



# VISION

VISIONARY INSIGHTS INTO THE STRATEGIC INQUESTS OF NATIONS

## SVI FORESIGHT

VOLUME 2, NUMBER 4  
APRIL 2016

Compiled & Edited by:  
S. Sadia Kazmi

**Strategic Vision Institute**  
**Islamabad**

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## Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

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SVI aims to project strategic foresight on issues of national and international import through dispassionate, impartial and independent research, analyses and studies. The current spotlight of the SVI is on the national security, regional and international peace and stability, strategic studies, nuclear non- proliferation, arms control, and strategic stability, nuclear safety and security and energy studies.

## SVI Foresight

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*SVI Foresight* is a monthly electronic journal. It has a multi-disciplinary perspective highlighting on the contemporary strategic and security studies. The Journal is envisioned to be a collection of policy-oriented articles written by its Research Associates, Visiting Faculty and professional experts. The objective is to provide the readership with a concise all-round and real-time policy oriented discourse on contemporary strategic regional and international developments, highlighting their relevance to Pakistan.



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## *Editor's Note*

This electronic journal for the month of April particularly takes into account the recent developments in the nuclear field. Readers can find interesting article on one of the foremost prevailing challenges to global peace, security and stability i.e. the spread of nuclear weapons. So far the efforts that have been made to curb the spread of nuclear weapons have reinforced the impression that under the changing dynamics of global politics and regional/national security, challenges to nuclear non-proliferation are ineffectively addressed. One of the opinion articles sheds light on the evident discrimination in the implementation of Non-Proliferation regime which causes skepticism and doubts about its credibility and sincerity of its application too. Similarly another article looks at the feasibility and authenticity of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which in its absolute form has yet to come into force. The author closely scrutinizes various dimensions, aims, objectives and the hidden agendas behind the nuclear safety and security treaties. It questions the very morality of IAEA and veracity of CPPNM in the light prevailing biased policies that are only serving the vested interest of the chosen few. Another opinion article highlights the report released by US based think tank Belfer Center, which somehow establishes an unbiased narrative about Indian nuclear program being unsafe and dangerous. The writer looks at the bigger picture and tries to draw inferences about US-India strategic relationship in the light of this recent report that openly maintains that India's civilian nuclear energy project which is being expanded with help of countries like United States can create new potential pathways to the acquisition of fissile material that could be diverted for military purposes. Recently Pakistan also expressed concern over the latest Indian test of a submarine capable of firing nuclear ballistic missiles, saying the "act will impact the delicate strategic balance in the region". The test of the nuclear-propelled submarine has been stated as "serious development" resulting into "nuclearization of Indian Ocean". Readers will be able to find a unique analysis of this development also in this month's electronic journal.

Looking at the Central Asian politics, the ever growing tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan don't seem to subside any time soon. Long-simmering tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan have recently blazed again over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh issue, a region occupied by Armenian forces but surrounded and recognized internationally as part of Azerbaijan. It is time that UN launches its peace keeping activities in the area and does something to prevent and put an end to bloodshed. An in-depth analysis of the whole issue in the past and present perspective can be found in



this volume. The author rightly suggests that at the very least, the demands from both sides should have to be addressed otherwise the never ending blame game will continue in the future if the clash between Azerbaijan and Armenia is allowed to sustain.

The Iranian politics too seem to have taken an interesting turn in the wake of parliamentary elections. The ex-President Rafsanjani, who is heading the coalition is recognized as reformist within Iran and is being criticized by the hardliners who believe that he is trying to weaken the defense of the country. They are calling for strict action against the likes of Rafsanjani. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's preeminent leader, sees the predominance of Rafsanjani's school of thought in Iran as the demise of the Islamic Revolution, of which he is the gatekeeper. The author believes that fathoming the Rafsanjani issue will remain a test to the preservationist foundation for quite a long time and years to come the conflicts between the two camps will heighten considerably further

A very important development with regards to emerging propinquity between India and KSA has also been witnessed and is covered in this issue. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's maiden two-day visit to Saudi Arabia has been remarkable in terms of the treatment and honor meted out to him by the Saudi leadership. He has been bestowed with the highest civilian award by the Saudi Government. The article included in this issue looks closely at the possible reasons as to why Pakistan despite being the most trusted ally of KSA was never bestowed with such an honor. Significant takeaways for Pakistan have been identified and the future possibilities to strengthen Pak-KSA relations have been suggested by the author believing that in the evolving scenario it is important that Pakistan should take off its rose tinted glasses and stop its over reliance on the notion of "Muslim brother" vis a vis KSA. This is also not to suggest that Pakistan needs to be unnecessarily alarmed but keeping a tab and staying watchful of the unfolding dynamics while maneuvering its own foreign and diplomatic policies accordingly should be the adopted course of action by Pakistan. At the same time it is important that KSA adopts a balanced approach between India and Pakistan in order to avoid any uncalled for misunderstandings with its long trusted historic ally: Pakistan.

Pakistan has long been the victim of external infiltration and despite all the diplomatic efforts and raising voices at various international forums; the issue has never been resolved. Ever since the CPEC has started shaping up and gained pace, such activities have also been increased simultaneously. One of the articles included in this issue, exclusively looks at the sabotaging efforts by the neighboring adversary to derail the progress on CPEC. The author believes that India has always been aiming at creating law and order situation in the region. At the moment such tactics are specifically being used as

a tool to compel Chinese to vacate the Gwadar port so that they eventually lose interest in the completion of the CPEC and Gwadar projects. Author however maintains that India is trying every mean possible to make CPEC into failure and even though it even poured an initial investment of \$150 million for the development of Iranian Port of Chabahar but such strives will never undermine the significance of the Gwadar Port.

This issue also covers other important trends such as energy politics of major powers, analysis of Merkel's refugees' policy, and nontraditional threats that are constantly undermining the state security.

It is hoped that the issue will help readers in staying updated with the current political environment and will find the analyses useful. The SVI Foresight team invites and highly encourages the contributions from the security and strategic community in form of opinion based short commentaries on contemporary political, security and strategic issues. Any suggestions for further improvement are welcome at our [contact address](#). Please see [here](#) the copy of SVI Foresight electronic journal. You can find us on [Face book](#) and can also access the SVI [website](#).

Syedah Sadia Kazmi  
Senior Research Associate



## ***Nagorno-Karabakh: Recent Wave of Aggression and Continuation of Blame Game***

*Saima Ali*

Long-simmering tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan blazed again Saturday, with at least 18 Armenian and 12 Azerbaijani troops killed in fighting, according to state media reports. The aggression was centered in Nagorno-Karabakh, a region occupied by Armenian forces but surrounded and recognized internationally as part of Azerbaijan. Where it belongs has been in dispute for years, though it's been relatively rare of late for this disagreement to erupt in bloodshed. Nagorno-Karabakh, which lies inside Azerbaijan but is controlled by ethnic Armenians, has run its own affairs with heavy military and monetary backing from Armenia since a separatist war ended in 1994. But the situation along the tense "contact line" worsens in recent weeks, leading to clashes in which dozens were killed that drew international calls for an immediate ceasefire. Both sides also reported civilian fatalities.

More than two decades ago, the two former Soviet republics fought a fierce war over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Azerbaijan gained formal independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991 after initially declaring its national sovereignty in 1988. Since then, it has been locked in a territorial dispute with ethnic Armenian separatists. A six-year conflict from 1988 to 1994 saw separatists, backed by troops from Armenia, and Azerbaijani forces fight over the Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan regions in southwest Azerbaijan. In 1994, a ceasefire was reached, but by then, the separatists, who are seeking full independence from Azerbaijan, had taken control of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding provinces. What were the reasons behind this recent wave of violence, how this all started and who's to blame are the queries need to answered. However each county blamed the other for the fresh hostilities. That aggression not only started a new wave of clash along with that never ending blame game continued.

According to Azeri media an Azerbaijani Mi-24 helicopter carrying out airstrikes on Armenian military positions was shot down, and a mine blast damaged a tank. Six Armenian tanks and 15 artillery pieces were destroyed, while over "100 enemy soldiers were killed and injured. On the other hand President of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, said 18 troops were killed and 35 wounded "because of the confrontational actions made by the Azerbaijani armed forces along the entire length of contact line with the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Armenia said "the adversary" undertook "offensive actions," trying to "infiltrate deep into the defensive lines of the (Armenian army) and seize tactical positions using tanks, artillery and air force." The Armenian military "strongly condemns the hostilities and the aggressive and irresponsible decisions made by the Azerbaijani authorities," the ministry said. "Azerbaijani authorities are to be held fully accountable for the unprecedented escalation of tensions along the Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan contact line."

The Azerbaijani government, by contrast, characterized the Armenian forces as the aggressor. Hikmat Hajiyev, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, accused them of intentionally and "intensively" shelling

“settlements near the front line, where civilians closely live.” He said the Armenians “killed and injured several civilians,” in addition to firing on Azerbaijani troops, “As an aggressive country, Armenia bears responsibility for the current situation.”

The U.S. State Department condemned “in the strongest terms the large-scale ceasefire violations, resulting in a number of reported casualties, including civilians. We urge the sides to show restraint, avoid further escalation, and strictly adhere to the ceasefire,” said the statement, urging the two sides to enter into negotiations. “We reiterate that there is no military solution to the conflict.” It called for both sides to start negotiations.

A long-boiling, violent feud in Eurasia is now on pause — at least according to one of the dueling countries. Taking the initiative, Azerbaijan showing good will said on last Sunday it would cease fire Armenian-backed separatists over the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh region after two days of clashes, but the other side denounced Baku’s gesture as hollow and said violence was continuing. Armenian News Agency said Azerbaijan was still attacking with missile artillery systems.

“The statement by Azerbaijan side is an information trap and does not amount to a unilateral ceasefire,” Artsrun Hovhannisyan, spokesman for the Armenian Defence Ministry said. “As a result of the rival’s bombardment, houses, trees, as well as gas pipelines feeding the city (of Martakert) in Nagorno-Karabakh have been damaged, Armenpress reported. On the other hand Azerbaijan said it reached a unilateral ceasefire decision “to stop counter-attacks and retaliatory action against the enemy in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan” after international calls and the country’s efforts to pursue a “peaceful policy,” the news agency Azertac reported. But Azerbaijan said it will respond to any continued “provocations” with “offensive operations in order to destroy the enemy.” President Ilham Aliyev said “Armenia has violated all the norms of international law. We won’t abandon our principal position. But at the same time we will observe the ceasefire and after that we will try to solve the conflict peacefully,” Azeri troops had achieved a “great victory” in an apparent reference to territorial gains made on Saturday.

Armenian officials said, the fighting had not let up and Deputy Defence Minister David Tonoyan said his country was ready to provide “direct military assistance” to Nagorno-Karabakh forces if necessary. The Azeri Defence Ministry said earlier on Sunday it would “cease retaliatory military actions” against the separatist forces. The previous day it said the Azeri army had “liberated strategic heights and settlements” in the north and east of the region. The Nagorno-Karabakh military said Baku’s statement on a unilateral ceasefire was “disinformation” but that it was ready to discuss a ceasefire proposal from Azerbaijan on the condition both sides returned to their positions held before the clashes erupted. Such ethnic conflicts which are becoming more challenging with the passage of time need serious attempts to negotiate settlement. For solution of that conflict different talks held under Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) but failed to encourage peaceful negotiation in past. Multiple efforts over the years to reach a permanent settlement led by France, Russia and the United states have failed. Baku frequently threatens to take back the mountain region by force. It is time that UN launches its peace keeping activities in the area and do something to prevent such bloodshed. Neither Baku, nor Yerevan can afford to be seen to compromise over the issue.



At the very least, the demands from both sides should have to be addressed. Consequently the never ending blame will continue in future if the clash between Azerbaijan and Armenia expands.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/04/07/recent-wave-aggression-continuation-blame-game/>



## *Sharing of Sensitive Nuclear Information*

*Nasir Hafeez*

The Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington D.C. concluded with a joint communiqué on April 1, 2016. This communiqué touched all the important aspects of nuclear security which are desired to be given enduring priority. One of the difficult areas of the communiqué is about sharing of sensitive information by the states. It has been understood and accepted that such sharing of information should be in light of national conditions and every nation has the right to protect sensitive information. But in the same flow it also demands international cooperation in this regard. It is encouraging that the communiqué reaffirmed implementation of action plans on a voluntary basis and consistent with national laws and respective international obligations.

In this backdrop let us examine some of the implications for Pakistan. As we all know Pakistan has a very stringent and focused National Command Authority (NCA) established through NCA Act 2010 which clearly specifies its purpose and scope covering research, development, production and use of nuclear and space technologies and other related applications in various fields. It has not left any aspect or area related to nuclear and space technology uncovered. It will not be wrong if we consider NCA and its secretariat (SPD, Strategic Plans Division) as a National focal point for all matters related to nuclear and space technology. As far as sharing of information with any country or international organisation related to these two subjects, SPD exercises its ultimate authority and jurisdiction.

Sharing of information with any one, may it be friend, is a very serious business. Under normal conditions when dealing with less sensitive issues errors can be tolerated and recourse is easy, however, while dealing with nuclear issues related to national security under tense environment, nothing is pardonable. Strict control mechanisms through multilayered oversight under experienced hands are required to vet and clear text to be shared.

It is well recognised that Pakistan has been hostage to a very sensitive situation for more than a decade, after 9/11, where deliberate efforts are being made by various foreign intelligence agencies and organisations to peep inside strategic installations and seek sensitive information. New technologies and methods have been developed where information can be obtained in well protected system too. In such an advanced environment deliberate sharing of information can be problematic. It can fill in the gaps and let the picture be completed. The other side may be interested in small information which may look trivial yet may be essential from their perspective.

Total black out was a good position in the past but no longer is a practical option in increasingly interconnected world. We admire that Pakistan has adopted transparency and responsibility as its cardinal principles for dealing with nuclear program related information, but there are challenges too.

While sharing information we need to clearly define the process through which it may be decided what is to be shared and what is not, who should write the text to transmit information and

what method should be adopted to share information. We need to be extremely careful at all levels of the process, only specially trained individuals, in law and linguistics, should be asked to draft such communications. Moreover no official directly dealing with sensitive information in whatever manner should be tasked to share information. It will be highly beneficial if a joint interdepartmental group in collaboration with selected experts group should review the final text and clear it for sharing. Such mechanism should be formally approved and followed for all matters including nuclear. Afterwards the responsibility to share information with any external actor may it be a state party or international organisation should finally be Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No information what so ever may be shared with foreign governments and agencies on personal basis. A sequential record should be kept in Foreign office so as to keep abreast with the ongoing developments and build an overall big picture.

Additionally all information shared with foreign governments and organisations should be made available to own scholars and researchers through open source web based applications or other convenient methods, suiting to the sensitivity of the information. Sometimes it becomes very embarrassing when information shared by our own government, not available to our own scholars, is leaked out by the other side. There is greater need of transparency at the domestic level also so that our experts and scholars are better equipped to defend our stated national position.

I am quite sure that people at the helm of affairs are well aware of the challenges of sharing information related to our nuclear program and other related national security issues. Let us be clear that there is no fool proof system, it is through constant upgrading and improvement that we can ensure highest level of information security. In my view it is a genuine public concern and may be given highest priority without unnecessarily undermining vital national security of the country.

<http://nation.com.pk/columns/09-Apr-2016/sharing-of-sensitive-nuclear-information>



## ***Khamenie and Rafsanjani: Missiles vs. Negotiations***

### ***Sidra Khan***

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's preeminent leader, lately propelled a direct hit on Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, an ex Iranian President, who while rising from the ashes is heading a coalition comprising the conservatives mainly recognized as sober minded or pragmatics and within Iran termed as reformists.

As twitter, now-a-days, is the easiest way to send out a message, Ayatollah Rafsanjani's has tweeted "The world of tomorrow is a world of dialogue, not missiles." In light of the fact that by March 8, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) tested two long-range ballistic missiles, Rafsanjani's tweet is conveys an important message.

Iran's supreme leader was quick to respond to Rafsanjani's tweet. He thrashed Rafsanjani saying the individuals who place the nation's future in negotiations instead of rockets are "either insensible or swindlers". Many sources in Iran translated these statements of Khamenei as a declaration against Rafsanjani.

The missile tests also started mayhem among American government officials as the missiles were suspected to be capable of carrying nuclear arms.

Since the releasing of statement by Iran's supreme leader, Rafsanjani is being grilled by hardliners from every corner of the country. The Iranian hardliners state that Rafsanjani is among the leaders who are trying to weaken the defense of the country. They are calling for strict action against the likes of Rafsanjani.

Similarly, Sadeq Larijani, the leader of Iranian court and the person in line to become Iran's next supreme leader, responded to Rafsanjani on twitter saying, "The political stage ought not be open to the people who try to weaken Iranian military capacities along with its beliefs and standards."

Rafsanjani's rise in popularity is an interesting one. He completed his presidential term in 1997 as the most disliked political figure in Iran. Today, the conservatives as well as the proponents of change have assembled behind him.

Rafsanjani won over 2.3 million votes in the 26 February elections for the Assembly of Experts, the body tasked with the supervision and race of Iran's supreme leader. His votes surpassed every other candidate's, running in the month of February for either Iran's parliament or the Assembly of Experts.

Rafsanjani's underlying tweet was reconsidered, and he said that his unique explanation was wrongly interpreted. The reconsidered tweet read, "The universe of tomorrow is the universe of the talks like the Islamic Revolution's, not intercontinental ballistic rockets and nuclear weapons." He included that "we haven't had and don't have a superior pioneer than Ayatollah Khamenei."



Rafsanjani has been at odds with Iran's pioneer over the issue of having stringent controls on political and social freedoms and also Iran's relations with the West, especially the United States. He contends that connection with the US as a superpower is vital for the survival of Iran.

However, Ali Khamenei sees the predominance of Rafsanjani's school of thought in Iran as the demise of the Islamic Revolution, of which he is the gatekeeper. Rafsanjani's popularity and overwhelming votes as the leading figure in "the moderation current," as they refer to themselves, which is in fierce rivalry with the conservatives, raised serious concerns in the latter faction led by Ayatollah Khamenei.

Ayatollah Khamenei's skeptical position toward Rafsanjani fulfills the moderates, as well as quiets him and confines his intrigues. In the mean time, it prepares the preservationist camp to effectively enter the stage and go up against the control current.

Iran's supremo likewise has a message for outsiders, particularly the Americans. This message set out somewhat like this: "On the off chance that you imagine, on the grounds, that the conservatives negotiated with you, chuckled, walked, and shook hands with you, and that our approach and position toward you has transformed, you are dead off-base. What's more, on the off chance that you were imagining that the acknowledgment of the JCPOA will prompt the conservatives picking up the high ground in Iran, you better reconsider."

In any occasion, fathoming the Rafsanjani issue will remain a test to the preservationist foundation for quite a long time and years to come. It is normal that as the 2017 presidential race nears, the conflicts between the two camps will heighten considerably further.

<http://www.voiceofjournalists.com/khamenei-and-rafsanjani-missiles-vs-negotiations/>

## ***Modi's Visit to Saudi Arabia: Some Takeaways for Pakistan***

***S Sadia Kazmi***

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's maiden two-day visit to Saudi Arabia has been remarkable in terms of the treatment and honor meted out to him by the Saudi leadership. He has been bestowed with the highest civilian award by the Saudi Government. There is no denying the reality that the two states are keenly pursuing bilateral relations and have kept no secrets about making it into a strategic and economically cooperative engagement.

At the same time it is important to note that while one is Pakistan's immediate neighbor and sworn adversary, the other shares brotherly relations primarily based on ideological and religious affinities. This ideological factor has worked as an adhesive, binding the two countries not just at the state level but on the national level too, especially true in case of Pakistan where the individual's inclination / blind following and reverence towards KSA and its policies, owing to the fact that it is the guardian of the holy cities, is quite evident.

Simultaneously these relations have converged many a times on the security front where one can identify a seamless glide from ideology based closeness to strategically beneficial alliance. Interestingly enough KSA has been quite supportive of Pakistan's nuclear program in response to India's, with which it now it is exploring the cooperative strategic possibilities, publically tagging India as the "strategic partner". Pakistan also has its regular troops stationed in KSA lest there is a need for providing defense against any existential threat to KSA's sovereignty. These facts point to the reality as to how the national interests dictate state policies in the international political environment where there can be no permanent enemies or permanent friends.

Not very long ago KSA and the Gulf states had been very lukewarm rather critical of PM Modi's win in election owing to his previous bad record with the Muslims of India allowing for the genocide in Gujarat while he was the minister there. India on its part also has always been skeptical of extremist elements carrying out terrorist activities inside India, allegedly having essential financial and moral backing from the KSA. India's relations with Iran and close Pak-KSA equation also kept KSA and India to pursue a more robust cooperative relation.

While one wonders as to why despite all this PM Modi was conferred with this award, the whole episode can be seen into much larger spectrum where other bigger states may also appear on the scene. On the sly Western factor strongly seems to be at play. The US has been very vocal about strengthening India as a counterbalance to China in the region and for this purpose wants to massively invest the economic and military capital in India.

As part of its Asia Pacific policy, India serves as a pivot for the US' bigger designs, while on the other hand it is the intentional policy of the US to show India in the most positive light and give it an



international projection among the community of the states. PM Modi's visit and warm treatment he received further proves these assumptions true. US-KSA close partnership is known to all and US is not leaving any stone unturned in its efforts to having India amicably accepted and greeted as the most suitable investment destination by other states. This, quite well explains the change in the moods and disposition of KSA and Gulf states towards India as they are primarily towing the US agenda. These facts put the valid questions to rest as to why such an award by a Muslim state be given to a person who has been notorious for his anti-Muslim sentiments. His real reason to come to power that made him win major votes was his anti-Muslim rule in Gujarat and the mass massacre of Muslims there and his strong links with hard line Hindu groups.

However some personal interests can also not be ignored where KSA is aiming to wean India away from Iran and wants to continue to be the major oil exporter to India. Even though it might not be too easy a task especially after the Iranian nuclear deal which has lifted sanctions on Iranian economic activities and its subsequent re-emergence on the regional and international political scene. India cannot forego its commitment on Chahbahar with Iran at any cost even if it finds an alternative in the KSA. India also is most definitely seeking to have wider influence in the Middle Eastern region to fend for its ever growing energy appetite and hence would like to simultaneously engage with both KSA and Iran. Ultimately in a bigger picture it all boils down to war for survival and supremacy.

Pakistan despite being the most trusted ally of KSA was never bestowed with such an honor, and this is not a complaint but an effort to bring the reality into check. In the evolving scenario it is important that Pakistan should take off its rose tinted glasses and stop its over reliance on the notion of "Muslim brother" vis a vis KSA. This is also not to suggest that Pakistan needs to be unnecessarily alarmed by the growing Indo-KSA propinquity. However keeping a tab and staying watchful of the unfolding dynamics while maneuvering its own foreign and diplomatic policies accordingly should be the adopted course of action by Pakistan. At the same time it is important that KSA adopts a balanced approach between India and Pakistan in order to avoid any uncalled for misunderstandings with its long trusted historic ally: Pakistan.

<http://www.eurasiareview.com/21042016-modis-visit-to-saudi-arabia-some-takeaways-for-pakistan-oped/>



## *IAEA's Morality and CPPNM's Veracity*

*Beenish Altaf*

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN nuclear watchdog said a week ago that more than 100 countries will have to meet higher standards on the protection of nuclear facilities and materials from now onwards. For doing so, of course, the countries would have to coerce themselves with certain sets of obligations that could be in form of treaties, international bindings, either legal or self imposed. For that matter along with many others, the most recent and blazing one is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which in its absolute form has yet to enter into force.

At the outset, the CPPNM initially entered into force on February 8, 1987, and it is actually a legally binding international instrument in the area of physical protection of nuclear material. It establishes measures related to the prevention, detection and punishment of offences related to nuclear material. But on July 8, 2005, States Parties to the CPPNM adopted an Amendment to the CPPNM (a concern that refrained few countries from ratification), which expands the scope of the convention to cover nuclear facilities and nuclear material in peaceful use, storage and international as well as domestic transportation. The IAEA chief Yukiya Amano said that the amendment would help reduce the risk of a terrorist attack involving nuclear material, which could have catastrophic consequences.

Besides, recently, Nicaragua formally completed ratification of an amendment to the CPPNM. Pakistan too ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM just a few days ago; this means that enough states have ratified it for it to go into force. At large, 10 countries ratified the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM in 2016 specifically, allowing it to reach the required two thirds necessary to enter into force. Those states are: Côte d'Ivoire ratified on February 10, Paraguay on March 11, New Zealand on March 18, Pakistan on March 24, Marshall Islands and Serbia on March 30, Azerbaijan on March 31 and, last but not the least, Cameroon, Montenegro and Kuwait ratified the amendment on April 1, 2016.

The convention was adopted by 152 countries a decade ago, and it had to be ratified by two thirds of them to go into effect. The amendment, intended to guard against threats such as smuggling and sabotage, makes it legally binding for countries to protect nuclear facilities as well as the domestic use, storage and transportation of nuclear material. The United States, Russia, India, Pakistan, and former Soviet republics including Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan are among the countries that have ratified the amendment, also acknowledged by the IAEA. Iran and North Korea are out of it so far.

The provisions to which the CPPNM obligates the parties to are given as: 1)... make specific arrangements and meet defined standards of physical protection for international shipments of nuclear material for peaceful purposes (plutonium, uranium 235, uranium 233 and irradiated fuel), according to Annexes I and II and IAEA INFCIRC/225; 2)... undertake not to export or import nuclear materials or to allow their transit through their territory unless they have received assurances that these materials will

be protected during international transport in accordance with the levels of protection determined by the Convention; 3)... co-operate in the recovery and protection of stolen nuclear material, by sharing information on missing nuclear materials; 4)... criminalise specified acts, including misusing or threatening to misuse nuclear materials to harm the public; and 5)... prosecute or extradite those accused of committing such acts. States Parties undertake to include those offences as extraditable offences in every future extradition treaty to be concluded between them.

The CPPNM also presents itself for broader cooperation among countries on finding and recovering stolen or smuggled nuclear material. Likewise, it promotes international cooperation in the exchange of physical protection information. Nevertheless, a legal aspect of the convention and amendment is that only the states that have ratified it would be subject to relevant binding upon them, which actually is a matter of consternation since it has yet to be entered into force in large.

<http://dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/22-Apr-16/iaeas-morality-and-cppnms-veracity>



## ***Sabotaging the Gwadar and CPEC Project***

***Nasurullah Brohi***

The external infiltration has always been a major reason for the instability in Pakistan and despite huge diplomatic efforts and raising voices at various international forums; the issue has never been resolved. Particularly, right from the proclamation of the China's investment plans for the development of Gwadar port and CPEC projects with an announcement of \$46 billion development projects for Pakistan, the regional rogue powers never sat with ease. Since, with its immense trade potential, the Gwadar Port provides a shortest trade route and serves as a corridor between the Persian Gulf and Western China.

Notably, China provides over 80 percent of the \$248 million for the development of the Gwadar Port. The decision to invest on Gwadar Port, allows the regional states and the trade partners to benefit through a short, safe and convenient trade route that effectively passes through the South China Sea, Pacific Rim, Malacca Strait and Sri Lanka and effectively connects the entire region with the European markets.

Pakistan has always shown serious concerns over the Indian efforts to sabotage the China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor (CPEC) by possible terror attacks aimed at making the CPEC a failure. The issue of sabotaging the projects through the clandestine nexuses against the Pakistan as revealed after the recent apprehension of Indian spy Kulbhushan Yadav with a series of his confessions about the tasks and operations yet were in the pipeline to carry out in Pakistan.

Such motives do not seem merely confined with the objectives to put a single target in chaos but in fact reflect the eager pursuits of creating muddle the situations that ultimately delay the completion of the development projects particularly those underway with the friendly states and predominantly that aim at boosting Pakistani economy.

At the diplomatic fronts, ambitious efforts also try to isolate Pakistan by creating a typical sense of bitterness amidst the relations of Pakistan with its friendly states like China but fortunately, the time-tested friendship of the two countries, and the wisdom of their leaderships never let such immoral tactics to become successful. Many analysts believe, since, India considers China as a regional competitor therefore; it frequently tries overcoming the China rise that greatly diminishes the chances of Indian ambitions of becoming a regional and later on a global power.

With over 46 billion dollars investment, the project would greatly increase the political and economic influence of China in the region therefore; the Indian side always attempted through the despicable means to create law and order situation in the region. Such tactics often used as a tool to compel the Chinese to vacate the Gwadar port and eventually lose interest in the completion of the CPEC and Gwadar projects. Though India poured an initial investment of \$150 million for the



development of Iranian Port of Chah Bahar but such strives could not undermine the significance of the Gwadar Port.

Comparatively, the Gawadar port enables the regional countries to carry out the trade activities much easier access than Chah Bahar. In addition, the Port also provides landlocked Afghanistan and the Central Asian states with much cheaper opportunity than the Chah Bahar. The Gawadar Port also reduces the trade distances of regional partners from 10,000 km to 2,500 km. moreover; the regional trade partners will effectively save the cost and time as well.

However, the firmness Chinese and Pakistani government is always obvious for making the long cherished dream a resounding success. For the reasons of security and the timely completion of the CPEC project additionally with the successful functioning of the Gawadar Free Trade Zone, Pakistan has allocated a special security division of over 8, 000 military personnel. In addition, an estimated number of 90,000 security personnel comprising the paramilitary and other security services of Pakistan also vigilantly monitor and ready to curb all the Indian secret activities for sabotaging the Chinese investment plans in Pakistan.

<http://www.voiceofjournalists.com/sabotaging-the-gwadar-and-cpec-project/>

## *Iranian Nuclear Deal and Regional Concerns*

*Shahzadi Tooba Hussain Syed*

There are mixed reactions in the Gulf towards the Iranian nuclear deal. Those who support a deal – any deal – argue it would prevent the region from sliding into a destructive nuclear arms race that would deplete everybody. But others say the deal will have a number of negative consequences for the Gulf. The secretive nature of the talks made many uncomfortable about the outcome, as did the absence of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members. Wisdom has it that if you do not have enough cards on the negotiating table, you may not get everything you want, but if you are not even present, you will certainly get nothing.

In Geneva, everybody concerned was present except for the Gulf states, which would be directly impacted by any kind of agreement in their backyard. Additionally, any deal between Iran and the US would likely not be favourable to the GCC states. A compromise between negotiating parties would stipulate mutual concessions, and the question remains: Beyond the lifting of economic sanctions, what would Iran want in return for ending its nuclear programme?

The US surely does not want to see a more powerful Iranian hegemony in the region, but at the same time, it does not appear to mind some kind of Iranian influence in the region. Iran has been seeking to reclaim its previous role as the region's police. It is clear that a western recognition of Iranian regional influence would come at the expense of the Gulf states, given that they are the weakest link in the regional chain of influence. In the post-deal reality, there would be three regional powers: Iran, Turkey and Israel.

From an economic perspective, any agreement between Iran and the West would certainly lead to the lifting of sanctions on Iranian oil exports that are estimated at between one and 1.5 million barrels a day. This would further flood the already saturated oil market with cheap Iranian oil, bringing prices even further down. If this persisted, it would have adverse economic consequences on the Gulf states, which are already financially overstretched.

In light of these shifting realities, the Gulf Arab states may be wise to make a number of changes to preserve their long-term interests, including abandoning their military and security alliance with US in favor of their own joint military cooperation. The Gulf states should also build strategic partnerships with the regional powers of Pakistan and Turkey, who share the Gulf nations' fears of Iranian ambitions in the region. Finally, the Gulf states would need to improve internal GCC relations; indeed, their cooperation in the Yemen air campaign has shown that these states can not only work together on regional threats and initiate major actions, but also have the potential to become a major regional player capable of countering US-backed Iranian hegemony.

Neither Iran nor the US is interested in military confrontation and both have much to gain from an agreement. But since this deal will constitute a building block towards diplomatically resolving other regional conflicts involving Iran and the US, all sides have been negotiating with their eyes on the future.

For all forces involved, winning and losing are not etched in stone. Saudi Arabia and Israel can be either losers or winners. If they really do not want a bomb, they are winners. If they want Iran to stop being Iran – if they seek nothing less than Iran’s destruction – they will definitely lose.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/04/25/iran-nuclear-deal-regional-concerns/>



## ***Discrimination in Implementation of Non-Proliferation Regime Raises Questions over Its Sincerity and Application***

***Maimuna Ashraf***

In the contemporary international environment, one of the foremost prevailing challenges to global peace, security and stability is the spread of nuclear weapons. The international mechanism to combat nuclear proliferation is becoming increasingly 'inadequate' not only to deal with potential proliferators, which are few yet more determined, but also undermines objectives of the Articles I, II, IV and VI of the NPT. Article I of NPT prohibits each Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) party to the Treaty from transferring nuclear technology to Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS). Under Article II, each NNWS party to the treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor. Article IV talks about the right of all the parties to the Treaty to produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this treaty. Article VI calls states parties to the Treaty to pursue negotiations for cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and ultimately to nuclear disarmament. Until the 1980s, the international measures to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation were relatively more successful, but later not only India, Israel and Pakistan became de facto nuclear weapon states but the non-nuclear weapon states (Iran, North Korea, Libya and Syria) were not fully committed by the instruments of international non-proliferation regime. So far, nine states (P-5, T-3 and North Korea) have acquired nuclear weapons while more than 40 states have technological capability to acquire them.

The efforts that took place to curb the spread of nuclear weapons have reinforced the impression that under the changing dynamics of global politics and regional/national security, challenges to nuclear non-proliferation are ineffectively addressed. The NPT review conferences, which took place every five years, have often failed to achieve consensus on a final document on different issues pertaining to non-proliferation. Disagreement between NWS and NNWS on nuclear disarmament/horizontal nuclear proliferation under Article VI of the treaty, which calls upon P-5 NWS to 'pursue negotiations' for 'effective measures' within the framework of the NPT, lingers on with no consensus in sight. Similarly differences continue to persist in the interpretation and application of article IV of the NPT on peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

The institutional structure and process of the non-proliferation regime has by itself not been fairly adopted and therefore could not be successful in tackling issues like transfer of nuclear technology and fissile material from NWS to NNWS. Though Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and Nuclear Safety and Security addressed through the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) have succeeded in creating institutional frameworks to address the problems but they have yet to fully achieve their objectives.

The discrimination exercised in the implementation of the non-proliferation standards and employment of the Non-Proliferation Regime (NPR) as an instrument of great-power's foreign and strategic policies' objectives has raised questions about the sincerity behind its creation and subsequent application. The original and revived advancement of Indo-US Nuclear Deal undermines the non-proliferation efforts as it violates Articles I and II of the NPT and defies its primary objective to prevent nuclear proliferation. Moreover, India's potential inclusion in Nuclear Supply Group (NSG), after the India-specific exemption to NSG guidelines, is disturbing regional nuclear equilibrium and triggering Pakistan to indulge in a nuclear arm race to ensure credible deterrence which is posing serious challenges to nonproliferation regime. Likewise, the country-specific safeguards display a discriminatory institutional mechanism of the nonproliferation regime and undermine the nonproliferation endeavors. Moreover, India and the US last year renewed an enhanced Defense Framework Agreement for the next ten years and identified four key "pathfinder projects" for joint development and production including the next generation Raven mini UAVs and specialized kits for C-130 military transport aircraft. Both countries also agreed on a Working Group to explore aircraft carrier technology besides designing and development of jet engine technology. These developments not only raise question about discriminatory nature of Nuclear Proliferation Regime, India's speedy nuclear program but may instigate the NPT NNWS signatory states to opt out of the Treaty or violate Treaty obligations and pursue acquisition of nuclear weapons. The withdrawal clause, Article X of NPT, already accepts the rights of member states to withdraw from the treaty. India's accumulation of uranium through deals with Australia, Canada and other countries based on NSG exemption is generating immense pressure on Pakistan to maintain strategic/deterrence equilibrium against India.

The two important elements of the nonproliferation regime, CTBT and FMCT, have never come into effect which questions the status of nonproliferation efforts. Moreover, the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is another critical sidelined issue on the UN disarmament and arms control agenda. The weaponization and militarization of space undermines the security of NNWS.

In this vein, among several other factors, a decrease in nuclear weapons inventories of NWS is a critical step in maintaining Global Nuclear Order. However, the ambiguity and secrecy about defining exact number of nuclear weapons by a state, creates general uncertainty, mistrust and misunderstanding. In addition, all the nations with the nuclear weapons continue to modernize or upgrade their nuclear weapons.

Recently, North Korea claimed to detonate hydrogen bomb or thermonuclear weapon, which is far more powerful than the first three North Korea tested in 2006, 2009 and 2013. Pyongyang's latest nuclear test is taken internationally as another reminder of the seemingly intractable problem of North Korea. The country's pursuit of nuclear weapons has apparently been unstoppable. North Korea has proceeded with its weapons program despite sanctions, isolation, military threats, and attempts at engagement and reconciliation. At a time when the United States is moving toward normalizing relations with Cuba and extolling historic progress through diplomacy with Iran, U.S. relations with North Korea are increasingly anachronistic. But Pyongyang's conventional military capability, its often-convoluted relations with its neighbors and the United States, and the ambiguous examples of other states' paths to developing or abandoning nuclear weapons have made solving the North Korean



problem a complex challenge indeed. North Korea has said it is developing (all missiles) under its nuclear program for deterrence purposes only and North Korea will continue to develop these capabilities until it balances the security structure in the Korean peninsula.

No doubt, the total number of nuclear warheads in the world is on perpetual decrease; however, the constant up-gradation and modernization of nuclear arsenals by nuclear weapon states show a disorder in Global Nuclear Order generally and NPR particularly. Despite years of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation struggles, nuclear weapons remain integral to the conception of national security of nuclear weapon states. It could be inferred that global nuclear inventories would keep on increasing and modernizing unless robust, rational and unbiased non-proliferation efforts are streamlined by major nuclear power states. Otherwise states would continue spending a major junk of their budgets on nuclear weapon program in self-defense.

<http://nation.com.pk/blogs/25-Apr-2016/discrimination-in-implementation-of-non-proliferation-regime-raises-questions-over-its-sincerity>



## *Comparison of Indian Tactical Weapons*

*Saima Ali*

Pakistan keeping a large army by compulsion of its geographical location and ambitious neighbors has to strive for a balance in the military equilibrium by quality. The doctrine of Pakistan's Armed Forces seeks quality over quantity. The Armored Corps being the spearhead and the decisive force in any conflict forms an integral and important component in today's armies. Armored units are the primary force multipliers utilized by ground forces for offensive actions conducted using the fundamental elements of speed and firepower. The fundamentals of armored warfare came in on their own during the German blitz across Europe and North Africa during World War II, and were later used by the Red Army with the same devastating effect in their march towards Berlin. Pakistan Army's Armored Corps came into being with the creation of Pakistan, and inherited six regiments from the old British Indian Army. The Armored Corps is rich in tradition, with storied units still included in its order of battle. It is a proud fighting arm of the Pakistani army.

Indian Army Chief announced a new war doctrine of Indian army to eliminate Pakistan and China in matter of hours even if it has to fight on simultaneous fronts, but two weeks later outrageously admitted Indian Army's Armored debacle and expressed concern about the force's 'night blindness' in the area of Armored Corps and mechanized infantry. Indian Army's tanks have a night vision capability of 20 percent, Pakistan's have 80 percent while China has 100 percent. The lack of night vision capability of the Indian Army has affected its fighting capability during the night. The deficiency has been since the Kargil conflict. The investigations into the matter reveal that despite a numerical strength of tanks over Pakistan, Indian army otherwise armored and infantry capabilities are even below average if compared with Pakistan Army. According to these findings, Indian armored corps comprises around 3,912 tanks with a backup of 1, 133 as reserve while Pakistan Army's Tank strength is 2,220 with a backup of 270 as reserves.

However this numerical supremacy of Indian army is outraged with the fact that Indian armored corps relies mainly on its Main Battle Tank (MBT) Arjun which emerged as a big failure while Pakistan Army's armored corps' main strength has become Al-Khalid MBT which is a great success story, endorsed across the world. But the latest admission of Indian Army Chief about failure of its armored corps to fight a battle in the night time is an additional and a rather huge disadvantage to the Indian Army and crystal clearly negates the claims of Indian Army Chief regarding smooth victory in case Indian army has to fight a war with Pakistan or China or even both at the same time.

India's MBT Arjun is more flab than brawn. More of a heavyweight than a performer. A potpourri really, with a French engine, and German seals fitted into an Indian hull and turret. And transporting this heavyweight is going to be another problem, which could limit its operational performance. These findings further indicate that Arjun has indeed suffered throughout its

development, from confusion and inexplicable delays and by imbalances between the Army, the DRDO and the bureaucracy. Pakistan by contrast, has drawn a lesson from the Indian experience and avoided the trap of over lasting her R&D's indigenous know-how in the development of its MBT Al-Khalid.

Arjun mounts a 120mm rifled gun deadly in lethal power but wanting in accuracy. Its performance in various trails was reported to be anything but up to the mark. It is believed that during in March 1990, General V. N. Sharma, the then Army Chief of Staff and an armored expert, was "quite wild" when only three of the five rounds hit the 5X5 meter target and no hit was scored against a moving target.

According to Major General M. L. Popli (retd.) of the Indian Army, Arjun production was basically planned as an ambitious project with complete indigenous components and assemblies but it was later revealed that the Arjun sub-systems were all imported except for the hull and the turret. The imported assemblies include all major sub-systems such as engine, transmission, track-suspension, gun and fire control. Our experts are of the view that their integration "leaves much to be desired". The auxiliary power unit from France did not perfectly fit in the tank, with the German seals not meeting the General Staff qualitative requirements of withstanding temperatures up to 150 degree Centigrade. The barely measured up to 120 degrees. Arjun is therefore quite a "fuss" with the French engine, with German seals fitted into the Indian hull and turret mounting a not very accurate 120mm gun.

Armored experts say that another problem thrown up by the heavyweight is its transportation. Arjun could present a lot of problem for transportation by railways particularly through certain portions of the system. This imposes very serious limitations on the Arjun operational performance. In most of the field armies, the tank transporters and assault bridges are not usually designed to take such heavy weights. These aspects mostly highlight the engineering and operational problems. Global military analysts say that Pakistan adopted a step-by-step approach towards the manufacture of its MBT-2000 Khalid, and this is the single most important reason for having stolen a march over India. They are of the opinion that the Indian project was too ambitious, whereas Pakistan's approach was more systematic comprising the following phases and that was why Pakistan Army got a well prepared MBT while the Indian Armored Corps was equipped with huffing, overweight and inaccurate Tank system.

It indicates that clear technical and professional edges of Pakistan Army's Armored Corps over Indian Army's Armored Corp are valid reasons to make General Kapoor a really apprehensive Chief of Indian Army. These findings indicate that Pakistan's MBT-2000 Khalid mounts a 125mm gun with thermal image converter. Maximum efforts were devoted to getting the machine soaped up as possible mainly to cut down weight. Just compare the 60 tons Arjun with the maximum 44 tons Al-Khalid. The Al-Khalid Main Battle Tank (MBT) forms the backbone of Pakistan Army's Armored Corps. The Al-Khalid is a capable tank, and would be an adequate match for any adversary it faces in a conventional conflict.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/04/27/men-black-quality-overshadowing-quantity/>



## ***India: South Asia's Intimidating Nuclear Proliferator***

***Beenish Altaf***

Finally the West is cracking down on some authenticable integer with regards to the Indian nuclear security especially India's potential of becoming a hefty fissile material proliferator of the South Asian region. Besides the Indo-US strategic partnership aiming at mutual outcomes, there are several reports on the press and social media by the US think tanks and policy making institutions expressing similar apprehension.

A United States based think tank the Belfer Center has declared the Indian nuclear program as unsafe, saying that India's civilian nuclear energy project which is being expanded with help of countries like United States can create new potential pathways to the acquisition of fissile material that could be diverted for military purposes. The report titled *The Three Overlapping Streams of India's Nuclear Programs* is written by Kalman A Robertson and John Carlson at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of the Harvard Kennedy School. It actually identifies the problems in India's nuclear program arising from gaps in the commitments New Delhi had made after its nuclear deal with the US and in its separation plan, its Safeguards Agreements and its Additional Protocols. The relationships and overlaps between its three streams of nuclear program: civilian safeguarded, civilian unsafeguarded, and military of their civil and military programs were observed in the report are not transparent. For that reason the report is also known to be a call for a satisfactory international oversight on Indian nukes.

Perilously after acquiring enough nuclear weapons, nuclear city, aspirations for hydrogen bomb etc, India's new strategy followed by the Cold Start Doctrine is to build up and widen the production of smaller and less destructive nuclear weapons. The manufacturing of these tactical nukes are increasingly expanded because of the fissile stock India managed to acquire from Indo-US nuclear pursued by several such deals since 2009. This devastating fissile material stockpile is actually a by-product that is left open ended when it comes to the IAEA safeguards and Additional Protocol.

Likewise the report titled *Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline?*, formulated as a Project on Managing the Atom Report released by Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School access the similar kind of observations. In this one, the US officials have reportedly ranked Indian nuclear security measures as weaker than those of Pakistan and Russia, and the US experts visiting the sensitive Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in 2008 described the security arrangements there as extraordinarily low key.

In contrast to the prior scorching argumentation over Pakistan and India's NTI ranking (both theft of sabotage ranking) it is highlighted in the aforementioned report that although India has taken significant measures to protect its nuclear sites, its nuclear security measures may be weaker than those



of Pakistan. India faces significant insider corruption. It is difficult to judge whether India's nuclear security is capable of protecting against the threats it faces within itself as the information available about India's nuclear security measures is too limited in this regard.

While examining the Indian nuclear security and safety measures many such incidents have been on record, showcasing its poor record. Investigating that, Vijay Singh, a Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) head constable at the Kalpakkam Atomic Power Station in 2014, shot and killed three people with his service rifle. Although the CISF had a personnel reliability program in place, it was not able to detect Singh's deteriorating mental health, despite multiple red flags including him saying that he was about to explode like a firecracker. Despite India's evidential stockpile of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material, India also has a civilian plutonium reprocessing program in a workable practice.

Actually, India has not placed due safeguards at a 500MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, which is scheduled to achieve criticality in April 2016, and as result the nuclear plant is poised to introduce a new pathway for the production of both electricity and un-safeguarded plutonium. So it is dissected that India's nuclear program is not only unsafe but requires implementation of satisfactory international oversight mechanisms which should be taken into consideration by nuclear suppliers. Therefore, taking into account the forthcoming 2016 NSG plenary meeting in which Indian membership would be a conflagrating matter, the 'incompleteness of the separation of India's civilian and military programs should be taken into consideration when determining conditions for nuclear cooperation.' This could be effective especially now, when the US think tanks despite collaborating in areas of mutual interests, are coming up with some unbiased narratives in this regard.

<http://nation.com.pk/blogs/27-Apr-2016/india-south-asia-s-intimidating-nuclear-proliferator>

## *Nuclear Armed Submarines*

### *Maimuna Ashraf*

Pakistan lately expressed concern over the latest Indian test of a submarine capable of firing nuclear ballistic missiles, saying the “act will impact the delicate strategic balance in the region”. The test of the nuclear-propelled submarine has been stated as “serious development” resulting into “nuclearization of Indian Ocean”. In general the event is taken as worrisome development for the region and the international community. Pakistan also showed concern that the ballistic missile test conducted by the submarine was not notified to Pakistan, notwithstanding the agreement on pre-notification of test launch of ballistic missiles. In line with the agreement the test should have been notified to Pakistan as any test of missiles, whether launched on the surface or sea, can be mistaken by the other country as an offensive act.

In a world with economic and military development, as viable cooperation’s coming up, oceans are having a significant role in strategy and tactical maneuvers. The economic worth of Indian Ocean was highlighted through the exploration of oil by the Gulf States, however later the trade interests multiplied the significance and security challenges in the region. The Indian Ocean has now become a place of trilateral security competition among China, India, and Pakistan. The bilateral contention between China and India as well as India and Pakistan are intensifying the nuclear activities in the ocean.

The evolving naval nuclear dynamics in South Asia would start a new competition in the region with alarming future prospects. Both states are said to be developing their naval nuclear forces. India, the world’s largest weapon importer, has already approved \$16 billion for nuclear powered submarines and naval warships. Reportedly, India plans for developing more than 160 ship navy, 3 aircraft carriers and more than 40 warships and submarines that includes anti-submarines corvettes and stealth destroyers. India is one of the three Asian countries to maintain aircraft carriers. On other hand Pakistan has lately approved a proposal to purchase eight diesel-electric submarines. However viewing India’s naval ambitions, Pakistan will look to neutralize developments with India and it may prove an initiative for having permanent sea-based deterrent equipped with submarine launched variant of cruise missile (Hatf-7- Babur).

According to a 2013 policy brief on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, Pakistan already indicated in 2005, when the missile was first tested, that the system was designed to deploy in submarines. The Hatf-7 is a medium-range subsonic cruise missile with a reported range of 700km (430mi). However the Western experts are divided over whether Pakistan has the ability to shrink warheads enough for use with tactical or sea-launched weapons. Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear and nonproliferation scholar is skeptical over the development and stated “They may have done so, but I can’t imagine it’s very reliable.” A while back, the report “Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean” by Iskander Rehman highlighted few interesting and important points. It discusses in detail that the pursuit of sea-based nuclear strike force is the next step towards India’s quest for an assured retaliatory capability and Pakistan’s naval nuclear ambitions are fueled primarily with growing



conventional asymmetry rather than strategic imbalance between both countries. Nonetheless, an imperative issue is missing in debate that what a new command and control model will be adopted by Indian strategic forces and what challenges it would pose to the security of region.

Evidently, the pursuit of sea-based nuclear strike force is the next step towards India's quest for an assured retaliatory capability and Pakistan's naval nuclear ambitions are fueled primarily with growing conventional asymmetry rather than strategic imbalance between both countries. Nonetheless, an imperative issue is missing in debate that what new command and control model will be adopted by Indian strategic forces and what challenges it would pose to the security of region. However evidently, these two recent developments in South Asia affect three foremost components of strategic stability that includes deterrence stability, arms-race stability and crisis stability. The recent trends show that India is shaping the regional security domains and Pakistan is bound to react accordingly. Nonetheless, India's conventional superiority and nuclear advancements strongly influence Pakistan's threat perceptions and nuclear strategies, resultantly boosting the region's nuclear naval developments. This recent revelation will critically hoist the danger of accelerated nuclear naval developments in South Asia.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/04/27/nuclear-armed-submarines-menacing-murky-south-asia/>

## *Energy Politics of Major Powers*

### *Shahzadi Tooba Hussain Syed*

Energy is power (Physicists may not agree) but control of energy supplies confers enormous power on the nations that wield it. Access to oil supplies played a critical role in Germany's and Japan's military and diplomatic strategies during World War II. In 1973, the U.S. Department of Defense actually developed plans for a Rapid Deployment Force to seize Saudi Arabia's oil fields to break an embargo as a way of pressuring the kingdom. There is no doubt that diplomatic factors have sometimes played a role in Saudi oil policy. King Faisal openly employed oil as a political instrument in the form of said embargo in 1973 in an (unsuccessful) attempt to change U.S. policy toward Israel. In the 1980s, King Fahd reportedly ordered extra oil sales to pay for an arms deal with Britain.

Historically, big shifts in oil prices sometimes have significant economic, political, diplomatic and military consequences. Russian economist Yegor Gaidar has argued the collapse in oil prices in the mid-1980s was responsible for the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It occurred because the high prices of the late 1970s and early 1980s had stimulated a huge increase in non-OPEC supplies and massive fuel conservation in the advanced economies.

Over the last months the oil market has been torn between conflicting statements. Most recently, Qatar's government announced that it would host a meeting on April 17 in Doha for oil producers both inside and outside OPEC to discuss a freeze of crude production. At an earlier ministerial meeting of the "oil quartet" in Qatar last month, Saudi Arabia and Russia together with Venezuela and Qatar expressed readiness to freeze oil output at the level of January 2016.

It is widely expected that 2015 will turn out to be the last year of production growth for Russia's oil industry — the government has already admitted that production will fall this year and by 2035 it may decline at major fields by as much as 34.5 percent. The same is likely to be true for Venezuela which is on the brink of a default and which, along with Russia, is the driving force behind the "quartet". In such circumstances some of the worst affected petro-states may jump onto the bandwagon in April. They may think that it is better to present an imminent fall in production as part of a cunning geopolitical arrangement than to acknowledge that it's the result of a worsening domestic economic crisis.

But the Iran opposed it and opted to boycott entirely. One of the reasons is that Iran has already said that it plans to ramp up production, aiming to export an additional million barrels per day into global markets within six months — a move that its oil minister says is "not seeking to disrupt the market," but instead help Iran regain lost market share.

A series of diplomatic skirmishes between Tehran and Riyadh has intensified the long simmering tensions between the two heavyweights of the Persian Gulf regarding this issue. The bitter dash over regional influence and energy policy parallels with striking similarity a stretched clash between the two



rivals three decades earlier, which generated a destructive spiral of violence and economic hardship for both countries.

The current Iranian-Saudi blaze is already more dangerous than the original, as the fallout from the conflict has been felt across the region in the devastating wars in Syria and Yemen. And in contrast to the 1980s, when it was the promising Islamic Republic whose ideological imperatives frustrated efforts at de-escalation. To understand Saudi reluctance to cut production look no further than 1981-1986, the deepest oil price collapse in history. Prices dropped 3.6 times — the current decline is close to this mark but has not yet broken the historical record. The Saudi Kingdom attempted to single-handedly pull the entire world out of the price slump by cutting production to a record low.

Two major powers of the world are playing the game very wisely. Russia is behind this “Oil Freeze Proposal” at one hand and Saudi Arabia is more willing to accept it but on the other hand the lifting of the economic sanctions and trade marked the way for Iran to go ahead with the USA strength to oppose any plans of the other party. The divide is so clear.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/04/28/energy-politics-major-powers/>

## ***Chotu Gang: A Product of Weak Law and Order and Widespread Corruption, Constantly Undermining State Security***

***S Sadia Kazmi***

The recent episode of Chotu gang and Punjab Police is a harsh reminder to the state and to the whole nation about how fragile the internal security situation of Pakistan is. Not just that but also how incompetent and ill-equipped our security forces are, to effectively and in time neutralize such elements. Specifically the embarrassing display of incompetency and lack of proper planning on part of Punjab police along with the elite force, counter terrorism department (CTD) and paramilitary Pakistan Rangers Punjab in the recent debacle with the gang of dacoits, where they could not capture the relatively untrained goons. Despite being supposedly formally trained, our law enforcement agencies struggled to tackle Chotu gang which raises a lot of questions about the very credibility of security forces who are responsible to look after the internal security and law and order situation of the state.

It wasn't just the failure of the police department but also a wakeup call about the deteriorating condition of important state institutions. Despite being much bigger in number the security forces had to face aggressive resistance at the hands of gang members, who were able to kill 7-10 police officials while holding 25 of them as a hostage, and still could not retrieve their companions nor could capture the gang members after a continuous exchange of fire for 17 days.

The fact that they incurred heavy casualties in the process without achieving any success not only brought physical damages but became a source of humiliation for the police force. The gang eventually reportedly surrendered when Pakistan army was called in for the assistance. However it points to a number of weaknesses and glitches in the state infrastructure, and the dire need for the overhauling of security forces and institutions.

Zarb-e-Ahan was the sixth operation by Punjab police against this gang since 2011. It is yet another pointer to the ineptness on their part that despite concurrently confronting this gang they still couldn't work out an effective operational strategy and instead made it into a constant state of routine fight. Also after allowing it to flourish and grow from 2007 to 2011, it was only inevitable that the gang would have fortified itself sufficiently. The intentional delays and oversights are indicative of condoning the crime and hence abetting it with an only obvious outcome of compromising on state's security.

Upholding the writ of the state and not comprising on the law and order situation are no brainers but are continuously being taken for granted and seem to be at the bottom of their list of vested interests. Politicians, state authorities and security personnel all seem to be so busy in getting the maximum share of the pie that this only always leave us with one option and that is army, fortunately or unfortunately the only "functional institution" of Pakistan. This is probably the reason why it still enjoys respect of the common people and even the criminals in this particular case who reportedly surrendered because they had the respect for army and did not opt to put up a fight against them.



However it is also to be kept in mind that army is already too over stretched in various operations and should not always be taken for granted. Instead immediate institutional reforms and implementation of new governance policies is the real need of time. Law enforcement agencies should be made stronger and functional while corruption should not be tolerated at any level. Accountability procedures should be made credible by introducing strict punitive measures.

While having no sympathies for the gang leader and his members, it is still important to follow the right procedure, which would be to give them fair chance and trial in the court. As per the reports, Ghulam Rasool, the gang leader, had previously been working as a security guard for the PML-N MPA Atif Mazari for three to five years in Rohjan and also for the Punjab Police as an informer till 2007 against the criminals in Rajanpur and Muzzaffargarh districts.

It is believed that he parted ways and created his own gang because of some unknown differences with the police. However as per Ghulam Rasool's account, it was the fake cases registered against him that made him resort to criminal activities. This also points to the societal differences and class stratification which allows for the disgruntled factions of the society to resort to immoral alternatives. In the absence of any credible law and justice, it becomes the only option available to them.

Even if there were differences, he shouldn't have been allowed to carry on with his activities. A former ally should have at least been slightly easier to keep a check on. But keeping the eyes shut and letting the things happen under their nose, out of callousness and lack of will to enforce law and order, allows for such elements to grow into bigger demons, and that's exactly what happened in this case.


Either his grievances should have been addressed right there and then or he should have been disallowed from freely accumulating strength. The police department's lassitude in such matters clearly points to the corrupt practices which are so abundant that the complete overhauling from top to down is the only way out. Otherwise it could be anybody's guess that the weak law and order will keep instigating the growth of several more Ghulam Rasools and Chotu Gangs.

<http://www.voiceofjournalists.com/chotu-gang-a-product-of-weak-law-and-order-and-widespread-corruption/>


## ***Will Merkel Surrender Her Pro-Refugee Policy?***

***Sidra Khan***

The Year 2015, marked the beginning of European Refugee crisis or the migrant crisis, when a rising number of displaced people made the excursion to the European Union (EU) to look for haven, traversing the Mediterranean Sea and coming from the Southeast Europe. From the calculations made by UN high commissioner for Refugees, there are three major nationalities landing in Mediterranean, the Syrians, which constitute 49%, Afghans that are 21% and lastly the Iraqis comprising 8%. Of the evacuees and vagrants conferring to Europe via ocean in are 58% men whereas the women are 17% and the kids constitute 25%. Quantity of passing's rose adrift to record, when five vessels conveying just about 2,000 vagrants to Europe sank in the Mediterranean Sea, with a joined loss of life evaluated at more than 1,200 individuals



According to many Europeans, Europe is not capable to take in every one of the evacuees escaping the war-torn territories of Syria and Iraq, upon that the refugee crisis additionally is putting the whole structure of European Union under great jeopardy.





The binding glue of European Union: The French-German duo unvaryingly has been thought to be the motor of the EU, the decisive duo combined runs the rowdy group of 28 countries. Nevertheless, as of late, if not years, the couple has turned out to be obviously disproportionate. As of recently, Germany leads the pack on a great many crisis's starting from the euro to refugees, however, the pressing questions keeps appearing, Where is France in all this? For what reasons France not ventured up for its partner Germany, to make its voice heard, even as the refuge crisis is transforming into a bad dream and undermines Europe Unions' framework.

One of the reasons presented by French general manager, Pascale Joannin at Robert Schuman Foundation is the immense pressure projected on France by its domestic politics. As Europe has been under euro crisis since last few years, there exists unshakably high unemployment and with that a political party gaining popularity on anti-immigrants policy. In such circumstances, France is in no state of mind to present a red carpet show for the refugees that are trying to pave their way into Europe.

Nevertheless, surprisingly, German Chancellor Angela Merkel is of opposite perspective. She believes that independent measures and policies taken by the European Union to tackle the refugee's crisis are counterproductive, as EU is one big body so there should be consensus to formulate one single policy for the migrant crisis.

Tactics such as fringe log jams and shutting down the refugee course all along the Europe have recently implied that individuals are currently entering and settling in Greece, overpowering the nation's assets which is already in debts,

Since the crisis started, Markel has been collaborating with turkey in this regard, although this deal of 6 million is highly dangerous for Germany as turkey can withdraw anytime with a plausible excuse that the money was not sufficient. Markel already has faced and still is facing criticism for her policy to open Germany's door for the refugee's irrespective Germany's receding economy due to euro zone crisis. To Markel, One-sided arrangements would not help EU. Europe needs to work intimately with Turkey to stop the stream of transients, furthermore to secure its outskirts.

The local German population however is not satisfied with this decision of Markel. The exiting social order can be altered greatly as these immigrants are not accustomed to the customs and norms of a liberal society. The availability of cheap liquor and such luxuries can lead to identity crisis with many added increase in social evils. Presently those evacuees, are inciting a political reaction that mixes uneasy German recollections, and with that Chancellor needs the political simple way out from the results of her careless compassion

This specific atmosphere is imperiling the Schengen Agreement. A dominant part of French Germans and Italians require the restoration regardless of the possibility that interim of outskirt checkpoints. Situation in European Union can get as complicated as Pakistan is facing in the wake of mismanagement at Durand line. Today Pakistani society is impregnated with social evils, which are not a part of Pakistani culture but were spilled out by the mass migration of afghan population.

Within the prevailing pressure, numerous European governments have chosen to execute border controls once more. This has exhibited to European general supposition, in the expressions of Fourquet, “that the situation of disassembling Schengen, an incomprehensible situation only two years prior and was then just being called for by populist bunches, conveying with it extremely extensive political and typical results for the European values, could be gotten under way by totally mindful and respectable governments.

Open outskirts and accepting refugees do not go hand in hand with supportable livelihoods.

Europe therefore needs to decide unanimously their policy for migrants before it breaks the very framework of European Union, on which it was build.

<http://cscr.pk/geopolitics/will-merkel-surrender-pro-refugees-policy/>



## ***The Less Explored Foreign Policy Options & the Connection between TAPI-CPEC and Afghanistan***

***Nasurullah Brohi***

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Central Asian Republics (CARs), the countries with their huge economic potential have been less explored by the foreign policy and diplomatic machinery of Pakistan. Despite the fact that being located in the same region and exceptionally sharing common characteristics, the geo-political and geo-economic importance of Pakistan and CARs could naturally stimulate the two sides to reach out to each other.

Pakistan has always sustained a hope to become a gateway to the Central Asia but other than the occasional efforts, the two sides have not been so successful to forge closer political and economic relations and even after a period of three decades, Pakistan is yet to make any breakthrough into the Central Asian region. Even though their immense richness in terms of energy and other natural resources, Pakistan could not benefit at the required levels at least to address its energy issues through the bilateral relations with these countries. The gas fields of the Uzbekistan are also overlooked whereas if the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gets connected with the CPEC, the region can linkup the natural gas resources of Uzbekistan that could easily overcome Pakistan's energy crisis and would help boost the ties of the country with all the states in Central Asian region. The Central Asian region vastly rich in untapped natural resources and being landlocked-having no sailing route and sea connection with the rest of the world is actually one of the foremost drawbacks that also decreases the chances for trade and exports of resources from this region. Even though located at the immediate neighborhood, the South Asian region is colossally energy-starved.

However, together with the Gwadar Port of Pakistan and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project there is incomparable potential to spectacularly make over the regional dynamics in terms of trade and investment and the development. It would be without any exaggeration to actually call it a game changer that would of course uplift the lives of about 3 billion people across China, Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East. The Gwadar and the CPEC have outstandingly brought the strategic and economic moments in favor of Pakistan and has twisted a wide range of opportunities for the country where it has assumed the position of economic pivot for the whole region.

The Central Asian States also utter enthusiasm of a regional linkage and eagerly are desirous to benefit from the projects that will remarkably assist in connecting the Central Asian countries for trading and exporting their energy resources to the European markets. Moreover, with the advent of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the regional geopolitics has also assumed new characteristics where the region and their people are going to be better connected than ever before. Notably, during the recent visit of Turkmenistan's President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov in March 2016, the two sides keenly agreed to overcome their detachment and explore the options on enhancing trade, economic relations, energy sharing, people-to-people contacts and the tourism. The particular focus also remained

on the timely completion of the projects of extraordinary importance ranging from the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline to Dushanbe's potential linkup with the CPEC. Moreover, the unique geo-economic and geo-political significance of both sides, Pakistan and Turkmenistan decided to pay special attention to establishing air, road and rail links on a priority basis.

The greater interests of the two sides link with the TAPI and the CPEC that would further move forward to improve the regional connectivity and serve the economic activity. The emergence of the CPEC is unusually an incomparable trade route to discover the potential of the region besides; Pakistan's accession to the TIR (international road transport) convention is another surplus opportunity whereas; the TAPI could provide crucial linkage to CPEC. Nevertheless, with the initiation of the CPEC Project, the manifold options have increased the optimism about Pakistan benefitting from lucrative foreign trade and investment whereas, the Central Asian states into jumping aboard as well.

Finally, to make the long cherished dreams resounding success, the reality lies with the facts of regional peace and stability. Nevertheless, the chaotic security situation in Afghanistan is purely a factor that could seriously undermine and hinge the linkage between Pakistan and the Central Asian States. The instable political and security situation in Afghanistan has gloomy repercussions for the rest of the region and the main reason for the delay in timely execution TAPI project conceived since 1990s. Aware of its importance Pakistan considers the TAPI project a 'trailblazing project' that enables the region to become an energy hub and source of diplomatic networking but however, all possible efforts should be made to address the Afghan issue at priority basis. The region's economic development mainly depends on the fact that TAPI will only work if there is peace and stability in Afghanistan since the pipeline will pass through northeastern part of the Afghanistan.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/04/30/less-explored-foreign-policy-options-connection-tapi-cpec-afghanistan/>