

In-House Seminar

ISSUES OF CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC
IMPORTANCE TO PAKISTAN



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The publication is based on the papers presented in the Three Day Workshop/Seminar on Issues of Contemporary Strategic Importance to Pakistan, organized by the Strategic Vision Institute (**SVI**). On behalf of *Mr. Ross Masood Husain* (Chairperson SVI) and *Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema* (President/Executive Director), we extend our profound thanks to all the speakers, session chairs, and volunteers who contributed in the three day workshop / seminar and made it a success.

INAUGURAL SESSION OF THE SVI's
THREE DAY WORKSHOP/SEMINAR
ON
ISSUES OF CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO PAKISTAN

The strategic vision Institute organized a three day-workshop analyzing the current environment of Pakistan. Each day was distributed with a different topic and speaker.

On the first day, topics related to the issues of *Indo-US Strategic Partnership and its developing fall-out for Pakistan* were looked into.

The US-Indo nuclear deal/strategic partnership has far reaching implications for the US security interests and policies in Asia and beyond. Despite the partnership, the global and regional security interests of both India and US converge and diverge, hence creating points of friction for both the states as well as for the non-proliferation regime. This partnership carries important implications for South Asia, Central Asia and Middle East security complex. From a Pakistani perspective and with regards to its strategic relations with India, this deal creates an element of uncertainty and possibility of an arms race between the two. This deal would for sure hamper the peace process between Pakistan and India. It has given India a de-jure weapons status while undermining strategic stability of the region and the nuclear status of Pakistan.

WELCOME REMARKS

In the introductory remarks, Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema President/Executive Director of the SVI, expressed his profound appreciation to the distinguished guests, excellencies, media persons and students from various universities attending SVI's Three Day Workshop / Seminar on "Issues Of Contemporary Strategic Importance To Pakistan". He especially mentioned that SVI was privileged to have such an august audience for the inaugural session.

Introduction to SVI

SVI is an autonomous, multidisciplinary and non-partisan institution established in January/March 2013. It is a non-governmental and non-commercial organization administrated by a Board of Governors (General body) under a Chairperson and administrated by a Management Committee headed by the President/Executive Director.

SVI aims to project strategic foresight on issues of national and international import through dispassionate, impartial and independent research analyses and studies. SVI aspires to be a debating forum on contemporary issues of national and international significance aiming to promote national, regional and international peace, security and stability. The rationale of SVI stems from imperative of cultivating professional expertise to cope with increasingly intricate environment for policy formulation process in all fields of national and international politics.

The core objectives of the SVI are to undertake research, analyses, and offer policy alternatives in the following fields:

- Strategic and Security Policy Studies.
- Nuclear Studies: Nuclear Power and Policy, Safety and Security, Nuclear Doctrines, and Deterrence, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation.
- Regional Peace, Security and International Stability.
- Energy Studies: Conventional, Nuclear and Non-conventional (Alternative/Renewable Sources of Energy, Solar/Wind etc) Sources.
- Strategic Communications, Informatics, and Media Studies (Print and Electronic Media).

Main Functions

- Production and promotion of literature to support the objectives of SVI through research and writings e.g. journals/magazine, books and reports, organization of training workshops, roundtables, seminars and conferences.
- Dissemination of literature through a variety of available medium, except when any contractual obligations require otherwise.
- Development of Data Base: (Data Collection, Processing, Analyses and Policy Recommendation.)
- Undertake consultancies, projects, and feasibility reports.
- Setting up educational facilities: Teaching/Training and Research through academic institutions if it became one at some later stage.

Specific Function

- Policy Analysis
- Policy Formulation
- Reports with Executive Summaries
- Policy Dissemination/Circulation/Promotion
- Consultancy/Surveys
- Projects/Feasibility Reports
- Organize Conferences/Workshop/Roundtables

Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi

Pakistan and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime

While talking about the issues related to the nuclear non-proliferation, Ambassador Naqvi highlighted the background from where many nations benefited and started their own nuclear programs. In 1956 Pakistan formulated the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and since then it made an excellent progress towards the formation of KANUPP in 1960s and later on the CHASHMA project was also initiated. He said Pakistan is a responsible nuclear weapon state and is supporting UNSC resolution 1540. Pakistan has ensured compliance by adopting the legislation.

When the NPT came into existence in 1968, Pakistan promoted the cause of nuclear free world but when in 1971 Pakistan was attacked by India and its Western part was disintegrated ruthlessly, India was not condemned by the world powers, therefore; the then leadership of Pakistan was compelled to think about the options to ensure the security and survival of the country. Eventually Pakistan became a nuclear power after successfully carrying out the tests in response to the Indian nuclear tests in 1998.



For the purpose of nuclear non-proliferation, Pakistan has a sophisticated mechanism of export control on goods, technologies, material and equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act 2004. It has taken serious steps to ensure the safety and security of its nuclear assets by creating the Strategic Export Control Division and other measures.

The main purpose of the Workshop was to familiarize the audience with the terminologies of Strategic Studies and different concepts of Arms control and Disarmament. Mr. Naqvi, while giving an overview of the term mentioned that it is used for restrictions upon the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation and usage of weapons, especially with reference to weapons of mass destruction.

While concluding his lecture he said that the concerns about the asymmetry in strategic capability lead Pakistan to call for a complete verifiable nuclear disarmament by all states. And there should be elimination of the discrimination in the current non-proliferation regime. Also there is a need for non-discriminatory rules ensuring every state's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, Pakistan has complied with international standards and objectives of non-proliferation initiatives.

Air Cdre. (R) Khalid Iqbal

INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE / POSTURE

Mr. Khalid in his address said that the Indian Doctrinal thought process and the nuclear policy has never been stagnant and it has been kept shifting over a wide continuum. After its so-called 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosion' in 1974, India declared its policy of 'not developing weapons' however, contradicting its own statement, it is found desperately looking for nuclear delivery capable air craft.



He mentioned that the nuclear doctrinal process of India had been very controversial. At the very beginning the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapon Free and Non-violent World Order was in vain and in violation to it India itself conducted multiple nuclear tests in May 1998. India tried to justify those nuclear tests on three major strands i.e. a need for national security, international regimes, and the need to benefit from nuclear energy. But for Pakistan it was a question of its survival and to counter the threat that was triggered by India's PNE of 1974. Pakistan's wounds of dismemberment were still fresh and it strongly needed a defence against the nuclear weapons because there was already India's superiority in conventional domain therefore the two countries had divergent reasons to go nuclear. Highlighting the salient features of Indian Nuclear Doctrine, he said that the doctrine emphasizes on the Credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence, 'No first use' policy, but will respond with punitive retaliation should the deterrence fail, maintain sufficient, survivable and operationally prepared nuclear forces, capable of shifting from peacetime deployment to fully

employable force in the shortest possible time and a robust command and control system. The authority for the release of nuclear weapons will be vested with the Prime Minister of India. This demonstrates the “political will” to employ nuclear forces at the time of need and the “military will” that focuses on highly effective conventional military capabilities.

The retaliatory attack can only be authorized by civilian political leadership through the NCA. Though there shall be no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states but in the event of major attack, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.

While discussing about Pakistan’s perspective, he said that the Indian stance has scuttled any possibility of a Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia. The “no first use” is a ploy and has no credence. It will continue to upgrade its conventional forces on the pretext of raising its nuclear threshold which will further accentuate the existing conventional imbalance and hence lower the Pakistani threshold because Pakistan’s economy does not permit a weapon by weapon equation with India. By keeping the size of its ‘minimum’ deterrence open ended, India wants to drag Pakistan into a nuclear as well as conventional arms race.

While discussing Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine/Policy, he said there were two choices with the country i.e. war denying deterrence, and nuclear war fighting deterrence. Though Pakistan’s economy allows only the pursuit of war denying deterrence, it also has to ensure nuclear deterrence against Indian posture. Pakistan has to ward off dangers of pre-emption and interception by the ABM Shield and ensure the minimum credible deterrence. It aims to abstain from a strategic arms race and supports the international arms control regime. Pakistan participates in FMT negotiations and refrains from further nuclear testing. At the Command & Control System levels, both sides have in place respective command and control systems and have set up a National Command Authority which is headed by the respective Prime Ministers and is represented by the military and technical experts along with military strategic commands.

Dr. Tughral Yameen

The Safety of Pakistani Nuclear Weapons



Dr. Tughral started with the argument that Pakistan is a responsible nuclear weapon state as is evident from the fact that it is a member of the IAEA, at the same time Pakistan's Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) has developed the NSAP in order to fulfill the international obligations under UNSCR 1540. Also there are strong nuclear export control laws in place and at the same time Pakistan is also a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. He was confident that all these measures point to the fact that Pakistan's nuclear assets are safe because there is a proper nuclear command and control system. These weapons are secured, monitored and accounted in on a routine basis. The personnel associated with the program are thoroughly screened and continuously monitored. He expressed his disappointment that despite these robust measures it is very unfortunate to see Western propaganda active against Pakistan's nuclear safety measures. The West has intentionally devised specific terms for Pakistan's nuclear assets such as "Islamic bomb" and openly expresses its doubts about the credibility of the safety and security mechanism, saying that the Islamic extremists are going to steal the nuclear bomb. However he confidently stressed that the reality is quite different and there is no room for faulty assumptions and Pakistan has a very vibrant and sophisticated nuclear Command and Control System like any other nuclear weapon state of the world.

He further mentioned in his talk that it is only the work of skeptics who are unnecessarily playing out multiple narratives that the nuclear arsenals of Pakistan are vulnerable to the terrorists. Sometimes, it is blamed that the hardliners within the security establishment are a threat because they are a big reason in the proliferation of the nuclear technology to the other non-nuclear weapon states. Pakistan is also accused and blamed for its uncontrolled production of the fissile materials, rendering its warheads dangerous. He suggested that in order to counter such propaganda, Pakistan should publish a nuclear weapons security policy and it should review and upgrade this policy regularly. The nuclear security drills should be publicized through press releases and it should build counter narratives. These counter narratives should be based upon

credible information and be within the overarching framework of the national aims and policies. The counter narrative themes should debunk the theories that the terrorists can steal the bomb or there is an inside threat and the civilian leadership is not involved in strategic decision making.

The situation at LOC between India and Pakistan seems to have returned to normalization following a month of tensions. Both the countries have a ceasefire agreement that has been shredded since the start of this year because of constant hostilities, more notably due to the incidents this month since August 6 and breaches of ceasefire in January. The skirmishes reintroduced tensions in bilateral relations and blocked the progress towards normalization of ties between the two countries. The process between India and Pakistan is always hampered by some kind of major event such as the situation on LOC. The LOC hostilities in January 2013 left the peace talks on ice and as the new government prepared to resume the process, the new episode in August further deferred its reopening. The future trend of the relations, in view of the expected meeting between Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Dr. Manmohan Singh, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session next month, has become more uncertain. To analyze the fragility of the peace process between India and Pakistan in the light of the current LOC situation, the distinguished speakers talked about dynamics of war and peace in South Asia.

He added that the current government of Pakistan has pledged to normalize relations with India and deliver on Peace. This calls for the resumption of the peace talks and discussion on strengthening the previous Confidence building measure and devising new ones. As the situation at the LOC evolves, it is pertinent to discuss the nature and robustness of peace mechanism between India and Pakistan. For more than twenty-five years, both the countries have sought to negotiate and implement confidence building measures to reduce the chances of conflict, decrease military tensions, advance economic ties and to provide a conducive environment to eventually resolve the fundamental territorial dispute over Kashmir, which is the bone of contention and the basic requirement for lasting peace. Since the Simla Agreement every crisis is succeeded by a few Confidence Building Measures, but these have never helped to improve ties between the two countries. On the contrary they just reflect the on-going state of affairs between the two states. There is an urgent need to evolve the peace dialogue between the two countries

that actually foresees a downward trend in the relations and aims to obstruct it rather than intrinsically be in a reactive mode.

Adil Sultan

Deterrence & Strategic Stability in South Asia

Mr. Adil Sultan talked about deterrence and said that no nuclear weapon state or a non nuclear weapon state would attempt a military campaign against a nuclear power to achieve a total victory and no nuclear or non nuclear power would dare to press a military campaign against a close ally of nuclear power to achieve total victory. The high cost of nuclear war calls for extreme caution during political and military campaign against a nuclear power. He emphasized that this is the reason why nuclear weapon states tend to avoid confrontation with each other. While discussing “The Deterrence in South Asia”, he described it as a coercive strategy, used to persuade the adversary that it must not act in a certain way, fearing the lethal consequences. He further elaborated on the idea by stating two types of Deterrence; first is the narrow deterrence – to counter specific threat (CSD, PAOs). The second one is broad deterrence (Full Spectrum) – to counter all forms of aggression at the tactical (limited incursions), operational (to deter sizeable military offensive), and strategic (to prevent an all out war) level.



He expressed that in order to maintain strategic stability in South Asia, both India and Pakistan can learn lessons from Post-1998 Crises and the Kargil Conflict of 1999. Especially during the Kargil Conflict the deterrence remained effective without actually operationalizing the nuclear command structures. The Conflict remained limited mostly to war-gaming of nuclear deterrence without operationally deploying nuclear assets on both sides. Both sides exercised restraint - India by not crossing the LOC, and Pakistan by not launching air operations. This shows that in the absence of an effective deterrence Pakistan and India could fall in a nuclear catastrophe.

In his talk he referred to 2001-02 crisis when both the states realized that military victory could not be easily guaranteed. The military strikes would not accrue desired dividends, especially once there was a danger of escalation with unintended consequences including the possible use of nuclear weapons. The Indian PM chose “to use this coercive tool as a prop for his diplomatic strategy”. It was believed that an all out war with Pakistan is not possible without risking nuclear retribution against major Indian cities. The full military mobilization for achieving limited political objectives is neither feasible nor economical, and would be difficult to justify. He also suggested that India needed to reconfigure its force structure, which should have quick reaction time and be capable of achieving limited political objectives without disturbing stability at the strategic level.

Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal

Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia

Talking about the Challenges to Strategic Stability in South Asia, Dr. Jaspal started with raising three questions: Which actions of New Delhi and Islamabad manifest that they are determined to alter the strategic equilibrium in their respective advantage? What are the repercussions of India’s doctrinal transformation and military buildup for South Asian Strategic Stability? Is conventional asymmetry obliging Pakistan to transform its Nuclear Posture? And how Pakistan’s nuclear posture transformation affects South Asian strategic stability?



Addressing the key questions of his presentation, he said that the strategic stability term has its roots in the history of the United States-Soviet Union rivalry during the second half of the 20th century. The strategic stability referred to a strategic environment in which (mutual) deterrence based on (mutual) assured destruction capabilities of the strategic competitors prevent war between them. It can be viewed broadly as the result of effective nuclear deterrence. The strategic stability is a state of strategic relations between the two powers where there is no incentive for a first strike.

He shared his views terming India and Pakistan as strategic competitors, and said that ever since the independence (1947), India and Pakistan remain in an adversarial relationship. By every significant measure of power -- military spending, men under arms, population, economic strength, control of territory – India enjoys massive advantages over Pakistan. The imbalance of capabilities between India and Pakistan does not mean that the former can rub the latter's nose in their military inferiority with impunity. Pakistan has been endeavoring to sustain and endure its deterrence capability credibly, despite gigantic obstructions, i.e. economic, diplomatic, etc.

He said that the constructs of Indo-Pak strategic environment can be seen in India's great power ambitions and its phony rivalry with China. India has gigantic investment in the conventional weaponry entailing conventional asymmetry. But in Pakistan's case the Global War on Terrorism undermines Pakistan's economic growth and limits its investment in defense sector. Pakistan is lagging behind in an expensive & expansive conventional arms race. India's & Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs are on an expansionary trajectory because there is absence of arms control.

Talking about the nuclear deterrence, he said that India and Pakistan are in nuclear puzzle. The nuclear deterrence theory confronts a situation in South Asia that is very different from the context in which such theorizations develop, namely, the United States-Soviet Union confrontation during the Cold War. Both states share a common border, a very short missile flight time, and a limited reaction time which is almost nothing. He suggested that there should be remembrance of four wars and unlimited border skirmishes, perennial Kashmir dispute, active involvement in each other's intra-state conflicts and the contesting regional and global outlook.

While elaborating on the same point he further contended that there is also a stability-instability paradox and vulnerability-invulnerability paradox in South Asia. The nuclear Deterrence is meant for non-action that sustains status quo. In case of Indo-Pak strategic relations, nuclear weapons have been used not only for deterrence purposes but more than that; thereby stability-instability paradox was instituted as an integral component of South Asian strategic vocabulary. Talking about the trends in South Asian Strategic Environment, he maintained that vertical proliferation is due to both the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and expensive and expansive arms race between India and Pakistan. This pessimistic conclusion is due to the absence of an arms control agreement/treaty between the strategic competitors, i.e. India-Pakistan and former's great power ambitions and phony rivalry with China.

He stated that Indo-Pak strategic equation at the technical level indicates that their military doctrines are in a transitory phase. The conventional and nuclear weapons modernization raises alarm about the probability of strategic instability in the region and the arms race contains inherent potential to destabilize deterrence stability. He said there are four alarming/destabilizing facts in India's doctrinal transformation: first is shifting of India's defensive-defense into offensive-defense as is evident from India's Cold Start Doctrine/Proactive Operations strategy—endeavoring to create a space for war. Secondly, India's flirting with the limited war option in a nuclearized strategic environment, thirdly Pakistan resilience to adopt countermeasures, which leads to the fourth fact i.e. Pakistan denying India a space for limited war. At last by concluding his presentation on the topic he said, the Indian and Pakistani military buildup would create an enormous spiral in offensive/defensive arms race—entailing a strategic environment, which is immensely complex, volatile and unpredictable

VOTE OF THANKS BY DR. ZAFAR IQBAL CHEEMA

At the end, Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema profoundly thanked the entire august audience present in the house and said that their presence is valuable for the events organized by SVI. He paid special thanks to the Guest Speakers and Discussants for their precious inputs that enlightened the audience. He extended his gratitude towards the research and secretarial staff of the SVI for their hard work and dedication towards the SVI.