Ibid.

capable to engage targets in exo-atmosphere.¹⁷ Moreover, it is stated that (PAV is capable of Infrared Imaging to distinguish between warheads and decoys, other than that, PAVs are capable of mid-course interception of incoming enemy missiles.¹⁸ In multilayered Indian Ballistic Missile system Advance Air Defence is for intercepting missiles in endo-atmospheric region at altitude of 15-40 km in the terminal phase, when missile enters into the atmosphere of the earth.¹⁹ Advance Air Defence is capable of maneuvering at low altitudes, it has 3D thrust vectoring capability that allows it to turn into any direction swiftly and it has single stage solid fueled missile.²⁰ So, in theory Indian two layered Anti-Ballistic Missile defence are capable of stopping not only strategic nuclear delivery vehicles but tactical delivery vehicles as well.

It is claimed by India that its capabilities in hardware of ballistic missile defences are indigenous but in reality Russia, US and Israel are biggest contributor in the ballistic missile defence technology.²¹ India has signed an agreement of \$ 5.43 billion to buy S-400 anti-

¹⁷ Hemant Kumar Rout, "What makes Prithvi missile interceptor one of the best in the world: Here are 10 reasons," *Indian Express*, February 11, 2017, <http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/feb/11/what-makes-prithvi-missile-interceptor-one-of-the-best-in-the-world-here-are-10-reasons-1569593--1.html> (accessed August 05, 2018).

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Franz-Stefan Gady, "India Successfully Tests Prithvi Defense Vehicle, A New Missile Killer System," *The Diplomat*, February 15, 2017, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/02/india-successfully-tests-prithvi-defense-vehicle-a-new-missile-killer-system/> (accessed August 05, 2018).

²⁰ "India's Ballistic Missile Defence Shield: A Strategic Analysis," <http://fullafterburnerweebly.com/aerospace/indias-ballistic-missile-defence-shield-a-strategic-analysis> (accessed August 6, 2018).

²¹ Frank O' Donnell and Yogesh Joshi, "Indian Missile Defense: Is the game worth the candle," *The Diplomat*, August 02, 2013, <https://thediplomat.com/2013/08/indias-missile-defense-is-the-game-worth-the-candle/> (accessed August 06, 2018).

missile system from Russia and with collaboration of Israel developed long range, phased array radars.²²

S-400 is considered as best available missile system in market due to its ability to engage not only ballistic missiles, but also UAVs, fighter planes and cruise missiles through surface to air attack missiles. It is also capable of intercepting and destroying multiple airborne targets at distance up to 400 km (250 miles).²³ S-400 missile systems have the capability to fire four different types of missiles, which include very long range missiles, long range missiles and short range missiles and 9M9E62 missile; that can fly at the speed of 5 Mach and can engage targets at 5 meters above the ground.²⁴ Furthermore due to its optional acquisition radars enable it to defeat modern stealth aircrafts such as F-22 and F-35.

Other than US, Israel and Russian, French also assisted India in development of guidance radars for Indian Ballistic missile systems. Acquisition of these sophisticated missiles by India for making its Ballistic missile defence operational is declared as defensive move. India claims that primary reason behind BMD development is to deter threats arising from two fronts China and Pakistan.

However, Indian logic of declaring BMDs as defensive deterrent could be tested based on repercussions it will have on the strategic stability of South Asia. In any arms race BMDs are considered as highly destabilizing factors as they eliminate the fear and give false

²²Ibid.

²³Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India approves S-400 buy from Russia, amid expectations for more bilateral deals," *Defense News*, September 28, 2018, <https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/09/28/india-approves-s-400-buy-from-russia-amid-expectations-for-more-bilateral-deals/> (accessed August 06, 2018).

²⁴Stephen Bryen, "Russia's S-400 Is Way More Dangerous than You Think," *The National Interest*, January 18, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-s-400-way-more-dangerous-you-think-24116> (accessed August 6, 2018).

sense of security these systems are yet unable to achieve 100% success rate.²⁵

Furthermore, nuclear deterrence allows state to respect shared risk of war to avoid total destruction. But, with development of BMDs, India is trying to supersede shared risk of destruction by rising above it. In other words, India is inviting other states to develop systems, which could breach ballistic missile defenses, to maintain deterrence by arms race. Proponents for Ballistic Missile Defence recognize it as defensive technology, acquired to enhance defensive deterrence of a state.²⁶ However, point to ponder in this regard is technology such as BMD could not be declared as defensive deterrent as they are the attempt to rise above the deterrence by eliminating the mutual vulnerability. Furthermore, technologies are seen under the microscope of intentions of states and their policies. So far, India is aspiring to be a global power, for achieving this status it is convinced that it requires maximization of hard power and BMD is a tool in maximization of power.²⁷ As BMDs will provide invincibility to nuclear arsenals and key civil and military installations, more aggressive and risk taking behavior on the expense of other state's vital interest could be expected in coming years from India. Thus, considering Indian intention of

²⁵"Ballistic and Cruise Missile Capabilities and Deterrence Equilibrium in South Asia", 2018, *SVI In-house Report, Strategic Vision Institute, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Capabilities and Deterrence Equilibrium in South Asia*" (accessed date August 10, 2018).

²⁶Balraj Nagal, "India and Ballistic Missile Defense: Furthering a Defensive Deterrent," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, June 30, 2016, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-and-ballistic-missile-defense-furthering-defensive-deterrent-pub-63966> (accessed August 10, 2018).

²⁷Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "The Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense in South Asia: Implications on Strategic Stability," *Nuclear Learning: the next decade in South Asia*, 2012, https://www.nps.edu/documents/Nuclear+Learning_Jaspal (accessed August 10, 2018).

being a global power, BMDs is more of a power maximization move.

India claims that its ballistic missile defence systems are to strengthen its defence against two front nuclear threats from Pakistan and China. Indian policy makers staunchly believes that due to technological advancements in both of its littoral rival states, security gap between India and its adversarial states will increase, thus BMDs will play pivotal role in narrowing the gap.²⁸

Such developments by India are not defensive maneuvers as even without BMDs India was deterring Pakistan and China effectively. According to former Indian Strategic Commander, development of ballistic missile defence by India was an attempt to protect not only its Metros but also its command and control system and increase credibility of its command system by denial to the adversary.²⁹ Thus, India's intention with BMD systems was to gain advantage against nuclear adversary by eliminating the notion of mutual destruction. However, India yet has not been able to deploy its BMD systems and Indian Ministry of Defence has demanded early induction of ballistic missile defence system from Defence Research and Development Organization.³⁰

²⁸Balraj Nagal, "India and Ballistic Missile Defense: Furthering a Defensive Deterrent," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, June 30, 2016, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-and-ballistic-missile-defense-furthering-defensive-deterrent-pub-63966> (accessed August 10, 2018).

²⁹B. S. Nagal, "Perception and Reality: An In-Depth Analysis of India's Credible Minimum Deterrent Doctrine," *Force*, October 10, 2014, <http://www.forceindia.net/PerceptionandReality.aspx> (accessed August 10, 2018).

³⁰Vivek Rahuvenshi, "India's MoD demands early induction of ballistic missile defense system," *Defence News*, May 18, 2017, <https://www.defensenews.com/land/2017/05/18/india-s-mod-demands-early-induction-of-ballistic-missile-defense-system/> (accessed August 11, 2018).

Impact of BMDs on South Asian Nuclear Deterrence

Although Pakistan does not have official published nuclear doctrine document, but it is following certain guiding principles as an attempt to decrease ambiguity in the strategic environment of South Asia. Absence of any guiding principle for use of nuclear force leaves enemy in conundrum that how adversary will use its force. Pakistan follows certain level of ambiguity in its nuclear doctrine not to limitize its options. However, to understand Pakistan's nuclear policy one has to look into the statements made by its National Command Authority.³¹

In 2013 National Command Authority (NCA) signaled that Pakistan would follow the policy of full spectrum deterrence, which was later confirmed again at 23rd meeting of NCA and in statement by Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai who is Advisor to National Command Authority.

Recent investments (short range ballistic missile, sea launched cruise missiles and multiple independently re-entry targetable vehicle) made by Pakistan in strengthening its deterrence against India suggests Pakistan's shift towards more complex Full Spectrum Deterrence posture. However, even when India's strategic policies and doctrines are challenging the existing status quo in the region biggest guiding principle of Pakistan's nuclear posture is Minimum Credible Deterrence. Moreover, in selection of its nuclear posture, Pakistan opted for war denying deterrence rather than war fighting deterrence vis-à-vis India to avoid arms race and nuclear competition in the region.³² Adoption of minimum credible deterrence by Pakistan was pragmatic decision based on limited

³¹Hassan Ehtisham "Pakistan's Evolving Nuclear Doctrine," *Express Tribune*, January 09, 2018, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1603554/6-pakistans-evolving-nuclear-doctrine/> (accessed August 12, 2018).

³²Khalid Iqbal, "India and Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrines and Posture: A Comparative Analysis," *Criterion-Quarterly* 11, no. 2 (September 9, 2016).

available resources owing to the small economy and threat perception of Pakistan. In South Asian threat landscape, Pakistan's security concerns revolve around threats from India, which are based upon the wars, ongoing conflicts, historic experiences, border skirmishes, offensive statements and policies from statesmen.

Indian covert nuclearization added fuel to the burning South Asian security and threat matrix; moreover, it brought nuclear arms race in the region, consequently led Pakistan to its own nuclear weapon program. Therefore, in development of its nuclear use policy India is the only country against whom Pakistani nuclear weapons are directed. Till, 2004 official documents of National Command and Control authority of Pakistan emphasized on the development of its nuclear forces according to "minimum deterrence needs".³³ But after Indian infatuation with Cold Start Doctrine, Pakistan resorted to miniaturization of its nuclear arsenals by making low yield, short range weapon (Nasr). Development of Nasr was Pakistan's response to deter Indian attempts of war at lower tiers in wake of operationalization of its pre-emptive limited war doctrine. With shift from Sundarji Doctrine to Cold Start Doctrine, India shifted its conventional military strategy from defensive to offensive. Thus, after achieving so called security for its nuclear silos, delivery vehicles, military installations and cities under BMD system India was shifting towards offensive conventional war fighting doctrines.

Hence, in this backdrop of Indian developments of Indian nuclear arsenals and in its conventional doctrines Pakistan realized the need to develop and communicate few other aspects of its

³³"Musharraf rules out arms race," *Dawn*, September 25, 2002, <http://www.dawn.com/news/58829/musharraf-rules-out-arms-race> (accessed August 12, 2018).

nuclear deterrence to the adversary. Thus, Pakistan's nuclear posture adopted another feature which is, Full Spectrum Deterrence to communicate it to India that its strategic deterrence is dynamic enough to counter threats emerging at all spectrums of conflict

Development of Low Yield Weapons

Due to low yield weaponization and full spectrum deterrence Pakistan faced a lot of criticism, it was argued that Pakistan is attempting to lower the nuclear threshold and is going for battle field nuclearization.³⁴ On the other hand, Pakistan is merely trying to maintain credibility of its minimum deterrence. Pakistan's policy of full spectrum is in line with its initial policy of credible minimum deterrence.³⁵ Moreover, full spectrum deterrence policy by Pakistan is not an attempt to take nuclear weapons to the battle field but rather developing different options for a full spectrum of targets.³⁶

After development of ballistic missile defence by India, Pakistan's deterrence posture required reinforcement of element of credibility. Consequently to maintain credibility in its deterrence posture Pakistan chose to go for countermeasure against rising threat from BMDs. In selection of its options against BMDs Pakistan's decision has to be in accordance with its economic limitations.

³⁴Sajid Farid Shapoo, "The Dangers of Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons," *The Diplomat*, February 01, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/02/the-dangers-of-pakistans-tactical-nuclear-weapons/> (accessed August 14, 2018).

³⁵No PR-615/2017-ISPR, Press Release, December 12, 2017, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=tpress_release&cat=army&date=2017/12/21 (accessed August 15, 2018).

³⁶"Rare light shone on full spectrum deterrence policy," *Dawn*, December 07, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1375079> (accessed August 16, 2018).

Developing a Ballistic missile system of its own was out of question for Pakistan, as it is not only an expensive technology but its effectiveness is still challengeable. As missile defence systems does not have the capability to intercept and destroy all the incoming missiles. For instance Iron Dome defense shield by Israel is highly acknowledged for its effectiveness in 2012-2014 but even it has the failure rate of 10-15%.³⁷ Moreover, in 2009 during the height of Korean missile threat, there Defense Secretary told the Congress that missile defense systems are fully adequate to protect us against a threat from North Korea but the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff told senate committee that he would assess the effectiveness of missile systems as 90 %³⁸. These analysis shows that it is hard to achieve 100% success rate with ballistic missile defence shields and on the top of technological difficulty it is also very expensive technology.

Counter Measure by Pakistan: Multiple Independently Re-entry Target Vehicle (MIRV)

As a consequence of Indian indulgence in ballistic missile defence, naval nuclearization and space militarization; strategic competition between both countries reaches new heights. Unfortunately, in ongoing strategic competition India being a larger economy and more resources to its disposal is leading the arms race and choosing diverse arenas of competition.

Development of Ballistic Missile Defence in South Asia is also one such attempt in which “war avoidance deterrence” is challenged and arms race is ignited by undermining the notions of deterrence equilibrium. Thus, Pakistan was forced to look for more

³⁷George N. Lewis, “Ballistic Missile Defence Effectiveness,” *American Institute of Physics*, (2017), <https://aip.scitation.org/doi/pdf/10.1063/1.5009222> (accessed February 11, 2019).

³⁸Ibid.

options to enhance credibility and survivability of its deterrent against BMD of its adversary in South Asia. Unlike BMDs the cost effective option opted by Pakistan was Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle.

Year 2017 was fruitful for Pakistan regarding development of survivability and credibility of its strategic weapons vis-à-vis India. As, in this year Pakistan developed not only a MIRV but also acquired second strike capability through the development of nuclear tipped cruise missile Babur 3 launched from a submarine. These developments were necessary considering growing nuclear threats from India. First multiple independent re-entry target vehicle (MIRV), named “Ababeel”, was tested by Pakistan in month of January 2017 with range of 2200 km and ability to carry nuclear and conventional warhead.

During Bi-polarity when both of the super powers (USA – former USSR) had almost equal missile launchers, issue of losing strategic force faster than enemy in attacking first was raised as an alarming concern. Answer of such dilemma was resolved by the development of Multiple Independent Re-entry Target Vehicle by USA and USSR.³⁹ MIRVs developed by both superpowers were not only capable of carrying more than one missile but these missiles have high accuracy and high yield. Increased accuracy and high yield of MIRVs made them ideal candidate for using in pre-emptive strike against enemy. Moreover, MIRVs if used in pre-emptive strike could also be used to hit hardened targets of enemy to decrease its potential for massive retaliation.

³⁹Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long, “The Geopolitical Origins of US Hard-Target-Kill Counterforce Capabilities and MIRVs,” *Stimson Center*, June 28, 2016, <https://www.stimson.org/content/geopolitical-origins-us-hard-target-kill-counterforce-capabilities-and-mirvs> (accessed February 11, 2019).

MIRV technology enables missile to carry more than one warhead in single launch and with the capability to hit multiple individual targets. MIRVing is a complex technology and required a lot of technological specifications regarding missile accuracy, miniaturization of warheads and increase in yield of weapon. In MIRVs main rocket motor pushes compartment that contains warhead in suborbital ballistic flight path, at the boost phase, warhead compartment maneuvers utilizing an inertial gravitational system to maintain accuracy and release warhead on board by maneuvering repeatedly.⁴⁰ This process is repeated till all the warheads are released.

So, MIRV was selected by super power like USA because of its cost effectiveness, high accuracy, high yields and its ability to not lose strategic assets faster than enemy. Development of MIRVs in South Asia is categorized as the second coming of MIRVs.⁴¹ Though MIRV technology is difficult to acquire yet Pakistan has achieved it because of its experience in miniaturization of missile weapon.

Pakistan tested its MIRV to make nuclear deterrence work in South Asia by keeping options open for itself at all spectrums of threat. By acquiring MIRV Pakistan became 7th country that has MIRV technology⁴²; USA, Russia, UK, France, Israel and China are the declared states with MIRVs technology. As MIRVs are regarded as complex technologies, they send more than one warhead in

⁴⁰Ali Osman, "What you need to know about Pakistan's Ababeel ballistic missile," *Dawn*, January 25, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1310463> (accessed August 15, 2018).

⁴¹Sameer Lalwani and Travis Wheeler, "The second coming of MIRVs: the future of strategic arms competition," *War on the Rocks*, August 23, 2016, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/08/the-second-coming-of-mirvs-the-future-of-strategic-arms-competition/> (accessed August 12, 2018).

⁴²Ali Osman, "What you need to know about Pakistan's Ababeel ballistic missile," *Dawn*, January 25, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1310463> (accessed August 12, 2018).

single launch and that too with high accuracy.⁴³ To achieve high accuracy for Ababeel, Pakistan also bought optical missile tracking system from China, which will track record different missiles in different directions in a MIRV through high-resolution images of a missile's departure from its launcher, stage separation, tail flame and after the missile re-enters earth atmosphere, the trajectory of the warheads it releases.⁴⁴ However, what makes this system unique is its ability to detect missile up to range of several hundred kilometers through the help of its telescopes, which are equipped with laser ranger, high-speed camera, infrared detector and a centralized computer system that automatically captures and follows moving targets.⁴⁵

Other than before mentioned seven states, it is considered that India is also capable of MIRVing.⁴⁶ With the development of Agni V and heavy lifting of satellite capabilities it is signified that India has developed basis for ICBM and MIRVs.⁴⁷ Moreover, international scholars are also of view that India would acquire MIRV technology

⁴³Ahyousha Khan, "Optical Missile Tracking Systems and Minimum Credible Deterrence," *Eurasia Review*, April 13, 2018, <https://eurasia.eu/2018/.../12/optical-missile-tracking-systems-and-minimu> (accessed August 12, 2018).

⁴⁴"China provides 'high-performance tracking system' for Pakistan's missile programme," *Express Tribune*, March 22, 2018, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1666541/9-china-provides-high-performance-tracking-system-pakistans-missile-programme/> (accessed August 16, 2018).

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ali Osman, "What you need to know about Pakistan's Ababeel ballistic missile," *Dawn*, January 25, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1310463> (accessed August 17, 2018).

⁴⁷"India's Quest for MIRV Technology-Analysis," *Indian Defense News*, January 3, 2015, <http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2015/01/indias-quest-for-mirv-technology.html> (accessed August 18, 2018).

not only in its land based ICBM but also at Sea launched Ballistic Missiles depending on the success at miniaturization of warheads.⁴⁸

This particular development has also increased the threat calculus for Pakistan. Pakistan didn't want to become victim of Indian combination of MIRVing and BMD. Any state if it has both BMD and MIRV will turn strategic pendulum in its favor as its ballistic missile defence will guard its strategic assets and MIRVs will have capacity to destroy enemy's strategic assets. In the wake of all these developments induction of MIRV by Pakistan in its strategic forces was to maintain balance.

Pakistan's induction of Ababeel in its strategic forces was necessary considering Indian efforts to shift strategic pendulum in its favor. Moreover, Indian technological developments suggest that India is opting for counter force posture and its "no first use policy" is nothing but a façade. International scholars like Vipin Narang are of view that Indian nuclear force posture is under change; in the retrospect of India National Security Advisor's book, in which, it is claimed that in case of war and crisis India might not let Pakistan to go first. Chances are rather than using conventional strike against Nasr batteries, India might launch "comprehensive counter force strike" against Pakistan.⁴⁹ This observation regarding India's changing force posture has acclaimed huge international audience but for Pakistani policy makers it was not such a surprise because of the skepticism towards Indian "No first use" policy.

⁴⁸ Mansoor Ahmad and Feroz Hassan, "Pakistan, MIRVs, and Counterforce Targeting, *Stimson Center*, 2016, <https://www.stimson.org/content> (February 11, 2019).

⁴⁹ Asma Khalid, "India's Nuclear Strategy: A shift to Counterforce," *South Asia Journal*, December 28, 2017, <http://southasiajournal.net/indias-nuclear-strategy-a-shift-to-counterforce/> (accessed August 18, 2018).

In a scenario where India is gradually but steadily moving towards MIRV technology, ICBMs, ballistic missile defence and secret doctrinal shifts, pragmatic decision to maintain deterrence cannot be categorized as offensive measures. For Pakistan, sole purpose to acquire nuclear weapon was not to be a global power but rather to deter India from waging war.

However, acquisition of MIRVs by Pakistan has amassed greater attention from international scholars. This step by Pakistan is criticized in international community as it will complicate the uncertain strategic environment of South Asia. It is perceived that MIRV technology with its high accuracy and high yield is an ideal choice to use at the start of nuclear war to inflict massive damage and make first strike a decisive blow. So, in the aftermath of attack enemy doesn't have sufficient reserves to launch massive retaliation. Thus, international community is of view that with selection of MIRV Pakistan is opting for counterforce targeting and inviting India to use its weapon first because of "use it or lose it" option.

Nevertheless International community due to its economic interests vested in larger Indian markets is undermining the logic of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence in the region. South Asian strategic stability is a constant see saw where Indian side is heavier and by using its nuclear deterrence Pakistan is merely trying to balance. By developing MIRV, strategic stability in South Asia will strengthen by offense-defense balance. MIRV is an ideal counter force technology but Pakistan developed it to enhance its defensive capacity against India. Pakistan's reliance on war denying deterrence is the reason behind acquisition of MIRV technology, which will ensure the validity of shared risk of destruction between India and Pakistan.

MIRVs enable Pakistan to send its nuclear delivery vehicle without becoming victim to interceptor missiles. As MIRVs carry more than one warhead it is impossible for interceptors to detect all missiles in one independently guided missile. With MIRVs more area can be covered and more destruction could be inflicted to enemy in single attack. As Pakistan face wide array of threats from India, in case of conventional attack from India, Pakistan could use nuclear weapon as a last resort. Before advent of MIRV, Pakistan was relying on its low yield weapon against India to deter its conventional attack. But, now Pakistan has option to go for Indian military installations, cities and command structures in single strike, if Pakistan's physical boundaries, its economic or military interests are compromised by Indian attack.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion reveals that Pakistan has been developing MIRVs capability, which would be added into Pakistan's operational missile inventory to ensure the credibility of its deterrence vis-à-vis India. Indian BMDs, its ghost MIRVing capabilities and its shift to counter force posture were issues of serious concern that Pakistan planned to resolve by developing and deploying Ababeel. No doubt, MIRV is a technology that fits more to the logic of offensive deterrence posture but yet it is intentions of a state that define that whether they want to use it for offensive measures or defensive measures.

So far, Pakistan is relying on defensive measures and will use its MIRV capability, if India tries to wage a war. Moreover, acquisition of MIRV by Pakistan will increase the deterrence stability in the region through offense-defense balance between India and Pakistan. Lastly, development of Ababeel was not to give rise to arms race in the region rather it was reaction of actions taken by India. In a situation where one party is relying on nuclear

deterrence to counter its enemy, technological innovations become necessity to ensure credibility to deterrent.

BOOK REVIEWS

War on Peace: The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence

(Ronan Farrow, New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, 2018, 438)

Reviewed by Amna Ejaz Rafi*

Ronan Farrow is a journalist, lawyer and an activist. He is the winner of the Pulitzer Prize for Public Service. His writings primarily cover issues related to foreign policy and human rights. Ronan has served as a foreign policy advisor under President Barack Obama's government. He has also been a United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF) spokesperson for eight years and contributed to the cause of women and children. Ronan's book titled: *"War on Peace The End of Diplomacy and the Decline of American Influence"* offers an insight into the US role in world politics. The author seems to be convinced that the US foreign policy over the years is more militarily driven and the role of diplomats in policy formulation has been considerably marginalized.

The book begins with highlighting the importance of diplomacy in inter-state relations. It refers to the US diplomatic efforts after the First World War in forging closer ties with the UK. The Washington Naval Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the Pact of Paris were efforts to diplomatically engage the international audience (p. 32). The years, 1940 to 1945 witnessed reform in the US State Department. The Foreign Service was restructured and modernized, new offices were created in other countries. These

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diplomatic endeavors, other than serving the US national interest, also had a profound impact on the international political order. The US-UK alliance, creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (negotiated between the US, Canada, Western Europe, Australia and Japan) were the new global trends. The era also saw the divergence of interest between the US and the former Soviet Union in quest of international supremacy. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the formation of NATO were aimed at countering the Soviet influence. The “architects” behind these political overtures were officials from the Foreign Service, often referred to as “Wise Men” (prominent ones namely George Kennan, Charles Bohlen and Under Secretary Robert Lovett). The author opines that these diplomatic efforts did lead to new alliance structures, however, simultaneously; it also prompted conflict that, in fact, was the beginning of the Cold War politics (pp.33, 34). The Cold War represented an ideological divide between the Capitalist and a Communist bloc, this divide was orchestrated by the two major global players with an aim to downplay each other. The success of America made the country the lone Super Power; it was a win of capitalism. The argument that the diplomats were the force behind the success of the US global win cannot be denied altogether. But the fact of the matter is that diplomacy cannot function without the support of military muscle, thus, there has to be a balance between the two. Diplomacy has to be on the forefront, supported/backed by the military.

Seeing the US recent involvement in military theatres world over, there appears to be a lack of diplomacy, and the policy reflects a military posture. In Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Somalia and Afghanistan, the US has employed coercive approach to deal with extremist/disgruntled elements. The author is of the view that the US troops deployment in these wars are reflective of a military mindset; “in Yemen and Somalia, field commanders were given

authority to launch raids without White House approval. In Afghanistan also, the Secretary of Defence, General James Mattis had the authority to set troop levels” (p. 181). The author also refers to the presence of serving/retired military officials in the National Security Council, and their influence in the foreign policy making. The author has pointed towards the sale of weaponry to other countries, with no or little say of State Department. The author has cited the example of sale of F-15 fighters to Qatar, the deal was signed between the Secretary of Defence General James Mattis and the Qatar Defence Minister. Another example is the US arms deal worth US \$ 100 billion with Saudi Arabia, despite the Arab country’s abysmal human rights record (p. 182). In view of the author, such deals may serve the US in short term, but in the long run they could be detrimental to peace. The author also appears critical of the US Syria policy. As mentioned in the book: “the CIA covertly armed and trained the loose coalition of so called moderate rebels in the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The Pentagon set up and began arming a coalition called the Syrian Democratic Forces, dominated by the Kurdish YPG (Yekineyen Parastina Gel or People’s Protection Units)” – p. 184. Another important aspect highlighted in the book is the US policy of “low footprint intervention”, and employing of foreign militaries to intervene in other countries. The former US President Obama while addressing the cadets at the US Military Academy in New York stated: “Why send American sons and daughters to do work that Yemenis or Pakistanis could be paid to do for us?” The drone attacks were also part of this legacy (p. 187).

The author sees the US diplomacy towards Iran and North Korea yet another failure. The provocative statements to downplay the North Korea has heightened the security threat, “they will be met with fire, fury and frankly power the likes of which this world has never seen before” (p. 304). The author sees the China’s

growing role in global affairs as a diplomatic success. As per the figure, China has committed approximately US \$ 10 billion annually on “external propaganda” programs. In comparison, the US State Department spends US \$ 666 million on public diplomacy (p.312). China’s participation in regional/international organizations as well as interaction with other foreign players is economically driven. China is the second-largest funder of United Nations peacekeeping missions. In Afghanistan, China has not employed a coercive muscle, rather it’s position is to negotiate a settlement politically with all the stakeholders, and economically empower the war-torn country. These diplomatic moves accompanied by soft power approaches have considerably enhanced Beijing’s image among the regional players. In sharp contrast, the US has abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, which has cut the economic arm of the ‘US rebalance strategy’, launched during Obama administration to forge closer ties with regional states. The vacuum left would be filled by the regional power, China. Another move, which could harm the US interests in Afghanistan/Central Asia is the cutting of assistance to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (p.313). This will gradually fade away the US’s influence in adjacent areas to Afghanistan, and Russia. Meanwhile, China’s belt and road initiative passes through the region, and opens up prospects of inter-regional connectivity. This will not only provide Beijing with alternate trade routes but in the long-run will enhance her regional role.

Grave New World: The End of Globalization, the Return of History

Stephen D. King (Yale University Press: 2017, 290)

Reviewed By Khurram Abbas*

Stephan D. King is known for his stimulating writing and long term thinking on global economic outlook. His writings are highly influenced by post-2008 global financial crisis and its repercussions on Europe. Hence, he is highly supportive of the argument that the Western world will likely lose its control on economic and political affairs of the world. Being an economist, he has written three books, *Why the Money Runs Out: The End of Western Affluence* (2010), *Losing Control: The Emerging Threats to Western Prosperity* (2013) and *Grave New World: The End of Globalization, the Return of History* (2017) arguing that a new wave of anti-globalization and end of Western influence has started due to 2008 global financial crisis. His central argument of this book is that Western-led globalization has been facing severe challenges. The collapse of Western-led globalization seems imminent and if so, it would lead to an increasingly chaotic world. To prove his central argument, King has divided his book into four parts.

Part one of the book discusses origins of globalization and history of its thriving, remarkable achievements and downfall. King thoroughly discusses the post-Columbus era of globalization (P. 5) and world's economic and political integration through Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, and massive migration from Europe to America in 17th and 18th Centuries. (P. 7). On the basis of historical evidences writer shares his fears about the current wave of anti-globalization. King narrates

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that global financial crisis often turns the table of global power centers as evident in history. He believes that it had happened in the 19th century, when globalization emerged in 1850 and thrived till 1914 (World War I). The WW-I turned the world upside down. The world had witnessed collapse of Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires. (p. 20) Later, the 1930s great economic depression and its economic shocks in 1940s led to demise of British and French Empires. (P. 34) History is repeating itself in shape of lost momentum of American growth and rise of China in post-2008 financial crisis (p. 25). However, the recent era of globalization is institutionalized and Western-led influence is based on a monetary institution. Although, the world's monetary institution International Monetary Fund (IMF) is trying to avoid this oblivion through various measures such as IMF's development of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), its increasing role as a surveillance body over financial institutions of states, and introduction of floating exchange rates in late 1970s, but it has overstretched itself over the years (p. 53). Member countries are now demanding quotas based on their share in world economy, if accepted, will lead to less monetary share for predominantly Western countries. Therefore, the writer believes that change in global financial system seems inevitable.

Part two of the book generates an academic debate about growing competition between globalization and nation state. The writer has considerably tried to develop his argument about the reason of this growing competition. The global financial crisis has altered inter-state and intra-state relationship. King argues that the global financial crisis of 2008 has given rise to populism and rightist political elite. (P. 104) Resultantly, the current Western world has been divided into isolationists and those who favour globalization. (p. 109) Elite (winners of globalization) and public (losers of globalization) are fighting for their competing interests. (P.116)

Likewise, various countries with distinctive civilizations and histories have also re-emerged such as China, India, Turkey, Brazil, Russia etc. Countries with competing histories and mythologies are not immersed with western values. (p. 131) Most of these countries had been competing political, strategically and economically with the West and their ideologies are also different to Western political and economic ideologies. Resultantly, the world is gradually returning to competing ideologies and unstable alliances as it happened during inter World Wars period and during Cold War, which is detrimental to globalization.

In part three of the book, King further extends the debate on downfall of globalization and argues that basic drivers of globalization – people, technology and monetary policies - that helped in thriving globalization across the world in past 27 years have been threatening its existence. King shares the information about migration from underdeveloped to developed countries during last two centuries. The migration of skilled workers from underdeveloped regions such as Africa and Asia significantly helped developed countries mainly Europe and the US and enhanced their production capacity and technological advancement. (p. 156) However, the second half of the 20th century and first half of the 21st century has witnessed migration of less skilled people from Africa and Asia who eventually proved as burden on Western society and economy including asylum seekers, no/low skilled labour and migrants of natural/human made disasters. Technological advancement further shrunk the prospects for migrants in Western world (p. 175). Resultantly, local public started considering migrants as their competitors. Replacing cheap labour with robots, cybercrimes, and radicalization through social media has shown dark side of technology. (p. 179) This dark side of globalization discouraged and enraged Western society towards globalization. Furthermore, absence of coordination among economic giants such as the US, China, and members of G20, on

monetary policies is another threat to globalization, highlights King. (p. 195) Though, the G20 Summit 2009 had decided for greater coordination to sustain against global financial crisis of 2008. However, they have not returned their economies on pre-2008 growth rate. (p. 197) Resultantly, China's slow growth and concentration on export-led growth has dragged lower commodity prices in the world. (P. 197) American shale energy revolution has contributed decline in oil prices. (P. 198) Hence, the misplaced collective confidence and lack of cooperation among major economies of the world has not only proved to be the major challenge for globalization but also creating uncertainty in global market.

Part four of the book offers bleak predictions and practical but highly ambitious solutions to fears of an anti-globalization wave. King predicts that the end of globalization would be a nightmare for international peace and security. Unstable borders, cross border claims and uncertainty will likely create further international challenges. (p. 224) He suggests that a global organization for financial flows (p. 235) and challenging those countries that are pursuing anti-globalization policies (p. 237) might avert the end of globalization. King suggests that at the time of financial crisis, this global organization would financially support troubled country on better terms than IMF and WB with a dispute resolution mechanism along with financial pockets. (P. 235) He also believes that through political narratives at home and abroad in favour of greater integration, the collapse of Western-led globalization can be stopped. These two solutions seem ambitious in this complex global environment. Rise of China and resurgent Russia have generated a competition between the West and the Rest. New security and economic alliances such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) and establishment of competing monetary institutions such as

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and New Development Bank (NDB) of BRICS against World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) has polarized the world and shrunk Western monetary influence. Resultantly, there are less likely chances of cooperation and establishment of a global organization for financial flows. Secondly, it is hard to challenge the US who is gradually defying globalization and free market for its own economic interests. King is also aware of these developments and he hints at the end of his book that mood of the real world is different to what he has suggested (p. 243). Perhaps by suggesting these two ambitious solutions King has further verified his central argument that collapse of Western-led globalization is imminent.

Though, the debate on globalization and shifting power centers of the world from West to East is not new, yet recent developments in the West, such as Donald Trump's protectionist executive orders – levy on steel and aluminum, pulling out from Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), travel ban – Britain's exit from European Union (EU), rise of advocates of anti-globalization on political arena in Europe mainly in Spain, France, Netherlands and Austria have fueled this debate. In this context, the relevance of the book has further increased for academia as well as policymaking circles.

The book is remarkable combination of political economy and history. The writer has maintained a delicate balance while describing the history and political economy of the world. Resultantly, the book expands its readership – economics, global politics and history - as well as maintains interest of the reader. Unlike many experts of global politics King outshines due to his writing style and compelling argument based on his professional experience as economist. Though, mostly books related to anti-globalization and global politics have been predicting a new world order based on less Western influence such as Oliver Stuenkel's

“Post-Western World: Emerging Powers Remaking Global Order”, Tom Miller’s “China’s Asian Dream: Empire Building along the New Silk Road”, etc. However, their arguments were based heavily on politics and geo-economics. Therefore, a general gap used to be felt in academia about the economic reasons of these global and economic shifts. This book primarily fills this gap and provides argument that is too worthy to ignore.

Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses



Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is pleased to announce the publication of its next Volume of its Biannual Journal: *Security and Strategic Analyses* (JSSA), January-June 2019. *Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses* is a peer-reviewed journal focusing on contemporary issues of peace, security and strategic studies.

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STRATEGIC VISION
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