In 1859, Julius Froebel emphatically expressed, “The German nation is sick of principles and doctrines, literary existence, and theoretical greatness. What it wants is Power, Power, Power!” Earlier, Ludwig von Rochau, in his 1853 book Grundsätze der Realpolitik (Principles of Realpolitik), introduced the term “Realpolitik,” which denotes a political approach where a country’s or group’s collective interests take precedence over ethical, normative, or legal concerns. The world today mirrors this sentiment, albeit grim and pessimistic. The so-called rules-based global order has eroded as unipolarity gives way to multipolarity, middle powers emerge, nationalist leaders rise, and legal norms are often disregarded in the pursuit of national interests. This shift underscores the prevailing notion that achieving national goals of a state to maximise its power supersedes de jure normativity, with emphasis on action over mere rhetoric; the ‘nice talk’ can follow later.
The unipolar moment of the 90s reached its zenith at the onset of the 21st century, with its gradual decline being marked after the 2008 financial crisis. This decline remained intermittent even with Russia and China coalescing to challenge the United States’ (US) sole hegemon status. But more than that, it was the US’s own domestic imperatives that have driven the “isolation” or withdrawal as the world’s policeman. This means that the US’s universalistic unipolar moment has ended and is overdue. But the institutionalism that emerged in parallel has, for the most part, after World War II, provided a normative semblance of order in global affairs. None of the US’s contenders has brought forth an equally robust institutional mechanism as an alternative. China is surely trying with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), but it is still far from matching what the US-led Bretton Woods systems are. Albeit, China and Russia themselves do not have actual universalistic aims, but rather, at best, collective regional gains.
With US allies rethinking their alliances, wars returning, derision of international law and norms, prevalence of distrust among international actors, and globalised institutions facing strain from their home governments, the transitional phase of the global order that is persisting reeks of a very destabilising period, unless this torrent of geopolitical flux settles into some predictability or an order (albeit a fragile one).
For established hegemons of the contemporary era, their decline would be a window of vulnerability. If the US thinks that China is catching up rapidly, it might go for active containment before China actually catches up to be a real peer competitor (especially in military terms). The windows of vulnerability marked by security dilemmas would mean that an existing power would want to make the best of its superior capability (currently) to deride the rise of a contender, making this window of vulnerability into a window of opportunity.
With US allies rethinking their alliances, wars returning, derision of international law and norms, prevalence of distrust among international actors, and globalised institutions facing strain from their home governments, the transitional phase of the global order that is persisting reeks of a very destabilising period, unless this torrent of geopolitical flux settles into some predictability or an order (albeit a fragile one).
From great powers to middle powers and even small powers, this transitional era instils fears that were nascent in the last twenty years and probably contained since WWII. The nature of leadership worldwide, especially in the West, is also worrisome. The new cohort of leaders in the West is increasingly anti-globalist, reactionary, nationalist, anti-institutionalist, and mercantilist. Veering away from this jargon, this means that Western leadership is simply not enthusiastic about the order its own predecessors strived to establish. Now the old order is cracking, the new is yet to form, and the phase currently is that of unease and vacuum.
Before the new order is formed, this transitional phase, marked by utter disregard for international norms, retraction from internationalism, and a knack for conflict, is a deadly period to be in. This is where miscalculation results in war and destruction. If history has one lesson from the last century, it is that leadership should know the cost of wars. The new capitalist elites seem oblivious to that. Aspirant hegemons are seeking to assert themselves (and not so peacefully). Russia is fighting in Ukraine, the US is not so covertly seeking security partnerships aimed at China, concomitant with an all-out trade war that will disrupt global supply chains, Israel attacks as per its whims, while its backers apparently remain helpless (even as their own Gulf allies are attacked). The world got close to a nuclear conflict when an aspirational hegemon, India, nearly went to an all-out war with another nuclear-armed country, Pakistan. India did not go to war because it had genuine security concerns; rather, its hegemonic aspiration found it suitable to do that on the premise of multipolarity, that India is a “big player” and it can act like big players against smaller countries in the neighbourhood.
The coming years are perilous, where no side has the knack for diplomacy, peace, or coexistence, further inflamed by mistrust even among allies. The self-help world reeks of destroy-the-other-first. The most troublesome position is of those countries that had invested little in their military; worse would be those who had outsourced it to another great power. As the states in Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East strive to pursue their own defence (with no little costs), the nascent conflicts among them would resurface. Domestic societies would alter, so would state structures. If the welfare models of Western Europe shift to war economies, the situation in the rest of the world would be dismal.
In a world where pragmatism precedes idealism and utopianism is overshadowed by hard-core realism, it should come as no surprise that it is only the “ruled” in this so-called rules-based order who are appalled by its ethical dissonance. For the “ruler,” or the “ruler in line,” it remains a matter of convenience. This persistent sense of trepidation drives states to pursue their national interests with little regard for customary niceties. As Kissinger stated in his 1994 book Diplomacy, “The main objective of American foreign policy is not to promote democracy but to promote American national interests.”
As ominous as it sounds, the coming decades will witness more overt militarisation, cross-regional security issues, and, even worse, an increase in nuclear proliferation. As the limits of extended deterrence offered by the US are tested, thresholds for war will be lowered, and states like India will seek to assert hegemony in their regions, with an undaunting realism. This trend will disincentivise actors that seek refuge in legality, norms and restraint. As Thomas Hobbes stated in Leviathan, “Covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all.”
Unless the major powers recognise the seriousness of ignoring irresponsible behaviours and work to reverse these ongoing trends, this “realism” will continue unchecked. Otherwise, wars unlike ever before would occur, total wars with no survivors. The Ukraine war should have been a wake-up call about the appalling nature of warfare, but it seems like the lessons learnt are otherwise. The past few years require lessons from history to be retaught and relearned to avoid repetition of the preceding century. The transition could either be bloody or relatively peaceful. The raw truth is that no one can preempt what’s coming, which is the most dangerous path of this transitional period we find ourselves in.
Publication Link: https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/politics-governance/a-world-between-orders-power-shifts-and-the-peril-of-miscalculation/
