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Comparative Analysis of India-Pakistan Proliferation Contours

Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

The Implications of the Trump Administration's South Asia Policy for US-Pakistan Relations

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Revitalizing SAARC: Challenges and Prospects

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Abbreviations

APC	All Party Conference
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BBIN	Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal
BCIM	Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar
BIMSTEC	Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectorial Technical and Economic Cooperation
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CASA	Central Asia-South Asia
CC	Climate Change
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CIRUS	Canadian-Indian Reactor US
CISF	Central Industrial Security Force
CJCS	Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff
CM	Common Market
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
COEs	Centers of Excellence
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
CPPNM	Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CSCD	Cooperation in Development in South Asia
CSF	Coalition Support Fund
CU	Customs Union
CWC	Chemical Weapon Convention
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EU	European Union
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FMCT	Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FTA	Free Trade Area
GB	Gilgit Baltistan
GICNT	Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
HEU	Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMT	India-Myanmar-Thailand

IOR	Indian Ocean Region
IP	Iran-Pakistan
ITDB	Incident and Trafficking Data Base
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NAP	National Action Plan
NCA	National Command Authority
NFC	National Finance Commission
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapon State
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NPTREC	NPT Review and Extension Conference
NSAP	Nuclear Security Action Plan
NSC	National Security Committee
NSDD	Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSS	Nuclear Security Summits
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
NWS	Nuclear Weapon State
PNRA	Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority
POTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
PTA	Preferential Trade Arrangement
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Area
SAPTA	South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement
SARSO	South Asian Regional Standards Organization
SASEC	South Asia Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation
SAU	South Asian University
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
TADA	Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
TAPI	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India
TTP	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States
WEF	World Economic Forum

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PREFACE

Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses (JSSA) attempts to offer a comprehensive and inclusive description of contemporary security and strategic environment at the national, regional and global level. It is a bi-annual blind peer-reviewed, academic journal. It aims to serve as a primary source of discussion & formulation of academic research on the current political, strategic and security discourse. *JSSA* with its lucid and coherent orientation provides an in-depth understanding of issues of contemporary international politics. *JSSA* envisages presenting an impartial and unbiased account that will help decision makers adopt an independent and objective approach during the decision making process.

The intelligible debate in this volume of *JSSA* offers an excellent compilation of well researched papers written by academicians, eminent scholars and skilled researchers. The major areas covered in the research papers in this issue reflect upon a rapidly changing international security environment and primarily focus on issues of non-proliferation regime, nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. The implication of the Trump Administration's South Asia policy for US-Pakistan Relations has also been discussed. Some papers discuss the nuclear security summits, geo-politics of Gwadar Port, SAARC, regional security and strategic threats.

The first paper included in the journal talks about the fact that India and Pakistan have failed to arrange and execute a bilateral arms control agreement or bargain, which would prevent the arms race, and resultantly an environment which is devoid of trust between the two. It further argues that in South Asia, arms control propagators have been irritated because of India's dismissal of Pakistan's Nuclear Restraint Regime proposition. Thus, the two states have been constantly producing fissile materials for weapons, expanding their nuclear stockpile and increasing their dual capable delivery vehicles—steps that enable both quantitative and qualitative improvements in their nuclear arsenals.

The next paper in the journal argues about President Trump's South Asia policy and critically analyzes its implications for US-Pakistan relations. It maintains and acknowledges the pivot of the US from Pakistan to India as its principle ally in the region to counter balance the rising power of China. Given the critical rhetoric directed at Pakistan by President Trump and several members of Congress and the US tilt toward India, it is understandable that Pakistan would reach out to regional powers, especially China and Russia, to form a countervailing coalition to the US-India-Afghanistan alliance. However, the paper maintains that Pakistan is essential to the settlement of the Afghan War and to the economic integration of Central and South Asia, the key to the region's peace and prosperity.

This volume also contains a very useful research based analysis on the challenges faced by SAARC and the need to uplift the association. The paper further proclaims that despite many loopholes, SAARC has not been entirely inactive and what needs to be ensured is that SAARC and its goals should not get embroiled and overshadowed by the power politics in the region. The paper maintains that building trust among South Asian states is the foremost challenge, especially in the case of India and Pakistan. As far as Pakistan is concerned, it is optimistic regarding SAARC's future and has always been forthcoming to facilitate regional integration for economic growth in the region. Additionally, the paper declares that, in order to achieve this objective, contentious issues need to be addressed but not at the cost of SAARC proceedings.

Another paper in the journal expounds on the National Security Summit (NSS): a remarkable initiative by President Obama and its potential implications for Pakistan's atomic security. It further states that NSS impact on Pakistan's nuclear security was positive because its nuclear establishment's response toward the NSS was very constructivist. Pakistan was invited in NSS and it played a very active role as evidenced by the multiple steps it took to secure its nuclear materials and nuclear

installations. Pakistan has been very conscious about nuclear security of its weapons from the very beginning and has taken numerous steps in this regard.

One of the papers gives a detailed analysis of the geo-political significance of the Gwadar Port. The paper argues that the port has huge socio-economic and geostrategic benefits for the country provided that its peaceful use is ensured. The paper further declares that it is imperative that all state institutions including the elected government, the military, judiciary as well as media play a positive role aimed at the wellbeing of the inhabitants of marginalized and impoverished regions like Balochistan and Gilgit Baltistan. Such an approach would not only bridge the growing trust deficit between state and citizens but in fact would provide natural immunity against geopolitical shocks emanating from Great Power politics. In this respect, China's approach to develop its restive and impoverished Xingjian province can be taken as an example to follow.

Another paper in the journal digs deeper into the problems and prospects of the international non-proliferation regime. The paper expounds that the rules of nuclear non-proliferation regime mentioned in different treaties and agreements such as Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) signifies those actions which are allowed as well as prohibited for states party to the regime. It additionally states that CTBT and FMCT are the two main instruments of the non-proliferation regime that have never come into effect because of resistance of USA and other nuclear weapons states. Entry into force of these two instruments would further strengthen the non-proliferation principles and make it harder for states to acquire nuclear weapons.

JSSA is envisioned to instill independent thinking and scholarship that supports national and human security and fundamental freedoms. It aims to generate an autonomous and rich debate on issues that specifically carry vital importance for Pakistan, peace and development in the region and international harmony so that the intellectual input could be utilized in the decision making process. Additionally, *JSSA* also seeks to be a major contributor in bringing out effective counter narratives to any prevalent policy discourse that acts against the security and strategic interests of Pakistan, and threatens regional stability and international security.

JSSA adopts the standard HEC guidelines/rules of publication. The quality aspect remains and will always be the prime concern at the SVI. It hopes that the narrative would reach out to a larger audience where the voice could be heard and registered in national and international policy circles. SVI plans to bring out subsequent volumes of *JSSA* on a regular basis and is looking forward to receiving high quality manuscripts exclusively written for *JSSA*. It looks for readers' comments and observations not only to improve its quality but also its utility in policy and academic circles.

RESEARCH PAPERS

Comparative Analysis of India-Pakistan Proliferation Contours

Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal[□]

Abstract

India and Pakistan are not party to the NPT, but they are acting in accordance with its norms/principles. They have refrained from exporting equipment, materials or technology that could be used in the manufacturing of nuclear weapons. Currently, they are observing a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests, but have conveyed unwillingness to join CTBT and FMCT negotiations at the CD. Since 2016, they have been struggling for the full membership of the NSG. Islamabad was the advocator of creating NWFZ and currently supports the nuclear restraint regime in South Asia. India has been adopting apathetic attitude towards Pakistan's restraint proposals.

Keywords: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Nuclear Supplier Group, Conference on Disarmament, India, Pakistan, South Asia, Technology.

Introduction

India and Pakistan have been receiving immense attention in the current international nuclear discourse. Although they are not members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), yet New Delhi and Islamabad officially proclaim that they act in accordance with the norms/principles of nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moreover, both states have actively been participating in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) sessions in Geneva, Switzerland. The participation in the processes of CD manifests India and Pakistan's realization about the significance of arms control, disarmament and nuclear proliferation for the international security. However, both states'

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policies are not in conformity with the CD agenda. Pakistan continues to deny consensus on start of FMCT negotiations; and India has laid down linkage to nuclear disarmament with regard to start of any negotiations; and in May 1996 India denied consensus on the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Since the establishment of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), both India and Pakistan have been members of the Agency. They have been profiting from its objective to promote peaceful use of nuclear technology. Both India and Pakistan adhere to the IAEA's facility specific safeguards. The Agency's record verifies Islamabad's claim that it has not violated the IAEA's safeguards system. New Delhi, however, sporadically deviated from its commitments with the IAEA. "It was first employed to reprocess Canadian-Indian Reactor US (CIRUS) spent fuel and from 1982-1986 it reprocessed safeguarded fuel from the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station."¹ It indicates that it had transferred the spent fuel of the safeguarded reactor to the military facility for manufacturing of weapon grade plutonium. India's 1974 test explosion "demonstrated that peaceful nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused."²

Ironically, the Indian and Western analysts malign Pakistan in the international media by publicizing that it is involved in nuclear weapons proliferation.³ Admittedly, one of Pakistan's leading nuclear scientists,

¹ Mansoor Ahmed, "India's Nuclear Exceptionalism," *Discussion Paper* (Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, May 2017), p. 29

² Quoted in Daryl G. Kimball, "NSG Membership Proposal Would Undermine Nonproliferation," *Arms Control Association*, December 21, 2016. <https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/ArmsControlNow/2016-12-21/NSG-Membership-Proposal-Would-Undermine-Nonproliferation>, accessed on October 20, 2017.

³ "India seeks probe into nuclear proliferation links between Pakistan, North Korea," *The Hindu*, September 19, 2017. <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-seeks-probe-into-nuclear-proliferation-links-between-pakistan-north-korea/article19713804.ece>, see also Con Coughlin, "The Saudis are ready to go nuclear," *The Telegraph*, June 8, 2015. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudi-arabia/11658338/The-Saudis-are-ready-to-go-nuclear.html>, accessed on October 29, 2017.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was accused of being associated with the transnational underworld nuclear network. It was involved in nuclear technology and material trafficking. As soon as this network was unearthed; the government of Pakistan publically reprimanded Dr. Khan for his illegal connection with the network. He was punished and put under house arrest. C. Collins, D. Frantz pointed out: “Khan was pardoned by the Pakistani government and remains outside the reach of the International Atomic Energy Agency and other interested parties. Similarly, prosecutions of others suspected of involvement in the network in Germany, Malaysia, South Africa and elsewhere were hampered by competing national interests and disputes between governments. Finally, the attempt by Switzerland to prosecute three of its citizens accused of helping Khan has been undermined by the destruction of evidence in response to what a Swiss parliamentary commission identified as pressure from the United States.”⁴ Instead of appreciating Pakistan’s quick and strict action against Dr. Khan, the Western analysts unleashed propaganda against the country.

Importantly, many analysts miscalculated India’s nuclear intentions from the outset. Stephen P. Cohen wrote: “Nehru was strongly opposed to an Indian nuclear weapons program, although he did not foreclose the possibility of the ‘option’ strategy. His closest confidant and advisor, V.K. Krishna Menon, was even more anti-bomb.”⁵ They were misled by Indian official statements, which advocated and supported nuclear disarmament. On October 28, 2016, D.B. Venkatesh Varma stated: “India attaches the highest priority to nuclear disarmament and shares with the co-sponsors the widely felt frustration that the international community

⁴ C. Collins, D. Frantz, “Fallout from the AQ Khan Network and the Clash of National Interests,”

<https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/symposium/2010/Documents/PapersRepository/2012749789382198030766.pdf>, accessed on May 02, 2018

⁵ Stephen P. Cohen, “Nuclear Weapons and Conflict in South Asia,” Article, Brookings, November 23, 1998. <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/nuclear-weapons-and-conflict-in-south-asia/>, accessed on October 29, 2017.

has not been able to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.”⁶ At the international forums, New Delhi gives impression the in the aftermath of its nuclear weapon tests in May 1998, that it has revamped its nuclear policy and became adherent of arms control. For instance, “India’s resolutions in this very forum [CD] reflect this concern and the need to take effective legal measures to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons as well as other measures to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons.”⁷ The critical review of India’s nuclear history reveals that it was neither in favor of nuclear disarmament nor supporter of nuclear arms control. Precisely, the nuclear analysts failed to judge accurately the hypocritical policy statements of the shrewd Indian ruling elite.

The critics fail to realize that Pakistan was a reluctant nuclear weapon state. It had sincerely advocated for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia. However, India’s nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974, transformed the regional strategic environment. Despite India’s advanced nuclear weapons program, Islamabad recommended many times various options for restraining nuclear proliferation in the region. Nevertheless, India’s nuclear arsenal advances obliged Pakistan to revamp its nuclear policy to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons and manufacture indigenous nuclear capable ballistic and cruise missiles. Importantly, despite the shift in its nuclear policy, it did not violate any of its commitments with the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The erroneous understanding of New Delhi and Islamabad’s proliferation record; the discriminatory approach of American-led Western countries towards Pakistan’s civilian nuclear program; and

⁶ Statement delivered by Ambassador D.B. VenkateshVarma, Permanent Representative of India to the CD, October 28, 2016. <https://pminewyork.org/adminpart/uploadpdf/11897Eov%20on%20L.41.pdf>, accessed on October 29, 2017.

⁷Ibid.

above all the preferential treatment to India by evading the NPT's article IV and NSG's guidelines, since 2008, compels for a comparative analysis on track *record* of India and Pakistan in the area of *proliferation*.

This study aims at critically examining the Indo-Pakistan nuclear behavior to answer three interlinked questions. How do India and Pakistan behave distinctly toward the nuclear non-proliferation regime? How Pakistan's non-proliferation record seems better and than that of India's? What is these states policy towards arms control and disarmament? The study contains five sections. The first section contains Pakistani and Indian approach towards IAEA's safeguards. It is followed by the second part that discusses engagement of both Islamabad and New Delhi with the technological cartels. The third section contains discussion on arms control and disarmaments treaties and stances of India and Pakistan. The fourth section discusses the fate of nuclear restraint regime proposal in South Asia. The fifth section debates Pakistan and India nuclear safety and security related policies.

International Atomic Energy Agency

The United States legislation of Atomic Energy Act of 1954 had allowed the transfer of nuclear technology and material for peaceful purposes. The probability of nuclear weapons proliferation as a by-product of nuclear cooperation for the promotion of peaceful use of nuclear technology under bilateral as well as multilateral arrangements resulted in the establishment of IAEA in 1957. The Agency promotes the peaceful use of atomic energy and also ensures the nuclear recipient states should not misuse the nuclear energy assistance for their military purposes. IAEA is an important international institution, which facilitates the peaceful use of nuclear technology and concurrently implements safeguards to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials and technology for military purposes.

NPT's entry into force, in March 1970, further increased the responsibility of the IAEA's safeguards mechanism. It was entrusted to ensure that non-nuclear weapon states members of NPT should not use their nuclear programs for military purposes. It introduced a monitoring mechanism—safeguards on the recipient states' nuclear facilities—to avoid the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use of nuclear facility to military facility. This process was further strengthened with the establishment of NSG in 1975, which introduced the comprehensive IAEA's safeguards system for the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) that desire to receive nuclear technology and material for peaceful use.

Pakistan has always acted as a responsible member of the IAEA. It has refrained from misusing its nuclear facilities, which have been operating under the safeguards of the Agency. Conversely, New Delhi openly violated its commitment with the IAEA in 1974 by diverting nuclear spent fuel from its CIRUS reactor to manufacture nuclear devices. The international community has ignored New Delhi's defiance of the IAEA's safeguards. Presently, the developed states, including Japan, Russian Federation etc. are cooperating with India, which implicitly boosts its nuclear weapons capability. But these States severely object to Pakistan's pursuit for peaceful use of nuclear energy, and also China's assistance to Pakistan in the construction of nuclear power plants and transfer of nuclear reactors under the IAEA's safeguards at Chasma and Karachi for power generation. This discriminatory approach not only undermines Pakistan's interest but is also detrimental for the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Technological Cartels

The multilateral export control cartels play a significant role in preventing the nuclear proliferation. However, the lack of legal legitimacy undermines their performance. In reality, they are mere technological cartels because they do not hold legal legitimacy and formal structure like

the institutional stature of the IAEA and NPT. Moreover, these cartels adopt discriminatory policies towards recipient states. For instance, the NSG's comprehensive IAEA safeguards apparatus was dented in 2008 due to its parties' consensual ratification of India specific amendment clause on the behest of United States.⁸ On September 6, 2008, the 45 members of NSG agreed in Vienna to exempt NPT holdout India from its guidelines that required comprehensive IAEA's safeguards as a condition of nuclear trade. NSG waiver would not only facilitate several foreign firms to supply sophisticated nuclear technology to India having declared eight unsupervised thermal power reactors,⁹ but had also rolled back three decades of nuclear trade restrictions on India. Nuclear analysts have concluded that the Indo-US nuclear deal would improve Indian nuclear infrastructure, which will have positive impact on the Indian nuclear weapons program. Daryl G. Kimball opined that "nuclear fuel sales to India for Indian power reactors may marginally help increase India's energy output, but at the same time it will free up India's limited domestic uranium supplies to be used exclusively for bomb-making."¹⁰ Thus, New Delhi continues to produce fissile material and expand its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, India's immunity sets a precedent that opens a door to facilitate nuclear trade between nuclear suppliers and recipient

⁸ According to the original/previous NSG nuclear trade guidelines, to be eligible for importing Part I items from an NSG member the recipient state must have comprehensive IAEA safeguards covering all its nuclear activities and facilities. The IAEA safeguards measures, such as inspections and remote monitoring, are supposed to deter and detect misuses of civilian nuclear facilities and materials to build nuclear weapons. In the case of Part II goods, IAEA safeguards are only required for the specific nuclear activity or facility that the imported material is destined for.

⁹ The NSG statement (released in September 2008) Article 2, Clause 1& 2 accepted the New Delhi's safeguards agreement agreed with IAEA on August 1, 2008. Agreement between the Government of India and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities reveals that India would separate civilian nuclear facilities in a phased manner and to file a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities with the IAEA, in accordance with its Separation Plan (circulated as INFCIRC/731).

¹⁰ Daryl G. Kimball, "Text, Analysis, and Response to NSG: Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India," (September 6, 2008) <http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3340>.

states without paying serious attention towards the IAEA's comprehensive safeguards mechanism.

India and Pakistan formally initiated the bid for the full membership of the NSG in May 2016. Even after extensive deliberation, the members of the NSG could not achieve consensus on the application of both the states in its plenary meeting held at Seoul, South Korea, in June 2016.¹¹ The denial of membership to both states confirmed that the NSG members did not behold either India or Pakistan as responsible nuclear weapon states (NWS) for global nuclear trade. Ironically, a few members of the NSG, including United States¹², demonstrated a biased approach towards Pakistan. It was reported, "The United States has said India meets missile technology control regime requirements and is ready for entry into the exclusive club."¹³ They were keen to endorse India's bid for full membership of NSG despite the fact that New Delhi disregarded the IAEA's safeguards. On May 18, 1974, India conducted nuclear explosion, for which it diverted nuclear fuel from Canadian research reactor, supplied for peaceful purposes. Thus, India is the first country to divert peaceful nuclear resources for manufacturing nuclear devices.

Ironically, the United States and likeminded members of the NSG have been ignoring the basis of the creation of this Group. The Indian nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974, was the reason for the creation of NSG to reinforce the nuclear export control mechanism. Since then, the NSG has played an important role in preventing horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation. Nevertheless, it lost its credibility in September 2008, when its members introduced an India specific amendment clause

¹¹Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "India-Pakistan Candidacy for NSG," *Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Summer 2016.

¹²Daryl G. Kimball, "NSG Membership Proposal Would Undermine Nonproliferation".

¹³"U.S. overrides objections of Pakistan and China, says India ready for NSG membership," *The Hindu*, May 14, 2016. <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/U.S.-overrides-objections-of-Pakistan-and-China-says-India-ready-for-NSG-membership/article14319309.ece>, accessed on October 29, 2017.

in the NSG guidelines on the behest of United States. By virtue of this amendment, the NSG opened up global trade with India in nuclear technology and material, without demanding or ensuring comprehensive IAEA's safeguards on the Indian nuclear facilities. This selective approach has weakened the case of nuclear abolitionists or those who were lobbying that India, Pakistan and Israel should become party to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states like South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

India's missile program has evolved after many years of clandestine research and development. Indian scientists acquired specialized missile know-how from dual-use space technology, under the pretext of its peaceful application. The available literature on the subject reveals that thousands of Indian scientists remained engaged in fusing the foreign and domestic research and components for the development of strategic and tactical missiles in India. Consequently, today, Indian scientists are developing and conducting successful test of their ballistic and cruise missiles. Despite the claims of the Indian scientific bureaucracy that they are manufacturing missiles indigenously, many analysts believe that the Indian missiles program is very much dependent on the equipment supplied by France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

India secured the full membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2016.¹⁴ The MTCR is a west-dominated cartel of 34 countries, which controls trade in missile and space technology.¹⁵ The cartel was established in 1987. Since then, the members of the MTCR have been maintaining a firm control over trade in missile and rocket

¹⁴ "India joins Missile Technology Control Regime as a full member," *Hindustan Times*, June 27, 2016. <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-joins-missile-technology-control-regime-as-a-full-member/story-MW7ZbbyxaoJtw9zCQCO9sM.html>, accessed on October 9, 2017.

¹⁵ "The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance," *Arms Control Today*, July 2017. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtr>, accessed on October 8, 2017.

components. Hence, the membership of the MTCR would be having a productive effect on India's space and missile programs. It is because, being a member of missile club, New Delhi is having access to sophisticated missile technology. Moreover, MTCR membership allows India to export its own space and missile technology to countries that comply with the regime.¹⁶

India and Israel announced the development of medium range surface-to-air missile (MR-SAM) system for the Indian Army. The missile has a range of 50-70 km. The missile is designed to defend against any type of airborne threat including aircraft, helicopters, anti-ship missiles, and UAVs as well as cruise missiles and combat jets within the range of 50-70 km. On February 22, 2017, India's Cabinet Committee on Security, a government body headed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and responsible for military procurements, approved 17,000-crore (\$ 2.5 billion) MR-SAM deal with Israel.¹⁷

Arms Control & Disarmament Treaties

NPT, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) are important initiatives of the nuclear non-proliferation propagators. Since its entry into force, the NPT had successfully prevented horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, but failed to prevent the vertical proliferation. The Treaty has failed to accomplish its disarmament objective due to its non-specific executing language of Article-VI. Secondly, the steady advances of nuclear weapon states arsenals and the vitality of nuclear deterrence capability in the making of defense strategy of the Great Powers not only obstruct the implementation of Article-VI of the NPT, but also encourage the security

¹⁶ Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Indo-Israel Missile Deal," *Pakistan Observer*, March 2, 2017.

¹⁷ "India clears Rs 17,000 cr missile deal with Israel," *The Hindu-Business Line*, February 24, 2017. <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/policy/india-clears-rs-17000-cr-missile-deal-with-israel/article9559107.ece>. Accessed on October 8, 2017.

conscious states either to develop their indigenous nuclear weapons or secure the positive security guarantees from the nuclear weapon states.

NPT has failed to attract India and Pakistan for different reasons, although both states participated in the negotiations of NPT draft discussions. Since the entry into force of the NPT, both states have maintained different policies on the Treaty. India declared the Treaty as discriminatory that divides the world into nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. Although, Pakistan refrained from joining the NPT, yet it did not reject the Treaty in totality. For instance, it proposed India simultaneous adherence to the NPT and acceptance of the IAEA’s full scope safeguards. “In 1978 it proposed to India a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons and in the same year also proposed mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of nuclear facilities, simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards.”¹⁸ India simply rejected all these proposals. If India had accepted these proposals of Pakistan, certainly South Asia could be free from nuclear weapons.

In response to India and Pakistan nuclear weapons tests, the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1172 on June 6, 1998, to “condemn their nuclear tests,”¹⁹ and called on Pakistan and India to cease further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and urged other states not to supply technology or material that could assist them to develop nuclear weapons. It specifically called for India and Pakistan:

Immediately, to stop their nuclear weapon development programs, to refrain from weaponization or from the

¹⁸ Rizwana Abbasi, “Why the NPT needs a makeover,” *Dawn, Sunday Magazine*, June 14, 2015.

¹⁹ UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 1172’, adopted on 6 June 1998; the text of the resolution is available at <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/158/60/PDF/N9815860.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed on September 9, 2017.

deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them and to undertake appropriate commitments in that regard.²⁰

Pakistan and India, while maintaining that they would not be party to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, have partially complied with the UNSC Resolution 1172. Both states refrained from exporting equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them. Despite respecting the norms of NPT on the nuclear weapons and peaceful use of nuclear technology prescribed in Article, I, III, IV, Islamabad maintains that Pakistan shall not sign the Treaty.

India and Pakistan are members of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). They have, however, espoused different positions on the CTBT. India, despite being one of the original originators of the struggle for the constitution of CTBT,²¹ refused to sign the Treaty in September 1996. New Delhi had earlier enthusiastically participated in the negotiations for writing the CTBT draft from 1994 to 1996. Pakistan took part in the CTBT negotiations and made useful contributions in drafting the Treaty.²² It has maintained a very positive approach towards the CTBT, especially after the nuclear weapon tests in May 1998. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, while addressing the 53rd session of the United Nations General

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ On July 12, 1956, New Delhi placed a proposal before the UN Disarmament Commission for “Cessation of All Explosions of Nuclear and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.”

²² Muhammad Sadiq, “International Non-Proliferation Regime: Pakistan and Indian perspective,” *IPRI Journal XIII*, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 13-36, 24.

Assembly on September 23, 1998, stated that, “Pakistan has consistently supported the conclusion of a CTBT for over 30 years...in a nuclearized South Asia; CTBT would have relevance if Pakistan and India are both parties to the Treaty. However, Pakistan's adherence to the Treaty will take place only in conditions free from coercion or pressure.”²³ Currently, Islamabad maintains a clear position on the Treaty. It is supporting the CTBT-related resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly, and also maintains that it ‘will not be the first in its region to resume nuclear testing.’²⁴

The Indian nuclear bureaucracy signaled about the probability of thermonuclear test in the near future. In August 2009, the Indian scientist K. Santhanam, who was director of test site preparations for India’s 1998 nuclear tests, claimed that ‘one of the tests—on a hydrogen bomb—had not worked, and that India would have to carry out more tests for a credible nuclear deterrent’.²⁵ P.K. Iyengar, former head of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, also confirmed the fizzling-out problem with the thermonuclear test. On 28 August 2009, Iyengar stated that he had made it clear in 2002 that India’s nuclear tests were ‘inconclusive and ambiguous’. Perhaps, the nuclear scientists are the only individuals qualified to judge and declare that a nuclear device test is up to the mark. If scientists dispute or question the validity of a weapon test, it becomes essential to conduct subsequent perfecting tests of the weapon’s ammunition and design.²⁶

²³ Rabia Akhtar, “Should Pakistan Sign the CTBT?” *IPCS*, August 24, 2009. <http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/should-pakistan-sign-the-ctbt-2955.html>.

²⁴ “Pakistan and United States Discuss Security, Strategic Stability, and Nonproliferation Issues,” June 3, 2015. <http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=Mjg0OA>, accessed on September 11, 2017.

²⁵ Sanjoy Majumder, “India nuclear test ‘‘did not work’’”, *BBC News*, Delhi, 27 August 2009, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8225540.stm>. Accessed on August 7, 2011.

²⁶ Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Towards Nuclear Zero in South Asia: Realistic Narrative.” *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol. 22, 2011, pp. 75-97.

India did not confer a legally binding commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament in reciprocity to the waiver of the NSG. Though, New Delhi made promises to respect and honor the principles of nuclear nonproliferation regime, yet it remains averse to signing CTBT and is also distancing from itself FMCT negotiations at the CD. India's history of violating its peaceful nuclear use agreements to build nuclear weapons provide little confidence in India's promises regarding the nuclear arms control, especially if the consequences of non-compliance are not made clear by India's potential nuclear supplier states.

Pakistan has participated in the FMCT negotiations despite its reservations with regard to fair play, non-discrimination and a comprehensive approach. Nevertheless, it has adopted a firm stance on the constitution of FMCT at the CD. Islamabad 'underlined its preference for a broader Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) that addresses the asymmetries in existing stocks and highlighted that Pakistan's position on FMT will be determined by its national security interests and the objectives of strategic stability in South Asia'.²⁷

The critical review of the US nonproliferation policy reveals that the double standards and discriminatory approaches of the United States and its likeminded states has hardened Pakistan's stance on the FMCT at the CD, which is viewed by many analysts as a perilous act of Islamabad for nuclear arms control and disarmament. Islamabad has resented Washington's endeavors to make India a party to the multilateral export control regimes. On August 4, 2011, Ambassador Zamir Akram, while presenting Pakistan's official stance on FMCT, pointed out that his country was not living in a vacuum. It, therefore, had not to take into account its strategic environment while entering into the negotiations of a treaty at the international forum. He stated, "from Pakistan's

²⁷ "Pakistan and United States Discuss Security, Strategic Stability, and Nonproliferation Issues," June 3, 2015. <http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=Mjg0OA>, accessed on September 11, 2017.

perspective, the discriminatory policies relating to nuclear cooperation pursued by major powers was creating insecurity and imbalances and Pakistan had been compelled to take a stand against nuclear exceptionalism, selectivity and discrimination.”²⁸ Islamabad has been maintaining a logical stance on the FMCT at the CD.

Nuclear Restraint in South Asia

Since 1972, Pakistan has been endeavoring to prevent South Asia from nuclear cataclysm. In the beginning, it was an ardent supporter of establishing Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia. In response to India’s so-called peaceful nuclear explosion on May 18, 1974, Pakistan tabled a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly calling for the establishment of a NWFZ in South Asia in December 1974. India, however, opposed the proposal. Despite India’s denial approach towards regional non-proliferation initiatives, Pakistan had proposed many proposals to prevent the nuclearization of South Asia. For instance, in 1987, Islamabad proposed to New Delhi a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty. The former also proposed a South Asia Zero-Missile Zone in 1994.²⁹ Nevertheless, India vetoed these proposals because they obstruct India’s “Great Power” quests.³⁰

India’s nuclear weapons tests on May 11 and 13, 1998 brought a shift in Pakistan’s nuclear policy. It conducted nuclear weapons tests on May 28 and 30, 1998 to restore the strategic equilibrium with its adversary.

²⁸ “Main points of Ambassador’s statement at the CD Plenary,” August 4, 2011. <https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/media/F5B92FD08F291108C12578E80038C7D2/file/1231Pakistan.pdf>, accessed on October 29, 2017.

²⁹ Feroz Hassan Khan, “Pakistan’s Perspective on the Global Elimination of the Nuclear Weapons,” in Barry Blechman, *Pakistan and Israel* (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009), 25-26.

³⁰ Muhammad Sadiq, “International Non-Proliferation Regime: Pakistan and Indian perspective,”

Secondly, it replaced its NWFZ in South Asia demand with Nuclear Restraint Regime in South Asia.

On September 26, 2009, the Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman restated:

Islamabad had a comprehensive approach to restraint regime based on three points: nuclear restraint in the light of the Pakistan-India situation, conventional imbalances should be corrected, and disputes, including that on Kashmir, should be resolved so that the risk of an arms race could be minimized.³¹

Assessing Nuclear Safety and Security Record of India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan's advanced nuclear programs necessitate the establishment of a robust safety and security national apparatuses to prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism. Pakistan assigned great importance to the safety and security of nuclear materials, nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons. Islamabad has not only indigenously institutionalized safety and security system but also has continuously been upgrading it with the assistance of neutral international institutions. In March 2016, Islamabad ratified an important nuclear security accord—a 2005 amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). It requires states party to it to provide appropriate physical protection of nuclear materials on their own territory. Today, its export controls are consistent with those being implemented by the NSG, MTCR, and the Australia Group. Moreover, the international community has acclaimed its Export Control Act of 2004.

Islamabad had actively participated in the four Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) with a sense of objectivity. During the first three NSS, the Prime Ministers of Pakistan led their delegations in the Summit. Premier

³¹“Resolution on nuclear disarmament welcomed”, *Dawn*, 27 September 27, 2009.

Nawaz Sharif announced to lead Pakistani delegation to participate in the fourth NSS.³² Unfortunately, due to terrorist attacks in Lahore on March 27, 2016, he cancelled his planned visit to the United States to attend the Nuclear Security Summit. Consequently, Tariq Fatemi, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Pakistan led the delegation to the fourth Nuclear Security Summit. Importantly, Pakistan's engagement with the NSS process was guided by four key principles: first, the NSS should not lead to new or parallel mechanisms; rather, it should help strengthen the existing arrangements. Second, the NSS should not put any additional obligations on the participating countries. Third, the NSS should maintain focus on the civil-nuclear fuel cycle, without venturing into weapons programs, which remain the sovereign prerogative of all nuclear weapon states. Fourth, NSS-related commitments, as agreed by participating states in the form of communiqués and other outcome documents, would remain voluntary in nature and be guided by the states' domestic and international obligations.

The fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington D.C. on March 31 and April 1, 2016. Nuclear Security Summit 2016 communiqué stated: "The threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism remains one of the greatest challenges to international security, and the threat is constantly evolving."³³ Although the issues discussed in the fourth NSS were broad based and not country specific, yet Pakistan received proportionately greater attention in the international media. The encouraging fact was that many international organizations, including IAEA, and reputed American think tanks, in their published

³² The Obama Administration had a series of Nuclear Security Summits that began in Washington in 2010 and concluded, again in Washington, in 2016. The second and third Nuclear Security Summits held in Seoul and The Hague respectively.

³³ "Nuclear Security Summit 2016 Communiqué," *The White House, Office of the Press Secretary*, April 1, 2016. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/01/nuclear-security-summit-2016-communicu%C3%A9>, accessed on October 29, 2017.

reports during the preceding weeks of 2016 NSS acknowledged the practical efforts of Pakistan to ensure the safety and security of its nuclear material and facilities.³⁴ During the 2016 NSS, Islamabad effectively highlighted its credible nuclear material and facility safety and security record and demanded for the end of the discriminatory NSG restraints on nuclear equipment and technology transfers to Pakistan. Tariq Fatemi stated in the NSS that “Pakistan has strong credentials to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export control regimes, on non-discriminatory basis.”³⁵ It is because of the fact that Pakistan maintains a comprehensive, safe, secure and effective nuclear program.

Islamabad regularly participates in the international forums to cooperate with the international community to impede the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Consequently, Pakistan’s nuclear installations are very much secure. It was reported that the IAEA has recorded 2,734 nuclear incidents worldwide, including five in India, but “not a single accident or breach happened in Pakistan.”³⁶ Similarly, the Harvard Kennedy School Report released on March 21, 2016, revealed that: “US officials have reportedly ranked Indian nuclear security measures as weaker than those of Pakistan and Russia.”³⁷ The report concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear security arrangements were stronger than India.

³⁴ NTI’s 2016 Nuclear Security Index Report. See also “India ranks below Pakistan in n-security index,” *The Hindu*, November 12, 2016. <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/India-ranks-below-Pakistan-in-n-security-index/article11491126.ece>, assessed on May 03, 2018.

³⁵ “Have strong credentials to become NSG member: Pak,” *The Tribune*, April 3, 2016. <http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/have-strong-credentials-to-become-nsg-member-pak/217132.html>, accessed on October 9, 2017.

³⁶ Anwar Iqbal, “Pakistan’s nukes no cause of concern: official,” *Dawn*, April 1, 2016.

³⁷ Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey, *Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline?* (Cambridge, MA: Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 2016), p. 50.

Pakistan maintains that international security is a shared responsibility and thereby a global consensus is imperative for an effective enforceable system for securing nuclear materials to protect the world from the dangers of nuclear and radiological terrorism. The participants rightly pronounced in the NSS 2016 Communiqué that “Countering nuclear and radiological terrorism demands international cooperation, including sharing of information in accordance with States’ national laws and procedures. International cooperation can contribute to a more inclusive, coordinated, sustainable, and robust global nuclear security architecture for the common benefit and security of all.”³⁸ Unlike New Delhi, Islamabad always advocates that instead of “discriminatory approach” in the nuclear realm, “universal approach” shall be adopted in engaging the sovereign nations to ensure the safety and security of nuclear material and facilities.

Pakistan endorsed and is a party to three important contemporary conventions and agreements that reflect basic requirements of safe, secure, and socially responsible peaceful nuclear energy programs of the state. They are:

1. The Convention on Nuclear Safety (as amended);
2. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (as amended); and
3. The conventions on early notification of nuclear incidents and mutual assistance in such cases.

Conclusion

The preceding discussion manifests that India and Pakistan have failed to negotiate and execute a bilateral arms control agreement or treaty, which would prevent a nuclear arms race and decrease the mistrust between them. In South Asia, arms control propagators have been

³⁸“Nuclear Security Summit 2016 Communiqué”.

frustrated due to India's rejection of Pakistan's Nuclear Restraint Regime proposal. Both states have been continuously producing fissile materials for weapons, increasing their nuclear weapons stockpiles and augmenting their weapons production facilities, as well as increasing their dual capable delivery vehicles—steps that enable both quantitative and qualitative improvements in their nuclear arsenals.

India has done serious harm to the nuclear non-proliferation regime by introducing nuclear weapons in South Asia and by setting a precedent in violating IAEA's safeguards agreement. Moreover, it did not fulfill its commitments, which it agreed to secure the NSG waiver in 2008. Conversely, Pakistan has not violated its agreements with the IAEA. Despite, the discriminatory behavior of NSG members, Islamabad has refrained from the transfer of nuclear technology and material to other states. To conclude, India's role in the realm of proliferation is pessimistic and perilous, whereas Pakistan has done its best to act responsibly and maintain cooperative and constructive proliferation policy.

The Implications of the Trump Administration's South Asia Policy for US-Pakistan Relations

Dr. Kenneth Holland[□]

Abstract

On August 21, 2017, US President Donald Trump unveiled in a televised speech his administration's "South Asia" policy, signaling his intention to place the Afghan war in the broader context of America's relationships with Pakistan and India. The policy announcement has significant implications for Pakistan because it clearly indicated a change in the identity of America's principal ally in the region from Pakistan to its rival India. This shift, however, had been in the works for years, originating in the George W. Bush administration. Both the executive branch and the Congress of the United States for years have blamed Pakistan for the failure of the international coalition to defeat the insurgents attempting to overthrow the Afghan government and praised India for its constructive role in building an Afghan state. It is not in Pakistan's interest, however, to overreact to the harsh statements and punitive actions emanating from the White House and Capitol Hill since the United States remains the world's sole superpower and, moreover, needs positive relations with Pakistan to resolve the Afghan conflict and effect peace, stability and prosperity in the South Asia region, which comprises 25% of the world's population.

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Keywords: South Asia, Afghanistan, Taliban, Foreign Military Financing, Trump Administration, Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

What is New in President Trump's South Asia Policy?

On August 21, 2017, President Donald Trump revealed his administration's long-awaited policy regarding the presence of the American military in Afghanistan.¹ The speech was keenly anticipated because, as a candidate for the presidency, Trump had threatened to withdraw all American troops from the country if elected. His security advisors, including H. R. McMaster, National Security Advisor, and Lisa Curtis, Senior Director for South and Central Asia at the National Security Council, strongly urged the president to keep troops in Afghanistan. After months of discussion with his staff, the president finally agreed. The key elements in the policy are:

1. American troops will remain in Afghanistan until victory is achieved.
2. The number and type of troops will be determined by the military commanders.
3. Unless Pakistan stops offering safe haven for terrorists who attack American soldiers in Afghanistan, the United States will reduce military and economic assistance to its erstwhile ally.
4. India, as America's most trusted ally in the region, will be asked to do more to contribute to the development of Afghanistan.

The Trump policy differs in some ways from the Obama administration's Afghanistan strategy, described by its critics as a "surge and exit" approach. Instead of proclaiming the number of troops to be deployed to the Afghan theatre and the date of their withdrawal, President Trump is leaving decisions regarding troop levels to the

¹ "Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia", Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, August 21, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/08/21/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-and-south-asia> (accessed September 12, 2017)

generals on the ground and in the Pentagon and is willing to maintain a US military presence until American objectives have been achieved, namely, the defeat of international terrorist groups, including al Qaeda and Daesh (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), and the prevention of a takeover of the Afghan government by the Taliban insurgents. Unlike his predecessor in the White House, Trump has pushed reconciliation talks with the Taliban to a low priority, thus making Pakistan's services as a mediator less urgent. Another new feature is the clear indication that the United States regards India as its principal ally in the region and sees Pakistan as an impediment to the achievement of a peace settlement to the Afghan war.

The threat in the president's speech to punish Pakistan for harboring terrorists who kill American and Afghan security personnel and civilians is not new, however. In 2010 the United States discovered that Osama bin Laden, mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in northern Virginia, was hiding in Pakistan—a discovery that led to his killing in May 2011 by United States Navy SEALs. US military assistance to Pakistan dropped considerably after the 2011 raid. Annual economic and security assistance peaked at more than \$3.5 billion in 2011 but had fallen to less than \$1 billion four years later.² In 2015 the U.S. government withheld \$300 million from the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), intended to reimburse Pakistan for the costs of its fight against terrorism. Since 2002, the CSF has reimbursed Pakistan more than \$14 billion. In December 2017, the Trump administration announced that it would withhold another \$255 million in aid from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

² Paul McLeary and Dan De Luca, "Trump Administration Threatens to Cut Aid to Pakistan. Does It Matter? U.S. aid to Pakistan was falling even before the president's speech." *FP*, August 23, 2017. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/23/trump-administration-threatens-to-cut-aid-to-pakistan-does-it-matter/>

program and said that Pakistan's status as a Major Non-NATO alliance partner in the fight against terrorism was in jeopardy.³ At stake is Pakistan's eligibility for such benefits as the transfer of excess defense articles from the US military, expedited delivery of weapons and equipment and access to a loan guarantee program to finance arms purchases. The Trump administration has made clear that it will no longer be "business as usual" in US-Pakistan relations.

In truth, President Trump's speech is not a balanced argument. It reflects the perspectives and interests of the United States and India and ignores Pakistan's point of view. In Pakistan, the National Security Committee (NSC), the Cabinet and later the National Assembly condemned the American administration's new policy on South Asia.⁴ Pakistan pointed out several facts that the policy disregards:

1. Pakistan has made enormous sacrifices in fighting the war on terrorism and has spent more than \$123 billion in the war, more than any other country in the region.
2. Pakistan does not harbor the Afghan Taliban, and there are no Taliban *shura* in Peshawar or Quetta, as alleged by Resolute Force Commander U. S. General John Nicholson.
3. Terrorists, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), operate freely against Pakistan from Afghan soil.
4. India is a known supporter of terrorists, including the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), in an attempt to destabilize Pakistan.
5. Pakistan is not responsible for the failure of the United States to defeat the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, and the continued presence of American troops will continue to destabilize the fragile country.

³ Anwar Iqbal, "US to Withhold \$255m From Another Fund after CSF Cuts." *Dawn*, December 31, 2017. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1379904>

⁴ Muhammad Khan, "Pakistani response to US S Asia policy." *Pakistan Observer*, September 8, 2017. <https://pakobserver.net/pakistani-response-us-s-asia-policy/>

6. There is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan.
7. The Trump administration's reason for the policy of putting more US military forces in Afghanistan is to maintain America's hegemony in the world.

The shift in US preference from Pakistan to India as America's principal ally in South Asia has also been underway for years. The rise of India in US foreign policy, however, does mark a significant change from the past. The United States was among the first countries to establish relations with Pakistan after its independence from Great Britain in 1947 and immediately enlisted the new country as a chief partner in the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Pakistan played a critical role as intermediary between the Nixon administration and Communist China and helped bring about the normalization of relations between the two giants in 1979. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan assisted the United States in enabling the mujahideen to drive out the Soviet forces. Pakistan became one of America's key partners in the War on Terror following the September 11, 2001, attacks and was named by the United States as a major non-NATO ally in the war in 2001. As a result, Pakistan was allocated more than \$30 billion in aid from the United States to fight terrorists (but in fact did not receive the full amount). India, by contrast, had been a close ally of the USSR during the Cold War. During the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, the United States supported the latter, and, in 1974, America denounced India for conducting its first nuclear weapons test. The administration of George W. Bush (2001-2009), however, witnessed a dramatic warming of relations between the United States and India, driven largely by the rise of an increasingly wealthy and powerful China and the American need for a strong ally in the region. Economic ties between the former adversaries also grew dramatically. The United States is now India's second largest trading partner and largest investment partner, including commerce in the rapidly growing information technology sector.

India, moreover, has long been a major contributor to the rebuilding of Afghanistan following the overthrow of the Taliban regime by US forces in 2001. India has given more than \$3 billion in assistance to the war-torn country since then. India is the fifth-largest international donor to Afghanistan and its largest donor in the South and Central Asia region. India has built thousands of miles of roads, dams, hydroelectric power plants, drinking water projects, hospitals, housing complexes for refugees, schools and even the country's new parliament building. In 2011 India and Afghanistan signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in which India made a long-term commitment to the security and development of Afghanistan. India's assistance to Afghan security forces has been limited, however, and includes training Afghan soldiers in its military academy and supply of attack helicopters to the nascent Afghan air force. India was pleased, however, by the praise it received from President Trump. In the first high-level meeting between the two governments following Trump's August 21st speech, on September 11, 2017, Afghanistan Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani and Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj signed an agreement increasing Indian assistance.⁵ India, however, has no interest in sending troops to Afghanistan, even though the Trump administration has drawn no red line against it doing so.

Pakistan Seeks Allies in Wake of Closer US-India Ties

The cooling of relations with the United States generates incentives to Pakistan to seek new and strengthen existing partnerships with regional powers to counter the close US-India ties and protect its economic and security interests. Pakistan's natural ally in building a new balance of power in the region is China. Immediately following Trump's August 21 speech, China came to Pakistan's defense, with the Chinese Foreign

⁵AnjanaPasricha, "India to Provide More Assistance to Afghan Defense Forces," VOA, September 11, 2017. <https://www.voanews.com/a/india-assistance-afghanistan-defense-forces/4023686.html>

Ministry stating that Pakistan is on the front lines of fighting terrorism. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a large investment and is part of China's Belt and Road Initiative. China shares what it calls an "all weather friendship" with Pakistan.⁶ Pakistan has shifted its reliance for high-tech weapons from the United States to China. China is now the biggest weapons exporter to Pakistan.⁷

There are limits, however, to Chinese support for Pakistan. For years, China shared Indian and US concerns that terrorist groups were taking shelter in Pakistan, including Uighur separatist groups from China's Xinjiang province that have taken refuge in North Waziristan.⁸ These fears have abated, however, as a result of Pakistani military operations against terrorists in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), including the North Waziristan Offensive (2013), Operation *Zarb-e-Azb* (2014) and Operation *Radd-ul-Fassad* (2017). China, however, has eyes on Afghanistan's rich mineral resources, and has economic investments in the country, including the Aynak Copper Mine and electrical generation and freight railroad projects. Afghanistan has large iron ore deposits and gold reserves that China covets. China stands to benefit, therefore, from any efforts made by the United States and India to bring stability and security to Afghanistan.

Pakistan also reached out to Russia, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia for support. Russia lifted its embargo on arms sales to Pakistan and helped Pakistan secure full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Russia, moreover, is interested in buying agricultural

⁶Sriparna Pathak, "Trump's South Asia Policy: Implications for China." In Tourangbam, Monish ;Maini, Tridivesh S. ; Pathak, Sriparna: Perspectives on Trump's South Asia Policy. URN: <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-53480-3>. pp. 13-17.

⁷ Omer Farooq Khan, "Report: Pak shuns US for Chinese weapons." *TNN*. April 20, 2018. <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/report-pak-shuns-us-for-chinese-weapons/articleshow/63838695.cms>.

⁸ Sriparna Pathak, "Trump's South Asia Policy: Implications for China," *IndraStra Global* 2017, 1(1), 1-4. <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-53948-6>

products from Pakistan since it has banned such imports from the European Union.

The prospects of Russia as a close ally of Pakistan, however, are limited. Russia and India have long military ties, and India is a major purchaser of Russian military equipment and weapons. India exerted its clout in the past as a major customer to pressure Russia into not selling military hardware to Pakistan.⁹ Because of the large volume of Russian-made hardware in its inventory, India will continue to purchase equipment, ammunition and service contracts from Russia that will exceed the value of its military imports from the United States. India, with great power aspirations of its own, however, is actively working to diminish its reliance on Russian arms and equipment and is seeking self-reliance in military hardware. Russia, for its part, has reacted to India's decline as an arms customer by opening and expanding new markets in the Middle East. Russia wants to sell energy to Pakistan, which it sorely needs. Because of Pakistan's indebtedness, however, its ability to buy weapons or oil and natural gas from Russia is constrained. Russia, moreover, regards China, Pakistan's closest ally, as a rival in its quest for global influence and economic clout.¹⁰ Due to geopolitical realities, a Pakistan-China-Russia alliance against US-India-European Union collaboration is not likely.

The Dangers of Overreaction

It is not in Pakistan's interest to overreact to the Trump administration's harsh criticisms of its support for terrorists, perhaps most crudely

⁹ Usman Ansari, "Pakistan cosies up to Russia, but Moscow doesn't seem to want to take sides." *Defense News*. May 2, 2018. <https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/05/02/pakistan-cosies-up-to-russia-but-moscow-doesnt-seem-to-want-to-take-sides/>

¹⁰ Ume Farwa, "Pakistan's Evolving Regional Policy: Impact Of Trump's South Asia Strategy," *South Asian Voices*, October 27, 2017. <https://southasianvoices.org/pakistans-evolving-regional-policy-impact-of-trumps-south-asia-strategy/>

expressed in a presidential tweet on New Year's Day in 2018.¹¹ In spite of China's rapid economic growth and rising military capability and presence in Central, South and Southeast Asia and Russia's ambitions to regain its status as a world power, the United States remains the world's sole superpower.¹² As a debtor nation, moreover, Pakistan is dependent on US support for continued lending from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Pakistan will continue to need IMF bailouts due to its growing current account deficit and falling foreign currency reserves. As the largest depositor, the United States can veto Pakistan's requests.¹³

Why the United States Needs Pakistan

Despite the harsh rhetoric coming from the White House and certain members of Congress, a positive relationship with Pakistan is critical to U.S. interests in the region. Firstly, there can be no lasting settlement to the armed conflict in Afghanistan without Pakistan's full involvement. U.S. and Afghan forces cannot, by themselves, defeat the insurgents and regain control over the vast swathes of territory currently controlled by the Taliban militants. The number of US troops in the Afghan theatre, for example, has fallen from more than 100,000 under President Obama to fewer than 15,000 under President Trump. Pakistan historically has had substantial influence over the Afghan Taliban and must be present at any negotiating table whose purpose is to end the conflict between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Pakistan's cooperation, moreover, is

¹¹ "Pakistan Will Continue To Have Engagement With US: Foreign Secretary." *NDTV*, January 7, 2018. <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-will-continue-to-have-engagement-with-us-foreign-secretary-1796897>

¹² Kenneth Holland, "How Unipolarity Impacts Canada's Engagement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," in Christopher Kirkey and Michael Hawes, eds., *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World*, pp. 241-267 (Don Mills, Ontario: Oxford University Press, 2017).

¹³ "Pakistan Could Face US Aid Cuts Over Human Trafficking: An aid cutback would deal a fresh blow to US-Pakistan relations following President Donald Trump's suspension in January of some \$2 billion in US security assistance." *NDTV*, April 12, 2018. <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-could-face-us-aid-cuts-over-human-trafficking-report-1836719>

essential in the control of the 2,430-kilometer-long border separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, a border that Pakistan has attempted to fence to prevent terrorist infiltration from Afghanistan, in the face of hostility and lack of cooperation from the Afghan government.

Secondly, Pakistan is pivotal for the U.S. counter-terrorism strategy. There are twenty terrorist organizations officially recognized by the United States operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan—the largest concentration in the world. The cooperation of Pakistan intelligence and security agencies is needed to counter these groups through drone strikes and other counter-terrorism measures.¹⁴

Thirdly, there will be no resolution of the Kashmir conflict unless Pakistan allows the United States to play a mediating role in negotiations with India. US credibility as a mediator, however, has been sharply diminished in Pakistan's eyes by America's tilt toward India and the relocation of its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Fourthly, the United States has no real alternative to the Pakistani route for supplying its forces in Afghanistan. The US needs Pakistan's cooperation to keep this supply route open.¹⁵

Fifthly, Pakistan is essential to the economic integration of the region, a principal goal of American foreign policy. The conflict between the Russian and British empires in the 19th century followed by the emergence of the Soviet Union and the Cold War with the United States in the 20th century erected barriers to the normal north-south trade between Europe and South Asia. With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the possibility of re-opening these trade routes emerged. In October

¹⁴ Tridivesh Singh Maini, "Trump's Straight Talk: India's Reaction." In Tourangbam, Monish ; Maini, Tridivesh S. ; Pathak, Sriparna: Perspectives on Trump's South Asia Policy. In: The Dossier by IndraStra 1 (2017), 1. URN: <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-53480-3>, pp. 9-12.

¹⁵ Monish Tourangbam, "U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: Old Wine in Trump's Bottle." In Tourangbam, Monish ; Maini, Tridivesh S. ; Pathak, Sriparna: Perspectives on Trump's South Asia Policy. In: The Dossier by IndraStra 1 (2017), 1. URN: <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-53480-3>, pp. 5-8.

2011, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton called for a New Silk Road. She said: "Turkmen gas fields could help meet both Pakistan's and India's growing energy needs and provide significant transit revenues for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Tajik cotton could be turned into Indian linens. Furniture and fruit from Afghanistan could find its way to the markets of Astana or Mumbai and beyond."¹⁶ The project would give the large populations of Pakistan and India access to the minerals, energy and agricultural products of sparsely populated Central Asia. The concept includes such initiatives as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline and the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA) power project. The benefits to the United States of this economic integration of Central and South Asia are the growth of the Afghan economy to the point where the Afghan government is no longer dependent on US financial support for its basic functions and the lessening of economic dependence of the Central Asian republics on Russia. The United States and India, however, oppose Chinese efforts to integrate these economies through the Belt and Road Initiative and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Sixthly, the United States has a strong interest in nuclear weapons not falling into the hands of Islamic extremists, and Pakistan's prosperity and stability and the strength of its major institutions, including the military and the state, are bulwarks against such an outcome.

Seventhly, Pakistan has a population of more than 200 million, making it the sixth most populous country in the world. Pakistan's stability, therefore, is a pillar of peace in the region. Thus, even as the level of military assistance declines, US development assistance to Pakistan remains high. Pakistan is the second largest recipient of development assistance from the United States in the region, after Afghanistan. The primary focus of the US civilian-assistance program is to

¹⁶ Joshua Kucera, "The New Silk Road? The United States hopes that a combination of trade and infrastructure can help steer Afghanistan away from unrest – and Russia." *The Diplomat*, November 11, 2011. <https://thediplomat.com/2011/11/the-new-silk-road/>

develop a stable, secure and tolerant Pakistan with a vibrant economy. The United States Agency for International Development has identified five areas essential to Pakistan's stability and long-term development: energy, economic growth, stabilization, education and health. The Trump administration budgeted \$211 million in economic assistance to Pakistan in 2018, compared to \$134 million in security-related aid.¹⁷

Conclusion

In geo-political terms, President Donald Trump's "South Asia" policy acknowledges the pivot of the United States from Pakistan to India as its principal ally in the region, the result of the rising power of China in Asia. The policy continues a trend, visible since 2011, of declining US military assistance to Pakistan due to frustration by Washington with Pakistan's unwillingness to deny safe haven to insurgents attempting to overthrow the Afghan government. Given the critical rhetoric directed at Pakistan by President Trump and several members of Congress and the US tilt toward India, it is understandable that Pakistan would reach out to regional powers, especially China and Russia, to form a countervailing coalition to the US-India-Afghanistan alliance. Given the economic and military strength of the United States in comparison with that of any potential ally, and the ongoing presence of US forces in neighboring Afghanistan, it is not in Pakistan's interest, however, to distance itself too far from the world's only superpower. The United States, for its part, has equally compelling interests in maintaining close relations with Pakistan, a country essential to a settlement of the Afghan War and to the economic integration of Central and South Asia, the key to the region's peace and prosperity.

¹⁷ "Rezaul H. Laskar, "US aid to Pakistan plummets to \$526m in 2017, set to fall further: The Trump administration has warned it could cut aid and revoke Pakistan's 'major non-NATO ally' status if it does not crack down on terror groups operating from its soil." *Hindustan Times*, November 29, 2017. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-aid-to-pakistan-plummets-to-526m-in-2017-set-to-fall-further/story-l8jlouhIG3OoklGv28YXNL.html>

Revitalizing SAARC: Challenges and Prospects

Gulshan Rafiq[□]

Abstract

The modern panacea for many economic and political ills is regional integration. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was also established aiming at regional integration and economic connectivity. However, for many years, its performance proved to be disappointing because of a lot of political riddles. SAARC critics bring up causes for ineffectiveness of SAARC as an argument to look for options beyond SAARC and find alternate avenues for regional cooperation. As a matter of fact, renewed efforts rethinking regional priorities and enabling SAARC to fulfill its promises are need of the hour, not the other way around. The revitalization of SAARC, in this regard, could be a better option for South Asian integration. Additionally, with a pragmatic way forward, challenges can be turned into opportunities. Therefore, this paper tries to reestablish the relevance of SAARC in contemporary regional environment by highlighting objectives behind its origin, its previous achievements and capacity to bring all SAARC members on the same page for regional growth. Moreover, it tries to proffer the fact that SAARC is still alive and regional states can adopt a collective course of action to make it effective.

Keywords: SAARC, Regionalism, South Asia, Rejuvenation, Integration.

Introduction

On March 6, 2018, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi during his visit to South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

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(SAARC) Secretariat in Kathmandu (Nepal), reiterated Pakistan's commitment to revitalize the organization for improvement of South Asian region. While discussing the significance of the association he affirmed that Pakistan and Sri Lanka need to 'work together' to revive the SAARC forum as a vibrant platform for regional cooperation.¹ Historically, SAARC came into being on December 8, 1985 with the initiative of the then President of Bangladesh Zia ur Rehman. The establishment of SAARC was mainly aimed at finalization of a regional cooperation for not only solving the conflicting issues between regional states through diplomatic means but also to identify the areas of cooperation to augment South Asian economic growth. In pursuance of these objectives, the core aim of SAARC includes enhancing South Asian self-reliance, diminishing trust deficit among regional states, assisting one another in socio-economic and technological fields and promoting as well as streamlining an agenda of common regional interest on international forums. Resultantly, "SAARC identified various areas of cooperation in different fields such as agriculture and rural development; science and technology; meteorology; transport; telecommunications; biotechnology; environment and forestry; tourism; energy; women, youth and children; health and population; education, arts, culture and sports; and intellectual property rights etc."² By the same token, a number of initiatives, agreements and conventions were also concluded by SAARC. Though SAARC's initial achievements are praiseworthy, it has not been able to come up to the expectations of South Asian people. Its failures are more pronounced than its achievements. The critics of SAARC blame that the organization could not succeed due to the fact that SAARC countries remained embroiled in mutual conflicts. Some of them like India and Pakistan, because of their territorial disputes, preferred geopolitics over socio-economic development. Notwithstanding that, much time has been

¹"Pakistan, Sri Lanka need to revive SAARC Forum: PM", *Daily Pakistan Today*, March 9, 2018, available at <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/03/09/pakistan-sri-lanka-need-to-work-for-revive-of-saarc-forum-pm/>, accessed on March 10, 2018.

² SAARC Secretariat, *SAARC: A Profile*, (Kathmandu: SAARC Secretariat, 2004), P.10–11.

wasted and SAARC has not been able to work effectively for the welfare of South Asian people, there is a possibility that in the new era of geo-economics, revitalization of SAARC will still be beneficial for the people of the regional states. The accomplishments of other such organizations like Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), European Union (EU) and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) etc., can be broadly taken as models for SAARC to follow. Moreover, China's inclusion into SAARC can also augment regional economic integration and intra-regional/inter-regional connectivity. So, in order to meet the above-stated goals, this study in detail aims to investigate the challenges to SAARC and suggests plausible measures to revitalize the organization for achieving regional peace through economic integration.

Theoretical Perspective

Regionalism, according to the optimists, improves the prospects of a multilateral system. It has gained its importance by becoming a dominant feature in international politics. Though the tilt towards regionalism started after the end of World War II, it rose to the dominant themes of world politics only in the post-Cold War era. Regionalism, in its essence, is aimed at tackling the problems of economic or security cooperation ingrained in the competitive tendencies of globalization. As a response, states' driven regional or sub-regional cooperation as well as integration policies effectively challenged international competition by facilitating economic growth of several regions. The regional organizations like "ASEAN, EU, and North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) are few examples of such integration. For this purpose, the degree of economic integration ranges from preferential trade arrangements (PTA) to free trade area (FTA), customs union (CU), common market (CM) and economic union (EU)."³

³ Moazzen Hussain, Iyanlur Islam and Reza Kibra, *South Asian Economic Development: Transformation, Opportunities and Challenges* (London, New York: Routledge, 1999), P.145.

Led by the consensus of regional states, the process of regionalism may be defined as “a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence”, and could be distinguished as per “the level and scope of exchange, formal organizations, and political interdependence.”⁴ These exchanges usually result in signing of agreement that can be “explicit and implicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”⁵ After starting the procedure, the foreign policy and political events of regional states kindle the process of regional integration as a result of which renewed cooperation in many fields like cultural, economic, political and security get initiated. Besides, the civil society of the region not only keeps an eye on the working of the organization but also facilitates communication and convergence process. “Cohesion of an integrated system can be measured by its capacity to withstand stress and strain, support disequilibria, and resist disruptions. Thus, strain-survival capacity of an integrated system is directly proportional to its cohesion.”⁶

Integration of a region can be operationalized through many ways wherein “Supra-nationalism” and “inter-governmentalism” are the most used ones by the international community.⁷ In this vein, “Functionalism”

⁴ J.S. Nye, ed., *Inter Regionalism: Readings* (Boston: Little Brown, 1969), P. 8.

⁵ Deutsch, Karl W. *The Analysis of International Relations*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968, P. 212.

⁶ *Ibid*, P. 213.

⁷ (Neo) functionalism is a theory of regional integration that places major emphasis on the role of non-state actors—especially, the ‘secretariat’ of the regional organization and interest associations in that specific functional area. One of the most attractive features of (neo) functionalism is its supranational structure. Furthermore, decisions are made by majority votes, hence, it is possible for a member-state to force by the other member-states to implement a decision against its will. Inter-governmentalism, by contrast, is a method of decision-making in international organizations, where power is possessed by the member-states and decisions are made by unanimity. Independent appointees of the government or elected representatives have solely advisory or implementational functions. For detail see at: <http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Supranationalism> (accessed on 31 August 2005), and <http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Intergovernmentalism> (accessed on 31 August 2005).

with its supranational structure has been the lynchpin of the formation of EU. Though the proposition of the making of EU started with “Inter-governmentalism but federalists’ idea won, and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established”. This supranational structure was one of the main reasons for the successful operability of ECSC as it separated politics from economic decisions. In a similar manner, neo-functionalism established a framework to comprehend the phenomenon of European integration with respect to supranational bodies. This model is based on several pillars. First, cooperation in one sector by two or a group of nations facilitates cooperation in other sectors as well. Second, economic integration usually results in increasing the interaction between regional actors. As a result, sub-state actors start cooperating politically with regional political leaders. Third, the supranational body automatically pursues tactics to deepen regional integration by expanding the ambit of cooperation and promoting benefits of further integration. Overall, the most important neo-functionalism’s concept is ‘spillover’ wherein integration in one sector generates incentives for integration in other areas too. For instance, “European cooperation in coal and steel was not fully achieved without integrating transport sector.”⁸

Since its inception, on the contrary, SAARC is being run through intergovernmental method of governance that has achieved nothing other than minor gains through SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), showing SAARC failures in achieving economic integration, let alone political coherence. That is why, EU model of integration-functionalism will not be a bad idea for SAARC to operate better for its member countries.

In sum, it can be inferred that regional integration results in the harmonization of regional trade policies which lead to economic integration as well as increased regional economic growth rate. In other

⁸ Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), P. 60.

words, it turns regional heterogeneity into homogeneity, which usually leads to prosperity of the people of that particular region. Likewise, South Asian regionalism or homogeneity was the brainchild of Bangladesh in the shape of SAARC.

Origin and Objectives of SAARC

The rationale for the establishment of SAARC was to improve regional cooperation. Prior to SAARC's establishment, the matter of regional cooperation was raised in different conferences including April 1947 "Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, May 1950 Baguio Conference in Philippines and April 1954 Colombo Powers Conference."⁹ Comprising mainly on four phases of evolution- "Conception (1977-80), the Meeting of Foreign Secretaries (1981-83), the Meeting of Foreign Secretaries (1983-85), and the Summits (1985-2016)" -the foremost proposal for the establishment of a framework for regional cooperation was put forward by the then President of Bangladesh, Zia ur Rahman, on May 2, 1980. The process started with the meeting between President Zia ur Rahman and newly elected Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai on the agenda of regional cooperation. It is pertinent to discuss the efficacy of regional cooperation for Bangladesh at that time. For this, numerous developments which led to President Zia ur Rahman's resolve for the making of a Framework for regional cooperation (especially during the period of 1975-1979) are as following:¹⁰

1. New South Asian leadership of that time was more prone to diplomatic solutions to various issues;
2. President Zia urRahman needed support to defend his coup d'état regime;

⁹ Hafeez Malik, ed., *Dilemmas of National Security and Cooperation in India and Pakistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), P. 276.

¹⁰ Muhammad Jamshed Iqbal, "SAARC: Origin, Growth, Potential and Achievements," *Pakistan Journal of History & Culture* XXVII, no. 2 (2006), p. 132.

3. Second oil crisis of 1979 generated balance of payment crisis in South Asia countries;
4. Failure of North-South dialogues and increasing protectionism by the developed countries;¹¹
5. Identification of area of cooperation in a report by the Committee on Studies for Cooperation in Development in South Asia (CSCD);¹²
6. United States and British assurance of economic assistance on water sharing projects; and
7. Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.

In this scenario, the establishment of a regional organization, such as SAARC, became a platform to discuss issues of common interest. The response from regional states remained mixed. As a result of Indian concerns, the Bangladesh draft paper excluded security matters and allowed only non-political areas for cooperation. Finally, as a result of several meetings at foreign secretary and ministerial level, the first SAARC summit meeting of South Asian leaders was convened at Dhaka from December 7-8, 1985. “Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka were its founding members.”¹³ Later on, “Australia, China, the European Union, Iran, Japan, South Korea, Mauritius, Myanmar and the United States (US) joined SAARC as observers between 2005 and 2008.”¹⁴ Similarly, Afghanistan joined SAARC as a member at the “2007 New Delhi Summit”,¹⁵ while Myanmar

¹¹ Muni Anuradha and S.D. Muni, *Regional Cooperation in South Asia* (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984), P. 29-31.

¹² “Report of the Evolution Mission on the CSCD Programme”, *Committee for Studies on Cooperation in Development in South Asia*, available at <https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/11192/96562.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, accessed on February 17, 2018.

¹³ “South Asian Association for regional Cooperation”, Asian Organization, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, available at <https://www.britannica.com/topic/South-Asian-Association-for-Regional-Co-operation>, accessed on February 17, 2018.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Afghanistan inducted as 8th member: 14th SAARC Summit begins”, *Dawn*, April 4, 2007, available at <https://www.dawn.com/news/240651>, accessed on February 4, 2018.

applied for membership in 2008 ahead of the Colombo Summit. Russia and Turkey have also applied for observer status membership.

The core objective behind the establishment of SAARC is to augment socio-economic and cultural development of South Asian states through economic cooperation.¹⁶ The basis of this cooperation among SAARC countries is based on mutual respect towards one another's sovereignty, integrity and independence. In sum, non-interference in other member states' internal affairs is the yardstick. That is why, bilateral contentious issues are not allowed in the debates of SAARC. According to the SAARC charter¹⁷, the objectives of this association are as following:¹⁸

1. To enhance and reinforce South Asian self-reliance;
2. To diminish trust deficit among member states;
3. To assist cooperation in economic, social, cultural, technical and other fields;
4. To promote an agenda of common interest in international forums; and
5. To streamline the cooperation with other regional and international organizations.

As a result, "SAARC identified various areas of cooperation in different fields such as agriculture and rural development; science and technology; meteorology; transport; telecommunications; biotechnology; environment and forestry; tourism; energy; women, youth and children; health and population; education, arts, culture and sports; and

¹⁶ Verinder Grover, ed., *Encyclopedia of SAARC (South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation) Nations* (New Delhi: 1997), P. 23.

¹⁷ South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, *Compilation of SAARC Charter/Conventions/Agreements (1985-2016)*, available at <http://saarc-sec.org/publications/detail/compilation-of-saarc-charterconventionsagreements-1985-2016>, accessed on June 28, 2017.

¹⁸ Ibid.

intellectual property rights etc.”¹⁹ South Asian University (SAU) was established in India in 2010. Similarly, a food reserve and a food bank were also operationalized in 1987 and 2007 respectively to strengthen food security in South Asia.²⁰ Besides enhancing the people-to-people contacts through a plethora of initiatives²¹, it also adopted a Social Charter pertaining to the prosperity of women, children, disabled and youth during Islamabad Summit in 2004.²² Furthermore, on the political front, during 2001-02 stand-off between India and Pakistan, Pakistan successfully utilized the forum of SAARC to diffuse the tensions as the then President Pervez Musharraf approached the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee at Kathmandu on the conclusion of the inaugural session of the Eleventh SAARC Summit.²³

On the trade and economic integration front, SAARC made noteworthy progress in the past. For instance, agreements aiming at the promotion and facilitation of trade and mutual economic development, such as “South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement 1993 (SAPTA) and South Asian Free Trade Area 2004 (SAFTA) have been concluded.”²⁴ In furtherance to this, scores of other economic initiatives, such as “SAARC Arbitration Council 2005; Avoidance of Double Taxation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 2005; Mutual Administrative

¹⁹ SAARC Secretariat, *SAARC: A Profile*, (Kathmandu: SAARC Secretariat, 2004), P. 10–11.

²⁰ SAARC Secretariat, *SAARC Summits, 1985–1988* (Kathmandu: SAARC Secretariat, 1990), P. 151-153 and 209-215.

²¹ SAARC Secretariat, “Area of Cooperation: People-to-People Contacts” (Kathmandu: SAARC Secretariat), available at http://saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/cat-detail.php?cat_id=52, accessed on June 30, 2017.

²² SAARC Secretariat, “SAARC Social Charter” (Kathmandu: SAARC Secretariat), available at http://saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity_id=7, accessed on June 30, 2017.

²³ Javednaqvi, “Musharraf offers sustained talks: Handshake with Vajpayee charms SAARC”, *DAWN*, January 6, 2002, available at <https://www.dawn.com/news/13684>, accessed on June 29, 2017.

²⁴ Seekkuwa Wasam Hirantha, “From SAPTA to SAFTA: Gravity Analysis of South Asian Free Trade”, *European Trade Study Group (ETSG)*, available at <http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2004/Papers/hirantha.pdf>, accessed on February 5, 2018.

Assistance in Custom Matters 2005; the formation of South Asian Regional Standards Organization (SARSO) in 2008; Trade in Services 2010 and Energy Cooperation 2014 have been successfully taken by SAARC.”²⁵ The most recent agreement was on energy cooperation, titled, “SAARC Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation”, signed during the 18th SAARC Summit on 27th November, 2014.²⁶

SAARC Impasse

Unfortunately, most of the aforementioned objectives remained on paper as SAARC remained incapable in the effective realization of its promises.²⁷ For example, SAARC Food Security Reserve could not tackle Bangladesh’s 1991 disaster. The fact of the matter is that SAARC activities have mostly been limited to the organization of seminars or workshops and have not been focusing on the effective evolution and development of the region. Likewise, a number of conventions have been signed by the SAARC members on issues of mutual interest, such as eradication of terrorism, suppression of women and child trafficking for prostitution; however, commitments of mutual cooperation to prevent growth of these menaces usually remained trivial. Interestingly, even after SAARC recognized these loopholes in its 13th Summit that was held in 2006 wherein it “directed all SAARC institutions and mechanisms to work collectively towards a decade dedicated to implementation,”²⁸ mutual cooperation among SAARC members again remained insignificant. A

²⁵ SAARC Secretariat, “Agreements and Conventions” (Kathmandu: SAARC Secretariat), available at <http://saarc-sec.org/Agreements/69/>, accessed on June 24, 2017.

²⁶ SAARC Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation (Electricity), available at http://www.moen.gov.np/pdf_files/SAARC-Framework-Agreement.pdf, accessed on June 29, 2017.

²⁷ E. Sudhakar, *SAARC: Origin, Growth and Future* (Lahore: Book Traders, 1994), P. 200.

²⁸ Thirteenth SAARC Summit, “Dhaka Declaration,” November 13, 2005, available at sec.org/userfiles/Summit%20Declarations/13%20-%20Dhaka%20-%202013th%20Summit%2012-13%20Nov%202005.pdf, accessed on June 24, 2017.

former foreign secretary of Nepal articulated SAARC ineffectiveness in the following words:

“We have oceans of documents, ideas, proposals and studies. But we have hardly implemented them. After twenty years, we don’t have a regional project that has a SAARC trademark. As one foreign minister joked SAARC may soon become NATO: No Action Talk Only.”²⁹

In sum, from unsuccessfulness in achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the developing ineffectiveness of the organization, SAARC could not do much for South Asian diaspora.

Challenges to the Effectiveness of SAARC

SAARC’s progress has largely been hindered by lingering regional contentions. In other words, its ineffectiveness is embroiled in the regional security complex of South Asia. Though SAARC has completed almost 32 years since its inception in 1985, it could not learn to benefit from its geo-strategic location in the world politics and remained poorest, when compared with other regions. Regrettably, it has continuously been showing downward trends in previous years as well.

The causes of less progress of SAARC in South Asia are many; nevertheless, Indo-Pak rivalry and India’s negative politics to isolate Pakistan in the SAARC region are noteworthy. With the purpose of distancing other SAARC countries from Pakistan, India is promoting the sub-regional grouping through the “Bay of Bengal Initiative” for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation (BIMSTEC), which provides a BBIN-plus platform.”³⁰ BIMSTEC includes SAARC and non-SAARC

²⁹ Cited by Lok Raj Baral, “Cooperation with Realism: The Future of South Asian Regionalism,” *South Asian Survey* 13, No. 2 (2006): P. 266.

³⁰ BIMSTEC Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation,” BIMSTEC Secretariat Newsletter, Dhaka, Bangladesh, available at <http://www.bimstec.org/index.php?page=overview>, accessed on April 1, 2017.

countries: “Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and two from south-east Asia, Myanmar and Thailand.”³¹ With the exception of the Maldives, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the other five SAARC countries are included in BIMSTEC. BIMSTEC has pruned its priorities down to five major areas: trade and industry, transport and connectivity, counter-terrorism, energy trade and climate change.³² The Indian government also invited the leaders of the BIMSTEC countries to attend the 8th Summit of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as its observer.

Moreover, another regional body, “South Asia Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) was established in 2001. It comprises of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka.”³³ Trade, transport and energy projects are the priorities in its Operational Plan 2016-2025 that is worth billions of dollars.³⁴ In their regional initiatives, SASEC countries have endeavored to implement projects pertaining to “energy, economic corridor development, transport, trade facilitation, and information and communications technology sectors worth more than \$9 billion in the.”³⁵ The initiative, in this regard, is expected to increase mutually beneficial trade between the seven SASEC countries.

Another initiative “the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN), could be seen as a precursor to a possible formal sub-SAARC grouping.”³⁶

³¹ Ibid.

³² Pratim Ranjan Bose, “BIMSTEC trying to reinvent itself, after two decades,” *The Hindu*, March 31, 2016, available at <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/bimstec-trying-to-reinvent-itself-after-two-decades/article8418842.ece>, accessed on April 7, 2017.

³³ “South Asia Sub regional Economic Cooperation,” *Asian Development Bank*, available at <https://www.adb.org/countries/subregional-programs/sasec>, accessed on April 1, 2017.

³⁴ Rezaul Karim, “SAARC Summit Minus Pakistan?” *Asia News Network*, October 6, 2016, available at <http://annx.asianews.network/content/saarc-summit-minus-pakistan-29682>, accessed on May 30, 2017.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Vikaskumar, “The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation: Part One-The problem of SAARC,” *Future Directions International*, November 17, 2016, <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/south-asian-association-regional-co-operation-part-one-problems-saarc/>, accessed on April 23, 2017.

India has signed the Motor Vehicles Agreement with Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal. This agreement is made to facilitate the seamless movement of people and goods across their borders for the benefit and integration of the region and its economic development. India along with Myanmar is also developing multi-national transport infrastructure on various platforms like SAARC, ASEAN, SASEC, BIMSTEC, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM), “India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT)”³⁷, and “Mekong Ganga Co-operation (MGC/Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam).”³⁸

Additionally, India is “re-engaging Iran to access Afghanistan via Chabahar, bypassing Pakistan.”³⁹ For this purpose, it cooperated to “develop the strategic port of Chabahar in Iran and agreed on a three-nation pact to build a transport-and-trade corridor through Afghanistan.”⁴⁰ Its major objective is to bypass Pakistan, access Central Asian and global markets and also serve as an American watchdog in the region to counter China’s peaceful rise.

One more initiative “Nepal-India (Dehli-Kathmandu Bus Service) via Sunauli border is India’s plan to connect to Nepal.”⁴¹ The bus service is

³⁷ Naresh Bana, “The road to Mekong: the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway project,” *Observer Research Foundation*, February 7, 2017, available at <http://www.orfonline.org/research/the-road-to-mekong-the-india-myanmar-thailand-trilateral-highway-project/>, accessed on April 23, 2017.

³⁸ “Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC),” *The Ministry of External Affairs, India*, March 2017, available at http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Brief_MGC_March_2017.pdf, accessed on February 5, 2018.

³⁹ Victor Mallet, “India to bypass Pakistan on the road to Central Asia,” *Financial Times*, May 24, 2016, available at <https://www.ft.com/content/8510176c-2188-11e6-9d4d-c11776a5124d>, accessed on April 7, 2017.

⁴⁰ India, Iran and Afghanistan sign Chabahar port agreement,” *Hindustan Times*, May 24, 2016, available at <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/india-iran-afghanistan-sign-chabahar-port-agreement/story-2EytbKZe06zeCIpR8WSuAO.html>, accessed on March 25, 2017.

⁴¹ Devendra Bhattarai, “India upgrading roads along Nepal border,” *The Kathmandu Post*, September 3, 2015, available at <http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2015-09-03/india-upgrading-roads-along-nepal-border.html>, accessed on April 24, 2017.

part of the Motor Vehicles Agreement between the two nations. They will operate on three bus routes – Kathmandu-New Delhi, Pokhara-New Delhi and Kathmandu-Benares.

The above mentioned sub-regional grouping by India and other SAARC countries are being considered as reducing the efficacy of SAARC. Since 1947, due to the Kashmir dispute, India and Pakistan remained at loggerhead. Various initiatives, no doubt, have been taken to normalize these hostile relations; but, the greater share of responsibility for bad relations also goes to India because of being the largest political player of South Asia. It is the largest among SAARC countries. It has preponderance in economic, technological and military sectors of South Asia. Except Afghanistan, India has all other states on its periphery. It is connected to all of them and holds three quarters of regional GDP. But instead of playing a positive role in SAARC for the welfare of the people of this region, India has played games and used SAARC for political gains and to undermine Pakistan's position. While no bilateral disputes are supposed to be discussed at the SAARC platform, India has been using bilateral issues to postpone SAARC meeting. For instance, the last summit of SAARC to be held in Pakistan in 2016 was postponed after India announced that it will boycott the summit because of "cross-border terrorist attacks in the region."⁴²

Besides, the regional countries too could not reach a common dispute resolution mechanism. As a result, some lingering dispute resulted in the distortion of SAARC meetings or summits time and again. Another such issue is the absence of trust. The level of distrust among SAARC member countries is an ongoing hurdle to the effective functioning of SAARC. In a similar way, it has caused the cancellation, disruptions and ineffectiveness of SAARC summits time and again. Dr. Manzoor Ahmad of

⁴² Kaloll Bhattacharjee, "SAARC Summit to be Cancelled", *The Hindu*, November 3, 2016, available at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/SAARC-summit-to-be-cancelled/article15004093.ece>, accessed on April 15, 2018.

International Islamic University Islamabad in his paper entitled, “SAARC Summits 1985-2016: The Cancellation Phenomenon” describes reasons for the failure of SAARC summits and its implications for the organization as well as regional cooperation. According to the author, “the most significant reason (for the cancellation of SAARC Summits) include members’ bilateral disputes; political problems and contentious issues, with India being a party in almost all of them.”⁴³ Main reason for the failure of SAARC have been India’s efforts to use the platform of SAARC against Pakistan, despite the fact that the latter has made positive contribution to make the SAARC efficient.

Revitalizing SAARC Would be Beneficial

It is usually being asserted by India that “SAARC is constantly sinking into irrelevance.”⁴⁴ SAARC critics bring up aforementioned causes of the failures of SAARC as an argument to look for options beyond SAARC and find substitutes for regional cooperation. Interestingly, these arguments or criticism are also correct. This does not mean that SAARC should be abandoned but there is a need of renewed efforts to rethink regional priorities and enabling SAARC to fulfill its promises, not the other way around.

So, the main question to be asked here is: why is it pertinent for South Asian states to connect themselves through a regional organization, such as SAARC? The simple answer is: Regional Cooperation. It is only through connectivity by which South Asian states could augment their economic growth rate in the face of an expanding population. Maintaining economic growth rate only is not enough to

⁴³ Manzoor Ahmad, “SAARC Summits 1985-2016: The Cancellation Phenomenon”, IPRI Journal XVII, No. 1 (Winter 2017), P. 52.

⁴⁴ Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “SAARC should be allowed to drift into oblivion,” Hindustan Times, February 22, 2017, available at <http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/saarc-should-be-allowed-to-drift-into-oblivion/story-lkiULsWDJfp7doqHGiodM.html>, accessed on May 29, 2017.

meet the standards of human security.⁴⁵ The countries now need to continuously increase their socio-economic development through increasing economic growth rate because of increasing non-traditional security threats in the region, such as climate change. Similarly, to harness the fast developing manufacturing sector in South Asia, regional states need to connect themselves with one another through gas pipeline projects as they are considered to be playing a vital role in importing energy from Central and West Asia. Moreover, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) and Iran-Pakistan (IP)⁴⁶ are also salient for energy supply. Though these extra regional initiatives are promising, yet hoping for a breakthrough in near future is improbable because India has already pulled out of IP and the future of TAPI gas pipeline is connected with durable peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Second, connectivity for South Asian states is also a prerequisite to attract greater investment from the outside world. If the region is economically integrated, the projects like 'Make in India,' the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),"⁴⁷ the Bay of Bengal Initiative and a corridor networking Chabahar with Central Asia and similar networks to be initiated in Myanmar with Chinese and Indian investment would multiply not only the incoming investment but also its benefits owing to decreased trust deficit and subsequent hurdles. Similarly, the Heart of Asia process, by establishing peace and stability in Afghanistan, would bring investment as well and will smoothen the operationalization of existing economic, transit trade and energy projects.

⁴⁵ Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, *Human Development in South Asia 2005: Human Security in South Asia* (Oxford University Press, 2006), P. 1.

⁴⁶ Saman Zulfqar, "Pakistan's Energy Security: Viability of Regional Options", *IPRI Journal of Current Affairs*, Vol 2. No 2, 2018, available at <http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/art3szj22.pdf>, accessed on January 12, 2018.

⁴⁷ "China Pakistan Economic Corridor", *CPEC - Government of Pakistan*, available at <http://cpec.gov.pk>, accessed on December 22, 2017.

Pakistan's Contributions in Past

Pakistan believes that the effectiveness of SAARC for regional integration, despite some setbacks, is still there. In 2017, the ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan Mian Nawaz Sharif had reasserted Pakistan's commitment during a telephonic conversation with the Foreign Minister of Maldives Dr. Mohamed Asim who called on him in Islamabad. According to him, "Pakistan attaches great importance to SAARC and wishes to see it as a vibrant regional organization; and is committed to the principles and objectives of the SAARC Charter."⁴⁸ The same commitment to SAARC was also reassured by the current Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, during his visit to Nepal in March 2018.⁴⁹ Nepal wants SAARC working⁵⁰ while Bangladesh is also of the view that the organization must keep working. Logically, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina, on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum (WEF) Annual Meeting 2017 at Davos, asserted that "SAARC is still alive."⁵¹ Like Bangladesh, Pakistan has always been a staunch supporter of the body of SAARC and has been actively participating in its evolution. It believes that, through cooperation under the Charter of SAARC, socio-economic conditions of South Asian Diasporas can be ameliorated, especially by resolving the evils of poverty, illiteracy, hunger and disease.⁵² Moreover, Pakistan also used the SAARC platform to suggest

⁴⁸ "Pakistan committed to objectives of SAARC Charter", says PM, *The Nation*, April 25, 2017, available at <http://nation.com.pk/national/25-Apr-2017/pakistan-committed-to-objectives-of-saarc-charter-says-pm>, accessed on June 25, 2017.

⁴⁹ "Pakistan, Nepal talk SAARC, as Shahid Khaqan Abbasi trip starts," *The Indian Express*, March 6, 2018, available at <http://indianexpress.com/article/world/pakistan-nepal-talk-saarc-as-shahid-khaqan-abbasi-trip-starts-5087303/>, accessed on April 15, 2018.

⁵⁰ "Pakistan, Nepal for revitalising SAARC", *The Nation*, March 7, 2018, available at <https://nation.com.pk/07-Mar-2018/pakistan-nepal-for-revitalising-saarc>, accessed on April 15, 2018.

⁵¹ "SAARC still alive, says PM", *Daily Asian Age*, January 19, 2017, available at <http://dailyasianage.com/news/45323/saarc-still-alive-pm>, accessed on July 2, 2017.

⁵² General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Address at the concluding session of the first SAARC Summit at Dhaka, 1985, in SAARC Summits 1985-88, Vol. I, published by SAARC Secretariat, Kathmandu, August 1990, P. 39.

nuclear disarmament or a South Asian nuclear free zone.⁵³ At the seventh SAARC summit held in Dhaka, Pakistan welcomed and endorsed the objectives of SAPTA suggesting that trade and economic co-operation should form the bedrock for any organization for regional co-operation.⁵⁴ Pakistan has time and again asserted that only combined regional efforts can eradicate the menace of terrorism; therefore, the solution to this problem warrants cooperation. That is why; Pakistan appreciated the finalization of SAARC Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. Pakistan also regarded “SAARC Convention on Drug Control as an important milestone in the evolution of regional co-operation.”⁵⁵

In parallel, Pakistan stressed the need to evolve a common framework to predict and tackle natural disasters. Having a belief in the immense capacity of the South Asian regional association, Pakistan proposed many important initiatives like that of SAARC 2000 Basic Needs proposal which was adopted at the Islamabad summit in 1988. Pakistan’s assertion is that with the economic initiatives like that of CPEC, the geo-economic and geo-political dynamics of the region are merging, “making it pertinent for South Asian states to cooperate and address bilateral difference simultaneously.”⁵⁶ Pakistan wants SAARC to stay and evolve as a forum for regional economic growth. It believes that the South Asian region with its geographical proximity has great potential for cooperation in the connectivity sector. As far as hostility between India and Pakistan is concerned, problems among any two members should not weigh down

⁵³ Mohammad Khan Junejo, Address at the inaugural session of the Third SAARC Summit, Kathmandu, 1987, P. 25.

⁵⁴ Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari, Address at the inaugural session of the Seventh SAARC Summit, New Delhi, 1985, P. 116.

⁵⁵ Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, Address at the concluding session of the Fifth SAARC Summit at Mali, P. 43.

⁵⁶ See Akber Ali, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Prospects and Challenges for Regional Integration,” *Arts Social Science Journal*, July 20, 2016, available at <https://www.omicsonline.org/open-access/china-pakistan-economic-corridor-prospects-and-challenges-for-regionalintegration-2151-6200-1000204.php?aid=77852>, accessed on April 10, 2018.

the progress in cooperative endeavors among other members in other sub-regions of SAARC. Progress and success story in those areas could serve as an inducement for other areas and lead to the evolution of SAARC as an effective organization.

Reactivating Regional Cooperation under SAARC would be Beneficial

It can be inferred from the above discussion that regional connectivity is the lynchpin of peace, stability, development and prosperity in South Asia. In the contemporary international environment, the significance of South Asia is not only gauged by the fact that it has one fifth population of the world. It also covers an area of 5.22 million square kilometers and is abundant in natural resources. Another fact is that it is home to two nuclear weapon giants: India and Pakistan. The region has become an attractive global market because of its economic growth and vast potential. Its political and strategic importance is increasing with every passing day. As mentioned earlier, South Asia currently, is facing multi-dimensional challenges, both traditional and non-traditional security threats. Notwithstanding these challenges, there still exists huge economic potential.

Efficacy of SAARC: Future Prospects

SAARC is still effective but there is a lot of work which needs to be done for making it more relevant. The organization is very much alive. The alarming fact is that one canceled meeting is taken as an indication that SAARC has become completely ineffective and should be abandoned. The relationship between India and Bangladesh or India and Sri Lanka ten years ago was not exactly as cooperative as today. Progress is made by leadership which is truly powerful, mature and wise in every aspect. The fact that one particular relationship is not yet matured should not lead the states to a conclusion that this entire constellation of countries cannot relate. The nature of the conflict in Europe was much pessimistic

but today it is the best example of regional integration. It did not happen overnight; there were many cancelled meetings and failed steps that brought Europe to where it is today. No doubt it has come through a long path. Though, the “19th SAARC Summit to be held in Pakistan was postponed after India refused to participate”⁵⁷, but it should not be a worrisome matter if only one of all SAARC Summits was postponed. There should not be any illogical reason for this kind of apprehension. The hope is that next the SAARC Summit could take place in the near future. It should be kept in mind that SAARC is not meant only for economic cooperation but also for cultural and people to people contact, and for all the resource sharing in the region.

Palpable Economic Ventures under SAARC

Currently, South Asia has a small business venture; however there could be high number of business opportunities. There are 1.8 billion people living in South Asia. The GDP Growth is 7 percent. About 25 percent of the world’s middle class is living in this particular region. This could be taken as a huge opportunity. Though the total level of intra-regional trade today is 5 percent of the total trade but it could be increased. The states have to start small and think really big but without any hurry. Every regional stakeholder needs to begin taking small steps. The Motor Vehicle Agreement between Bangladesh, Bhutan and India is such an example. Starting with bilateral or with two or more countries is a good idea. Moreover, cross border movement will open up a supply chain opportunity. Pakistan should suggest small, bilateral, trilateral, quadrilaterals relations. In other words, it has to do whatever is possible. Eventually, this mosaic and jigsaw will begin to fill with trade. As the economic linkages strengthen, the inherent potential for conflict will reduce. Connectivity and free movement of people in Europe has been a

⁵⁷ “SAARC summit in Pakistan postponed after member states pull out”, Dawn, September 28, 2016, available at <https://www.dawn.com/news/1286684>, accessed on June 23, 2017.

huge advantage for trade. There is no direct connection between Delhi and Islamabad, but the trade between two countries happens via Dubai. So, direct connectivity, visas, arrival and facilitating movement of people are precursors to good trade.

The normalization of relations between India and Pakistan will take time. There is enough evidence from big countries that without resolving the issues, a country can still start trading. The anticipated SAARC Summit in 2016 in Pakistan could have been a beginning of the transformational movement. There is still an element of common toes where SAARC is today? The brave and resilient leadership is a necessity to do this. South Asia has a brave leadership with women also in politics. The smaller countries need to particularly push India to be the big country with a big heart, and to do this it has to invest in multilateral forums.

Indo-Pak Rapprochement

Pakistan's disturbed relations with India have also hindered its trade relations with other SAARC countries. For instance, Pakistan has minimal trade relations with Nepal and Bhutan because of geographical constraints. Similarly, India has more trade relations with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka than these countries have with Pakistan. The core problem remains that Pakistan has to have good relations with India for trade with Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. In a similar way, India depends on Pakistan's cooperation for land trade route to Afghanistan. Moreover, it becomes more difficult if there is an obvious asymmetry between two states, with the stronger party unwilling to renounce the use of force. Therefore, both India and Pakistan need to normalize their relationship for effective regional integration.

Revamping other Thematic Issues

In South Asia, more importance is given to trade and too little initiative is taken to solve issues like education, health-care, information, common-

values, articulation, women-child malnutrition, equal-opportunity enforcement etc. All issues are particularly prevalent in the region and are source of difficulties among the countries and the very reason for a communion into SAARC. These issues need to be addressed on a priority basis, especially poverty alleviation and education. Moreover, the internet connectivity within the region can be of great importance for e-education and to transform the educational platform. The educational reach across the region is possible through using the internet. It does not require school buildings, hiring of hundreds or thousands of qualified teachers and other infrastructure which require a huge capital.

SAARC as a Non-Political Forum

Since its inception, SAARC was never a political forum. On Indian demand, a clause was made and included stating that all bilateral political issues and conflicts between states will not be discussed on SAARC platform. India itself has been exploiting the forum for political objectives. The primary objective of establishing a body like SAARC was to promote welfare of South Asian people and improve in their life standards; yet its achievements for the said objectives are fewer. India also has attempted a “minus-Pakistan formula”⁵⁸, and is exploring options for alternative regional alliances.

Menace of Climate Change (CC)

Another welcome step by SAARC is the launch of SAARC satellite to boost cooperation in telecommunication among the member countries. Bangladesh is combating the impacts of CC by setting up a climate change trust fund with own funding of \$400 million. It does not rely on others alongside framing some 134 action plans to tackle the implications

⁵⁸ “We should look at South Asia minus Pakistan: BJP’s Foreign Cell Head”, *Hindustan Times*, March 17, 2018, available at <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/we-should-look-at-south-asia-minus-pakistan-bjp-s-foreign-cell-head/story-clvfybqkmVkq6vBXnx9Y6K.html>, accessed on March 17, 2018.

of CC. Pakistan's Ministry of CC can collaborate with the relevant ministries in the region and assist the Bengali government. Pakistan is one of the four countries who have presented and are working on 'Climate Action Bill.' Therefore, Pakistan could sign MoUs with Bangladesh for joint ventures to tackle the climate change induced threats.⁵⁹

SAARC member countries have consensus on CC and environmental protection. SAARC has already appreciated Bhutan's concept, the 'Gross National Happiness.' It believes that this concept is a lesson for China and for all mankind as it allows sustainable growth without endangering the earth.

SAARC Summit on Annual Basis

The annual meetings of SAARC are a means to promote social connections between key global power players and national leaders. Unless India cooperates willingly by participating in the process and does not bring in its bilateral political issues with Pakistan into consideration of improving trade connectivity, SAARC simply cannot move forward. Pakistan also needs to propose that "SAARC summit must be held no matter what may come for effective working of SAARC."⁶⁰

A Greater SAARC

A greater SAARC concept was propagated by Senator Mushahid Hussein Syed, during his New York visit in 2016. This greater South Asia includes China, Iran and the neighboring Central Asian Republics (CARs). CPEC is considered the most important economic route which can link South Asia with Central Asia. Similarly, the Gwadar port would be the nearest warm

⁵⁹ "Achievements of the Ministry of Climate Change," *Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Climate change*, available at [http://www.moccc.gov.pk/moccc/userfiles1/file/Final%20Report%20MOCC%20-2%20years-%2005_10_2015%20\(1\).pdf](http://www.moccc.gov.pk/moccc/userfiles1/file/Final%20Report%20MOCC%20-2%20years-%2005_10_2015%20(1).pdf), accessed on April 10, 2018.

⁶⁰ Manzoor Ahmad, "SAARC Summits 1985-2016: The Cancellation Phenomenon", *IPRI Journal XVII*, No. 1 (Winter 2017), P. 52.

water port, not only for China but also for the landlocked CARs. Pakistan has already invited its neighbor India to join the initiative. Landlocked Afghanistan is most likely to get the most benefits from a greater South Asian alliance. “Afghanistan’s presence in SAARC justifies Pakistan’s argument that Central Asian nations can be included in a greater South Asia.”⁶¹ This would essentially help Pakistan in tackling India’s hegemony over the organization, giving it more chances of effective operationalization. It will also provide Pakistan with a greater maneuvering space in case India tries to isolate Pakistan regionally.

Smart Borders

Like the EU, the whole idea of SAARC is a common market. The economy of a scale even in a smaller country like Bhutan can benefit from BIMSTEC. To get all the encompassing issues, like connectivity, people to people contact and free trade in the region, it should fall in a place so that the whole region can benefit.

There is a need for smart borders or seamless connectivity in the whole region. It includes not only roads and bridges but maritime, railway, telecom, and the rest of it. The trade can go to 100 billion⁶² if SAARC countries just ensure seamless connectivity in the region because doing business with neighboring states is cheaper than doing it with countries in North America. The transportation cost and the barriers at the custom point are really not enabling.

⁶¹ Anwar Iqbal, “Pakistan seeks bigger Saarc to counter India’s influence”, Dawn, October 12, 2016, available at <https://www.dawn.com/news/1289685>, accessed on July 2, 2017.

⁶² Sanjay Kathuria, “5 things to boost South Asian regional trade to \$100 billion in 5 years”, The World Bank, September 28, 2015, available at <http://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/5-things-boost-south-asian-regional-trade-100-billion-5-years>, accessed on April 15, 2018.

Power Sharing - The SAARC Grid⁶³

Power can be a tradable product in the South Asian region easily. Same strategy can be formulated to manage water through common basin management. Similarly, there are great prospects for intra-state electricity trade among the SAARC countries. The SAARC working group on energy also reflects this objective. Another initiative could be the creation of a power pool or the 'SAARC grid' to enable the region to utilize its sources of electricity optimally by balancing the demand and supply. It would not only make electricity cheaper but also reliable. Additionally, it would create interdependence among SAARC countries to a win-win solution

Sharing Water

Himalayas are the water towers of Asia. They have the hydro-power potential to supply electricity to the entire region. Power trade with Central Asia offers vast opportunities. Countries, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic have excessive hydro resources of wells. They are more than public domestic need. Pakistan and India can offer them major import markets. Regional cooperation can also help tap natural complementarities. For instance, when Bhutan and Nepal's rivers are full of water in the summer, there is a vast hydro power generation potential. Bangladesh, India and Pakistan have the greater demand for electricity to cope with the summer heat. Less than 20% of South Asia's hydropower potential is developed while energy sharing also remains minimum. By developing this hydro potential, building cross border transmission lines and eventually emerging into a regional energy market, electricity can reach thousands of energy businesses and billions of people still living in the dark.

⁶³ Abdul Matin, "Prospects of a SAARC Power Grid", South Asia Journal, July 8, 2015, available at <http://southasiajournal.net/prospect-of-a-saarc-power-grid/>, accessed on June 21, 2017.

The great rivers of South Asia like Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra are more than just energy potential. They support life and supply resources; however, conflicting demands on these waters cause tensions, distrust and little or no cooperation between countries while the risks from natural disasters and climate change continue to grow. During past two decades, natural disasters affected over 800 million people and billions of dollars were lost. With cross border cooperation on water and river basins, flood forecasting and early warning systems, lives and resources can be saved.

Sharing Goods and Services

Trade among the countries of South Asia could increase economic growth enormously. The trade potential in South Asia is 100%; yet, its intra-regional trade is the lowest in the world making less than 5 % of the total world trade. The land locked countries and sub-regions are affected the most since they depend on the neighboring states to access the sea and global markets. Goods are often moved through secure routes sometimes up to eight times the distance to destination. Border crossings are so heavily congested taking take days to cross. As a result it costs more to trade within South Asia than with the countries outside the region. For example, despite the geographic neighbors, the trade cost between India and Pakistan is 20 % more than India to Brazil which is over 9000 miles away. South Asia already has the resources to meet its development challenges; the water, energy and trade potential are waiting to be developed. What is needed is cooperation.

Consequently, following steps are the cornerstone to revitalize regional cooperation under SAARC:

1. Political will for regional connectivity will decrease the level of conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment in South Asia.

2. Resumption of composite dialogues should be assured to normalize relations between India and Pakistan as apparently cordial Indo-Pak ties can reincarnate SAARC.
3. The use of hard power to eradicate terrorism and to establish law and order could not bring socio-economic development to the people of affected areas in South Asia. Therefore, use of political and economic approaches in conjunction with the boots on the ground is necessary.
4. Owing to proximity among South Asian states, cross-border cooperation is inevitable if reduction of conflicts, tackling the menace of terrorism and smooth trade is the intention of South Asian leaders.
5. Nepal and Bhutan can play a decisive role in regional integration through SAARC. Both nations are abundant in hydropower but there is a need to look for regional economic cooperation for prosperity. Through joint economic initiatives, both targets can be achieved.
6. China's full membership in SAARC could bring stability in SAARC working. It can definitely reduce Indian political and economic clout on it. Over and above that, China is already investing in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Nepal in the shape of CPEC and other such economic ventures. So, construction of CPEC and BCIM corridors will strengthen inter-regional connectivity among South Asian countries as well as their intra-regional association.
7. Most importantly, peace in Afghanistan is not possible without regional cooperation. Pakistan would be having a central role in it. Nevertheless, SAARC members could help in sustaining the peace initiatives, such as Heart of Asia process as well as operationalizing trade and energy corridors for Afghanistan in particular and South Asia in general.

8. The South Asian countries could follow best practices by other regional organizations like ASEAN and EU etc. Learning from their practices and mistakes would build stronger regional ties to fulfill regional objectives.
9. The burden of slow growth of SAARC lies with member nations' lack of willingness to align domestic agendas with SAARC agendas.
10. Normalization of political relations between SAARC member states, especially between India and Pakistan, should be encouraged for better SAARC interaction.
11. SAARC does not have any robust conflict-resolution mechanism like that of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) where the South Asian states could discuss and move forward from their political disputes. The annual summits and periodic ministerial meetings do not usually result in desired outcomes. Therefore, political will for the establishment of a mechanism to resolve such disputes is also need of the hour.
12. There is also an urgent need to promote tourism among the SAARC member states. It can stimulate confidence amongst people as well as enhance people-to-people contact of the region for greater economic cooperation.
13. Establishing joint infrastructure funds are also important. They can work as a joint investment company to facilitate connectivity and cross border investments in the region, which could result in the establishment of a SAARC bank to facilitate the process.
14. One of the very crucial issues that SAARC as a regional forum has not formally discussed yet is human rights. No committee has ever been created within SAARC to discuss and promote this basic issue. India itself is abusing human rights in Indian Occupied Kashmir by coercing laws like "Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act 1978; Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) 1987; Armed Forces Special Power Act 1990 and

Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA).”⁶⁴ Moreover, being cognizant of this reality thoroughly, India, already having major portion of Kashmir, feels that it can maintain status quo over Kashmir easily. This has led India to pursue delaying tactics over negotiations. Moreover, India thinks that over time Kashmiri movements will die down slowly and gradually. Therefore, SAARC as an organization should take positive measures to ensure an environment that enables all people in the region to enjoy their rights.

15. India does not show its willingness to cooperate under the ambit of SAARC but developing a common vision for regional growth is necessary for the future of SAARC. All SAARC member states should be on one page to keep SAARC alive.
16. SAARC can also benefit from a framework with the objectives of a secure regional environment by joint planning of civilian and military operations and comprehensive approach to crisis management like that of the EU’s Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD).

Conclusion

Despite many loopholes, SAARC has not been entirely inactive. What needs to be ensured, however, is that SAARC evolution or development should not get embroiled with the power play in the region. In this vein, a lot remains to be done. Nevertheless, with pragmatic and practicable way forward loopholes can be turned into opportunities. The foremost challenge that would prevail is building of trust among South Asian states, especially India and Pakistan. As far as Pakistan is concerned, it is optimistic regarding SAARC’s future and is always ready to facilitate regional integration for economic growth and alleviating poverty in the

⁶⁴ “Draconian Laws in Indian Occupied Kashmir Foreword,” *National Assembly of Pakistan*, available at <http://www.na.gov.pk/en/content.php?id=90>, accessed on July 02, 2017.

region. In order to achieve this objective, contentious issues need to be addressed but not at the cost of SAARC proceedings. Therefore, sincerity and mutual accommodation through result oriented dialogues is of paramount importance currently. SAARC will undoubtedly benefit from China's full membership by inserting new spirit and vigor in the organization. The writing on the wall is that regional states cannot move forward without pragmatism and flexibility. This is the only way out.

Nuclear Security Summit Process: Future and Impact on Pakistan's Nuclear Security

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Abstract

Terrorism is a global threat, but due to terrorism in Pakistan, most of the western media and distant observers remain apprehensive about the security of Pakistan's nukes. Such perceptions are based on false understanding of the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Pakistan's unprecedented response to Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)s have been the reflection of maximized standards of nuclear security. Pakistan's nuclear establishment is keen towards beefing up nuclear security in accordance with IAEA rules. The primary objective of this research is to examine the impact of Nuclear Security Summits on Pakistan. It also analyses and compares Pakistan and India's nuclear security procedures by evaluating their respective measures. NSS ably sensitized the world leaders about possible threat of nuclear terrorism and urged them to prevent the theft and illegal use of nuclear technology. Pakistan stepped up to adopt multiple measures for securing its nuclear weapons. International community eventually started acknowledging Pakistan's efforts and expressed satisfaction over it. Pakistan is likely to continue cooperation with IAEA to make its security insurmountable.

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Keywords: International Regimes of Security, Nuclear Security, Nuclear Security Summits.

Introduction

In 2009, United States President Barak Obama clearly stated in his speech in Prague that today's most dangerous threat is nuclear terrorism. The International community should not wait to take the necessary action needed in order to minimize this threat. He announced a design to secure loose nuclear material around the world and global Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) to be hosted in the United States of America. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups are trying to get nuclear weapons with which they will threaten the world if they obtain them. The threats of theft of vast nuclear stocks and the availability of nuclear material, sensitive technologies and armaments in the black market pose serious threats that terrorists can obtain them for making nuclear weapons.¹

Giving a realistic assessment of the threat of nuclear terrorism, while Naeem Salik acknowledges the serious consequences of any act of nuclear terrorism, he, however, contends that terrorists would face a number of "technical" and "logistic" difficulties that even a highly technical terrorist group like Al Qaeda does not have the required technological knowledge and wherewithal. According to the national security team of the former US President Bush there are a lot of evidences regarding terrorists' interest in acquiring chemical and biological weapons. However, nuclear weapons are extremely complicated weapons and most of them have Permissive Action Links (PALs) which require a code to activate the arsenals. The system only permits a restricted number of attempts after which the arsenals become automatically locked denying any further attempt. If terrorists overcome

¹"Nuclear Posture Review Report," *Department of Defense, US*, April 2010, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf, (accessed on Aug 9, 2017).

these technicalities, they may dismantle the arsenals. There are no loose nukes and portable nuclear arsenals missing from storage locations and available in black market.²

Pakistani authorities welcomed Obama's nuclear initiative, considering that nuclear security awareness is a global problem. The authorities understood that the issue required the attention of the international community. In 2010, Pakistan claimed that its nuclear security is effective and responsive against the entire range of the dangerous threats. It suggested that international regimes had already initiated numerous steps to deal with nuclear security. According to Pakistan, the summit allowed countries to take a deep look into their nuclear security and to work with international organizations to strengthen their security, thus contributing to the prevention of terrorist acts. For Pakistan, this offers the opportunity to dispel misperceptions about its nuclear safety.

The main purpose of the summit was to exchange expertise and experiences related to nuclear safety and security, and to learn best practices in a non-obligatory manner. From a Pakistani perspective, this was viewed as a necessary step in order to enhance the country's competence in nuclear security. The summit focused on nuclear security rather than disarmament, which had been the topic of discussion in previous and related forums.³ India is an active contributor to the nuclear safety process of the United Nations (UN) following the implementation of 1540 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). The Indian minister of external affairs attended The Hague Summit, while the prime minister attended the first two summits.⁴

²Naeem Salik, "Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Danger," *Strategic Analysis* 38 March 19, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.884437>, (accessed on Aug 9, 2017).

³ "Pakistan's National Statement," *Nuclear Security Summit*, 2014, <http://www.pid.gov.pk/?p=3053>, (accessed on Jan 09, 2018).

⁴Arvind Gupta and Rajiv Nayan, "Nuclear Security, The Summit Process and India," *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, 32, No.2, March 29, 2014, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/NuclearSecuritySummit_GuptaNayan_290314, (accessed on December 17, 2018).

Nuclear Security

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to prevent the theft, illegal trafficking, illegal ownership, sabotage of nuclear and radiological material is nuclear security.⁵ The 9/11 attacks also highlighted that destruction could be on a large scale if the nuclear materials were included in that attack. Since 9/11 the term “nuclear security” became more relevant to the prevention of nuclear terrorism.⁶

The danger is that terrorist, non-state actors and criminal organizations can use nuclear materials against states which pose a threat to international security. It is the responsibility of every state to ensure the security of its nuclear materials by joining hands with the international community to fight against nuclear terrorism.

Jack Boureston and Tanya Ogilvie-White discuss in their working paper entitled “*Seeking Nuclear Security through Greater International Coordination*” that in 2008, Mohamed ElBaradei, former DG of the IAEA described that nuclear terrorism is threat to international security. He also pointed out that terrorist organizations are trying to get nuclear technology and if they would get it ultimately, they would use it. The IAEA reports also revealed that blue prints of nuclear weapons are available in the black market and 15 cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear material had occurred in 2008 alone.⁷

Japanese terror group, AumShinrikyo has made serious efforts to get nuclear material and Al-Qaeda has attempted many times to acquire

⁵“IAEA Nuclear Security Series,” *IAEA.org*, March 18, 2017, :http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/nuclear_security_series.asp?s=5&l=35, (accessed on Aug 9, 2017).

⁶Jack Boureston and Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Seeking Nuclear Security through Greater International Coordination,” *The Council on Foreign Relations*, March 2010, :https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2010/03/IIGG_WorkingPaper_1_NuclearSecurity.pdf, (accessed on June 13, 2017).

⁷Ibid.

nuclear material.⁸ Most Western observers believe that Pakistan's nuclear weapons can go into the hands of terrorists due to a wave of terrorism and presence of lethal terrorist groups in Pakistan. This perception is based on flawed logic and knowledge because the distant observer cannot measure Pakistan's stringent nuclear security.⁹

The first summit was held in Washington in 2010, second in Seoul in 2012, third in The Hague (2014) and last in Washington DC in 2016, to minimize the threat of nuclear terrorism through cooperation and take national steps to strengthen the safety of nuclear weapons. Bowen, Cottee, Hobbs and Lentini discuss in their "*Nuclear Security Briefing Book*" that Morocco and Lithuania established Centres of Excellence (CoEs) and hosted workshops on nuclear security. Kazakhstan, Japan and Singapore eliminated Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and encouraged other states to support HEU mitigation efforts. Since the Washington summit, 530-kilogram HEU has been eliminated by six states and this amount is enough to make 21 nuclear weapons. Belgium and Republic of Korea improved their nuclear safety laws after Fukushima nuclear accident and NSS political pressure. Nuclear security is a national responsibility but NSS has provided a platform to the states and made them realize to share their expertise on the ground of nuclear security with a view to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. The objective of the NSS was to secure the nuclear material throughout the world in four years.¹⁰

⁸ Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, Nickolas Roth and William H. Tobey, "Key Steps for Continuing Nuclear Security Progress," *Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs*, December 2016,

https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/%5B3A-1%5D_FUL_574_Bunn.pdf (assessed on Aug 3, 2017).

⁹Rizwan Zeb, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: How Safe Is Safe Enough? Transparency versus Opacity," *Defense and Security Analysis*, p. 30, July 1, 2014, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2014.925640>.

¹⁰Wyn Q. Bowen et al., "Nuclear Security Briefing Book," *King's College London*, 2014, <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/csss/pubs/Nuclear-Security-Briefing-Book-2016-edition/2016NSBB>, (accessed on Aug 3, 2017).

According to the Obama statement, Pakistan's nuclear program is secure, but US government officials expressed great concerns related to Pakistan's nuclear security. According to the apprehensions of Western observers, which are blown out of proportion, there are very possible threats that Pakistan's insiders can help terrorists to get nuclear material. There are several factors which suggest that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are secure as in the recent years Pakistan implemented a more rigorous personal reliability program with PALs development which was not part of its nuclear arsenals years ago. It was first time used in the US nuclear weapons in 1960 when it consisted of 5-digit codes. PALs are the methods of coding which are installed in nuclear weapons to save the system from terrorists, rogue insiders, theft and sabotage. The US nuclear weapons consisted of locking devices until the mid-1960, thus anyone could use them once physical access was achieved. They introduced the presidential control over nuclear weapons to reinforce security. In the case of Pakistan, the most important improvement is that it keeps its nuclear weapons separate from their non-nuclear detonators. By using this method, it may protect against any threat of terrorists and theft.¹¹ Normally, rogue insiders try to leak out the information to the terrorist and non-state actors to gain their personal interests.¹²

Pakistan's Response to NSS

Pakistan welcomed Obama initiatives and made sufficient progress to improve its nuclear weapons security. Pakistan opened Centers of Excellence (CoEs) in 2012 for training. American institutions documented that Pakistan's safety and security measures are on high level. Pakistan's response towards NSS was very positive and followed all summits to

¹¹ Montgomery, Evan B. "Nuclear Terrorism: Assessing the Threat, Developing a Response," *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*, 2009.

¹² Kevin Beaver and McClure, Stuart, "Straightening out the Hacker's Terminology," *Dummies*, 2009, <http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/straightening-out-the-hackers>

make sure to the world that it has maximized the safety and security of its nuclear material. Pakistan's Prime Minister offered to operate the Excellence Centers regionally and internationally. The IAEA accepted this offer and these centers are running as a training hub today on a regional level. The IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano visited the Centre in March 2014 said: "It is very impressive that you organize the training in a very systemic and operational manner." Pakistan is also implementing Nuclear Security Action Plan (NSAP) with the cooperation of IAEA to manage the radioactive sources, detect radiation and prepare for emergency. It also established nuclear emergency management system.¹³

An essential part of Pakistan's nuclear program is to keep nuclear weapons safe. Pakistan has constructed an efficient nuclear safety system. There is a vigorous nuclear security organization in place that reinforces nuclear security. This organization covers nuclear related and radioactive materials. In addition, Pakistan is contributing to the IAEA, in order to promote nuclear related safety. The country is a member of many IAEA security commissions, committees and other relevant networks.

Organizations and Institutions

The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) governs the nuclear security regime on behalf of the National Command Authority (NCA). The NCA was established in 2000 and is the policy making body concerning nukes. It controls development of all nuclear forces and relevant organizations. It deals with arms control and disarmament, export control, safety and security of nuclear materials and installations. It also deals with strategic organization. The SPD manages Pakistan's strategic possessions,

¹³Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security," *Nation*, February 23, 2013, <http://nation.com.pk/columns/23-Feb-2013/pakistan-s-nuclear-weapons-safety-and-security>.

coordinates its organizations, and controls the administration and economic matters of particular organizations.¹⁴

NCA is a strong nuclear command and control arrangement chaired by the Prime Minister. This is the judgment making body. Multi-layered security is a method to prevent smuggling of nuclear related technology and it takes place via land, air and sea mediums, and also requires an efficient approach to curb it. The office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) works with the partner states and cooperates with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism(GICNT), the IAEA, the EU commissions and the UN to prevent smuggling on regional and global level.¹⁵

The NSDD arranged nuclear security program globally in 2015. NSDD offers mobile detection system to the partner states with the radiation detection system to counter nuclear materials smuggling. It also provides training workshops to protect nuclear materials and counter the trafficking. Pakistan is the partner state of NSDD.¹⁶

Development on Education and Training Programs

Pakistan ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 2016 and established CoEson nuclear security with the cooperation of the IAEA. It also hosted the annual meeting of International Network of Nuclear Support Centres. It established nuclear emergency management system on national level and arranged detection equipment to stop the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials. India also established national counter smuggling teams to prevent the threats of nuclear materials smuggling through sea, its

¹⁴Naeem Salik and Kenneth Loungo, "Challenges for Pakistan's Nuclear Security," *Arms Control Association*, February 28, 2013, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/Challenges-for-Pakistans-Nuclear-Security.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶,"Combating Nuclear Smuggling, Report," *Government Accountability Office*, 2016, <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-460>.

airports and handling these threats through radiation doorways, and detection instruments.¹⁷

The Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) established a School for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. It offers courses, table top exercises, workshops to train the first responders to handle the radiation accident. It hosted workshops on nuclear culture security. Pakistan Strategic Export Control Division in Ministry of Foreign Affairs revised the export control list with the consultation of other departments. This list is revised on the basis of European Union (EU) which is according to the rules of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Australia group. Pakistan is also working on UNSCR 1540, and has submitted the reports to a committee which explains measures taken by Pakistan on radiological security and control of sensitive materials, and WMDs transfer.¹⁸ Pakistan is the first country which submitted a report to the UN 1540 Committee that it is fulfilling its responsibilities.¹⁹

Pakistan has upgraded more than a dozen medical centers in order to advance nuclear and radiological safety. It has opened training centers for SPD with courses on nuclear safety. It has established schools for nuclear and radiation safety, and has managed the IAEA programs on nuclear safety culture. The country has managed regional training courses on the safety of radioactive sources. It has also modified its national export and nuclear safety action plan in coordination with the IAEA, and established nuclear emergency management systems.²⁰

¹⁷“Nuclear Security Summit 2016 - Highlights from National Progress Reports” *White House*, April 4, 2016, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/04/nuclear-security-summit-2016-highlights-national-progress-reports>.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹“Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security.”

²⁰Rizwana Abbasi, “Pakistan and the Nuclear Security Summit,” *Institute of Strategic Studies*, 2016, <http://www.issi.org.pk/pakistan-and-the-nuclear-security-summit/>.

It is hosting IAEA's regional training courses on the protection of radioactive sources. It established an academy of training for the SPD with nuclear security courses. It is offering a specialization course in nuclear security and nuclear engineering and a master in the engineering institute of Pakistan.²¹

Development on Counter Radiological and Nuclear Smuggling

Pakistan is contributing in the IAEA and Incident and Trafficking Data Base (ITDB). India is also contributing in it. According to the IAEA no single incident of illegal trafficking has occurred in Pakistan as compared to different European countries where many such incidents were reported. The report revealed that 827 incidents of nuclear trafficking have occurred from 1993-2005 but none of them was related to Pakistan. "Pakistan has taken stringent measures to secure its nuclear materials and is continuously pursuing to meet international standards in regulating its nuclear activities."²² It improved its action plan of nuclear security with the IAEA to manage radioactive sources and secure the nuclear materials to deter the emergency threats. The cooperation with IAEA is in the process for the advancement of physical protection of nuclear power plant of Karachi.²³

Improvement on Radiological and Nuclear Security

All nuclear medical centers have been upgraded with radioactive sources through the IAEA collaboration. Pakistan has maintained safe and secure nuclear power plants system for 42 years under the IAEA safeguards, and it is interested in sharing its expertise with other states in nuclear power

²¹Michelle, Davenport, and Parker, "The Nuclear Security Summit: Accomplishments of the Process," *Arms Control Association*, 2016, <https://www.armscontrol.org/files/The-Nuclear-Security-Summits-Accomplishments-of-the-Process.pdf>

²²"Pakistan Not on IAEA N-Trafficking Database," *Dawn*, September 8, 2006, <https://www.dawn.com/news/209490>.

²³ "Pakistan's National Statement," *Nuclear Security Summit*, 2014, <http://www.pid.gov.pk/?p=3053>

generation expertise under the umbrella of the IAEA. It revised the security and emergency vigilance of power plants to save them from disasters like the Fukushima accident. It is also in a position of becoming part of any nuclear fuel cycle organization. It is strengthening its nuclear export control regime and enhancing its cooperation with other export control organizations. Pakistan's nuclear establishment response towards NSS reflects its seriousness towards nuclear safety and security. These measures certainly pave the way for Pakistan to get smooth entry into the NSG and it is also in a position to become the member of NSG on non-discriminatory basis with India.²⁴

Pakistan welcomed the NSS initiative and Pakistani Prime Minister participated in it which was followed by several regional security workshops recognized by the IAEA in Rawalpindi and Islamabad after the launching of this initiative. These workshops played a very successful role as all nuclear states send their representatives to attend these workshops and all states praised Pakistan for doing a significant job.

India's agenda is different to get the membership of NSG and Pakistan approach is very different. The US is supporter of India despite the fact that India is non-signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty(CTBT)and therefore, it is in direct contravention to proliferation regime. India used nuclear fuels in 1974 from Cyrus reactors acquired from Canada and heavy water from US. It also signed an agreement that it was only for peaceful purpose but it has used Cyrus nuclear fuel for detonating the 1975 devices. Pakistan's nuclear program is more secure than that of India. In Pakistan all nuclear reactors are under safeguards other than military, but in India all civilian reactors are not under safeguards. Those which are under safeguards, they are under India's specific safeguards. A number of initiatives are taken by both India and Pakistan to try to convince the NSG to be able to gain its membership. However, there has been a struggle for the same

²⁴Nuclear Security Summit, "Pakistan's National Statement."

position by both these South Asian rival nuclear weapons states. For example, India (along with some part of international community that are in close alliance with India) blames Pakistan for blocking the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), the episode of AQ Khan, nuclear technology to North Korea, Iran and Iraq in 2004, and that Pakistan nuclear materials might fall in wrong hands because of the increasing terrorism in Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan increasingly justifies its position convincingly that Pakistan has never been involved in such activities as a state actor. Pakistan has a position that it is India that has been increasing its nuclear reactors program and has achieved a greater number of fissile materials that in turn enable India to produce as many nuclear warheads as India would want, though India is not a member of the NPT. It is encouraging to observe that although Pakistan has never been part of the NPT since its creation in 1968, Pakistan has been participating in most of the international non-proliferation regimes to ensure that the world should remain non-discriminatory towards international affairs related to nuclear weapons and their related facilities, but also to make sure that its nuclear weapons program and its related facilities do not fall in the wrong hands. Pakistan ensures that its nuclear weapons program and related materials are under tight security and better command and control. Pakistan has cooperated with the international non-proliferation regime. It has created a stringent export control regime and successfully made the world realize that it is a responsible nuclear weapon state.²⁵

. Pakistan's export control act was the response to UNSCR 1540 in April. It was legislated in September 2004, which was much admired by the international community. Both, India and Pakistan are doing their best for maintaining safety and security of their nuclear material and Pakistan has been very successful in it as no incident of theft has occurred. The reports of the IAEA, Belfer Centre and Arms Control, released in March 2016, authenticate that Pakistan's nuclear security and

²⁵ Dr. Zafar Khan, interviewed by Sonia Naz, September 13, 2017

safety program is much more secure than India²⁶. Recently, IAEA DG, Yukiya "expressed his appreciation" on Pakistan's nuclear safety and security efforts.²⁷ However, both states are very much concerned about nuclear safety and security as well as their nuclear installations.

Basically, there has been no attack on any nuclear facility of Pakistan or even an attempt on its nuclear installations. Kamra is an aeronautical complex which was attacked and termed as a terrorist attack on nuclear installations whereas it was merely a terrorist attack. It has not even got a delivery network of nuclear weapons and is a production facility: consequently, the attacks on Kamra, GHQ and Sargodha were not attacks on nuclear facilities but are just speculations. The 9/11 incident did not mean that it was an attack on the US nuclear weapons; same is the case of Pakistan. The attack on these places does not mean that it was an attack on Pakistan's nuclear installations. In the first nuclear summit in Washington, Pakistan did not make any commitment but in 2012 it expressed its desire to establish CoEs and also offered nuclear fuel services to other states under the safeguards of the IAEA. These things retreated in 2014 and 2016 summits also. India also assured that it would establish CoE and Indian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (INRA) but it failed to attain it. The response from Pakistan's nuclear establishment was very positive towards the NSS. Pakistan's active role has been accepted internationally as it fulfilled its commitments while India merely talked about it.²⁸

Japan, China and South Korea Centres of Excellence are under construction and they are far behind than Pakistan. India has not done much in nuclear safety and security: it just formed a Central Industrial

²⁶ Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, interviewed by Sonia Naz, September 18, 2017.

²⁷ "Amano Commends Pakistan Nuclear Safety and Security," *World Nuclear News*, March 15, 2018, <http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Amano-commends-Pakistan-nuclear-safety-and-security-1503187.html>

²⁸ Dr. Naeem Salik, interviewed by Sonia Naz September 20, 2017.

Security Force (CISF) to protect nuclear installations whereas they do not have any special force to defend nuclear material. It has not established CoEs and training academy like Pakistan but Pakistan started its nuclear safety and security since 1998 when after 9/11 Collin Powel (former US Secretary under Bush administration) visited Pakistan as he was aware that in Pakistan there were concerns about nuclear security of Pakistan because of the war on terror and the fear that Taliban could take away nuclear material and could possibly use it in Afghanistan to make nuclear weapons. He offered the training courses to Pakistan in the United States for importing education in the US security measures but Pakistan clarified that they would not take the whole US model but tailor it in the light of their interest. There is also rapid reaction force which can reach anywhere to respond to emergency situations and counter intelligence team that will give early warning to deter any threat. The PNRA established NSSA and technological labs while India could not.²⁹

The biggest threat to Pakistan's nuclear security has been terrorism given the fact fragile internal security situation in the country in the post 9/11 era. However, this threat has been exaggerated by many Western and Indian leaders and scholars. Pakistan fought its case well through NSS process and told the world that nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear installations in the country are in safe hands. Pakistan has been the most improved country on nuclear security index – a fact that international community admits. It has taken a numerous legislative and institutional measures to strengthen nuclear security regime in the country. By all means, it has achieved many milestones in peaceful nuclear energy as well. Pakistan has been very actively participating in all the programs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Undoubtedly, Pakistan has proved that it has the wherewithal for the safe operations of nuclear power plants in the country. The international community should treat

²⁹ Ibid.

India and Pakistan equally with regards to NSG affairs.³⁰ The terrorist activities in Pakistan have created negative concerns about its nuclear security but the US policy makers, its Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and Obama showed confidence that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe and its military is equipped to prevent any act of terrorism against its nuclear arsenals. Pakistan's nuclear devices are unassembled and it has a very strong system of monitoring so, the few thousand of Taliban's cannot take over its nuclear weapons.³¹

Conclusion

NSS was not an institution but it was a remarkable initiative of President Obama's to counter nuclear terrorism by securing nuclear material throughout the world and it has ended with the last summit. NSS provided a forum of cooperation to states to strengthen their nuclear security. After Obama, some other Presidents may not carry Obama's legacy effectively as president Donald Trump had ascended to power and he is undoing Obama's initiatives but nuclear security proposal may not come under attack because it aims to secure worldwide nuclear weapons.

NSS impact on Pakistan's nuclear security was very positive because its nuclear establishment response toward the NSS was very constructive. Pakistan was invited in NSS and it played a very active role as it has taken multiple steps to secure its nuclear materials and nuclear installations. Pakistan has been very conscious about nuclear security of its weapons since its inception and has taken numerous steps in this regard. NSS is off the view that every state should secure its nuclear weapons to prevent it from theft, sabotage, illegal use and unauthorized control. NSS played a very important role in making more secure Pakistan's nuclear materials.

³⁰ Mr. Sadiq, interviewed by Sonia Naz, September 21, 2017.

³¹ Ibid.

Pakistan's welcomed NSS and actively participated in every international forum related to the nuclear security. Pakistan established CoEs and hosted nuclear security workshops. It is member of CPPNM and it is also following UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA rules. Pakistan's nuclear establishment is making more advanced its nuclear security system to save it from any accident and nuclear terrorism. According to the secondary and primary data, since the inception of Pakistan's nuclear program, no incident of nuclear material theft has occurred in Pakistan though some cases of nuclear theft were noted in India. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are stored separately and there has not been any attack on its nuclear material and nuclear installation. The western media propagated a lot that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not secure and they can go in wrong hands but fact is that they have not much idea about its nuclear weapons and their security. According to the nuclear expert's responses and IAEA, NSS progress reports and Arms control association, Pakistan is extremely serious to make its nuclear security system more fortified. Terrorism is a global threat for whole world; not only for Pakistan and its nuclear security system is much secure to defend it from any hazard. The attack on any air base and GHQ does not mean that it is attack on Pakistan's nuclear installations.

Pakistan proved that it has secured nuclear, fissile and radioactive material from misuse and terrorist by its nuclear security efforts. It has strengthened its nuclear export control structure, monitoring system and nuclear regulatory provisions in the form of strict laws and principles. Pakistan advisor of foreign policy said in 2014 that Pakistan's promises to join hands with the international community in the efforts of nuclear security to ensure that the nuclear weapons cannot get into the wrong hands.³²

³²Naeem Salik, "Learning to Live with the Bomb: Pakistan: 1998-2016," *Oxford University Press*, <https://www.amazon.com/Learning-Live-Bomb-Pakistan-1998-2016/dp/0199404569>

Pakistan exists in the most troubled region in the world where it is facing so many challenges. Western media propaganda against Pakistan nuclear security pressurizes Pakistan so there is need of international cooperation to encourage Pakistan because it is very concerned about its nuclear safety and security. Pakistan has taken multiple measures to secure its nuclear material after the broke of NSS as it established COEs, hosted workshops and legislated UNSCR 1540. These measures should not stop even after the ending of the NSS. Pakistan's encouraging response towards NSS improved its nuclear security, placed Pakistan higher than India in NTI ranking and made international community realize that Pakistan's nuclear materials are safe and secure from any theft or misuse.

Geo-Political Significance of Gwadar Port: Challenges and Prospects

Nisar Ahmed Khan[□]

Abstract

The strategically situated deep sea Gwadar port promises significant strategic rewards for Pakistan. It is likely to attract traffic from Central Asian Republics (CARs), China, Afghanistan and western countries. Because of its prime location in the Arabian Sea near to Straits of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman and at the junction of South Asia, Middle East and Central Asia, the port has the potential to function as a transshipment harbor after the necessary infrastructure is put in place. However, the port also faces some daunting challenges due to divergent interests of major players in the ongoing New Great Game. In the light of geopolitical theories this study attempts to explain the prevailing geostrategic environment and puts into perspective the interests of various players with respect to strategic viability of the Gwadar port.

Keywords: Gwadar Port, Geopolitics, Pakistan, China, US, CARs, India, CPEC, OBOR, BRI

Introduction

The global geopolitical landscape is witnessing a radical change which is evident in the wake of re-alignments from Asia to the Middle East, perception of declining influence of the US in the region, the resurgence of Russia and most importantly the rise of China. These power dynamics

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in the global politics have led to a strategic competition among states for the attainment of access and control of markets and resources lying across the Eurasian Rimland and Heartland. The players of this New Great Game include all the major states, with the US, China, Russia, India, Pakistan and Iran acting as leading actors.

The US and India being the close strategic partners perceive Chinese rise and consequent global ambitions as a severe blow to their strategic interests. In his National Security Strategy, US President Donald Trump declared China and Russia as being rivals and ‘revisionist states’ posing threat to American interests.¹ Interestingly, despite having \$52 billion trade volume with China, India seems adamant in its opposition to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).² Due to perceived fear of encirclement, India is visibly discomfited by the extended network of Chinese ports along some major coastlines of the Eurasian Rimland.

This growing great powers competition, seemingly driven by zero-sum mindset has various strategic and security implications for Pakistan's Gwadar port in its restive province of Balochistan.

Historical Background

Once a small fishing town, Gwadar is currently in the process of becoming an international port city. Historically, Gwadar has been a source of attraction and conflict simply because of its important geo-strategic location. It is situated at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, at the meeting point of Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. It is estimated that

¹ “In new security plan, Trump hits out at Russia, China”, *Aljazeera* available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/trump-russia-china-rivals-threaten-security-171218130840891.html> (accessed on December 19, 2017)

² “Indo-China trade volume to touch \$65 billion during 2016: Official”, *Indian Express*, available at <http://indianexpress.com/article/business/economy/indo-china-trade-volume-to-touch-65-billion-during-2016-official-4425200/> (accessed on April 25, 2018)

around 60% of the world's crude oil is carried through the Strait of Hormuz.³

For centuries the sea-lanes near Gwadar had been a medium of transportation between the Middle East and the Sub-Continent. It has always attracted the ancient travelers and conquerors. The mention of Gwadar in several historical books and accounts of travelers like Marco Polo, Firdausi, and Ibn-ul-Haikal reflect its strategic significance.⁴

In geo-political terms, the world has long recognized the significance of coastal lines of Pakistan's Gwadar, and Iran's Chabahar falling in the Inner Crescent i.e. Rimland. The Indian Ocean was described by Nicholas Spykman as "one of the maritime highways of the world."⁵ He considered the areas forming Rimland to be vital in containing the Heartland due to their huge population, natural resources and industrial potential. No wonder why Spykman's vision was instrumental in the US Containment policy against Soviet Union during the Cold War era.

Due to the volatile situation in the Arab world, and the recent uprising and the spread of terrorist organizations, it is becoming increasingly difficult for states to solely rely on the Persian Gulf countries in order to meet their energy needs. The European countries which rely on Russia to meet their energy requirements are also eager to lessen their dependence considering that the latter often uses gas as a political tool in its dealings with these countries.⁶

³ Mary Burdman, "Pakistan's Gwadar Port is a Potential Great Project," *EIR* Volume 28, Number 44, (November 16, 2001), p. 16, available at <http://www.larouche.com/eiw/public/2001/eirv28n44-20011116/index.html> (accessed on Jan. 20, 2018).

⁴ Azhar Ahmad, "Gwadar: Potential and Prospects," *Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies*, (Feb 17, 2015), available at <http://www.picss.net/2015/02/17/gwadar-potential-and-prospects-report-by-dr-azhar/> (accessed on Feb. 3, 2016).

⁵ Nicholas John Spykman. *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), p. xxviii available at <https://books.google.com.pk/books?id=rsIwxKfuHwIC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false> (accessed on Jan. 20, 2016).

⁶ Robbie Gramer, "Is Europe Caving to Russia on Pipeline Politics?" *Foreign Policy* at

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and ensuing independence of the energy-laden CARs, the world has witnessed a growing competition between the great powers to gain access to the CARs which have huge tapped and untapped reserves of oil, gas and other resources. In this context, Pakistan is considered to be a bridge and Gwadar port a Gateway which, once fully operational, can be used by the traffic to and from Central Asian Republics, Chinese province of Xinjiang through Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and South East Asia.⁷

In a nutshell, Gwadar deep sea port is envisaged as a regional hub for transshipment which could significantly contribute to the economic development of Pakistan, particularly the impoverished province of Balochistan. But unfortunately, in the face of New Great Game between competing powers with divergent interests, it is also feared to be a source generating intense rivalry and conflict. Balochistan and thereby Gwadar port is thus central to the New Great Game. Central Asia being the Historical Pivot and Heartland is once again the focus of the world.

Geo-political Significance of Gwadar Port Region: Past and Present

The term geopolitics can be defined as the study of the impact of geographic factors on power relationships in international relations.⁸ Thus, when we employ the lenses of geopolitical theories to appraise the importance of Gwadar port, it becomes crystal clear that this entire region where Balochistan and thereby Gwadar port is situated is of utmost geopolitical significance.

<http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/08/is-europe-caving-to-russia-on-pipeline-politics-european-union-nord-stream-two-gas-oil-energy-germany-baltic-poland/> (accessed Jan 23, 2018)

⁷ Zahid Anwar, "Gwadar Deep Sea Port's Emergence as Regional Trade and Transportation Hub: Prospects and Problems," *Journal of Political Studies*, Vol. 1, Issue 2, (2010) P. 97.

⁸ *Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia*, "Geopolitics," at <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geopolitics> (accessed 18, 2016).



Figure 2 Location of Gwadar port at the mouth of Straits of Hormuz depicting its importance⁹.

When one delves into the history of the Great Game between British Empire and Russia during 19th century, Balochistan and its coasts turn out to be very much central to the global quest for domination and subjugation. Balochistan was considered a golden prize to be won by the imperial powers in their strategic calculations. British Empire exercised its Afghan policy with respect to the erstwhile USSR by controlling the administration of Balochistan.¹⁰ The British Empire used Balochistan for communication purposes and turned it into a buffer zone in a bid to prevent the expansion of the USSR.¹¹

⁹ Nabiha Gul, "Gwadar port: Geo-economic and geostrategic dimensions," *World Times*, at http://www.jworldtimes.com/Article/42013Gwadar_Port_Geo_economic_and_Geostrategic_Dimensions (accessed Jan 20, 2016).

¹⁰ Imtiaz Ali, "The Balochistan Problem," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (April 2005), P. 44.

¹¹ Syed Fakharuddin Shah, "Baluchistan: British Rule, an Era of Political Awakening and Merger," *Global Journal of Human Social Science* Volume 13 Issue 6 Version 1.0 (2013): 1, at https://globaljournals.org/GJHSS_Volume13/3-Baluchistan-British-Rule.pdf (accessed April 27, 2018)

Later, after witnessing a period of relative calm and brief halt in the political turmoil, Balochistan once again emerged as an important location during the Cold War period when the strategic quest for power projection and hegemony entailed Soviet Union and the US. The Cold War rivals also viewed Balochistan as an opening to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.¹²

This was one of the reasons that in a bid to challenge the US policy of containment and to avenge Pakistan's role in it, Soviet Union supported *Azad* [independent] Balochistan and Greater Pashtoonistan Movements. Logically, an independent Balochistan was considered in the best interest of Soviet Union in terms of expanding influence and gaining access to reach the warm waters. Surprisingly, with the introduction of Chinese built Gwadar port in Balochistan, the Indo-US nexus has been quite vocal in supporting separatist elements in Balochistan. Earlier, it was the fear of Soviet expansion; now it is primarily Chinese rise and outreach that send shock waves.¹³

Thus in light of the tumultuous history of this region and the current Sino-US rivalry, it can be said that a new geopolitical game or New Great Game has already commenced. In fact, the term New Great Game has been used by Rudyard Kipling in his book *Kim* to describe the power politics among countries to gain access and control the energy reserves of CARs.¹⁴

¹² Muhammad Khurshid Khan, Asma Sana and AfifaKiran, "Balochistan Unrest Internal And External Dimensions," *NDU Journal* (2012): pp. 101-104. at http://www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/ndu-journal/NDU-Journal-2012/05-Balochistan-Unrest.pdf (accessed 27 April, 2018)

¹³ Khalil-ur-Rehman, "Balochistan: The Strategic Pearl," *The Dialogue*, Volume vi No. 1, (Jan-March 2011), pp. 4 at http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/The%20Dialogue/6_1/Dialogue_January_March2011_1-11.pdf (accessed Feb 3, 2016).

¹⁴Qamar Fatima and SumeraZafar, "New Great Game: Players, Interests, Strategies and Central Asia," *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies* Vol. 29, No.2, (July - December 2014), P. 624.

Two important geopolitical theories which have long influenced the thinking pattern of statesmen and foreign policies of countries are still useful in understanding the ongoing competition among states for territories and resources in Eurasian landmass. In this regard Halford Mackinder's Heartland theory and Spykman's Rimland theory are being employed in order to demonstrate the geopolitical significance of Gwadar port. Though these theories were propounded by the geopoliticians to predict and analyze power politics among states in 20th century, to any one with little knowledge of the ongoing New Great Game, these theories would still seem relevant to explain the state policies today. This is because the Mackinder's historic geographical pivot which he later renamed as Heartland (the erstwhile Soviet Union and thus also the energy rich CARs) and Spykman's Rimland (the coastal areas of Eurasia including the coastal areas of Pakistan and thus Gwadar port) are once again gaining value as states seeking secure routes and additional sources to meet their fast growing energy requirements. These objectives can easily be achieved by gaining control over what Spykman termed as the Rimland of the Eurasian landmass. Thus, Balochistan and thereby Gwadar port is central to the New Great Game.¹⁵

About Rimland it is said: "Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia, who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world."¹⁶ This dictum influenced US policy makers to formulate the policy of containment against Soviet Union who were desperately trying to establish influence in the Eurasian landmass by gaining access to the Rimland. Now another major Eurasian power China is flexing its muscles and attempting to establish its own rule in the World Island thus challenging predominance of the US and its allies. To this end, China is building several commercial and naval facilities along the Rimland.¹⁷ China's port development projects at Hambantota and Colombo in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan,

¹⁵ Khalil-ur-Rehman, "Balochistan," p. 5.

¹⁶ Spykman, *America's strategy in world politics*, p. 132

¹⁷ Mercy A. Kuo, "The Power of Ports: China's Maritime March", *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/the-power-of-ports-chinas-maritime-march/> at (accessed on Jan 23, 2018)

Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar demonstrate China's naval maritime prowess and its growing naval ambitions.

Gwadar is one such facility which offers China with an alternative, secure and cost-effective route, enabling it to avoid the troubled Straits of Malacca in the South China Sea. Thus, China will not have to pass through the South China Sea which is heavily guarded by US forces. This invulnerability of China does not go down well with the US as it views Chinese rise as a threat to its strategic interests.

The US and Gwadar Port

In line with the great geopolitical thinkers of the early 19th century, Henry Kissinger and Brzezinski, highlighted the importance of Eurasian landmass by warning that any country that seeks to dominate either of the two spheres i.e. Europe and Asia would be a serious strategic threat to US interests in this important landmass.¹⁸ Such suggestions underscore that US views this entire region as a major geopolitical prize and its preponderance in international affairs heavily depends on how long does it wield power in Eurasia. When we analyze US policies in this framework of geopolitical theories, it appears plausible that to maintain its hegemony and status of 'super power', the US would always try to counter any country that it considers a threat to its standing and status in the world Island.

The Indo-US strategic partnership, ostensibly to contain the rising influence of China, gives credence to this premise. Indeed, India as a major Rimland power is now locked in a strategic competition with China. India's premier secret agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), has been accused by Pakistan time and again of its involvement in creating instability and backing insurgency in Balochistan province.¹⁹ Similarly,

¹⁸ George D. Cleva. *Henry Kissinger and the American approach to foreign policy* (Associate University Press, Inc. 1989), pp.132.

¹⁹ BaqqirSajjad Syed, "Raw instigating terrorism, says Army," *DAWN*, (May 6, 2015) at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1180243> (accessed on Jan 18, 2015).

talks in the US Congress about an 'independent' Balochistan are in fact part of this new great game. A restless or independent Balochistan is considered helpful by the Indo-US nexus in containing the rise of China.²⁰

Pakistan's Interest in Gwadar Port

Economic Benefits

Study of the literature reveals that, keeping other variables constant, those nations which are more integrated into the international market are more prosperous as compared to the less integrated ones. It has been found in most cases that trade is positively correlated with growth. For instance, during 1960s Pakistan was more open to trade and was more integrated with the world in terms of economic activities. Consequently, its total volume of manufactured exports was higher than the combined manufactured export volume of Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.²¹

Gwadar port and the ancillary connectivity network is just such an endeavor on the part of Pakistan to create secure and easily accessible trade routes for regional economic integration. Being at the cross roads of oil rich Middle East, heavily populated South Asia with a huge consumer market, and the energy rich CARs, Pakistan can hugely benefit from Gwadar port which is ideally located to attract the import and export traffic of these regions.

The trade potential of Gwadar port can thus be gauged by the global trade trends. Global maritime trade trends indicate the growing need of additional ports to accommodate and channelize the rising maritime trade. The 2017 issue of United Nations' Review of Maritime Transport reports an increased demand for shipping services in 2016, as a result of 2.6 per cent increase in world seaborne trade. The overall seaborne trade volume was estimated at 10.3 billion tons, reflecting an increase of over

²⁰ Eddie Walsh, "Should the US support an independent Balochistan?," *Aljazeera*, March 3. at <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/02/201222112203196390.html> (accessed Jan 22, 2016).

²¹ Manzoor Ahmed, "Improving Regional Trade to Support Pakistan's Economic Growth," *The Lahore Journal of Economics* 19: SE, September 2014, P. 461.

260 million tons of cargo.²² In the same way there has been a record increase of 12.6% in the world container port traffic.²³ On the basis of current trade trends, a report projected that the world container traffic will increase more than twice and will reach 371million TEU by 2020.²⁴

With the growing industrialization of global economy, there has been a parallel demand for energy sources like coal, natural gas and oil to sustain economic growth. Studies show that there will be high demand for natural gas and oil in the coming decades. It is projected that the demand for natural gas will increase by 2.75 percent annually and that the demand for oil will remain unabated.²⁵

These global trade trends and rising energy demands necessitate the construction of additional ports. Owing to its strategic location, the deep sea Gwadar port has the potential to serve as the hub that helps in meeting these growing demands and aspirations for energy sources, alternative and secure routes to the oil rich Middle East as well as the CARs.

Thus, given the important geo-strategic location, the positive global trade trends and the increasing global demand for energy resources and secure routes, Gwadar port is destined to earn huge revenues once it is fully operational. The economic benefits linked to Gwadar port primarily

²²“Review of Maritime Transport,” *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development*, UNCTAD/RMT/2017 United Nations Publication at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2017_en.pdf

²³Jehanzeb, “The Trade Potential and Industrial Development in Gwadar,” *Journal of Management Sciences*, volume 1, No 1 (June, 2007) at http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/jms/default_files/JMS/1_1/6_jehanzeb.pdf (accessed Feb, 2016).

²⁴TororinNedyalkov And TeodoraAndreeva-Nedyalkova, “Trends in the container shipping and need of a new generation container terminals and container vessels,” *JOURNALS of Scientific Technical Union of, Mechanical Engineering* at http://mechaning.com/journal/Archive/2011/3/32_Todorin%20Nedqlkov.pdf (Accessed April 27, 2018).

²⁵Ammad Hassan, “Pakistan’s Gwadar Port – Prospects of Economic Revival,” Master’s Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, Jun 2015) at <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/2138> (accessed 27 April, 2018)

stem from three factors i.e. trade, industrial development, other port related activities, and proposed gas and oil pipelines which will pass through Gwadar port.

Military Benefits

Gwadar port has substantial military benefits for Pakistan. Around 95% of its import and export is done via sea routes.²⁶ Currently, most of Pakistan's import-export has to be carried out near Indian border in the east. This has stark consequences of naval blockade and other acts of aggression in case of a conflict with India. In such a desperate moment, Gwadar being further 460 km away from India provides an indispensable alternative to the Karachi port complex. Thus, Gwadar port offers Pakistan military much needed maneuvering space and response time in case of urgency. Cognizant of these threats, Chinese and Pakistani naval forces have resolved to enhance security cooperation in the Indian Ocean, as indicated by the sale of eight submarines capable of carrying nuclear weapons.²⁷

Moreover, in military and strategic terms it is a necessary and wise strategy to keep vital national assets dispersed. Thus, Gwadar port provides a sigh of relief by lifting the burden of traffic as well as the valuable ships and other related technology concentrated in Karachi port and port Qasim. Although the government of Pakistan has declared Gwadar as commercial port, the chief of Pakistan Navy has gone so far as to say that Gwadar is the third naval base of Pakistan which will further strengthen the country's defense.²⁸

²⁶ Sajid Hussain, Muhammad Ayaz Khan et al., "Role Of Maritime Sector In Pakistan's Economic and Security Development" *Pakistan Annual Research Journal* Vol. 50, (2014), P. 71. At https://www.google.com.pk/?gws_rd=cr,ssl&ei=uQmiVv6_OMWeugSetISIAg#q=Pakistan+relies+on+sea+trade (accessed Jan 22, 2016).

²⁷ Franz-Stefan Gady, "China Confirms Export of 8 Submarines to Pakistan", *The Diplomat*, October 19, 2016 at: <https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/china-confirms-export-of-8-submarines-to-pakistan/> (accessed April, 2018).

²⁸ Naheeda Naseem, "Geopolitical Value of Gwadar for the Region (Mainly for Pakistan, China and the Region)," *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies* Vol. 29, No.2, (July - December 2014), P. 519.

Another factor which would go a long way in augmenting Gwadar port's security and military significance is China. Pakistan has already leased operations of Gwadar port to China for 40 years.²⁹ Thus, it could be logically said that Chinese presence at Gwadar port would be a strong deterrent against hostile states. Any external power opposed to the prosperity of Pakistan and China will find it difficult to take aggressive measures fearing a punitive reaction from China. In addition, Gwadar port provides listening post to Pakistan with regards to Indian moves and activities in the region. Given the higher stakes of China in Gwadar port and the strategic relation it has with Pakistan, Pak-China Naval collaboration to curtail or limit Indian influence in the Indian Ocean cannot be ruled out. Thus Gwadar port provides much needed listening and monitoring post to Pakistan in particular and China in general. This is considered a great setback to Indian aspirations for Blue Water Navy.

Gwadar's proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, a major conduit of sea borne trade, enables Pakistan to monitor key Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) stemming from the oil rich Persian Gulf region.

Political/ Strategic Benefits

Gwadar port has immense political and strategic benefits for Pakistan and the region at large. Sea trade is considered one of the major sources of globalization and integration. This is more so of the western world which is relatively more integrated. The consequent interdependence has not only resolved interstate conflicts but has also made it costly for states to engage in wars and conflicts as this would harm the common interests of countries involved owing to the interdependence.

The region of South Asia has seen enough conflicts, poverty, and illiteracy as it lacks integration and cooperation in various fields. The projects like Gwadar port and China Pakistan Economic Corridor have the

²⁹ Marex, "Pakistan Gives China a 40-Year Lease for Gwadar Port," *The Maritime Executive*, April 27, 2017, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/pakistan-gives-china-a-40-year-lease-for-gwadar-port#gs.Pa_Lvic

potential of reviving the ancient Silk Route and integrate the region of South Asia internally and connect it with the external world. Thus, by providing shipping services through Gwadar port, Pakistan can develop mutually beneficial relations with the neighboring states seeking those services. This in turn would lead to increasing interdependency and cooperation in other grave issues like peace and security, poverty, illiteracy etc. The signs of this can already be seen in the case of Pakistan's warming relations with Russia which is seeking alternate markets for its oil and gas in the aftermath of the western sanctions.³⁰

China's Interest in Gwadar Port

The People's Republic of China saw tremendous socio-economic development after the initiation of economic reforms in 1978. In the present times, China is the second largest economy after the U.S with the average GDP rate of 10 percent annually.³¹ However, China is struggling to improve the standard of living of its citizens given that it has the second largest percentage of poor after India.

Thus, in its 'go west strategy' China is aiming to develop its impoverished Xinxiang province. It needs easily accessible markets for its products in order to maintain or increase its economic growth rate. It is in this context that Gwadar port and the flagship China Pakistan Economic Corridor are being considered the most important elements of China's strategic outreach. In the headings given below different aspects of Chinese interest in Gwadar port are discussed separately to understand the emerging geo-strategic environment in clear terms.

³⁰ MuneerAkram, "Pakistan's Moscow Option," *DAWN*, August 17, 2014 at, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1125770> accessed Jan 20, 2016.

³¹ "China Overview," *The World Bank* at, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>(accessed Jan 19, 2016).

Economic Benefits

Being the most populous country and second largest economy of the world, China has huge import and export market. In order to sustain and improve its economic conditions, it needs easily accessible and secure trade routes. Thus, smooth and uninterrupted flow of oil imports from foreign countries is crucial for Chinese industries. The fact that China imports more than 50% of its oil requirements from the Middle Eastern countries speaks volumes of the importance it attaches to secure and alternate trade routes and energy sources.³²

In the absence of alternate routes, these imports and exports have to be carried through the South China Sea, which is notorious for incidents of piracy. In addition, the troubled Strait of Malacca is another major source of concern for China due to US influence there. In this context, Gwadar is natural choice for China, for it is merely at a distance of 2500 km from China's western Xinxiang province. On the contrary, it is as much as 10,000 km if taken the route of South China Sea (As shown in Figure 5 below).³³ Thus, Gwadar significantly reduces the distance and vulnerability of important oil imports on which China's economic development depends. In addition, Gwadar is seen as a transit terminal and regional hub port thereby offering potential benefits to its users.

³² Keith Johnson, "China tops US as biggest oil importer," *Foreign Policy*, (May 11, 2015) at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/11/china-tops-u-s-as-biggest-oil-importer-middle-east-opec-sloc/> (accessed on Jan 18, 2015).

³³ "Gwadar port implications for GCC and China (continued)," *International Center for Strategic Studies* at http://www.icsana.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=433:gwadar-port-implications-for-gcc-and-china-continued&catid=9&Itemid=561&lang=en (accessed Jan 19, 2016).




Figure 5 showing distance from Gwadar to western China

Military Benefits

Notwithstanding the fact that Gwadar port has been declared by Pakistan as commercial port, there are many, particularly Indian and American government officials and scholars, who consider Gwadar to be China's naval outpost in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). They see it as a part of China's alleged 'String of pearls' strategy, a theory used to describe the extended network of China's military and commercial facilities along Eurasian Rimland.

It suggests that China is aiming to expand its maritime and naval capabilities to project its power and to achieve control of major SLOCs. However, China plays down this perception and emphasizes the economic and development imperatives for establishing sea ports and

naval facilities. Nevertheless, there appears to be a general consensus among scholars that China is seeking some sort of improvement in its naval capabilities in order to protect its key sea lines of communications (SLOCs). In this regard, US naval war college publication brings forth Chinese perspective and concludes that China is not satisfied with its current method of merely depending on commercial port access for safeguarding its vital interests abroad.³⁴

Furthermore, China's dissatisfaction with the current security situation and power equilibrium at Indian Ocean and India's assertive maritime policy may exacerbate the ongoing competition for influence in the IOR. In a proposal to the US Pacific Fleet Commander in 2009, China unequivocally demanded that "the Indian Ocean should be recognized as a Chinese sphere of influence."³⁵

This suggests that China is considering some sort of change in its maritime and naval strategy. Thus, keeping in view the strategic relations between China and Pakistan, the dual use of Gwadar port for military and commercial purposes by China and Pakistan naval forces cannot be totally ruled out.³⁶ This view is further amplified by the fact that China has been given operating rights of Gwadar port.

Thus, Gwadar's strategic location provides China with multiple benefits: it provides a foothold for China at the mouth of Persian Gulf, from where it can secure its interests in the Indian Ocean and check Indo-US naval activities. Moreover, the Straits of Malacca can prove to be

³⁴ Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici et al., "Not an Idea We Have to Shun: Chinese Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century," *National Defence University Press*, (Oct 2014) Perspectives, No. 7 at <https://www.chinafile.com/library/reports/not-idea-we-have-shun>(accessed Jan 20, 2016).

³⁵ Christabel Neo, "China's Gwadar Pearl The port acquisition and implications for India," *ISAS Brief* No. 288 – July 11, 2013 available at <http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Pages/home.aspx> (accessed Jan 20, 2016).

³⁶ Rorry Daniels, "Strategic Competition in South Asia: Gwadar, Chabahar, and the Risks of Infrastructure Development," *American Foreign Policy Interests*, (2013), P.100.

Achilles heel for China in any future conflict with Indo-US nexus. Such an eventuality is not so inconceivable given that during 1971 Bangladesh war and later in 1999 Kargil conflict India had threatened China of naval blockade.³⁷

Political/ Strategic Benefits

Politically Gwadar port possesses immense value for China as it is heading to be a great power but with a peace loving image or soft image. China is projecting and selling its peaceful image to the world countries by purportedly establishing mutually beneficial and strong economic relations. Gwadar port is one such example through which the political and strategic relations between China and Pakistan have been further cemented. If this port achieves desired objectives of economic prosperity for Pakistan, then it will set an example for other countries as well. In addition, this region of the Eurasian Rimland has been deemed by geopolitical thinkers like Spykman to be the most important pivot that any power in control of this Rimland will be able to control the destinies of the world.

Challenges for Gwadar Port

Balochistan Quagmire

The internal security situation and political turmoil in Balochistan pose the greatest challenges for successful and optimal use of Gwadar port. Despite being rich in natural resources like gold, copper, gas and coal, Balochistan remains one of the least developed provinces. The resultant sense of alienation and deprivation has led to six insurgencies in Balochistan since the partition of the subcontinent.

³⁷ Ashay Abbhi, "Strings of pearls: India and the geopolitics of Chinese foreign policy," *International Relations*, (July 26, 2015) at <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/26/string-of-pearls-india-and-the-geopolitics-of-chinese-foreign-policy/> (accessed Jan 20, 2016).

It is feared that if CPEC and Gwadar port project are not sufficiently aimed at the development and prosperity of Balochistan province, it would be difficult to counter the recurring wave of insurgency and terrorism in the province. This in turn will lead to underutilization of these projects or they can be targets of the insurgents. These apprehensions have been expressed by many including the then Chief Minister of Balochistan Abdul Malik Baloch that “whether it is Gwadar port or the CPEC project, it is important that the people of Balochistan should benefit first. If that is not ensured then the people of Balochistan will not support Gwadar and CPEC related projects.”³⁸

The Baloch nationalist leaders have grave concerns regarding the demographic change which is foreseen as a result of these mega projects. It is believed that the influx of 1 to 2.5 million non-Baloch workers to fill the major positions at Gwadar will render ethnic Baloch a minority in their own province. This is one of the reasons that attacks on non-Baloch workers and residents have increased in recent times. An important figure and leader of National Party Hasil Bizenjo was reported to have said in an all party’s Conference (APC) chaired by the then PM Nawaz Sharif that as more investment comes into Balochistan under CPEC, more non-Baloch will come to Balochistan in search of jobs, thus further squeezing Baloch population.³⁹ Thus, all these apprehensions have direct or indirect bearing on the successful utilization of Gwadar port.

Constitutional Status of Gilgit Baltistan (GB)

Yet another challenge to the success of Gwadar port stems from the unsettled constitutional status of Gilgit Baltistan (GB). GB is strategically situated to the very north of Pakistan and connects it with China via Karakoram Highway (KKH). The KHH is now being expanded and

³⁸Ibid, P.170.

³⁹KhawarGhumm, “Baloch-Pakhtun rivalry rears its head at CPEC meeting,” *DAWN*, (May 29, 2015), at <http://www.dawn.com/news/1184917>(accessed Jan 20, 2016).

upgraded as part of CPEC initiative. As a gateway to China and Pakistan, it is through GB that 500 km of CPEC will pass.⁴⁰ But for all this to happen, things are not as simple and smooth as they might appear to some. This is so due to the disputed status of GB.

Current Situation

The disputed status of GB not only adversely affects the lives of the locals but also raises a question mark on the legality of Chinese funded mega development projects. Worryingly, the decades long political marginalization of GB has resulted in a sense of deprivation and identity crises in the locals. This sense of deprivation and identity crisis has given birth to separatist and nationalist sentiments. If the genuine grievances of the locals are not addressed and GB's economic and political security is not ensured while carrying out work on CPEC, then the situation there will be no different from the one in Balochistan. Moreover, India and the US have raised serious objections over the mega projects undertaken by Pakistan and China by pointing out the disputed status of the region. Therefore, it is imperative that GB should be given its due constitutional rights. The status of 5th province or more feasible option such as Kashmir like setup can go a long way in allaying long held grievances of the natives.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

Balochistan and Gwadar port have become golden prizes for which there is a cut-throat competition among major powers involving US, China, Russia, and other medium powers. This competition can have negative implications for the successful completion and full utilization of Gwadar port.

⁴⁰Safdar Sial and Peer Muhammad, "Silk route monitor: A review of developments on China Pakistan Economic Corridor," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, P. 173. April 27, 2018 at <https://www.pakpips.com/article/3096>

1. As a remedy it is recommended that in order to save the port from becoming prey to the conflict among global powers, Pakistan should declare the port purely commercial, leaving no space for doubt about the ports' potential military use by China as it has been given 40 years' operating rights of the port. Transparency regarding the terms of conditions with reference to Chinese use of the port may prove helpful. This will mitigate the concerns frequently raised by the US and India.

The study has revealed that the most daunting challenge to the full realization and utilization of the port is rooted in internal opposition from some Baloch nationalists and insurgents who fear that the benefits of the port will bypass them. They fear that even if the port becomes fully operational, the influx of people from other provinces will turn them into minorities in their own province. The non-Baloch will dominate the key positions or jobs because the Baloch having been deprived of the quality education for a long time may be lacking the required skills and education to meet the criteria for the jobs set by the center. Moreover, the feeling of deprivation and exploitation has led the insurgents to attack development infrastructure in the province. The crisis is further fuelled by hostile neighbors opposed to the integrity and prosperity of Pakistan.

2. In order to deal with the aforementioned situation, a multifaceted strategy is recommended to be adopted by concerned authorities.

A. Strategy for Immediate Results

- i. Increase the royalties in return for the extraction of natural resources from Balochistan.
- ii. Increase the quota for Baloch students in educational institutions.
- iii. The provincial government should be delegated powers and authority to make deals with foreign countries and companies with regard to its minerals business.

- iv. In order to ensure Baloch representation in key positions in the mega projects, government should train students and provide skills along with allocating maximum quota for Balochs.
- v. The sale of lands to non-locals at Gwadar should be minimized.
- vi. A media campaign should be designed aiming at countering the appeal of foreign backed insurgents.
- vii. In order to blunt the appeal of terrorist and extremist elements, a de-radicalization campaign should be launched. In this regard, full implementation of National Action Plan (NAP) would bring positive results.

B. Strategy for Long Term Results

- i. Pakistan's parliamentary form of democracy necessitates harmonious relations between the center and provinces for successful implementation of such mega projects. But in the absence of this, provincialism is rising due to uninformed policies of successive governments. It is therefore recommended that decentralization should be done in letter and spirit; provinces should be further empowered and made autonomous. Since this desire of the people has been denied, it has only accelerated nationalist and separatist movements in the country.
 - ii. The allocations in National Finance Commission (NFC) should not be based primarily on population: instead, provinces which lack infrastructure and educational facilities should be allotted special quota in NFC like formats.
 - iii. Emergency measures should be taken to improve the situation of education in Balochistan.
3. The present constitutional status and disputed nature of GB has serious legal implications for CPEC and thereby Gwadar port.

Although, the current Pakistan Muslim League N. government in Islamabad has been mulling over to provide legal protection to CPEC, there is no quick fix to the status of GB which was unwittingly linked to the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. The cosmetic measures adopted by successive Pakistani governments since then to assuage grievances of the locals seem to have little to no effect as indicated by growing ethno-nationalism.

Therefore Pakistan needs to revisit its policy of keeping GB in a constitutional limbo and come up with an out of box solution. The repeated unfulfilled promises by the state of making GB the constitutional province like the other four may result in the complete loss of trust in the state institutions. Undoubtedly, it would be a challenging decision for the state to provide constitutional status of a 5th province to GB as long as Kashmir issue is alive. However, another viable option is to provide Kashmir like setup and initiation of people centric development projects under CPEC.

Conclusion

This analytical study dealing with the significance of Gwadar port leads to the conclusion that the port has huge socio-economic and geostrategic benefits for the country provided that its peaceful use is ensured. The port could prove to be harbinger of prosperity for the impoverished Balochistan province and the country at large. However, the question remains about clarity of vision for national development and sincere efforts to realize that vision through policy reforms based on democratic ideals. In this regard, it is imperative that all state institutions including the elected government, the military, judiciary as well as media play a positive role aimed at the wellbeing of the inhabitants of marginalized and impoverished regions like Balochistan and GilgitBaltistan. Such an approach would not only bridge the growing trust deficit between state and citizens but in fact prove be the natural immune against geopolitical shocks emanating from a Great Power politics. In this respect, China's approach to develop its restive and impoverished Xingjian province can be taken as an example to follow.

Problems and Prospects of Non-Proliferation Regime

Dr. Sadaf Farooq[□] & Saiqa Bukhari**

Abstract

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is an extensive global framework of international accords, voluntary agreements, international institutions, export control arrangements and bilateral and multilateral initiatives, which have been designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, contributing to arms control and disarmament. There are several arms control and disarmament treaties like Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The NPT is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. Along with that some multilateral formal and informal non-proliferation agreements like Nuclear Suppliers Group, International Atomic Energy Agency and Missile Technology Control Regime are also part of the international non-proliferation efforts. This paper attempts to highlight the current key issues facing the nuclear non-proliferation regime. An endeavor has also been made to discuss how the threats to the non-proliferation regime can affect the prospects for nuclear disarmament. A considerable portion of the study is devoted on finding solutions and suggesting some recommendation to the non-proliferation issues.

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Keywords: Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime, Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Nuclear Suppliers Group, International Atomic Energy Agency, Missile Technology Control Regime.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the atomic age, one of the major challenges to international strategic stability, security, and peace is the nuclear weapons proliferation. Massive destructive power of nuclear weapons makes the containment of nuclear capability more important for the international community. Nuclear weapons usually serve as a deterrent against potential aggressor state in form of threat for massive retaliatory strike against any major attack. Simultaneously, spread of nuclear weapons could destabilize and undermine the existing balance of power or raise the possibility of accidental nuclear attack. An increasing concern for the consequences of proliferation of nuclear arms race in the Cold War period led to the establishment of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, intended to promote strategic stability and reduce the chances of nuclear weapons use.¹

The Nuclear non-proliferation regime is an extensive global framework of international accords, voluntary agreements, international institutions, export control arrangements and bilateral and multilateral initiatives, which have been designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thus contributing to arms control and disarmament.² Non-proliferation regime is very significant for stability in international strategic environment because the consequences of nuclear weapons use are unimaginable. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, working towards diminution and ultimately elimination of the

¹Lettow, Paul. "Strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime." *The Council on Foreign Relations*, (2010): 3-4.

²Meyer, Paul. "The Fragmenting Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime." *OpenCanada.org*, (2014). Retrieved from <https://www.opencanada.org/features/the-fragmenting-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/>

existing nuclear weapons, consequently will benefit all the states of the international community. Non-proliferation regime is supported by a wide range of coalitions and security reassurances. The Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.³

The early nuclear non-proliferation efforts were started after United States nuclear test at Alamogordo in 1945 when 'Baruch Plan' (1946)⁴ sought to ban nuclear arsenal and internationalize the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Baruch Plan was the first attempt to control nuclear technology but it failed because of Soviet opposition and thus three more states acquired nuclear arsenals by 1952. From 1946 to 1953, there was no nuclear non-proliferation regime. On 8th December, 1953, the then President of United States, Eisenhower introduced the 'Atoms for Peace' policy,' which led to the establishment of 'Atomic Energy Act 1954'.⁵ Atomic Energy Act opened new ways for the distribution of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under bilateral as well as multilateral accords. Atoms for Peace Initiative and Atomic Energy Act paved the way for the establishment of Atomic Energy Commission Agency (IAEA) in 1957 which regulates atomic technology for peaceful purposes. However, two more countries became nuclear weapon states even after the creation of IAEA, which highlighted the fact that the proliferation of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes could not be separated from the spread of nuclear weapons.⁶ In 1958, Ireland requested for the creation of a United Nation resolution for preventing 'further spreading of nuclear arsenal'.⁷ In 1961, United Nations General

³ Hewitson, Patricia. "Non-proliferation and Reduction of Nuclear Weapons: Risks of Weakening the Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm." *Berkeley Journal of International Law*, 21 (3) 2003: 406-407.

⁴ Baratta, Joseph. "Was the Baruch Plan a Proposal of World Government?" *The International History Review*, 7 (4) (1985): 592.

⁵ Weiss, Leonard. "Atoms for Peace." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 59 (6) 2003: 42.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁷ Baratta, p. 415.

Assembly passed a resolution 1655⁸ which encouraged the countries to reach an agreement in order to forbid further transfer and pursuit of nuclear devices between states. After Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, USA and USSR came closer to plug the way for further expansion of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, Ireland's resolution, adopted by the United Nations in 1961, became the direct pioneer of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).⁹

In 1965, the Geneva disarmament conference initiated consideration of a draft of nuclear non-proliferation accord. By 1968, Geneva conference completed its negotiations and the non-proliferation treaty was opened for signature on 1st July, 1968.¹⁰ On 5th March, 1970 the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force with 43 member states, including three out of five nuclear weapon states i.e. USSR, UK and USA.¹¹ The treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) is the basis of international non-proliferation efforts. Today, nine states possess nuclear weapons i.e. USA, UK, Russia, China, France, India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan and more than 30 states have the technical capability to rapidly acquire them.¹²

The paper outlines the key issues currently facing the non-proliferation regime. It also offers a novel perspective on how the threats to the non-proliferation regime can impact on the prospects for nuclear disarmament and to what extent nuclear renaissance presents major proliferation risks. Finally, the paper focuses on finding solutions to the nuclear non-proliferation issues.

⁸ Schiff, Benjamin. *International Nuclear Technology Transfer: Dilemmas of Dissemination and Control*. Lanham Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 1984: 27.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁰ Smith, Roger. "Explaining the Non-proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory." *International Organization*, 41 (2) (1987): 259.

¹¹ Spies, Michael. "Iran and the Limits of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime." *American University International Law Review* 22 (3) (2007): p.402.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 405.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Currently, there are a good number of non-proliferation arrangements related to WMDs that are working internationally with the objective to stop the spread of nuclear material and technology. The rules of nuclear non-proliferation regime signify those actions which are allowed as well as prohibited for member states. In the Cold War period, two super powers, United States and the Soviet Union, worked hard for the non-proliferation of nuclear technology. Major arms control and disarmament treaties, several formal and informal nuclear export control regime i.e. Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), Australia Group, Wassenaar arrangement, and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) are all part of international non-proliferation efforts.

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is an international treaty and a core component of the international non-proliferation regime. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) consists of a preamble and eleven articles that deal with the purpose to prohibit the spread of nuclear material and technology around the world.¹³ Except India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, all other states are party to the treaty. The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is unique among international arms control treaties as it identifies two classes of states: the one who manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon before January 01, 1967 were recognized as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and all other states were considered as Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS).¹⁴

Article I and II of Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty binds non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) to neither receive nor develop nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to neither assist nor transfer

¹³ Ibid., p. 407.

¹⁴ Hewitson, p. 404.

sensitive nuclear technology to NNWS.¹⁵ These two articles explicitly highlight the rule of non-proliferation as an obligation on all the member states. Article III of NPT requires non-nuclear weapon states to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear facilities. According to the article IV, Treaty will not hinder the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, especially for the developing countries.¹⁶ As per article V of NPT, each party to the treaty ensures that potential benefits from nuclear explosive services shall be provided to all member states of the treaty. According to NPT article VI, all members of the treaty will pursue negotiation in good faith for the strategic arms reduction at an early date and ultimately complete elimination of strategic weapon under strict international control.¹⁷ Article VII allows all member states to conclude regional treaties for the complete elimination of nuclear weapon from their territories.¹⁸ Article VIII deals with the procedures of amendments of the treaty and it will be reviewed after every five years.¹⁹ According to the remaining articles of NPT, the Treaty will be open to all states for signature at any time, and member states will be able to withdraw from the NPT at any time if treaty affects their supreme interest.

In sum, the NPT is based on three pillars: Non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful cooperation. Non-nuclear weapon states as of 1967 agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons. Secondly, five nuclear weapon states ((USA, USSR, UK, China and France) were agreed neither to assist nor transfer nuclear technology to non-nuclear weapon states and will move towards complete disarmament.²⁰ Third pillar of the NPT is

¹⁵ Siracusa, Joseph. "The Eight Pillars of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime and the search for Global Security." *Global policy*, (September 2012).

¹⁶ Spice., p.410.

¹⁷ Sokolski, Henry. "Reviewing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty." *Strategic Studies Institute*, (May 2010): 237-242.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.65.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., p.417.

NNWS will be able to access nuclear technology for peaceful use.²¹ The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conferences take place every five years in order to attain member state consensus on a final document on different problems pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the second essential nuclear preventive mechanism in the comprehensive non-proliferation regime. It is the implementing body of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which monitors compliance with the treaty and ensuring that non-nuclear weapons States (NNWS) do not use civilian nuclear technology for the development of nuclear weapon.²² IAEA safeguards system consists of practices and agreements that permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to gain a clear picture of a state's nuclear related activities and decide whether those activities are posing a risk of nuclear proliferation. NNWS of NPT agree to accept International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards comprehensively to their civil nuclear program for the purpose of monitoring, auditing and inspecting their peaceful energy nuclear programs within the territory of such state. Under this system, it is the responsibility of IAEA to give credible assurances that civil nuclear energy will not be used for the development of explosive nuclear devices. The IAEA safeguards system consists of safeguards agreements implemented in accordance with relevant treaties, the statute of the international atomic energy agency to the extent it is integrated into safeguard agreement, and practices of IAEA that have changed in the implementation of safeguard agreements.²³ Therefore, the success of this non-proliferation regime entirely depends on a universally applicable, verification and efficient monitoring system.

²¹ Shaker, Mohamed. "The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Origin and Implementation 1959-1979." *James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies* 2 (1980).

²² Defrancia, Cristian. "Enforcing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime: The Legality of Preventive Measures." *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 45 (2012):712.

²³ Ibid.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is the third significant mechanism of global nuclear non-proliferation regime which was founded on the sound basis of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The explosion of a nuclear device on 18 May, 1974²⁴ by India increased concern about nuclear proliferation which prompted seven major nuclear supplier states i.e. United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, France and the Federal Republic of Germany to collaborate for nuclear export controls, and also focus on the inspection of management of nuclear exports. The plutonium used in New Delhi's nuclear test was produced from reactors supplied by Canada and United States on the condition that it would be only used for peaceful civil purposes.²⁵ Consequently, Nuclear Suppliers Group was established (which was initially known as 'London Group'²⁶ because above mentioned states met with each other in London from 1975 to 1977). London Group was later officially known as Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). France's inclusion into NSG had particular significance because France was not part of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at that time. Nuclear Suppliers Group brought major nuclear supplier state France into the multilateral discussions on nuclear export with other major nuclear supplier's states. Currently, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) consists of 48 States.²⁷

NSG was developed with the aim to contribute in the global non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by implementing the two sets of guidelines for nuclear transfers and nuclear related supplies. The first set of Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines deals with exports of items that are specifically designed for nuclear use e.g. nuclear material, non-nuclear material for reactors, nuclear reactors, equipment, and technology

²⁴ Nikitin, M., Kerr, P., & Hildreth, S. "Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status." *Congressional Research Service*, (2012).

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Schmidt, Fritz. "The Zangger Committee: Its History and Future Role." *James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNG)*, (1994). Retrieved from <http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/schmid21.pdf>.

related to each of the above mentioned items.²⁸ The second set of guidelines governs the supply of nuclear related dual-use items and technologies that could be used in unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity.²⁹ The Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines are a complement to and consistent with global non-proliferation regime/treaties such as NPT, treaty of Tlatelolco, treaty of Bangkok, treaty of Rarotonga and treaty of Pelindaba.³⁰ The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines ensure that a nuclear export for civil purposes does not contribute to the production of nuclear weapons. NSG also facilitates the expansion of peaceful nuclear trade consistent with global nuclear non-proliferation norms. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) member states obligate themselves to the conditions of export and further development of the application of nuclear energy for civil purposes.³¹

The objective of NSG is to ensure that nuclear supplies are carried out with proper physical protection, safeguards and other non-proliferation conditions.³² The NSG also aims to restrict the supply of sensitive materials that can contribute to the nuclear explosive activities. In 1992, NSG developed guidelines for the export of dual-use nuclear equipment and technology which could make a considerable contribution to a nuclear explosive activity.³³ These dual-use guidelines also serve to develop a full-scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a condition for the future export of trigger list items to any NNWS.³⁴ This decision guarantees that only NPT party states

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Thranert, Oliver. "The Nuclear Suppliers Group at the Crossroads." *Centre of Security Studies*, (2013): 1.

³⁰ Ibid., p.2.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Anthony, I., Ahlstrom, C., & Fedchenko, V. *Reforming Nuclear Export Controls: What Future for the Nuclear Suppliers Group*. New York: Oxford University Press, (2007): 124.

³³ Hibbs, Mark. "The Unmaking of a Nuclear Smuggler." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 62 (6) (2013): 35-41.

³⁴ Anthony, p.125.

and other states with full scope safeguards agreements could benefit from nuclear exports.³⁵ The approval of full-scope safeguards policy at NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC)³⁶ in 1995 showed that the international society believes NSG played a vital role for the nuclear non-proliferation obligations and commitments.³⁷

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) requires International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as a requirement for provision of nuclear supply, with full scope safeguards as the norm, physical protection against stealing of sensitive items of the nuclear fuel cycle, national control laws and restraint on enrichment, a common control list, and reprocessing plant assistance to countries of proliferation concern.³⁸ The NSG Guidelines for nuclear exports, which supplier states agreed upon in 1977 and transmitted them to the international atomic energy agency Director General in January 1978, envision additional export control restraints beyond those given in NPT. These restraints forbid the utilization of nuclear exports from being used in any explosive nuclear device; oblige physical protection of nuclear³⁹ materials and facilities, uranium enrichment and heavy water production and control of re-transfer of nuclear materials. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1992 at Warsaw meeting adopted the statement on Full-Scope Safeguards which require the application of IAEA safeguards on all nuclear related sources and especially fissionable material in recipient countries present and future nuclear activities.⁴⁰ Hence, Nuclear Suppliers Group is the valid instrument of nuclear non-proliferation efforts at global level. The NSG non-proliferation regime is a voluntary association whose guidelines are

³⁵ ElBaradei, Mohamed. "Saving Ourselves from Destruction." *New York Times*, (12 February, 2004).

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Hibbs, Mark. "The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, (2011):7. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/future_nsg.pdf

³⁹ Ibid., p.9.

⁴⁰ Hibbs, p.11.

not binding on any member state nor has any formal system to enforce compliance.

The MTCR is the fourth layer of the non-proliferation regime. It is an informal and non-treaty association of countries that have an established policy of limiting the spread of missiles and missiles related technology. Efforts for the missile technology control regime were started since 1970's when the United States government became aware of the dangers created by the missile program of third world nations. Several events such as South Korea's ballistic missile test (1978), Iraq's attempt to purchase retired rocket stages from Italy in 1979 and New Delhi's SLV-3 test in 1980 particularly contributed to the United States apprehensions.⁴¹ The US concerns were met by the then President Reagan's administration which consequently, led to the development of MTCR in 1987 with the help of G7 States such as United States of America, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Canada, Japan and France.⁴² According to the guidelines, Missile Technology Control Regime's (MTCR) purpose is to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation by controlling the missiles and missile technology transfers which contribute to the development of unmanned nuclear weapon delivery systems. Eventually, the aim of MTCR was to 'limit the risk of proliferation of the delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction by controlling export that could make any contribution to delivery systems for nuclear weapons'.⁴³

Presently, thirty four states are member of MTCR including Russia. The Missile Technology Control Regimes (MTCR) members have released guidelines for the control of certain missile technologies. According to the guidelines, MTCR member states would refrain from the transfer of banned items on both voluntary and independent basis. The guidelines

⁴¹ Scheffran, J., & Karp, A. *The National Implementation of the Missile Technology Control Regime – The US and German Experience*. Amsterdam: Vu University Press, (1996):.39.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Fialka, John. "Allies to Curb Flow of Missile Technology." *Wall Street Journal*, (1987).

also summarize the essential criteria to review missile related transfer applications; for instance, nature of the recipient country's missile and space program, development of a nuclear delivery system and any appropriate multilateral treaty. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) presently supplies the central institutional arrangement with international norms for dealing with missile explosion. But now international society recognizes the proliferation of missiles and missile technology as a central security issue and the comprehensive political changes observed over the past three years demand a reassessment of the MTCR strength, weakness and capability to combat missile expansion in a new changing global order.⁴⁴

The fifth most important layer of the international non-proliferation regime is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)⁴⁵. The comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty prohibits nuclear explosions by all of its member states. CTBT was negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at Geneva and the majority of the states, party to the CD, expressed their will to support the treaty.⁴⁶ The idea for the establishment of CTBT originated in the mid 1950's when apprehension about the fallout from the nuclear test was increased. During 1958 to 1963 both the super powers of Cold War, USA and USSR leaders attempted to negotiate full ban on all the nuclear test detonations but failed to finalize the deal.⁴⁷ However, these attempts led to the establishment of Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). After three decades, negotiation for comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapon was concluded in the form of CTBT. On 24 September 1996, the treaty was

⁴⁴ Mistry, Dinshaw. *Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic technology, security regimes, and international cooperation in Arms Control*. Washington: University of Washington Press, (2003).

⁴⁵ Nikitin, Beth, Mary. "Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments." *Congressional Research Service*, (2016): 1. Retrieved from <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33548.pdf>

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.2.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.3.

opened for signatures. It is still not entering into force because entry into force requires a minimum of 44 states' ratification of the treaty.⁴⁸ The forty four countries had nuclear facilities at the time the treaty (CTBT) was negotiated and adopted. Till August 2011, 35 out of 44 states have ratified the CTBT but nine states still need to do so. These nine states are Pakistan, India, China, Democratic Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Israel and United States of America.⁴⁹

A proposed international treaty that bans the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, but has not been concluded and formalized yet is Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The then US President Clinton gave a speech in UNO in September 1993 and called for the establishment of multilateral agreement that may prohibit the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or outside global safeguards. United Nation General Assembly in December 1993 adopted a resolution 48/75L, which was related to the negotiation of a multilateral, non-discriminatory and universally effective verifiable treaty that prohibits the production of fissile material for nuclear arsenals.⁵⁰

In March 1995, Conference on Disarmament (CD), agreed on a mandate for a committee to start negotiation for the development of FMCT. Since the Conference on Disarmament requires consensus of all member states for any action to take place, negotiations for FMCT has not yet taken place; while preliminary negotiations are ongoing. FMCT was considered a natural next step on the arms control program which was negotiated after CTBT. It's also an important pillar of non-proliferation regime. Treaty like FMCT would effectively ban the future production of fissile material for explosive and restrict the number of nuclear weapons that could be manufactured. The target states of Fissile

⁴⁸ Kimball, D., & Reif, K. "Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at a Glance." *Arms Control Association*, (2013).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Mustafa, Qasim, Malik. "FMCT and Pakistan: Futuristic perspectives." *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad*, (2014): 1-2.

Material Cut-off Treaty are USA, UK, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel.⁵¹ Hence, the CTBT and FMCT are the two important components of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and provide the foundation for complete nuclear disarmament.

Achievements of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

The nuclear non-proliferation regime enhanced the peace and security of international community and strengthens the norms of nuclear non-proliferation. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the foundation of the global non-proliferation regime which includes the legal restrictions framework, export controls, safeguards and other mechanisms that assist in prevention of nuclear proliferation. Due to the efforts of the non-proliferation regime, importance of peaceful nuclear energy has grown, and international community expected to bring the civil nuclear energy benefits to the greatest number of people. During Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty existence, there have been some important nuclear non-proliferation successes. Inheritors of nuclear arsenal states Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had agreed to destroy their nuclear weapons and joined NPT after the USSR disintegration in 1990's.⁵² South African apartheid government destroyed its secretly developed nuclear weapons and joined the non-proliferation regime NPT.⁵³

South Africa is quite possibly the best example of a country choosing of its own consensus to accede to the NPT. In 1993,⁵⁴ South African President de Klerk publicly revealed the South African nuclear program. In addition to disclosing the program, de Klerk also announced the deactivation of both the program and the six warheads it had produced.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid. , p.143.

⁵³ Doyle, James. *Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Non-proliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy*. United Kingdom: Butterworth- Heinemann, (2008): 10-15.

⁵⁴ "South Africa: Nuclear Weapons Program." *Global Security Organization*. (April 28, 2005). Retrieved from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/rsa/nuke.htm>

Additionally, all nuclear facilities were made accessible for IAEA inspection and the entire program was verified as disabled prior to South Africa signing the NPT. South Africa's unilateral dismantlement of its nuclear program is a unique event in global politics, and is the only time a country has willingly revoked its nuclear arms after having developed them, and is truly the best example of the success of the NPT.⁵⁵

In late 2003, United States' invasion of Bagdad and banning the shipment of thousands of centrifuges parts, Libya agreed to destroy its hidden nuclear weapon programme unilaterally and gradually reintegrate with international society for non-proliferation purpose. Now Libya is cooperating with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to authenticate the scope of its nuclear programme and to guarantee that remaining facilities are fully secured and safeguarded.⁵⁶

Beyond these successful examples of the non-proliferation regime, many other states i.e. Japan possessed nuclear financial and technical resources from decades but yet they have refrained from acquiring nuclear arsenal. Another accomplishment of international non-proliferation regime is the successful nuclear talks with Iran for the limitation of its sensitive nuclear activities. Iran's nuclear interest and efforts had started from 1950's when Shah of Iran received technical support from USA for peaceful nuclear programme. Iran signed Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty but after Iranian revolution in 1979, Iran increased its interest in nuclear technology and covertly established a broad nuclear fuel cycle with sophisticated enrichment capacity which became a cause of concern for international community in 2002.⁵⁷ The US and UN Security Council placed sanctions on Iran from 2002 to 2015. In

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Hibbsop, p.45.

⁵⁷ Lettow, Paul. "Strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime." *The Council on Foreign Relations*, (2010):3-7.

response nuclear non-proliferation regime members P5+1⁵⁸ won a considerable success in stopping Iran's nuclear weapon program. P5+1 and Iran agreed on the Parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)⁵⁹ which significantly limits Iran's stockpile of uranium used to make reactor fuel. Iran nuclear deal also stops the nuclear arms race in the Arab World because Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt could seek to make nuclear bomb before Tehran gets a chance to.⁶⁰

It is a major breakthrough in the history of non-proliferation that contributed to creating a more positive environment. In the civil nuclear field, cooperation among states is expanding rapidly. Due to the efforts of international non-proliferation regime, several regions became the nuclear weapon free zones, which are free from the burden of nuclear arsenals. Nuclear weapon free zones include the Tlateloco treaty which covers Latin America, Pelindaba treaty covers Africa and lastly newly negotiated Central Asia Nuclear Weapon free zone treaty.⁶¹ Latin America is also the only region where all nuclear facilities are under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.⁶² Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty encouraged the USA and Russia to take considerable actions of several arms control and arms reduction programs which contribute to halt the nuclear arms race between United States and Russia, thus establishing greater stability.⁶³

⁵⁸ Kerr, Paul. "Iran's Nuclear Programme: Status." *Congressional Research Service*, (2016): 28. Retrieved from <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34544.pdf>

⁵⁹ Yadlin, Amos., & Golov, Anver. "A Nuclear Iran: The Spur to a Regional Arms Race." *Institute for National Security Studies 15* (3) (2012): 10-17.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Kerr, Paul. "Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations." *Congressional Research Service*, (23 February, 2017).

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Kimball, Daryl. "The Future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime." *Arms Control Association*, (2005). Retrieved from https://www.armscontrol.org/events/20050219_AAAS

Current Issues and Challenges for Non-Proliferation Regime

Despite the considerable accomplishments mentioned above, the nuclear non-proliferation regime such as Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system and other nuclear export control agreements, are under immense stress. The most serious problem faced by the non-proliferation regime is non-compliance with the non-proliferation rules by states seeking to make nuclear arsenals. For example, in January 2003, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) notified the UN Security Council of its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and declared that its revocation would be effective from the next day.⁶⁴ North Korea is the only case of a state withdrawing from the NPT after signing it.

Before 2003, DPRK had been covertly working on the development of nuclear arsenal for many years despite of its succession to the non-proliferation treaty. Therefore, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) efforts to acquire nuclear weapons before its effective withdrawal from NPT violated Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Article II and III.⁶⁵ Five rounds of Six Party Talks (including United States, Democratic Republic of Korea, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea) from 2003 to 2007 were aimed to halt the North Korean nuclear weapons program but failed to achieve its objective because North Korea conducted nuclear test in October 2006. Presently, the facts of DPRK breach of non-compliance of nuclear non-proliferation treaty are evident.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Melissen, Jan. "Ending the North Korea Nuclear Crisis: Six Parties, Six Perspectives." *Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'*, (2008):9-13. Retrieved from http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20081022_cdsp_korean_nuclear_crisis.pdf

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 21.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

Unfortunately, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not the only state to have violated Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Article II and Article III, and its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement.⁶⁷ But recently, the DPRK took a step back by announcing that they would temporarily halt the testing of their nuclear weapons and missile systems which can be considered as a North Korean initial move towards nuclear non-proliferation.

On the other hand, Iran also has violated these NPT obligations and has yet to discard the capacity to create fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. Therefore, Tehran remains a member party to a treaty (NPT) which poses a greater challenge to the non-proliferation regime.⁶⁸ Consequent to the public disclosure of many of its secret activities which had started in 2002, Iran was found to be in violation of IAEA Board of Governors safeguards agreement in 2003⁶⁹. In September 2005⁷⁰, Tehran was again found in breach of safeguards agreement by the Board of International Atomic Energy Agency⁷¹ and, in February 2006 its violations of safeguards agreement was reported to the United Nation Security Council. United Nation Security Council adopted a resolution 1696⁷² in July 2006 which demanded that Tehran verifiably suspend all reprocessing and enrichment activities, including research and development. This resolution also imposed sanctions on Iran.⁷³

⁶⁷ David Fischer, "The DPRK's Violation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA," *IAEA*, 1997, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/dprk.pdf>

⁶⁸ Bajoria, Jayshree., & Xu, Beina. "The Six Part Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program." *Council on Foreign Relations*, (2013). Retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-program/p13593>

⁶⁹ Goldschmidt, Pierre. "Concrete Steps to Improve the Non-proliferation Regime." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, (2010): 3-17. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/improve_nonpro_regime.pdf

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Sauer, Tom. (2006). "The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime in Crisis." *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 18 (3) (2006): 333-335.

⁷³ Albright, Dom. "Iran's Nuclear Program: Status and Uncertainties." *Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)*, (March 2007): 3-7.

The other major challenge faced by the non-proliferation regime is the emergence of non-state actors and nuclear terrorism. The non-proliferation regime must become more proficient to tackle with nuclear terrorism. Existing threats to regime from non-state actors has raised the question over the capability of non-proliferation regime to address these threats. According to Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Article VI, each state party to the treaty should refrain from transfer of sensitive nuclear material but there is no assurance that this rule can be sustained in a world where non-state actors are gradually challenging the sovereignty of the state.⁷⁴ All this contributes to the uncertainties about the nuclear attack which may be conducted by the non-state actors (terrorist). Gradually, the power of non-state actors is increasing but the non-proliferation regime has not yet developed the capacity to exercise control over non-state actors which highlights the importance of global initiatives i.e. Nuclear Security Summit. These initiative can help to build a more committed and coordinated international effort against the threat of nuclear terrorism.⁷⁵

The favouritism exercised in the application of the nuclear non-proliferation principles of Non-Proliferation Regime (NPR) as an instrument of great powers strategic and foreign policies has raised questions about the sincerity behind regime creation and successive implementation. Nuclear deal between United States and India undermined the efforts of non-proliferation as it breached NPT Articles I and II and violated its prime objective to avoid nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, New Delhi's potential inclusion in NSG, after the special waiver to India from NSG guidelines, is upsetting existing nuclear strategic stability and triggering Pakistan to indulge in a arm race in order to create credible deterrence, which pose sever challenges to the

⁷⁴ Rodhan, Nayef. "Proliferation, Non- State Actors and the Impact on Global Security." *Geneva Centre for Security Policy* (19) (2006): 5.

⁷⁵ Goldring, Natalie. "Role of the non-proliferation regime in preventing non state nuclear proliferation." *Institute of Energy and Environmental Research*, (2002). Retrieved from <http://ieer.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2002/04/npt-goldring.pdf>

international non-proliferation regime. Similarly, the state-specific safeguards present a biased institutional mechanism of the non-proliferation regime and challenges the non-proliferation activities. Above mentioned discrimination prompts the Non-Nuclear Weapon States party to the NPT to opt out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty or breach the treaty obligations and acquire nuclear weapons. New Delhi's accumulation of uranium, through agreements with NSG member states i.e. Canada, Australia, based on special waiver, is generating huge pressure on Islamabad to maintain deterrence stability of South Asia. Due to such type of decisions, states give priority to their own national interest instead of the common interest of the international community, which is the objective of non-proliferation regime.⁷⁶

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty fails to give any broad plan for disarmament of the nuclear weapon states. NPT Article VI⁷⁷ includes only the commitment that nuclear weapon states member to NPT will pursue negotiation in good faith for effective measures concerning the elimination of nuclear arms race at an early date which may ultimately lead towards nuclear disarmament. But no efforts have been done so far. Now commitments to disarmament must move further than negotiations 'in good faith'. Along with Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), significant mistrust flows from the fact that Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty prevents them from developing nuclear arsenal, despite the need that nuclear weapon states move steadily and slowly towards nuclear disarmament. Thus, survival of the treaty depends on the establishment of a comprehensive and non-biased framework. If international society had prioritized addressing the world's humanitarian crisis over obtaining deadly nuclear weapons, development of nuclear arsenal might have been brought to an end.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Pervaiz, Beenish. "Challenges and Solutions for Non-proliferation." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist*, (22 Nov, 2012). Retrieved on 20th March, 2017.

⁷⁷ Neil, Andrew. "Nuclear Weapons and Non-proliferation: Is Restraint Sustainable?" *Security Challenges* 5(4) (2009): 39-57.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

The central bargain of the NPT – that NWS would disarm if non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) assured not to acquire nuclear weapons – has been undermined due to the low progress on disarmament internationally. There are no enforcement measures and specified penalties for non-compliance given in international non-proliferation regimes. The Western countries make discriminative strategies and practice different rules according to different regions and states on their own interest which aggravate dissatisfaction among developing countries. Particularly, the United States adopts double standards. On the one hand, it prohibits other states to transfer missiles and technology by defining them sensitive regions/nations; while on the other hand, it continues to export missile technology to specific nations of the same region which fulfill the US national interest. Another issue faced by the non-proliferation regime is the lack of confidence bonds among regimes party states which is essential for the progress in nuclear arms control. International atomic energy agency safeguards depend on the political will of the member states which ensure that adequate resources are provided for the IAEA safeguards operation and to ensure that safeguards are impartially applied.⁷⁹

The current international nuclear non-proliferation regime also faces the issue of universal applicability. Some states of the international community refused to join the non-proliferation regime and still develop nuclear arsenals secretly or publically. This fault of the non-proliferation regime was exposed after the nuclear tests conducted by South Asian states India and Pakistan. Globalization makes states more economically interconnected and interdependent. Much of the nuclear transfer technology for peaceful purposes could be used for military purposes. The export control for dual-use technology is difficult to implement in practice which make non-proliferation regimes less effective.⁸⁰ Currently,

⁷⁹ Abe, Nobuyasu. “The Current Problem of the NPT: How to Strengthen the Non-proliferation Regime.” *Strategic Analysis* 34 (2) (2010): 219.

⁸⁰ Miller, Marvin., & Scheinman, Lawrence. “Israel, India and Pakistan: Engaging the Non-NPT States in the Nonproliferation Regime.” *Arms Control Association*, (2003). Retrieved from https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/MillerandScheinman

nuclear non-proliferation regime is fulfilling the interests of Western powers rather than other countries. Developing states are met with unfair treatment. Only a small number of states parties to the regimes make rules and demand that the others abide by them. Thus the effectiveness and authority of the non-proliferation regimes get reduced.⁸¹

Presently, greatest challenges to the non-proliferation regime are the existing international stockpiles of fissile material including highly enriched uranium, and plutonium. Major Powers like United States and Russia are cooperating on nuclear threat reduction program. This program secure and lock down existing global stockpiles but these efforts are inadequate to speed up the program as swiftly as the menace should dictate. In short, strengthening nuclear non-proliferation regimes promote security and peace in the world. In order to strengthen non-proliferation, practical measures should be taken to improve the non-proliferation regime in order to make them more reasonable.

The Future Prospects of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

Disarmament and universality are the two fundamental themes of the non-proliferation regime, especially the NPT. Non-proliferation regime will be strengthened and maintained in future only if these two important themes of the regime are addressed properly. Universality of non-proliferation previously focused on Israel but after nuclear test by India and Pakistan, international society expected to push universality to include Islamabad and New Delhi as well.⁸² The future status of any missile non-proliferation regime is complicated by the fact that the states that pose greatest threat to this regime are not part of any missile export

⁸¹ Perkovich, George. "The End of the Non-proliferation Regime?" *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, (2006):362. Retrieved from http://carnegieendowment.org/files/perkovich_current_history.pdf

⁸² Davis, Zachary. "Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Coping with the Best and Worst Cases." *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 6 (1995): 16.

control regime. Iran and North Korea are among such states. International community started Six Party Talks with North Korea in 2003, soon after the North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from NPT, and exerted pressure on it to limit its missile program only for peaceful use. But these talks were not successful for a long period of time and North Korea resumed its nuclear program.⁸³

NSG rules need to be strengthened and reinforced because nuclear technology transfer and nuclear black market raise questions on the long term relevance of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The future prospect of the CTBT is also uncertain because United States Senate does not ratify it. However, Japan played a significant role in promoting the CTBT by dispatch of official delegations to non-ratifying states to convince them for the ratification of the treaty.⁸⁴ Recently, Russia ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is a hopeful sign and may well convince China and USA to follow suit. Though, both Pakistan and India are still cautious about signing the CTBT.⁸⁵

Conclusion

International non-proliferation regime was established in different times to deal with different issues. The rules of nuclear non-proliferation regime are mentioned in different treaties and agreements such as Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and signify those actions which are allowed as well as prohibited for states party to the regime. It is established with the objective of prevention of nuclear

⁸³ Landau, Emily., & Bermant, Azriel. (2014). "The Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime at a Crossroads." *Institute for National Security Studies*, (2014).

⁸⁴ Davis, p.19.

⁸⁵ Duarte, Sergio. "The Future of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." *UN Chronicle XLVI* (1) (2009). Retrieved from <https://unchronicle.un.org/article/future-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty>

weapons at an early stage and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. NPT, which is a corner-stone of the non-proliferation regime, stipulates that NNWS will not seek to develop nuclear arsenals, and nuclear weapon states will work towards nuclear disarmament and all states parties to the treaty have direct access to nuclear technology for peaceful use. CTBT and FMCT are the two main instruments of non-proliferation regime that have never come into effect because of resistance of USA and other nuclear weapons states. Entry into force of these two instruments would further strengthen the non-proliferation principles and make it harder for states to acquire nuclear weapons. Globalization brought the international non-proliferation system to a moment of serious crisis. The non-proliferation regime is facing serious challenges from both non-state actors and rouge states. But international society is cooperating to handle these threats. Nuclear non-proliferation regime reinforces the generally shared rule that the expansion of nuclear weapons produce security dilemma for the states.

In spite of the lack of development in measures of arms control, the state parties to the non-proliferation regime continued to regard the NPT as serving their essential national interest. MTCR represent one component of missile non-proliferation efforts which is insufficient to deal with all missile technology transfer issues. Hence, other integrated efforts will be required to produce both consensus on and practice to deal with licit and illicit delivery system exports. These efforts should include flight test notifications and demand side curbs e.g. regional security assurances and space launch services. IAEA safeguards play a significant role in the international society's efforts to ensure that nuclear energy is used in NNWS for only peaceful use. By deterring countries from developing nuclear arsenals, safeguards have the capability to prevent proliferation. Deterrence can only be successful if countries believe that noncompliance has a high possibility of being detected and carries big consequences. Once again the dynamics of proliferation are at an important stage. After the nuclearization of South Asia, North Korea

and Iran nuclear programs increase the fear of a new wave of nuclear proliferation. International society should tackle these problems through the combination of international non-proliferation agreements as global community did after Chinese nuclear test in 1965.

Hence, the non-proliferation regime is the successful story of the history which has been attempting to keep a huge majority of states from developing the nuclear weapons through establishing rules under which a small number of states manage nuclear technology. The non-proliferation regime has been overcome by one state that acquired nuclear arsenal illegally which is North Korea. The international non-proliferation system is being challenged by another country Iran and has been bypassed by three states Israel, India and Pakistan. Future progress on nuclear non-proliferation and complete disarmament will require greater cooperation among nuclear weapon states.

BOOK REVIEWS

Nuclear Pakistan: Seeking Security and Stability

Edited by Naeem Salik (CISS, 2018, 270 pages)

Reviewed by Ahyousha Khan □

“Nuclear Pakistan: Seeking Security and Stability” illustrates the journey of Pakistan’s nuclear program, starting from its inception under the Atom for Peace project of the Eisenhower Administration to the current situation where Pakistan is labeled as a country with fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world. It explains how biasness of the International community can stop a state from achieving its inalienable right to use nuclear technology for peaceful and security purposes.

In the world, where war of narratives is strong against Pakistan’s nuclear program, counter narrative was the need of the hour. This particular book challenges western false narratives against Pakistan’s nuclear program with reasoning and logic. Moreover, it also provides the detailed account of issues nuclear Pakistan is facing and presents the rationale behind specific actions.

The book is well structured, which starts from troublesome times when Pakistan was striving to master the nuclear fuel cycle. However, the path was not easy, and technological apartheid was challenged by constant dedication, determination and motivation of Pakistan’s scientific community. Moreover, the consistent support from the Pakistani political leadership also helped the nuclear program to reach the point where it stands today, though, collective international effort to withhold essential modern technology from Pakistan was a major issue faced by our scientific community when the nuclear program was in the nascent stages.

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The book also highlights that after the Indian nuclear test of 1974, Pakistan embarked upon the decision to make nuclear weapons, which brought immense international pressure on respective political governments. The subsequent international pressure and sanctions, which created hurdles in Pakistan's attempt to acquire nuclear fuel cycle, has been discussed appropriately in the book. The book also explains how the effects of these sanctions were mitigated and how the public debate on Pakistan's prospective nuclear doctrine, and command and control systems was shaped subsequently. However, according to the book, with overt nuclearization in 1998, Pakistan suddenly faced the challenge of formulating a nuclear doctrine.

This book identifies that nuclear doctrines, whether conventional or nuclear, are not made in a vacuum; rather there are many contributing factors such as constraints of geography, the size of the population, economic potential including the availability of strategic raw materials and advanced industrial units, which effects the formulation of doctrines. It argues that Pakistan's nuclear posture/doctrine was also made under above mentioned imperatives. Due to lack of strategic depth vis-à-vis India, forward defensive posture was adopted by Pakistan to secure its politically sensitive cities and strategic communication networks.

Another theme discussed in this book is that at the very outset Pakistan nuclear doctrine was premised on the policy of minimum deterrence to deter all kind of conventional and nuclear attack. However, due to the fear of a disabling first strike, Pakistan prefixed the word credible to the minimum deterrence unlike its regional counterpart India, which meant that the size of its strategic forces would be something more than minimal.

According to authors, Nuclear Pakistan is now a reality which has adopted rational approach towards the size of its strategic forces based on its security environment and its resource scarcity. Moreover, for

Pakistan its nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence, but considering India's wish to keep the size of its minimum deterrent flexible, equivalent flexibility was also desired by Pakistan. Thus, a recent change in Pakistan's nuclear posture is because of the changes in technological and doctrinal posture of its rival. It's not just Pakistan which has set the benchmark by inducing some changes to its nuclear posture; generally, doctrines are subjected to changes in the regional security environment and states change them according to need of the time. Salik identifies two reasons behind changes in Pakistan's nuclear posture; first, development of Proactive Operations Doctrine (Cold Start Doctrine) and second, engagement of large sector of Pakistan's military on western borders to counter terrorism that resulted in thinning of Pakistani forces along eastern border with India. Author is of the view that Pakistan's doctrinal thinking has come a long way and it has become more sophisticated and nuanced. In addition, it has the capability to shift and change according to the changes in the regional security environment.

After 9/11 and the AQ Khan Incident, safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear facilities and sites became one of the most debated topics at the international political forums. However, the author explains in this book the systematic mechanisms Pakistan has developed over a span of time to regulate and supervise its nuclear facilities and nuclear program. The initiatives include formulation of National Command Authority (NCA), an integrated intelligence system, a rigorous regulatory regime, a comprehensive export control regime and active international cooperation

Moreover, this book illustrates how Pakistan, which is a small country with limited resources, has entered into the complex nuclear business and was able to build nuclear weapons without violating any of its international obligations. Moreover, Pakistan's nuclear command and control structure remains centralized, which ensures that only the top most authority should decide about the employment of nuclear weapons

during a military crisis. Thus, the claims that, after development of SRBM, Pakistan's command and control system would be decentralized are nothing but a false claim.

In the nuclear arena, treaty of Nuclear Non-Proliferation holds a significant position. But, Pakistan is not a signatory to the treaty on the basis that it is discriminatory in nature. If non-proliferation policy of Pakistan is analyzed properly, it becomes clear that it is mostly region centric. Pakistan's stance on nuclear non-proliferation changed after Indian nuclear test of 1974, when efforts to acquire nuclear capability were initiated to maintain nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis India. Later on in 1998, after overt nuclearization, the gulf between Pakistan and non-proliferation regime further widened. More recently, the waiver given to India by the NSG, further lowered down the credibility of the non-proliferation regime in the eyes of Pakistan.

Nuclear Pakistan has never shied away from making its nuclear program safe and secure. The proof of this claim is given in the book with the example that Pakistan became member of IAEA in 1957 and from than the momentum of cooperation between both the entities has been successfully sustained by Pakistan not only at political level but also at technical level. Moreover, this book tells its audience that, as a responsible nuclear state, Pakistan has put all its nuclear power plants under IAEA safeguards since their inception.

This book not only unfolds the current dynamics of nuclear Pakistan but also explores the future prospects on South Asian nuclear competition. It embarks upon the idea that in future Pakistan's nuclear arsenals will definitely grow in the short term, and though this growth will remain un-bridled but it will certainly be far less intensive than suggested in some recent western studies.

Pakistan's nuclear program has been stereotyped since its inception by the western analysts. The recent myth, that Pakistan has fastest

growing nuclear arsenals in the world, has been effectively challenged in this book. Pakistan has never officially declared its fissile material stockpiles or weapons inventory and therefore, no authentic information is available in the public domain about the size and capacity of Pakistan's nuclear fissile material production plant.

“Nuclear Pakistan: Seeking Security and Stability” provides not only an insight into Pakistan's perspective on current nuclear debates going on in the international community, it also validates the importance of nuclear weapons for Pakistan's security. It is true that this book not only challenges the existing parochial bias against Pakistan's nuclear program but also dwells upon the ongoing developing situations and past experiences in Pakistan's quest for nuclear weapons. However, it is pertinent to mention here that nuclear Pakistan should also explore the emerging new technological trends as they are one of the significant factors which could change the deterrence equation in future.

Neighbours in Arms: An American Senator's Quest for Disarmament in a Nuclear Subcontinent

Larry Pressler (Haryana: Viking-Penguin Random House, 2017, 304 pages)

Reviewed by Attiq ur Rehman [□]

The debate on South Asian nuclear politics and its significance to the United States has been revealed through another study of American foreign policy by a former US senator. It is an updated viewpoint of Larry Pressler on Indo-Pak toxic interaction in the presence of their nuclear armed capabilities. A former Republican Senator from South Dakota and a veteran of Vietnam War, Larry Pressler, served twice in the House of Representatives. His efforts for changing the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 under his suggested Amendment attached him to South Asian politics and made him a prudently agitating personality. The book written by Pressler tells the story of New Delhi-Islamabad specific armed race through his own lens. The US ex-senator, who also served as a chairman of the US Senate's Arms Control Subcommittee, attempts to provide his own perceptions on nuclear race in the subcontinent instead of providing an actual record of Washington's non-proliferation policy relevant to the subcontinent. In this way, the book is a combination of Pressler's personal life experiences and story of American sanction on South Asian states over nuclear issue.

The book is divided into thirty essays, which starts the story from a Senator's home in South Dakota and ends at the foreign policy debates on Capitol Hill. The opening chapters of the book explain Pressler's early life along with a concise history of his struggle for becoming an exceptional personality. The subsequent chapters enumerate the major foreign policy developments in the United States, which thus becomes the main theme of the book and which mainly revolves around Pressler's professional experiences. The most interesting part of the book in

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chapter-II introduces a phenomenon called Octopus. Initially, President Eisenhower, in his farewell address in 1961 (p.7), explained that the Octopus was actually military-industrial complex. This book also describes the contemporary role of Octopus in American foreign relations. According to the book, sometimes, the Octopus compels the leading foreign policy decision makers of United States to alter the American foreign relations in specific directions.

The evolution of American South Asian engagement under its broader nuclear non-proliferation campaign is another important theme of the study which is greatly fractured by author's various self-proclaimed determination for impartially shaping up Washington's foreign policy. The author in his book views Pakistan as a potential threat while India as a close friend. Such perceptions further explain the nature of historical accounts of Pak-US and Indo-US relations in the book which is based on writer's friendship with two South Asian fellows, Wasim Sajjad and Montek Singh Ahuwalia. A close interaction with both friends attracted the writer toward Pakistan and India specifically in addition to a third friend during his days at Oxford University (p.119). During his graduate degree from Oxford, he maintained close contact with Benazir Bhutto in addition to Sajjad and Ahuwalia.

After covering Vietnam War and its impact on American politics, Pressler pens down his personal experiences as a soldier from chapter twelfth to sixteenth, while the seventeenth chapter begins with the discussion on the historical Pressler Amendment. The writer's struggle to bring sanctions on Pakistan was undermined by Charlie Wilson's support for Operation Cyclone. It was Regan-Zia collaboration, which got cemented during the CIA-ISI cooperation and forced Washington to prefer the defeat of Soviet Union over curtailing of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. This dichotic reflection of American foreign policy is termed as the persuance of core national interest of Washington by Pressler. Moreover, the application of same political attributes on Pakistan is called a stigmatic factor in the book. In the end, the final chapter provides five policy recommendations which could help President Trump in improving the contemporary framework of American South Asian policy. The five suggestions of Pressler categorically ignore the undeniable realities of South Asian region where two nuclear armed

rivals share borders. Recommendations conclude the book by mainly suggesting that the Trump administration should “create a super US-India alliance” equivalent to “declare Pakistan a terrorist state.”

The book mainly carries three parallel stories which are Pressler’s personal life, Washington’s South Asian engagement, and the role of American military industrial complex in world politics. The obsession of self-righteous in Pressler’s nature forced him to provide a record of declassified government documents in support of his arguments. Moreover, the references of few books, selected newspapers and personal observations of the writer try to justify the central argument of the study. Few pages of the book contain photographic surveys of Pressler’s life instead of providing a brief overview of declassified documents referred to in the book. The writer talks more about his own ambitions and determination to prove that his political decisions and personal choices were right. The quest for appositely implementing his proposed Amendments in Foreign Assistance Act made Pressler an antagonistic personality. In this way, the analysis in the book lacks an impartial and balanced examination of US-South Asian policy. In short it is a pessimistic study which finally says “Pakistan should be treated like North Korea” in the end (p.223).

An analytical survey of the book diminishes its academic value in the presence of the writer’s emotional history of exceptionally supporting India rather than Pakistan. In contrast to Islamabad’s perception, the writer views New Delhi as a close strategic partner of Washington. While maintaining the India-Pakistan arms build-up during the last phase of Cold War, the writer becomes biased for unfavourably maligning Islamabad’s position over its nuclear program. Pressler’s love for India and aspiration to cultivate United States-India alliance shows his antipathy for Pakistan which he unambiguously narrates in the book. Therefore, this book while lacking scholarly features contains a distorted structure and an inaccurate depiction of American South Asian policy which can mislead the readers.

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is pleased to announce the publication of its next Volume of its Biannual Journal: *Security and Strategic Analyses*(JSSA), January - June 2018. *Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses* is a peer-reviewed journal focusing on contemporary issues of peace, security and strategic studies.

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- 8 British English spellings should be used.
- 9 References must be footnoted according to Chicago manual 16th edition. Please follow the link:

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