Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) is an autonomous, multidisciplinary and non-partisan institution, established in January 2013. It is a non-governmental and non-commercial organization, administered by a Board of Governors (General Body) supervised under a Chairperson and administered by a Management Committee headed by a President/Executive Director.

SVI aims to project strategic foresight on issues of national and international import through dispassionate, impartial and independent research, analyses and studies. The current spotlight of the SVI is on the national security, regional and international peace and stability, strategic studies, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and strategic stability, nuclear safety and security and energy studies.

SVI Foresight

*SVI Foresight* is a monthly electronic journal. It has a multi-disciplinary perspective highlighting on the contemporary strategic and security studies. The Journal is envisioned to be a collection of policy-oriented articles written by its Research Associates, Visiting Faculty and professional experts. The objective is to provide the readership with a concise all-round and real-time policy oriented discourse on contemporary strategic regional and international developments, highlighting their relevance to Pakistan.
Contents

Editor’s Note ........................................................................................................................................... 3

India’s NSG Inclination and US’ Support
  Shahzadi Tooba .................................................................................................................................. 5

Pakistan Has As Much A Right to Nuclear Suppliers Group Membership As India – If Not More
  Maimuna Ashraf ................................................................................................................................. 7

NSG Membership: Exceptional Approach Is Risky
  Amanullah Khan .................................................................................................................................... 9

NSG Membership: New Efforts
  Beenish Altaf .......................................................................................................................................... 11

Joining the Nuclear Cartel: The Essence of NSG Elitism
  S. Sadia Kazmi ...................................................................................................................................... 13

Post Surgical Strikes Anonymity
  Saima Ali ............................................................................................................................................... 15

Terrorism in Pakistan: The Root Causes
  Amanullah Khan .................................................................................................................................... 17

Nuclear Disarmament Case and Marshall Islands
  Saima Ali ................................................................................................................................................ 20

CTBT and South Asian Considerations
  Beenish Altaf .......................................................................................................................................... 22

CPEC and The Maritime Security
  S. Sadia Kazmi ....................................................................................................................................... 24

Nuclear Energy Cooperation and Pakistan’s Nuclear Vision 2050
  Shahzadi Tooba .................................................................................................................................... 26

South Asian Nuclear Brinkmanship and Recent Tensions
  Maimuna Ashraf ..................................................................................................................................... 28
**Editor’s Note**

The fast shifting regional and global realities, the consequent responses and readjustment of relations among the states, and the re-evaluation of their policies vis-à-vis each other, warrants a close scrutiny of the national, regional and global strategic and political dynamics simultaneously. This is what the electronic journal for the month of May brings to its readers, i.e. an all inclusive and insightful anthology of opinion based short commentaries by the SVI research associates, deliberating upon a range of contemporary strategic and security issues having close relevance to Pakistan.

The membership of NSG and the politics behind US’ efforts for India’s inclusion have been highlighted in five articles included in this issue. The NSG stands compromised in the wake of all the goading by the US for India specific exemptions and concessions. This surely carries immense and incendiary strategic implications for the whole South Asian region. The case that India doesn’t qualify for the membership as it is a non-NPT signatory, doesn’t even require any evidences for it to keep out of the NSG cartel. This will be the sheer violation of the very principles of this group if India is given the membership. Ironically India is the one because of which this group was created and imposed on the states. The use of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes by India cannot be guaranteed as it has not fully separated its civilian and nuclear reactors despite the assurances given, nor are most of these reactors under the IAEA safeguards. All these credentials possessed by India and the past history, makes it the most unqualified states to be considered as the member for the NSG. A very pertinent debate criticizes India’s “apparent” quest for prestige as the “projected” reason behind its desire for inclusion. The author in the article rightly maintains that not only it will allow India to further increase its nuclear capability manifolds, but this exclusive membership will provide India with the “legitimacy” of a nuclear weapon state and bring it into the nuclear mainstream. Such a step will be discriminatory towards Pakistan and devastating for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Yet another article points out that the consensus based decision making within the group with make the chances bleak for Pakistan’s inclusion incase India is made the member before Pakistan. Hence the country based membership has lots of risks involved and should be condemned/discouraged.

The geopolitical and maritime realities have been discussed at length in another article included in this issue. This article delves deeper into the various aspects of China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor and highlights the significance of maritime security for the fool proof and smooth materialization of this
project. The author very aptly points out various sea based challenges that carry the sabotaging potential and how these could be addressed proactively.

A scholastic analysis of CTBT can be found in one of the articles included in this issue. Not only does it give a new and unique overview of the subject but also provides useful recommendations by closely scrutinizing the Indian and Pakistani perspectives.

Some other important areas covered in this issue deal with Terrorism, the truth behind India’s “alleged” surgical strikes against Pakistan. The Marshall Islands case, and Pakistan’s nuclear energy vision also make part of this issue. It is hoped that the issue will help readers in staying updated with the current political environment and will find the analyses useful. The SVI Foresight team invites and highly encourages the contributions from the security and strategic community in form of opinion based short commentaries on contemporary political, security and strategic issues. Any suggestions for further improvement are welcome at our contact address. Please see here the copy of SVI Foresight electronic journal. You can find us on Face book and can also access the SVI website. Syedah Sadia Kazmi

Senior Research Associate
India’s NSG Inclination and US’ Support

Shahzadi Tooba

Efforts to include India into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) are mainly after the US aspiration and its grand long term agenda. It is actually a part of greater design to contain China and prevent the resurgence of Russia. It is reaffirmed recently by Pakistan’s National Security Adviser Nasser Janjua. If the statement is viewed in terms of on-going global strategic power politics then to it would be right to narrate that it aimed to contain China, prevent the resurgence of Russia and keep the Muslim world in a controlled chaos.

The NSG was in fact founded in response to the Indian nuclear test back in May 1974, the 48 member NSG that seeks to reduce proliferation by controlling the export and retransfer of nuclear materials. Although, Indian nuclear tests caused the concerned nations to form this body now India too wants to join the NSG as it believes that this would lead to its recognition as a nuclear power worldwide. The United States supports India’s application. The clandestine diversion of nuclear material and equipment for the so-called Indian Peaceful Explosion of 1974 was the prime reason behind the creation of NSG, since 40 years. It is an open secret that the illicit act of breach its international agreements with Canada, i.e., diverted plutonium from the Candian-Indian Reactor, US (CIRUS) reactor provided solely for peaceful purpose, instigated South Asia region for another regional nuclear arms race.

India has been trying to get into NSG since 2008. While India is being backed by United States, Switzerland and Mexico for its membership of NSG it is being opposed by China, New Zealand, South Africa and Pakistan on the basis that a country which is a non signatory of NPT, CTBT etc should not be given the NSG membership. China is putting forward their arguments on the basis that if India is to be granted a seat in NSG, then all other South Asian countries like Pakistan which were non-signatory of NPT should be granted a seat too. Meanwhile Pakistan is opposing India’s entry merely because it doesn’t want India to possess high end technologies in the nuclear field. And Pakistan also fears that if India becomes a member it could prevent it from becoming a member just like how China is currently down voting India.

If India alone is admitted into the NSG it would have negative fallouts on the region that includes dimming of future prospects for Pakistan’s entry into the club and likely growth in India’s nuclear arsenal. For India, NSG membership could may boost its international standing as a responsible atomic power and also give it greater influence on issues related to global nuclear trade as many countries are already in line with similar kind of deals as of 2008.

The US commits to seek an agreement from the Congress to adjust US laws and policies, and that the United States will work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India. Nevertheless, if the West merely to gain their economic benefits from the Asia’s third-largest economy- India, and slots for New Delhi in the NSG club then there would be a disaster for NSG’s credibility particularly given the irony of accumulating a member whose action was the very impetus for the organization’s establishment. It would be pertinent
to say in this wake that west’s recent demands to sign CTBT, FMCT; restrain from FSD etc all is a joke without asking the country who actually was the first player in this regional race.

http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/10/03/indias-nsg-inclination-us-support/
Pakistan Has As Much A Right to Nuclear Suppliers Group Membership As India – If Not More

Maimuna Ashraf

South Asian security and strategic stability is a very relevant subject and the politics of NSG has gained immense significance in the recent few months not only in South Asia but in the international corridors of power as well. The NSG is now confronted with a very critical issue of high politics where all major powers are generating tremendous pressure favoring India’s membership into the NSG. It is ironic since it was India whose 1974 nuclear test led to the very creation of the NSG. The basic purpose of the NSG is to provide a mechanism through which the non-proliferation goal could be achieved, but in the present scenario the group members are unanimously supporting India- a proliferator- to be part of the group. This group is not a formal, institutional or governmental group but a private cartel of 48 members. Notwithstanding the question of its legitimacy, it is an important group since it deals with the dual use of nuclear technology, commercial nuclear activities and nuclear exchanges between the member states.

The NSG membership has also become a symbol of prestige which probably is one of the reasons why India is vehemently pursuing its membership. India is being supported by the US in this regard, irrespective of any principles or criteria on which the inclusion should be based. This can give India, a non-NPT nuclear state, a further recognition as a nuclear weapon state and an edge over other non-NPT nuclear states, such as Pakistan which is not being considered to be equated with India. This discrimination against Pakistan has a history and specifically goes back to the signing of India-US nuclear deal in 2008. In the last two plenary meetings of NSG, few states opposed the US’ “country-specific” stance and stressed that India should only be included on the merit basis. They took a very principled stand by stating that if the NSG has to be expanded it should be based on some criteria.

India’s partnership with the US is largely viewed as an alliance. India is seen as a pivot to Asia and Asia-Pacific and is being encouraged by the US to develop its conventional capabilities and nuclear program. For this purpose the US is providing hi-tech weapon system, aircraft carriers and other nuclear technology to India. This support is not in the best interest of Pakistan, because it undermines Pakistan’s security at the level of conventional military capabilities and also disturbs nuclear equilibrium in the region. The strategic stability of South Asia is crucial for maintenance of peace around the region because the instability between the two South Asian nuclear states may also drag the great powers into regional politics, which India and Pakistan have alignments with.

Conversely, there are many security driven reasons for Pakistan to join NSG. If India is treated as an exemption and becomes the member of the NSG, it will create instability in the region. Another reason for Pakistan is of political nature i.e. since the decision in NSG would be based on consensus where India will be the first to get membership, it will become very difficult for Pakistan to join the group at any later stage. Another reason is socio-economic; since Pakistan has ambitious plans for the
development of its nuclear energy sector, the goal which could be more easily achieved if it gets NSG membership. Yet another reason is technological; Pakistan is an advanced nuclear country which in the last few years has started producing the nuclear fuel domestically for Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) reactor. This gives a sufficient rationale for Pakistan to ask for NSG membership.

Pakistani experts believe that the country meets the criteria for NSG membership except that it is not the member of NPT. Pakistan’s credentials qualify it to become the member of NSG as Pakistan fully adheres to the requirements of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS); Pakistan possesses separate nuclear operational and nuclear regulatory authority. All NPPs of Pakistan are under IAEA safeguards whereas eight nuclear reactors of India are outside IAEA safeguards and speedily creating weapons grade uranium too. Pakistan has strong nuclear export and control measures and never has to face any issue/problem in this regard. However, Pakistan needs to realize that NSG cannot approve the same criteria for both the NPT members and non-NPT member states. Nonetheless, it will be encouraging to engage the non-NPT nuclear states in the non-proliferation regime thus it is very important for Pakistan to be active engage with countries that are skeptical about its nuclear credentials.

On the debate to separating the politics from non-proliferation regime, it should be realized that it could happen only if we were living in the perfect world but the things should be seen realistically; unfortunately the non-proliferation regime is much politicized. Due to geopolitical interests, countries whose record is far from perfect are being portrayed as countries with perfect record.

To conclude, it is in the national interest of Pakistan to become the member; Pakistan should develop criteria on its own and submit it to the other countries and should ask them for their support. It is time to work hard, because if Pakistan has a goal it should do its best to make it happen.

NSG Membership: Exceptional Approach Is Risky

Amanullah Khan

NSG politics would continue to affect power equilibrium in South Asia. This is primarily because of a lobbying group that pursues double standards in favor of India. Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG) which was created in response to the covert Indian nuclear weapons program, its mandate is being hijacked to grant membership to the same country. This is against the spirit of the NSG and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The first step to favor India was taken in 2008 when it was exempted from the comprehensive IAEA safeguards so that it could conduct civil nuclear trade with the NSG member states. This special waiver paved the way for India to ink nuclear agreements with France and America in the same year.

Pakistan is also eager to join the Group. Pakistan is facing acute energy deficiency that is imperative for its economic development. Access to advance nuclear technology with the club members would help Pakistan overcome its energy needs. Strategic stability in the region is another objective of Pakistan which is linked with Indian membership. Pakistan believes that the existing threats to non-proliferation regime should be addressed collectively through fair practices. Exceptional policies in favor of India would disturb balance of power in the region.

Regarding new membership procedure, Pakistan calls for criteria based approach instead of country specific or exceptional approach. Indian scholars are of the view that criteria based approach would not help Pakistan’s case for membership because decisions at NSG meetings are restricted to political consensus by all the Group members. They also believe that linking application for the membership to Indian one reflects lack of confidence on Pakistani part to join NSG on merit. Such kinds of psychological moves and deceptive narratives coming from India talk more of the frustration level at Indian end.

Like others international issues, US and China are major stakeholders in the NSG politics between India and Pakistan. Apparently, there is a tussle between the two on the extending membership to Pakistan and India. Washington is supporting Indian bid for membership, while China is asking for the inclusion of Pakistan—indirectly. China is keeping a close eye on western support to India because it is aware of US’ attempts to engage /contain China. Besides NSG membership, Indian Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program is a matter of concern for China. America, of course, has a big say in nuclear politics in the world. To some experts, the US government does not consider the NPT member condition as an NSG’s criteria for granting member of the Group. It contends this as a factor of consideration, but not mandatory. Instead, it emphasizes on other factors like applicant’s non-proliferation record and domestic export control mechanism.

It could be argued that some NPT and NSG members have also been involved in proliferation of nuclear technology. Their non-proliferation record is not clean and their biased policies have damaged the non-proliferation regime. Nevertheless, Pakistan understands its international nuclear obligations and has established Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) which fully cooperates with International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The international agency monitors all civil nuclear facilities of Pakistan. Domestically, Pakistan has established a robust command and control structure, National Command Authority (NCA), that ensures safety and security of the nuclear program. Regionally, Pakistan has proposed India to go for an agreement with it on nuclear non-testing. It is India which is reluctant to any such measure that could put limit on its nuclear weapons program. The above noted measures from Pakistan support the objectives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, thus make it eligible to become member of NSG.

To sum up, it could be said that in the chaotic and shaky international order, interests of stronger nations matter only. The interest-oriented tussle among major powers leads them to a biased approach in their foreign policies that ultimately put world peace at a risk. Modi’s government is putting untiring efforts to garner support for his country’s entry into the Group; however, it would not be easy for it to convince all the Group members. Political consensus can only prevail through criteria based approach. Pakistan’s entry into the Group seems a reality in such a scenario. Along with China, some other countries like, Turkey, South Africa, Ireland and Austria also support criteria based approach.

There are many influential voices who have raised questions on the exceptional approach. US Senator, Ed Markey, had warned about a possible nuclear race in South Asia if India alone is granted membership. Likewise, the NSG chairman, Ambassador Rafael Grossi, has ruled out a “tailor made India-specific solution” for NSG membership. Above all, nuclear community widely believes that exceptional approach undermines the credibility of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Pakistan should continue to effectively fight its case for membership. It deserves the right to be given membership of the Group. Regional strategic stability is already at stake due to India’s hostile agenda. Its relations with Pakistan have steadily deteriorated since Modi government came to power. His agenda talks of India as a hegemonic power in the region. NSG membership would further Indian great power ambitions. In such a situation, Pakistan reserves the right to safeguard its national security interests by whatever means possible. Pakistan should keep on attracting world attention that country-specific approach would put regional security at a risk in many ways. Instability in the region would also undermine peace in the world at large. Lastly, it should be noted that if India is granted membership ever, it would perhaps never let Pakistan become member of the Group.

http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/10/07/nsg-membership-exceptional-approach-risky/
NSG Membership: New Efforts

Beenish Altaf

There is a possibility of a special Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) plenary session in the coming months spotlighting the membership issue of the non-NPT states. Several dynamics could be weighed out in this regard: the criteria issue, the evolving global nuclear order, the south Asian strategic stability, the regional strategic environment all would have an impact on the South Asia’s nuclear future mainly. Along with this the P-5 state’s guarding behaviour and the global non-proliferation norms would also be questioned directly.

The constant NSG debate on possible inclusion of non-NPT states is gaining momentum, with some opposing the membership, while others suggesting criteria to accommodate non-NPT signatories into NSG fold. Since India and Pakistan have formally applied, India could not succeed in getting into the group in the recent plenary despite of hard efforts by few states. Unquestionably if India alone is allowed to become a member of the NSG while Pakistan remains outside, this would not only undermine global non-proliferation norms but cause countries like Pakistan to question the value of engaging with the non-proliferation regime.

Even though Pakistan wishes to be included in the NSG cartel on the basis of merit, it also wants to draw attention to the issue of discrimination in the group’s membership. India is being treated on favourable terms, with laws amended and waivers granted to accommodate it. This despite the fact that India’s diversion of nuclear material and equipment for the so-called peaceful explosion of 1974 was the prime reason behind the creation of the NSG. It was created to prevent the diversion of nuclear material from civilian trade to military purposes, with seven suppliers of advanced nuclear technology, i.e. United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Japan, West Germany, and Soviet Union, getting together to form a cartel to control nuclear technology supplied for peaceful uses. India violated its obligations with Canada, diverting plutonium from the Canadian-Indian reactor that was being run by US heavy-water, which was provided purely for peaceful purposes.

If India is brought into the NSG and Pakistan is left out, it would be another act of discrimination based on short-sighted commercial and strategic interests. India has not fulfilled its major commitments given to the United States as part of the 2005 civil nuclear deal such as working for the conclusion of the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) and separating its military and civilian reactors. Yet, it is again being considered for exceptional treatment. Contrary to its promise that it will work towards the conclusion of FMCT, India has not even considered unilateral moratorium to freeze its fissile material production. According to a recent report by the Belfer Center, India seems to have done the opposite, and expanded its fissile material production capacity. Instead of discouraging India, the United States and other major suppliers that have entered into nuclear cooperation agreements with it are pleading India’s case for NSG membership.
In view of the strong opposition from several countries, it is likely that both India and Pakistan may not be accepted into the NSG in the immediate future. However, if the United States once again coerces the NSG participating governments, as it did in 2008, Pakistan would not have any choice but to review its engagement with the international non-proliferation regime, which is increasingly becoming a tool to serve only the interests of major powers. After the India-specific NSG exemption in 2008, India reportedly began a massive expansion of its nuclear programme, including military facilities. It is believed that since civilian facilities were supplied with foreign fuel, India had the option of using its indigenous stockpiles for military purposes. This seems to have helped India’s bomb-making potential, and has disturbed regional balance. Pakistan should continue to take measures to ensure that strategic stability is maintained, without getting into an arms race.

The other option for Pakistan could be to start a diplomatic campaign to convince the NSG members of its needs and capabilities, and simultaneously highlight India’s non-adherence of the promises made as part of the nuclear deal with the United States. Pakistan should continue nuclear cooperation with China, while also focusing on economic development to attract other nuclear vendors to explore commercial benefits in the country. Last but not the least; Pakistan can wait for a more appropriate time to secure membership, while it continues to pursue a normative approach to international non-proliferation efforts.

http://pakobserver.net/nsg-membership-new-efforts/
Joining the Nuclear Cartel: The Essence of NSG Elitism

S. Sadia Kazmi

Generally speaking the functional utility, efficacy and relevance of Nuclear Supplier Group, make it imperative for states to actively pursue its membership. First and foremost it is believed to provide the member states with a receipt for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This also allows them to legally carry out nuclear trade and commerce, since in doing so the NSG members are obligated to abide by the guidelines that have been suggested by the IAEA. This particular aspect enhances the appeal of this elite group as once the member, not only these provisions can be exercised but it directly adds to the general profile of the state making it come across as a more responsible, capable, trustworthy, and dependable when it comes to the peaceful use and transfer of nuclear technology. One of the prerequisites for inclusion in is to be a signatory of the NPT. This further means that the member states voluntarily forego their right to develop, agreeing to dismantle their existing nuclear weapons, because the NSG itself commits to providing for ones' such requirements. Hence this nuclear cartel of 48 states enjoys a unique privilege where the nuclear trade is freely being done among the members but at the same time the proliferation of nuclear weapons is curbed and remained under strict control and check.

No wonder states consider it a privilege to be part of the NSG. The leverage to augment the nuclear capability and competence that one could incur through this cartel is in itself tempting enough for the states. The freedom and ease of nuclear trade and exchange of technology openly sanctions ones status as a legal entity to be receiving and sharing nuclear merchandise. Hence it opens great commercial and economic avenues for the nuclear weapon states and also satisfactorily addresses the basic concern of non nuclear weapon states to actively indulge in peaceful usage of nuclear energy. However there is a procedure involved which stipulates that only a consensual voting by all the member states would make it possible for a new state to acquire membership. Such a mechanism while on one hand promotes the coequal status of the members, it also endorses that the reservations of any kind by even a single state will not be brushed under carpet or superseded whether it is a nuclear weapon states or not, thus adding to the credibility and transparency in the functioning of this group. By principle, no country can be accommodated under the ploy of favoritism nor any preferential treatment can be extended to anyone. If maintained, this will augment and keep the NSG’s reliability and integrity intact among the states.

However this doesn’t seem to be the case in reality if one closely scrutinizes the US-India equation and US efforts to include India into the group. While on papers and in documents the guidelines of NSG validates it credibility but the biased and totally prejudiced dealing in India’s case by the US, largely undermines the very essence of its main principles. Nonetheless this appears to hardly be the US concern that is not leaving any stone unturned in its effort to make India part of this cartel. The underlying objective and motives are obviously not hidden, where in lieu of its own aspiration in Asia pacific; the US is eyeing India as the pivot to its policies in the region. This is the reason why rules have been tempered; concessions and exemptions have continuously been made in India’s case, whether it was the 2001 NSG waiver or the recent efforts for its inclusion. Despite the fact that the group itself was
created in response to India’s testing of weapons in 1970s, the very “proliferator” back then is now being considered the most “eligible” candidate is just too ironic. Not just that, but India still doesn’t fulfill the criteria to be taken onboard. The NPT still remains unsigned; the NSG waiver that was given back in 2001 was exploited to the maximum by massive uranium acquisition with 13 different states, and by also signing of a reactor contract. Since there is no efficient mechanism to keep a check whether the uranium would strictly be used for peaceful purposes, India’s vigorous acquisition of uranium raises legitimate apprehensions about its motives. India’s aspirations clearly go beyond the peaceful use of nuclear energy and are more strategic in nature. While enhancing its own regional and global standing on one hand, the NSG membership if given to India will allow it to veto Pakistan’s inclusion in the group. Hence the argument that both Pakistan and India should be given simultaneous membership holds a lot of ground. Or on the other hand a uniform, merit based criteria instead of a country specific one should be followed not just to appease the apprehensions of Pakistan but in order to avoid damaging the credibility and trust in the NSG. Even though not a binding on the states but the elitism of NSG will not be bothersome if an unbiased, impartial and neutral approach is adopted by the member countries, otherwise it will lose its very purpose of existence, specifically in case of South Asian region where the chances of arms race and proliferation would increase manifold if the country specific criteria is implemented.

http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/10/12/comment/joining-the-nuclear-cartel/
Post Surgical Strikes Anonymity

Saima Ali

Remember what Sun Tzu has said in his book entitled “The Art of War”. It begins thus: “All wars are based on deception. “Last month the Indian DGMO, Lt Gen Ranbir Singh proclaimed that the Indian Army performed a ‘surgical strike’ on ‘Terrorist launch pads’ in Pakistan next to the Line of Control (LoC). The statement was met with joyousness all across India as it was taken at face value and general public in India felt that Pakistan was given a relevant response after its so-called connection in Uri attack. As the term surgical implies, it is a defined military attack on just a legitimate military target. It is usually conducted by air and Special Forces. The idea is to only engage a military installation with surprise and an element of secrecy. Such strikes are usually carried out to remove particular targets and for this reason require a perfect Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ISR).The case on the Line of Control; attacks are usually loud with massive fire support. A silent night attack does not go well with the deployment and defense patterns along the heavily fenced LoC. Hence, contact with the Pakistani troops should have been specific. Pakistan, rejecting ‘baseless’ Indian claims that it carried out surgical strikes in Pakistan, condemned unprovoked ceasefire violations across the LoC.

Although Indian Army did not endow with the details of the operations and hence many military minds questions remained unanswered. The Pakistani military denied the occurrence of such an attack and with video confirmation showed that Indian shelling was countered successfully. Immediately the news came out, many military question needs authenticity. This is so because the ground situations did not match with the notion of surgical strike taught in various military establishments globally. India cannot afford a war with Pakistan. It fully understands the implications of this an endeavour on its development. India should not try to push the limit too far as if the Modi govt opts for a military response, it will be neglecting the wisdom of past Indian Prime Ministers, who recognized the costs of a risky, destabilizing crisis dwarf the scant political, reputational, and coercive effects.

Another important aspect is that Indian media is again creating hype. At the moment, India is refusing to back off and uses the power of their media to spread lies about Pakistan and hence manipulating the state of affairs even more. Their media has already spread lies about the alleged surgical strike that never took place, causing a state of confusion, even embarrassment to India. The Indian affiliate of CNN, recently carried an interview with SP Ghulam, making up a story about a Pakistani police officer ‘confirming’ that surgical strikes took place. After the release, SP Ghulam firmly denied speaking to any Indian journalist. He also expressed his anger over his fake voice making rounds in Indian media. Indian Media has no credibility whatsoever but a Propaganda arm for Indian Government is shameful indeed. No doubt, India is mostly on the wrong side of the truth or humanity but they keep lying for the sake for national interest no matter how immoral their actions.

BBC reporters on both sides of the border check with the locals and they not aware of any military incursion. So if there is an indication of troop incursion, you should provide the evidence to the
public. A senior police officer on the Indian side told BBC reporter that there was heavy artillery fire from the Indian side on Pakistani posts but Indian army did not cross LOC. It all depends on what is the definition of a surgical strike? May be Indian army’s definition is destroying the military posts with long range artillery fire. Modi in a public rally in Lucknow few days ago did not make any reference to the surgical strike.

It would not be wrong to say that LoC is certainly not the place to carry out a classical surgical attack. Since even the legitimate targets were not attacked, the claims by Lt Gen Ranbir are not based on military realities of the Line of Control rather they are based on deception. The UN, in a latest statement, also alluded to a dichotomy between the term used and the situation on ground. Just like any other citizen, we must stand by our country and soldiers but will definitely use our conscience before believing anything on what politicians say.

http://pakobserver.net/post-surgical-strikes-anonymity/
Every terrorist incident in Pakistan strengthens my belief that root cause of terrorism in the country is external. The father of the nation, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, truly said that no power on earth can undo Pakistan; however, he did not say that no power can hurt Pakistan. It is equally true that mere existence of Pakistan is not acceptable to many countries in the world. These ‘rogue states’ worked together in the disintegration of Pakistan (East Pakistan) and the same forces are active since ‘9/11’ to destroy Pakistan from within.

Internally, hostile forces have worked hard to deprive the nation from the spiritual power of dignity. These forces have applied multiple subversive methods to achieve this goal. The important among such strategies is the political and economic systems that are mainly responsible for all of the evils. When a nation loses the way to live with dignity, loses everything at last. This is a universal principle and in line with the teachings of Islam also. Allah in Quran says, “Allah will never change the condition of the people until they change it themselves.” Surah Ar Raad, part of Ayaat 11.

Pakistani nation has lost its cause to live like a nation. Two times Roti (meal) is the prime goal of life for majority (poor class) in the country, and add two more to it, kapra and makan (cloth and a house), is the mindset and life style of the middle class. Making money is the practice of the rich, and ruling the country is the right of the 1% elites. In such a scenario, everyone is busy to grab an opportunity. State machinery is out of work, institutions are serving privileged class in the power corridors, and thus performance of the institutions is next to nil. National assets are being sold/privatized, money is borrowed in trillions of dollars, and a new wave of unregulated capitalism has emerged that is exploding the nation like a bomb.

Other than that, enemies have deployed their assets across the country at different stations, in different forms and at different levels. These include people in politics, media, academia, judiciary, religious circles and in the civil society organizations at large. These people are more dangerous than the bullets fired from an enemy’s guns. We may call them mouthpieces who are on the mission relating to subversion—changing the national narrative and mindset that suits their masters.

The only national institution working efficiently to defend the nation and the state is Pakistan armed forces (Army, Navy, Air Force). The nation acknowledges their sacrifices at both peace and war times. However, the emerging security challenges are grave and complex in nature, and in different spheres and domains of the society that seem beyond the capacity of army alone to cope with them effectively. In the strategic terminologies, these security challenges are collectively termed as fourth and fifth generation warfare.

There is dire need for a fundamental change in the political system of the country. Structures of political, economic, judicial, education, and social systems have got corrupted that should be revised. The political system requires a major surgery at first place because leadership, whether honest or
corrupt, emerge through a political system. Surgery of system will bring about change in the mindset of political leaders which will automatically lead to rigorous revision of Pakistan’s internal and external policies.

Here are some policy recommendations that would certainly serve the purpose if implemented in letter and spirit: first, there is an urgent need for Turkey like purge all over the country. Turkey realized this reality after the coup and started a purge campaign to brought traitors into justice. Secondly, Pakistan must learn to deal effectively with ‘rogue states’—India and a few more—by applying tit-for-tat policy. Thirdly, Pakistan should learn to engage Afghanistan and the US the way Iran is doing. Fourthly, time has come to fight enemies assets beyond our own borders, same as Iran, Turkey, US, India and Russia are fighting. And finally, death penalties to all hard terrorists be given at public places which is in accordance with the teachings of Islam.

Unfortunately, National Action Plan (NAP) does not maintain any of the above noted points. It also does not address the real—external—source of terrorism. Like 3D policy (Deterrence, Development and Dialogue) of the previous Peoples Party government, NAP is also not a promising policy which does not touch upon the root causes of terrorism in the country. It mostly addresses internal sources of terrorism with implementation on the part of Army only which resulted into temporary peace in the country.

Time has come that we say enough is enough to all enemies inside and outside the country. Condemning every terrorist incident is not going to be productive. Similarly, providing evidences to the stooge Afghan government, disinterested America, compromised UN, and biased international community is not a result-oriented policy option. International system is so chaotic and anarchic that one cannot rely on these so-called international entities. Self-reliance is the best approach. Offence beyond borders would work definitely. Internally, terrorists, facilitators, and traitors should be hanged in open space along with the arrested Indian spy, Kulbhushan Yadav.

In sum up, Pakistan needs a competent, honest, courageous and visionary leadership who could restore national cause, and perform well to all challenges and threats, at home and from abroad. A kind of controlled revolution can bring about such fundamental changes. The core question yet remains; who will dare doing all this. I personally do not see any chances in the foreseeable future, although people have strong desire for a revolution—survey reports confirm. However, there could be some scenarios that may alter whole course of history and relieve Pakistan from the menace of terrorism forever: First, a controlled revolution with military support in order to establish a technocratic government; second, a miracle in the shape of a war between big powers in which India suffers (this happened during World War-II in which an arrogant Japan was defeated and Chinese were relieved from its atrocities), and finally, Almighty Allah can bring up an honest, competent, and a brave leader within the existing system of democracy who could introduce revolutionary policies and practices in the best interest of the country and the nation. There are many such examples in the political history of countries (Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey).
The bottom line is that we should give up the unworkable policy of, jeo aur jeene do (live and let us live), situation demands we must send a clear message to these ‘rogue states’ especially India that, jeena hai to jeene do (let us live if you have to live).

http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/10/26/terrorism-pakistan-root-causes/
**Nuclear Disarmament Case and Marshall Islands**

*Saima Ali*

The Marshall Islands turned into a member of the United Nations in September 1991. The Marshall Islands upholds embassies in the United States, Fiji, the Philippines, Japan, and the Republic of China (Taiwan). They also maintain consulate in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. Marshall Island pursued a lawsuit against the main player U.S. who carried out 67 nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands between 1946 and 1958. The Marshall Islands is appealing to the US Supreme Court after its case against the country was dismissed by a US federal court last year. U.S. nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands has deeply affected the country’s sensitivity toward the issue of nuclear weapons.

Marshall Island nuclear disarmament case against India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, was dismissed by United Nations Highest court earlier this month. A bench of 16-judge at the international court of justice (ICJ) ruled there was no proof that the islands’ administration had a previous conflict with any of above mentioned nuclear powers or had sought cooperation on the issue.

Marshall Islands filed case against nine nuclear weapon states at the ICJ China, North Korea, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States accusing them of insufficiently “fulfilling their obligations with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”

Earlier in March hearing the Marshalls’ lawyers painted a bright picture of the dreadfulness caused by 67 nuclear tests, notably on the atolls of Bikini and Enewetak. A former foreign minister Tony deBrum told the bench in that session, “Several islands in my country were vaporized and others are estimated to remain uninhabitable for thousands of years,” According to him “Moreover, the NPT itself is not a light switch to be turned on and off at convenience — States must be held to full accountability for violations of the Treaty or in abusing withdrawal provisions — a matter of concern for every nation, and the wider global community that defines us all.”

But the ICJ already failed to take up cases against the other countries — China, France, Israel, North Korea, Russia and the United States — as they have not recognized the court’s jurisdiction. Israel has also never formally admitted to having nuclear weapons. The Marshall Islands has maintained that by not stopping the nuclear arms race Britain, India and Pakistan continued to breach their obligations under the treaty — even if New Delhi and Islamabad have not signed the pact. The treaty commits all nuclear weapon states “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. Majuro is calling for nuclear powers to take “all necessary measures” to carry out what it considers to be their obligations under the treaty. Critics have argued however that the ICJ action is a distraction and that the islanders’ real fight is with Washington, which carried out the tests in their backyard.
They contend that the case has no relation to the victims’ claims for increased compensation, better health care and clean-ups to render the sites habitable again. Experts however say the islands hoped the three cases before the ICJ will thrust nuclear disarmament talks, which have stalled over the past two decades, back into the spotlight. Even if the case has no direct impact, the Marshall Islands’ residents “perhaps feel that the more the difficulties with nuclear weapons are brought to the public consciousness, the better,” said Jens Iverson, assistant professor of Public International Law at Leiden University.

The case is far from a loss for the cause of nuclear disarmament championed by the Marshall Islands. Even while it did not decide to proceed with a consideration of the merits put forward by the Marshall Islands, the ICJ’s ruling reaffirms a non-binding 1996 advisory opinion on nuclear weapons, which found that states ought “to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” Of course, this will stand as a declaratory statement of international law without any enforcement mechanisms, but can ostensibly serve to strengthen the global taboo against nuclear weapons use.

CTBT and South Asian Considerations

Beenish Altaf

“The small step of signing the CTBT would be important in building confidence in the region and creating international momentum behind the Treaty.” — Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary, CTBTO

To bring the vision of CTBT into reality the first and foremost step should be its ratification by the US itself. Therefore, the US itself needs to ratify the treaty first as this would be the chief encouraging step for the rest seven states stagnant on the ratification of the CTBT.

It’s been long; back in 1996 since the then US President Bill Clinton signed for the CTBT after which the US impeded nuclear testing. When the CTBT was opened up for signature, the vision was epitomizing a world without nuclear weapons. The CTBT has hitherto been signed by 183 states wherein ratified by 164.

On whole, in-order to turn this de facto moratorium into de jure moratorium, still the 44 countries that are listed under Annex 2 of the treaty – the states possessing nuclear technology needs to ratify the Treaty in order to fulfill its demand of entry-into-force. Out of which 36 states have ratified whereas the remaining eight states needs to ratify the treaty. Among which 3 states: NK, India and Pakistan have not even signed while remaining five states the US, China, Egypt, Iran, and Israel – have signed but not ratified the treaty.

As the US President Barack Obama counts down his remaining tenure, the endeavors to burnish his legacy with a re-look at the nuclear test ban treaty could birth implications for India. While analyzing the future of CTBT, one has to be skeptical of the fact that the US is putting all efforts to inculcate India into the NSG for attaining a legitimate right over the civil nuclear trade. While doing so, India is under pressure to ratify CTBT since most of the NSG states are party to the treaty except the US.

India will not go for signature because firstly, since, the CTBT bans all nuclear explosions, in consequence hindering both the initial development of nuclear weapons as well as significant enhancements (h-bomb); wherein India ironically, is reportedly engaged in the development of a thermonuclear city (bomb). Secondly, Arundhati Ghose, Indian permanent representative to the UN in Geneva in 1996, stated its country’s decision on not signing on to the CTBT as “not now, not later”. Thirdly, India’s historic stance towards CTBT; it wants to retain its nuclear testing option open. Fourthly, India is already enjoying more than enough from Indo-US nuclear deal, which up till now could not manage to convince India to open up for signatures on the treaty. After the Indo-US nuclear deal episode, Indian stance on CTBT was restated pretty categorically that “New Delhi would not sign the CTBT even it was ratified by other countries”.

Like in the past, Pakistan once again proposed India a mutual nuclear test ban arrangement that, if accepted, would hold a legally binding bilateral agreement among both regional nuclear rivals. Even though, India has rejected the same kind of proposal that Pakistan offered right in the aftermath of the
1998 nuclear tests for a mutual accession into the CTBT, this time India should look into it in a plausible manner. Previously it aimed at a mutual confidence building measure ensuring regional peace and stability however this time it would pave the way for both India and Pakistan to be accepted into the NSG. Sardonically narrating, if nothing else, it would at least make hard for India to be included (alone) into the NSG. However both states are already abided by the policy of a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing; nevertheless there should not be any harm on Indian part to accept it after the long deadlock on the treaty.

Even if the CTBT does not halt vertical proliferation but to achieve limitation and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Pakistan believes it to be an instrumental part of a long term agenda. In principle Pakistan could never be against such a non-proliferation measure that would ultimately promote peace and strategic stability in the region, and would lead a way for both India and Pakistan towards the nuclear technology sharing cartels. It has always remained steadfast in its commitments towards non-proliferation efforts.

The 20 Years CTBT Ministerial Meeting bestows an opportune moment to reinvigorate the paused debate on the CTBT. Pakistani personals, recently, were taken on a tour of the International Data Centre (IDC), the nerve centre from where data recorded by the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS) is processed. The system has proved its capabilities to detect even small nuclear tests during the announced DPRK nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2016. In addition to detecting nuclear explosions, these data can also be used for analyzing earthquakes, providing advanced warning of tsunamis, and a wide range of other applications.

Pakistan, who holds an ‘observer’ status to the Treaty’s decision-making body, the Preparatory Commission, is currently unable to access IMS data as a non-member of the Treaty. But it should be much appreciated that Pakistan looks up to operate two monitoring stations that will detect nuclear tests as per the requirements of the CTBT where as India is far behind in this regard. Undoubtedly, Pakistan is consistently supporting the objectives of the CTBT.

Realistically, it could be anticipated that Pakistan might sign onto the CTBT keeping the ratification by the US as a pre-requisite that could bring mild chance of signature from Indian part too. Well, the US has to lead the way in order to bring this dream into reality. Nevertheless, mindful of Indian growing missile systems, its Cold Start doctrine, missile defense shield against Pakistan, sea based missiles and deterrence, ICBMs capabilities; etc Pakistan needs to sustain a pragmatic Indo-centric pretense on the CTBT even after proposing a mutual test ban arrangement to India.

CPEC and The Maritime Security

S Sadia Kazmi

The sea routes have always been a major source of global economic activity conjoined with the political interests of the states. They have remained integral in the quest for power and also play an essential role in maintaining the power equilibrium among the contending states. This is why the countries which are landlocked are considered to be less fortunate and handicapped in terms of pursuing their economic and political interests as compared to the littoral ones. However in order to fully utilize the maritime advantages, it is essential that an effective policy focusing on the security and safety of the sea lanes and water bodies; including both the domestic and international waters is devised and streamlined on the regular basis.

Gwadar port promises to offer huge dividends not just to Pakistan and China but has the potential to bring about benefits beyond the immediate region. Hence the maritime security is an important yet less attended area that demands serious attention by the policy makers. It is a fact that any deliberation on CPEC must evaluate and highlight the region’s prevailing and emerging maritime challenges. While the deep sea Gwadar port is going to place China and Pakistan in an extremely advantageous strategic position, it will also bring about a trend of intense competition among the contending states. India for instance considers itself the biggest stakeholder in China’s One Belt One Road initiative. Its ambitions to turn the Indian Ocean into India’s Ocean are perceived to be under great threat by Pak-China strategic cooperation in the form of CPEC.

Not only will China be able to station its vessels at the Gwadar port, securing permanent place for itself in the Arabian Sea but will also undermine the much desired Indian hegemony in the Indian Ocean while at the same time strengthening security for Pakistan’s seaward shores. The US also feels apprehensive of China’s alleged designs regarding diverting India’s attention from Asia Pacific, ultimately neutralizing US’ attempts to isolate/contain China. Hence the three major states India, US and China are very closely scrutinizing and re-evaluating their options around the Indian Ocean. Furthermore the Chahbahar port in Iran, not only provides a channel to India for an easy access into Afghanistan but also points to the increasing presence of India in Iran and Afghanistan. While the Eastern border of Pakistan is constantly troubled owing to the hostile neighbor, the Western borders will also come under direct security threats emanating from Indian supported and financed activities in Iran and Afghanistan. Hence Pakistan needs to keep the competing interests of the state in mind and formulate implementable policies to address these emerging challenges.

However recently Iran itself has expressed interest in joining the CPEC, which brings in hope that the expected “port competition” between Iran and Pakistan might not be initiated after all. Also the arrival and docking process of Chinese ship has already become a reality with the 1st Chinese cargo ship Zhen Xing Sung reaching the port in mid October. Hence it becomes all the more important to take
preemptive measures to ensure fool proof security of Gwadar port. Some of the other challenges to the
seaward activities include piracy, human trafficking, smuggling etc. Even though Pakistan does have the
capability to safeguard CPEC, it requires more focused research, evaluation and dedicated finances to
formulate more robust and up-to-date seaward security policies. Pakistan Navy is diligently rendering its
services to ensure the security at three basic levels: the port security, vessel security and the security of
the sea lanes.

More than 400 marines of Pakistan Navy’s Third Marine Battalion (TMB) are providing security
to the Gwadar port round the clock. In August the launching ceremony of second maritime patrol ship
BASOL was held at Liuzhou city, China. The presence of maritime security cooperation points to the fact
that both the states are working towards drafting a comprehensive mechanism to ensure security of
Gwadar and surrounding area. This enhanced security cooperation between two countries will auger
well for the entire maritime region of interest. Another important development in this regard is that the
Ministry of Defence Production under PSDP programme signed a contract with M/s CSTC of China for
construction of 4 x 600 Tons and 2 x 1500 Tons Maritime Patrol Ships in June 2015. As per the contract,
four ships are being constructed in China while remaining three ships are being constructed at Karachi
Shipyards and Engineering Works. Also only last month in September the inaugural ceremony of the Fast
Attack Craft 3 of Pakistan Navy was held. This again is the product of Pak-China cooperation which
confirms that the navies of both Pakistan and China are fully committed to providing a safe and secure
maritime environment pivotal to the success of CPEC. Indeed Pakistan-China collaboration has the
potential to face the challenges and further enhance cooperation for indigenous ship construction
industry.

However despite having satisfactory measures in place, one cannot afford to go lax regarding
the continually emerging challenges to the maritime security from traditional and nontraditional threats.
At the moment Pakistan is in the process of developing its maritime doctrine. This sure is the much
needed right move in the right direction, which is aimed at developing coherence among Pakistan’s
Navy, Air Force and Army. Along with that Pakistan should also enhance its efforts to acquire assured
second strike capability. Only after giving considerable consideration to the maritime sector, will the
CPEC be able to translate into something implementable.

http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/10/31/cpec-maritime-security/
Nuclear Energy Cooperation and Pakistan’s Nuclear Vision 2050

Shahzadi Tooba

Pakistan’s fourth Nuclear Power Plant has started supplying electricity to the national grid on trial basis. Chashma Nuclear Power Plant Unit-3(C-3), situated near Mianwali, has been formally connected to the national electricity grid. After completion of several safety related and functional tests, the C-3 will attain full capacity of 340 MWe in December, when inauguration ceremony will be held.

The country’s first nuclear power plant namely KANUPP near Karachi is operational for the last 44 years. The other two nuclear power units at Chashma, C-1 and C-2 are already supplying electricity to the grid for many years. The nuclear power plants C-1 and C-2 are considered to be the best energy generating units in the country with more than 90% capacity factor consistently. These power plants are supplying about 600 MWe.

The new power plant C-3 will add around 315 MWe net electricity to the system. The next unit of the nuclear power generation C-4 at Chashma will start its operation in early 2017. The other two larger capacity nuclear power plants (K-2 & K-3) at Karachi are also under construction and will be completed in 2020 and 2021 respectively. These plants will further add around 2100 MWe net electrical power in the system upon connection to the national grid.

Pakistan is long being denied by its legitimate right of acquiring nuclear technologies to expand its civil nuclear program. China has cooperated with Pakistan to construct nuclear plants in Pakistan. But now gradually this cooperation is expanding and other countries are making their marks in this regard. Recently, Pakistan and Belarus agreed to cooperate in the field of nuclear energy and on devising a tripartite trade mechanism by involving a third country, most probably China or Russia.

“Belarus and Pakistan want to promote cooperation in nuclear energy for peaceful means,” President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko said in a joint news briefing with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The president Alexander Lukashenko was elected to the post in 1994 and is now serving his fifth term and Belarus is among the very few countries that supported Pakistan’s bid for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Another important factor of Pak-Belarus cooperation is the Russian factor as Belarus and Russia share a close diplomatic and strategic equation. Elaborating on this assertion, the visit of the Belarus president needs to be seen in the backdrop of Pakistan’s revamped relationship with Russia and developments to this effect.

On cooperation between Belarus and Pakistan, the Prime Minister said, “Our two countries enjoy a warm, cordial and multi-faceted relationship. Pakistan is keen to forge closer ties with Belarus in all fields including trade, economy, investment, industry, education, defence, agriculture, culture and other areas—the momentum of increased high level exchanges between the two countries needs to be maintained.” Belarus has significant expertise in building of heavy machinery including automotive
engineering, agricultural harvesting machinery, road construction machinery and dump trucks—Both sides can develop joint ventures and business-to-business contacts in these areas.

A number of memorandums of understanding (MoUs) were signed between the two sides during bilateral talks, related to the expansion of areas of cooperation in the field of agriculture, industrial cooperation, crime counteraction, education, postal, customs and banking collaboration.

Nuclear Vision 2050 envisages greater than 40,000 MW nuclear power by 2050 or about 15% of the projected capacity of the country. Currently, energy demand in Pakistan during summers is 18000 MW and supply of power is 13000 MW, which cause of 5000 MW of gap in the demand-supply chain. It is estimated that in next 10 years the demand will grow exponentially making the current demand to twice of present level. The existing installed capacity is 21000 MW which includes thermal, hydro, and nuclear capacities. Here, nuclear option can be best employed to meet the future challenges of demand in Pakistan. Nuclear power plant development in next 17 years can produce 7370 MW of energy and the expansion of nuclear power plants till 2030 will enable the country to raise nuclear power level from 750 to 8,800 MW.

http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/10/31/nuclear-energy-cooperation-pakistans-nuclear-vision-2050/
South Asian Nuclear Brinkmanship and Recent Tensions

Maimuna Ashraf

The current tensions between India and Pakistan can be easily traced back to the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government and now accentuated after the Uri episode; an attack by the militants on the Indian military forces. The issue has become more complicated but knowing Prime Minister Modi and the kind of composition of his government, this kind of situation or deterioration between India and Pakistan could not have been ruled out.

It has been in fact the part of fluctuations that have taken place between India and Pakistan since independence. The South Asian history is interspersed with wars, conflict, crisis and disruption of diplomatic relations and dialogues between the two states, therefore the prevailing tension was quite expected. It is not a cozy situation. There is a kind of conflict growing up which if escalates, either intentionally or inadvertently, will make the situation all the more dangerous, since both India and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states. It needs to be addressed and handled with utmost care. Not just for the sake of peace and stability of both countries but also because the ramification might go beyond the South Asian region.

Regarding the Uri event, India has internationalized this event. This highlights two Indian objectives, first, to malign Pakistan in the world alleging that terrorist attack at Uri was done by Pakistan. Second, India is now trying to make a political capital of local situation and trying to project Pakistan as terrorist state which is also a general objective of Modi’s government. India tried its best to isolate Pakistan and wanted it to be declared a terrorist state at BRICS Summit but failed miserably. China stood with Pakistan and rejected Indian claims. China’s stance was correct as Pakistan remains the worst victim of terrorism despite playing a vital role in suppressing terrorism.

These escalatory trends present a dangerous situation that has the potential to spiral into a limited conventional conflict or may even inadvertently lead to a nuclear catastrophe. Without a doubt Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have maintained deterrence against India. Both the countries know that any misadventure would lead to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Conventionally, Pakistan is still behind India; however, nuclear weapons have covered that gap to some extent. Pakistan has kept its nuclear doctrine ambiguous so that the element of surprise could be utilized. India introduced Cold-Start Doctrine in order to launch limited war against Pakistan for achieving certain specific objectives. Pakistan in response developed Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs), battlefield nuclear weapons for countering such specific strikes from the Indian side.

The most important factor that will determine the deterrence equilibrium in South Asia is the induction of new nuclear weapon system in South Asia which includes INS Arihant, submarine launched ballistic missiles and acquisition of ballistic missile defense. Pakistan is not unaware of the potential of such kind of deployments and Pakistan is also not unaware of the kind of strategic weapon system based on nuclear warheads which India is developing while Pakistan is not lagging behind in maintaining its national security based on adequate national defense and nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan’s
maintenance and advancement of minimum credible deterrence at the moment is well recognized internationally which discourages India to launch a war against Pakistan. After having the full spectrum deterrence, Pakistan now has the capability to cover all kinds of threats. India has very aggressive strategic posture; it is aiming at the nuclearization of Indian Ocean and projecting military power in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. Both these water bodies have traditionally been recognized as very important waters for Pakistan’s national security and should remain a concern for Pakistani military decision makers.

Both Pakistan and India have not signed NPT and there seems less possibility for regional cooperation in the nuclear field, which is a worrisome issue. However, whenever the nuclear factor came into play it did not allow the situation to escalate into a full-fledged war. It is the space for limited war only which keeps putting deterrence stability a bit under stress. Thus the two states need to understand that the dominant thought in deterrence debate is that no nuclear power would be able to control the pace of escalation by threatening another with massive retaliation – and also hoping that it would deter a response.