In the wee hours of 13 June 2025, Israel initiated aerial strikes against Iran, under operation codenamed “Rising Lion.” Israel’s multipronged operation was an amalgam of sophisticated intelligence operations that included sabotaging Iranian air defence sites and detecting command locations across the country, precisely like Ukraine did in its Operation Spider Web against Russia. Mossad agents and Israeli assets in Iran proved pivotal in creating strategic paralysis. In parallel, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) initiated precision strikes on Iranian air defence batteries, command sites, airbases, missile storage and launch vehicles, and even nuclear installations at Natanz and Fordow. Visuals started to emerge of damages inflicted on Iran. Most of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) pivotal leadership was killed in initial Israeli strikes, which itself raises questions about informational breach.
Iran’s air force was once among the strongest in Asia, wielding state-of-the-art armaments during the Shah era. But the post-1979 revolution and Iranian clergy clamping down on Iran’s traditional military (the Artesh) started the operational decline. The Iran-Iraq war saw some significant feats where the Iranian Air Force carried out lethal strikes. Some of these included Operation Kaman 99 (29 September 1980), mentioned in Pierre Razoux’s book “The Iran-Iraq War”. This was the largest Iranian counter-strike after being attacked by Iraq, where nearly 140 Iranian aircraft destroyed sizeable Iraqi Air Force infrastructure, impairing its ability to launch air operations. The infamous strike on the H-3 airbase in 1983 is a known event in the history of air warfare. The Iranian Air Force struck an Iraqi airbase in the farthest stretch of Iraq; the daunting operation included aerial refuelling over Iraqi airspace multiple times, enabling Iranian aircraft to achieve strategic depth. Iran also used its air force to target oil vessels in the Persian Gulf during the infamous “Tanker War” of the ‘80s, delivering a decisive blow to Iraq’s oil exports.
Air Denial Failure: A Crippled Integrated Air Defence Network (IADN)
The surprising element was Iran’s lack of aerial defence, be it through aircraft or even its much-touted air defence systems. Iran has often propagated that it not only employed imported Russian systems like the S-300 and TOR missile batteries but even achieved a level of ingenuity by making Bavar-373 and Khordad systems. But these systems fell short of defending Iranian airspace and protecting critical assets at a critical time. Iran’s sole offensive leg, its large stock of ballistic missiles, was left impaired because launchers and launch sites were vulnerable to Israeli strikes. As per the Wall Street Journal, Israel’s defence force claims it destroyed almost 120 of Iran’s launch vehicles. This restricted Iran’s ballistic vectors to activate properly, making en route projectiles numbered and easy to intercept. However, this equation started to shift after the third day of conflict.
The Ageing Iranian Air Force and Doctrinal Decay
The Iranian Air Force (IRIAF) could not put up a battle due to its legacy systems and lack of modern aircraft and 21st-century integrated aerial defence systems. Iran mostly operates pre-revolution aircraft like F-5 Tiger Sharks, F-4E Phantoms and F-14 Tomcats, all acquired during the ‘60s and ‘70s. Iran did make some acquisitions like the Chinese F-7, Russian SU-24 Fencer bombers, and MiG-29s in a limited number. But these numbers fall short of the operational requirement of maintaining credible squadron strength. The ageing fleet was not complemented by any Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft (no Russian system like the Russian A-50), as well as ground-based support systems that include modern radars and signals intelligence.
Competing Military Structures, Purges, Rise of the IRGC and Tactical Paralysis
Post-revolution, international sanctions and domestic ideological purges took a toll on Iran’s conventional forces. One of the very first steps by the Iranian clergy-led regime was to establish control over armed forces and local law enforcement to augment control over masses and quell institutional dissent, as well as diminish prospects of a military coup. This was done to defang the military’s functional capability so that it would not indulge in counter-coup efforts.
Iran already possessed an air force, army, and navy, but it also has the IRGC, which has its own air, ground, naval, and strategic arm. The latter is the mainstay militia for the Iranian Supreme Leader to consolidate control within Iran and external operations in the Middle East. The parallel structure meant that Iran’s Artesh would have insufficient resources and a lack of decision-making in military doctrines. The IRGC’s forces got the best piece of the pie, especially the newer equipment. The disconnect also resulted in non-linear training that took a toll on the professional parity of military sources. The IRIAF was left with aircraft only, while the IRGC’s air arm got control over air defences and the infrastructure to manufacture localised systems that would augment the Air Defence (AD) net. The air force could not induct any latest airframes due to sanctions. Though a limited number of Chinese and Russian systems were acquired, the primary squadron numbers remained those of the legacy pre-revolution Western systems. The IRIAF strived to obviate sanctions and utilise the black market to smuggle parts of Western aircraft to keep itself operational. But it has limits: hindered flight hours, lack of ground personnel training, equipment integrity, and pilot retention. An aged fleet became ever more aged, so its flyable asset ratio dwindled not just in quantity but in quality.
For militaries around the world, the recent showdown signals that state-of-the-art technology is still very much the deciding factor in conflicts. Conventional tools require conventional counter-options, not sub-conventional.
Fast forward to 2025, and the lack of doctrinal attention to the air force haunted the Iranians when Israeli jets established aerial dominance over Iran. The IAF could fly, take out strategic Iranian assets, and scoot away freely to friendly airspace, precisely what Iranians would have done four decades back against Iraq.
The IRGC’s primary deterrent was to utilise salvos of drones and ballistic missiles to strike mainland Israel. But this dynamic, with tactical sense, requires a secure airspace to launch, shoot, and scoot. Israel managed to trace out transporter erector launchers (TELs) and struck them while they were in pre-launch configuration. Drone launchers didn’t fare well either. Slow-speed drones were easily countered by AD nets in Iraq, Jordan, and Israel.
Denial of Strategic Depth: The Collapse of Deterrent Posture
The lack of credible airpower and failure to invest in modern aircraft seriously hampered Iran’s strategic reach and objectives. This has also diminished a sense of tactical superiority among its regional rivals, which does not bode well for Iran in any of the strategic equations. Even the smaller Gulf States possess modern air forces, albeit not at par with Israelis or Americans. Also, the IRGC’s threat of blocking the Strait of Hormuz would have faced complications without solid air cover. Even if small missile boats were used, they would have been easily overwhelmed when facing off with the United States (US) naval assets in the Gulf. Any credible sea denial or A2/AD strategy would also have required a good air force with stand-off missiles to take out shipping vessels or rapidly respond to any maritime intrusion. So this leg of Iranian strategy was also lethargic due to a lack of air power.
Why Russian Support Fell Short
Keeping aside the political dynamic of why Iranians would not allocate more resources to the state military and air force, the situation is grim. For many years, analysts claimed that Iran would be armed with modern Russian Su-35 fighter jets, but there is currently no evidence of an active acquisition. Furthermore, from a tactical purview, it should be comprehendible that even a bunch of newer Sukhois or MiGs would not have made any difference in the absence of a robust integrated aerial defence network that comprises modern radars, AEW&C aircraft, Electronic Warfare (EW) aircraft, and space-based intel communication, where a single asset is part of a wider air defence network working in synergy (a characteristic of modern aerial warfare). Furthermore, the Russians themselves are busy in Ukraine; their war industry is committed to replenishing the Russian war effort. It is unlikely an emergency order by Iranians for their AD systems could have been catered to. Russia could have leased some of its AD batteries, but those would have gone to the IRGC aerospace corps, which was also a victim of Israeli covert assassinations and sabotage efforts, and transporting equipment during wartime itself is a very complex and risky undertaking.
The Chinese option and procurement dilemma
Now there is speculation that Iran will seek alternative options to establish air defence networks (with good SAMs and aircraft). Lessons are being construed from the early May skirmish between India and Pakistan, where Pakistan claims it shot down six Indian aircraft, including French-origin Rafale, using Chinese-made J-10CE and PL-15 BVR missiles. The engagement also saw Pakistan using Chinese HQ-9 SAMs. Witnessing the success of this system, Pakistan is considering acquiring more advanced Chinese SAMs, AEW&C aircraft and 5th-generation fighter jets. Chinese state-owned enterprises have demonstrated the ability to manufacture a large number of aircraft in a given time, mainly due to a robust and wide industrial base and a linear supply chain. Furthermore, PLA, PLAAF, and PLAN mass orders have kept the industry running for a staggering number of orders over the years.
However, China might be more careful in providing Iranians with their most advanced systems. While Beijing is actively seeking export destinations for its defence equipment, it is also cognisant of the reputational costs of its equipment provided to its own security imperatives in the Asia-Pacific region. To put it simply, the Chinese would want their newfound escalated defence dominance after the Indo-Pak engagement to endure. They are seeking export destinations among militaries of South East Asia, Middle Eastern Gulf States and North Africa.
A Two-Generation Lag in Airpower
But there is another caveat for Iranians here: Iran had to face 5th-generation aircraft. Israeli F-35s opened the salvo against Iran, taking out crucial high-value targets, advanced radars, and AD sites, clearing the way for F-15s and F-16s to deliver their payloads safely. Secondly, American strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure were carried out by stealth B-2 Bombers. The number of air forces with anti-stealth capabilities is already limited. Therefore, Iran, which uses ageing 3rd-generation aircraft (many of which might not be flyable for Combat Air Patrol (CAP) missions), faced 5th-generation fighter aircraft; its adversaries were generations ahead. Iran cannot jump directly to 5th-generation. Iran would require a whole network of specialised aircraft, which would require two things: spending billions on short notice and providing adequate training span to personnel. Iran might have the money (thanks to its hydrocarbon exports), but for the latter, it might not suffice well enough, especially now under an active looming threat over Tehran.
Conclusion and Lessons Learnt
Iran’s doctrinal shortcomings have severely impaired its national defence. Its politico-ideological purges have left its state military outdated and outmanoeuvred, and the IRGC could not solely stand against the Israelis. While a bombing campaign alone cannot induce any regime change, a notion augmented by the Vietnam War, Iraq War, and now the Iran War, can inflict serious counter-value damage and pave the way for a ground operation.
From Tehran’s purview, the war is not over, and what happened in June cannot happen again. To establish a form of credible deterrence, it seems Iran’s options are getting limited, providing an impetus to seriously pursue a nuclear deterrent.
For air forces around the world, the recent conflict enhances the need for integrated systems that utilise hi/low mix in aerial assets. Low-cost technology, while revolutionary, cannot outpace sophisticated aircraft. Furthermore, the conflict underscores how stand-off munitions in SEAD and anti-aircraft roles are the “new normal”. A country without a good inventory of missiles can neither inflict damage nor protect its airspace.
For militaries around the world, the recent showdown signals that state-of-the-art technology is still very much the deciding factor in conflicts. Conventional tools require conventional counter-options, not sub-conventional. The entire debate surrounding disrupting technologies like small drones is relevant, but it is not the sole determinant. Small drones can be a complementary factor, but not the decisive or strategic one.
