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Abbreviations

AQI	Al Qaeda in Iraq
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BJP	Bharitya Janata Party
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India and China
CARs	Central Asian Republics
CBD	Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue
CBMs	Confidence-Building Measures
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICA	Confidence Building Measures in Asia
CPEC	China Pakistan Economic Corridor
DAA	Disturbed Areas Act
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GICNT	Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
IOK	Indian Occupied Kashmir
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
ISI	Islamic State of Iraq
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LeT	Lashker-i-Taiba
LDCs	Less Developed Countries
LoC	Line of Control
MFN	Most Favored Nation
NSAs	National Security Advisers
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
NSS	Nuclear Security Summit
OBOR	One Belt-One Road
OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development

PLA	People's Liberation Army
POTA	Prevention of Terrorist Act
PSA	Public Safety Act
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
RIC	Russia, India and China
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SEATO	South Asian Treaty Organization
TAPI	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WoT	War on Terror
WSAP	Western Structural Adjustment Program
WB	Working Boundary

Contents

Preface	01
 Research Papers:	
Geo-Economics or Geo-Politics? China's Rise in Asia and the US	
Zahid Shahab Ahmed	09
 Prospects of Indo-Pak Relations: Transcending Parochial Politics	
Shamsa Nawaz	21
 Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus	
Shams uz Zaman.....	40
 Sino-African Strategic Partnership and Stratagem of Foreign Aid: Implications for the West	
Dure Shahwar Bano & Sadia Mehmood Falki	65
 Balance of Power in South Asia: The Politics of Nuclear Deterrence between Pakistan and India	
Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi & Fazal Wahid	96
 Prospects of India's Inclusion in the NSG and Options for Pakistan	
Beenish Altaf	114
 Nuclear Terrorism: A Potential Threat to World's Peace and Security	
Muhammad Wajeesh	135
 Book Reviews:	
The Geopolitics of Red Oil: Constructing the China Threat Through Energy Security	
Reviewed by Dmitry Shlapentokh.....	156
 Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism	
Shahzadi Tooba Hussain Syed	163
 Nuclear Weapons and International Security	
Reviewed by Saima Ali	166

PREFACE

Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses (JSSA) is a bi-annual, blind peer-reviewed, academic journal. It deals with the contemporary trends and themes in the fields of security and strategic studies. *JSSA* with its lucid and coherent orientation provides an in-depth understanding of political, security and strategic processes. It also promotes wide-ranging comprehension of key issues and offers an unbiased, extensive and balanced perspective to the readers. The main purpose of the *JSSA* is to help build an insight about the current security and strategic challenges and explore various dimensions of national and international security environment. The journal offers a rich debate on numerous security notions with profound assessments and critique, simultaneously providing policy oriented recommendations that will contribute in creating an alternative academic narrative on significant contemporary issues.

This issue of *JSSA* covers crucial subject matters such as changing dynamics of international security, Pakistan-US strategic calculus, and examines the prospects of Indo-Pak Relations. It also carries extensive debate on the threat of nuclear terrorism, Sino-African strategic partnership and implications for the West, and other issues like Balance of Power in South Asia. These research papers will provide much required critical understanding of global policing and the emerging spectrum of new and complex security and strategic threats. Focus of the *JSSA* is to establish academic and original empirical research to present a unique account of the critical security and strategic matters. Most of the research articles in this issue employ a qualitative research technique and base their data findings on verifiable evidence. Unstructured data is also analyzed through interpretative approach. Simultaneously various indexes and accurate facts have been used in order to achieve more accurate and generalized findings.

One of the research papers in this volume assesses the politics and significance of the South China Sea. The article gives a detailed account of the origin of geo-economics, China's foreign policy towards developing states, South China Sea dispute and involvement of extra-regional countries especially the US in the dispute. The dispute of

South China Sea is viewed as one of the most complex and challenging ocean-related conflict in the East Asian region. Actual concerns of regional countries (e.g. China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Taiwan) and extra-regional countries (US, India, Japan) is a constant threat to their security due to their contending strategic and economic interests. The trade and economic factor adds more than just a territorial dimension to the dispute. Owing to the strong geo-strategic and geo-economic interests, the US rivalry with China and relations with other parties in the dispute, the US has become a major player in this complex regional maritime conflict. Resultantly the US is not only engaged in the direct confrontation but pursues the policies to counter China's rise in the Asia-Pacific. This research article will surely help broaden the understanding about regional maritime disputes in East Asia and high stakes of rival nations as well as challenges to the US-led regional order.

The next paper analyzes Pakistan-US relations within the strategic context. The bilateral relations have seen many ups and downs. Pakistan has mostly viewed its relationship with the US through an idealistic prism, whereas the US mostly followed the realistic approach to achieve its national interests. Presently Pakistan's relevance for the US has undergone a decline primarily due to an alternative stabilizing ally India. On the other hand, Pakistan's role is perceived less significant for the US policy to contain China, owing to the strong Sino-Pak ties. This redefining and reshuffling of alliances make Pakistan less significant in the new US policy for the region as compared to India which gets to acquire a more defining role in the regional politics. For both Pakistan and the US, it is imperative to address the prevalent mistrust and suspicions regarding each other's motives in order to improve bilateral relations to achieve mutual benefits. In this research article, the author analyzes Pakistan-US relationship in historical and strategic perspective, highlights various lessons that Pakistan should learn from its past experiences with the US and recommends viable policy options and strategy for the future.

Another paper included in this volume highlights the significance of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in conflict prevention and resolution between India and Pakistan. Indo-Pak relations have remained astringent since partition in 1947. In this regard a regional organization could have been an ideal instrument to help evade the

bitter feelings and contribute to conflict management in South Asia ultimately achieving regional connectivity and cooperative prosperity. This paper also identifies numerous factors that have collectively contributed in the deterioration of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan primarily the territorial disputes, whereas terrorism and information sharing has added more rancor in the bilateral equation. Being the nuclear weapon states, the only option available to them is exploring common ground to ensure political resolution of conflicts. In this regard it is imperative to formulate economic regionalism and sustainable counter terrorism strategy to ensure security and stability in the region. The author in this article suggests that the SCO can play an effective and much needed role by providing assistance to both the states to transcend from their parochial politics. This article will surely help in building a more clear understanding about the significance of collective hard work to ensure peace and prosperity of the region through Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and the management of biased perceptions under the umbrella of regional organization.

This issue of *JSSA* also covers an important topic where the aspect of nuclear terrorism has been explored in great details. The article has successfully been able to unveil the myths surrounding this subject and has established concrete arguments based on factual realities. While on one hand the terrorists groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS seem to have enhanced the risk of nuclear attack, the acquisition of nuclear weapons still remains a cumbersome task. The possibility of ISIS attempting to acquire the nuclear material makes the world to believe that nuclear terrorism is a viable threat. One feels convinced that the possibility of nuclear attack on Europe by ISIS is real and can disturb the peace and security of the world. This factor has made it imperative to formulate a nuclear terrorism combat strategy. However it is not as simple as it seems and the weapons have till date remained out of the reach of terrorist organizations. Many factors such as security structure of nuclear weapons' storage facilities and the inbuilt device code systems of nuclear weapons have considerably lowered the probability of attack by terrorists. Yet the use of nuclear material in the radioactive dispersal devices has the ability to create panic and fear among the masses. In this regard, the global strategy and practical measures can minimize the risks

of nuclear terrorism. This research article is helpful in understanding the potential threat of nuclear terrorism and whether the concerns associated with it are based on a myth or a reality.

Another research article examines the prospects of Sino-African strategic partnership and how it could possibly impact the West. China's strength lies in the fact that its policy of foreign aid is associated with the developmental efforts on both sides rather than maintaining merely a donor-recipient relation as is the case with the Western policy. The research article establishes that China is employing foreign aid in the African the region as a substantial policy tool to enhance economic ties and interdependence. It is suggested that the West should also revisit and reform its assistance policy in order to ensure sustainable economic development. The article contains tables and figures for better understanding of the debate. This research article not only makes for an excellent read but can also serve as a good resource material for further study on this subject.

Nuclear Deterrence and Balance of Power between India and Pakistan also make part of this issue. It is believed that the introduction of nuclear weapons has changed the dynamics of the Balance of Power system. This particular research article analyzes the impact of conventional power gaps between India and Pakistan and the role of super powers in disturbing the regional equilibrium. The central focus of the paper is to explore how the conventional and nuclear forces have been used by both nuclear rivals to counterbalance each other. The author maintains that while both the states aim to increase arms stockpiles, in present regional politics, China is viewed as the real balancing power in the South Asian region. The author elaborates in detail on the dynamics of deterrence and strategic equilibrium between India and Pakistan. The study will help readers in developing a sound comprehension of the subject.

All the articles included in this volume are reflective of the SVI's endeavor to broaden the academic and policy understanding in strategic and security spheres. The articles present authentic and veritable ideas and concepts underlying the security concerns.

JSSA strives to maintain the quality of research according to the standard guidelines and rules of HEC, and devotes significant attention to research, analyses and policy narratives. Hence it is hoped that the comprehensive research work with a focus on Regional Peace, Security and International Stability, found in the second issue of Volume II of *JSSA* will enable the readers to remain updated with these contemporary issues and enhance the knowledge to build linkages with the academia.

RESEARCH PAPERS

Geo-Economics or Geo-Politics? China's rise in Asia and the US

Zahid Shahab Ahmed*

Abstract

The geostrategic environment of Asia-Pacific region has changed from the US' dominance to now also China's increasing existence. The US strategists think that their country must have a military capability of countering and defeating an emerging competitor, which in this case is China. The US' response to China's emergence in the Pacific region has also been full of confusion. For example, in 2012, Hillary Clinton (the then Secretary of State) said, "Pacific is big enough for all of us". However, on the other hand, the US has been taking steps, militarily and otherwise, to counter China. The US has already established a military base in Darwin, Australia. Recently, the biggest trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), was reached between 12 Pacific Rim countries, including the US and Japan as the key players. China was intentionally left out of the TPP agreement. This paper focuses on the constantly changing nature of competition between the US and China in the Asia-Pacific and its impact on the overall geostrategic environment in the region.

Key Words: Trans-Pacific Partnership, Gwadar Port, Southeast Asian Nations, Asia-Pacific East Asia Summit, One Belt-One Road.

Introduction

In order to better understand the origins of geo-economics one has to look at the colonial history from 17th century onwards. Since then, it has evolved but had mainly started off with European colonial powers using military strengths in quest of resources and markets for their goods around the world.

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There are many countries that have been following or had followed “mercantilist” policies and a prominent example is that of China. The understanding of geo-economics and its application has evolved over time. In the post-Cold War era, “geopolitics was driven by ideological rather than purely economic factors”.¹ According to Leonard, due to globalization and increasing competition among economies, “the pursuit of power is as important as the pursuit of profit, with increasing state presence in economies”.² The emerging economies like India and China are actively seeking new networks for trade – both for security energy, and selling their goods – at regional levels. As it looks, it is not purely geo-economics but also involves geopolitics, as both countries use trade connectivity as tools to strengthen influence in their neighborhoods that overlap too.³

There is a predominant point of view in Pakistan that China's investment for trade corridor from the Gwadar Port is going to upscale geostrategic relations through geo-economic cooperation.⁴ Similarly, according to Kalim, the construction of Gwadar Port is crucial for Pakistan's maritime security in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.⁵ Although the idea of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was the brainchild of Beijing, Pakistan had to make that happen, especially after 2001.⁶ For Islamabad, China's investment in Gwadar is more than geo-economics – more about gaining economic and political fortunes of partnership with China for counterbalancing India's rising influence.

¹Baru, Sanjay. 2012. "Geo-economics and strategy." *Survival* 54 (3):47-58

²Leonard, Mark. 2015. *Geo-economics: seven challenges to globalization*. Geneva: *World Economic Forum*, p.4.

³Ibid.

⁴Javaid, Umbreen, and Rameesha Javaid. 2016. "Strengthening geo-strategic bond of Pakistan and China through geo-economic configuration." *Pakistan Economic and Social Review* 54 (1):123-142.

⁵Kalim, Inayat. 2016. "Gwadar Port: serving strategic interests of Pakistan." *South Asian Studies: A Research Journal of South Asian Studies* 31 (1):207-221.

⁶Cordesman, Anthony H, and Abdullah Toukan. 2014. *The Indian Ocean region: a strategic net assessment*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Thus, Chaziza talked about the possibility of geo-economic and geo-strategic implications of China's economic investment following operationalization of the Gwadar Port.⁷

Often scholars claim that China's foreign policy, especially with reference to relations with developing countries, is entirely different from that of the West because of being non-manipulative. For instance, China has opted for an approach that emphasizes on creating a different kind of empire – different from that of the colonial powers of the past by focusing on development in least developed and developing countries. According to Lee, China has invested billions of dollars towards infrastructural development in countries around the world, such as Pakistan. Beijing's aid policy is also the opposite of Western countries, but has been effective in promoting China's economic and political ambitions.⁸ It is mainly through aid to countries in Asia, Africa and South America that China has been able to achieve diplomatic successes vis-à-vis global politics. For example, Beijing asked its allies to refrain from attending the Nobel Peace Prize awards ceremony for dissident Liu Xiaobo. The response was very positive for China because over 19 countries, including US allies Colombia and Egypt, joined the protest.⁹ This is troublesome for the US and its allies who still are dominating the development or donors' world.

South China Sea Dispute

There are divergent claims, some active and some passive, over five countries' jurisdiction of South China Sea. Five Southeast Asian countries, namely the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia and Taiwan, are in dispute with China over the South China Sea. Five out of six, excluding Taiwan, are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and have maritime claims that overlap with each other over the issue of South China Sea.

⁷Chaziza, Mordechai. 2016. "China–Pakistan Relationship: A Game-changer for the Middle East?" *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 3 (2):1-15.

⁸Lee, Ann. *What the US Can Learn from China: An Open-Minded Guide to Treating Our Greatest Competitor as Our Greatest Teacher*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2012, p.174.

⁹Ibid, p.175.

There are contentious claims over the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal. China claims almost all of the area extending closer to Indonesia. Beijing's claim is based on historical records of the Han (110AD) and Ming (1403-1433AD) Dynasties. During the Ming Dynasty in the 15th century, Chinese Navy dominated South China Sea all the way through the Indian Ocean to East Africa. Taiwan contests these claims but passively. Vietnam claims the islands of Paracel (seized by China from Vietnam in 1974) and Spratly. The Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei partially claim jurisdiction of other islands. Out of all the stakeholders, only Vietnam and the Philippines have openly been challenging China's stance on South China Sea.¹⁰

South China Sea is crucial due to its significance in sea trade. It roughly covers an area of 1.4 million square miles in the Pacific Ocean from Singapore to Malacca Straits to the Straits of Taiwan, west of the Philippines, north of Indonesia and east of Vietnam. The Straits of Malacca link the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. According to an estimate, \$5.3 trillion worth of trade, including \$1.2 trillion of the US, passes through the South China Sea on annual basis.¹¹ This includes roughly half of the world's merchant fleet through the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits with the majority via the South China Sea.¹² In addition, Japan and South Korea are heavily reliant on energy imports through this trade corridor. Roughly 15 million barrels of oil are transported daily through the Malacca Straits and South China Sea to East Asia and this volume is more than three times that of Suez Canal.¹³ Any disruption in trade via the South China Sea is going to have economic and political implications for the US and its key partners in the region, mainly Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

¹⁰Tariq, Sidra. "South China Sea: A New International Hotspot." Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 2014.

¹¹Glaser, Bonnie S. "Armed Clash in the South China Sea." Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>.

¹²Tariq, Sidra. "South China Sea: A New International Hotspot." Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 2014, p.4.

¹³Snowiss, Mark. "Oil Shipments Steady as South China Sea Dispute Heats Up." Voice of America, <http://www.voanews.com/content/oil-shipments-steady-as-south-china-sea-tensions-flare/3009261.html>.

On the issue of disputes between China and several countries claiming rights over South China Sea, there are countries which are interested in India's involvement. As far as diplomatic relations with the Philippines are concerned, New Delhi has been backing Manila's position over its dispute with China on the South China Sea. Therefore, New Delhi had supported Manila's decision for approaching Permanent Court of Arbitration against Beijing in 2013.¹⁴ China had boycotted the proceedings in The Hague and rejected the decision. So far, New Delhi's approach has been cautious. Although India seems interested in exporting weapons, such as Brahmos (cruise missile), to the Philippines, it has not threatened China's interests in South China Sea by sending any ship.¹⁵ Nonetheless, India is the only other Asian country that is anywhere closer to China in terms of parity and also the country that has its own territorial dispute with China and serious concerns of Beijing's increasing support for Pakistan – India's traditional rival. Other than the Philippines, India has closer ties with Vietnam that began in Indira Gandhi's time. "Many in India regard Vietnam as an ally against China", and it shows that weaker claimants of the South China Sea are exploited by strong players, such as the US and India, for their own competition with China.¹⁶ While President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, has already given clear signals of how he wants to handle his country's internal challenges, such as war against drugs, it is important to notice a shift in policy in South China Sea.¹⁷ Duterte has agreed with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping to open talks on South China Sea. This of course signals a shift from the Philippines' previous policy of seeking support from external actors like the US and India on the issue.

¹⁴Parashar, Sachin. "India Backs Philippines on South China Sea Row." *The Times of India*, 15 October 2015.

¹⁵Mohan, C Raja. "Why Delhi Must Not Be at Sea." Observer Research Foundation, <http://orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=90323&mmacmaid=90324>.

¹⁶Buszynski, Leszek. "The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US - China Strategic Rivalry." *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2012), p.142.

¹⁷Perlez, Jane. "Rodrigo Duterte and Xi Jinping Agree to Reopen South China Sea Talks." *The New York Times*, 20 October 2016.

It is also important to notice that indirect stakeholders in the conflicts, like the US and Japan, want India's participation in Asia-Pacific rebalancing. There is a realization in Washington and Tokyo that without India the new maritime alliance will remain incomplete. Therefore, there has been joint naval exercise among India, Japan, and the US. Australia, another key player in the Asia-Pacific security and a US ally, has shown interest in participating in the joint naval exercises. Currently, India is involved in trilateral frameworks as the US-India-Japan Ministerial Trilateral and India-Japan-Australia Trilateral at the official levels.¹⁸

The intensity of the dispute continues to grow, not merely because it is at the heart of the Asia-Pacific region, but also because it has significance beyond maritime security due to being a prominent trade corridor and energy rich. It is estimated that the South China Sea has proven oil reserves of seven billion barrels and estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.¹⁹ Therefore, for an energy deficient region, its significance has grown considerably with time. Fish is a major source of protein for countries in conflict over the South China Sea. As of 2013, one-tenth of the world's global fisheries catch was in this region and fish protein accounts for 22 percent of Asian diet. In the view of Buszynski, "had the issue remained strictly a territorial one, it could have been resolved through Chinese efforts to reach out to ASEAN and forge stronger ties with the region."²⁰ In addition, US-China rivalry has intensified tensions at regional and international levels between China and other stakeholders of the South China Sea dispute.

The US Factor

Beyond the often-publicized version of the US foreign policy that they are interested in South China Sea out of their concern for freedom of navigation, international norms and law, there are also geostrategic reasons due to which the US is engaged in direct confrontation with China.

¹⁸Pulipaka, Sanjay. "India and Vietnam: Time for Trilaterals with the Us and Japan." *The Diplomat*, 1 September 2016.

¹⁹Tariq, Sidra. "South China Sea: A New International Hotspot." Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 2014, p.20.

²⁰Buszynski, Leszek. "The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US - China Strategic Rivalry." *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2012), p.139.

For understanding the US' interest in South China Sea, we need to look into the US-China rivalry in the contemporary context of Asia-Pacific. As it appears from recent moves made by both Washington and Beijing, this part of the world will continue to give boost to the competition between the US and China. The US along with its partners in the Asia-Pacific and elsewhere, mainly through cooperation in security and trade, has been trying to decrease China's influence in the Asia-Pacific.

Much to Beijing's displeasure, the Obama Administration has intensified its role in the Asia-Pacific. This can also be a response to withdrawal of troops from Iraq and drawdown in Afghanistan. This new strategy is called Obama Administration's "rebalance" towards Asia for protecting its strategic interests. While addressing the Australian Parliament in 2011, Barack Obama said that, "the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region [Asia-Pacific] and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends".²¹ The following are the key features of the Obama Administration's "rebalance" policy towards Asia:²²

1. Troop deployment to Australia and naval deployments to Singapore, and military cooperation with the Philippines
2. Strengthening of US' military presence in East Asia
3. Membership of the East Asia Summit
4. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)

The above-mentioned facets of the US' policy are assurances that were much needed and timely for the US' key allies in the region who, during the previous Bush's Administration, had felt being ignored by Washington. Other than establishing a naval base in Darwin (Australia), the US has strengthened its military ties with the Philippines and Singapore. Membership of the East Asia Summit will offer just another forum for the US to gang up with local players against the rise of China.

²¹Obama, Barack. "Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament." White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament>.

²²Campbell, Kurt, and Brian Andrews. "Explaining the Us 'Pivot' to Asia." London: Chatham House, 2013.

It is important to mention that the Bush administration had a completely different point of multilateral initiatives in the Asia-Pacific; therefore, participation on such forums was ignored. For example, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had missed two of the annual meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which is central to the work of ASEAN on regional security.²³ In contrast, the Obama administration decided on greater engagement and meaningful cooperation with organizations like ASEAN and APEC.

Although the Obama Administration claims this “rebalance” or “Pacific Pivot” to be a new angle in the US’ policy towards the Asia-Pacific, this is just an extension or transformation of the United States’ long-term policy. For example, a couple of other dimensions, like partnerships with India and TPP, are products of initiatives taken by the previous government of President George W. Bush.²⁴ The term “pivot” was changed by “rebalance” but that seems to have not changed the direction of the approach in Washington. Bader labels the Bush administration’s policies towards most of the Asian countries as “generally sound”, for instance relations with India moved ahead through a civil nuclear energy deal.²⁵

The Obama Administration’s “rebalance” policy is not merely a policy because many concrete steps have been taken and achievements have been made by the US since its implementation. During her first three years in office as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton made 36 official visits to East Asia and Pacific—double than her predecessor.²⁶

²³Bader, Jeffrey A. *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2012, p.2.

²⁴Manyin, Mark E, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V Lawrence, Michael F Martin, Ronald O'Rourke, and Bruce Vaughn. "Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" toward Asia." Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2012.

²⁵Bader, Jeffrey A. *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2012, p.1.

²⁶Manyin, Mark E, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V Lawrence, Michael F Martin, Ronald O'Rourke, and Bruce Vaughn. "Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" toward Asia." Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2012, p.17.

This perhaps shows new vigor rather than a mere change of direction in any policy. During one of her visits to the Asia-Pacific, Clinton said that, "Pacific is big enough for all of us" (*The Telegraph*, 15 November 2012) – perhaps a direct message to Beijing for avoiding any direct confrontations.

There is no doubt that several US allies who have claims over the South China Sea surround China. Simultaneously, China is facing an increasing US military presence in the region. There have been several occasions of diplomatic hiccups between China and the US over the issue of what Beijing views as violation of its sovereignty by the US through its ships in the South China Sea. A recent example is that of when China declared illegal the movement of USS Lassen near disputed Spratly archipelago in October 2015.²⁷ In the present scenario, China aims for increasing economic dependence of claimant countries on China, keeping them out of any development in the disputed region, and avoiding open confrontation with the US.²⁸

In the Asia-Pacific region, there are countries that are seen as blind followers of the US, for example Japan and Australia. These two countries are labeled as not having independent foreign policies. Many others, especially the ones having grievances against China, can be put in the same category. There is a strong defense cooperation among Japan, the US and Australia, and the issue of dispute over South China Sea is often under discussion (for example, it was discussed during Japan-US-Australia Defense Ministers Meeting in May 2015). At the meeting, the representatives of the three countries expressed serious concerns vis-à-vis China's dominance of the South China Sea, as reflected in the following statement:

They also expressed their strong opposition against coercive action to unilaterally alter the status quo in the East China and South China Seas as well as their serious concern over Chinese land reclamation activities in the South China Sea.²⁹

²⁷Phillips, Tom. "Beijing Summons Us Ambassador over Warship in South China Sea." *The Guardian*, 27 October 2015.

²⁸"Stirring up the South China Sea (Ii): Regional Responses." Beijing: Crisis Group (CG), 2012.

"Japan Defence Focus." Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, Government of Japan (GoP), 2015, p.2.

The South China Sea is a major reason behind the military buildup in Asia. All claimants, including China, are constantly increasing their military strengths. In this arms race, the weaker parties are buying weapons from the US and other countries. For example, Indonesia is buying 20 frigates from the Netherlands.³⁰ Beijing has several facets of its maritime defence system for protecting its maritime security and economic development, and South China Sea holds a central place in that defense system. Major goals are to deter the US' naval deployment in the area and to protect crucial maritime trade routes for China. It is important to mention that an estimated 80 percent of China's oil imports pass through the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca.³¹ At the same time, China is building its naval capabilities to match that of the US. It has a naval aircraft carrier, the Shi Lang, and it is constructing a 50,000-60,000 ton carrier and working on a nuclear powered carrier.³²

With increasing military capabilities in relevant countries, the growing nationalism in some countries is increasing support for tougher solutions to the dispute. This would only make agreement on solutions difficult for all stakeholders. As far as solutions are concerned, Beijing has no interest whatsoever in going for any other option than bilateral talks. On the other hand, often Vietnam and the Philippines have approached the US and ASEAN for interventions. Indonesia, a leading player in ASEAN, has also rejected China's stance that the US should not become part of this dispute.³³ However, as far as bilateral talks are concerned, no progress has been made on the issue. There seems to be some hope regarding China-Taiwan relations with talks between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou in Singapore in November 2015 (News Week, 3 November 2015). In 1993, Singapore had hosted first direct talks between China and Taiwan.

³⁰Gauba, Vaishali. "Asia Defense Spending: New Arms Race in South China Sea." CNBC, <http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/21/asia-defense-spending-new-arms-race-in-south-china-sea.html>.

³¹Buszynski, Leszek. "The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US - China Strategic Rivalry." *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (2012), p.145.

³²Ibid, p.145.

³³Ibid, p.148.

The US has strong geo-strategic interests in Asia and therefore continues to push for the solution of the dispute over South China Sea. With reference to the Philippines case at an International Tribunal in The Hague, the Chinese government for the first time appeared before the international justice system. The Tribunal overruled China's claim over most of the South China Sea. It is said that this ruling may ignite the US-China rivalry while also influencing other countries, such as Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam, having maritime disputes with China. Beijing's response was an expected and read: "China does not accept or recognize it (judgment)".³⁴ As far as the judgment of the Tribunal is concerned, China was not the only one on the losing side, as Taiwan's claim over the Spratly Islands was also rejected.³⁵ Beijing claims that the Tribunal judgment is because of the US pressure, the country that has not signed the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.³⁶ However, there is no doubt that the US has geo-economic and geo-political interests in Asia due to which it is going to keep supporting its key allies having claims over the South China Sea.

It seems that the US' so-called transformed approach towards Asia-Pacific is full of contradictions because whatever it has been doing is with the purpose of countering China. TPP is just another example, from which China has been intentionally left out. TPP is supposedly the biggest trade deal that has been reached after a decade of intensive negotiations among the US, Canada, and ten countries of the Asia-Pacific region.³⁷ This is considered a "giant" agreement because TPP countries are responsible for 40 percent of the world's GDP and 26 percent of the world's trade. In addition, 40 percent of US' imports and

³⁴Perlez, Jane. "Tribunal Rejects Beijing's Claims in South China Sea." *The New York Times*, 12 July 2016.

³⁵Brosnan, Erica. "Taiwan Resists Hague-Based Tribunal's South China Sea Ruling." *The Washington Times*, 14 July 2016.

³⁶Blumenthal, Daniel. "Thoughts on the Hague Tribunal's South China Sea Ruling." *Foreign Policy*, 12 July 2016.

³⁷Following countries are party to TPP: Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam, Japan and South Korea, Chile, Mexico, Canada, the US and Peru.

exports will be governed under TPP.³⁸ Nonetheless, there is a view that Australia should try to bring Indonesia and China into TPP. So far, it seems that Beijing is not disturbed by TPP because China already has bilateral trade agreements with almost all of the TPP countries; therefore, it is likely that TPP would not harm China's economic growth. While, the US is pushing for its geo-economic and geo-political objectives through TPP in the Asia Pacific, China continues to give reality to its "One Belt-One Road (OBOR)" project in Asia. According to Mendis, "since China is excluded from the TPP, one would expect antagonism rather than symbiosis between the Washington-advocated trade package and Beijing's [OBOR] strategy".³⁹ Due to China's ongoing South China Sea dispute, OBOR may lead to suspicions that Beijing is using its geopolitical influence.⁴⁰ This is not different from the US geopolitical influence in China's neighborhood.

Conclusion

In the Asia-Pacific, South China Sea has become a conflict hotspot due to overlapping claims among China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and Taiwan. Due to energy reserves and fisheries, the conflict is more than a territorial dispute and, thus, claims of all stakeholders have been intensified over the years. Due to its rivalry with China and relations with other parties in the dispute, the US has become a party to the complex South China Sea dispute. Washington's role has further increased following the Obama Administration's "rebalance" towards the Asia-Pacific policy because some stakeholders wanted to seek the US' support for countering China's influence. In the rebalancing act, there is a desire in Washington and Tokyo to involve India in the Asia-Pacific. Thus, India is part of trilateral US-Japan-India naval exercises. As of now, it appears that Washington's policy is that of countering China's rise in the Asia-Pacific and beyond, and not that of co-existence. This is clear from geo-economic and geo-political policies and projects, such as TPP, promoted by the US and its allies in Asia.

³⁸DePillis, Lydia. "Everything You Need to Know About the Trans Pacific Partnership." *The Washington Post*, 11 December 2015.

³⁹Mendis, Patrick. "When the TPP and One Belt, One Road Meet." East Asia Forum, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/04/26/when-the-tpp-and-one-belt-one-road-meet/>.

⁴⁰Campbell, Charlie. "China's Xi Jinping Talks up 'One Belt, One Road' as Keynote Project Fizzles." *Time*, 18 August 2016.

Prospects of Indo-Pak Relations: Transcending Parochial Politics

Shamsa Nawaz*

Abstract

The world is moving towards a complex phenomenon of regional connectivity with a revolutionary content in it. The security challenges, collective economic prosperity and stability are all contaminated by the vague strategic calculations with 'equi-probables'. The phenomenon anchors on regional peace, political will mutual trust and economic stability. The assent of India and Pakistan together for the first time, in a China and Russia backed security and economic organization of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as co-members, may help to evade the hard feelings. The incompatibility is nevertheless detrimental to their threat perceptions and objectives. Both India and Pakistan have nursed serious reservations about each other since partition in 1947. How would they overcome their age old acrimony? Their contribution to the pro-peace and pro-normalization process desired for South Asia by the US to Russia and China for a dispute-free, free-trade corridor is vital in regional connectivity and cooperative prosperity. This could help in harmonizing the age old quagmire and bilateral relations on way to regional patriotism and identity.

Key Words: India, Pakistan, parochial politics, SCO, collective identity, regional forum, Kashmir, Ufa summit, counterterrorism, intermediary.

Introduction

As a recent development, there has been heightened concern shown by both the US and the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon about the continuing sullenness in the relationship of the two nuclear power

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adversaries, India and Pakistan. "I can't speak for how leaders in either country are going to make announcements on their bilateral relationship – or, frankly, their bilateral tensions," said spokesman of the State Department, Kirby, at a briefing in Washington.¹ India-Pakistan relations have been punctuated by the deeply bruised polarizing controversies since the partition of the Sub-continent in 1947. The flashpoint remains the disputed region of Kashmir, the cross border violent exchanges and the legacy of mistrust ever since. Heavy gun fire is traded almost daily at the Line of Control (LoC) even after sixty eight years of partition.

Could these provocative attacks spiral out of control is a question threatening the politics of economic regionalism and counter terrorism, to which Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, willfully agreed upon, in the sideline meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the Russian city of Ufa on July 10, 2015. The two had met even in Kathmandu in November 2014 and bilateral talks were held. Earlier, in May 2014, Nawaz Sharif had attended the swearing-in ceremony of Modi on his invitation to all the states of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The bilateral meeting was followed by the exchange of gifts, the sari-shawl diplomacy and the tweets. This had given rise to the hope of improvement in ties. Nonetheless, soon the ties saw a downward swing in the relations with the continuing firing on the border, claiming more than two hundred and sixty lives in 2014-15 including that of the security personnel. In August 2014, foreign-secretary level talks were also called off by India at the last moment on the pretext of Pakistani envoy's meeting with the Kashmiri leaders. During his visit in May 2015, Modi told China to wisp the trade corridor through Pakistan. Similarly, Abu Dhabi is advised by him to come down hard on Pakistan. In his intimate swipe with Bangladesh Prime Minister Hasina Wajid during his visit to Bangladesh, Modi had admitted the covert orchestration of Mukti Bahini's rebellion in 1971, which led to the dismemberment of Pakistan. Efforts are being made to declare Pakistan a terrorist state since 2008. India even tried to isolate Pakistan at the 8th BRICS summit held at Goa on October 16-17 by using the term "mother-ship of terrorism", without naming Pakistan. Threats, rather actual implementation of fantasized

¹*Dawn* (Islamabad), August 11, 2015.

"surgical strikes" in September, 2016, at LoC and furious statements of the Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar of "neutralizing" terrorists with terror, are all a sequel of conflict investment in the pursuit of 'enlightened self-interest' of India.

Locked in an unrelenting hostility, to establish a non-securitized culture and bring a strategic equilibrium between the two nations under the circumstances, even left the engagement between Modi and Nawaz in Ufa, fragile. A futuristic vision of collective security through conflict resolution is blocked by their parochial politics. How would they team up against the transnational threats and the transnational responses as members of the SCO? On the other hand, it also raises questions on their cooperation and the subsequent role in an international forum such as the SCO. History suggests that the bellicose lessons of political forces, especially nationalism, have largely kept the basic conflict dynamics unchanged between India and Pakistan so far.

Based on the literature review, the paper investigates the possibility of using the SCO forum to focus on the identity of perceptions for the management of conflicts in their bilateral relations. Both India and Pakistan are economically central, politically vital, geographically contiguous and diplomatically cordial to almost all the member states of the forum.

India and Pakistan: Litany of Grievances

One of the characteristics of regional cooperation is strengthening of the moves to seek conflict management. The geo-economic collaboration of the region, with autonomy for individual countries is dependent upon the political and security conditions. Security, for example, conceptualized as comprehensive, has the core objective of achieving the well-being of the region, the nation, the state, the society, the community and the individual. Its dimensions could be military, political, economic, socio-psychological, cultural and ecological.²

²Carolina G. Hernandez, *PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ASIA PACIFIC REGION* Professor of Political Science, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. Selected Papers Delivered at the United Nations University Global Seminar '96 Shonan Session, 2-6 September 1996, Hayama, Japan.
www.angelo.edu

Conflicts arise when "one or more actors are pursuing incompatible goals".³ Hence, comprehensive and collective security between and amongst the states would ensure utterly predictable peace and development.

Affected by the narrator's partisanship, the 'vivisection'⁴ of the sub-continent or the making of Pakistan as a result of communal discrimination in 1947, has kept South Asia's collective security an 'incandescent of panoply'. It carries several agonizing controversies for the people of both India and Pakistan. Despite sharing a long struggle against British imperialistic oppression, prejudice and insular nationalism apart from territorial disputes have stampeded the prosperity in the bilateral relations of both the neighbors. It has contrarily become an impetus to security policy in the succeeding decades of the partition for both.

Since the recent past, the relations between Pakistan and India have retrograded. Aggravating impasse in the Indo-Pak relations, accompanied with the situation at the Line of Control (LoC) and the Working Boundary (WB) is worrisome. During the months of July-August, 2015, Pakistan accused India of 70 violations of the LoC and India accused Pakistan of 91 cross border violations. Each summoned each other's diplomats for protest, leading to further deterioration of the relationship.

Taking examples from human history, many bigger states have tried to safeguard their security by influencing, destabilizing and interfering in their smaller bordering states. For example, Poland had immense significance for Russia and Germany in their security policy but remained volatile despite having a geostrategic corridor. Similarly,

³Jolan Gultang & Carl Jacobsen, "Searching for Peace - The Road to TRANSCEND", London Pluto Press, 2000. P.23

⁴Rajiv Dogra, "Where Borders Bleed: An insider's account of Indo-Pak relations", Rupa Publications India Pvt. Ltd. 2015, New Delhi, p. 32

⁵"Ceasefire violations: India -Pakistan Field Commanders to meet tomorrow", NDTV, Indo-Asia News Service, 20 September, 2015.

India's ambition of driving nationhood across the territorial boundaries of "Greater India" or "Indus Valley Civilization",⁶ has often complicated the regional atmosphere. Consequently, this has left a comparatively small and fragile but resilient Pakistan, to struggle through highs and lows in a fear of existential threat, and possible loss of its ideological and territorial integrity. Pakistan had even compromised on its sovereignty during the period of alliances to safeguard itself. Hence, the promise of peaceful coexistence taken at the time of partition was regrettably precluded from the later relationship. The defence of their individual ideals, ambitions and principles has haunted one another into imperceptibly on numerous occasions. This resulted in three bloody military encounters between the two nations of India and Pakistan, loss of the eastern wing of Pakistan (now Bangladesh), and a resource drained nuclear and missile race.

In this relentless confrontation, how would the imperatives of a modern state and a new world order, such as the realization of the political, economic, social potentialities and natural resources of one geographical unit, bear fruit? Where would they start as co-members of the SCO? Who would initiate to challenge the resultant incongruities required in the cooperation, both internally and externally?

To borrow from the Theory of Transcendence for conflict resolution, proposed by Johan Galtung, India and Pakistan have the following three options to respond to the changing world of multipolarity and regional integration:

1. To give up in advance on the outstanding issues,
2. Contenting oneself at the expense of the other,
3. Or reaching to some compromise.⁷

Together in the SCO

Evident satisfaction was expressed by its members, at the end of the protracted expansion stalemate at the SCO summit. Both India and

⁶Iftikhar Haider Malik, "Modi Machine Moves On: India at its Watershed", *Strategic Outlook*. 2014.

⁷Johan Galtung & Carl Jacobson, P.111.

Pakistan have joined simultaneously. Russia has traditionally been a strong economic and security collaborator of India, while China has always been an ardent supporter of Pakistan. The equation is quite ostensible. Would their membership impart a new momentum to coherent and effective togetherness in conflict management? Is it an opportunity? Or would it deepen their already existing strains and widen their ancient rivalries further afield to Afghanistan and Central Asia? The organization is still very feeble to bear such consequent shocks.

In the words of Michael Fugleman, a senior program associate for South and Southeast Asia at the Wilson Centre in Washington, "India is particularly interested because it lacks direct access to Central Asia, and it sees the SCO membership as a way to get a better foothold in the region. The SCO membership could better position India to benefit from Central Asia's gas riches."⁸ Modi, on the announcement of membership for both India and Pakistan in the Ufa Summit July 2015, said that India's membership "reflects the natural links of history.... It will also promote peace and prosperity in this vast region that has often been called the pivot of human history."⁹ He envisions the ambitious fulfillment of India's dreams as South Asia's regional leader in the SCO.

Facing an intense war against terrorism and as a frontline state, Pakistan has lost more than forty-nine thousand lives in the War on Terror (WoT) since 9/11.¹⁰ Nawaz Sharif's perspective during the SCO conference was very fundamental and more towards building compatibility with the eastern neighbor and ensuring peace in Afghanistan. With its geo-strategic location, Pakistan holds an economic and communication corridor for its South Asian and Central Asian neighbors. The history of its significance goes back to Silk Route times. Nawaz Sharif, therefore, emphasized on 'regional stability and economic integration to achieve the objectives of peace and development'.

⁸"Michael Fugleman Quotes." Quotes.net. STANDS4 LLC, 2015. Web. 28 Sep. 2015. www.quotes.net

⁹Remarks by Prime Minister at preliminary of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Ministry of External Affairs India, Documents 10 July, 2015. www.mea.gov.in

¹⁰Ashley J. Tellis, "Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals Compromised Performance", Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2008.

Kashmir: An Apple of Discord

Unfortunately, the legendary splendor and the salubriousness of Kashmir is blemished by the policing of 700,000 Indian military and paramilitary forces. Today, it is the most densely militarized land on earth.¹¹ Its 12.5 million population is enduring draconian Indian laws of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), the Disturbed Areas Act (DAA) and the Public Safety Act (PSA), and the Prevention of Terrorist Act (POTA) with valour. The recent murder of more than one hundred unarmed freedom fighters against the curfew ridden atmosphere of Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK) is further abating the possibilities of achieving any consonance. Kashmir could be an undermining factor in the credibility required from India and Pakistan to establish international peace and friendship for all the nations as members of the SCO forum. Their conduct needs to be in compliance with the charter of the SCO. The tasks and the goals of the SCO in its Article (1) emphasize on promoting "human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with the international obligations of the member states and their national legislation."¹² It urges "mutual respect of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking no unilateral military superiority in adjacent areas".¹³

The transformation of the regional and global security paradigm amidst the growth of new economic centers also necessitates a qualitative change. The world looks askance at teamwork in countering transnational threats and transnational counter terrorism policies of both India and Pakistan.

Realistically, Pakistan's claim in recognizing Kashmir as a disputed territory has a validity according to UN Security Council's Resolutions 47 and 49. The UNCIP has passed a resolution stating: "The question of accession of the state of Jammu & Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be

¹¹Arundhati Roy, "Listening to Grass Hoppers", (Penguin Books, 2009), P. 164.

¹²The Charter of SCO. www.sectsco.org

¹³Ibid.

decided through the democratic method of free and impartial plebiscite".¹⁴

Article 25 of the UN Charter reiterates the obligatory nature of the UN resolutions and the Security Council. India itself had originally taken the Kashmir issue to the United Nation and the plebiscite was promised. This never met its fate in reality.

In 1974, the Simla Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan. It recognized the LoC, resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971.¹⁵ Both resolved to respect each other's territorial integrity and address the basic issues and conflicts without prejudice. Both sides agreed to ensure the "prerequisites for reconciliation, good neighborliness and durable peace" and "neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally".¹⁶ The issue further got complicated by its longevity. India's resistance to Kashmiri's demand perhaps stems more from the fear that it might enthuse other linguistic, cultural, religious and territorial-based separatists.

The Kashmir issue has deepened within the folds of their historically asymmetrical relations. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 held the provisions for both the majority communities of Hindus and Muslims living in the sub-continent as "the Dominion of India may be regarded as an expression of the desire for self-government of the Hindus in India, and the Dominion of Pakistan as the expression of the desire for self-government by the Muslims."¹⁷ The British had left undivided India with an option given to Princely States, either to join India or Pakistan or maintain their sovereign status. It was a critical

¹⁴Wajahat Ahmed, "Kashmir and the United Nations", www.countercurrents.org 27 August, 2008.

¹⁵P R Chari, "Kargil, Loc and Simla Agreement", *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, 23 June, 1999. ipcs.org

¹⁶Jaswant Singh, "India at Risk, Mistakes, Misconceptions and misadventures of Security Policy", Rupa Publication, India. 2013. P.17

¹⁷Indian Independence Bill : HC Deb 15 July 1947 vol 440 cc227-84. hansard.millbanksystems.com

decision for about 500 other rulers of princely states as well. The rulers had to affiliate on geographical contiguity or on the religious affiliation of the population. Kashmir was the biggest of all the princely states. Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu, was its ruler. He is said to have acceded to India in his letters written to the Indian Union in October 1947, with the condition of receiving Indian military reinforcements. Lord Louis Mountbatten, as Governor of Independent India, on behalf of the Crown accepted the decision but with a condition that "the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people".¹⁸ The first Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was from the Kashmiri ancestry himself. He, in his combination of idealism and realism, envisaged a secular and democratized state of India where the Muslim population from the previous autocratic principalities would also enjoy self-determination. On the other hand, Pakistan took geographically contiguous and majority Muslim Kashmir as its rightful part and vital for its existence. For Pakistan, it is a 'jugular vein' and for India, the state is its integral part. The controversy has become a festering and enduring sore ever since, characterized by both international and internal dynamics. Occupied Kashmir is now victimized by the dual strategy of territorial nationalism adopted by India through the judicial adjustment made in Article 370, and its gradual erosion in order to consolidate it in the mainstream of Indian politics.

The Indian government has become particularly sensitive to the Kashmir issue since the last three years. The meeting of Nawaz Sharif and Modi on the sidelines of the Ufa Summit in July 2015 provided an opportunity to both to resume the stalemated bilateral talks. "They agreed that India and Pakistan have a collective responsibility to ensure peace and promote development. To do this they are prepared to discuss all outstanding issues."¹⁹

To expect a peace process to succeed is unlikely if the main sources of tension remain unresolved. The conflict of Kashmir is regrettably institutionalized on both sides of the border. By taking only cosmetic measures, the international pressure could perhaps be siphoned off. It

¹⁸Arundhati Roy, "Listening to Grass Hoppers: Field Notes on Democracy", P.191. www.pakistantoday.com.pk

¹⁹Kuldip Nayyar, "The chasm in Indo-Pak relations", *Pakistan Today*, 26 July, 2015

can preserve some mutual interests. However, the implementation of UN resolution must involve more watchful eyes of the world.

Internal Dynamics of Occupied Kashmir

India is a common party to both the aspects of the Kashmir issue, India vs. Pakistan and India vs. Kashmiris. The internal political dynamics of Occupied Kashmir are daunting. The Indian held Kashmir has chosen its own government twice only in the post-partition history; and only a limited democratic development has been witnessed in Kashmir until the late 1970's. By 1988, many of the democratic reforms provided were reversed by the Indian Government.

There had been a serious violation of basic human rights in Kashmir and the state is experiencing proliferation of insurgency. According to the International Commission of Jurists, Asia Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, Amnesty International, and Kashmiri and even Human Rights Organizations, the Vale of Kashmir has seen 'brutal' military operations and heinous human rights violations, such as torture, gang rape, the destruction of property, homes and even entire villages, abduction, and extrajudicial killings. According to the global human rights group, Amnesty International in its report titled Denied: Failures in Accountability For Human Rights Violations by Security Force Personnel in Jammu and Kashmir, "Indian security forces have killed 90,986 civilians in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IOK), while Indian forces under AFSPA had reportedly destroyed about 105,182 shops and houses in Indian held Jammu and Kashmir. About 3288 innocent Kashmiris have been detained by Indian security forces since 1990."²⁰ The report has also unearthed the presence of mass graves in IOK, 'generally termed as missing persons'. The stance of Kashmiri people is endorsed by the Amnesty International report. The account on impunity given to the Indian Armed Forces under AFSPA is based on the report on the examination of nearly 100 cases of human rights abuses by Indian security forces between 1990 and 2012 and interviews with

²⁰ Amna Razaq, "Human rights violation by India and Amnesty international report", *The Patriot* (Delhi), July 12, 2015.

58 family members of the victims in 2013.²¹ Nonetheless, the Movement for Self-Determination in Kashmir is continuing making the political compromise difficult and the use of military too dangerous to press the case. Both India and Pakistan have also tested their nuclear weapons in 1998.

A new dimension is added to the internal qualms of the people of Kashmir with the growth of religious extremism. Extremist tendencies are more readily acceptable in the Indian society by the coming of Bharitya Janata Party (BJP) and Modi to power. The affiliation of the ruling political party with the communalist militant political Hinduism or Hindutva not only identifies majoritarian rule but also fosters Hindutva doctrine which communalizes the entire country even further. Nehru, in his prophetic remarks had once warned that "if fascism would arrive in India, it would arrive in the form of majoritarian (Hindu) communalism".²²

The Ufa Summit

With its multi-dimensional characteristics, the Kashmir issue once again overshadowed the Ufa summit held between Modi and Nawaz Sharif. Its agenda fell victim to ambiguity resulting in the scuttle of the dialogue between the National Security Advisers (NSAs) of India and Pakistan scheduled for the 23-24 August, 2015. India tried to restrict the agenda to terrorism, alone. The Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, in fact, had maintained a threatening tone while cancelling the talks against the presence of any third party.²³ This is continuing even today. To deny the participation of Kashmiri representation in any dialogue for the resolution of the Kashmir issue would be more of a travesty of the continuing historical reality and is yet another somersault of the Indian government.

While expressing disappointment on the Ufa summit, Ayaz Akbar, the spokesman of the Hurriyat said "we did not expect any breakthrough

²¹Ibid.

²²Dr. Nasir Khan, "Resolving the Kashmir Conflict", *Foreign Policy Journal*, 13 January, 2011.

²³Dawn, 22 August, 2015.

from the meeting. It was just a diplomatic compulsion for the prime ministers of the two countries." ²⁴

building has already been reached in the spirit of the SCO. The Ufa Communiqué had the mechanism to achieve the overall objectives of peace and security. Furthermore, the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue (CBD) process agreed between the two also encompasses terrorism, Kashmir and other issues in its eight point agenda.

In order to work together on the SCO forum, it is obligatory for its members to enhance 'comprehensive cooperation' and to strengthen peace and ensure security and stability in the region 'in the environment of developing political multi-polarity and economic and information globalization'.²⁵ In the wake of long drawn misunderstandings between India and Pakistan, cooperation on information sharing and counter terrorism is yet another sour issue.

Pakistan, since the recent ascendance in its relations with Russia, stands the chance of transforming Russia's stance on Kashmir, favorably. It already has an edge of having an accomplished friendship with China and its support on the Kashmir issue, as the two main sponsors of the SCO. On the other hand, the relations between India and Russia have lost its luster. Ever since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India has espoused itself with the US as a main contender of Asia pivot policy. The proximity of China and Russia is also a thorny issue in their Indo-US relationship.

Counter-terrorism and Mutual Trust

The end of the twentieth century has seen a change in global geopolitics. The weapon of terrorism with its political objectives in sight has been instrumental in using the forces of nationalism, ethnicity, religion, ideology and social class. The focus of the Ufa summit in 2015 has also been largely on counterterrorism. An appeal was made to the United Nations to direct more efforts against terrorism and extremism. The SCO

²⁴"Separatists dismiss Russia dialogue; say India, Pakistan PMs should focus on Kashmir", *The Economic Times*. 10 July, 2015.

²⁵SCO Charter.

in its Article 3 urges its member states to develop and implement 'measures aimed at jointly counteracting terrorism, separatism and extremism'.²⁶

To forward its apprehensions, India has used terrorism both as a tactic and strategy. Pakistan has been able to unearth the indulgence of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in the insurgency in Baluchistan and Karachi. According to some official reports, Indian spies are operating through a network of Indian missions dotting southern and eastern Afghanistan, where most of the Baluch insurgents are also based.²⁷ Pakistan's claims of Indian interference in Baluchistan and patronization of terrorist groups by RAW to destabilize it are quite clear-cut. The recent statement of Modi on Baluchistan and accusation in reference to "they glorify terrorism"²⁸ is more of an investment in conflict. Earlier Pakistan had given four dossiers after the September 2015 session to the UN Secretary General Ban ki moon.

The mutual mistrust is intractable. Pakistan's Inter-service Intelligence (ISI), on the other hand has been indicted by India for carrying out terrorism in Kashmir. Pakistan bears the onus of the July 2006 Mumbai train bombing, 2001 parliament attack, which almost brought the two nations face to face. Lashker-i-Taiba (LeT) is also widely blamed for the November 2008 attacks on Mumbai. The LeT was banned by Pakistan in 2002, after it was alleged to have carried out an attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001.²⁹

In reality, reaction to oppression and an inexcusable Indian abomination, particularly in Occupied Kashmir is sometimes interpreted as terrorism and is regrettably attached to Pakistan. This paradox adds to the uncertainties in the complex relationship of India and Pakistan and swathes it in the debate of terrorism and counter-terrorism. The space thus provided has been invariably used by widespread transnational

²⁶SCO Charter.

²⁷Aparna Pande, "South Asia Counter-terrorism & Postures after 9/11". www.satp.org

²⁸Dawn, "People of Baluchistan, Kashmir thanked me: Modi on India's Independence Day", 15 Aug, 2016. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1277670>

²⁹M Ilyas Khan, "What lies behind Pakistani charges of Indian 'terrorism'", *BBC News*, Islamabad, May 6, 2015. www.bbc.com

terrorists and has kept the South Asian region volatile. There has never been any coherent, consistent and effective policy against terrorism designed by the South Asian countries collectively, even after a welcome start in cooperation after the Pathankot Airbase attack in January 2016. In fact, the counter-terrorism initiatives have primarily found underpinnings in the short-term national interests and realpolitik foreign policy agendas. The wide gap between stance and intent, pledge and action has further complicated the comprehension of terrorism. Mutual assistance and cooperation can certainly provide the best antidote to this threat.

Economic Interdependence

The value of economic interdependence has remained contentious between the liberals and the realists to bring peace in the conflicting nations. The success of economic regionalism is conditioned on political traditions and security relations. Although, economic and trade relations have a distinct role to help evade otherwise political issues, as is seen in the case of India and China, yet, institutional arrangements and the level of integration required for regional economic connectivity have to be established on the foreign policies and relations of the member states. The SCO's economic institutions have not seen any tangible progress. China has unilaterally launched its own Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. It has "adopted and revitalized the Kazak-created Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), which some Chinese aim to make into an influential pan-Eurasian security structure that excludes Japan and the United States"³⁰ as forward momentum needs similarity in objectives.

In the economic relations of the region, the most basic form is a free-trade area which abolishes or condenses custom duties between members. Then a customs union and common market is established to ensure a greater degree of integration, for example a common tariff on non-members. The third level of economic regionalism is based on economic and currency union, as was seen in the European Union. For

³⁰ Andrew Elek, "Welcoming China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Initiative", *East Asia Forum*, 21 September, 2014. www.eastasiaforum.org3

example "there is a high level of political consensus required between the member states with an objective of complete economic integration through a common economic policy, a common currency and the elimination of all tariff and non-tariff barriers".³¹ The economic relations between India and Pakistan, despite being snagged by a plethora of political factors, are making headway.

Historically, the economic interdependence of India and Pakistan was reasonably voluminous. In fact, India's share in Pakistan's global exports and imports accounted to 23.6 percent and 50.6 percent in 1948 and 1949 respectively, which declined to 1.3 to 0.06 percent in 1975-76 respectively, after the breakup of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Similarly, Pakistan's share in India's exports and imports to the international market was 2.2 percent and 1.1 percent respectively in 1951-52.³² The decline in the economic relationship is most noticeable during the times of political tension. Recent realization of synergy potentials for the peace and development of the region has shown an upward trend in the economic relationship of the two political arch rivals. India granted Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan in 2006 in consonance with the WTO agreement, which is pending for reciprocation from Pakistan. According to the figures, Pakistan's exports to India had recorded at US\$1.735 billion during 2006-7-2011-12, against the imports of 8,363 billion dollars. This leaves the nation to face a loss of 6 billion dollar trade deficit. The balance of trade in favor of India also often overlay for political rhetoric.³³ To see the relationship on the established fundamentals of economic regionalism is perhaps still thinking too far.

³¹Chung-in Moon, "Economic regionalism; International Relations", *Encyclopedea Britannica*.

³²Tasneem Noorani, " MFN status and Trade between Pakistan and India", *Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency(PILDAT Report)*, Islamabad, 2012.

³³The Journal of Commerce, 16 September, 2012, zeenews.india.com

Uni-polarity vs. Multi-polarity: A Delicate Straddling

Through SCO, China and Russia are building a decidedly multi-polar "Eurasian" point of view. Its strategic aims are to condemn any efforts to achieve "monopoly in world affairs", divide the world into "leaders and followers" and "impose models of social development." This obviously reflects China's insistence on "multi-polar" world as against the US persistence of "uni-polar" international order.³⁴ It has invariably asserted on common security through mutually beneficial cooperation to foster confidence building and resolve actual and common conflicts within the organization.

To further clarify the spirit of SCO, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation gave a statement on June 20, 2001, while obligating the member states of SCO to "strictly abide by the goals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the principle of mutual respect of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality and mutual benefit, the solution of all issues through mutual consultations"³⁵...and non-use of threat or force against each other and neither would seek unilateral military superiority in contiguous areas.

In its newly found rapprochement, mainly predisposed by China, Russia sees Pakistan as a responsible state committed to counter terrorism contrary to India's calling of Pakistan a "backward rogue state" secretly controlled by the "terrorists". In fact, it is underpinning the Russian plans to ship arms to Pakistan. A joint military exercise was conducted by Pakistan and Russia recently in the month of September-October, 2016. China is also convinced of its co-members of the SCO that India and Pakistan should let go of their historical acrimony. It has urged both to cooperate with the shared multilaterally beneficial vision of enhancing China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and pan-Eurasian connectivity.

³⁴William E. Carroll, "China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Hegemony, Multipolar Cooperation or Cooperation in Central Asia", *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, Vol.1, No.19, December 2011.

³⁵Ibid

Nonetheless, the 'trip wire' relationship between India and Pakistan and China and India is a vulnerable point for the organization. For example, the CPEC project which routes through the legitimate Pakistani territory of Gilgit and Baltistan is considered part of the disputed territory of Kashmir. Though the world recognizes it otherwise, India fears that it would permanently tie the region with Pakistan.

Similarly, there is no doubt that India has played a significant role in the promotion of economic and institutional multi-polarity, and has historically rearranged the global trade and financial networks, it has gone contrary to the geopolitical multi-polarity by following the three guiding precepts of its foreign policy for the region:

1. Containing China, as an ardent ally of the US in its policy of "Asia Pivot". It would position India to counterweight China as well as find an alternate strategic partner of Russia. It paradoxically pushes Modi's India into uni-polarity.
2. Confronting Pakistan, with which it has fractured relations ever since.³⁶
3. With the continuing human rights violations in Indian Occupied Kashmir, India has been widely criticized by the human rights organizations in the world. Besides, the violation of the UN Security Council resolutions is evident. Its non-compliance makes India's membership of SCO controversial which fundamentally advocates the obligations of the UN charter. These geopolitical advances have more chances of shaking the multi-polar forum since there is very little chance for SCO to intercede in Indo-Pakistan's protracted rivalry.

Conclusion

Located on the southern extremity of the Eurasian continent, South Asia's continental entrance is both from the accessible passes of the highest mountains of the world, and the borders of the Indian Ocean which opens it to maritime trade since over 3000 years ago. Its strategic location is a favorable trait for Persian Gulf oil flow. The unity in its

³⁶Andrew Korybko, "Modi's game and the true meaning of Multipolarity", *OrientalReview.org*. January 31, 2015.

cultural and geographical diversity, however, has not been able to significantly place cooperation above conflict in the conduct of interstate relations. The region has not been able to achieve complementarity of political interests. The perpetual intra-state conflicts have kept the region preoccupied with the misgivings of individual existence rather than looking for regional solutions. Furthermore, there has been an inextricable connection between the internal and external politics of the regional states. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is perhaps the only regional forum which has not been able to provide a platform for discussing security-related issues. It only recognizes political dialogue for which it is essential to have a political will and problem-solving diplomacy.

South Asians are, therefore, negotiating their place in an arena of global interconnections within the throes of rapid change. Genuine prospects of peace, democracy and cooperative development need to be ensured. To challenge the disputes, especially over Kashmir and terrorism, and ensuing bitterness between the two nuclear powers of India and Pakistan, place them at a decisive crossroads in their history. The present is of critical importance in their way forward.

The bilateral relations between India and Pakistan have been often victimized by vengeance in which even individuals are an entity. It is sometimes a distressing outgrowth of obsession. Many attempts for the resolution of the Kashmir issue have already been exhausted except for Plebiscite. What choices do Modi and Sharif have? The stakes are too high to give up in advance on outstanding issues both internally and externally, and this is so for both the countries. Both are nuclear, so the danger of contending at the expense of the other is suicidal. Compromise is perhaps the only alternative left by exploring the common grounds to progress towards a political resolution of outstanding issues, economic regionalism and have sustained counter terrorism strategy.

SCO provides an opportunity to both to transcend from their parochial politics. It is a Eurasian political, economic and military organization, and has the experience of providing a platform to its

member states to sign such crucial agreements like the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions and the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, amongst its member states. The converging interests of the member states of the SCO in South Asia offer an opening to the forum for an effective intermediary role to resolve the Kashmir issue. The presence of unimplemented resolutions in the United Nations has already given it an international status. Kashmir is a 'powder keg'. Inclusive strategies can best be devised with the help of the Kashmiri freedom fighters. In the shifting paradigms of the realization of shared threats and combined counter-terrorism strategies, a mechanism for conflict management and resolution requires collective hard work to ensure peace and prosperity of the region populated by thirty percent of the world population. It needs to facilitate Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) and the management of biased perceptions. Recognizing an expanded number of stakeholders and their goals expands the possible number of creative combinations of interests, which can lead towards solutions and transformed relations. This is the key to a cooperative or collaborative approach to the conflict.³⁷

³⁷ Annabel McGoldrick and Jake Lynch, Peace Journalism, What is it? How to do? www.transcend.org

Pakistan in the US Strategic Calculus

Shams uz Zaman*

Abstract

Pakistan and the US have enjoyed an uneven relationship since the creation of Pakistan. While Pakistan did benefit from the US assistance to modernize its military and defence capabilities, the perceptions are varied due to diverging interests. Looking through an idealistic prism, Pakistan's hopes were dampened on numerous occasions due to the US policy which is primarily conceived through realist perspective. Of late there is a realization that other regional and extra-regional players are also significant and there is a need to establish durable relations with other regional states and powers like, for example, Russia, Turkey, Iran and Central Asian Republics as well. Continuation of such policies would require foresight, realizing the role and objectives of states seeking regional hegemony and identifying the limits of cooperation with the US, which was ignored in the past.

Key Words: US Asia Pivot policy, South East Asian Treaty Organization, Central Treaty Organization, NSG, Gwadar, Afghanistan, Asia-Pacific.

Introduction

Since its inception, Pakistan has been confronted with a persistent security dilemma of a hostile neighborhood. Indian hostility on its Eastern front and an unstable and unfriendly Afghanistan towards the West shaped Pakistan's security paradigm in which the military's role always remained significant. Pakistan's ideological and bureaucratic preferences, coupled with the sense of insecurity, obliged it to choose the United States (US) over a communist Soviet Union as a strategic balancer against India amid an intensifying Cold War.

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Thus Pakistan always perceived the US as its protector against regional threats, especially India. This Pakistani viewpoint was however not completely shared by Washington, which always regarded India as a valuable regional partner. Consequently, despite Indian inclination towards the Soviet Union, the US still regarded an Indian role vital in containing the spread of Communism.¹ The simplistic assertion of Pakistani leaders,² namely, considering US as “protector and friend”, emanated due to a complex structure of global politics where “interests” transcends “friendships”³ and inter-state relationships are sought to safeguard national interest through astute use of statecraft, diplomacy and politics.

The Pak-US relationship has mostly suffered from this agonizing reality leading to frequent disappointments and hiccups. The US has mostly utilized its fiscal leverage to promote its strategic interests in the region sometimes at the cost of Pakistan's national interests. The financial aid was rarely utilized efficiently due to governance issues and corruption, which consequently has done little to redress widespread anti-American sentiments among the masses. Furthermore, due to changing US global priorities, Pakistan became less significant vis-à-vis India, thus encouraging India to perceive its role of a regional hegemon perpetuating instability. It therefore becomes imperative to evaluate converging and diverging issues between the US and Pakistan to project the future course of Pak-US relations.

The Strategic Context

Pakistan has mostly viewed its relationship with the US through an idealistic prism. Considering US as a mentor and protector against threats emanating across the eastern border from a much potent

¹Mehrunnisa Ali, ed. *Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-1998* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 8-9.

²The classical example in this regards comes from the memoir of Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), in which the author narrates a bleated account of his grievances that the basis of Pak-US relations should have mutual friendship rather than pivoting around master-subordinate equation.

³Jack Donnelly et al, *Theories of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 30-32.

adversary were misplaced and exaggerated. On the contrary, the US, dominated by the realist approach, always used Pakistan as an instrument, which could always be abandoned later, suiting its strategic interests in the region. Due to Pakistan's historical ties with China, Pakistan has little utility for the US policy of containing China's military and economic rise. India, which is aspiring for a defining role in global politics and for its competitive relationship with China, thus becomes valuable to serve as a fulcrum in US Asia Pivot policy. However, this change in US priorities still does not make Pakistan redundant in the regional context due to its geo-strategic location and status of a nuclear power.

Brief Appraisal of Pak-US Relations

Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, was the first Pakistani leader to set the course of Pak-US relations. He initially contacted USSR for a visit but subsequently travelled to Washington rather than to Moscow in May 1950 on his first formal foreign visit.⁴ Ideological and bureaucratic preferences may have altered his decision regarding the visit.⁵ During the initial years of independence, Indian hostility coupled with the Kashmir issue shaped the foreign policy choices of Pakistani decision makers. In a bid to secure protective US shield against India, Pakistan subsequently joined the US led alliances against Communism, namely South Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1954 and 1955 respectively.

Pakistan sought these alliances as a defensive shield against a more powerful and larger adversary, India, but contrary to this perception, Washington never made any such commitment despite India's visible inclination towards Moscow. Soviet overt support to India was visibly stronger than the US support to Pakistan over contentious issues like Kashmir. As a sequel to this, USSR accepted the disputed region of Kashmir as an integral part of India, and also vetoed numerous

⁴Shahid Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 41-43.

⁵Mussarat Jabeen and Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, "Security Game: SEATO and CENTO as Instrument of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan", *Pakistan Economic and Social Review*, Vol.49, No.1, Summer 2011, 113.

resolutions presented in Security Council on the status of Kashmir.⁶ Although, Pak-US defence ties helped Pakistan to strengthen its defence against India, but the US support to Pakistan at critical junctures and on critical political issues mostly remained non-existent, be these the wars of 1965 and 1971. In contrast, Pakistan always went out of its way to serve the US interests in the region, even sometimes risking direct confrontation with global powers. The U-2 spy plane incident in 1960 is just a case in point which almost brought Pakistan and Soviet Union to the verge of an armed conflict.

The misleading notion of US defending Pakistan probably strengthened in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian border dispute during which the US openly sided with India against communist China. Pakistani policy makers had anticipated the same level of US support for Pakistan against India, which was never the case. Although India had proclaimed a “Non-aligned” status, it remained visibly pro-communist in its orientation. Nevertheless, all these hopes were dampened after the Indo-Pak war of 1965 when the US imposed sanctions on Pakistan. Subsequently, in 1971, the Soviets openly sided with India but the US support for Pakistan was completely non-existent, which resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan's eastern wing and the creation of Bangladesh.⁷ But even after 1971, Pakistani leaders continued to rely on the US thus serving its interests in the region. This was illustrated by Pakistani mediation between the US and China to facilitate President Nixon's surprise visit to Beijing in 1972.⁸ Nothing tangible could be achieved by Pakistan in lieu of this diplomatic favor. Realizing the futility of SEATO, Pakistan finally withdrew from it in 1973. The Pak-US rocky

⁶Safdar Sial, “Pak-US A Balance Sheet of Relations”, *Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies*, Report, June 26, 2007, 3.

⁷Zubeida Mustafa, “The USSR and the Indo-Pakistan War, 1971”, in *Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-1998*, ed. Mehrunnisa Ali (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 23-25.

⁸*University of Southern California US-China Institute*, “Getting to Beijing: Henry Kissinger's Secret 1971 Trip”, July 21, 2007, <http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=2483&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1>, accessed on September 10, 2014.

relationship was further strained in 1977 when the US used its influence on France to cancel the shipment of a nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan, fearing that Pakistan could use this plant to manufacture nuclear weapons in response to the Indian 'not so' peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974. After the Iranian revolution of 1979, Pakistan also left the CENTO considering it redundant. The relationship further deteriorated after the US imposed sanctions against Pakistan in 1979 over suspected nuclear activities.⁹

However, in the early 1980's after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US reviewed its policy in the region, selecting Pakistan as a strategic ally against growing Soviet influence.¹⁰ This informal alliance lasted till the Soviet disintegration and, in 1990; the US lawmakers again imposed sanctions against Pakistan, which were partially relaxed to allow import of essential military hardware in 1995. After the nuclearization of South Asia in 1998, the US imposed across the board sanctions against Pakistan, and even India, thus terminating all sorts of military and civil cooperation.

The fateful event of 9/11 changed the Pak-US equation, and Pakistan once again became a frontline state in the US' war against terrorism. However, the US always remained skeptical of Pakistan's intentions accusing it of playing a double game and demanding to 'do more'. Pakistan, on the other hand, also viewed the US intentions with suspicion and distrust.¹¹ The lowest ebb in Pak-US relations was witnessed after the raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad and the deliberate US aerial strike on Salala check post killing tens of soldiers. Although the situation has gradually improved over the last few

⁹National Security Archives - The George Washington University, "The United States and Pakistan's Quest for the Bomb", National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 333, posted December 21, 2012, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/index.htm>. See also: M. Raziullah Azmi, "Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal", in *Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-1998*, ed. Mehrunnisa Ali (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 231.

¹⁰Ibid, 232-234.

¹¹Syed Farooq Hasnat, "Pakistan – US Relations on Slippery Grounds: An Account of Trust and its Deficit", *Pakistan Vision*, Vol.12, No.1, 2011, 24-26, 57-59.

years, Pak-US relations still face an unpredictable future. This is due to changing US priorities in the region with the US trying to project India as a hegemon in the region. The off-shore rebalancing posture of the US in the shape of Asia Pivot Policy and its unqualified support/efforts to grant India the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership, projects India as a more suitable partner in comparison to Pakistan. This poses formidable challenges for Pakistan to maintain a regional balance in South Asia.¹²

Pakistan's Geo-Political Imperatives

The strategic importance of Pakistan has always kept it at the centre stage of global politics. Due to its ideological visage and geographical significance, the following factors make Pakistan a strategically important player for the global powers:

- **Geographical Proximity:** Pakistan's close proximity to the Middle East, Central Asia, South East Asia, Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf makes it strategically a very important state in the region at times making it indispensable for the regional and world powers. This was clearly evident during the Cold War and, more recently, in the case of Yemen's civil war in which Saudis and Iranians both were seeking Pakistani support. All of Pakistan's neighbouring states, namely China, Afghanistan and India, have remained critical for the polar powers. This geo-strategic significance of Pakistan holds some unique geo-political dilemmas and opportunities at the same time which are:
 - **Role in Containment of Soviet Union during the Cold War.** The US considered Pakistan an extremely important asset against the USSR during the Cold War.¹³ Pakistan provided the US with bases to conduct surveillance and intelligence operations against Soviet targets which resulted in deterioration of Pak-Soviet relations. The support to militant groups participating in the Afghan war (with

¹²Khurram Abbas, "Asia Pacific: Relevance of Pakistan – A Guest Lecture by Dr. Muhammad Khan", *IPRI*, September 10, 2014, <http://www.ipripak.org/asia-pacific-relevance-of-pakistan/#sthash.42dmLXGv.dpbs>, accessed July 10, 2015.

¹³Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004), 41.

support from CIA) gradually transformed the complete social fabric of Pakistani society. The Cold War alliance enabled Pakistan to strengthen and modernize its military alongside running a clandestine nuclear weapons program in response to Indian aggressive designs.

- **Shortest Route to Central Asian Energy Resources.** Pakistan provides the shortest and easiest route for China and Central Asian Republics (CARs) to trade through Gwadar.¹⁴ This route passing through Afghanistan is approximately 2600 kilometers long whereas the Iranian and Turkish routes are much longer with distances of 4500 and 5000 kilometers respectively. Pakistan's location in the middle of regional economic giants, namely India and China,¹⁵ thus holds immense prospects of becoming a 'Trade and Economic Corridor' by developing itself into a transitory zone and subsequently associating itself with other economic and financial organizations like CARs, SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and RIC (Russia, India and China) etc.
- **A Gateway to the Persian Gulf.** Pakistan's Gwadar port dominates the narrow opening of the Persian Gulf which is the world's busiest oil supplying corridor and has since become a concern for the Indian regional ambitions.¹⁶ Amid the US policy of re-posturing in Asia Pacific, Gwadar Port is being seen by China as an important strategic location alongside other ports in South East Asia.¹⁷ This

¹⁴Fazal-ur-Rahman, "Prospects for Pakistan becoming a Trade and Energy Corridor for China", *Strategic Studies*, Vol.XXVII, No.2, Summer 2007.

¹⁵Shahid Javed Burki, "China-India economic détente", *Dawn.com*, undated, <http://archives.dawn.com/archives/154828>, accessed on September 21, 2014.

¹⁶*Daily Times*, "Gwadar Port has strategic implications for India: Indian Naval Chief", January 23, 2008, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008%5C01%5C23%5Cstory_23-1-2008_pg7_53.

¹⁷*The Express Tribune*, "China confirms takeover of Gwadar port: Report", September 4, 2012, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/431304/china-confirms-takeover-of-gwadar-port-report/>.

will enable China to significantly improve its strategic posture vis-à-vis US in the region, with what the US describes as China's new 'String of Pearls' strategy.¹⁸ However Chinese officials have categorically stated that their policy is peaceful and aimed at economic integration.¹⁹ Pakistan, in future conflicts, can use also Gwadar port to block Indian supply of oil from Persian Gulf in response to an Indian attempt of naval blockade.

- **Important Player in South Asia.** Pakistan is an important player and a major state in South Asia which at times is also included in the Greater Middle East region.²⁰ The key to prosperity in South Asia largely depends on Indo-Pak mutually shared relations due to their size and population. Unfortunately, so far the lukewarm relations between the two big nuclear rivals have hampered any prospects of regional cooperation and economic integration. The Indo-Pak equation is likely to remain fragile in future due to unresolved disputes, especially Kashmir.
- **Human Resource Potentials.** Pakistan is the second most populous country in South Asia after India and fourth on the Asian continent with immense human resource potential.²¹ Although the current trajectory of population growth in Pakistan is cited as a major impediment to development and economic growth, primarily this economic stagnation should be blamed on governance issues and failure to effectively utilize this resource potential by successive governments rather than attributed to population alone.²² This

¹⁸Shannon Tiezzi, "The Maritime Silk Road Vs. The String of Pearls", *The Diplomat*, February 13, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/the-maritime-silk-road-vs-the-string-of-pearls/>.

¹⁹*Beijing Review*, "Hu: China Would Never Seek Hegemony", April 23, 2009, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2009-04/23/content_192517.htm.

²⁰Mohsin Raza Malik, "Battleground Greater Middle East", *The Nation*, November 25, 2015, <http://nation.com.pk/columns/25-Nov-2015/battleground-greater-middle-east>.

²¹*Business Recorder*, "Australian HC highlights Pakistan's human resource potential", July 20, 2012, <http://www.brecorder.com/general-news/172/1219044>. See also: *Daily Times*, "Human resource real driver of Pakistan's growth", January 23, 2012, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2012%5C01%5C23%5Cstory_23-1-2012_pg11_2.

²²Dr. Sania Chaudhry, "Capping our human potential", *The Nation*, April 6, 2012, p. 6.

unexplored human resource potential is an asset rather than a liability and adds to its importance in the region and beyond.

- o **Nuclear Flash Point.** Pakistan is located in the extremely dense nuclearized region of the world. Russia, China and India along with Pakistan are nuclear powers, most sharing borders with each other. Nuclear weapons capability qualifies Pakistan to be an extremely important state in the region, but unresolved disputes with India since 1947 have added to the regional complexities, thus projecting the region as a nuclear flashpoint.²³ Consequently, the region continues to live under the fear of nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

Afghan Neighborhood: The Graveyard of Empires. Afghanistan is historically known as “the graveyard of empires”.²⁴ In the 19th century, Britain and Russia engaged in the 'Great Game,' thus venturing to establish their hegemony over Asian Rim land, but failed to control Afghanistan.²⁵ British Empire suffered a decline thereafter. Soviet disintegration is also attributed to its adventure in Afghanistan. Currently, the US is fighting its longest war of US history in Afghanistan. After 9/11, the US, supported by NATO, invaded Afghanistan and made it the nucleus of the war against terrorism. But, the spillover of this war has affected the entire Middle East, and the situation in Afghanistan still remains in peril. It is uncertain whether the US would face a similar fate as that of Britain and Soviet Union in Afghanistan or otherwise,²⁶ but due to

²³Michael Scheuer, “Coming Nuclear Flashpoint”, *The Diplomat*, August 30, 2010, <http://thediplomat.com/2010/08/30/the-coming-nuclear-flashpoint/>.

²⁴Milton Bearden, “Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.80, No.6, November/December 2001, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/57411/milton-bearden/afghanistan-graveyard-of-empires>.

²⁵David Piper, “The 'Great Game' of influence in Afghanistan continues but with different players”, *Foxnews.com*, June 9, 2012, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/06/09/great-game-influence-in-afghanistan-continues-but-with-different-players/>.

²⁶Michiko Kakutani, “The Choices that Closed a Window into Afghanistan”, *The New York Times*, July 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/books/14kaku.html?_r=0.

geographical proximity Pakistan has again become a critical factor in finding a meaningful and durable solution for Afghanistan's stability as and when US withdraws from Afghanistan.²⁷ In Pakistan's perception a stable and friendly Afghanistan would add to its strategic depth which many scholars erroneously confuse with the idea of territorial depth.²⁸

- **Ideological Significance.** Pakistan is a leading Islamic nation with a nuclear weapon capability and a large population. Its once influential image as a prospering state in the Islamic world has significantly been tarnished due to internal problems like governance issues, corruption, nepotism, sectarianism, terrorism, lack of justice and rising debt. Despite these factors, Pakistan still maintains its stature of an influential state within the states of the Islamic community. This ideological base was used as a catalyst by the US to make Pakistan a frontline state against the Soviet march towards warm waters through arming militant groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Failure of subsequent Pakistani governments to assimilate these militant groups back into the folds of mainstream society adversely affected Pakistan's security paradigm. After the fateful event of September 11, 2001,²⁹ and the historic U-turn by Pakistani government over Afghan policy amid the US pressure, these militant groups refused to disarm. But despite these challenges Pakistan still enjoys strong influence within the Muslim world.
- **Nuclear Weapons Capability.** In 1998 responding to Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan joined the elite club of Nuclear Weapon States by overtly demonstrating its own nuclear capability. However, these tests only helped Pakistan and India to become defacto and not

²⁷Javed Hamim Kakar, "NATO wants Pakistan to facilitate Afghan stability", *Pajhwok Afghan News*, May 21, 2012, <http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2012/05/21/nato-wants-pakistan-facilitate-afghan-stability>.

²⁸Shams uz Zaman, "Prospects of a Nuclear Armed Iran and Policy Options for Pakistan", *IPRI Journal*, Vol. XII, No.1, winter 2012, 85-86.

²⁹Tom Doran, "Sympathy for the Devil", *The Huffington Post*, August 27, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/tom-doran/sympathy-for-the-devil_2_b_1831223.html.

dejure nuclear weapon states.³⁰ Pakistan is the only Islamic country to possess nuclear weapons capability, discriminately termed as “The Islamic Bomb”, in the west while downplaying the Indian nuclear capability.³¹ This preferential treatment is now posing a serious threat to regional stability especially after signing of the Indo-US nuclear deal.

Pakistan and US Strategic Goals in the Region

The foundations of Pak-US relationship were mostly laid on an imperfect premise that Pakistan and US' interests converge on all matters in the region and as such a perpetual relationship should be a natural outcome.³² Certainly on many issues Pakistani and the US' interests converge but, due to changing US' priorities in the region numerous contentious and divergent issues have surfaced which now persistently dominate the bilateral discourse between these two states. The strategic priorities of Pakistan and the US can separately be enumerated as follows:

• US Strategic Objectives in the Region

- **Defeating Islamic Militancy.** Since 9/11, the primary US objective had been to defeat the Islamic militant groups, with whom it previously had enjoyed a rhapsodic alliance in the fight against Communism. The US perceives militant and political Islam, like Communism, a threat to the Western capitalist system and therefore must be contained and defeated.³³ Muslim militant

³⁰Marvin Miller and Lawrence Scheinman, “Israel, India and Pakistan: Engaging the Non-NPT States in the Non-proliferation Regime”, *Arms Control Today*, Vol.33, December 2003, pp. 15-17.

³¹Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, *The Islamic Bomb* (New York: Times Books, 1981).

³²*The Express Tribune*, “US interests converge with Pakistan's: Marc Grossman”, May 19, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/171954/us-interests-converge-with-pakistans-marc-grossman/>. See also: Sohail Mahmood, “The Crisis in Pakistan-US Relations”, *Spearhead Research*, July 13, 2012, http://spearheadresearch.org/SR_CMS/index.php/internationalaffairssecurty/the-crisis-in-pakistan-us-relations.

³³John L. Esposito, “It's the Policy Stupid: Political Islam and the US Foreign Policy”, *Georgetown University - Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding*, undated, <http://acmcu.georgetown.edu/135400.html>.

groups initially were only opposed to US imperialistic policies aimed at securing the vital energy resources of the Middle East. Tyrannical and autocratic rulers, who mostly enjoyed western support,³⁴ used harsh techniques against the dissident groups and dissatisfied youth, thus pushing them towards radicalism which enormously contributed in terrorism acquiring global dimensions. These groups have now mutated into a structure carrying vicious hate for western values and an extremely intolerant view for anyone who disagrees with their ideology. They have gradually transformed into ideologues, like ISIS, envisioning a global caliphate premised on a puritanical and narrow interpretation of Islam. Defeating terrorism and violent forms of political Islam currently remains one of the top priorities of the US in the entire region.

- **Ending Wars in Greater Middle Eastern Region.** After fighting the longest war in its history, the US is now suffering from an imperial fatigue. This fatigue is reflected from its waning influence and reluctance to deploy ground troops in large numbers in Syria. Although the US hastily announced an end to combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was forced to postpone the decision to pull-out its troops due to worsening situation in these states.³⁵ American announcement to end the war in Iraq without achieving anything tangible and subsequent intentions to pull out from Afghanistan, leaving behind token forces for support missions, indicate that the US government remains wary of the economic consequences of these wars.³⁶

³⁴ John Glaser, "Exporting Tyranny through Foreign Aid", *The American Conservative*, April 19, 2011, <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/exporting-tyranny-through-foreign-aid/>.

³⁵ Robert D. Kaplan, "Where's the American empire when we need it?", *Washington Post*, December 3, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/03/AR2010120303448.html>.

³⁶ Rasul Bakhsh Rais, "Rethinking 'imperial stretch'", *The Express Tribune*, November 5, 2012, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/461181/rethinking-imperial-stretch/>. See also: Mark Landler, "US Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016", *The New York Times*, May 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/world/asia/us-to-complete-afghan-pullout-by-end-of-2016-obama-to-say.html?_r=0.

- **Dominating the Asia Pacific Region.** The US focus is gradually shifting to the Asia-Pacific region mainly for two reasons. First it wants to project its power to counter the rising China phenomenon, an objective which is officially dismissed and downplayed by the US;³⁷ and second, the Asia-Pacific region offers a lucrative market to the US manufacturing industry.³⁸ Therefore, the US is not only struggling to project its off-shore capabilities through new deployments and alliances but also increasing its naval presence around the region with the purpose of dominating the sea lanes and trade corridors.³⁹ The US also sees the rising Japan-China tensions over Senkaku Islands an opportunity to keep its hold over the region and is thus putting its weight behind Japan.⁴⁰
- **Containment of China.** The US envisages an Asia of high economic and geo-strategic value in which China is seen as a strategic challenger posing a threat to its interests. Containment of China in the region thus has become top most priority for the US policy makers,⁴¹ using India as a pivot by exploiting Sino-Indian historical

³⁷Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century", *Foreign Policy*, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century?page=full. See also: Leon E. Panetta, "America's Pacific Rebalance", *Project Syndicate*, December 21, 2012, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/renewing-the-us-commitment-to-the-asia-pacific-region-by-leon-e-panetta>.

³⁸UN News Centre, "Global economy risks falling into renewed recession, warns UN report", December 18, 2012, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43803#.USxZ4h2j2yY>.

³⁹*Aljazeera*, "US military to strengthen presence in Guam", updated June 22, 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2013/06/201362252123311576.html>.

⁴⁰Kirk Spitzer, "Big US Fleet Nears Disputed Islands, But What For?", *Time*, September 30, 2012, <http://nation.time.com/2012/09/30/big-u-s-fleet-nears-disputed-islands-but-what-for/>. See also: *CBS News*, "Amid tensions in Asia, Obama meets with Japanese PM", December 11, 2014. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57570683/amid-tensions-in-asia-obama-meets-with-japanese-pm/.

⁴¹Ted Galen Carpenter, "Washington's Clumsy China Containment Policy", *The National Interest*, November 30, 2011, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/washington%E2%80%99s-clumsy-china-containment-policy-6202>, accessed on December 11, 2014.

rivalry since 1962. The US endeavors to promote India as a strategic balancer to China by enhancing its military, diplomatic and economic stature in the region.⁴²

- **Pushing the “Asia Pivot” Strategy.** Shifting of the economic centre to Asia-Pacific is anxiously being watched by the US which is thus rebalancing itself according to this emerging reality. The newly crafted policy of “Pivot to Asia” has thus drawn mixed reactions from the regional states.⁴³ Most view it as a move to contain China by increasing military presence in Asia Pacific which, according to the US perception, would deter China from undermining the US strategic interests in the region.⁴⁴ The US officials however have argued that this policy is primarily aimed at readjusting the US economic and defence priorities and, therefore, is not directed against China or any other regional country for that matter.⁴⁵ Regardless of these differing opinions, it is a known fact that states seldom reveal their real intentions regarding their adopted policies and the US is no exception to this rule. Great powers always perceive new rising power centres as a potential threat to their influence. Accordingly for the US, the rise of China and a resurgent Russia now pose the biggest challenges since the end of the Cold War. Consequently, states which are either closely aligned with China like Pakistan or states which are not at ease with China like India, would automatically become key players in this new great game.

⁴²C. Raja Mohan, “The New Triangular Diplomacy: India, China and America at Sea”, *The Diplomat*, November 5, 2012, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/05/the-new-triangular-diplomacy-india-china-and-america-on-the-high-seas/?all=true>.

⁴³Richard C. Bush III, “The Response of China's Neighbours to the US “Pivot” to Asia”, *Brookings Institute*, January 31, 2012, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2012/01/31-us-pivot-bush>.

⁴⁴Bonnie S. Glaser, “Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences”, in *Global Forecast 2012 – Risk, Opportunity and the Next Administration*, ed. Craig Cohen and Josiane Gabel (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2012), pp. 23-24. See also: Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 91, No.6, November/December 2012,

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138211/robert-s-ross/the-problem-with-the-pivot>

⁴⁵Leon E. Panetta, “America's Pacific Rebalance”, op cit, December 21, 2012. See also: Shawn Brimley and Ely Ratner, “Smart Shift”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.92, No.1, January/February 2013, .

- **Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons.** Pakistan's nuclear programme had been a cause of concern for the US since its inception. The US tried its level best to prevent Pakistan from acquiring the nuclear weapon capability,⁴⁶ but couldn't succeed in its objective. Despite the fact that Pakistan is now a de-facto nuclear weapons state and has undertaken adequate safety and security measures regarding its nuclear program, the US' apprehensions over Pakistan's nuclear program have not withered away.⁴⁷ The US has 'made ready plans' to secure and seize these weapons under exceptional circumstances. Consequently, securing Pakistani nukes remains one of the top most US foreign policy objectives.⁴⁸
- **Maintaining a Controlled Level of Instability in the Region.** No unanimity exists between scholars regarding real US policy objectives when it comes to establishing peace and stability in South Asia. Two hypotheses dominate the discourse. The first hypothesis posits that a divided and relatively unstable South Asia best serves US interests,⁴⁹ because it provides the US with an opportunity to maintain its influence and presence in the region besides profiting through sale of military hardware to both India and Pakistan. The complex web of intelligence networks and drone

⁴⁶National Security Archive, George Washington University, "Non-Papers and Demarches: US and British Combined to Delay Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program in 1978-1981, Declassified Documents Show", National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 352, July 27, 2011, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb352/index.htm>.

⁴⁷Seymour M. Hersh, "Defending the Arsenal: In an Unstable Pakistan, Can Nuclear Warheads be Kept Safe?" *The New Yorker*, November 16, 2009, .

⁴⁸Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapon's: Proliferation and Security Issues", *Congressional Research Service Report*, 7-5700, February 13, 2013, p 19. See also: Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, "The Pentagon's Secret Plans to Secure Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenals", *The National Journal*, NTI, November 9, 2011, <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/the-pentagons-secret-plans-to-secure-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal/>.

⁴⁹Ejaz Haider, "Define Relation with the US", *The Express Tribune*, July 10, 2012, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/406327/define-relations-with-the-us/>. See also: Ashley J. Tellis, "Stability in South Asia", *RAND Corporation*, Documented Briefing, 1997, pp. 53-54.

strikes in Pakistan, thus killing the militant commanders inclined towards negotiations, is cited as a rational action.⁵⁰ The other viewpoint argues that regional stability remains a topmost priority for the US for it provides ideal strategic and economic opportunities for US' businesses and industry to invest in the region. More so, stability would also reduce the risks of nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan thus paving the way for economic prosperity.⁵¹ The US persistent engagement with India and Pakistan to diffuse tensions after any crisis is cited as evidence in this regard. Nevertheless, both these assertions enable the US defence industry and business to sell military hardware and invest in the region for economic gains.⁵²

- **Controlling the Energy Resources.** One of the key foreign policy objectives of the US is to control the energy resources in Middle East and Central Asia.⁵³ Military deployments and bases in the Middle East and subsequent invasion of Iraq were aimed at attaining physical control over these resources which however did not go as per plan.⁵⁴ Despite strategic defeat in Iraq and

⁵⁰Mikael May, "US Sabotaging Peace talks in Pakistan!", *The News Tribe*, May 31, 2013, <http://www.thenewstribes.com/2013/05/31/u-s-sabotaging-peace-talks-in-pakistan/>. See also: Mark Mazzetti, "A Secret Deal on Drones, Sealed in Blood", *The New York Times*, April 7, 2013, A1.

⁵¹Stephen P. Cohen, "The Future: US Grand Strategy and South Asia", in *The United States and South Asia*, ed. Alexander Evans (New York: Asia Society, 2012), p. 65.

⁵²Tom Hussain, "Arms race between India and Pakistan takes to air", *The National*, May 31, 2011, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/arms-race-between-india-and-pakistan-takes-to-air>.

⁵³Mamoun Fandy, "US Energy Policy in the Middle East", *Foreign Policy in Focus (FPF)*, January 1, 1997, http://www.fpf.org/reports/us_oil_policy_in_the_middle_east. See also: Ariel Cohen, "US Interests and Central Asia Energy Security", *Heritage Foundation*, Backgrounder#1984, November 15, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/11/us-interests-and-central-asia-energy-security>.

⁵⁴*The Independent*, "Blood and oil: How the West will profit from Iraq's most precious commodity", January 7, 2007, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/blood-and-oil-how-the-west-will-profit-from-iraqs-most-precious-commodity-431119.html>

Afghanistan, the military bases in the Gulf States, Afghanistan, South East Asia and Europe still provide assurance to the US for exercising control over these regions. However, due to a rising China and a reasserting Russia, the strategic competition between the global powers is growing.⁵⁵ The emergence of new polar powers poses a daunting challenge for the US to establish its hold on Central Asian and Middle Eastern energy resources.⁵⁶

- **Pakistan's Core Interests in the Region.** Pakistan persistently faces a geo-strategic dilemma due to its location in the region.⁵⁷ Its involvement in the 'Afghan Jihad' during the Cold War and its alliance with the US in the war against terrorism resulted in various predicaments (alongside a few benefits) due to high socio-economic cost and subsequent security problems. Pakistan's informal alliance with the US was aimed at achieving following strategic objectives in the region:
 - **Avoiding a 'Two Front War' Scenario.** Pakistan is relatively a smaller country than India with regards to strength, size and economy. Due to its linear shape and hostile neighborhood, a 'two front war' becomes a doomsday scenario for Pakistan. Owing to its historical hostility with India, Pakistan desperately needs stable and friendly neighbors in the west which could thus provide strategic depth in times of war.⁵⁸ The idea of strategic depth must

⁵⁵Chankaiyee2, "The emergence of a new cold war – China and Russia against US?", *China Daily Mail*, March 26, 2013, <http://chinadailymail.com/2013/03/26/the-emergence-of-a-new-cold-war-china-and-russia-against-usa/>.

⁵⁶Shams uz Zaman, "Strategic Alignments in Asia – I", *Pakistan Observer*, October 17, 2012, p. 5.

⁵⁷Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Present* (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2009), p. 336. See also: Rajpal Budania, *India's National Security Dilemma: The Pakistan Factor and India's Policy Response* (New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company, 2001), pp. 217-218.

⁵⁸Ejaz Haider, "Pakistan Needs Strategic Depth", *The Express Tribune*, October 7, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/268921/pakistan-needs-strategic-depth/>. Also: Asad Durrani, "Strategic Depth – Revisited", October 19, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/277418/strategic-depth--revisited/>.

not be confused with the concept of territorial depth.⁵⁹ Pakistan's quest for a stable and friendly western theatre implies that Afghanistan and Iran should have deep rooted economic and strategic interests in Pakistan, which resultantly could get adversely affected if Pakistan faces a war like situation on its eastern border. This could thus necessitate the western neighborhood to support Pakistan in such a scenario. Pakistan seeks peace with India but, without the resolution of Kashmir dispute peace would remain an elusive term under the prevailing circumstances. In retrospect, Pakistan's desire to have friendly governments in Afghanistan and Iran becomes a policy objective of immense strategic value. Some analysts erroneously deny the notion of 'strategic depth' on the pretext that Pakistan has no such intentions in Afghanistan or for that matter Iran,⁶⁰ thereby implying that Pakistan has no interest in the stability along the Western border which can thus be contested.

- **Strategic Ties with China.** Pakistan and China enjoy historical ties over unique commonality of interests. Although, Pakistan is considerably dependent on Chinese military and economic assistance, this relationship is not one sided. Pak-China joint research ventures have produced some state-of-the-art technologies, which have significantly helped China to improve its own military hardware as well. Production of fighter aircrafts, tanks, energy projects, road and railway infrastructure and naval ports etc. are illustrative of this development. After the end of the Cold War, Pakistan became less significant in US strategic interests resultantly bringing China and Pakistan further closer and thus strengthening their defence and economic relations.⁶¹ Chinese

⁵⁹Shams uz Zaman, "Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran on Middle East and Pakistan", *Strategic Studies*, vol. XXXI and XXXII, no. 4 & 1, (Winter 2011 & Spring 2012), pp. 182-183.

⁶⁰Peer Muhammad, "Envoy denies Pakistan seeking 'Strategic Depth'", *The Express Tribune*, May 6, 2013, p. 2.

⁶¹Muhammd Ishaque Fani, "Pak-China Security Relations and Mutual Ventures" *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan J.R.S.P*, vol.46, no.2, 2009, pp. 83-95. See also: Chintamani Mahapatra, "India-China-Pakistan Triangle: The US Factor", *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal*, vol. 6, No. 4, October-December 2011, pp. 415-416.

bilateral relations with India and US have also improved considerably without fundamentally altering the Pak-China strategic equation. Pakistan's offer to China for developing the Gwadar Port and Chinese investment in CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) is reflective of this reality.⁶² Thus, maintaining a strategic relationship with China is one of the core objectives of Pakistan.

- **Maintaining a Credible Nuclear Deterrence.** Pakistan faces an existential threat from India since its inception. Since 1947, India has been in a process of gradually occupying territories principally belonging to Pakistan notably Kashmir, Junagadh, Manavadar, Run-of-Kutch and Siachen.⁶³ These territorial disputes resulted in three major wars between India and Pakistan, besides numerous skirmishes and conflicts including large scale mobilizations. The perception gap between India and Pakistan grew enormously after the latter's dismemberment of 1971, in which India played a critical role.⁶⁴ Indian 'not so peaceful nuclear tests' in 1974 posed a serious security threat, and as a consequence, Pakistan had to acquire a nuclear deterrent of its own. Due to financial constraints Pakistan cannot afford to engage in a conventional arms race with India, which is continuously modernizing its armed forces at a rapid pace. Thus a cost effective option of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrence, premised on the principle of minimalism, acquires a critical role in Pakistan's security paradigm to deter the possibility of Indian conventional aggression.
- **Maintaining Defence Ties with the US.** Pakistan had mostly considered the US as a strategic balancer vis-à-vis India, and did benefit from the US military technology from time to time. However, this perception was subsequently transformed in later

⁶²*The Express Tribune*, "Gwadar Port handed over to China", February 18, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/509028/gwadar-port-handed-over-to-china/>.

⁶³Sandhya Jain, "Pakistan finds more 'disputes' to fight over", *Niti Central*, February 2, 2013, <http://www.niticentral.com/2013/02/02/pakistan-finds-more-disputes-to-fight-over-43584.html>, March 10, 2015.

⁶⁴A. Z. Hilali, *US – Pakistan Relationship* (England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2005), pp. 35-37.

years, especially after the 1965 and 1971 wars, during which the US support to Pakistan was non-existent. US maintained a transactional nature of relationship with Pakistan, and imposed sanctions time and again when it did not feel Pakistan of much utility. The 1971 debacle ultimately convinced Pakistan that only nuclear weapons could guarantee its territorial integrity against a hostile and conventionally powerful neighbor. US sanctions also played an important role for Pakistan to achieve self-sufficiency in the defence industry to counter Indian offensive posture. Pakistani leaders at times endeavored to secure personal relationships with US policy makers, even at the cost of Pakistan's national interests. This resultantly fermented widespread anti-Americanism in Pakistani society against the US and even a few Pakistani leaders. This contradiction mostly resulted in mistrust between both the governments at times bringing this relationship almost to a breaking point.⁶⁵ Pakistan desires to maintain a strategic relationship with the US but due to ever expanding gap over promises vis-à-vis expectations and Indian significance in the new evolving US Asian policy,⁶⁶ Pakistan's role is perceived to become less significant for the US in future.

- **Defeating Terrorism.** During the Soviet-Afghan war, CIA and Pakistan trained and armed Pakistani, Arab and Afghan militants to take part in the war. However, after 9/11 when Pakistan hesitantly joined the US-led War on Terror, there was a severe backlash, and Pakistan got engulfed in a serious internal security situation. This situation was effectively exploited by hostile intelligence agencies which fuelled the insurgencies in the tribal areas and Baluchistan, exposing Pakistan from eastern as well as western flanks while the

⁶⁵Hassan Abbas, "How Obama can Fix US-Pakistani Relations", December 21, 2011, *Foreign Affairs*, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136978/hassan-abbas/how-obama-can-fix-us-pakistani-relations>, March 10, 2015.

⁶⁶Declan Walsh, "US shift poses risk to Pakistan", *The New York Times*, May 25, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/world/asia/us-shift-poses-risk-to-pakistan.html?pagewanted=all>, March 10, 2015.

US pressure 'to do more' kept increasing.⁶⁷ Defeating the terrorists and militant groups has now become the top most priority for the Pakistani government especially since the tragic attack on school children in Peshawar.

- **Resisting Indian Hegemony in the Region.** Pakistan's threat perception, since its inception remains India centric.⁶⁸ After having fought three major wars and numerous limited conflicts, Pakistan perceives Indian military superiority and hegemony an existential threat. Consequently, Pakistan has always resisted Indian ambitions for regional dominance and global eminence.⁶⁹ This Pakistani policy to resist Indian supremacy is likely to continue in the foreseeable future as well.
- **Economic Prosperity.** Economic prosperity and development remains one of the principal objectives of all the states in modern times including Pakistan. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan's economic goal is to "Project Pakistan's economy as a source of enterprise & innovation".⁷⁰ Although the economic situation has improved in the last several years, there is still a lot more to be done to make Pakistan an economically viable state. The external debt is continuously rising and despite immense resources, Pakistan is likely to remain dependent on the foreign aid in the foreseeable future.
- **Preserving Ideological Foundations.** Pakistan was created on an ideological basis and majority of Pakistanis perceive religion as

⁶⁷ Anwer Iqbal, "Do more mantra doesn't go well down in Pakistan: Sherry Rehman", *Dawn*, March 9, 2013, <http://beta.dawn.com/news/701297/do-more-mantra-doesnt-go-down-well-in-pakistan-envoy>, See also: Eben Kaplan, "Pakistan's balancing act", *Council on Foreign Relations*", last updated October 10, 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistans-balancing-act/p11646>.

⁶⁸ Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), p. 366.

⁶⁹ Javed Husain, "India – an aspiring hegemon", *The Nation*, February 19, 2013, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/columns/19-Feb-2013/india-an-aspiring-hegemon>, accessed March 10, 2015.

⁷⁰ *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Government of Pakistan*, "Objectives", undated, <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/content.php?pageID=overview>.

as playing an important role in their lives and legislation,⁷¹ barring aside a few exceptions.⁷² Although, in practice the governance, security and social issues in Pakistan have dominated its ideological relevance, yet in theory preserving the religious ideology remains an important factor for the Pakistani leadership which has frequently been reiterated in their policy statements from time to time.⁷³

Contending Issues between Pakistan and the US. Having analyzed the US and Pakistani priorities, the diverging issues between Pakistan and the US can be enumerated as below:

- The US sees China as a rising threat and is seeking to contain Chinese influence in the region. Projecting India as a new regional power centre and deployment of forces under the umbrella of off-shore balancing in Asia-Pacific, are new strategic initiatives by the US aimed at containing China. Pakistan being a strategic partner of China cannot become part of this new US game plan. The Chinese involvement in the development of Gwadar port is also seen as a response to the US 'containment of China' policy.
- Pakistan faces a continuous dilemma in Afghanistan. Its efforts to bring the Taliban on to the negotiation table have not yielded desired results due to multiple reasons.⁷⁴ On one hand the

⁷¹Steve Kull and Christine C. Fair, "Pakistanis want larger role for both Islam and democracy", *United Institute of Peace*, January 7, 2008, <http://www.usip.org/publications/pakistanis-want-larger-role-both-islam-and-democracy>. See also: Ansar Abbasi, "84 pc of Pakistani Muslims want Sharia, says PEW survey", May 2, 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-22608-84pc-of-Pakistani-Muslims-want-Sharia-says-PEW-survey>.

⁷²*Dawn*, "Call to declare Pakistan a secular state", June 28, 2012, <http://beta.dawn.com/news/730057/call-to-declare-pakistan-a-secular-state>, See also: Sonia Malik, "Secular Pakistan: 'Pakistanis should know Quaid's Aug 11

⁷³Kalbe Ali, "Islam should serve as unifying force: Kayani", *Dawn*, April 21, 2013, <http://dawn.com/news/1024712/islam-should-serve-as-unifying-force-kayani>.

⁷⁴Michael Kugelman, "If Reconciliation Fails in Afghanistan, What's Plan B?", *War on the Rocks*, March 10, 2016, <http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/if-reconciliation-fails-in-afghanistan-whats-plan-b/>. Michael cited that military offensive in North Waziristan and intelligence agencies activities remain principal reasons for Pakistan to have lost control over the Taliban.

presence of the US forces in Afghanistan fuels insurgency while on the other hand the pull-out of the US troops would have spillover effects inside Pakistan.⁷⁵ Pakistan is also apprehensive of the sizeable Afghan National Army which remains vulnerable to penetration from hostile agencies desiring to raise this heterogeneous force to destabilize Pakistan's tribal areas and Baluchistan. Apprehension of an Indian intelligence officer is a proof of this bitter reality. So far the US and Pakistan have not been able to concede to common ground in Afghanistan.

- Pakistan considers Indian hegemonic regional ambitions as posing an explicit threat to its national security. Any support to India by western states (including the US) in nuclear or conventional area, thus by default becomes a serious challenge for Pakistan. US' growing cooperation with India, in nuclear, missile and defence fields, and its unqualified support to grant India the NSG membership has thus become a foremost concern for Pakistan owing to existing asymmetries in conventional and nuclear fields.

Pakistan's Future Policy Trends

Although Pakistan's strategic salience in the new US policy for the region would be secondary to that of India, yet Pakistan is not likely to become entirely irrelevant for the US in future. New trends in Pakistan's national policy involve:

- Further strengthening of strategic partnership with China especially in the economic and defence fields. CPEC and development of Gwadar Port is an extremely valuable project which illustrates the growing partnership between both the states. Iran, Afghanistan and even India should also be invited to invest in the CPEC project to make the region the hub of economic and trade activities.

⁷⁵Yousaf Nazar, "US should talk to the Haqqanis", *Business Recorder*, October 8, 2011, <http://www.brecorder.com/articles-a-letters/single/626/187:articles/1239612:us-should-talk-to-the-haqqanis/?date=2011-10-08>.

- An endeavor to improve trade relations with Iran while balancing the policy inclination towards Saudi Arabia.⁷⁶ Completing the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline project, which is already in the process, would significantly improve relations with Iran in addition to help in overcoming the energy crisis in Pakistan.
- Critical re-evaluation of policy towards the Gulf States (especially Saudi Arabia) which now involves a more cautious approach for striking a balance between reality and perception. Pakistan was also inclined to play an important role in bridging the gap between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which although it did not yield desired results yet the efforts need to continue in future as well.
- Re-evaluation of old ties with Russia with the purpose of improving the existing relationship to explore possibilities of establishing joint defence and energy projects and considering possibility of technology transfers.⁷⁷ However, such a policy would mandate a strong economic base and fiscal space for purchase of Russian technology. Such transfers could be compensated by offering Russian companies to invest in Pakistan like for example initiating the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) gas pipeline project, expansion of steel mills etc. Russian companies have already shown an interest in the TAPI energy project.
- Pakistan was extremely optimistic to play a pivotal role in negotiations between Taliban and Afghan government on US instance. However, the negotiations could not progress due to Pakistan's incoherent Afghan policy which alienated and subsequently divided the Taliban into several groups. This scenario has encouraged India to use Afghanistan as a base to support insurgency on Pakistan's western front by employing rebellious Taliban and Baluch factions. Pakistan's sole reliance on military

⁷⁶Salman Rafi, "Pakistan's balancing act between Iran and Saudi Arabia", *Asia Times*, February 12, 2016, <http://atimes.com/2016/02/pakistans-balancing-act-between-iran-and-saudi-arabia/>.

⁷⁷Shahbaz Rana, "Pakistan and Russia usher in new era of cooperation", *The Express tribune*, November 21, 2015, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/995578/trade-and-defence-ties-pakistan-and-russia-usher-in-new-era-of-cooperation/>

could keep the tribal belt along the Afghan border in a continuous state of peril in future as well. Therefore, a re-evaluation of policy towards Afghanistan seems imperative, and there is a need to incorporate Afghanistan in energy and economic activities for a durable relationship.

- Pakistan's economic reliance on the US is unsustainable. As the US inclines towards India, the volume of financial aid would dwindle. Maintaining a pragmatic relationship with the US, based on reciprocity without compromising on core Pakistani policy objectives, has so far remained an unfulfilled dream but needs to be adopted by Pakistani policymakers. Despite the US tilt towards India, the US is likely to continue using a 'stick and carrot' policy towards Pakistan by asking it to 'do more' for accomplishing US policy objectives. Trading tangible benefits in quid-pro-quo manner must never be lost sight of. Damaging one's own national interest at the cost of serving US objectives must be avoided at all costs. US limited engagement with Pakistan is likely to continue due to the risks of nuclear confrontation in South Asia.

Conclusion

The Pakistan-US relationship greatly suffered after the Salala attack and the raid on Osama bin Laden's compound. After these incidents it was feared that the relations between both the states could break down and reach to a point of no return. However, despite visible improvement in the bilateral equation, the prevalent mistrust and suspicion regarding each other's motives is likely to affect the US-Pakistan relationship in the future. Despite normalization, due to renewed US priorities in the region, the US is likely to scale down its relations with Pakistan tilting more towards India. US pull-out from Afghanistan and India's increased presence in Kabul would not oblige the US to seek Pakistani support in Afghanistan, and India may replace Pakistan as a strategic partner to the US, especially in the context of containment of China policy. Nevertheless, despite losing its relative significance to the US, Pakistan would still continue to be an important regional actor for other regional players and other global powers. Pakistan thus has to look for alternatives while walking on a tight rope of balancing its relations with the US and other regional powers/states.

Sino-African Strategic Partnership and Stratagem of Foreign Aid: Implications for the West

Dure Shahwar Bano & Sadia Mehmood Falki*

Abstract

China's ascending role and its comprehensive involvement in the African region is of great concern for many Western commentators. Among the Third World states, China stands out to be victorious after surpassing obstacles. It has emerged as a developing state with enormous economic stability. China's relation with Africa is of a strategic nature which works to reduce intolerable issues, extend economic benefits, and deal with Africa as an equal trading partner. Both China and Africa shared the common historical legacy of imperialism and believed that foreign aid is a new technique designed for exploitation. As a result, Africa is leaning more towards China than it was ever before. China's growing economic influence in different regions like Africa is emerging as an interesting area of foreign policy debate among the western political scholars mostly viewing China's strategic relations as a major concern for the western interests in semi-peripheral and peripheral regions. This paper is an attempt at understanding the dynamics of Sino-African emerging strategic partnership. This research also tries to view the Chinese perception of foreign aid as an instrument of trade and investment in the African region as a part of its strategic stratagem to enlarge Chinese influence, which is significantly different from the western stand view of aid and assistance to the developing and underdeveloped states. This article establishes a framework to understand the phenomenon of Chinese foreign aid to the African region as one of the substantial policy measures to enhance interdependence and economic ties rather than just increasing economic dependence for the recipient Africa.

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Key Words: Foreign Policy, China, Africa, Strategic Partnership, Dependency Theory, Marxism, Economic Interdependence, Foreign aid.

Introduction

The twentieth century brought discernible changes in world politics by dividing it into economically deviating blocs. This demarcation has been established as a visible term of International Political Economy since 1960s, precisely distinguishing the rich core states from semi-peripheral and peripheral states. A clear delineation between the developed states of the global North and underdeveloped or developing states of the global South contributed significantly to the nature and structure of the international financial regime and also manifested the economic relations between the two poles in favor of the global North in the Post-Cold war era.¹ Despite the fact that the global South is enriched with natural resources and manpower, several domestic factors like under-development, civil war, backwardness, lack of proper administrative infrastructures, corrupt practices, bribes and most notably political instability made these states vulnerable to external dominance.

These inherent limitations led these states to consider foreign aid as a significant remedy to resolve their economic and developmental problems. However, most of the states from the global South remained largely dependent on the developmental path devised by foreign aid conditions aid down by the developed countries as donors, which were not according to the ground realities of these LDC (Less Developed Countries). The issue of China is based on a different economic paradigm. Unlike capitalist view, its scheme to concentrate on regions rather than individual states for economic development provides an other mode of foreign aid which seems more disposed to maintain cordial economic relations as economic partners with developing regions like Africa.

¹Global North is comprised of 20 percent of world population but have access and control over 80 percent of world resources whereas global South is consisted of 80 percent of population but only 20 percent of resources are available to them. See for further detail Charles W. Kegley and Shannon Lindsey Blanton, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 136-187.

Theoretical Understanding of Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy Strategy

The concept of foreign aid is not new. One can find ample instances in the history of international politics, where states often relieved each other against any uncomplimentary circumstances or impulsive natural disaster. But these initiatives were weak and short termed and often known as humanitarian assistance. Active participation of states in the shape of military assistance, technology, the exchange of information and monetary issues can be traced back to the World War II. After the War, the US, under the Marshall Plan financially rescued the war-torn states of Western Europe and Japan to reconstruct them from the debris of war. Foreign Aid as military support took shape after the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), when the US vigorously pronounced its commitment to contain communism and military assistance as a form of foreign aid was offered to various states of the Middle East, Africa and Asia to act as potential fronts against Soviet ideological and territorial expansion. As a response to the capitalist western bloc, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) developed Warsaw pact to provide military assistance to its allies in the Cold War period. This bipolar skirmish left less room for other states, especially from the South to maintain their foreign relations apart from this bipolar conflict.

The era of 1950's is of great importance in international relations with regard to geo-strategic competition and power contest among the states. This era brought many nascent states on the surface of the world map. China is among those states that emerged as an independent entity after its struggle against colonization in 1949. Its gradual and consistent economic and sustainable political development made it a role model for other states of the global South. China's history of oppression and humiliation as a result of imperial and colonial control by European powers and Japan provided a major theme in its foreign policy orientation that centered on the idea of non-interference in the matters of other states. This led China to espouse the policies and strategies upholding interdependence with other countries at the regional and global level.

According to Morgenthau, foreign aid is an “innovation” in modern foreign policy. This innovation helps many states to reconstruct them. Now, mostly Third World states depend on foreign aid and assistance program mainly from the western donors. Carol Lancaster described foreign aid as a policy or a part of long term policy in order to achieve the long term national goals.² R. C Riddell expounded foreign aid as the transfer of all goods, resources, skills and practical information, financial grants whether as gift or concessional loans.³ Development Assistance Committee of Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) comprehends foreign aid as financial flows, procedural support and supplies that are designed to promote economic prosperity, safety and welfare, in the form of grant or subsidized loan and technology.

To comprehend the phenomena of foreign aid, it is important to understand the hypothetical base for foreign aid. Many spectators deliberate and frequently interface it with the two noteworthy schools of thought in international relations; Realism and Liberalism. Under the Realism paradigm, the primary contention is based on the assumption that the world is anarchic and there is no supreme power to regulate the relations. The overwhelming element of realism is the survival of the fittest, so in order to ensure security and maintain existing status quo, states fervently embraced those strategies which are viable for their survival. One of such power execution instruments is the foreign aid through which, a powerful state exercises its authority and extends its sphere of influence.

Liberalism paradigm, on the other hand, advocates human rights, free will and free trade among the states. Liberal stand considers individuals as instrumental in international relations. Liberalism believes that people start such procedures which expand association and thus augment the survival risks and minimize the perils. In this globalized paradox, interdependence and interaction is necessary and no state can avoid it. In this manner, foreign aid is a powerful and helping tool to increase harmony between the donor and recipient states.

²Carol Lancaster, “*Foreign aid: Diplomacy, development and domestic politics* (London: Chicago Press, 2007), 19-26.

³Roger C. Riddell. *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* (London: Oxford, 2007) ,17.

With the advent of globalization, specifically with the economic expansion of markets across the globe and emergence of non-state actors as significant players, there is a need for an exclusive theoretical framework to understand the phenomena of foreign aid. In this contesting milieu, proponents of Constructionism provide Modernization theory as a significant systematic approach to correlate developmental strategies and foreign aid. Modernization theorists attempt to locate a pathway to accomplish development, while claiming that the Third World states are dependent and underdeveloped due to the inherent exploitative structures of the international economic order. Many of the dependency theorists also expounded that it's a trap to capture African rich resources and to introduce them to the capitalist world.⁴ According to Modernization theory, social change is multi-dimensional. Most of the developed states passed through the same procedure. It is an evolutionary process from backwardness to illumination to achieving political development; hence it is evolutionary not revolutionary.⁵ States from North Pole are not ready to facilitate the South countries to pass through that process of evolution, and are intentionally restricting them by imposing sanctions and discouraging protectionist policies which is coined by Ha Joon Chang as "Kicking Away the Ladder".⁶

Dependency Theory

The aforementioned speculations encompass the relationship between foreign policy, foreign aid, power, development and modernization. One way or the other these theories work to maintain the status quo of major powers. After WWII, major states were economically wrecked and politically fragmented. Before that, weak states' exploitation was at its

⁴Alvin Y. So *social change and development modernization dependency and world-system*, (Sage Publications, 1990),2.

⁵ibid, 2.

⁶Mr. Ha Joon Chang criticized the great pressure put forward by developed states on developing states to follow certain "good policies and strategies", he concluded that developed states "kick away the ladder" with which they have moved up to the top. In this way keeping nations from embracing strategies and institutions that they themselves have utilized for economic development. For further reading see Ha-Joon Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective* (London: Anthem, 2002)

peak. After the war, social scientists tried to develop a framework for political and economic development in peripheral states. Marxists rejected the cooperation by adopting the policies of trade and avoidance of conflict through power politics. Marxists focused on the economy, which superseded other aspects of political development.

Neo-Marxist theorists debate over the unjustified division of wealth among states: why the Third World states depend on the core states. Dependency theory is strongly affiliated with Marxism, which maintains that major powers penetrate for natural resources in developing states. Dependency theory strongly contributes towards foreign aid; the concept emanated from the Latin American situation and propounded by Latin American intellectual Raul Prebisch. Dependency theory was a result of failure of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the structural inequality between North and South. Dependency theory refuted the orthodox Marxist claim of bourgeois revolution to nurture development as the successful revolution of China has fundamentally dismissed the idea. Similarly, following a modernization path to achieve development was also rejected by the dependency theorists.⁷

A renowned proponent of dependency theory, Gunder Frank, explicated the dependency cycle in his Metropolis Satellite Exploitation Model. In his analysis, Frank asserted the developmental process of the developing states by criticizing the concept of modernization theorists who claimed that the underdevelopment is due to ignorance and backwardness. Frank gave the examples of China and India who were once developed but because of colonization, confronted backwardness. Under Metropolis Satellite Exploitation Model, Frank explains that an underdeveloped state works as a satellite state of a hegemon by transferring economic surplus.⁸ Another reason of exploitation is the

⁷So, *social change and development modernization dependency and world-system*, 91-95.

⁸Ibid, 95-99

foreign direct investment, loans and grants, which later become an impediment in the developmental phase of the local market. Due to the structural limitation of industrial development, e.g. export control of foreign capital, subsidized product, budget deficit problem, trade, tariff and the lower earnings from the primary products, developmental sector is monopolized.

By examining the main contention of both the realist and the liberalist, one can differentiate that a power struggle and interdependency are the catalysts of change. Liberals were regularly condemned by the critics for advancing private enterprise and encouraging another way of exploitation. Realists used individual's penalty and power politics to extend their status quo. Dependency theory is more allied to the concept of foreign aid and their interrelation with the development and contested interest of the major powers. Although many scholars have discussed the concept of foreign aid, the dependency theory has provided a more comprehensive and conceptual development to understand this phenomena and its relation with the core and periphery states. Unlike realism, liberalism and modernization theorists who lack a basic element: "domestic politics of developing state" in their assumption for development, the dependency theorists incorporate these elements while explaining in relation with development.

Foreign aid, as a policy measure, has its varying consequences according to its objectives, type, nature of restrictions and conditions attached. Some of these are as follows:

- The main advantage of foreign aid in any underneath state is that it will bridge the gap between budget deficit and capital formation.
- Developing a proper infrastructure for agriculture, the industrial segment is challenging for developing states due to their inability to properly employ natural resources and human capital in investment sector. Through foreign aid, new specialized learning and data can, without much of a stretch, be passed on. Coordinated effort with any developed state in specialized terms will expand the adequacy and efficiency of a developing state.

- Foreign aid in the shape of food, sanctuary and medicine will help to meet the emergencies.
- Foreign aid, if utilized properly will create income and build the expectation for everyday comforts of the beneficiary states. On the other hand, foreign aid can be used as a neo-imperialist strategy by donor countries to put the recipient states in a subservient position. This can lead to empowering donor countries to pull the political and diplomatic strings through economic-hegemonic control.
- The main disadvantage of foreign aid is the increase in foreign debt. With increasing interest rate, it is difficult for a receiving state to pay the debt and meet their needs.
- Recipient countries do not exert for the proper use of foreign aid. Sometimes it is used to enrich politicians, bureaucrats and other top orders of the state.
- Foreign aid is a tool of exploitation and is employed by major powers in order to extend their political influence or to accomplish their foreign policy goals.

Progression of Sino-African Ideological, Economic and Strategic Ties

Throughout the years, economic stability and political development remained the main theme of Chinese foreign policy towards major regions of the world which considerably enlarged its area of influence across the globe.⁹ Africa is one of the significant regions, which is of great importance to China's investment and trade for its sustainability of economic development and military power. The economic and political relations between China and Africa dated 500 years back. However, a profound change was observed in the last three decades after the

⁹For an exceptional history on Sino-African ties, see David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement*, Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania, 2012. For a brief review of Maoist ties with Africa, see Domingos Jardo Muekalia, "Africa and China's Strategic Partnership," *African Security Review*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2004.

changing dynamics of international politics.¹⁰ Sino-African foreign relations were initiated in 1951 by establishing China's diplomatic ties with Egypt.¹¹ Political commentators and scholars describe the transformation of Sino-African relationship from formal diplomatic ties to a strategic partnership. They divide the nature of foreign aid into three main phases. These phases were highly influenced by the realities of the international world order and domestic socio-political circumstances. Beijing's engagement with the African region is not at all a new development; however, its nature of associations remained varying in all three phases. Strategic partnership between the two sides evolved and developed steadily.

The first phase was characterized by China's urge of getting political and diplomatic recognition majorly from the global South as China was not on good terms with both the Capitalist West and the expansionist and revisionist USSR.¹² Thompson explains that the evolution of Sino-African relations were largely characterized by aid agreements which assisted the various African states with aid projects in the form of technical and financial resource.¹³ Looy considers China's

¹⁰China is having a significant effect on Africa on its socio-political, monetary and social aspects. Migration to Africa from China has existed for no less than 500 years, however, it has quickened in the previous 5 years as new business opportunities become apparent. For further detail please see Giles Mohan and Diner Kale, *The invisible hand of South-South globalization: Chinese migrants in Africa*, (A Report for the Rockefeller Foundation prepared by The Development Policy and Practice Department, The Open University, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK., 2007).

¹¹Zhang Chun, *The Sino-Africa Relationship: towards a strategic partnership*, in *Emerging Powers in Africa*, (Special Report, LSE Ideas., 2013), <http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/publications/reports/pdf/sr016/sr-016-chun.pdf>.

Kanaz, T.M. "Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa ; An African View", in, *Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa* ,ed.W.Weinstien ,(New York: Praeger Publisher,1975)

¹²Kanaz, T.M. "Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa ; An African View", in, *Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa* ,ed.W.Weinstien ,(New York: Praeger Publisher,1975)

¹³Thompson Drew, "China's soft power in Africa: From the" Beijing Consensus" to health diplomacy," *China Brief*, no. 21 (2005)

strategy as simply an attempt to increase as many allies as it could possibly maintain.¹⁴

In this phase, China's collaboration with many Asian and African nations was structured on the basis of shared history under colonialism and ideological discernment against Western domination.¹⁵ The first phase of China's aid to Africa was a purely ideological one. The relations among states were based on ideological orientation. African states were also looking for diplomatic and financial support from the political allies to advance their nationalist movements for independence. China assisted many African states in the form of economic, technical, political and military support as a counter to the policy of western imperialism.¹⁶

The Sino-African relations were reconnected in the Bandung Conference of 1955, where Zhou Enlai supported the struggle of developing states against colonialism. Before that, five principles of peaceful coexistence also laid the basis for non-interference and friendly relations with neighboring states. Under the Maoist perceptions, relationship with Africa was maintained on the Chinese geopolitical and ideological considerations. Since 1950, China initiated various aid programs, which at that time were rather limited in scope.

Under the Cold War setting, foreign aid was considered a vital political mean that Beijing used to expand its diplomatic recognition and to compete with the Soviet Union and the US, and to obtain recognition, support from the African region. The formal aid program evolved gradually. Zhou Enlai visited ten African countries in 1963-1964

¹⁴Judith van de Looy, "Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership?" ASC Working Paper 67/2006, Leiden, the Netherlands: African Studies Center, 2006, p. 06.

¹⁵The Bandung Afro-Asian Conference of 1955 emerged as effective forum for promoting economic and cultural relations between China and 29 African and Asian states where colonialism, imperialism and hegemonic position of West was viewed as major common threats.

¹⁶Peking Review of 26 January, 1973, advocated armed opposition by stating "the armed struggle is the only way through which colonialism, apartheid, and racial discrimination in Southern Africa and Guiney can be eliminated." Quoted in Larkin, B.D. (1975) " *Chinese Aid in political Context 1971-1975; Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa* , ed. W. Weinstien, (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1975)

and developed “Eight Principles of Economic and Technical Aid to Africa”. Key agenda of this diplomatic expansion was to facilitate African countries by offering “condition free loans, interest free loans, technical assistance and local market development.” At the same time, these aid principles were also intended to contend with the “imperialists” (the US) and the “revisionists” (the Soviet Union) and ultimately gaining Africa's approval and support.”¹⁷

From the year 1966 onward, despite China's determination to support Third World states against neo-imperialism, its domestic uncertainties caused by the Cultural Revolution diverted its focus from nourishing its partnership with the African states. However diplomatic relations were still extended to many African countries.¹⁸ China remained actively involved in developing the infrastructure of African states through its aid projects. “Tanzania-Zambia railway”¹⁹ was one of the significant aid projects by China in African region in 1970s. Many other African states were also offered construction of federal buildings, factories and the development of infrastructures. China also made use of


¹⁷The principles include: China always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other nations; China never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges; China helps lighten the burden of recipient countries as much as possible; China aims at helping recipient countries to gradually achieve self-reliance and independent development; China strives to develop aid projects that require less investment but yield quicker results; China provides the best-quality equipment and materials of its own manufacture; in providing technical assistance, China shall see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such techniques; the Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities. “Zhou Enlai Announced Eight Principles of Foreign Aid,” China Daily, August 13, 2010.

¹⁸In 1967, China has 13 diplomatic missions in Africa and by 1974 this was increased upto 30. By 1979, a total number of 49 African states established diplomatic relations with China. see for further detail: Yizhou Wang, “*Transformation of foreign Affairs and International relations in China 1978-2008*”, Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2011.

¹⁹It was the largest project assisted by China in Africa under which 1800 km railway track was constructed with cost over US\$ 450 million.

its health diplomacy and student exchange programs to advance its multidimensional ties with the African region.²⁰

The second phase of Sino-African relations began in the Post-Maoist period. China at that time inevitably needed new investments in economic markets across the globe. The aim was to modernize its economy and enlarge its power under the commercial strategic theme of “Go Global”. However, in this era, Beijing heavily depended on the West for expanding its commercial links and for technical advancement. This led China to confine its role to being only a facilitator in the “North-South Dialogue” instead of acting as a champion of anti-imperialist causes as it attempted in the first phase of relations with Africa. During this phase, largely due to Cold War compulsions, Moscow and Washington with varying intensity remained involved in containment strategies which provided enough space for Beijing to focus on other states instead.²¹ However, to expand the Chinese trade prospects, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited eleven African countries in December 1982 and pronounced following four principles of Chinese collaboration with and assistance to Africa states.²²



In second phase of post-Maoist China, Beijing's economic interests increasingly ascended as the prime drivers of its foreign relations with Africa. Looy expounded in a working paper by the African Studies Centre

²⁰Since 1964 around 15000 doctors and health workers have been sent to more than 47 African states. Approximately 180 million patients have been treated by Chinese doctors over the years. For further reading see Philip Snow, *The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).

²¹Judith van de Looy, “Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership?” ASC Working Paper 67/2006, Leiden, The Netherlands: African Studies Center, 2006, 5.

²²Taylor, I. “China's Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa in the post Maoist Era, 1978-1999”, in F. Columbus (ed.) *Politics and Economics of Africa*, Volume 1, New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 2001

that, despite all the developments on diplomatic front, Africa remained less relevant for China during the decade of the 1980s as Beijing was more occupied with the issue of international recognition, especially from the United States and the Soviet Union. This led China to expand its contacts towards Western countries to advance its economic development. Moreover, the lack of financial resources was also one of the reasons behind China's incapacity to assist or support African countries against dictators.²³

The third phase of foreign aid was based on economic pragmatism. In this third phase of its relationship with African region, the orientation of its policy emerged as non-ideological and more inspired by its “Go Global Strategy”.²⁴ In this phase China seemed less concerned with the type of regime and their ideological positions. It was primarily the economic interests that shaped the Chinese behavior in its foreign relations. The third phase of relations which truly translated the Sino-African ties into a strategic partnership began in the Post-Tiananmen Square events which strained Chinese relations with the West. As a result of these developments, China once again turned towards “South-South cooperation” to pronounce its traditional stance of non-interference in order to counter the Western allegations of Chinese human rights violations in Tiananmen Square.

²³Looy, *Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership?*, 5.

²⁴The “Go Global” policy was outlined in the CCP's tenth Five-Year Plan in 2001 (China Internet Information Center, “China Mapping Out the 11th Five-Year Development Guidelines,” website, China.org, undated), and reaffirmed in the 12th Five-Year Plan in 2011 (People's Republic of China, Twelfth Five-Year Plan, trans. Delegation of the European Union in China, March 2011). The policy calls for Chinese firms and institutions to expand China's outgoing foreign direct investment (FDI) globally and to place an equal importance on outgoing and incoming FDI. Doing so facilitates several goals, among them the ownership of assets abroad, a larger global role for Chinese finance, the development of “national champion” firms, and expanding overseas markets for Chinese exports. See Linda Yueh, “China's 'Going Out, Bringing In' Policy: the Geo-economics of China's Rise,” International Institute of Strategic Studies Geo-Economics and Strategy Seminar, A New Era of Geo-Economics: Assessing the Interplay of Economic and Political Risk, March 25, 2012

Foreign aid is one of the significant aspects of Sino-African relations since the inception of their ties, however, China has its own meaning, definition and strategy of foreign aid in accordance with its developmental path evidently diverse from the Western perspective.²⁵ Notwithstanding Beijing's claim that the aid and assistance to Africa is thoroughly related to economic development, political commentators have noted that the political and diplomatic intents have been driving the aid program.

China amassed a substantial role in the international aid system; especially its long term engagement with African states is increasing the apprehension among major states. China was the first developing country to establish an aid program.²⁶ Tom Crouch (Director of Aid Program for Philippines at the Asian Development Bank) views China as a power player, who has established trading relations with Sudan, Nigeria and Angola, and changed the landscape of international assistance.²⁷ China provided foreign aid for three reasons; strategic interest, commercial and economic benefit and ideological objectives.²⁸

²⁵Officially, China provides eight types of foreign aid: complete projects, goods and materials, technical cooperation, human resource development cooperation, medical assistance, emergency humanitarian aid, volunteer programs, and debt relief. China's aid to Africa covers a wide array of fields, such as agriculture, education, transportation, energy, communications, and health. According to Chinese scholars, since 1956, China has provided almost 900 aid projects to African countries, including assistance supporting textile factories, hydropower stations, stadiums, hospitals, and schools. See for further detail : un Sun, "China's Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah? Institution," Brookings, last modified February 7, 2014, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/>.

²⁶Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift: the real story of China in Africa* (UK: Oxford University Press,2009),33.

²⁷Perlez, Jane. "China Compete with West in Aid to Its Neighbors." Asia Pacific, New york Times . September 18, 2006. Accessed November 17, 2015.http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/18/world/asia/18iht-web.0918aid.2845121.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed on November 17, 2015)

²⁸Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift: the real story of China in Africa*, (UK: Oxford University Press,2009),15

Furthermore Beijing and Chinese commercial companies have three key economic interests in the African region:²⁹

- Quest for natural resource import.
- Utilization of a rising and comparatively unexplored economic market for Chinese exports and investment.
- A thriving prospect for Chinese companies to increase employment opportunities and accomplishment of “Go Global” commercial strategy.³⁰

In the year 2000, Sino-African strategic partnership was further strengthened by the establishment of 'Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)'.³¹

²⁹Renowned American Think tank, RAND has identified mainly four strategic dynamics driving the China's aid policy. First, it wants access to natural resources, particularly oil and gas. It is estimated that, by 2020, China will import more oil worldwide than the United States. To guarantee future supply, China is heavily investing in the oil sectors in countries such as Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria. Second, investments in Africa, a huge market for Chinese exported goods, might facilitate China's efforts to restructure its own economy away from labor-intensive industries, especially as labor costs in China increase. Third, China wants political legitimacy. The Chinese government believes that strengthening Sino-African relations helps raise China's own international influence. Most African governments express support for Beijing's "One China" policy, a prerequisite for attracting Chinese aid and investment. Finally, China has sought a more constructive role as contributor to stability in the region, partly to mitigate security-related threats to China's economic interests. see for further detail see: Hanauer, Larry and Lyle J. Morris. *China in Africa: Implications of a Deepening Relationship*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9760.html.

³⁰Lloyd Thrall, “*China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for US National Security*”. Rand Corporation, 2015, 12.

³¹FOCAC was established with an aim of pronouncing an international political and economic order which was participated by over 40 African states with 80 foreign minister and ministers with addition of 17 international and regional organizations to enhance South-South Cooperation. This conference developed two major documents, The Beijing Declaration And Programme for China-Africa Cooperation In Economics and Social Development.

Main theme of this conference from Chinese perspective was:

- Appraising prospects of South-South Cooperation
- Construction of international economic and political order in accordance with South's reservations and concerns.³²

The issue of debt relief was raised at the first meeting of FOCAC by African states which was resisted by Beijing. However, a very cordial and positive gesture was made during second meeting of FOCAC, held in Addis Ababa in 2003 where Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao pronounced that the investment and foreign assistance 'comes with the deepest sincerity and without any political condition'. This led China to announce the debt relief of total 'US \$ 1.27 billion' and offering of aid packages to several African countries.³³ Sino-African cooperative measures were further expanded on November 4, 2006 when 43 African countries participated in FOCAC's Beijing Summit. China's role was largely strengthened, not merely as a donor, but as a partner of the African region, which elevated the relations up to strategic heights. This was much appreciated by African states. The Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, stated during the summit that 'China's policy of non-interference and respect for sovereignty contributed to the establishment of Sino-African partnership based on mutual trust'.³⁴ China has profoundly influenced African economies, as is particularly evident in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the most recent decade, the Chinese have built a network of trade and exchange along with the investment with nearly fifty nations.³⁵ Rand Corporation noted in a report on Sino-African partnership that "China's officially reported annual aid to Africa has grown steadily from US \$550 million in 2000 to US \$2.5 billion in 2011, representing about half of China's total aid budget."³⁶


³²See for further detail: www.china.org/english/features/china-Africa/82047.htm (10 september 2016)

³³Looy, working paper, 12.

³⁴Yizhou Wang, "Transformation of foreign Affairs and International relations in China 1978-2008", Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2011. p. 73

³⁵Zafar, Ali. "The growing relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, trade, investment, and aid links." *The World Bank Research Observer* 22, no. 1 (2007): 103-130.

³⁶Thrall, "China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for US National Security", p.39



Ideological Partnership

Since the Cold War period, in order to enhance the 'third-world solidarity', China advanced its image as an alternate model of political and economic development against neo-imperialist and North dominated-power politics. Though Beijing never overtly pronounced this policy, however, to validate its economic and political centralization within the Chinese state apparatus, "Beijing Consensus of state-based capitalism and tighter political control" are largely propagated.³⁷

³⁷While the "Beijing Consensus" is a Western term, Chinese sources do portray parts of China's state-led economic model as an alternative to that of the more private-led model of Western states. For example, Xinhua, "China's Development Model Good Example for African Nations: CCM Vice-Chairman of Tanzania," June 21, 2012.

Africa was pivotal for China in its early struggle for recognition in the world arena. Africa at the same time passed through a transitional phase in which nascent states emerged as the result of decolonization. China remains an important factor for Africa for its struggle against colonial rule and sustainability against external and internal vulnerability. Sino-African partnership serves as a role model for the developing states. Secondly, China's policy of non-interference and non-aggression is of great concern for Africa. Without having any expansionist intention, China's involvement in the world and particularly in the Third World states, serves a good example.

China's state centered policies are also commendable for Africa as it encouraged domestic market due to which the inflow of imports and exports has increased. On the other hand, Africa has its sustainable visibility in international organizations such as the United Nations and its vote is crucial for China. With the help of Africa and other developing states, China is playing its role in the maintenance of a multipolar world to avoid hegemonistic intentions of any other state. With China as a reference, Africa is more aware of its strategic importance. Beijing summit broadened the continental frame of reference for China's foreign policy and strengthened Africa's self-perception.³⁸ Today China is more interested in developing a common identity for all the developing states, most of which are African states.³⁹

Economic Partnership

David Brown, a scholar in the US National Defense University is of the view that Chinese political and commercial actors are more inclined to view Africa through an "optimist" lens, while the Western actors mostly resort to a "pessimistic" approach largely owing to the prevalent problems of famine and conflict.⁴⁰ China and Africa on economic fronts

³⁸Thomas Fues & Sevn Grimm, Denise Laufer "China's Africa policy: opportunity and challenge for European development cooperation", German Development institute" briefing paper,4/2006

³⁹I Taylor "China's foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990's," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 36,3: 450.

⁴⁰Thrall, "China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for US National Security",13.

are cooperating to sustain their developmental goals. China's economic ties with the African region are built on strong structural footings as Africa's generous store of crude oil and raw materials are very crucial for China's enormous economy. Liberia's Finance Minister Antoinette Sayeh acknowledged the learning capacity and policy initiatives of China, and declared it as a role model to reduce poverty for African states.⁴¹ The Chinese model of interest essentially brings money related advancement targets in Africa largely based on 'no string attached' financial and specialized help.⁴² Current engagement of China and its concessional loans to Africa appeal to majority of the states in Africa. These countries look forward to the Chinese aid as both the states have confronted colonialism in the past and were defrauded at the hands of the Western states.⁴³

More importantly, the Chinese involvement in Africa is based on shared advantages with minimal political objectives. Their relationship is more about partnership than that of a borrower and lender. In November 2006, 43 states of Africa were present in the international summit in Beijing. This conference led to a new strategic partnership between Africa and China with a massive aid package, augmented technical assistance and a win-win situation for both.⁴⁴ It is a fact that the

⁴¹Transcript of IMF press conference of African finance ministers, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, April 14, 2007, (<https://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2007/tr070414a.htm>) online accessed on 13 September, 2015

⁴²Zafar, Ali. "The growing relationship between China and Sub-Saharan Africa: Macroeconomic, trade, investment, and aid links." *The World Bank Research Observer* 22, no. 1 (2007): 103-130.

⁴³In support of Beijing's wider "Go Global" commercial strategy, the CCP's eleventh Five-Year Plan in 2006 called for a global expansion of Chinese special economic zones (SEZs).⁸⁹ China has initiated six SEZs within Africa: Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Zambia, and two in Nigeria (Ogun and Lekki).⁹⁰ The purpose of SEZs is to attract Chinese and other foreign investment and to reduce the costs, risks, and delays of doing business in Africa. SEZs function by incentivizing firms—through subsidies, tax breaks (both Chinese and host nation), and cheap loans—to move or establish businesses within the zone

M. Chidaushe, "China's grand re-entrance into Africa – mirage or oasis?," in *African Perspective on China in Africa*, ed. F. Manji, and S. Marks (Cape town, Nairobi: Oxford, 2007), p.107 - 118.

Chinese concessional loans are more attractive to African states than the preconditioned loans from the West, and they believe that China's involvement in Africa keeps African states away from the international marginalization.

China's presence in Africa is multi-lateral which further extended visibly during 1990's. China has increased its inclusion, investment, transfer of technology and resources in Africa. Major focus was on infrastructure building. Chinese investment in Africa started from 410 Million USD in 1990, transformed into a tremendous 3 Billion USD in 2004 and surged up to 5 Billion USD in 2008. From 2009 to 2012, huge concessional credits were given to Africa worth 10 Billion USD, in contrast to World Bank lending of 4.5 Billion USD since 2006.⁴⁵ China is one of the largest partners in African mining and imports more minerals and material than the US and EU. As per the reports, 66 percent of oil from Africa is exported to China, followed by copper, Iron, cotton, zinc, lead and diamond.⁴⁶ Africa is one of the largest FDI destinations for China. Starting from 1 percent in 2000 to at least 3 percent in 2010 and, since 2009, it generally expanded 20 percent.⁴⁷

Table No 1: Foreign direct investment, 2009-14 (USD million)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Inflow	54,379	44,072	47,405	56,435	53,969	53,912
Outflow	6,225	9,264	6,500	12,386	15,961	13,073

Source: "Statistics," African Economic Outlook, accessed September 20, 2016, <http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/statistics>.

Chinese inclusion in Africa is far more than just a demoralizing issue, though its involvement is greatly observed by the Western states, but there are few examples with positivity by the west in Sino-African relations. China is one of the largest trade partners in Africa, owning

⁴⁵Nida, Jafrani. China's Growing Role in Africa: Myths and Facts, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace February 9, 2012: <http://carnegieendowment.org/ieb/2012/02/09/china-s-growing-role-in-africa-mythsand-facts/9j5q> (accessed on 05/09/2016).

⁴⁶Thrall, "China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for US National Security", pg 30

⁴⁷Ibid 39-40.

almost 900 factories pan-Africa, playing its significant role in improving the conditions of Africa. Zambia-China economic corridor (2007) brought a huge investment of 800 Million USD, creating thousands of local jobs.

In 2005 China lifted import tariff from 190 goods from 29 African states. Increasing interdependence of Sino-African partnership has been identified by Rand Corporation in a report in 2015 by calling it a “peaceful development of Chinese power” in the African region where China has emerged as the largest trade partner on the whole.⁴⁸ China also has become the largest exporter of small armaments and light weapons to African countries. Sino-African economic ties are largely more significant to African countries than to China as Sino-African trade stands for 15 percent of total African trade but just accounts for 5 percent of total trade of China.⁴⁹

Table 2: China's Trading Partners in Africa in 2012

Sr. No.	State	2012 Total Chinese Trade in Million	2012 Total Sino-African Trade in (%)	Chinese Imports in Millions	2012 Chinese imports from Africa (%)	2012 Chinese exports in Million	Chinese exports to Africa (%)
1	South Africa	59,494.8	33	44615.5	42	15,334.4	21
2	Angola	37,502.2	21	33,458.3	32	4,044.2	5
3	Nigeria	10,573.8	6	1,266.2	1	9,307.6	12
4	Egypt	9,546.4	5	1,321.4	1	8,225.0	11

⁴⁸Though China stands second as a trading partner to Africa as compare to an aggregated European Union.

⁴⁹Thrall, “*China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for US National Security*,” pg 12-13.

5	Libya	8,760.3	5	6,368.2	6	2,392.1	3
6	Algeria	7,737.4	4	2,319.8	2	5,417.6	7
7	Ghana	5,432.3	3	624.8	1	4,789.5	6
8	Congo (Republic of Congo)	5,075.7	3	4,555.0	4	520.7	1
9	Democratic of Congo	4,347.1	2	3,508.5	3	838.4	1
10	Sudan	4,220.4	2	2,040.3	2	2,180.1	3
11	Morocco	3,692.2	2	562.2	1	3,130.0	4
12	Togo	3,468.5	2	84.8	0	3,383.8	5
13	Zambia	3,348.7	2	2,688.6	3	696.2	1

Source: Lloyd Thrall, "China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for US National Security". Rand Corporation, 2015, pg 26.

Table 3: China's Most Important Trading Partners from Africa In 2004

Angola	3422.63 Million USD
South Africa	2567.96 Million USD
Sudan	1678.60 Million USD
Republic of Congo	1224.74 Million USD
Guinea	787.96 Million USD
Gabon	415.39 Million USD
Nigeria	372.91 Million USD
Algeria	216.11 Million USD
Morocco	208.69 Million USD
Chad	148.73 Million USD

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (May, 2005)

According to the second White Paper on China's foreign aid, in three years (2010-2012) since the last report, China provided US \$ 14.41 billion in official development assistance (ODA), or an average of US \$ 4.8 billion per year:

- 7.26 billion Yuan (\$1.17 billion) of interest-free loans
- 32.32 billion Yuan (\$5.21 billion) of grants
- 49.76 billion Yuan (\$8.03 billion) in concessional loans

According to the paper, 51.8 percent of Chinese aid goes to Africa. This means an average of US \$ 2.5 billion per year between 2009 and 2012.⁵⁰

China's economic partnership is helping many African states to maintain their sustainability. Many states got ample opportunities to balance their trade ratio with the export of crude materials. However, few states suffer from an influx of low-cost consumer products from China which topples the balance of their import/export relations. China's selling of weapons to African states also creates aggravation among nations. China's strategic and military aid to Africa made China a strong ally of Africa. In response to that, Africa ideologically supports China's stance in the United Nations. China has been one of the world's advanced and growing economies since the start of the present decade. Its hankering for crude materials has driven up product's costs and therefore supported development in Africa.⁵¹ On the other hand, China's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is essential for Africa for reaching its Millennium Development Goals (MDG).

Social Partnership

One distinguished feature of China's aid to Africa is non-conditional loans which are more convenient than the Western Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). The West is more concerned about democratic reforms in Africa, whereas, China focuses more on political and economic development. China is the major contributor in infrastructure building. With the coordinated efforts of local African market and strategic monetary policies, China has introduced a positive investment environment in Africa. This initiative is more conducive and slanted towards development as it is more compatible with the ground realities of Africa.

More importantly, traditional Western donors, who imposed political and economic sanctions with high investment standards, set by ISO, overlook the indigenous issues and formative crevices between North

⁵⁰Deborah Brautigam, "China in Africa: The Real Story: China's Second Foreign Aid White Paper Published -- Finally!," China in Africa: The Real Story, last modified July 10, 2014, <http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2014/07/chinas-second-foreign-aid-white-paper.html>.accessed online on 16th Sept, 2015

⁵¹Goldstein Andrea et al., *The Rise of China and India What's in it for Africa?: What's in it for Africa?* (Paris: OECD Development Centre Studies, 2006),37-50

More importantly, traditional Western donors, who imposed political and economic sanctions with high investment standards, set by ISO, overlook the indigenous issues and formative crevices between North and South states. China then again, entirely takes over its non-intervention and non-interference rule and remains neutral in any political or domestic issue, until it becomes a threat to regional stability. China's impartial position and non-impedance expectations were plainly exhibited on account of Sudan. Despite the immense pressure from the West and criticism for non-cooperation, China focused on the political solution of this issue rather than putting sanctions and undue pressure on already conflict torn area.

Table 4: Chinese-aided Complete Plant Projects in Africa by 2009

Total	Agriculture Projects	Schools	Hospitals	Sports Ventures	Conference Centers	Industrial Projects	Others
884	142	71	54	53	62	145	357

Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China

Regarding the socio-political dimension, China's involvement in Africa is more comprehensive and multilateral. China is more willing to guide the directions of African people to decide about their own future. China has added to the United Nations peacekeeping missions all through Africa. In April 2003, around 175 Chinese troops and a medical group of 42 members were conveyed to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) on a peacekeeping mission, and in December 2003 almost 600 Chinese peacekeepers were sent to Liberia. 1,400 Chinese were conveyed to Africa in 2004, in nine United Nations peacekeeping missions. China deputed almost 11,000 Chinese personnel (technicians, engineers and police, etc.) in 18 peacekeeping operations in Africa.⁵² China's role and level of engagement in Africa is far higher than the other permanent members of the United Nations, which is highly commendable.

On the higher education level, China and Africa share common goals and have taken mutual steps to increase the cooperation in this regard. In 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the pattern of education initiatives was limited and based on partial educational exchange programs. However the

⁵²Thrall, "China's Expanding African Relations: Implications for US National Security, pg 50-54

action plan of Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, 2000) focused more on training and scholarships for African students. Further, to improve efficiency, the human development mechanism was set up to train the African professionals. Since the last decade, the volume of professional training and scholarships has been increased to double in size. Third (China, Africa Cooperation) FOCAC meeting decides to build 100 schools in different African countries.⁵³ Since 1964, around 15,000 Chinese medicinal laborers have set out to 47 African nations treating around 180 million patients.

China's Foreign Aid strategies in Africa and Implication for the West

China's rapid expansion and its multidimensional engagement in LDCs are augmenting criticisms and concerns among western donors. Critics largely manifest that China's aid programs are enormous but serve to support generally the undemocratic regimes. However, it is largely recognized that irrespective of the nature, objective and orientations of the Chinese aid program, it is strengthening its foreign relations vigorously. China's aid system has emerged as a significant and formidable alternative to the persisting western aid regime. China as a non OECD⁵⁵ (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) member is increasing its global development community which is enlarging China's political influence in several regions.⁵⁶

⁵³Milton O. Obamba, "The Dragon's Deal: Sino-African Cooperation in Education," international higher education, Number 72. Summer 2013 Pages 7-8, Boston College, https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/research_sites/cihe/pdf/IHEpdfs/ihe72_p7_8_Obamba.pdf, accessed October 2, 2015

⁵⁴J. Van de Looy, "Africa and China: a strategic partnership?," African Studies Centre Working Paper no. 67, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2006, 7.

⁵⁵Official development assistance is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as concessional funding given to developing countries and to multilateral institutions primarily for the purpose of promoting welfare and economic development in the recipient country. China is not a member of OECD and does not follow its definition or practice on development aid. The bulk of Chinese financing in Africa falls under the category of development finance, but not aid. This fact is privately acknowledged by Chinese government analysts, although Chinese literature constantly blurs the distinction between the two categories.

⁵⁶Yun Sun, "China's Foreign Aid Reform and Implications for Africa Institution," Brookings, last modified July 1, 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/07/01/chinas-foreign-aid-reform-and-implications-for-africa/>.

In the recent past, a significant debate has started about China's enlarging role in African development through its aid strategies which are largely a policy instrument of Beijing for its broader and global goals of economic development.⁵⁷

Renowned American Think Tank Rand Corporation identified the momentous Sino-African strategic partnership in its report in 2015 in following words:

“Across economic, political, and security domains, the growth of China's presence has been swift and staggering. For example, Sino-African trade increased almost twenty folds since 2000, supplanting the US as the continents' largest trading partner. Among the permanent United Nations (UN) Security Council members, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the largest contributor to the United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa, deploying 20 times the number of peacekeepers it sent to Africa in 2000. In addition, approximately 1 million Chinese live in Africa, up from only a few thousand, ten years ago.”⁵⁸

This report elaborated its stand view by maintaining that China's engagement with Africa has transformed dramatically over the previous ten years and will expect to continue with alteration and further advancement of these relations.

⁵⁷Chinese investment grew in Africa from USD 210 million in 2000 to USD 3.17 billion in 2011. Yun Sun, "China's Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah? Institution," Brookings, last modified February 7, 2014, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/>.

⁵⁸Thrall, Lloyd “China's Expanding African relations: Implications for U.S National security” 2015, Rand Corporation, www.rand.org, 11

The economic and political system offered by China is state-centric which has entirely altered the existing world order thus challenging the economic and political orthodoxy. One unmistakable element of China and the West is that regardless of having over 4000 years of age history, China never expected to mediate or assault some other state for expansionism. More importantly, harmony and non-interference is still a dynamic topic in China's worldwide arrangements. Thus China emerged as a potential threat to the West.

- Most significantly, China's emergent interests in Africa will probably compel Beijing to remain a keen observer of internal affairs of African countries as its energy security and energy interests are primarily driven by its broader interests of securing economic development and augmenting its political influence across the globe.⁵⁹
- China presently as the world's second-largest oil consumer and importer receives almost 21 percent of its oil imports from the African region, which enhances its stakes in African political stability and development for ensuring its energy security.⁶⁰ Beijing's emergent security interests in the African region are primarily driven by its broader global goals of preservation of economic development and enlarging its political influence. China as an emerging global power is in the process of expansion of its global goals where “security practices, missions, and presence” in significant regions are part of its policy while defining its security and energy interests.⁶¹ This engenders potential security interests for China, which can lead to political involvement of Beijing if its stakes of foreign aid and trade seem at risk, though the possibility of such a situation are quite less as is evident from the Chinese non-interference policy.

⁵⁹Ibid,14.

⁶⁰Energy security is generally enhanced by supply diversification. Concentration of resource supply in a small group of sources raises the risks and costs of an individual disruption. See Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2, March/April 2006.

⁶¹China likely has more than 15,000 overseas enterprises (including more than 2,000 in Africa) with well more than 1 million overseas citizens.³² Chinese firms have active investments and contracts of more than \$1 billion in 12 of the top 20 global failed or failing states.

- Largely China is under heavy criticism from the West for not following the traditional donor standards. This generated challenges for the European Union and its working in Africa. It is generally assumed that China's foreign aid programs are neither transparent nor confined to serve the economic interests, but largely comprised of its global and political interests about expanding its area of influence.
- It is generally understood that Africa prefers China over the West because the policies experienced under the western aid system have been incompatible with development realities and had largely failed to bring any relative and substantial change in African economic development. The conditional loans by western donors and schemes under the international financial regime further worsen the situation which led the African states to lean more towards China. So, one can relate to China's aid to Africa by the following equation:

No Strings attached+non-interference= Modern Donors (China)
Conditional loans+ good governance (Political Stability)= Traditional Donors

Looy explains that although the fast growing investments of Chinese companies and increasing relations between Africa and China are not overlooked, but the West has yet not been well informed regarding the prospective emergence of this relationship.⁶² Thompson expounded that Sino-African relationship must be observed in the broader context of strategic orientation rather viewing it as merely a quest for raw material and resources. He explicated it further by saying that "China's influence and sound relationship in Africa are the result of many years of investment in building relations through aid, trade, cultural and technical exchanges and not just the by-product of China's recently booming economy and soaring demand of African raw material"⁶³

⁶²Judith van de Looy, "Africa and China: A Strategic Partnership?" ASC Working Paper 67/2006, Leiden, The Netherlands: African Studies Center, 2006, 1.

⁶³Thompson Drew, "China's soft power in Africa: From the" Beijing Consensus" to health diplomacy," *China Brief*, no. 21 (2005) www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/artical.asp

The Western foreign aid system is based on Washington's consensus, under which many restrictions were being imposed on the recipient states to comply with the principles of fiscal policy, interest rates, the flow of trade and public resource disbursement, etc. The main purpose of these arrangements is to reduce poverty. However, these fiscal policies and aid provisions seem little relevant with existing economic realities of recipient countries which significantly contribute for ad hoc management and short lived governance strategies. Aid and assistance programs initiated and supported by international financial regime are characterized by financial and monetary conditions which restrict largely the recipient states to devise economic resolutions in accordance with their ground realities. Moreover, these fiscal conditions imposed by western donors do not structure their relationship with recipient countries as partners as this relationship describes the latter as subservient without getting the adequate fruits of development.


As a result of these reservations regarding foreign aid, developing states considerably felt inclined towards China for its unconditional support in the form of aid with trade policy. Many commentators speculate that China's involvement in the public sector increased its presence in the African states, especially its natural resources. China, however, criticized the Western economic setup as their structural adjustment programs and restrictions are dominating the developmental capacity of African states. State-centric and conditional free loans are more convenient to African states as they are more compatible to the African culture. However, conditional free loans and assistance would undermine the vested interest of the West.

Social Partnership

China extended its official relations with Africa in 1956 by initiating diplomatic ties with Egypt. Since then, they have become all weather friends. China currently has diplomatic relations with 51 states out of 54 in Africa and these relations are built on shared goals, common interests, mutual understanding and unanimity on regional and international issues. These relations steadily matured as strategic partnership due to emerging multidimensional areas of cooperation. In the initial period of their relation, colonial past and anti-imperialist stances brought the two sides closer. Sino-African relations can be classified broadly into three phases though all phases were characterized by Chinese compulsions including emergence of its domestic uncertainties and transformation of international order.

China's policy of foreign aid seems different from the western perspective since it is more associated with the developmental efforts on both sides rather than maintaining a merely donor-recipient relation. China generally renounced using the words “aid” or “donor” specifically as it believes in mutual benefit and development assistance. After its policy of opening up, China focused more on economic integration to accelerate its role in the global economy. China established itself as the largest developing state while Africa is the largest developing continent with numbers of under developing states. Both of them shared a common history of humiliation by the Western imperialism. So Sino-African solidarity is not astonishing.

Even though Africa is gifted with natural resources, e.g. Africa owns 40% of world's potential hydroelectric power supply, 30% of world's uranium, 50% of world's gold, 40% platinum, 7.5% of the world's coal, 8 % of discovering oil reserves, 12% of natural gas reserves, 60% of cocoa and 70 % of coffee reserves, yet it is the dark continent of all.⁶⁴ Its colonial past, political crisis and slavery further worsens the situation. In this regard, Africa needs strategic partnership of a country that not only helps Africa in improving its overall condition, but also treats Africa as a strategic partner rather than only a recipient of aid.



With fewer prospects of Western economic models to rescue LDCs for sustainable development, China pursues a more reliable, strategic economic partnership and adopted policies which are compatible with African ground realities. These policies are instrumental in the development of the region and compatible with the working conditions and ground realities of the African continent. African states, favor Chinese involvement in the region, which is more conducive and non-expansionist. Besides aid and assistance program, China provides soft loans and grants to Africa. In its second address of FOCAC (China, Africa

⁶⁴George B.N. Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos: A Comparative History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998),5-6

Cooperation) meeting in 2003, China announced to forgive 1.2 Billion USD to 31 African states. In the same meeting China exempted tariff on 190 products in Africa.⁶⁵ In China-Africa Policy paper (2006), China reiterated its needs of African raw material, but it also stressed on the political and economic stability, peace and more importantly focused on Africa's concerns.

Historical harmony between Africa and China is an important contributing factor in the strategic interest of both. China supported African states when they were politically isolated and economically deteriorating. Non-interference and non-aggression principles from China are crucial for politically unstable areas like Africa. China believed that the Chinese foreign aid model is more suitable to Africa. China supported state-centric policies as they are imperative for political growth in Africa. With the rapid initiatives by the major powers, working conditions in Africa are improving; however, there is still a question mark on the overall improvement of Africa. Collective efforts in this regard are highly recommended in order to reduce the misery of this gifted region of the world. With all these apprehensions and concerns among western donors regarding Beijing aid strategies as its policy instrument, it still is not widely perceived as major threat to the international financial regime and its goals. However, China also needs to work collectively with traditional donors to increase productivity and establish proper infrastructure for future endeavors and joint ventures in Africa. There is also a need to introduce reforms into China's aid and assistance policy in order to ensure transparency. Its growing role as one of the major global players also requires its support to economic development and sustainability which is already being manifested in its diplomatic orientations. In case of amplifications of western concerns and misunderstandings regarding Chinese ambitions due to non-transparent nature of Chinese foreign aid and assistance, disagreements over aid policies can lead to potential political conflicts.

⁶⁵"China-Africa Trade and Economic Relationship Annual Report 2010," Forum on African-China Cooperation, last modified May 22, 2011, <http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t832788.htm>. Accessed on November 15, 2015.

Balance of Power in South Asia: The Politics of Nuclear Deterrence between Pakistan and India

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Abstract

Balance of Power mechanism is meant to ensure the existence of the nation state in the international system through creating a balancing mechanism or equilibrium of power. Political scene of Europe has been witnessing this mechanism for the last 400 years, though in varied forms. The arrival of nuclear weapons transformed the dynamics of the balance of power system. This factor has raised the relevance of balance of power in favor of political forces at the expense of military power. The realists, nonetheless, argue that it is the interplay of military and political dimensions of balance of power i.e. the characteristics of the nation state's balancing approach vis-a-vis the dominant player in the system. The concept of power equilibrium has led the Italian born political scientist A.F.K. Organski to opine that it is not equilibrium of power that guarantees peace, but the preponderance of power between great powers that leads to lasting peace and order in the international politics. Relatively weak players in the international system get engaged with strong ones to minimize their opponent's military threats and may opt for deterrence capability. As a result strategic balancing comes into effect. The focus of this study is to analyze the conventional power imbalance between India and Pakistan since independence. Super powers' struggle for influence in the South Asian region has been a great disturbing factor for regional equilibrium. It will also be analyzed in this study as to how the conventional and

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nuclear forces have been used by both India and Pakistan to counterbalance not only each other's moves but also the intentions. An interesting paradox of the power moves of both countries will be studied in which the regional outreach of one country (India) is straight away considered as a threat to the very survival of the other country (Pakistan).

Theoretical Framework

The year 1947 brought about new lessons to the history and alterations to the geography of the world. The emergence of two new states in South Asia created new opportunities with corresponding challenges in the international system. The Indo-Pak hostility, right from the partition of the South Asian Subcontinent, owes its origin to the external actor i.e. the role of Great Britain. Having been indecisive to resolve the Kashmir issue before its departure from India was the first sign of sowing the seeds of hostility by Britain between the two South Asian neighbours. Rajiv Dogra argues that by favouring Pakistan the British tried to kill two birds with one stone: "Pakistan provided Britain a window to the Muslim world in the future and by cutting India it was deprived of its prospective status to be a great power in the future".¹

The hostile attitude of India towards Pakistan from the very start compelled the latter to seek and invite foreign influence to the region and the same was manifested in the larger Cold War confrontation.² Faced with the security dilemma posed by a preponderant India, Pakistan joined the US sponsored military pacts i.e. SEATO and CENTO in 1950s, while India made the counter move by showing a tilt towards the Soviet Union. In the eyes of realists, both the powers of South Asia embarked upon the courses of real-politic relying excessively on hard military power and trying everything possible to counter the preponderance of each other. Here comes the paradox: India was bent upon assuming the role of regional power and Pakistan was endeavouring hard to survive in its own territorial boundaries. Every

¹Rajiv Dogra. *Where Borders Bleed*. New Delhi: Rupa Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2015.

²Margaret Bourke-White. *Halfway to Freedom: A Report on the New India in the Words and Photographs of Margaret Bourke-White*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949. p. 91-93

action of India (the preponderant power) was viewed by Pakistan (the weaker player) as an existential threat. In the words of Jan Hornat, when a balance of power system comes into operation, the main objective of all players involved is to avoid the emergence of an imbalance or a tilt of the equilibrium in favour of one state or alliance. The means to maintain the state of power equilibrium are numerous including preventive wars. As the staunch practitioners and theorists of balance of power-Matternich and Castlereagh state: "all thought of war as an instrument to preserve or restore balance of power, is merely pretended as a formula for peace".³

The shift of focus of balance of power from conventional to nuclear is because of the imbalance between the size, resources, outreach and perceptions of India and Pakistan. In the words of Manpreet Sethi, "in Pakistan's nuclear strategy, the primary task of its nuclear weapons is not to deter India's nuclear weapons, but to avoid an engagement with a superior military capability."⁴ The study of the dynamics of expansionary policies of India and contradictory reactions of Pakistan constitutes the theoretical framework for the study of balance of power in South Asia where every action of India has been inviting a prompt reaction from Pakistan. India outlines its security arch extending from the Strait of Hormuz in the West to the Strait of Malacca in the Southeast. As a reaction, Pakistan has been promoting the rhetoric of being a member of the Islamic Ummah stretching from Morocco in the West to Malaysia in the Southeast. So it can safely be assumed that joining of the Western camp by Pakistan in 1950s, having friendship with China in 1960s, playing a pivotal role against Soviet Union during 1979 and 1989, and envisaging a role of pioneer of the Pan-Islamism in 1990s were all reactions to the Indian moves of becoming a regional hegemon.⁵ During the early phase of its independence, India's tilt toward the Soviet Union and later on its new role as a champion of the Non-Aligned Movement were the manifestations of its policy of playing one great power against another for its national gains. Similarly the Arab world's tilt towards India

³John Hornat. "Say No to Balance of Power in Asia." *The National Interest*. 2014. p 37-42.

⁴Manpreet Sethi. "Responding to Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapon: A Strategy for India." *Journal of ICPS*, 2014.

⁵Zafrullah Khan. "Pakistan's Place in Asia." *International Journal* 6, no. 4. 1951. p. 265-274.

after the Cold War was another sign of India realizing its dream of getting strategic preponderance within its strategic arch. In the following lines we will be studying the push and pull factors of the two powers of South Asia that have shaped the balance of power structures right from the partition of India.

In the Arena: India's Vision of Akhand Baharat (in the Light of Chanakya's Arthashastra) and Pakistan's Reaction

Chanakya was the famous Indian politician, strategist and writer during the period 350 BC-283 BC. He was an adviser and a prime minister to the first Maurya Emperor Chandragupta (340-293 BC), and is the architect of his rise to power. Chanakya studied at Takshashila, nowadays called Taxila in Pakistan. Takshashila was a great centre of learning and the teachers here were highly knowledgeable who used to teach sons of kings. Later Chanakya himself became a teacher at Takshashila University. So famous was Chanakya in the vicinity of the university that he had many nicknames namely – Vishnugupta, Kautilya etc. etc. He lived his life working to his capacity in pursuit of his vision of a happy, strong and prosperous India. It is widely believed that Chanakya was the first person to propagate the idea of the first Indian Empire or Akhand Bharat.⁶

The partition of the South Asian Sub-continent has not been recognized from the core of its heart by India even today and resorting to use the phrase of Akhand Bharat by some political hawks in the country spells out the real intent of the Indian political leadership's mind. India's bitter relations with almost all of its neighbours has been a testimony to this aggrandizing policy.⁷ When Chanakya was Prime Minister of first Maurya Emperor Chandragupta, he was able to consolidate the emperor's authority in ancient India and make a strong federation. In his recent book, 'World Order,' Henry Kissinger refers to the ancient Indian treatise, the Arthashastra, written by Chanakya, as a book that lays out the requirements of power, which is the "dominant reality" in politics. For Kissinger, the Arthashastra contained a realist vision of politics long before The Prince. Kissinger deems Arthashastra as a "combination of

⁶Susil Kumar Sahoo. <http://www.quora.com>. May 31, 2015.

⁷Frederic Grare. "India and Pakistan: Improbable War, Impossible Peace." *Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures*. Haryana: Random House India, 2016. pp 335-345.

Machiavelli and Clausewitz.” Meanwhile, the German sociologist Max Weber once called it “truly radical Machiavellianism”, and that compared to it, Machiavelli's ‘The Prince’ is harmless.⁸ The mainstream political parties, like Baharatiya Janata Party (BJP), argue that countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Burma are part of undivided India. These countries are part of Akhand Bharat.

Pakistan has been instrumental in resisting this mindset of the Indian leadership since its inception and it is primarily because of this Indian action that has defined all of Pakistan's reactions. Pakistan's rhetoric of being a member of the Islamic Ummah stretching from Morocco to Malaysia is the most conspicuous example of countering India's vision of Akhand Bharat. The very existence of the state of Pakistan is thus the stumbling block in the way of India realizing the design of Akhand Bharat. The changing patterns / dynamics of balance of power between India and Pakistan can be seen in this perspective.

Patterns/Dynamics of Balance of Power in South Asia

India's Designs in Regional Context (India's actions vis-a-vis its neighbors)

Having a strategic look at India's neighborhood, it encompasses the entire region from the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca. India views it its security parameter. Any development in this arch has a great impact on India's security. On the Western side, almost six million Indians are having their jobs in the Gulf, sending remittances of over \$50 billion to their home country annually.⁹ This region is the largest supplier of oil and gas to India. At the same time, this area is the heart of Islam and influences and ideologies emanating from here impact on India's immediate external and internal environment. In any case, had India not been partitioned in 1947, so says Kanwal Sibal, former foreign secretary of India, its Western frontier would have extended to the Persian Gulf. In the East, India's possession of the Andaman and Nicobar islands stretches her frontiers to the other choke-point, the Malacca Strait. The Bay of Bengal has Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand as littoral states. This stretch of the sea is the link to Southeast Asia and beyond. For buttressing India's 'Look East' policy, this area is of vital importance. Apart from India forging bilateral ties with these countries, the security

⁸Henry Kissinger. *World Order*. New York: Penguin Press, 2014.

⁹Kanwal Sibal. "India and the South Asian Neighbourhood." *Indian Defence Review*, 2013.

of the sea lanes of communication in an area where the only regional blue water navy is Indian, devolves some special responsibilities on India.¹⁰

Seeing geographically, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives constitute the core of India's neighborhood. Myanmar is a contiguous neighbor. However, since India has been looking at the SAARC countries over the years as her neighbors, Myanmar lost its importance despite its critical geographical location adjacent to the Northeastern region of the country. Afghanistan is not a direct geographic neighbor. However, with the inclusion of Afghanistan as a full member of SAARC, the political case for treating Afghanistan as an integral part of India's neighborhood stands reinforced.¹¹

With China's occupation of Tibet, the former has become direct neighbor of India. The unresolved border dispute between India and China constitutes a major Indian foreign policy problem. This issue is coloring India's relationship with the world's foremost rising power. Moreover, in India's perception, China has adversely influenced India's relations with its South Asian neighbors. China, therefore, qualifies as India's most formidable neighbor, affecting India's role not only in the South Asian region, but in Asia as a whole and even at the global level.¹²

The management of relations with neighbors is always a declared priority in any country's foreign policy. The credibility of a country's regional and global posture is undermined if it is seen as bogged down in disputes and conflicts with neighbors. The established view is that the time and energy consumed in manipulating events in the immediate neighborhood is at the cost of pursuing wider interests at the regional and international level. In this context, India had problems with Bangladesh (India's endeavors to influence its domestic as well as foreign policy), Sri Lanka (India's interference in its internal affairs in the form of supporting LTTE), Bhutan (water sharing dispute), Nepal (India's strict control of its economy and foreign relations) and its simmering territorial and water sharing disputes with Pakistan have left scars on the body politic of India having dire consequences for its becoming a regional power. Adding insult to injury is its fragile peace with China which has

¹⁰Ibid

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

been a source of constant anxiety for its foreign policy. However, having set for itself a regional as well as international role, India had been able to extract concessions both from former Soviet Union in the past and the US during the Cold War.¹³ The concept of any regional cooperation is nullified when the only regional organization i.e. SAARC is not able to discuss bilateral political issues.¹⁴ Even after the Cold War, India has been able to attract the US to its fold and has successfully courted Iran and Afghanistan. The new alignment in the region now holds India, the US, Russia, Iran and Afghanistan in its orbit. It clearly illustrates that international relations are conducted not on emotional desires but purely on national interests, which are permanent.

Pakistan's Reaction

Pakistan has been pursuing a policy that would ensure its existence vis-a-vis preponderant conventional power of India. Pakistan's inability to match military superiority of India took it to the Western bloc in the 1950s. However, the disillusionment with the Western powers and the US during the 1965 Indo-Pak war led Pakistan to seek friendship with China.¹⁵ The notion of inviting foreign powers to regional balance of power mechanism was in full swing then during 1950s and 1960s. Pakistan's getting closer to China was dictated by the Sino-Indian war of 1962. 'The enemy of my enemy is my friend' concept guided Pakistan's policy to embrace China. As Pakistan had a window towards the West (having been a member of SEATO and CENTO), the US seized the opportunity and used good offices of Pakistan to have access to China. This behavior of Pakistan, by playing the role of bridge between the US and China, was exploited by India to the fullest possible extent and India concluded a security and defence treaty with the Soviet Union in August 1971 which culminated in the dismemberment of Pakistan in December the same year.

¹³ Andrew Small. *The China Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics*. Haryana: Random House Publishers Pvt Ltd India. 2015

¹⁴ Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury. "SAARC Membership: India blocks China's entry for the time being", *Economic Times*, December 2, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-12-02/news/56648834_1_shanghai_xi_jinping_observers

¹⁵ Altaf Gauhar. *Ayub Khan: Pakistan's First Military Ruler*. Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1993. P. 345

This was the turning point in the South Asian affairs which compelled Pakistan to seek something else, something more trustworthy to guarantee its survival in the face of heavy odds. Resorting to nuclear option provided one such panacea. Nuclear tests by India in 1974 fuelled Pakistan's quest to pursue a nuclear agenda that was allegedly assisted by China and funded by the oil rich Arab countries of the Gulf,¹⁶ the last having been proven entirely untrue. The exploration of oil in the Middle East and Gulf had reinforced the power capabilities of the Arab World with which Pakistan exploited its religious, cultural and historical ties. This situation took a new turn. Being adamant in for its quest for survival, Pakistan came down in its banking on the US, then China and finally to the Arab world. The dynamics of this shifting association of Pakistan were obvious: its alignment with the US earned her isolation from the Soviet bloc, its alignment with China and facilitating a Sino-US rapprochement resulted in earning the wrath of both India and the Soviet Union and its subsequent strengthening of ties with the Arab World led Iran to seek friends in the Arab world who were already under the Soviet influence.¹⁷ Thus Indo-Pakistan rivalry led to the regional alignment in which Saudi Arabia, China and Pakistan with little bit support of the US were on one side and Soviet Union/Russia, India, the radical Arab countries of Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria were on the other.¹⁸

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided a set of new opportunities to Pakistan and its drive for nuclearization went unabated.¹⁹ In order to benefit Pakistan's role in containing the communist threat across the Durand Line, the US turned a blind eye on Pakistan's nuclear programme until 1989-90. However, the Afghan war posed Pakistan with new challenges and opportunities. During this war, Saudi clout increased not only in Pakistan but also in the length and breadth of Afghanistan, thereby invoking Iran's anxiety. In turn, Iran also

¹⁶Andrew Small. *The China Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics*. Haryana: Random House Publishers Pvt Ltd India. 2015. pp. 28-29.

¹⁷Sana Haroon. "Pakistan Between Saudi Arabia and Iran: Islam in the Politics and Economics of Western Asia." *Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures*. Haryana: Random House India, 2016. pp. 301-325.

¹⁸Shahid Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010.

¹⁹Ayesha Jalal. *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics*. Noida: Gopsons Papers Ltd. India, 2014. p. 234-235

started exerting its influence in Afghanistan through its surrogates. The emergence of Taliban on the political horizon of Afghanistan presented Iran with a reasonable pretext to come with daggers drawn against Pakistan in Afghanistan. The advances of Taliban in Afghanistan were viewed by Tehran as a challenge to its monopoly of the so-called leadership of the Islamic world and she started influencing the course of action in Pakistan through strengthening and supporting the Shia community in Pakistan.²⁰ The new dimensions of balance of power between India and Pakistan brought Iran on India's side and Saudi Arabia on Pakistan's. The actions of India and reactions of Pakistan led to the introduction of new foreign actors on the South Asian horizon.

External Actors (Opportunities afforded to them by India's actions and Pakistan's reactions) UK, USA, USSR/Russia, China, KSA, Iran, Non-State Actors

Pakistan faced the security dilemma immediately after independence and she joined SEATO and CENTO in the 1950s. This led to Indo-Pak hostility becoming encompassed into the larger Cold War confrontation. India had already showed its tilt towards the Soviet Union because, her policy of non-alignment coincided with the Soviet objective of checking the growing power of the US military alliances. These military pacts had a direct impact on the Indo-Pak ties. The most important phase so far started after the 9/11 attack on the US, after which, the US policy makers realized the importance of South Asia once again in their "Global War on Terror (GWT)". Now the US administration focused its attention on South Asia, with a key objective to find partners in their war on terrorism.²¹

In the 21st century, the strengthening of US-India strategic partnership, particularly in the nuclear field, is a cause of concern for South Asian security.²² Pakistan needs to gauge and closely monitor the US objectives in this backdrop. The US-Indian deal (through strengthening India) could further impose Indian hegemony in South Asia. So far, Pakistan had tried to play the role of a balancer in the region.

²⁰Saeed S. Khan, *Reasserting International Islam*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001.

²¹Jamshaid Khan. "India Pakistan Relations: An Enduring Rivalry." http://www.slideshare.net/.../termpaper-india_pakistan_relations:_an_enduring_rivalry.jamshaidkhan. august 31, 2010.

²²C. Chrisitne Faire. *The Counter terror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India*. California: RAND Corporation. 2004

This role, to some extent, did dilute Indian hegemony in the South Asian region. Unless the US takes into account the military, political, economic and societal nature of the region, its strategic partnership with India could aggravate the smaller countries' concerns vis-à-vis the hegemonic power—India. This would imply that if it was based on Indian security interests alone, the partnership would give a free hand to India vis-à-vis the smaller South Asian states.

According to Agha Shahi, the US declaration in March 2005 to help India become a “major world power in the 21st century” would enable India to project its power in its “neighborhood and beyond”. Agha Shahi rightly objected to this move that the agreement ignores the “maintenance of strategic balance in South Asia”. Pakistan and other South Asian states are much more vulnerable to external influence. This is partly because they are smaller and partly they look at the external world as a counterweight to the overwhelming power of India. Pakistan is intrinsically inclined to resist India's political dominance, by diplomacy when possible and by force when necessary. The stage is thus set for continued rivalry between the two states.²³

The tension between India and Pakistan provided an excellent opportunity to China to raise its stature in the Indian subcontinent. India-Pakistan animosity is deep-rooted in religion, history, and the politics of revenge and thus predates India-China hostility. China's shrewd strategists recognized the enduring nature of the India-Pakistan enmity and exploited it to Beijing's advantage. Former Director of China's Peoples' Liberation Army's General Staff Intelligence Department, General Xiong Guangkai had once remarked that Pakistan is China's Israel.²⁴ Beijing has long been an active player in the India-Pakistan-China triangular relationship. Since the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, China has aligned itself with Pakistan and made huge strategic and economic investments with a view to keep the common enemy, India under strategic pressure (this included Karakurram Highway (KKH), construction and development of Gawadar port, and now China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

²³Jamshaid Khan. "India Pakistan Relations: An Enduring Rivalry."

<http://www.slideshare.net/.../termpaper-india-pakistan-relations:an-enduring-rivalry.jamshaidkhan>. august 31, 2010.

²⁴Mohan Malik. “The China Factor in the India-Pakistan Conflict.” *Parameters*. Spring 2003. p. 62

In this triangular power balance game, the South Asian military balance of power is neither pro-India nor pro-Pakistan; rather it has always been pro-China. And Beijing will take all means possible, including war, to ensure that the regional power balance does not tilt in India's favour. Even in the absence of war, Pakistan hopes to continue to reap significant military and economic payoffs not only from the intensifying Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry in South Asia but also from what many believe is the coming showdown between China and the US. Should this happen, it will further increase the significance of China's strategic ties with Pakistan.²⁵ Along with the role of great powers in the South Asian region, there are some other potent powers / non state actors that are in operation in the region and causing challenges to the peace between India and Pakistan. Through different terrorist activities in both countries, they generate tensions, distrust and misperceptions on both sides.

Another paradox developed here. The traditional Saudi-Iran rivalry of gaining mastery of the Gulf and the Middle East found a new battle ground in Pakistan as well. The soil of Pakistan now started to be used for the proxy wars of Saudi Arabia and Iran. This was one of the corollaries of the balance of power between India and Pakistan. Iran and Saudi Arabia are also active in fuelling the already volatile atmosphere of South Asia by choosing strategic sides in the region.²⁶

Nuclearization of South Asia

The primary task of Pakistan's nuclear capability is not to deter India's nuclear weapons, but to avoid an engagement with a superior military capability. Pakistan believes that its nuclear weapons constrain India from resorting to an active military adventurism. Pakistani strategic establishment is determined to uphold balance of terror with India to deter its aggression or blackmailing tactics.²⁷ The deterring capabilities can be acquired through internal build-up and/or via alliance formation. Pakistan's alliances (SEATO & CENTO) and band wagoning (the US & China) did not prevent its dismemberment in 1971 war with India. Since 1971, therefore, it has been focusing on internal build up.

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Vali Nasr. *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2007.

²⁷ Manpreet Sethi. "Responding to Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapon: A Strategy for India." *Journal of ICPS*, 2014.

While quoting Ayub Khan, the former President of Pakistan, as having said in his January 1968 diary, the former Indian diplomat Rajiv Dogra writes, "two things have unbalanced India completely; the 1962 clash with China and the 1965 war with Pakistan....So, whilst wanting a Kashmir solution, we should show no undue anxiety. Let India bleed till she can no longer bear the burden of big power chauvinism. She may then come to her senses".²⁸ Though the author has not provided any proof/reference of the writings of Ayub Khan's diary, it shows the preoccupation of India's mind with the Pakistan phobia that preoccupies its leadership. After the dismemberment of Pakistan in December 1971, it was Indira Gandhi who ordered '*Buddha is smiling*'.²⁹ The smile on Buddha's face was a nightmare for Pakistan. That is why, despite the opposition, economic sanctions (1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and negative signaling over safety and security of its nuclear weapons programme (since 9/11) by the US and like-minded states, Islamabad has been up surging its nuclear arsenal. The nuclear weapon of Pakistan was meant only to correct the strategic imbalance in South Asia that had caused Pakistan half of its body. But India has perceived this situation in quite another way. Rajiv Dogra writes in his book, '*Where the Borders Bleed*', "actor George Clooney recalls in an interview in December 2012 issue of Esquire magazine:

I talked with the President [Obama] at one of those fundraisers some months back, and I asked him, 'What keeps you up at night?'

And he said, 'Everything. Everything that gets to my desk is a critical mass. If it gets to my desk, then no one else could have handled it.'

So I said, 'So what's the one that keeps you up at night?'

He goes, 'There are quite a few.,

So I go, 'What's that the one? Period'

And he says, 'Pakistan.'"³⁰

²⁸Rajiv Dogra. *Where Borders Bleed*. New Delhi: Rupa publications india pvt ltd, 2015.

²⁹Smiling Buddha was the assigned code name of India's first nuclear bomb test on 18 May 1974. The bomb was detonated on the army base, Pokhran Test Range, in Rajasthan, India.

³⁰Rajiv Dogra. *Where Borders Bleed*. New Delhi: Rupa publications india pvt ltd, 2015.

Rajiv's strenuous effort to invoke the American actor's interview with the US President and quoting his dread for Pakistan's nuclear weapon shows something more than the substance of the balance of power mechanism in the region; it is the mindset of India's elite vis-a-vis Pakistan that echoes as the backdrop music in the balance of power drama being played on the South Asian stage. In this back drop, the entire spectrum of balance of power between India and Pakistan has undergone a new transformation which needs further elaboration.

Balance of Power Revisited

War as the ultimate recourse of the nation state has been at its disposal ever since the history has begun to be recorded. Preventive wars, as were espoused by the 19th century British statesmen Castlereagh and Austrian Matternich, were the common panacea for peace. These wars were fought sometimes unilaterally by some powerful state while sometimes a cluster of nations fought a war against the preponderant power of the time. However, the emergence of the balance of power system in Europe limited the nature and scope of war during the 19th century.³¹ Whenever some power tried to disrupt the general equilibrium of the international system, the mechanism of balance of power came into operation.³² However, the system of balance of power would require a power guarantor to ensure smooth functioning of the system. Similarly the similarity of culture and a shared historical perception would be another galvanizing factor of the balance of power system. In case of balance of power between India and Pakistan, all the important prerequisites of the system are conspicuous by their absence.

Pakistan came into being as a result of the partition of India which the Congress leadership considered as the vivisection of 'Mother India'. On the other hand, the leadership of the Muslim League declared that, 'we will have India divided, or we will have India destroyed'. This was the level of emotions that ran during the time of partition and the subsequent trauma of migration appalled the people on both sides of the divide. Till 1857, Muslims were the rulers of India who had ruled the land for almost 1000 years. In the 90 years, till 1947, Hindus had a taste of

³¹ Henry Kissinger. *Diplomacy*. Glasgow: Simon & Schuster Ltd, 1994.

³² Ibid

³³ Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre. *Freedom at Midnight*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1975.

power due to their compliance with the British and were now bent upon revenging the 1000 years of Muslim rule. Thus it was neither the shared historical perspective nor the cultural affinity that could have provided glue to their shared vision of the future. And the erstwhile great power (Britain) had left the area leaving even more quagmires than before; the Kashmir issue was planted by Britain and left unresolved between the two new dominions. No guarantor was present in the region to ensure the orderly functioning of the international system in this part of the world. Thus, instead of resolving their disputes bilaterally (which was not possible) or through some regional mechanism (which was not available), both India and Pakistan entered the Cold war political system by mortgaging their security on the false hope that the super powers would help them resolve their outstanding issues.³⁴ The super powers could not develop a viable system of balance of power in the region and the imbalance led to the dismemberment of one of the players [Pakistan] of the game.

The disillusionment of 1971 debacle led Pakistan to reconsider its options. At the other end of the tunnel, the nuclear option looked brighter than banking on others for own security. The same was done by India and its nuclear tests of 1974 provided fillip to the nuclearization drive of Pakistan. The technology (the nuclear weapon) to make the war more dreadful and the enemy more frightened, however, limited the scope of war. The powerful states equipped with nuclear technology could now only project force over limited distance, in certain quantities and against so many targets. Ambitious leaders were constrained and radical courses of action were inhibited by the pace at which they unfold. The same went well with both powers of the South Asia and the clouds of war never caused rain in the region ever since the nuclearization of the region. Previously it was the weaker state of Pakistan that yearned for security, now it is the US President, as said by actor George Clooney, who spends sleepless nights worrying lest the world peace is destroyed by the nuclear weapon of Pakistan.³⁵

³⁴C. Christine Fair. *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

³⁵Rajiv Dogra. *Where Borders Bleed*. New Delhi: Rupa publications India pvt Ltd, 2015

India and Pakistan are not afraid of each other anymore. A sort of rough balance exists between the two nuclear armed neighbours. The race now is for maximizing the national gains and for projecting national power much beyond national frontiers. It is now not Pakistan that is worried about its existence but the great powers [to be more specific, China] that are worried about courting Pakistan to further its national interest in the region. In the words of Vali Nasr, "Indeed, while we scratched our heads about how to turn Pakistan our way during my tenure in Obama administration, Chinese leaders were serenading Pakistan with assurances that Sino-Pakistani relations are 'higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, stronger than steel, and sweeter than honey.'"³⁶

And the arrival of the nuclear weapons has changed the contents of the security stories in South Asia. In the words of Manpreet Sethi, "the threat implied by Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) is based on two assumptions. One, Pakistan believes that the use of TNW would bring about such a material and psychological shift in hostilities as to stun India into a halt. Confronted with the prospect of further escalation, the nature of Indian polity and the 'softness of the state' would make India choose war-termination over escalation. So, Pakistan believes that India would be deterred from using its superior military capability since it would not have the will or the motivation to act. She doubts whether India, with a strategic culture of military restraint, would find it prudent to inflict damage (and risk more on itself) in response to a threat that is not itself mortal. Second, Pakistan assumes that the battlefield use of a small nuclear weapon would not be seen as provocation enough by India, or the rest of the world, to merit massive retaliation. It tends to assume that the international community will stop India from continuing its conventional campaign or undertaking nuclear retaliation. Therefore, in Pakistani perception, the TNW is a deterrent at best, and a war termination weapon at worst."³⁷

³⁶Vali Nasr. *The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat*. New York: Anchor Books, 2014.

³⁷Manpreet Sethi. "Responding to Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapon: A Strategy for India." *Journal of ICPS*, 2014.

Analysis

If an impartial analysis is ever made of the forces that ultimately led to the nuclearization of South Asia, one thing will be conspicuously clear; the failure of the classical balance of power mechanism led to the dreadful balance of terror system. Neither was India in a position to act as a guarantor of the balance of power nor was Pakistan accustomed to its dynamics. Being at daggers drawn against each other, both India and Pakistan became the objects of the system by themselves with the Soviet Union and the US respectively governing their fates. But the Cold War priorities of both the super powers were different from those of India and Pakistan. The reliance of India and Pakistan on the Cold War adversaries kept them from developing their regional model of balance of power. Since India's geographical size, economic resources and military capabilities were far superior to Pakistan's, the former was able to mobilize international support to its foreign policy overtures.³⁸ On the other hand the smaller power (Pakistan) was neither able to attract international attention to its security concerns nor was it in a position to alter the regional security parameter in its favor.

The acquisition of nuclear weapon by Pakistan with corresponding delivery system was meant to neutralize the preponderant Indian military threat. Pakistan made the point. So far the existential threat to Pakistan is over; however, this nuclear capability of Pakistan has brought in its wake new challenges. The US in particular and the West in general are particularly worried about the scenario that this dreadful weapon might be used immaturely by the Pakistani authorities.³⁹ Given the anti-American and anti-Indian sentiments in the length and breadth of the country, the US President is rightfully alarmed about that scenario (George Clooney's talk with Obama is relevant here). But the strong command and control of the nuclear arsenal and the responsible behavior that Pakistan has evinced ever since its acquisition of the nuclear capability has belied all such worries. Nuclear regimes of the two adversaries have shown sufficient resilience and maturity to pass the tests of Kargil conflict in 1999; Compound Crisis of 2002; Mumbai Crisis;

³⁸Frederic Grare. "India and Pakistan: Improbable War, Impossible Peace." *Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures*. Haryana: Random House India, 2016. P. 335-345.

³⁹David E. Sanger. *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power*. New York: Harmony Books, 2009.

and recently Pathan Kot & Uri Incidents. Thus President Obama was knocking the wrong door. He better get worried about the places where humanitarian disaster is more exposed than Pakistan. He must focus on Syria, creation of Palestine, intransigence of North Korea, and challenges posed by Daa'ish.

The rise of China to a prominent position in the region and the immense influence it enjoys with Pakistan is another factor that is contributing to regional stability and the viability of the balance of power system in the region. India's obsession with economic development and its prospective competition with China in Asia have also provided a breathing space for Pakistan. The situation in Afghanistan, however, is a source of friction between India and Pakistan where both the powers for compete gaining considerable clout in Kabul. However, the US willingness to initiate dialogue with Taliban and Kabul's gesture to be ready to bring Taliban to the mainstream political arena, especially with the agreement of President Dr Ashraf Ghani with Gulbadin Hikmatyar, hold encouraging prospects for peace. Once situation in Afghanistan changes for the better, the rivalry between India and Pakistan may also take the form of an economic tug of war between them. Should that happen, further impetus would be provided to the ongoing process of change of behavior in New Delhi and Islamabad, leading to the galvanization of the balance of power system in the region.

Conclusion

Historically the Indian subcontinent has always been a land of attraction for great powers of the world. Its vast plains suitable for various agricultural activities, immense deposits of natural resources and its hardworking people have been watering the mouths of the imperialists in the past. After the last imperial power decided to leave the area in 1940s, the ground realities of the contemporary world compelled Britain to carve out two new nation states out of its erstwhile Indian empire. The new states of India and Pakistan were neither accustomed to self-rule nor having the required skills of statecraft. Excessive delusions about each others' perception and lack of confidence in own capacities on the part of both the countries led them to seek support of the extra regional powers and South Asia was plunged into the hotbed of Cold War politics. Till early 1970s, both the powers relied on foreign powers. However, after arming themselves with nuclear weapons covertly and overtly, body languages of both the powers changed and

instead of devising local security parameters and a regional balance of power model, these powers started a new arms race in the region which appalled the world and South Asia once again became the hub of world politics. After the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001, India and Pakistan engaged in a new balance of power mechanism that resembled the one designed by the German Chancellor Bismarck in the mid 19th century by shifting the alliances swiftly and isolating the opponent. The South Asian kaleidoscope now represents India, Iran, the US on one hand and Pakistan, China and likely Russia on the other. In this fluid situation, the real balancing role seems to be assumed by the new rising power, i.e. China. At last Pakistan's maneuvering seems to be succeeding by cultivating reasonable partnership with China.⁴⁰ Given the ever increasing ties between India and the US and especially after entering into a mutual civil nuclear partnership, Pakistan once again feels desperate to have been pushed to the wall. In this backdrop, Pakistan's strategic ties with China will surely bend the Indo-US strategic sword. However, one thing needs to be understood by both the powers. In the 21st century, the balance of power will be maintained not through the stockpiling of lethal and dreadful weapons in the arsenals but buttressing the economic power through multilateral economic activities by the states on one hand and infusing a sense of ownership in the people that live outside the economic parameters of the state on the other, who have not benefited from the welfare nature of the state. Once the economies of the states are strong and the state provides health, education and other economic and social services to its masses, the attitude of the people on both sides of the divide will surely change for the better and that will lead to a lasting peace in South Asia.

⁴⁰Farah Jan and Serge Granger. "Pakistan-China Symbiotic Relations." *Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures*. Haryana: Random House India, 2016, pp. 279-296.

Prospects of India's inclusion in the NSG and options for Pakistan

Beenish Altaf*

Abstract

With the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) plenary meeting held in Seoul on June 23-24, 2016, debate on the possible inclusion of non-NPT states has gained momentum, with some opposing the membership, while others suggesting criteria to accommodate non-NPT signatories into the NSG fold.¹ India and Pakistan have formally applied, while Israel is still contemplating, mindful of being left outside the mainstream non-proliferation regime while other states with similar credentials are brought in. If India alone is allowed to become a member of the NSG while Pakistan remains outside, this would not only undermine global non-proliferation norms but cause countries to question the value of engaging with the non-proliferation regime. It is ironic at the same time since it was India whose 1974 nuclear test led to the creation of the NSG previously called London Suppliers Group. The basic purpose of the NSG is to provide a mechanism through which the non-proliferation goal could be achieved, but in the present scenario some of the group members are unanimously supporting a proliferator (India) to be member. The special favors to India are being given in the Grossi-Song nine points formula presented after the extraordinary meeting of the NSG PGs on December 6, 2016 because of the United States' strategic partnership with India. Given its discriminatory agenda favoring India the formula did not go through but ironically, 2016 became remarkable for Group's future outlook and credibility.

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¹“Nuclear Suppliers Group,” *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, July 22, 2016, <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/nuclear-suppliers-group-nsg/>

Key Words: Nuclear Suppliers Group, India, Pakistan, Participating Governments, Proliferation, Membership, US.

Introduction

The prevailing trends after Vienna meeting on 23 and 24 June 2016 in Seoul, Republic of Korea (ROK) reveal that both India and Pakistan might encounter tough resistance in getting the membership of NSG in the near future. Many members of the Group seem determined to thwart non-NPT states attempt to join the Group without a criteria-based approach. Nevertheless, New Delhi has been lobbying robustly (with the intense support of Washington and its like-minded countries) since 2010 to get a 'special treatment' by the NSG members. Simultaneously, Islamabad lately seems equally determined to join the NSG viewing the possibility that India's unilateral entry would block Pakistan's candidacy into the cartel. Pakistan sent the formal application for NSG membership just a week after the Indian application on June 9, 2016.² Many analysts have expressed their concerns on a number of issues, including NSG membership and the strategic implications for South Asia. The agony here blows up, just in case a preferential treatment is given to India by keeping the other non-NPT states left out of the group. Therefore it is emphasized to adopt a criteria-based approach than going for a country specific membership that favors India. It should be non-discriminatory and equally applicable to all non-NPT states.

On the other hand, India's membership in NSG carries not merely defense related implications rather it has political dimensions as well. It would not only fulfill India's needs regarding nuclear materials and technology but will also enable India to forge strong international support against Pakistan on various disputes. This paper is an effort to answer questions dealing with the NSG membership for South Asian nuclear weapon states and apprehensions associated with the approach NSG would adopt in this regard.

²Natalya Zamarayeva, "Pakistan and India's NSG Application," *Journal New Eastern Outlook*, May 7, 2016, <http://journal-neo.org/2016/07/05/pakistan-and-indias-nsg-application/>

The study is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the need and reason for multilateral export control regimes in the global nuclear order. The second section is an attempt to examine the shift in US led non-proliferation regime, impact of US-India strategic partnership and its (US) countering China policy. The third section deliberates on India - Pakistan's candidacy for NSG membership and options for Pakistan. The fourth section meditates on the recent criteria drafted by the NSG former Chair, Ambassador Rafael Mariano Grossi. Finally the credibility of NSG has been questioned for future efficacy or trust due to such type of discriminatory initiatives as Grossi formula.

Need for multilateral export control regimes

Since the nuclear age and particularly after the use of nuclear weapons in 1945, the dominant powers of the world have crafted treaties and regimes to maintain a check on spread of nuclear technology. However, ironically, present day's Global Nuclear Order; defined by various treaties/ regimes/ agreements, as enacted one after the other in the wake of failure on part of already established measures to check proliferation, implement disarmament or streamline export of nuclear technology. One of the fundamental strands of the Global Nuclear Order is enforcement of rules related to nuclear technology and material commerce. Currently there are four Multilateral Export Control Regimes: MTCR, NSG, Warrsaner Arrangement and Australia Group. Among all NSG seeks to strengthen nuclear order through strategic trade controls.³

Reason behind NSG formation

The NSG was created as a voluntary group of nuclear exporters among the group members in 1975.⁴ The group was established in response to India's — a non-NPT state May 18, 1974, peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE), named as 'Smiling Buddha'.⁵ India violated its pledge to use the

³Lt. Col. Mushtaq Ali, "Relevance of Nuclear Supply Group in 21st Century," Presentation at National Defence University, Islamabad.

⁴Sameer Lalwani and Shane Mason, "India Needs to Understand the Causes of its NSG Embarrassment," *The Wire*, June 6, 2016, <http://thewire.in/46165/india-needs-to-understand-the-causes-of-it-nsg-embarrassment/>

⁵<https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/18-may-1974-smiling-buddah>

Canadian-supplied CIRUS research reactor spent-fuel for making plutonium. It has a history of illicit nuclear procurement and inadequate nuclear export controls, and continues to produce fissile material for weapons and to expand its nuclear weapons and missile capabilities more generally.⁶ Thus the Indian violation of peaceful nuclear use resulted in adoption of stringent measures by all the nuclear states to prevent the horizontal proliferation. "The PNE sent shockwaves across the world. Meetings spearheaded by the US and the UK, and backed by Moscow, set up the 'London Club', later renamed the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)."⁷

As a consequence, the preliminary objective of the NSG was to impede its members from assisting India in making nuclear weapons. It has expanded over four decades from 7 to 48 nuclear supplier countries as its members. While reflecting in the cases of granting entry to new members, the cartel has two predominant defined objectives, the first goal is to get all supplier states to adhere to the guidelines; and the second is to reinforce good non-proliferation behavior.

Membership and Administrative Procedures

The member states have agreed that the decision making process of NSG is by consensus along with having equal voting right. Therefore, there is no chance of granting membership to any prospective state without consensus of all the existing member states.⁸ That is the main reason why India is out of the group even after vigorous Western support. Moreover, it has two set of guidelines, each of which was created in response to a significant proliferation event that highlighted shortcomings in the then existing export control systems.

⁶Jim Green, Uranium, India and the Fracturing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime," Briefing Paper No. 18, *Energy Science Coalition*, October 2010, <http://www.energyscience.org.au/BP18India.pdf>

⁷G. Parthasarathy, "Failed NSG bid: China is a formidable adversary," *Mail Today*, July 5, 2016. <http://www.dailyo.in/politics/nsg-nina-xi-jinping-npt-pakistan-nuclear-weapons-programme/story/1/11562.html>, accessed on July 20, 2016.

⁸G. Balachandran, Reshmi Kazi and Kapil Patil, "Membership Expansion in the Nuclear Suppliers Group," *idsa.in*, June 22, 2016.

1. Guidelines for nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254, Part 1). Since Zangger Committee was already working on nuclear safe transfers, NSG took forward its aim and agreed on a set of Guidelines incorporating a trigger list. These were published in 1978 as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Document INFCIRC/254 (subsequently amended) to apply to Nuclear Transfers published in 1978 by IAEA for peaceful purposes to help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities.⁹ The items on the trigger list are as flashed: Nuclear reactors and their equipment; non-Nuclear material for reactor; plants and equipment for reprocessing; plants and equipment for fabrication of nuclear fuel elements; plants and equipment for separation of isotopes; plants for heavy water production; plants and equipment for conversion.¹⁰
2. Guidelines for transfers of nuclear related dual use equipment, materials, software and related technology, (INFCIRC/254, Part 2).¹¹ In 1992, NSG decided to establish Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and technology, which could make a significant contribution to mitigate the misuse of unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity.¹² The items on the trigger list are as flashed: Industrial equipment and Materials; Uranium isotope separation

⁹Nuclear Suppliers Group, Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 22, 2016, <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/nuclear-suppliers-group-nsg/>

¹⁰“Guidelines,” *Nuclear Suppliers Group*, <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/guidelines>

¹¹“Communication received from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Certain Member States' Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology,” Information Circular INFCIRC/254/Rev.13/Part 1a, *IAEA Atoms for Peace and Development*, November 8, 2016, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r13p1.pdf>

¹²“What you need to know about the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” *Dawn*, June 10, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1263947>

equipment and components; Heavy water production plant related equipment; Test and measurement equipment for the development of nuclear explosive devices; Components for nuclear explosive devices.¹³

Till 1990 or the end of the Cold War, the NSG did not have any fixed criteria for its membership. The need of adopting a criteria for induction of states was first deliberated in the first ever formal plenary meeting in 1992 held in Warsaw.¹⁴ During the subsequent 1993 Lucerne Plenary, the participating members of the NSG adopted the first procedural Arrangement.¹⁵ According to this, the membership criteria were:

- A. Membership of the Nuclear-Suppliers Group initially consists of the countries adhering to the Nuclear Supplier Guidelines (INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1, Part 1 and 2) and fully participating in the Plenary Meeting in Lucerne in 1993.
- B. Countries other than those referred to in paragraph 1 (a) may be invited to join the NSG by a consensus decision of its members. Consensus may be achieved inter-sessionally by the Chair through regular channels.

¹³“Guidelines,” *Nuclear Suppliers Group*,

<http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/guidelines>

¹⁴Daniel Joyner, “NWS Nuclear Policy and Interpretation of the NPT,” *Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, United States, 2011,

https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=_6MZhjmvwCAC&pg=PA54&lpg=PA54&dq=first+ever+formal+plenary+meeting+in+1992+held+at+Warsaw&source=bl&ots=HTheALFFiY&sig=Sg2RYvGMMCNC3HWae4hD9JSkkUI&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi4lKeYo_PQAhVEKcAKHe-RAQYQ6AEIODAF#v=onepage&q=first%20ever%20formal%20plenary%20meeting%20in%201992%20held%20at%20WarsawINFCIRC%2F254%2FRev.%201%2C%20Part%201%20and%202&f=false

¹⁵Press Statement, Archive - Arms control contracts, Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security (BITS), <http://www.bits.de/ac-archive/6pr/on/nsg/1993-Press.pdf>

- C. While it is understood that prospective members would, as a rule, adhere to INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1 in its entirety before being considered for membership, it would also be possible to invite adherents to part 1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1 to participate in the Plenary Meetings prior to their adherence to Part 2. Until these countries have adhered to Part 2, they will only take part as Observers in Plenary Meeting discussions on issues related to Part 2.¹⁶

The NSG members had made the criteria further stringent for new members during their May 10-11, 2001 Aspen, Colorado, United States Plenary meeting.¹⁷ It is defined as:

“To be eligible to become a new NSG Participating Government, a government must have adhered to the Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology, and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology. Such adherence is accomplished by sending an official communication to the Director-General of the IAEA stating that the government will act in accordance with the Guidelines. This communication is to be intended for publication in the INFCIRC series.”¹⁸

According to it, the requirements are the following:¹⁹

- The candidate ought to have the ability to supply items (including items in transit) covered by the Annexes to Parts 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines;

¹⁶G. Balachandran, Reshmi Kazi and Kapil Patil, “Membership Expansion in the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” Special Feature, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, June 22, 2016. http://www.idsa.in/specialfeature/membership-nuclear-suppliers-group_gbalachandran_220616, accessed on August 2, 2016.

¹⁷Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “India-Pakistan Candidacy for NSG.”

¹⁸“Nuclear Suppliers Group,” *Civil Services Mentor Magazine*, June 2016. <http://iasexamportal.com/civilservices/magazine/csm/june-2016/nuclear-suppliers-group>, accessed on August 2, 2016.

¹⁹Nuclear Suppliers Group, *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, July 22, 2016, <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/nuclear-suppliers-group-nsg/>

- It's adherence to the Guidelines and action in accordance with them;
- The applicant should ensure enforcement of a legally based domestic export control system which gives effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the Guidelines;
- The NSG aspirant express adherence to one or more of the NPT, the Treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Tlatelolco, Bangkok, Semipalatinsk or an equivalent international nuclear non-proliferation agreement, and full compliance with the obligations of such agreement(s); and
- The applying state supports international efforts towards non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and of their delivery vehicles.²⁰

Non-Proliferation Regime and the West

NSG plays an indispensable role that governs the set of provisions for both nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports. Gradually, the NSG makes sure that it keeps itself updated, effective and credible. Currently, NSG seems to have increased its credibility much more by making sure that its members would follow the strict guidelines by not exporting the nuclear related technology to both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states if they are sure that these nuclear related items/technology/materials could be diverted for nuclear weapons program. NSG confronts critical issues with regard to its long lasting efforts for meeting the principles of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.²¹

An ironical incongruity is that the US and India have concluded a strategic partnership in economic, political and military domains. The US is encouraging the buildup of the Indian military and is conniving

²⁰Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "India-Pakistan Candidacy for NSG," *Journal of Security and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1.

²¹Dr. Zafar Khan, NSG Norms, Non-Proliferation Regime: Critical Issues and Criteria, Conference paper: Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and International Security in 2016, Strategic Vision Institute, October 27, 2016.

On the nuclearization of the Indian Ocean.²² Since the US is having defense and nuclear cooperation deals with India, it has been the main force behind Delhi's NSG bid here. The Indo-US nuclear deal and the subsequent NSG waiver for India for that reason had affected the region in terms of derailing the India-Pakistan dialogue on nuclear issues, destabilizing regional security, and undermining the global non-proliferation regime. Pragmatically the deal has actually marked a paradigm shift in the US non-proliferation policy due to its own strategic considerations. Such a major paradigm shift in the US policy is the manifestation of the 'Realist Strategic Thinking' in the US. The US 'Realism' is focused on 'Countering China Policy'. Whereas, China's active role in denying NSG membership to India is a 'Chinese Realism' response to the 'US Realism' regarding its strategic interests in the region. China's opposition to India's membership in NSG is part of its strategic interests including relationship with Pakistan. However, Chinese support to Pakistan's stance should not be taken for granted. This may not be the same case in the future if Pakistan itself does not take any prudent measures. In realpolitik, there are neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies; the only thing that prevails is the national interest.²³

The fact should not be denied that China is the largest trading partner of India. China's trade volume with India itself may provide leverage to India for getting Chinese nod for entry into NSG. Although the US support to India aims at countering China but there are little chances of confrontation like that of Cold War between China and the United States. Rather, there are greater incentives for engagement among the three if an agreement regarding strategic interests could be sorted out.²⁴

²²Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan & Arka Biswas, "Military Build-up in the Indian Ocean: Implications for Regional Stability," *Observer Research Foundation (ORF)*, India, Occasional Paper, October 12, 2015, <http://www.orfonline.org/research/military-build-up-in-the-indian-ocean-implications-for-regional-stability/>

²³Dr. Shahid Bukhari, paper presented "Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Politics of the NSG and Its Implications for Pakistan," SVI monthly in-house Series, *Strategic Vision Institute*, Islamabad, July 2016.

²⁴Ibid.

Candidacy of India and Pakistan

The nature and character of the non-proliferation regime (NPR) has been altered from its innovative status due to the P5 nuclear weapon states (NWS), especially the United States' discriminatory use of the Western led NPR as an instrument to pursue its own foreign and strategic policy objectives such as the Indo-US Nuclear Deal. India is being propped up as a 'pivot' in the Asia Pacific strategy of the US.²⁵ It has already been analyzed above that its aim is to assist India to become a rival great-power to China. Therefore, it is now being hectically supported to become a full member of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). Hence it is imperative to deliberate on the prospects of India's inclusion in the NSG and the options and way forward for Pakistan in the face of currently prevailing challenges.

If India is included in the NSG

India's application could not acknowledge a confirmatory response from a few members of the Group, yet it leaves the impression that New Delhi is determined to try for the full membership of NSG. Like the Seoul plenary meeting of June 23-24, 2016 failed to reach a consensus among the 48 members cartel, the recent consultative group's meeting also could not reach any consensus with regards to India's bid for NSG.²⁶

Nevertheless, if India is brought into the NSG and Pakistan is left out, it would be another act of discrimination based on short-sighted commercial and strategic interests. India has not fulfilled its major commitments given to the United States as part of the 2005 civil nuclear deal such as working for the conclusion of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.²⁷

²⁵Muhammad Shafiq, "Emerging Trends in Geo-politics of Asia Pacific Region," *IPRI Journal XIV*, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 81-101, <http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Article-no.5-Mohd-Shafiq.pdf>

²⁶Mark Fitzpatrick, "India is kept waiting for admission to Nuclear Suppliers Group," *International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)*, June 13, 2016, <https://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2016-d1f9/june-ccc4/india-is-kept-waiting-for-admission-to-nuclear-suppliers-group-dd84>

²⁷Proposed Fissile Material (Cut-off) Treaty (FMCT)," *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, October 30, 2016, <http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty/>

(FMCT) and separating²⁸ its military and civilian reactors.²⁹ Yet, it is again being considered for exceptional treatment. Contrary to its promise that it will work towards the conclusion of FMCT, India has not even considered unilateral moratorium to freeze its fissile material production. According to a recent report by the Belfer Center, India seems to have done the opposite, and expanded its fissile material production capacity.³⁰ Instead of discouraging India, the United States and other major suppliers that have entered into nuclear cooperation agreements with it are pleading India's case for NSG membership.

Pakistan's bid

Though Pakistan's ongoing political and diplomatic efforts are intended to create space for itself in the NSG, it does qualify for civil nuclear trade in legal terms. It would be pertinent to mention here that Pakistan has recently ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM on March 21, 2016.³¹ The provisions to which the CPPNM obligates the parties to are given as: 1. Make specific arrangements and meet defined standards of these materials will be protected during international transport in accordance with the levels of protection determined by the Convention; 3. Co-operate in the recovery and protection of stolen nuclear material, by sharing information on missing nuclear materials; 4. Criminalize specified acts, including misusing or threatening to misuse nuclear

²⁸Kalman A. Robertson & John Carlson, "The Three Overlapping Streams of India's Nuclear Programs," Kennedy School, *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs*, April 2016, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/thethreesoverlappingstreamsofindiasnuclearpowerprograms.pdf>

²⁹Zahid Ali Khan, "Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal: The Gainer and the Loser," *South Asian Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, January – June 2013, pp.241-257, http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/17_V28_1_2013.pdf

³⁰Ibid.

³¹"Pakistan Ratifies 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material," Press Release, No. 103/2016, *Nuclear Security Summit*, March 23, 2016, <http://www.nss2016.org/news/2016/3/23/n82o715o8aib4avkx30o8tdz63da6x>

materials to harm the public; and 5. Prosecute or extradite those accused of committing such acts. States Parties undertake to include those offenses as extraditable offenses in every future extradition treaty to be concluded between them.³² While submitting its application for NSG membership, Pakistan outlined its credentials such as harmonization of its export control lists with those of the international export control regimes, its efforts to ensure nuclear security and safety,³³ and its adherence to NSG guidelines.³⁴ Likewise Pakistan's Ambassador at Vienna³⁵ said "seeking participation in the export control reflects Pakistan's strong support for international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery."³⁶

Even though Pakistan wishes to be included in the NSG cartel on the basis of merit, it also wants to draw attention to the issue of discrimination regarding group's membership.³⁷ India is being treated on favorable terms, with laws amended and waivers granted to accommodate it.³⁸

³²Beenish Altaf, "IAEA's morality and CPPNM's veracity," *Daily Times*, April 22, 2016, <http://dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/22-Apr-16/iaeas-morality-and-cppnms-veracity>

³³"Pakistan Ratifies 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,"

PR. No.103/2016, *Nuclear Security Summit 2016*, March 23, 2016, <http://www.nss2016.org/news/2016/3/23/n82o715o8aib4avkx30o8tdz63da6x>

³⁴"Move on export control of sensitive technologies, goods praised by US," *Dawn*, September 17, 2015, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1207461>

³⁵Mariana Baabar, "Pakistan submits formal application for NSG membership," *News International*, May 21, 2016, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/121627-Pakistan-submits-formal-application-for-NSG-membership>

³⁶Anwar Iqbal, "Pakistan's application for NSG to be decided by consensus: US," *Dawn*, May 29, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1261318>

³⁷Adil Sultan, "India and the NSG," *News International*, April 25, 2016, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/115098-India-and-the-NSG>

³⁸Saima Aman Sial, "Nuclear Suppliers Group: Impact of India's Membership," *South Asian Voices*, May 31, 2016, <http://southasianvoices.org/nuclear-suppliers-group-impact-of-indias-membership/>

It is so despite the fact that India's diversion of nuclear material and equipment for the so-called peaceful explosion of 1974 was the prime reason behind the creation of NSG.³⁹ It was created to prevent the diversion of nuclear material from civilian trade to military purposes with seven suppliers of advanced nuclear technology, i.e., United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Japan, West Germany, and Soviet Union getting together to form a cartel to control nuclear technology supplied for peaceful uses. India violated its obligations with Canada, diverting plutonium from the Canadian-Indian reactor that was being run with the US heavy-water, which was provided purely for peaceful purposes.⁴⁰

Options for Pakistan⁴¹

- In view of the strong opposition from several countries, it is likely that both India and Pakistan may not be accepted into the NSG in the immediate future. The year 2016 counts two meetings that went off without reaching to any certain point in this regard. However, if the United States once again coerces the NSG participating governments, as it did in 2008, Pakistan would not have any choice but to review its engagement with the international nonproliferation regime, which is increasingly becoming a tool to serve only the interests of major powers;
- As a responsible nuclear state and a country in dire need of nuclear technology to meet its growing energy needs, Pakistan should remain constructively engaged with the global

³⁹Naveed Ahmad, "Why are NSG berths crucial for nuclear Pakistan, India?," *Express Tribune*, April 17, 2016, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1086536/why-are-nsg-berths-crucial-for-nuclear-pakistan-india/>

⁴⁰"18 MAY 1974 - Smiling Buddah," Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization," <https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/18-may-1974-smiling-buddah>

⁴¹Beenish Altaf, "Nuclear Suppliers Group and Pakistan's Options," *South Asian Voices*, June 3, 2016, <https://southasianvoices.org/nuclear-suppliers-group-pakistans-options/>

nonproliferation regime, so that along with China, it could qualify for civil trade with other states also. Nevertheless, this relationship cannot be based on unilateral commitments and obligations;

- After the India-specific NSG exemption in 2008, India reportedly began a massive expansion of its nuclear program, including military facilities.⁴² It is believed that since civilian facilities were supplied with foreign fuel, India had the option of using its indigenous stockpiles for military purposes. This seems to have helped India's bomb-making potential, and has disturbed regional stability. Pakistan should continue to take measures to ensure that strategic stability is maintained, without getting into an arms race;⁴³
- The other option for Pakistan could be to start a diplomatic campaign to convince the NSG members of its needs and capabilities, and simultaneously highlight India's non-adherence of the promises made as part of the nuclear deal with the United States;
- Pakistan should continue nuclear cooperation with China, while also focusing on economic development to attract other nuclear vendors to explore commercial benefits in the country; and Pakistan should engage China through such incentives that could contribute to sustain Chinese support for Pakistan;
- Pakistan should continue to refuse to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) unless India signs it first for ensuring regional security;

⁴²Mansoor Ahmad, "Reactors, Reprocessing & Centrifuges: India's Enduring Embrace of Fissile Material," *South Asian Voices*, June 26, 2014, <http://southasianvoices.org/reactors-reprocessing-centrifuges-indias-enduring-embrace-of-fissile-material/>

⁴³Adrian Levy, "India Is Building a Top-Secret Nuclear City to Produce Thermonuclear Weapons, Experts Say," *Foreign Policy*, December 16, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/india_nuclear_city_top_secret_china_pakistan_barc/

- Pakistan should not give in to Western "double standards", and keep calling for an unbiased criteria-based approach for inclusion into the NSG group;⁴⁴
Pakistan should put its own house in order and project itself as
- one of the largest countries of the world having great investment incentives for the international community. Catering support for Pakistan should not only be focused on barring India from the
- membership but should also aim at catering support for Pakistan's entry into the club. Pakistan needs to adopt 'Proactive Diplomacy' rather than 'Reactive Diplomacy';
- Last but not the least, Pakistan can wait for a more appropriate time to secure membership, while it continues to support international non-proliferation efforts.

Time slot to work in:

2016 was the first year that had two NSG meetings in a year, i.e., NSG plenary in June and Consultative Group's meeting in November 2016 discussing mainly India's NSG bid. Both concluded without any consensus on the decision about candidacy of India and Pakistan in the NSG. The time slots for Pakistan that should be capitalized are:

1. First is the time slot till the next plenary meeting of NSG; this time should be capitalized in promoting Pakistan's prospects regarding NSG membership through proactive diplomatic and political initiatives for support across the 48 NSG nations.
2. Second window of opportunity comes in the backdrop of slow-pace developments in Indo-US nuclear cooperation. Pakistan has sufficient time to strengthen its politico-economic engagement with the rest of the world in general and with China in particular till the India-US nuclear deal gets further materialized.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Saqir Sajjad Syed, "China won't let India gain entry into NSG," *Dawn*, April 14, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1251947>

⁴⁵Dr. Shahid Bukhari, paper presented "Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Politics of the NSG and Its Implications for Pakistan," SVI monthly in-house Series, *Strategic Vision Institute*, Islamabad, July 2016.

Grossi-Song formula

Since the June 2016 Plenary failed to lay down criteria for NSG membership, China took a principled position that there should be criteria-based approach for NSG membership aspirant countries. However, the stalemate continued during the extraordinary NSG's consultative meeting in November at Vienna, except that only China came out with a two point approach for inclusion of non-NPT states into the NSG, i.e., to find out a solution that is applicable to all the applicants who are not signatory to the NPT, with the process of consultations and then discuss the specific application of relevant non-NPT country. Turkey Austria, Ireland Italy, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Belgium took the same stance as that of China. The serious blow was the stance of few other states i.e., Brazil, New Zealand and Switzerland that earlier stated to oppose India's membership but later denied. In this regard, there were almost of 12 Participation Governments (PGs) that supported China's proposal and 12 opposed the initiative favoring Western stance of Indian biasness, while remaining 24 PGs did not take any substantial position either way.⁴⁶

Previously, at the June plenary, NSG Chair was tasked to come up with a transparent consultation process with all the PGs to agree on a criteria without being inclined in India's favor. An outcome of this is the revised version of a draft 'Exchange of Notes' for Non-NPT applicants outlined by the former NSG Chair, Ambassador Rafael Mariano Grossi of Argentina and the current Chair, Ambassador Song Young-wan of South Korea on December 6, 2016.⁴⁷ It is a nine point commitment, which not only gives special favor to India but at the same time is harming Pakistan's case for the NSG membership. The Grossi-Song formula did not even consult China and many other divergent PGs including Turkey, New Zealand, Brazil, Ireland, Austria, Belarus, Italy and Switzerland. Even Russia apprehended the criteria calling for more consultations among the PGs and greater transparency in procedural aspects.⁴⁸

⁴⁶“Ahead of NSG meet in Vienna, China refuses to budge on India's bid,” *Times of India*, November 7, 2016, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Ahead-of-NSG-meet-in-Vienna-China-refuses-to-budge-on-Indias-bid/articleshow/55290720.cms>

⁴⁷“Draft Proposal Boosts India's Chances For Entry Into NSG,” *Indiandefense News*, December 30, 2016, <http://www.indiandefensenews.in/2016/12/draft-proposal-boosts-indias-chances.html>

⁴⁸Ali Sarwar Naqvi, “Manoeuvres for NSG Entry,” *News International*, December 23, 2016, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/173783-Manoeuvres-for-NSG-entry>

Though the Grossi proposal did not break the logjam in the process of NSG membership process, its conditions have nothing new to make India bound of. For instance, Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association points out “this formula would not require India to take any additional non-proliferation commitments beyond the steps to which it consented in September 2008” as a result of India-US nuclear trade exemptions.⁴⁹ Likewise he said: “any further country specific exemption from NSG guidelines for trade and/or membership without compensating steps to strengthen non-proliferation and disarmament would increase nuclear dangers in South Asia, and weaken the NSG and the broader nuclear non-proliferation regime”.⁵⁰

Since Pakistan's credentials for membership are equivalent to that of India's' if not better than it, so realistically the proposal's point stating that India will not obstruct any non-NPT country's membership in NSG, is simply unjustified because this can be done by any ally country on India's behest. India has not to do that inevitably itself. Pakistan has later in the year 2016 proposed a bilateral test ban to India (one commitment from Grossi's nine points) that it refused to sign. Nevertheless, if the said criterion would have been acceptable to Pakistan, it would most probably neither have any apprehensions in signing an additional protocol on its civilian facilities nor on accepting a separation plan over its military and civilian programs that is technically already operating separately.⁵¹ The only additional step would have been to bring these measures under the IAEA formal considerations. If done so, these steps can strengthen Pakistan's case where the Western mixture of incentives tries to bring-in India, making it difficult for Pakistan's candidature.

⁴⁹Daryl G. Kimball, “NSG Membership Proposal Would Undermine Nonproliferation,” *Arms Control Association*, December 21, 2016, <https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/ArmsControlNow/2016-12-21/NSG-Membership-Proposal-Would-Undermine-Nonproliferation>

⁵⁰Zameer Akram, “NSG Deadlock,” *Express Tribune*, December 30, 2016, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1279755/nsg-deadlock/>

⁵¹“Process for NSG membership politicized: Pakistan,” *Dawn*, December 31, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1305484>

Question of Credibility for NSG

Due to the double standards and inability to reach any consensus on the India – Pakistan candidacy issue, NSG credibility and integrity is being compromised. Despite of successfully expanding its members the non-proliferation regime itself and the NSG has too many escape boards. For instance, previously the NPR could not halt India's nuclear weapons test, neither in 1974 nor of 1998 tests. Likewise, the Indo-US so-called civil nuclear deal followed by the NSG waiver to India is taken as a critical matter of concern when one discusses credibility of the NSG. It is a well known fact that India has not agreed to the comprehensive safeguards in its claim to of following the IAEA's additional protocol.⁵² The credibility of the NPR and NSG would be questioned once again when India would carry out more NWS test after getting the membership. The NSG PGs supporting India's candidature failed to influence China and France to ratify the NPT in the early years of its creation. Both the states joined the Treaty in 1992.⁵³

Last but not the least; in order to sustain the norms and credibility of these multi-lateral export groups of nuclear non-proliferation regime, the non-proliferation regime itself needs to promote the ideals of strategic restrain regime and avoidance of nuclear war. It is in the realization of their normative postures that the non-proliferation regimes including the NSG will have the chances of survival.

Recommendations for the NSG

The Chinese delegation in November 2016 Vienna meeting pointed out that 'the solution to the NSG accession should be non-discriminatory, applicable to all non-NPT members and must not damage the core values of the NSG as well as the authority, effectiveness and integrity of

⁵²Brahma Chellaney, "India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement Fact Sheet," *Challaney.net*, July 12, 2008, <https://chellaney.net/2008/07/12/india-iaea-safeguards-agreement-fact-sheet/>

⁵³"Fact Sheets and Brief: Timeline of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," *Arms Control Association*, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-the-Treaty-on-the-Non-Proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons-NPT>

the NPT'.⁵⁴ NSG comes across a complex decision making dilemma. While the NSG members unanimously consider India's NSG's membership with the aim to strengthen the norms and values, then it is equally imperative for NSG to consider Pakistan's membership as well. Nevertheless, as long as the NSG's policies creates a bar for both India and Pakistan to become members without being Party to the NPT, there are some of recommendations for both the NSG:

1. There could be a possibility that the NPT may recognize both India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons states before they think of joining the NPT. With the passage of time, the NSG and NPT could eventually recognize these nuclear weapons states with the ultimate motive to strengthen the non-proliferation regime in the interim only, if India and Pakistan administer their nuclear weapons program more responsibly.
2. Owing to the fact that with the current NSG guidelines, there is no prospect of India and Pakistan joining the group so, to revise the NSG guidelines by creating a little flexibility could be recommended here. It may allow the two nuclear weapons states entry to NSG while remaining outside the NPT, but of course agreeing to international treaties and safety conventions. Wherein, at present there is no option of India and Pakistan to join the NSG as non-nuclear weapons states, Party to the NPT. In the international and nuclear politics, states would always go for effective cost and benefit analysis as to how much they are winning and losing before becoming part of the treaty.
3. Another fundamental critical issue for the NSG in general and the non-proliferation regime in particular, is the NSG's principle of non-proliferation, disarmament and the use of peaceful nuclear technology. The issue of disarmament still remains at large. Fissile Material Control Treaty is just a proposed treaty. The CTBT is yet to be enforced. The Prevention on Arms Race in the Outer Space (PAROS) is still an outstanding issue in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). None of the nuclear weapons state has yet any

⁵⁴Ali Sarwar Naqvi, "Manoeuvres for NSG Entry," *Center for International Strategic Studies*, December 23, 2016, <http://ciiss.org.pk/articles/manoeuvres-for-nsg-entry/>

commitment to disarm completely rather they are engaged in the modernization of their weapons in or the other way by retaining their deterrent forces.⁵⁵

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, the US acted irresponsibly in India's favor without considering the long-term impact of their policies for the region. This acquiescence of nuclear powers will undermine the global non-proliferation regime. The US wants India to be recognized as a legitimate nuclear weapon state which is at par with other P5. The only reason why India got declined the NSG membership till now is the comprehensive safeguard agreement for the non-nuclear weapon states of NPT so these agreements are not applicable on India or Pakistan.

Though Pakistan desires NSG membership, it arguably applied this time mostly in response to India's application. From Pakistan's perspective, standing up to discrimination is important. Indian entry into the former 'London club' (now NSG) would be a destabilizing factor for South Asian security as Pakistan will be kept out once India gets in, and it will have negative fallout on the nonproliferation regime at the international level. As Adil Sultan argues: "the responsibility for the eventual demise of the remaining non-proliferation norms will lie with the NSG and the major powers that are supporting India's entry into the NSG."⁵⁶ Also, despite the eagerness of the United States, there are still some states opposing India's NSG induction, and because the group takes decisions by consensus.⁵⁷ Hence, for Pakistan, things would continue the same way, and the status quo is likely to be maintained. It is time for PGs to restore the NSG's credibility by adopting a criteria-based approach for adding states without giving country-specific waivers, as

⁵⁵Dr. Zafar Khan, NSG Norms, Non-Proliferation Regime: Critical Issues and Criteria, Conference paper: Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and International Security in 2016, *Strategic Vision Institute*, October 27, 2016.

⁵⁶Adil Sultan, "India and the NSG," *News International*, December 23, 2016, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/115098-India-and-the-NSG>

⁵⁷China as well as some European countries, such as Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland, have not given in yet can be seen at <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1086536/why-are-nsg-berths-crucial-for-nuclear-pakistan-india/>

this will only weaken the global nonproliferation regime. The NSG should not walk away from its founding principles.⁵⁸

To conclude, both South Asian nuclear weapons states remain optimistic about the membership of NSG in the near future. This is so because instead of rejecting their applications for membership of the Group, the members of NSG have shelved the matter for future deliberations. Nevertheless, Pakistan can survive without the NSG membership but it is necessary for Pakistan to be acknowledged, accepted and treated as a nuclear weapon state by the international community as is India.

Lastly, following a negative backlash to the recent Grossi-Song formula, Pakistan has achieved a 'tactical success'⁵⁹ by halting another preferential waiver to India. This is in response to its firm struggle by the principled countries for the last few months that should be continued till the conclusion of any draft criteria acceptable to all PGs. It is because of the largely unacceptable Grossi formula that the scheduled informal NSG meeting for end December 2016 is postponed till mid January or February 2017 so that an effective proposal could be develop with transparent and comprehensive consultations among all the participating governments.

⁵⁸“IPS Speakers urge NSG to adopt “non-discriminatory, criteria based approach,” *Pakistan News Express*, June 27, 2016, <http://pakistannewsexpress.com/story/ips-speakers-urge-nsg-to-adopt-non-discriminatory-criteria-based-approach/>

⁵⁹Ali Sarwar Naqvi, “Manoeuvres for NSG Entry,” *News International*, December 23, 2016, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/173783-Manoeuvres-for-NSG-entry>

Nuclear Terrorism: A Potential Threat to World's Peace and Security

Muhammad Wajeeh*

Abstract

Since 9/11, there is a great concern in the international community about the potential nuclear terror attacks by the terrorist organizations in the major cities of the world. The quest of the terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to get access, seize, or steal the nuclear weapons and nuclear material either to inflict heavy damages to human lives or to disperse the radioactivity in the environment using a 'dirty bomb' further strengthens this concern which can pose a great threat to the security and peace of the world. This paper analyzes the potential threat of nuclear terrorism, the scenarios regarding the acquisition of the nuclear weapons or nuclear material, nuclear terrorism as myth or reality, consequences and response to nuclear terrorism, Al-Qaeda's and ISIS quest for nuclear weapon and nuclear material acquisition for nuclear terrorism, and international measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear terrorism so far.

Key Words: Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Iraq, Nuclear Terrorism, Nuclear Weapon, Fissile Material, Osama bin Laden, IAEA.

Nuclear Terrorism: an Introduction

Nuclear terrorism is a constantly evolving threat and has emerged as the most imminent challenge to world security. Nuclear terrorism refers to the prospective use of nuclear weapons containing fissile material by terrorists. Nuclear terrorism also denotes the attack of terrorists to sabotage a nuclear facility, destroy a nuclear facility to create massive radiology or consumption of nuclear fissile material using conventional

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explosives generally termed as “Dirty Bomb” which is also termed as 'Radiological Terrorism'. There is no uniformly agreed definition for this term. According to the United Nations' International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005),

“Nuclear Terrorism is an offense committed if any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally: (a) Possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a device: (i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or (ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or the environment; (b) Uses in any way radioactive material or a device, or uses or damages a nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material: (i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or (ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or the environment; or (iii) With the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act”.¹

The EU representative, Catherine Ashton in 'International conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts' stated, “Nuclear terrorism, as the risk of non-state actors getting access to nuclear materials or radioactive sources, represents a most serious threat to international security”.² In the past few years, the nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorist organizations, has become the biggest growing concern in the world. Since the 9/11 attacks on US soil, the world has witnessed the quest of terrorist organizations (specially Al-Qaeda) to acquire nuclear weapon or nuclear technology. Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, who was a dissenter of Al Qaeda in his trial testimony had

¹“International Convention for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism”, 2nd Session, September 11, 2008, accessed October 22, 2016.

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/59/766

²“The EU and Nuclear Security”, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, November 2013, accessed August 26, 2016.

<http://www.nonproliferation.eu/focus/archives/2013/2013-11.php>).

“revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for Al-Qaeda”.³ The terrorist efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon or weapon grade Uranium for use in an improvised nuclear device pose a great threat. In case terrorists acquire nuclear fissile material, it is a hypothetical assumption that such nuclear radioactive material could be used as a “dirty bomb” by detonating it with a conventional explosive device. In reality, such explosives cannot produce similar results as that of a nuclear weapon but it will disperse radioactive particles over a wide range. The detonation of such a bomb in a large city will not create massive casualties but will cause the psychological terror which will lead to a mass panic situation that could be more devastating. In contrast, the detonation of a nuclear weapon by terrorists will be a nightmare, resulting in massive casualties that could range from few hundreds to over a million, depending upon the yield of the weapon. This paper will focus on the options for terrorist organizations to acquire nuclear weapons, its prospects, myths or realities, consequences of nuclear terror attack, options to respond to nuclear threat/terrorism, Al-Qaeda's history and current status with regards to acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction, and efficiency of the existing international measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons by Terrorists

The terrorist organizations around the world have different political, ideological, ethnic and nationalist associations. They seek to gain the attention of the people through devastating attacks without losing their base of support. According to Brain Jenkins, “Terrorists wants lots of people watching, not lots of people dead”.⁴ Therefore, terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and ISIS are determined to acquire the most devastating weapon system in the world for the purpose of terrorism to create terror in the minds of people around the world. If any terrorist organization makes efforts to go nuclear, there would be different obstacles which that organization will have to face. There are four different scenarios following which a terrorist organization could

³Rahimullah Yusufzai,. Exclusive Interview: Conversation with Terror,” Times. January 11, 1999, accessed 26 October, 2016.

www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,174550-1,00.html.

⁴Steve Bowman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Terrorist Threat*, Congressional Research Report (CRS) Report for Congress (March 2002).
<http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL31332.pdf>

attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon. In the first and unrealistic hypothetical scenario, the terrorist organization could attempt to develop the fissile material enrichment facilities to develop highly enriched uranium for the manufacture of a nuclear weapon by getting the services of disgruntled nuclear scientists from Russia. As per the statement by the Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress:

“Producing nuclear weapon materials indigenously would require at least a modest technological infrastructure and hundreds of millions of dollars to carry out. The cost of a full scale indigenous program, however, if clandestine and lacking outside nuclear-weapon expertise, can be as much as 10 to 50 times higher than for a program aimed at producing just one or two bombs and largely carried out in the open or with outside technical assistance”.⁵

Thus, it is the most difficult and least likely scenario that could ever happen because the technological knowhow, infrastructure and finances required for this purpose are quite high which even an organization having strong financial resources could not bear.⁶

Following the second scenario, a rogue nation, like any of the former Russian States having fissile material stockpiles or a country like North Korea having capability of nuclear weapons, can sponsor a terrorist organization by selling a nuclear weapon to earn legitimate money⁷ and/or to serve its clandestine objectives. It may be the easiest way for terrorist organizations to acquire nuclear weapons but for certain factors. One of the obvious factors is that states normally do not

⁵United State Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 1993), 126.

http://books.google.com.pk/books?id=B4zSFd8DRWYC&printsec=frontcover&source=gbgs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

⁶Evan Braden Montgomery, *Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat, Developing a Response*, Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), (USA, 2009).

<http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2009.04.22-Nuclear-Terrorism.pdf>

⁷Michael Rühle, Analysis - The Nuclear Dimensions of *Jihadist Terrorism*, NATO Review, Growing Dangers: Emerging and Developing Security Threats, accessed October 25, 2016.

http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2007/Growing_Dangers/Nuclear_jihadist_terrorism/EN/index.htm

share their valuable assets with terrorists, and there is always a risk of them being discovered of intentionally providing a nuclear weapon to a

terrorist organization which could bring serious consequences for that state. Another fact to be kept in mind is that states would be reluctant to provide such a powerful weapon to terrorists since there is a possibility that the terrorist organization might use it against the sponsor state. The third possible scenario could be that the terrorist organization acquires a nuclear weapon through theft either from the US or Russia as both countries have assembled nuclear weapons. But still there are various challenges for terrorist organizations to handle the nuclear weapon and overcome the security features such as incorporating the proper code. However small nuclear weapons (known as 'tactical nuclear weapons') developed by these states can easily be stolen as the International Task Force on the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism declared tactical nuclear weapons of Russia as being vulnerable to fall in the hands of non-state actors through theft.⁸

Lastly, there is a growing concern that terrorists can steal fissile material from a civilian or military facility or purchase it from the nuclear black market to develop an improvised nuclear device.⁹ "Theft of weapon-grade nuclear materials would be more serious than that of material requiring substantial additional processing. If a particular stock is poorly safeguarded, diversion of material might not be detected before it had already been fabricated".¹⁰ This scenario is considered as the second easiest route which terrorists might seek because of the availability of fissile material all over the world in various civilian and military nuclear facilities most of which have vulnerable security and protection. Moreover, terrorist organizations can get the expert services to probably build a gun-type, in case of availability of highly enriched uranium, which has a relatively easier design causing the scenario of nuclear terrorism salient.¹¹

⁸Zafar Nawz Jaspal, *Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?* Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 19, Issue - 1, 2012, 91:111.

⁹Op cit, Braden Montgomery, *Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat, Developing a Response*.

¹⁰United State Congress, Office of Technological Assessment, *Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 130-131.

¹¹Braden Montgomery, *Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat, Developing a Response*, x.

Nuclear Terrorism: A Myth?

If we focus on nuclear terrorism as a myth, it reveals that the technological impediments and sophistications involved in the process of enrichment forced various states to revert their nuclear weapon projects. As far as the technicalities and sophistications involved in the production of fissile material for the weapons are concerned, it seems impossible for a terrorist organization to develop a nuclear facility for the enrichment of fissile material. Moreover, it is very difficult for a terrorist organization to manufacture and design a nuclear device in case of availability of enough fissile material for a weapon. On the other hand, it is a very difficult process to design and assemble a reliable nuclear device and nuclear warhead.

Nuclear weapon technology is so expensive and sophisticated that countries who consider it as essential for their survival have to pay an extreme cost and go through a great deal of trouble in acquiring it. That is the reason of abandoning of the nascent programs of Argentina and Brazil, and the volunteer handover of nuclear weapons by Ukraine, South Africa, Kazakhstan and Belarus in early 1990's.¹² Moreover, many nuclear scientists have a consensus that the development of a crude nuclear weapon by terrorist organizations seems impossible due to certain scientific technicalities. It needs the technological expertise in nuclear physics, chemistry, engineering, propellants, high explosives, electronics etc to manufacture a nuclear device. According to Kevin O'Neil,

“in addition to sufficient fissile materials, a nuclear explosive device requires the assembly of several non-nuclear components. For instance, for an implosion system, these include high explosive lenses and high-speed switches; some form of a neutron generator; an iron or depleted uranium tamper; and perhaps natural uranium reflector. Assembling these components requires specialized knowledge and the ability to operate specialized machine tools.”¹³

¹²Jonathan Tepperman. *Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb*, News week, (August 29, 2009), accessed 25 October, 2016. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248>

¹³Kevin O'Neill. *The Nuclear Terrorist Threat*, Institute for Science and International Security, August 1997. <http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/threat.pdf>

Hence, if a state lacks the capability to acquire proficiency in nuclear knowhow and to develop or continue its nuclear weapon program without international assistance, then how can a non-state terrorist organization achieve the milestone of nuclear weapon research and development by itself? Thus, many scientists are of the view that it is impossible for a terrorist organization to develop or manufacture even a crude nuclear weapon because such a process requires extensive expertise in various fields which are not easily available to the terrorists. The former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Michael Hayden notes, "We are fortunate that those with the clearest intent to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction are also the least capable of developing them".¹⁴ The provision of nuclear material to terrorists organizations like Al-Qaeda by any nuclear state is over blown due to the fact that no sensible state will provide their most essential and valuable materials which is important for their own security to the terrorist organizations. Moreover, the US has already made it very clear that any provision of such assistance and supply of nuclear material and weapons to terrorist organizations for nuclear terrorism will be responded to accordingly by tracing the origin of the weapon using nuclear forensics technology.

Nuclear Terrorism: A Reality?

The incapability of terrorists to enrich fissile material or weapon development cannot overshadow the threat of nuclear terrorism if we see through the prism of reality. The possibility of nuclear terrorism cannot be eliminated due to the incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material. But, at the same time, the absence of any example of nuclear or radiological terrorism should not be taken for granted. There is a need to properly analyze terrorist ambitions that have a desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons or their development capability to

¹⁴Stuart S. Brown, *Human Security: US Leadership on Counter-Proliferation*, in *The Future of US Global Power: Delusions of Decline*, (Houndmills, UK, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 144.

<http://books.google.com.pk/books?id=RgVBK3B1oOQC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>

fulfill their clandestine objectives. Though the use of weapons of mass destruction (especially the nuclear weapons) is relatively less probable, but still there is a great concern of usage of such destructive weapons by terrorists like Al-Qaeda and its affiliates due to their mindset and philosophy. When it comes to nuclear terrorism, Al-Qaeda is the most active participant among the terrorist organizations to go nuclear. Other terrorist organizations include the Japanese cult group Aum Shinrikyo, Al-Qaeda and its associates – notably the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)—who intended, and actively sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction.¹⁵

Al-Qaeda: Striving to go Nuclear

Al-Qaeda, after its emergence, found the US as its future target. Osama bin Laden, along with Ayman al-Zawahri, showed their interest in acquiring the weapons of mass destruction.¹⁶ For this purpose, Ayman al-Zawahri extensively travelled to Russia, Yemen, Malaysia, Singapore and China hunting for the Weapons of Mass Destruction¹⁷ but remained unsuccessful. In 1998, Osama bin Laden declared war on the US and secretly planned for the 9/11 attacks. At the same time, Ayman al Zawahri was piecing together Pakistan and Malaysia based networks to develop Anthrax weapons for use in the US.¹⁸ The top leadership of Al-Qaeda is reportedly having close contact with the nuclear scientists from Russia and Central Asia which make the possibility of nuclear terrorism a reality. A Pakistani Nuclear Scientist, Sultan Basharuddin Mahmood was arrested and interrogated by Pakistan and the US Intelligence Agencies. He confessed that “I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul”.¹⁹

¹⁵Mowatt-Laressen, *Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?*, 5.

¹⁶Rolf Mowatt-Laressen, *Al-Qaeda's Religious Justification of Nuclear Terrorism*, in *Islam and the Bomb: the Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear Weapons*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 29. http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Islam_and_the_Bomb-Final-pt2.pdf

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹N-scientist confesses to meeting Osama, Dawn.com (May 05, 2010). Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/940677/n-scientist-confesses-to-meeting-osama>

Osama bin Laden considered the acquisition of WMDs an Islamic duty which was extensively followed by his lieutenants and followers. This started their quest to acquire WMD's. In 1998, he gave a Fatwa regarding the legitimate use of Weapons of Mass Destruction against the US, and pointed out to the Americans in a video release to "escalate the killing and fight against you (Americans)".²⁰ Osama bin Laden stated during an interview with Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir, "I wish to declare that if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons (purchased from Nuclear Black Market of Central Asia)".²¹ During the same interview, Ayman al-Zawahri stated,

"If you have \$30 million, go to the black market in Central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of... dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available. They have contacted us, we sent our people to Moscow, to Tashkent and to other Central Asian states, and they negotiated and we purchased some suit case bombs".²²

Later in 2008, Ayman al-Zawahri gave a Fatwa justifying the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, he stated, "There is no doubt that the greatest enemy of Islam and Muslims at this time is America".²³ Adding this statement, he quoted, "artillery bombardment is permissible when the Jihad needs or requires it". He further quoted a Saudi cleric,

²⁰Mowatt-Laressen, *Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?*, 19.

²¹Rolf Mowatt-Laressen, *Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs-Harvard Kennedy School, (Cambridge, USA: 2010), 18.
https://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CEwQFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fbelfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu%2Ffiles%2FAI-Qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf&ei=ieYxU4ioL_Gz0QW394DYDw&usg=AFQjCNHGydNtb9LuhuhEf6tgO7e3pPkCTA&sig2=Hpg5cmsLI8OFyv-HVDtm6w&bvm=bv.63587204,d.d2k

²²Mowatt-Laressen, *Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?*, 18-19.

²³Mowatt-Laressen, *Al-Qaeda's Religious Justification of Nuclear Terrorism*, 38.

Nasir-al-Fahd's Fatwa: "If a bomb were dropped on them, destroying 10 million and burning as much of their land as they have burned of Muslim land that would be permissible without any need to mention any other proof. We might need other proofs if we wanted to destroy more than this number of them".²⁴ The nuclear deterrence strategy cannot work out in case of such ambitions of non-state terrorist organizations, regardless of the imagination of the results and consequences of such terrorist activities. According to Daniel Whiteneck,

"Evidence suggests, for example, that Al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong US response, especially if it included catalytic effects on governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred".²⁵

Osama bin Laden, the founder and head of the extremist militant group Al-Qaeda, was killed in Pakistan on May 2, 2011 by Navy SEALs of the US Naval Special Warfare Development Group (known as DEVGRU or SEAL Team Six)".²⁶ This operation was given the code name of "Operation Neptune Spear", and was carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency. The assassination of Osama bin Laden by US troops gave a shock to the Al-Qaeda's top leadership. It was also an important milestone for the US efforts to defeat Al-Qaeda but the threat of nuclear terrorism still exists. The Al-Qaeda leadership was later on transferred to Ayman al-Zawahri after Osama's demise. Since then, this quest of acquiring nuclear weapon and fissile material has been shifted to the ISIS.

²⁴Mowatt-Laressen, *Al-Qaeda's Religious Justification of Nuclear Terrorism*, 39.

²⁵Daniel Whiteneck, *Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework*, The Washington Quarterly, The Center of Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 187.

²⁶"US SEALs had ground support in Abbottabad Operation: Report", *The News*, July 08, 2013, accessed September 3, 2016. <http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-108532-US-SEALs-had-ground-support-in-Abbottabad-operation:-report>

ISIS: Striving to go Nuclear

In the current Syrian conflict, various Al-Qaeda affiliated groups joined in, but the presence of Al-Qaeda's top leadership is strikingly missing. In this regard, 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)', also known as 'Daesh', emerged as a strong non-state actor in the current era. ISIS having its bases in Iraq and Syria is an organization with an objective to establish an Islamic Caliphate in the world. ISIS emerged around the year 2000 and began its insurgent activities in Iraq after the US invasion there. The mastermind of ISIS was 'Abu Mushab al-Zarqawi' who started training the militants under the banner of 'Jama'at al-Tawhid Wa'al-Jihad'. It later got affiliated with Al Qaeda in 2004 and started its insurgency operations under the banner of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The AQI faced decline after the death of Zarqawi on June, 7, 2006 in a US airstrike,²⁷ and Abu Ayub al-Masri, an Egyptian bomb maker, was announced as the successor of Zarqawi. In the leadership of Masri, AQI was criticized by the local Sunnis for the foreign influence and promoting the sectarian violence.²⁸ Masri convinced other militant organizations to join the newly established 'Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) to give it a more Iraqi brand. The suggestion was made to give leadership of ISI to 'Abu Umar al-Baghdadi' in order to launch a unified resistance against the US and coalition forces.²⁹ Despite the change of the leadership, ISI was still dominated by the foreign fighters and this caused local resistance to the ISI.³⁰

²⁷Peter Bergen, Joseph Felter, Vahid Brown, and Jacob Shapiro, "Bombers, Bank Accounts, & Bleedout: Al-Qa'ida's Road In and Out of Iraq", *Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point*, Eds Brian Fishman, July 2008.

http://www.princeton.edu/~jns/publications/Sinjar_2_July_23.pdf

²⁸Karen DeYoung, and Walter Pincus. *Washington Post*, "Al-Qaeda in Iraq May Not Be Threat Here." 18 Mar. 2007, accessed September 7, 2016.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/17/AR2007031701373_pf.html

²⁹Joseph Felter, and Brian Fishman, "*Al-Qai'da's Foreign Fighters in Iraq*", *Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point*, Jan. 2007.

<http://library.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/reada/felter.pdf>

³⁰Najim Abed Al-Jabouri, and Sterling Jensen, *The Iraqi and AQI Roles in the Sunni Awakening*, National Defense University. January 2010.

http://cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/02/Prism_3-18_Al-Jabouri_Jensen.pdf

The Syrian War provided grounds to the ISI for its expansion and, by April 2013, it started operations in Syria. ISI was renamed as 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)' by Baghdadi and announced the merger of 'al-Nusra' group created by Al Qaeda into the ISIS. Baghdadi's decision to operate in Syria was criticized by al-Zawahiri but Baghdadi negated the criticism and announced the continuity of the operation of ISIS in Syria.³¹ This decision led to a disavowal of ISIS by Al Qaeda and ISIS became the leading jihadist group carrying out the military offences against the Iraqi and Syrian government security forces. In 2014, the assets of ISIS were estimated to be worth \$2 billion which were acquired through the invasion of major cities and through various criminal activities like extortion and smuggling.³² Experts estimated the per day earning of ISIS only from the oil resources was around \$1 -2 million per day.³³

ISIS is believed to have about 90 pounds of low grade uranium (which was seized from Mosul University in Iraq after the invasion of the city in 2014) that can be used in the Dirty Bomb's to create serious panic among the public.³⁴ In 2015 and 2016, ISIS became the leading high profile jihadist group in Iraq and Syria. Moreover, ISIS carried out attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, killing 130 civilians and injuring more than 100 people.³⁵ ISIS carried out a series of three coordinated suicide

³¹Thomas Joscelyn, "Al Qaeda in Iraq, Al Nusrah Front Emerge as Rebranded Single Entity." *The Long War Journal*, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. 9 Apr. 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/04/the_emir_of_al_qaeda.php#

³²Ehab Zahiyyeh, *Al-Jazeera, America* "How ISIL Became a Major Force with only a few Thousand Fighters", June 19, 2014, accessed September 8, 2016. <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/6/19/isil-thousands-fighters.html>

³³Gregor Aisch, Joe Burgess, C. J. Chivers, Alicia Parlapiano, Sergio Peçanha, Archie Tse, Derek Watkins and Karen Yourish, *How ISIS Works*, The New York Times, September 16 2014, accessed 9 September 2016. <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/09/16/world/middleeast/how-isis-works.html>

³⁴Ben Riley-Smith, *ISIL Plotting to Use Drones for Nuclear Attack on West*, The Telegraph, April 01, 2016, accessed September 9, 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/01/isil-plotting-to-use-drones-for-nuclear-attack-on-west/>

³⁵BBC News, Paris Attacks: *What Happened on the Night* - BBC News, December 9, 2015, accessed September 10, 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994>

bombings in Belgium: one at Maalbeek Metro Station, Brussels and two at Brussels Airport in Zaventem, killing about 32 civilians and injuring 300 people.³⁶ During the attacks, a G4S guard working on the Belgian nuclear research center was also murdered and it left the world believing that the ISIS has a potential plot to attack the nuclear facility either to steal the radioactive material for dirty bomb or to release the radioactive material and waste into the atmosphere. These attacks also raised the issue of nuclear security after a discovery made by the Belgian authorities that the ISIS has kept an eye on the local nuclear scientists and their families. Moreover, two Belgian nuclear power plant workers at Deol having knowledge of the nuclear sites joined ISIS and could provide assistance to exploit them for terrorist purposes.³⁷ On March 30, al-Furat, the media wing of ISIS, threatened attacks on Germany and Britain on the eve of Washington Nuclear Security Summit 2016.³⁸ US President, Mr. Barak Obama expressed during the Washington Nuclear Security Summit 2016 that,

“We know that Al-Qaeda has long sought of nuclear materials. Individuals involved in the attacks in Paris and Brussels videotaped a senior manager who works at a Belgian nuclear facility, ISIL (ISIS) has already used chemical weapons including mustard gas in Syria and Iraq. There is no doubt that if these mad men ever got their hands on a nuclear bomb or nuclear material,

³⁶Sheldon Chad, Christina Boyle, and Corina Knoll, *Los Angeles Times*, “Hunt is on for Brussels Bombing Suspect; Islamic State Warns for more, Worse Attacks”, September 10, 2016, accessed September 10, 2016.

<http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-brussels-airport-explosion-20160322-story.html>

³⁷Jennifer Newton, *Mail Online*, “Two Belgian nuclear power plant workers have joined ISIS leading to fears the jihadis have the intelligence to cause a meltdown disaster”, March 26, 2016. Accessed September 10, 2016.

<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3510384/Belgian-nuclear-plant-guard-murdered-security-pass-stolen-two-days-Brussels-attacks.html>

³⁸Gilad Shiloach, *Voactiv*, “ISIS Threatens German, Calls for Attack on International Airport”, March 31, 2016, Accessed September 10, 2016.

<http://www.vocativ.com/news/303858/isis-threatens-germany-calls-for-attack-international-airport/>

they most certainly would use it to kill as many innocent people as possible”.³⁹

Moreover, the British Prime Minister David Cameron warned, “ISIL (ISIS) terrorists are planning to use drones to spray nuclear material over Western cities in a horrific 'dirty bomb' attack”. It shows that the ISIS' probable hold over nuclear material was being taken as too real.⁴⁰ All these advancements and attempts of ISIS to obtain the nuclear material forced the world to believe about the possibility of nuclear terrorism at its highest. Many of the experts believe that the threat of the nuclear attack on Europe by ISIS is real and can disturb the peace and security of the world.

Consequences of a Nuclear Terrorist Attack

The detonation of fission nuclear devices will generate massive amount of energy which will cause blast heat and radiation. The explosion in favorable conditions causes extensive radioactive fallout, firestorms, shockwaves, and intense winds which altogether result in massive damage and casualties.

“A 10-kiloton nuclear weapon would release a massive amount of thermal radiation... a fireball of superheated gas that would destroy everything for 200 meters in all directions. The intense light and heat radiating from the fireball would also ignite clothing as far away as 1,100 meters... the effects of thermal radiation, the explosion would generate an outwardly moving shockwave of overpressure capable of crushing heavy objects, and extremely high velocity winds of several hundred miles per hour”.⁴¹

³⁹Riley-Smith, *The Telegraph*, “ISIL Plotting to Use Drones for Nuclear Attack on West”.

⁴⁰Riley-Smith, *The Telegraph*, “ISIL Plotting to Use Drones for Nuclear Attack on West”.

⁴¹Braden Montgomery, *Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat, Developing a Response*, 30.

Besides the catastrophe caused by the nuclear weapon explosion, there will be a new phase of conflict between the states. Despite the fact that a non-state terrorist organization had conducted such an activity, the future victim of the war will be the “rogue” states, mainly North Korea, Russia, Iran and Pakistan. The world would believe that it is the ineffective security measures by these states that make it easy for the terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons using different tactics as mentioned above.

Response to Nuclear Threat

The nuclear terrorism combat strategy should comprehensively focus on three objectives: “preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or fissile material; stopping terrorists from delivering a nuclear weapon to their intended target should prevention fail; and being prepared to respond as quickly and effectively as possible both at home and abroad, in the event that terrorists succeed in detonating one or more nuclear weapons”.⁴² The most important preemptive way to prevent possible nuclear terrorism is to keep away the terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons, or fissile material to develop a nuclear weapon. In case terrorists acquire nuclear weapons, then the main challenge would be to prevent the usage of nuclear weapons and catastrophic effects of such attacks. The human intelligence has a very vital role in this regard. Other challenges would be to address the concern if in case the nuclear weapon is used by the terrorists then how one would be able to limit the damage. Developing and designing certain policies would also be needed in various areas like health, development and so on. In case of such a disaster, the very first priority of government would be to limit the effects of the attack. However there is more probability of governments quickly diverting their attention to identify those responsible and conducting actions against them. The quick analysis of the events can lead the victim state to retaliate against a respective sponsor of terrorist act. The rogue states i.e. North Korea and Russia already possessing nuclear weapons, and Iran, Central Asian States, and European States like Belgium, having nuclear facilities, can be identified as the non-responsible states as these states demonstrate vulnerable nuclear safeguards and have links with the terrorist and extremist organizations.

⁴²Braden Montgomery, *Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat, Developing a Response*, 63.

International Measure to Eliminate Nuclear Terrorism Threat

The growing concern of nuclear terrorism has forced the world to adopt certain measures to ensure a strong preventive defense against nuclear terrorism. The efforts of Al-Qaeda and ISIS to gain nuclear weapons and their ambitions to use it against the US threatened the world with the prospect of a holistic catastrophe if nuclear weapons fall in the hands of these terrorist organizations. The 9/11 incident further strengthened this threat where the international community felt the need to establish certain measures which could be effective in combating and eliminating the threat of nuclear terrorism. In this regard, the first ever initiative at international level was the 'Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material' which was opened to signature on March 3, 1980, and entered into force on February 8, 1987. The Director General, IAEA was the depository of the convention and currently it has 149 state parties.⁴³ Later, on April 28, 2004, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1540 was unanimously adopted under Chapter VII of UN Charter which imposes binding obligations on all states to “prevent proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery and establishes appropriate domestic controls over related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking”.⁴⁴ The UNSC resolution 1673 (April 27, 2006), UNSC resolution 1810 (April 25, 2008), UNSC resolution 1977 (April 20, 2011) were adopted to reaffirm the objectives of the UNSC resolution 1540, endorsing the work already carried out by the signatory states and noting the full implementation of UNSC resolution 1540 by all the signatories. All these resolutions extended the mandate of UNSC resolution 1540 to two, three and ten years respectively.⁴⁵ The UN ad hoc committee was established by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 15/210 on December 17, 1996, which was adopted to elaborate on certain measures to eliminate international terrorism. It further addressed the

⁴³*Nuclear Threat Initiative*, “Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material”, accessed September 5, 2016. <http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/convention-physical-protection-nuclear-material-cppnm/>

⁴⁴*UN Home*, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)”, accessed Septem4, 2016. <http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/>

⁴⁵*UN Home*, “United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)”.

'International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (November 25, 1997)' and thereafter addressed 'Nuclear Terrorism Convention' which is formally known as 'International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (April 13, 2005)' and has 115 signatories and 91 state parties.⁴⁶ An important step in combating nuclear terrorism is the establishment of 'Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)', on July 16, 2006, which was a volunteer initiative of US President G.W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin to "strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism by conducting multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures and interoperability of partner nations. This organization is co-chaired by the US and Russia. It has an international partnership of 85 nations and four official observers.⁴⁷ Further in this regard, IAEA established 'World Institute of Nuclear Security (2008)', a unique organization which provides a forum to about 800+ members, including nuclear security experts, nuclear industry leaders, governments and international organizations from more than 60 countries, to implement best practices to reduce the amount of vulnerable nuclear material and to prevent nuclear terrorism.⁴⁸

The major contribution in designing a framework against nuclear terrorism is the 'Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)', an initiative of US President Obama, aimed at preventing the world from the possible threat of nuclear terrorism. The first NSS was hosted by US President Obama in Washington DC on April 12-13, 2010 in which 47 countries and three international organizations participated and issued a work plan to implement the objective of communiqué.⁴⁹ The objective of this Summit

⁴⁶ *Audio Visual Library of International Law*, "International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism", accessed September 4, 2016. <http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/icsant/icsant.html>

⁴⁷ *US Department of State* "The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism", accessed September 5, 2016. <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c18406.htm>

⁴⁸ *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, "World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS)", accessed September 5, 2016. <http://www.nti.org/about/projects/wins/>

⁴⁹ *US Department of State*, "Nuclear Security Summit, Washington DC 2010", accessed September 4, 2016. <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/nuclearsecuritysummit/2010/index.htm>

was to reaffirm the responsibility of all the states to maintain the security of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities from the terrorists and from the non-state actors, and to prevent them from obtaining the related information and technology. The information could be required to enrich the fissile material or to use the fissile material to develop a nuclear weapon or radioactive dispersal device/Dirty Bomb for terrorism purposes. It emphasized on developing the legislative and regulatory frameworks for nuclear security and on fully implementing all the existing international accords and commitments regarding the nuclear security (mainly Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism). It also reaffirms the essential role of IAEA and recognizes the role of United Nations G-8 led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction, and Global Initiative to Combat Terrorism within their respective membership and mandates. The purpose is to cooperate at international, regional, multilateral and bilateral levels to develop mechanisms for effective prevention and response to the incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking, recognizing the private sector in nuclear industry and ensuring the physical protection of nuclear material, establishing the security culture, and maintaining the accountancy of the nuclear material. It also aims at supporting the establishment of strong nuclear security practices, including strengthening of the global nuclear security architecture, advancing tangible improvements in nuclear security behavior and their implementation, and facilitating the international cooperation for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.⁵⁰

The second NSS was held in Seoul (South Korea) on March 26-27, 2012 in which 53 countries and four international organizations (as observers) were invited. The focus was on establishing political agreements to implement the objectives of the first NSS.⁵¹ The goal of this summit was to reaffirm the commitments and the objectives of the Hague Summit and to look for

⁵⁰ Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit, Washington DC, 2010, accessed September 8, 2016.

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/237037.pdf>

⁵¹ *US Department of State*, "Nuclear Security Summit, Seoul 2012", accessed September 6, 2016. <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/nuclearsecuritysummit/2012/index.htm>

avenues for their implementation. The NSS 2014 was held in the Hague (Netherlands) on 24-25 March 2014 in which 53 states and 5 observers from international organizations participated. It focused on strengthening nuclear security, and preventing nuclear material (which could be used in nuclear weapons or in conventional weapons to disperse radioactivity) from any unauthorized use by terrorists and criminals. Moreover, it demanded international cooperation through IAEA and other intergovernmental organizations for strengthening international nuclear security architecture among the participant states and to adopt effective measures in order to control the illicit trafficking of nuclear material and devices. The Hague Summit reviewed the achievements made by the States in the light of Seoul Summit and determined the ways to achieve the remaining objectives.⁵² The last NSS was the continuation of The Hague Summit, and was held in Washington DC on 31st March and 1st April 2016, where all the participant states reaffirmed the global goal of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, peaceful use of nuclear energy and agreed to take measures to strengthen security of the fissile material to be used in nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities as the fundamental responsibility of all the states. All the participating states were required to cooperate at international level and to share the information in accordance with the national laws and procedures of every state to counter nuclear and radiological terrorism. Though NSS of the year 2016 puts an end to the NSS process, but the NSS communiqués of years 2010, 2012, 2014 and Work Plan of year 2016 will be the guiding principles for the full implementation of them.⁵³

International Measures to Eliminate Nuclear Terrorism Threat

Nuclear terrorism has emerged as a global concern and a reality which cannot be neglected because of the incapability of the terrorist organizations to develop, purchase, seize or steal the nuclear weapon or nuclear material for the development of a dirty bomb. One cannot

⁵² *US Department of State*, “Nuclear Security Summit, Hague 2014”, accessed September 7, 2016. <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/nuclearsecuritysummit/2014/index.htm>

⁵³ Communiqué, Nuclear Security Summit 2016, Washington DC., accessed September 7, 2016.

<http://static1.squarespace.com/static/568be36505f8e2af8023adf7/t/56fef01a2eeb810fd917abb9/1459548186895/Communiqu%C3%A9.pdf>

simply afford to take it as a myth. The terrorist organizations can attempt to target civilian or military nuclear facility in order to seize or steal the nuclear material and/or to disperse the radioactivity in the environment by damaging the facilities through 9/11 like tactics. The efforts of the terrorist organizations like (Al-Qaeda and ISIS) to get the nuclear capability by purchasing the nuclear weapons or by stealing nuclear material to make dirty bombs, intended to be used against the US and Europe without realizing the consequences, further strengthens the concerns of the international community regarding the dangers of nuclear terrorism. In case of any such adventure by the terrorist organizations, the primary target of the international community will be the Muslim world which will have to pay the price of western biases. The best way to eliminate the dangers of nuclear terrorism is to have collaboration at international level among all the states and to adopt the nuclear security cultures with the improved advancements at all the levels.

Conclusion

The destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons to inflict massive damages in the shape of instant deaths, massive casualties, destruction of infrastructure and creation of widespread panic in case of its detonation by a terrorist organization is the great challenge of today's world. The demonstration of efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda, ISIS and its affiliated groups, and their willingness and ambitions to use them against their enemies (especially the US and Europe) further creates the hype. On the other hand, the acquisition of nuclear weapon is not so easy and thus far has remained out of the reach of terrorist organizations. It involves a great degree of hurdles such as the security structure of nuclear weapons' storage facilities and the inbuilt device code systems of nuclear weapons, which is not easy to break and hence lowers the probability of such an attack by terrorists. However, the nuclear material can be used in the radioactive dispersal devices commonly known as 'dirty bombs' by the terrorist organizations to spread radioactivity and create fear and panic among the masses. In this regard, the international measures to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism pose a great offensive-defense against the threat of nuclear terrorism which ensures the safety of the world from the catastrophe of nuclear terrorism.

Book Reviews

The Geopolitics of Red Oil: Constructing the China Threat Through Energy Security

Andrew Stephen Campion, (Routledge, 2016, 206 pages)

Reviewed by Dmitry Shlapentokh*

Potential readers of the book would expect a certain narrative, an assessment of China's quest for gas and oil, and the path to it. Still, Campion surprises them. In this book, China's quest for oil and gas occupies just a third of the text.

Most of the book focuses on China's image in the West, a subject absolutely irrelevant to the title. This rather unexpected approach to China's need for oil and gas stems from the author's general views on foreign policy.

He openly proclaims that he has followed the teachings of such post-modernist luminaries as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.¹ They both believed that objective reality does not exist, and is "constructed" by observers. For Derrida, it was the reader who constructs the text; text here does not exist as an objective category, independent from the reader who has limited freedom in interpretation of the text, but actually as a product of the reader. This implies that the text is as much a product of the reader as of the author.

Foucault's theory was rather different. It implied that objective reality does exist, but it is defined by "discourse," the predominant frame of thought. It was this "discourse" that really mattered, and not the situation on the ground. This includes whatever could be defined as the nature of the action, including political activities and foreign policy. This is at least the assumption of those social scientists who belong to the Copenhagen School.

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¹Andrew Stephen Campion, *The Geopolitics of Red Oil: Constructing the China Threat Through Energy Security*, Routledge, 2016, p. 10.

In the context of this theory, the author dedicates two-thirds of his book to how China has been perceived by Westerners, and how these perceptions – deeply related to the prevailing “discourse” – shapes the Western approach to China. He predictably starts his narrative with Marco Polo, the Venetian merchant who visited China in the 13th century, during the rule of the Mongol dynasty.² Like all people from medieval Europe, Marco Polo was a religious person. Consequently, he saw in China a perfectly organized religious society, much more advanced than Europe, and the best example to follow. The other Europeans who followed Polo – and there were not many of them – shared his views.

By the time of the Enlightenment in the 18th century, the European outlook had changed. Europeans became rationalistic, and this affected their perception of China. On the surface, European intellectuals expressed an interest in China. Still, they began to despise China for a lack of scientific knowledge and implicit backwardness.³ As this strain of European thought continued to develop, it had led to continuous development of China's negative image. From the mighty and cultural giant, as it had been presented in Marco Polo's narrative, it now emerged as a backward country.

China's image had also undergone two important transformations. Instead of wise sages who taught Europeans, implicitly playing the children's role, they became children themselves. The image of the children implied intellectual and emotional immaturity. In China's case, they became bad children: mischievous, dishonest, prone to lecherous behavior, etc. They were unable, in this context, to care for themselves, required control/domination, and needed punishment from adults.

In the other emerging modification, the image of the Chinese was feminized.⁴ They emerged as weak, docile, and safely used for Europeans for their pleasure. This image of China had been dominant throughout most of the 19th and 20th centuries.

²Ibid., p. 30.

³Ibid., p. 35.

⁴Ibid., pp. 38-39.

China's image as “child” or “female” had changed after WWII, a change related to the beginning of the Cold War. As the author implies, the USSR was not an objective threat to the US and the West in general, plainly because this objective reality does not exist. The ideological difference between the USSR and the West was the root of the problem. The USSR, with its socialist ideology, was sharply in contrast to the ideological framework of the West, and as such, it was viewed as dangerous. China also became communist, and thus became alien and hostile. The image of Communist China had been blended with the old image of the “Yellow Peril.” These images underscore the alien nature of China to the West in general.⁵

Since China became alien, it also became threatening. When the USSR collapsed, China continued to be a communist state and was perceived as a major threat. As the author implies, China absorbed the negative feeling which Westerners feel toward the USSR.

After spending two thirds of the book describing the changes in Western views of China, and how it is related to changes in Western mentality, the author finally deals with what should have been the major focus of the book: why the US refused to allow China to buy one of the major American gas/oil companies in the early 2000s. As the author implies, this decision was mostly irrational and was derived from the fear of China as representative of the “other.”

The book has a clear, interesting, and unusual approach to the problem of energy security and, in more general terms, to the perception of one country by the other. It goes without saying that the prevailing attitude in this or that country has shaped its elite perception of the others. One could even suggest that, in some cases, the image of the foreign country tells us more about internal ideological and social conditions of the perceiver than about the object of perception.

The image could distort reality, but even this distortion is also grounded in reality. The reality, its objectivity unrelated to perception, is the basis of any observation and should be taken into account even when the study of perception, or image, is the major goal of the work.

⁵Ibid., p. 46.

Let's reexamine the discussed study from this perspective. Marco Polo and other European explorers who visited China became fascinated with China not because of their religious beliefs, but because of the conditions in Europe. At that time, the strong European states did not exist. Their economic and military potential was quite limited. As a matter of fact, Europe at that time was the object of expansion, or target of Asian powers, against which Europeans could do little or nothing. Mongols would be a good example.

It was not surprising that the centralized and expansive China looked immensely stronger than any European power. Indeed, this was the case.

By the 18th century, most European states were not only centralized but also engaged in the first round of the Industrial Revolution. Non-European powers were usually beaten in confrontations with Europeans. This, for example, was the case with the Ottoman Turks, who engaged in steady retreat under pressure from European power. The early 19th century was marked by the first collisions between European powers and China. The Opium War, the conflict between the UK and China, was the most important among these early conflicts and encounters. It went completely ignored by the author, for it debunks his theory that it was “discourse” and not reality that defines the relationship between the major powers and their perceptions of each other. During the Opium War, the small UK had defeated huge China with just a few battleships.

It was not surprising that in this geopolitical context, China's image started to change, and it started to lose its original Middle Ages/Early Modern History luster. By the late 19th century and early 20th century, China had actually become a semi-colony, and by that time China had been finally emasculated and had become “female” and “childlike” – i.e., the Chinese were seen as an object of use and exploitation by Europeans. These changes in the perception of China were due not to the abstract cultural changes in European minds, but were directly related to China's economic and military weakness. The very fact that China was seen as being “different” from Europe plays no role in this new image. One might note that Japan was also “different” from Europe; even the Meiji Restoration (1867-1911), when Japan tried to modernize/Westernize itself, did not remove the label of “otherness” from the country. Still, they had never lost their masculinity, and were not seen as childlike.

The author's attempt to explain the confrontation with Red China in the early Cold War era could be explained just by conflicts of "discourse," or conflicting images. The irrelevance of discourse, or image, in realpolitik could well be seen in WWI. Germans were definitely not the "other" and had been seen as a European power par excellence throughout all of modern European history. As a matter of fact, Germans regarded themselves as the legitimate cultural descendants of the ancient Romans. As soon as Germans had become the enemies of France, Russia, and the UK during WWI, they immediately became Asiatized and transformed into "Huns."

It goes without saying that Germans did the same when they invaded the USSR/Russia during WWII. At the time, Germans were anxious to Asiatize Russians to justify the invasion and treat them brutally. In this reading, Russians became a new embodiment of Mongols. As in the other case, power and political expediency created a foundation for discursive construction, but not the other way around.

The West's confrontation within the USSR at the outset of the Cold War era was often explained as a conflict of ideologies: as the conflict between communism and capitalism, or in the other reading, as the conflict between Western democracy and totalitarian states with the USSR as the leader. In the case of the USSR, the explanation was essentially the same. The only difference was that Soviet ideologists regarded socialism as "progressive," "true democracy," and "peaceful," whereas the West, with the US as leader, was intrinsically exploitative and imperialistic. The American imperialists, the Soviet ideologists claimed, could not stand the peaceful, prosperous USSR and its allies, and this was the reason for conflict. Both sides claimed that if the other's political and ideological system changed, their relationship would change dramatically and for the better, for there would be no reason for conflict.

The future would show that this was nothing but an illusion. Post-Soviet Russia proclaimed that it was now capitalist and democratic; at least these statements were always made in the beginning of the post-Soviet era. Moreover, the leaders of Moscow at that time announced that they regarded the US as a model to follow. Still, despite ideological and political homogenization, the conflict and tensions between the US and Russia reemerged once again, indicating that the conflict of the Cold War era was due not to ideology, or "discourse," and should be explained as geopolitical conflict of superpowers who vied for global predominance.

Red China was attached to the USSR, and this was the reason why the US was hostile to Red China. Still, after President Nixon visited China, this relationship changed. China was still a communist country, and surely fell into the category of “other,” at least from the perspective of the US' elite. However, this “otherness” had played no role in the Chinese-American relationship, and they had improved steadily until the collapse of the USSR.

One might note that Washington has strongly protested China's actions, even during the 1989 massacre at Tiananmen Square. The reason once again was that China became less “other,” but quite a pure geopolitical pragmatism. Washington experts were perplexed as to where the USSR was heading. Some assumed that the hardliners would finally come to power again and the USSR could reemerge as a dangerous rival. Thus, they assumed, it would be wise to keep China as a potential ally in the new Cold War. These facts of the US-China relationship were ignored by the author, and for a clear reason: these facts clearly show that it was not ideology/discourse, but geopolitical reality that defines the US' approach to China. The author's transition to the present-day China-US relationship also does not hold ground.

As the elements of capitalism become more and more visible in China, the country has become much more similar to the US; in any case, it became much less “other” than in the '70s and early '80s.

Still, the US-China relationship has become much tenser than in the '70s and '80s. Once again, the reason has nothing to do with ideological and discursive differences, but is still a matter of geopolitical pragmatism. The USSR had collapsed and post-Soviet Russia seemed to be in the process of freefall throughout the 1990s. At the same time, China had emerged as potentially a rival to the US. Moreover, Cold War rivalry between the USSR and China almost disappeared, and some observers were entertaining the possibility of a Russia-China alliance.

Consequently, the views of the American government on China changed. It became increasingly concerned with Chinese control over important natural resources, which could enhance China's economic development.

To summarize:

The author produces an original study, which attempts to apply the premise of post-modernism to explanations of US-China conflict over access to gas and oil companies. However, the book has serious problems.

First, the major part of the book is hardly related to economics or geopolitics. It mostly relates to cultural history, the way the West has approached China. The second, and most serious problem with the book, is the author's approach to the very nature of international relationships. He holds that the whole of international relationships are based on nations' perceptions of each other, which has nothing to do with reality. Reality actually disappears in his interpretation, and becomes almost entirely shaped by "discourse," which in many cases, emerges from almost nowhere. This could hardly provide an adequate explanation of US' relationship with China.

The cause of tensions is not in "discourse," not in China's "otherness," but in China's rise. It became the true competitor of the US regardless of the fact that present-day China is much less different from the US now than in the 1970s.

The book is interesting, engaging, and useful in some ways, when it deals with Europe's, and the West's in general, views on China. Unfortunately, it can hardly provide an adequate explanation of foreign policy of great powers, and the US-China relationship in particular.

Not War, Not Peace?

Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism

George Perkovich & Toby Dalton, (Oxford University Press India 2016, 310 pages)

Shahzadi Tooba Hussain Syed*

Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism is written by America's acclaimed scholar on India-Pakistan matters, George Perkovich and a former U.S. intelligence officer, Toby Dalton. Perkovich is the Vice President for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and works primarily on nuclear strategy, nonproliferation issues and on South Asian security. Toby Dalton is the co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment and his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.

The broader theme of the book is evident from its title "Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism". The challenge is how to change the thinking of the other side? Answering this question, the authors have presented some policy objectives of India which mostly aim at satisfying the domestic political-psychological need for isolating Pakistan. The book aims at motivating Pakistan to act decisively against terrorists, and to deter Pakistan from escalating the conflict. The book has six chapters that share a common theme of policy options available to India.

The first chapter, titled 'Decision Making Setting' identifies lack of civilian expertise in defense and security matters as well as the military's limited input in the decision-making process as the key challenges for informed decision-making in India. Moreover, the authors argue that in order to deal with the problems like military's limited input in defence planning and defence procurement, Indian decision-making system needs significant reforms.

The probability of Indian proactive operations and the impact of use of air power to deter Pakistan against using terrorism as a policy option have extensively been discussed in chapters two and three of the book. The authors analyzed that the Cold Start Doctrine is unable to address the question of motivating Pakistan to disband the India

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centric groups by waging large-scale land operations. The authors have presented a US and Israeli surgical strike model but also mentioned that tactically it has failed to produce any strategic impact that could help win the larger conflict. They maintained that the lack of accuracy in identifying terrorist targets in Pakistan would create hurdles in achieving the objective. They highlighted the deficiency of Indian Intelligence capabilities by pointing out the need for accuracy in identifying the targets.

In chapter four, the authors provide an overview of the history of covert operations between India and Pakistan, and simultaneously acknowledge India's covert operations in Baluchistan and Karachi. The authors write; "...it is safe to say that India has not been purely abstemious in the use of covert agents and actions against Pakistan... But Indian authorities have been very careful to preserve their reputational advantage over Pakistan in this domain of statecraft." Another chapter, titled 'Covert operations', traces the evolution of Indian covert operation capabilities under the political guidance of successive Indian governments from 1990's onwards. Authors are of the opinion that the success and failures of covert operations have not ended their utility around the globe, and the real test for statecraft is how well it can bargain with its adversary by leveraging the pressure generated through covert operations abroad.

The next chapter deals with 'Nuclear Capabilities'. It tries to assess the potential changes that India could make in its nuclear doctrine and force posture in order to complement its army and air centric operations. The ultimate aim is to achieve the objectives of compelling Pakistan to abandon proxy warfare and prevent it from escalating the conflict in the event of large scale Indian military operations. Since the existing Indian Nuclear Doctrine may not be suitable to cater for land operations inside Pakistan, India could consider adopting "limited nuclear options" to counter Pakistan's use of tactical nuclear weapons. The question then arises: would how India's adoption of 'limited nuclear options' enhance Indian deterrence against Pakistan?

In the last chapter, the authors consider “Non-Violent Compellence” by making use of various factors such as diplomatic pressure, soft power projection, information campaign, naval blockade and sanctions etc. These five strategies have been presented as useful tools for compelling Pakistan to change its course vis a vis India. These are suggested as preferable policy options mainly because these would help India achieve its objectives without fighting. An approach including these strategies would bring India reputational advantages also. Non-violent compellence is “softer” means of motivating Pakistan than the violent covert operations or conventional war. It may therefore be unattractive from the standpoint of Indian domestic politics.

The authors conclude that an appropriate mixture of coercive and non-coercive strategies coupled with domestic Indian reforms in defence and intelligence sector will enable India to address its most important foreign policy challenge i.e. Pakistan. They opine that 'Not War, Not Peace' (neither peace nor war) will be a foreseeable future for India-Pakistan relations.

All the options presented and discussed in the book are based on the Indian allegations that Pakistan is generating cross border terrorism. India however has not been able to prove “Pakistani hand” in any of the incidents allegedly linked with Pakistan. The fact is that Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorism. The book provides idealistic approaches and options to India and seems to largely undermine Pakistan's capabilities as a nuclear power to counter the coercive options. Idealistically India can adopt the mix of coercive and non-coercive options to achieve its objective but realistically adoption of coercive measures/options presented in the book would be devastating for the whole region because, in achieving the larger political objectives of war, escalation dynamics cannot be ruled out.

Nuclear Weapons and International Security

Ramesh Thakur, (Routledge, 2015, 262 pages)

Reviewed by Saima Ali*

Ramesh Thakur is currently the Director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. Educated in India and Canada, Thakur has held full time academic positions at universities in Australia, Canada, Fiji and New Zealand. He is a former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General, principal writer of Secretary-General Kofi Annan's 2002 UN reform report a "Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Commissioner", and with ANU Chancellor Professor Gareth Evans, author of its 2002 report on R2P. He is presently a professor at Crawford School of Public Policy, the Australian National University and Editor-in-Chief of Global Governance. He is also the author/editor of 50 books and 400 journal articles and book chapters.

Ramesh Thakur has written extensively on issues of nuclear disarmament and arms control. In these collected essays, the first from 1986 and the latest from 2014, he maintains a consistent voice, eloquent and extremely well informed. This volume collectively conveys more than three decades of study and writings on the challenges posed by nuclear weapons. Subsequently, in introductions to the current nuclear state of play, the book deals with the challenges of nuclear weapons in three parts. Part I refers to Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and tries to explore if the power of ideas can tame the power of the state. It also gives us an insight into the nuclear debate and the envisioning nuclear features. Part II, elaborates on the regional challenges in Asia, the Pacific and the Middle East. Part III, the last part, talks about the stepping stones to a nuclear weapon free world, NPT, the global nuclear security and the problems of nuclear weapons and suggests the remedial measures.

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While discussing nuclear non proliferation and disarmament, the author talks about the theoretical approaches in peace research, aiming at exercising control on arms and violence, the role of UNO and how best to bring a balance between theory and practice. He further elaborates on the global governance and the logics on which the theory meets practice and finally gives his opinion suggesting the role of international bodies in the next few years.

Professor Thakur, while sharing the nuclear debate, expresses his concern that the nuclear weapons pose some genuine moral dilemma for the global nuclear balance characterized by strategic parity or essential equivalence. He categorically opines that nuclear wars cannot be fought and won. The need for controlling the arms race is a must but technical and political reasons cannot be overcome easily.

Envisioning nuclear futures, the author expresses his concerns that even the nuclear threat cannot stop incidents like the Kargil conflict (1999). In this context, the international treaties have also failed to deliver. An enduring resolution of any conflict must strike a balance between the two competing pulls of realism and justice. Simultaneously, the CTBT has failed to achieve its desired results. The UN must come forward with a new resolution to cater for the prevailing insecurity owing to the nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

At any rate, while the nuclear era now has a long history since 1945, the continuities are also prominent. The means of delivering nuclear weapons, the theories administering their likely use and claimed deterrence worth, as well as some of the key actions of arms control, were started over the 1950s and 1960s. This means that the discussion of three decades ago can still be relevant to our current situation. It can also mean that at times we appear to be going round in circles with nothing actually resolved.

There is poignancy in this collection, for this is a record of agreements for control and reductions made but rarely observed. Even when the breakthroughs came, they were the result, by and large, not of compelling advocacy but of political developments. The anxious crisis management of the early 1960s led to the Test Ban Treaty and the hotline; later the superpower detente led first to strategic arms reductions and then to the moves towards the end of the Cold War: the

breakup of the Soviet Union saw the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and then unilateral cuts in short-range systems. There has been less proliferation than might have been feared, in part because of the norms created by the Non-Proliferation Treaty but also because the political incentives have not been strong enough for countries to accept the risk of acquiring nuclear weapons.

The difficulty or the weakness with Thakur's stance is that while he is serious about his study, in the end he is also an advocate of a particular outcome.. He starts by making a distinction between Strategic Studies and Peace Studies. I am not sure in terms of practice that this distinction is as sharp as it once seemed to be. On issues such as humanitarian involvement, for example, there is a strong “for and against” debate to be found in both traditions. But Thakur is reflecting the original inspiration behind Peace Studies that scholarship could and should serve the cause of peace.

Those outside the Peace Studies community might counter that they did not see it as their job to promote war, but that researchers must also accept that good analysis could lead them into uncomfortable positions that challenged their instinctive policy preferences. The risk of advocacy is that it distorts analysis. Thakur reflects a serious determination for acceptance that there is somehow a contest between nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence, in which the former must prosper as the latter is discredited.

Anyone who deals with the nuclear issue cannot escape the responsibility to think through how we ought to deal with the challenge posed by nuclear weapons and how we can reduce their potential for expected catastrophe. Thakur believes in this responsibility in full yet in a way his analyses would be more compelling if he were not so concerned to make them fit with his advocacy. In the end, there is no reason why recognizing the examples of deterrence at work cannot be combined with the aspiration for nuclear abolition because of the unavoidable risks connected with having numerous nuclear weapons around the globe. The book, “Nuclear Weapons and International Security” provides useful material for research on the subject of nuclear non-proliferation in particular and Arms control and Disarmament in general.

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Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses



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