The prevailing discourse on arms control and disarmament divides scholars into two categories: optimists who consider existing regimes and treaties as an effective tool to reduce the risk of war, and pessimists who have less faith in the effectiveness of such tools in limiting conflict. The collapse of the New START, with the Russian suspension in 2023, dealt the latest blow to the nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts. Recently, President Putin has offered to extend this treaty by one year but this has unveiled the reality of contemporary arms control: arms control is no more about stability but they are more about strategic signaling. The collapse of such treaties is not actually a cause but a symptom. The root cause is the erosion of political trust between countries, making such arms control initiatives futile. This op-ed will argue that such an absence of trust has created a gap that is not accidental but deliberate by states that want strategic flexibility, thereby institutionalizing “no rules” as a dominant feature of the contemporary arms control landscape.
As long as states possess nuclear weapons, they are an essential part of the global strategic landscape that can’t be ignored. However, the traditional arms control and disarmament frameworks have eroded significantly with new geopolitical realities in place. One such reality is the rise of China in this equation, which was traditionally bipolar between the US and USSR during the Cold War. The fact that China is not willing to enter into any multipolar arms control agreement with other major powers, especially the US, raises many questions about the future of arms control in a world where the US-China competition is evident. Growing Chinese nuclear arsenal echoed many concerns in policy-making circles in the US, calling for a bilateral mechanism to enhance communication. However, China’s reluctance is rooted in its strategic calculations where any arms control agreement would restrain its modernization efforts. Another reason would be the quantitative edge the US has over China which creates unequal basis for any such agreement between two powers. China’s prioritizes its defense modernization over reassurance and risk reduction. This makes the equation between China and the US far different from what existed between the US and USSR during the Cold War.
In 2019, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty was suspended stripping off a crucial ban on entire class of weapons. This was followed by the Russian suspension of New START in 2023 that was the last remaining agreement between two major nuclear powers. Although Russia continues to observe agreed restrictions on nuclear delivery systems but suspension of the treaty has halted vital inspections and data exchanges that was the pulse of the treaty. This treaty is set to expire in 2026 but as the clock ticks down, there are no meaningful negotiations for future. Russia conditions the inclusion of France and Britain in any future negotiations signaling for a multi-lateral framework to limit strategic assets deployment. The negotiations for such proposal and their ultimate implementation are still a far cry. The resulting system is an anarchic one where two states with world’s largest arsenal are entering into an era with zero formal, binding constraints on their strategic arsenals for the first time since the 1970s.
This shift is primarily catalyzed by the demise of the existing order being replaced by new ones where multiple poles of power exist. The arms control frameworks designed to cater the needs of bipolar world order during the Cold War no longer serve the needs of current (dis)order. China’s reluctance to be a party in any multilateral arms control framework is another powerful pretext for both Russia and the US to question the fairness and efficacy of their own restraints. For the US, two-front nuclear deterrence against Russia and China necessitates a change in their force posture which can have destabilizing effects. On the other hand, Russia is more reluctant than ever due to growing skepticism about effectiveness of such frameworks especially after conflict in Ukraine. All the major players in international system are trying to pursue unilateral advantage over cooperative management.
The above mentioned geopolitical crisis is augmented by emerging technologies demanding for new frameworks to cater them. The rise of hypersonic delivery systems, which are extremely fast and maneuverable, severely compresses decision-making time for retaliatory strikes. The development of sophisticated Artificial Intelligence (AI) for target identification, command, and control raises the terrifying prospect of a conflict initiated not by human error, but by machine miscalculation. The emergence of such technologies has increased the ambiguities that remain unaddressed in existing arms control frameworks. How do you distinguish between a conventional and nuclear hypersonic strike when reaction windows are measured in minutes? Instead of acting as foundation for new rules, these technologies have provided countries with a new frontier of gaining edge from an adversary.
The “no rules” reality in arms control is catastrophic in the long run with growing power contestation between major powers. This would result into increased arms race enhancing the risk of any miscalculation. Resurrecting a regulatory framework is an inescapable, though monumental, task that requires abandoning the defunct Cold War model for a flexible, multilateral, and technology-aware approach. Firstly, there is a need for immediate risk reduction measures where the US and Russia can agree to non-binding commitments on transparency and crisis communication to manage the dangerous post-New START environment. Secondly, there should be a shift from bilateral to multilateral arms control frameworks involving China focusing on regulating destabilizing functional capabilities like hypersonic weapons. Lastly, there should be negotiations on political norms and confidence-building measures around AI and autonomous weapon systems to prevent the coming third nuclear age arms race from being governed by algorithms.
Publication link: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/10/18/are-no-rules-the-new-rule-in-contemporary-arms-control-debate/
