From non-alignment to multi-alignment, Indian foreign policy has struggled a lot to achieve the stated objectives and has caused more trouble than ease. While refusing to be drawn into the web of great power rivalries, India is pursuing the strategy of multi-alignment for guarding its geopolitical and economic interests, an organic outcome of global diversity.
Since the turn of the century, the US has been pitching India as a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific, while engaging with India in economic, social, technological, and cultural domains. This engagement was strategically based on pragmatism and cold calculations.
However, the Indo-US quasi-strategic partnership has been severely tested during recent times. During Trump’s second administration, fissures in the US-India bilateral relations have widened. Trump’s transactional approach and India’s assumption that it is indispensable for the US in Asia have complicated the conduct of affairs. Furthermore, the complex unfolding of great power competition between the US, Russia, and China has complicated the turf for the execution of multi-alignment by India. The imposition of high tariffs by the US on India, in retaliation for buying Russian oil, adds another factor for diluting the strategic convergences between the two.
It was predicted that a special relationship between Modi and Trump during the first tenure would guide a stable and mutually beneficial bilateral state of affairs in the next term; on the contrary, Trump’s economic protectionism, unpredictability, and America First policy did the opposite.
Nirupama Roa underscores that India’s denial and unappreciation of Trump’s mediation in the recent Pak-India May conflict is the root cause of the alienation between the US and India. New Delhi’s insistence on solving the problems with Pakistan bilaterally led to this estrangement between the two sides. Conversely, in the past few months, Pakistan’s Army Chief, Syed Asim Muneer, has visited the US twice and was hosted by President Trump at White House. Very lately, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Muhammad Shahbaz Shareef, has called on President Trump, while describing him as the “man of peace”. Furthermore, while acknowledging Trump’s mediation and efforts for ensuring peace in South Asia, Pakistan has nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize.
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, India was perfectly placed, as per its own strategic calculations, to engage with Europe and the US, while simultaneously buying Russian oil at affordable prices. However, factoring in Trump’s overtures for ending the Russia-Ukraine war, the White House seems less interested in girding itself for great power competition and rather focuses on short-term gains. For this, the US is more interested in augmenting financial gains while improving the trade imbalances.
Though distant, the possibility of US-China rapprochement will further diminish India’s significance in the US Asian strategic calculus. As the talks between the US and China continue, negotiating a trade deal and reversing the imposed skyrocketing tariffs will likely create the political space for further engagement. On top of that, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping have decided to hold a summit on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in South Korea.
Indo-China relations are beyond the long-standing and unresolved territorial disputes. India is heavily reliant on China’s supplies for semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, rare earth metals, and minerals. Being driven by a value-neutral foreign policy approach, India and China converge in ensuring an equitable global governance framework based on principles of non-intervention and the right to economic development. On the flip side, India and China have been competing to lead the Global South. India remains cautious about a “Sino-centric” global and regional order and participates vigilantly in the forums representing the Global South. The Indian approach is more “non-Western” as compared to the Chinese “anti-Western”.
The recent thaw in India-China bilateral relations hinged on the border agreement concluded last year, has cooled the temperature between the two neighbors. Although the underlying geopolitical rivalry is likely to persist and dictate the future of bilateral relations. The newly concluded visit of PM Modi to China for the SCO summit and absence from China’s grand parade mark symbolism, rather than substantive diplomacy.
India will likely face strong headwinds in executing its balancing act based on strategic autonomy. The West wants to cut down India’s reliance on Chinese supply lines, as the former pitches India as a counterweight against China in the Indo-Pacific. However, the economic considerations, dependence on the Chinese supply lines, and the push for a “non-Western” and equitable global governance will subdue India’s potential for the West as a strategic hedge against Chinese expansion.
On the other hand, India’s cautious participation in the forums representing the Global South will likely shrink its sway on the developing world, and China will cede the initiative. India’s economic development is dependent on the inflow of Chinese goods and materials. China will feel irritated if India continues to raise eyebrows on its “anti-Western approach” on forums like BRICS. If China continues to halt the Indian supplies, and the future of the US-India trade deal remains in the dark, the multi-engagement of Indian foreign policy will create more questions than answers.
In the midst of the Russia-Ukraine war, India’s import of crude oil from Russia has increased exponentially. Burgeoning oil imports from Russia serve as a foremost irritant in the US-India relations. Earlier, the US had a flexible approach towards India buying cheaper Russian crude oil and meeting its energy needs. However, the imposition of 50% tariffs by the US on Indian goods reflects a harder stance, as India’s buying of Russian oil is strengthening its war-fighting potential.
India-Russia relations have a strategic outlook spanning decades. Russia is the largest arms exporter to India. As the war in Ukraine persists, India will likely continue to buy cheaper crude oil from Russia and export refined oil back to Europe, making a lot of profit. However, this will act as a stumbling block for resetting US-India ties. Indian reliance on Russian military hardware can’t be reversed in a day, as the systems are cheap, having flexible terms and conditions focusing on the transfer of technologies and indigenous mass production.
Interestingly, Indians are skeptical about the possible role of Russians if India faces a stand-off with China in the near future. Factoring in growing economic and defence collaboration of Russia with China, and positive shifts in its ties with Pakistan, Russia is less likely to take the Indian side in future conflicts. India will continue to engage with Russia to keep it at bay from stepping further into China’s and Pakistan’s spheres of influence. Moreover, engagement with Russia acts as a pivot to counter China in the multi-lateral forums like BRICS.
It will be interesting to observe how India walks along this triangular tight rope between the US, Russia, and China, as this multi-engagement and aversion to entering into formal alliances is creating more problems for it. India has struggled to navigate obstacles in its bilateral relations with China, Russia, and the United States, and this predicament is likely to persist.
Publication Link: https://stratheia.com/from-multi-alignment-to-misalignment/
