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Strategic Vision Institute (SVI)

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SVI Foresight

SVI Foresight is a monthly electronic journal. It has a multi-disciplinary perspective highlighting on the contemporary strategic and security studies. The Journal is envisioned to be a collection of policy-oriented articles written by its Research Associates, Visiting Faculty and professional experts. The objective is to provide the readership with a concise all-round and real-time policy oriented discourse on contemporary strategic regional and international developments, highlighting their relevance to Pakistan.

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Editor's Note

With the arrival of New Year, the second volume of SVI Foresight presents its first issue for the month of January. It is specifically important as it covers some critical national, regional and international security and strategic issues in which Pakistan is not only playing a significant role but they also carry direct implications for the country. January saw an unfortunate event unfolded across the border where the Pathankot Airbase in India came under a terrorist attack. The incident drastically changed the course of Indo-Pak relations which had previously started to show some improvements. This impasse in Indo-Pak relations has been critically analyzed and evaluated in one of the articles included. With some convincing arguments the article generates a counter stance to Indian allegations implicating Pakistan and points to the possibility that it could very well be India's own doing. Indian PM's close association with the RSS and his anti-Pakistan disposition cannot be ignored despite the sudden cordiality he displaced in the previous months. Another article looks at the prospects of Pakistan as a mediator between KSA and Iran and poses a valid question as to how impartial can Pakistan really be between KSA and Iran. It is suggested that Pakistan should strictly adopt a neutral posture in this self assumed role of a mediator since KSA is an important ally and Iran is an important neighbor. CPEC project has been covered in yet another article with a critical approach towards the possible impediments that might hinder the progress on the project. The article evaluates dynamics of evolving issues and specifically looks at the new emerging internal challenges of Gilgit-Baltistan, KPK and Baluchistan. The route to prosperity can only be ensured by employing a combination of tools such as diplomacy, intelligence networks, economic measures and military.

One can also find a very interesting take on the Middle Eastern security dynamics in the context of Iranian nuclear deal / Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in this issue. The author believes that the future of Middle East is not free from a nuclear arms race despite the Iranian nuclear deal. An environment has been predicted where in ten years or so Iran would have been granted a breakout threshold and may continue to pose a security risk to the other regional states, which in turn will be compelled to indulge into a nuclear arms race. China's growing strategic interests in the Middle East have also been scrutinized in detail. Another article while addressing the Indo-Russian nuclear deal, explains the dynamics of world politics where only the vested interests of the states are constant and most of the time the great powers themselves undermine credibility of established frameworks such as NPT. Indo-Russian nuclear deal has been critically evaluated in the same context where it is believed that such strategic partnerships are being made to look justified on the pretext of countering the rival states. The politically motivated Indo-Russian strategic cooperation is an outcome of the Indian

refusal to Western powers for criticizing the moves of annexing Crimea into mainland Russia, whereas, sanction-hit Russia is also striving for a variety of options to get new markets and investment options. North Korean thermonuclear test also seem to pose serious challenge to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Readers can find a useful commentary about its implications on the regional politics and global nonproliferation efforts. The main message it carries that the world should unite against proliferation and take practical steps against the “real” threats instead of just smearing Pakistan. Another article suggests that the Nuclear Security Summits could be best utilized as a forum or a platform to initiate bilateral or multilateral networks, which would directly voice its objective and agenda worldwide. However the author is not hopeful for the future of NSS owing to its legal non-binding nature, which may remain uncertain and indistinct even after the next projected summit that is expected to be in Washington. Western stereotypes and biases against Pakistan and its nuclear program have been highlighted in another article. It convincingly builds the argument in favor of Pakistan when on the other side India is getting more ambitious with its nuclear program. The article delves in deeper to find answers to very valid questions as to why the West is so worried about Pakistan’s nuclear program as compared to India’s. If not, then why do Western countries adopt a mute approach on India, while Pakistan remains in spotlight of criticism? Last but not the least a very unique analysis of the Marshall Islands’ application against nine nuclear states in the International Court of Justice with special reference to Pakistan can be found in this issue. The article questions the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and also suggests the way forward.

It is hoped that the issue will help readers in staying updated with the current political environment and will find the analyses useful. The SVI Foresight team invites and highly encourages the contributions from the security and strategic community in form of opinion based short commentaries on contemporary political, security and strategic issues. Any suggestions for further improvement are welcome at our [contact address](#). Please see [here](#) the copy of SVI Foresight electronic journal. You can find us on [Face book](#) and can also access the SVI [website](#).

Senior Research Associate
Syedah Sadia Kazmi

Chanakya's Strategy of Deceit and Guile

Sadia Kazmi

It is hard to be an optimist when it comes to Indo-Pak bilateral relations. Unfortunately there is not much evidence available to believe otherwise even at the risk of being tagged a pessimist. Although the recent engagements between the two states during the year 2015 are marked by both, the negative and positive trends, a general feeling of skepticism prevailed. Despite witnessing a breakthrough in relations in December that garnered worldwide appreciation, the prudent political experts in Pakistan observed the sudden change in the disposition of Indian leadership with their breath held anticipating something bad to happen as has become the norm whenever improvements start to show between India and Pakistan.

As was feared, the bomb exploded, this time in Pathankot. A loud bang and gun shots, with which India started its New Year, is not without severe repercussions for Pakistan and on the peace process that is being hoped to resume between the two states. So far no one has claimed the responsibility for the attack but Jash-e-Muhammad led by Mullah Masood Azhar is being credited for the incident by Indian authorities. The reports have also alleged that the attacks were planned in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

Even though both sides have issued statements showing a strong resolve to continue with the peace process, AICC communication department Chief, Randeep Surjewala has openly implicated Pakistan in his statement, saying: "Two things are very clear, first, despite the PM's visit to Pakistan, ISI continues to sustain and support terror activities against India... Secondly, the terror camps that are run by terrorists for carrying on anti-India activity in PoK continues to be supported by Pakistani establishments...". So much for the short lived honeymoon period that hardly lasted a month.

Interestingly enough, none of this comes as a surprise. There is a passive-aggressive tactic that India has often adopted in its dealings with Pakistan which has now become a routine. Nonetheless it does leave one to wonder whether the apparent flexibility in the previously rigid posture was an intentionally calculated move by the Indians where they wanted to put across a positive image of India as fully committed towards regional peace and going all out embracing Pakistan with open arms or the future of Indo-Pak relations has actually fallen prey to the anti-peace entities on both sides of the border.

A look at the events in the latter half of 2015 might help find answer to this query. In the month of July PM Nawaz and PM Modi met at the sidelines of SCO summit in Ufa where PM Nawaz proposed a five point plan to start a composite dialogue. However, the NSA level talks

could not take place owing to the rigid positions on both sides where in August, Indian FM Sushma Sawaraj categorically stated that talks were only possible if meeting stayed focused on the issue of terrorism, whereas for Pakistan, it was impossible to go ahead with the talks without having Kashmir included in the agenda. Later, in September during his speech at the United Nations General Assembly, PM Nawaz again proposed a four point peace initiative to ease off tensions with India, but the efforts were once again thwarted by a single lined reply from Indian FM Sushma where she reiterated that Pakistan should “give up terrorism”.

However, India’s hard position underwent a sudden transformation in November when PM Modi approached PM Nawaz on the sidelines of COP21 meeting in Paris. This was followed by FM Sushma sawaraj’s official visit to Pakistan in early December for Heart of Asia Conference. This time she agreed to restart composite dialogue on all the outstanding issues important for both India and Pakistan. It is important to note here that this was the only occasion when India displayed some flexibility and agreed to consider Pakistan’s concerns too. Later on PM Modi’s unplanned and unofficial visit to Lahore in late December ended the year on a positive note while at the same time he became instrumental in portraying India as a benevolent nation.

One can’t help but think what brought about this abrupt change of mind and the motive behind India’s cordial behaviour. It seems as if India’s political persona carries two distinct yet enduring personalities that exist concurrently, each having a unique style of viewing and understanding the regional politics. While one is stubborn and hegemonic, the other tends to be slightly accommodating. The question arises, if India is actually indecisive about which line of action to adopt while dealing with Pakistan or is it part of India’s well thought out strategy based on Chanakya’s famous dictum of deception and cunning intelligence.

Was the unofficial meeting, impromptu visit and willingness to resume dialogue, all planned to overwhelm Pakistan with too much nicety so that later on India could orchestrate an attack like Pathankot incident (as some of the controversial news claim) and make Pakistan yield to Indian pressure to concentrate only on terrorism in composite dialogue and leave Kashmir and other issues aside. As per Sushma’s statement, the Heart of Asia rapprochement is primarily based on a commitment by Pakistan that it would expedite the trial of Mumbai accused. Also series of events show that most of the time India refused to discuss anything but terrorism. In this context the timings of Pathankot terror incident is just ideal to further press Pakistan to make terrorism the focus of talks.

However, if this is actually a terror attack then the ease with which India’s most sensitive strategic area was targeted, hints at major security loophole. India needs to seriously think about the mole in its official ranks. Also one cannot rule out the possibility that it could be the doing of local disgruntled extremist Hindus as was the case with Samjhota Express

bombings. This also exposes India as a failed state incapable of defending itself from terrorist elements operating from within its borders that may not even be Muslims or related to Pakistan in anyway. Aaker Patel in a digital daily of political and cultural news for India stated that most terrorists in India are not even Muslims but are Hindus. Therefore, instead of blaming Pakistan, India should look into its own weaknesses otherwise regional harmony and peace would remain a dream, while violence, distrust, suspicion and blame game would be the only way for India and Pakistan to “coexist”.

<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=284859>

Developments in CPEC Project and Evolving Issues and Threats

Shahzadi Tooba Hussain Syed

The ‘game changer’ and the ‘fate changer’ also entitled with a ‘controversial project’. The CPEC project while it is underway started facing a variety of challenges that seek to undermine its beneficial impact for all the stake holders. The main issues are the concerns of Gilgit-Baltistan, KPK and Balochistan.

CPEC projects were actually initiated with the construction of the Gwadar Port by the Chinese and the up-gradation of the Karakorum Highway (KKH) entering Pakistan through GB. The GB concern is that it has never been formally integrated into the Pakistani state and does not participate in Pakistan’s constitutional political affairs. The Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009, was passed by the Pakistani cabinet and granted self-rule to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, by creating, among other things, an elected Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly and Gilgit-Baltistan Council. Gilgit-Baltistan thus gained a de facto province-like status without constitutionally becoming part of Pakistan. Officially, Pakistan has rejected calls for full integration of Gilgit-Baltistan with Pakistan on the grounds that it would prejudice its international obligations with regard to the Kashmir conflict.

Another concern is that for GB, except for the KKH up-gradation no CPEC projects have been included in the overall plan. Surprisingly, no hydropower project has been identified for funding under CPEC. The government of Pakistan is focused on coal and LNG projects located in the plains of Punjab and Sindh. The Planning Division has oddly ignored the potential of hydropower projects. Along the KKH, the potential of run-of-the-river projects is phenomenal. At Bunji alone, a project of 7,400MW of energy can be established with two additional projects of 2,000MW each upstream from this location. These alone can meet much of Pakistan’s energy requirements. Hydro energy is environment-friendly, low-cost and economically viable; it can save billions of dollars.

Balochistan remains the Achilles heel of the CPEC. Baloch ethno-nationalist separatists remain the keenest opponents of Chinese investments in the province. Recently a new course of action has been initiated by some sub-nationalist parties that are alleging a change in the routes by the Federal government, that would only favor the eastern provinces of Pakistan and deprive the western provinces. Despite this allegation meeting no facts on the ground, the Pakistani and Chinese governments have tried to allay the fears, by interacting with the political parties that are making the allegations. There is also a stark need to engage the common man on the ground to stop the public from taking part in acts such as agitation that could halt work

on the CPEC. In 2006, three Chinese engineers lost their lives in an attack claimed by the BLA in Hub, a town west of Karachi. A week before the Chinese president's visit, at least 20 laborers were killed in cold blood by BLF gunmen in Turbat. Separatists routinely attack power and energy transmission lines. In order to specifically counter security threats to the CPEC, the Pakistani government established a 'Special Security Division' for Chinese workers.

With all the 'corns' the ambitious CPEC program is progressing. Mainly it has two components. It plans to develop a new trade and transport route from Kashgar in China to the Gwadar Port. The other component envisages developing special economic zones along the route, including power projects. The first-phase projects will receive \$45.69bn in concessionary and commercial loans, for which financial facilitation to the Chinese companies is being arranged by the Silk Road Fund. These include \$33.79bn for energy projects, \$5.9bn for roads, \$3.69bn for railway network, \$1.6bn for Lahore Mass Transit, \$66m for Gwadar Port and a fibre optic project worth \$4m.

The prioritised, short-term projects involve over \$17bn in investment. Apart from Karot, they include the upgrading of the 1,681km Peshawar-Lahore-Karachi railway line (\$3.7bn); Thar coal-fired power plants worth 1,980MW (\$2.8bn); development of two Thar coal mining blocks (\$2.2bn); the Gwadar-Nawabshah natural gas pipeline (\$2bn); imported coal-based power plants at Port Qasim worth 1,320MW (\$2bn); a solar park in Bahawalpur worth 900MW (\$1.3bn); the Havelian-Islamabad link of the Karakoram Highway (\$930m); a wind farm at Jhimpir for 260MW (\$260m); and the Gwadar International Airport (\$230m).

Pakistan Chinese friendship has been hailed as "higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel". As China's friend, it is up to Pakistan to deal with issues in appropriate way because China is having huge investment. Government should consider all the concerns of the stakeholders. In Balochistan specially the government must engage the local dissidents in a dialogue process, and bring them back into the national mainstream. A combination of Diplomacy, Intelligence networks, Economic measures and Military tools can be used to implement that 'route of prosperity'.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/01/13/developments-in-cpec-project-and-evolving-issues-and-threats/>

Race for Nuclear Bomb

Sidra Khan

Despite the fact that the U.S. and the other entire world forces work to compel Iran's atomic project, five opponent countries plans nuclear projects.

A standout amongst the most vital reasons why the U.S. is attempting to finish up an atomic arrangement with Iran is to keep an Iranian bomb from setting off an atomic race in the Middle East. As the deal concludes, Tehran's territorial opponents have as of now started discreetly following up on their own nuclear desire. Atomic force might be disappearing all over the place else on the planet, yet it's extremely popular in the spot with all that oil.

Egypt's declaration few months ago that it was contracting Russia to construct a reactor close Alexandria made it just the most recent contestant in a developing nuclear derby. Each and every other real Sunni power in the area has declared comparative arrangements. Also, however none seem either as driven nor as uncertain as what's occurred in Iran which are moving out to ace the whole nuclear fuel cycle, a warning for a military project. Every declaration sets out a marker in an area that, up to this point, was prominent as the one spot on the planet where governments had gained little ground on atomic force.

Except for Israel, which on no account openly recognized its generally known atomic arms stockpile, no Middle Eastern nation past Iran had an atomic system, tranquil or something else, awaiting the affluent United Arab Emirates started assembling a reactor around July 2012 (yet to finishing in 2017). The rundown now incorporates, notwithstanding Egypt, Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The final Iran's archenemy, and which a year ago uncovered arrangements to construct 16 atomic plants throughout the following two years. At the point as President of South Korea who owns 23 atomic plants went by the Kingdom not long ago, pioneers of both nations marked a notice of comprehension calling for Seoul to manufacture two of the atomic plants. The Saudis also have been making game plans with China, Argentina and France.

"It's not on the grounds that atomic force is seen as an initial move toward an atomic weapons choice," says Mark Fitzpatrick, a previous U.S. State Department atomic master who is now a member of nonproliferation and disarmament program. There is additionally a glory element: staying aware of the neighbors."

The Middle Eastern countries might have real motivations to put resources into atomic vitality. Jordan, for occurrence, has no oil structure, and also very less in water. Saudi Arabia along with UAE have tremendous unrefined stores, yet lose potential fare income when they smolder oil at home to make power , immense measures of these are reduced by desalination plants. Turkey, regardless of great hydroelectric potential, needs to import oil and also the gas.

Yet, the sum total of what that has been valid for a considerable length of time. What's changed as of late is the atomic abilities of Iran, Shi'ite Muslim nation Sunni pioneers have come to see as significant danger. Jordan's King Abdullah II broadly cautioned of a "Shia bow" of Iran-adjusted nations coming to from the Mediterranean towards the Persian Gulf. Saudis on other hand are bend to get a nuclear bomb if Iran is going on the same path.

Distrust ascends with each new declaration somewhat in light of the fact that the Middle East is evading a worldwide pattern. Around the world, the quantity of atomic plants has declined subsequent to the emergency at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi plant in 2011. Responses varied by nation. Germany renounced atomic vitality through and through after the debacle, while China squeezed ahead, arranging more than 100 new reactors. Be that as it may, in many places, the natural dangers and high expenses have turned nations off atomic force.

The cost single-handedly might keep some Middle Eastern countries from each really joining the atomic club. Construction a nuclear plant overheads at any rate \$5 billion, and Egypt is right away poor; Jordan depends intensely on settlements and outside guide. Be that as it may, the Saudis still have cash to blaze and, as per previous White House official Gary Samore, have reliably repelled U.S. imprecations to symbol a vow not to occupy any atomic project toward delivering a bomb. Saudi Arabia has marked the NPT, yet then so did Iran, and at last a race can be controlled by as few as two: India and Pakistan, sharp neighbors, neither of the two are rich, went atomic in 1974 and 1998, individually. They've gone to war once since, raising nervousness levels far and wide.

So the Deal signing in Switzerland is with reference to more than keeping Iran from receiving the bomb. They are likewise about convincing Iran's neighborhood that any atomic choice is passably not debatable. As the deal struck it resembles triumphant for Islamic Republic, envoys say its neighbors will quick track their own particular arrangements. "On the off chance that the agreement is not adequately strong then territorial nations would say it's not sufficiently genuine, so we are likewise going to get the atomic weapon.

<http://www.pinpointinstitute.org/Race-for-Nuclear-Bomb>

India-Russia Nuclear Deal and the Dynamics of World Politics

Nasurullah Brohi

The great powers, particularly the de-jure status holders, under the NPT framework only confer the nuclear status to those states who acquired the technology prior to 1968 and leaves no further room for others who were unable in the aforementioned timeframe and yet their persistent efforts for the acquisition of nuclear capability labels them as rogue states.

The role and policies of “great-nuclear powers” on the issues of further nuclear proliferation are some of the persuasive aspects of discouraging many non-nuclear states to refrain from seeking the nuclear options, but however, in some cases the situation becomes otherwise and the vested interests of those powers also imply the options and policies of cooperation with the non-nuclear weapon states and conversely eagerly assist in their clandestine nuclear programs.

The business interests and the policies of empowering the non-nuclear strategic partners only for the containment of the rival states such as the case of US–India relationship, the strategic partnership and the nuclear cooperation greatly is motivated by the economic and military containment of China. But as a reaction to such policies, additionally is given the fact that the regional powers consider them second to none and persistently keep-up with the procurement of huge arsenals of latest conventional and non-conventional military equipments merely to preserve their power, and as a consequence, the whole region ultimately is dragged into the budding power struggle.

Similarly, in the end of December, 2015, the visit of Indian Prime Minister to Moscow concluded with 16 new deals between the two countries ranging from Russian assistance for India in the fields of defence, energy, space cooperation and notably, the proclamations of procuring Russian nuclear reactors to build a nuclear industry in Kudankulam and some other undisclosed nuclear sites in India.

The politically motivated Indo-Russian strategic cooperation is an outcome of the Indian refusal to Western powers for criticizing the moves of annexing Crimea into mainland Russia, whereas, sanction-hit Russia is also striving for a variety of options to get new markets and investment options.

Apparently the current Indian ambitions are aimed at its self-sufficiency in the fields of energy for civilian purposes, but essentially these fulfill the broader objective of the Modi

administration to aggressive and assertively pursue the goals of thorium reactor technology and building nuclear power plants through foreign support.

The Russian state nuclear company Rosatom agreed to assist India in building new nuclear power plants besides the Russian support for Indian defense production means for manufacturing Russian-designed Kamov helicopters in India is the key defense project envisioned by the Prime Minister Narendra Modi's administration for its goals of 'Make in India' program. The Modi regime's ambitions of regional hegemony through the edge of advanced military equipment in the course of the local capability and indigenously made weapons system rather than importing from abroad are some of the factors pushing South Asia towards an unending arms race. India at the moment is one of the world's largest importers of defense equipments and its further plans for the procurement and modernizing its antiquated conventional military equipment by spending more than \$250bn in the next 10 years.

New Delhi's endeavor to benefit from Russian cooperation in the energy and defense sectors is principally the enthusiasm for modernizing the capabilities of its armed forces, but in turn these ambitions actually contain enduring security implications for the South Asian region.

<http://www.eurasiareview.com/16012016-india-russia-nuclear-deal-and-the-dynamics-of-world-politics-oped/>

Nuclear Security Summits

Beenish Altaf

The fourth and final meeting of the initiative — Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) 2016 will be held on March 31-April 1, 2016, at the Walter E. Washington Convention Centre in Washington, D.C. this was announced by the Berlin President two years ago. It is pertinent to mention here that even though nuclear security is solely the sovereign property of state, countries definitely need to ensure and agree upon the collective and mutually agreed steps to guarantee safety and security from the existing evolving threats hanging around them.

NSS is a summit basically aimed to seek awareness of the threat of nuclear terrorism and how to lock up the world's nuclear materials more securely, so that they would not be so easy for the terrorists to steal. Moreover, due to the evolving strategic Ukrainian environment, the short-term concerns over Ukraine partly overshadowed the long-term goal of the summit this time. By and large, the NSS outcomes cannot be expected as a binding legal instrument since it is not legally binding and its operating mechanism is political in nature.

As the President stated in his speech in Prague in 2009, nuclear terrorism is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. He announced an international effort to secure vulnerable nuclear materials, break up black markets, and detect and intercept illicitly trafficked materials. The first Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, D.C. in 2010, and was followed by additional Summits in Seoul in 2012, and The Hague in 2014. The forthcoming 2016 Summit aspires to continue discussion on the evolving threat and highlight steps that can be taken together to minimize the use of highly-enriched uranium, secure vulnerable materials, counter nuclear smuggling and deter, detect, and disrupt attempts at nuclear terrorism.

Previously all the participating countries reached The Hague in order to demonstrate and substantiate their commitment to the goals and foremost aims of NSS, just as Pakistan endeavored to do likewise by its presence at the NSS this time too. The fact is beyond doubt that Pakistan is committed to and has shown its determination and dedication to nuclear security by participating in all the three meetings of NSS (Washington, DC 2010; Seoul, 2012 and The Hague, 2014). Its engagement with the international community in promoting nuclear safety and security has been demonstratively admitted at international fora. Moreover, as per the NSS agenda on understanding the risks of nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents, Pakistani authorities have taken appropriate steps.

Moving ahead, as the NSS calls for regional and collective steps towards improved and enhanced security, Pakistan can adopt a frontline position in proposing a “regional nuclear safety and security arrangement by inviting both India and China to join in an Asian Trilateral – Nuclear Safety and Security Network (AT-NSSN).” The term AT-NSSN, coined by Rabia Akhtar, Kansas State University, proposes in a very rational, coherent and workable manner the need to elevate mutual gains that would, in practical, be beneficial for regional stability along with its nuclear safety and security concerns.

Since all these three countries of the region are nuclear powers, so they need to share and contribute their expert experiences and methods in this regard. It would add to the nuclear knowledge in the region. Akhtar here raised a very critical and paradoxical point that the three countries meet other global leaders at the NSS forum to reiterate their national and international commitments but even then they do not try to talk to each other about their regional commitments, especially when all three are nuclear weapons states. All three share a common border and all three carry historical/political baggage which fosters insecurity and hampers cooperation. Pakistan can use such type of fora and several other such platforms to address its national and international security concerns, including on its nuclear and energy security. In this trilateral nuclear region, India and China too stand with similar apprehensions about each other, therefore the most desirable pattern is to discuss the unease regarding the energy crises, nuclear facilities of the region and nuclear safety and security of their nuclear weapons over here; where the other important global players can act as observer states.

Pakistan however has highlighted its potential qualification to be included as a member in the export control regimes, especially in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, owing to the fact that “it is in a position to provide nuclear fuel cycle services under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and can participate in any non-discriminatory fuel cycle assurance mechanism.” Therefore, realistically Nuclear Security Summits could be best utilized as a forum or a platform to initiate such type of (bilateral or multilateral) networks, which would directly voice its objective and agenda worldwide. Nevertheless, being of legal non-binding nature, the future of NSS would be uncertain and indistinct even after the next projected summit that is expected to be in Washington 2016.

<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=286367>

With Pakistan Constantly Under Scrutiny, Why is the West Mute on Indian Nuclear Program?

Maimuna Ashraf

Purposely, state officials say less about the country's policy publically. But intermittently, their factually incorrect statements, devious responses to news reports, silent inclination to a particular revelation and opaque annotations, let drop the unstated. In this contextual reflection, the nuclear South Asia is quite corresponding. Interestingly, any controversial thing against nuclear Pakistan grabs the attention among officials, academicians and media houses at national and international level. Yet the controversies on Indian nuclear program receive noncommittal response or no response especially from West. The questions arises: objectively, is the worrisome section about Pakistan's nuclear program more levelheaded as compared to India? If not, then why do Western countries adopt a mute approach on India, while Pakistan remains in spotlight of criticism?

This question has been leveled up in the light of a series of five articles that appeared in the Public Integrity Magazine, a subsidiary of Center for Public Integrity, and Foreign Policy Magazine, a subsidiary of the Washington Post, on India's civil and military nuclear program. The first three articles have been written by Adrian Levy exclusively, while the last two, which predominantly deal with the security risks to Indian nuclear weapons, has been co-written with R Jeffry Smith who is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. The first piece narrates about the trial of disease and ill deaths caused by uranium mining, which maintains that India's nuclear industry is pouring its waste into a river which is making the nuclear workers and village residents living near mines ill after persistent exposure to unsafe radiation. In the second article, Adrian brings attention to the protests over the Russian built electricity generating nuclear reactors at Kudankulam. He recounts that 'transparency and accountability' are lacking at India's largest nuclear park as the reactor is vulnerable to a tsunami and lists other safety problems. The third article reported about a mysterious new 'Thermonuclear City' being built at a place in Karnataka called Challakere. The piece reveals, it will be the subcontinent's largest military-run complex of nuclear centrifuges, atomic-research laboratories, when it is completed probably sometime in 2017. Among the project's aims is to expand the government's nuclear research, to produce fuel for India's nuclear reactors, and to help power the country's fleet of new submarines. But another, more controversial ambition, according to retired Indian government officials and independent experts in London and Washington, is to give India an extra stockpile of enriched uranium fuel that could be used in new hydrogen bombs, also

known as thermonuclear weapons, substantially increasing the explosive force of those in its existing nuclear arsenals.

The fourth article titled as India's nuclear explosive materials are vulnerable to theft, U.S. officials and experts say, indicates the lax security at India's nuclear installations. This piece appeared after a head constable killed his senior and two other members at the Madras Atomic Power Station at Kalpakkam. Experts depicted this episode as a serious shortcoming in the country's nuclear guard force, tasked with defending one of the world's largest stockpiles of fissile material and nuclear explosives. Notwithstanding this shooting incident, the two experts based their concerns on a series of documented nuclear security lapses that took place in last two decades in India. This article was again reproduced in Foreign Policy magazine with the title Fast, Radioactive, and Out of Control, highlighting the US officials and experts apprehensions that India is not adequately safeguarding its booming nuclear installations and material.

These concerns associated with Indian nuclear program received meek reaction. Surprisingly, a tangible hype was not generated in the mainstream media on the revelation of these reports. Conversely, Pakistan's nuclear program remains in the headlines even in the absence of any documented nuclear security failure. Pakistan has been receiving proposals by the Western think-tanks, Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to normalizing nuclear Pakistan, strongly worded editorials by New York Times against Pakistan's nuclear program and baseless concerns by Special US Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Olson on the development of Pakistan's missile program and its pursuit of nuclear systems. The reason that why US officials and media is not voicing concerns over India to avoid developments, that might lead to increased risk to nuclear safety and strategic stability, has also been highlighted in the last article by Adrian Levy and Jeffry Smith. They articulated that experts regarded the issue as urgent and Kalpakkam shooting alarmed Western officials who question whether India has adopted enough measures to safeguard its sensitive facilities and building blocks of a devastating nuclear bomb from being stolen by insiders with grievances, ill motives, or in the worst case, connections to terrorists. However, after conducting interviews of several US officials, they concluded that 'Washington is not forcing India for rapid reforms. The Obama administration is instead going to avoid any friction that might disrupt a planned expansion of U.S. military sales to India.'

Evidently, despite all the reasoning, the oft-repeated cliché to associate nuclear Pakistan with terrorism and propose unfavorable options to secure its nuclear program is habitual and persistent in the broader strategic calculus, while the existent threats beyond this nuclear cliché are deliberately overlooked. It will be idiotic to assume this as an isolated or random activity, when it is a part of an orchestrated plan.

India has a substantial role to play in the US strategic thinking. Consequently other states are intentionally being treated in lieu of US' interests.

<http://nation.com.pk/blogs/22-Jan-2016/with-pakistan-constantly-under-scrutiny-why-is-the-west-mute-on-indian-nuclear-program>

North Korea's test and its implications

Beenish Altaf

North Korea's claim of having successfully tested a thermonuclear device that have serious implications for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the balance of power in the Korean Peninsula. While a 5.1 seismic event from near the country's nuclear testing site was reported by international seismic stations, there is no clarity as yet on whether the test was indeed a thermonuclear one and, if so, a successful one.

North Korea is unlikely to have mastered the technological capability to make highly sophisticated thermonuclear weapons, and therefore the device tested may well be a "boosted fission weapon", more sophisticated than an atomic (or fission) bomb but not as powerful as a hydrogen bomb.

Happymon Jacob an Indian professor elaborated very rightly in that the country has been on the nuclear path for some time now. Having declared its plans in 2003, it tested its nuclear weapons in 2006, 2009 and finally in 2013. Moreover, the country has been conducting submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) tests, a weapon system that when perfected could add great value to North Korea's nuclear delivery capability while, of course, increasing the insecurity of its neighbours. South Korea, which is routinely threatened with invasion or even nuclear destruction by its neighbour, denounced the latest test as a "grave provocation". President Park Geun-hye called an emergency meeting of South Korea's National Security Council, accusing the North of a "direct challenge to world peace and stability".

'North Korea's nuclear ambitions have undeniable consequences for the stable balance of power in the Korean peninsula and beyond. For one, this will make Japan and South Korea deeply insecure, especially at a point in time when a rising China is perceived as a challenge by them, and the US' ability to be the security provider for its allies in the region is in serious doubt. Secondly, with the breakdown of the six-party talks with Pyongyang, both the US and China have lost their traction within North Korea. Finally, the only country with some influence in Pyongyang is Russia, with whom the West has no meeting of minds on a variety of geopolitical issues, particularly after the conflict over Ukraine. It also shows that China, the rising superpower, does not enjoy much political and strategic influence in its own backyard.

North Korea's nuclear tests, whether or not their thermonuclear claims are valid, pose serious challenges to the global non-proliferation regime even as this order is under immense stress, particularly after the failure of the NPT Review Conference last year.

Moreover, if Pyongyang continues to develop more sophisticated, and miniaturized nuclear weapons and advanced delivery mechanisms, it could potentially force South Korea and Japan to follow similar paths.

While the Obama administration was able to successfully defuse the Iranian nuclear impasse, it has summarily failed to address the North Korean nuclear challenge. The so-called six-party talks, as part of which China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the US negotiated with North Korea to terminate its nuclear weapons program, collapsed in 2009 after six years of fruitless efforts to contain Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions.

For the talks to begin again, the Obama administration and the West would need to re-engage not only North Korea but also Russia.

North Korea came into lime light when it announced its withdrawal as signatory of Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). By testing its nuclear devices, Pyongyang has not really violated any treaties: It had withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003, and had never signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, given the potential implications that the recent North Korean test has for the global non-proliferation regime, the international community needs to immediately re-engage Pyongyang.'

In a recent article by Huma Rehman appeared at Daily Pakistan, identified correctly that nuclearization of North East Asia raises two points: one North Korea's unwillingness to abide by the international regulations and law bindings. Second; international community including the US could not streamline North Korea at both diplomatic and strategic level. Now to deal with North Korea's periodic nuclear detonations and concerns would be more challenging. The problem of nuclear proliferation is global, and any effective response must also be multilateral.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/01/30/north-koreas-test-and-its-implications/>

North Korea, Pakistan and Global Nuclear Order

Maimuna Ashraf

North Korea's recent detonation of nuclear device, which state proclaimed as successful test of hydrogen bomb, has once again shine the international spotlight on Pakistan's past proliferation record and alleged dealings with Pyongyang. Pakistan has officially condemned the North Korean nuclear test as it condemned the previously conducted tests. Notwithstanding Pakistan has repeatedly rejected claims of a Pakistan link, stressing that the North Korean state's bomb was plutonium-based and therefore did not incorporate the uranium technology that the AQ Khan network had been accused previously to deliver to Pyongyang. Yet, even after ten years the Khan's network has been shut down, few states skip no chance to malign Pakistan by deliberately recalling the past whenever the proposal to treat Pakistan as normal nuclear country surfaces. This practice may bring Pakistan under scrutiny but does not overshadow the failure of non-proliferation regime to prevent states conducting nuclear tests or seeking nuclear technology.

Notwithstanding various instruments, one of the predominant challenges in the contemporary security environment to world peace and security is the spread of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), since its ratification, is broadly accepted as world's most triumphant international arms control accord. Conversely, the proliferation record in the last few decades shows that the international mechanism to combat nuclear proliferation is relatively proving inadequate to handle prevailing challenges as the suspected cases of nuclear proliferation were not deterred or reversed. Consequently, various recent developments have drawn attention to indigenous imperfections and worth of NPT, as several proliferation issues remain unsettled, ineffectively addressed or purposely overlooked.

Almost fifty years after nuclear-armed states pledged under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to decrease nuclear proliferation, their budgets reflect a steady hike in nuclear spending. It is estimated that collective annual spending on nuclear weapons exceeds one hundred billion dollars. This hike reflects two dominant verities. First, advancement in the nuclear capabilities is rapidly growing and second, the development, deployment, maintenance and modernization of nuclear weapons carries an enormous price tag.

Accordingly, North Korea is not the only problematic state for proliferation regime that is proceeding its nuclear program in self-defense. Rising defense expenditures are a result of security dilemmas faced by several states. This is why despite ongoing global efforts for nuclear

non-proliferation, the nuclear costs of two major powers, the U.S. and Russia, will continue to rise even despite the ratification of the New START Treaty agreement. This rise is due to the plans of both states to upgrade and modernize their aging nuclear arsenals, missiles and submarines. Obama's proposed budget for fiscal 2016 amounts to \$585.3 billion and the nuclear budget seeks 8% more than the last financial year. The United States (US) estimated cost on nuclear weapons and related expenditures is \$56 billion annually. According to the report by the National Defense Panel Review, the US will spend between \$872 billion to \$1 trillion over the next 3 decades. Developments in the US have reportedly coerced Russia to an historic rise of 33% (more than \$50 billion) in military spending. Russia is also planning to grind out a new generation of submarines and rockets to keep parity with the US. China also announced a hike of 10% in its defense budget for FY 2015-16, the second highest in the world after the US. Although these three states are facing affordability issues in maintaining and modernizing, nuclear budgets are no longer tied to the economic position of states but rather tied to politics. Nuclear weapons have been established and accepted as a credible deterrence; thus making nuclear budgets untouchable regardless of resource constraints.

South Asia is significant for its unprecedented nuclear build-up between two nuclear rivals. South Asian regional nuclear politics and policies are defined by the behavior of three states; China, India and Pakistan. Pakistan's nuclear posture is India centric and Indian nuclear posture is believed to be mainly directed against China and nominally against Pakistan. The last insignificant hike in the Indian budget is significant for several reasons. The most important reason is, this rise will not be enough to narrow the military gap with China especially with declared forays into the Indian Ocean but enough to uphold asymmetry with Pakistan. The limited hikes validates Indian nuclear developments primarily focused on Pakistan and not China because nuclear weapons plus the acquisition of warships, fighter planes and submarines is not possible at once with this defense allocation. The fact that India's prime threat is focused on Pakistan will compel Pakistan to increase its defense spending and nuclear dependency regardless of monetary constraints.

It is naïve, if nuclear weapon states (NWS) demand that other states roll-back or shrink their nuclear size while they are growing their own. It is time to address the real issues if the non-proliferation regime is seriously concerned about North Korea and proliferations risks, rather than repeatedly recalling Pakistan's past, which will not resolve the problem and for which Pakistan has paid enough cost.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/01/31/north-korea-pakistan-and-global-nuclear-order/>

China's Strategic Interest in the Middle East

Sidra Khan

Middle East is a standout amongst the most imperative trade and social or cultural center points in the new world scenario. The region has witnessed advancement in the past couple of years and has attracted the attention of the world, both the developing and the under-developing, towards putting their capital in the region. Developed nations have created strategies for working in the region. The enormous forces like U.S.A., Russia, UK, Germany and so forth have planned their systems keeping in perspective their own national interest. China has built up a vital arrangement for Middle East over the past decades. In the present times, this arrangement is very much implemented.

The vitality needs and encompassing war are interrelated in the more extensive connection of China's energy status. In times of general energy crisis, China's enthusiasm for the Middle East is also energy driven. In 1993, when China turned into a net oil shipper interestingly Beijing set out on a "go out" (Zhouchuqu) approach to obtain energy resources abroad to nourish its developing economy. The authenticity of the Chinese Communist Party largely lays on proceeding with monetary development and conveying a rising standard of living for the Chinese populace. As a result, China is likewise worried about the security of energy supply lines and Sea lines of Communication.

Chinese President Hu perceived the importance of energy of the Malacca Dilemma in November 2003, taking note of that "specific forces have from the start infringed on and attempted to control route through the strait". Since U.S. is viewed as its principle adversary in the global framework, China is careful about U.S. maritime predominance and the danger of gagging China's vitality supply through the Malacca strait ought to threaten Taiwan. This is referred to as the Malacca Dilemma where 80% of China's oil imports navigate this chokepoint which is defenseless against theft and US barricade. In reality, given expanding pressures in the three-glimmer purpose of the South China Sea, the Korean peninsula and the Twain Straits, this worry is significantly even more squeezing for the Chinese authority. The noteworthiness of the Malacca Strait is that 80 % of China's vitality travels through a conduit that at its tightest point is just 1.7 miles over. Indeed, the adjacent Lombok-Makassae Straits are additionally noteworthy as most supertankers too expensive for the Malacca straits navigate this course. China is endeavoring to mitigate its reliance on these conduits by building pipelines through

Myanmar and by means of Gawadar in Pakistan, yet none of these tasks would swap reliance on the ocean for China's energy supplies.

China is building various infrastructure projects in the Middle East and Africa. These are usually bilateral agreements with the governments to bypass market forces of competition. One such illustration is the popular 2012 Sino-Israeli understanding of Chinese organizations to construct cargo rail line connecting the Mediterranean port of Ashdod with Eilat in the Red Sea, named the "Med-Red Rail" and the "Steel Canal" to sidestep an inexorably unsteady Suez Canal under the Muslim Brotherhood's control. The bilateral government assertion empowers Israel to sidestep its delicate law in honoring the establishment to permit it to contract with Chinese organizations to back the undertaking. Similarly, in Egypt, China as of late penned bilateral government concurrences with President Muhammad Mursi to assemble railroads, telecom and other framework ventures supported by Chinese concessions advances, furnishing financing with worthwhile conditions that a couple of different nations are willing to give.

Despite bilateral assertions, China likewise gave military bundle bargains that might incorporate military guide notwithstanding concessional advances and also credits for oil, advances for vital minerals and advances for infrastructural ventures. Western organizations cannot contend, in light of the fact that Chinese state owed organizations are sponsored by China's U.S. \$3.3 trillion war mid-section. For instance, in Afghanistan in 2007, China's Metallurgical Group outbid the second runner up by 70% offering \$3.5 billion for the Aynak copper mine evaluated to go for US \$2 billion. China's Metallurgical Group offered US \$1 billion more than any of its rivals from Canada, Europe, Russia, U.S. and Kazakhstan. The whole bundle incorporated a one-stop shop to manufacture railroads, a 400 megawatt plant to control the copper mine and Kabul coal mines to encourage the plant's generators, and in addition school, streets and even mosques for Afghans.

In fact, because of its geological format, the Middle East is additionally an energy logistic and an exchange center for China's master and showcase access in Europe and Africa. China better comprehends the significance of having solid economic establishments for military force; China can see that proceeded with business sector access for their fare to fuel China's economy would develop their war mid-section to promote and endorse military modernization. Likewise, China additionally has created tremendous interest on the African mainland covering all little and expansive nations. This interest is both via the infrastructure projects and via long-term energy supply contracts. It had been accounted for that more than 1 million Chinese are in Africa with exchange at \$120 billion in 2011. Along these lines in 2009, China largely overwhelmed the USA to wind up Africa's number one exchanging accomplice. Accordingly, the Middle East is a key area that joins European, African and Asian markets. To sum things up in this way given Middle East's area as an exchange center connecting the three continents, it is a

vital region for the business sector and a site of incomprehensible vitality for China to proceed with financial development; the CCP regards the Middle East as a high priority on its foreign policy. As the U.S. pivots to Asia, China is deemed to look for energy profundity in the zones that once were ruled by U.S. and its western partners.

<http://www.stratagem.pk/geostrategy/chinas-strategic-interest-in-the-middle-east/>

Prospects for Pakistan's Mediating Role between Saudi Arabia and Iran

Sadia Kazmi

The voice of reason may call for a neutral stance to be taken by Pakistan, more preferably a role of a mediator between Iran and KSA, which the officials of Pakistan have proactively adopted and are very wisely conveying it too. But the real question is: to what extent can Pakistan effectively play this self-assumed role? As a matter of fact, there is nothing new about KSA and Iran not getting along well with each other. Even though Pakistan is being lauded for its efforts to pacify both the states but considering their ever present ideological differences and frictional geopolitical interests, and its own domestic and traditional security concerns, Pakistan has some serious rational thinking to do while it aspires to be a peace broker between the two.

One major prerequisite for a mediator is to hold a position of respect, an unconditional support and trust by the contending parties. Does Pakistan enjoy such a position in this particular case?

Looking at the pattern of relations that Pakistan has had with the two major Middle Eastern states reveals that while KSA had been a close ally, Iran cannot be ignored as an important neighbour. Pakistan's traditionally warm association with KSA that comes with mutual geostrategic and economic interests was always perceived as a major irritant in Pakistan's relations with Iran. Not just that but Pakistan's lukewarm stance on IP gas pipeline project is essentially seen as falling victim to pro-Riyadh inclination of Nawaz Sharif government against Tehran. The pro-sunni Iranian insurgents allegedly stationed in Pakistan along Balochistan-Sistan border is another enduring problem shared by Pakistan and Iran. However, the recent shift in power equilibrium in the Middle Eastern region with the materialisation of nuclear deal with Iran and consequently the Western sanctions on it having been lifted, as well as Pakistan's refusal to be part of Saudi led war in Yemen, makes KSA insecure and specifically skeptical of Pakistan's intentions.

Even though Pakistan has now given consent for its inclusion in KSA led 34 states coalition against terrorism, but KSA is still keen on seeking reassurances from Pakistan that it will not let the sovereignty of the holy land be ever compromised, as is evident from the recent visit by PM Nawaz Sharif and COAS Raheel Sharif to KSA where the state visit only culminated in the revival of this pledge. At the same time, even though Pakistan's consent for the coalition is not without certain pre-conditions, Iran doesn't seem too happy with the coalition from which Syria, Iraq and Iran have intentionally been left out. Also the fact that Pakistan's leadership paid visit to Riyadh before visiting Tehran and stayed there much longer as compared to a few hours

stay in Iran, may not augur well for its relations with Iran, despite the fact that no such sentiments or rhetoric have been issued by Iran as yet.

In fact, quite interestingly there hasn't been a single statement released by Iran or KSA. Have they even acknowledged Pakistan's initiative? This is yet to be seen. Nonetheless it is a fact that Pakistan couldn't stay quiet on this matter. Especially because the prospective spat between KSA and Iran and the rising tension in the Middle Eastern region has direct implications for Pakistan. Since 1980s Pakistan seems to be a hotspot for KSA and Iran for their respective proxies against each other. This fact coupled with other domestic reasons has adversely affected the sectarian landscape of the country. In the present scenario, it is only natural for Pakistani leadership to be concerned about the possibility of Iran and KSA getting engaged in a full out proxy war in Pakistan while simultaneously pursuing it in Syria and Iraq. So now whether Pakistan is recognised as a mediator or not and whether its visit to the two states yield any substantial results or not, Pakistan should take the opportunity to firmly convey to both the states that whatever their differences, they will no more be allowed to "use" Pakistan for their proxies. It is being hoped that the COAS Raheel Sharif, who has been diligently working to root out terrorism and extremism from the country, must have made the visit and his presence more useful by conveying this particular message across to both Iran and KSA.

Pakistan needs to maintain and effectively convey its policy of non-interference in the Middle East and if and when required should use its good offices to bring the hostile parties on the negotiating table. Experts believe that only a balanced approach by Pakistan towards the two countries is imperative to improve sectarian harmony in the country. For Pakistan, more than playing a mediator, the main concern should be preserving its own national security and staying vigilant of its internal security situation which is usually disrupted by external hostile factors including so called "ally" in the Muslim world and an adjacent "important neighbour", who are constantly locked in an escalating competition for influence and dominance of the Middle East.

Also the fact cannot be overlooked that Pakistan has most of the time been providing military teeth to KSA's strategy in the Middle Eastern region and in return have been receiving huge economic dividends. On the other hand, with Iran there hasn't been any substantial connection ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution but one cannot ignore the geographical aspect where Iran lies just next to Pakistan. While Pakistan is already facing hostilities at two fronts from India and Afghanistan, it needs to be careful about opening a third front with Iran in its neighbourhood. For now, one can only stay positive about Pakistan's self-assumed mediatory role while the diplomatic sanity requires Pakistan to strictly adopt "neutrality" as a rational choice.

<http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/01/31/comment/keeping-balance/>

The Global Power Shift and the Role of Asian Players

Nasurullah Brohi

The world of globalization has brought enormous veiled opportunities and challenges for the each of the developed, developing and under developed nation in the world. The economic sustenance is the only guarantee of the national prestige in the contemporary inter-state interactions and fundamentally a means of the nation's survival. The economic recession and the global suffering are some of the reasons of the centralized economic system that structurally inherent the deprivation of the poor and the exploitation of the raw materials of the under developed nations by the developed one. The lowest rate of remittances against the natural resources of the less developed nations is some of the reasons that seriously undermine the objectives of human prosperity and international development goals.

The mutual progress and the cooperation for the development is indeed the surety of the prosperity that in turn brings enormous opportunities throughout the world, the circulation of wealth and the equal distribution of resources generally provide the maximum chances where the economic freedom would lead to growth and a better life for all. The economic independence subsequently ensures the developing nations to preserve their respective cultural identity and the ethnic characteristics. In the course of the prevailing delicate international economic revival and descending stress on many countries yet strive to materialize their development goals through bilateral and multilateral cooperation for the industrial and economic capacity enhancement.

The current political and economic landscape in the Asia is readily lingering for squiggle a new era of economic revival, bilateral and multilateral security arrangements. The rise of China particularly confers the optimism of development for countries in the region. The objectives of mutual benefit and the cooperation for common interests are some of the features of China's unique foreign policy and its mounting progress amidst the current economic and political arena puts it on a matchless pace for progressively crossing the regional boundaries where its influence is significantly expanding beyond the regional boundaries and border limitations.

Through the initiative, China allocates billions of dollars for the infrastructural developments that includes building a network of new roads, pipelines, power stations, railway tracks and seaports. The only viable solution for the economic growth viewed as better access and the better trade that increasingly motivates for the enhanced connectivity of the South Asia with Central Asia then Eurasia and the Europe. The \$46 billion project of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor attempts to linkup the trade routes. Pakistan grasps a crucial position for

China in terms of its regional economic and political discourse; China's strive for inflating its westward influence through the initiatives of One Belt, One Road are the factors that demand the region's infrastructural development. Pakistan's Gawadar Port holds a critically enacting place for China's impersonation as a naval power that significantly enables its increased access of Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, the Sino-Russian partnership leading through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, appears to be committed for the better economic and security arrangements for the Central Asia. China would help to boost the economic progress, industrial and infrastructural developments whereas, Russia to safeguard the region from falling into the hands of extra-regional players and to protect the region's security against the growing threats of terrorism, separatism and extremism.

To materialize the dreams of enduring peace, progress and the region's prosperity, the security issues should be addressed swiftly. The political solutions is the only assurance of the enduring peace therefore; all the stakeholders particularly, the countries in the region like China, Russia, India, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics must play their roles for the economic revival and the peace and stability in Afghanistan. The possible permanent membership of the India and Pakistan in the SCO along with the energy rich Central Asian countries and the economic and military giants like Russia and China is the magnetic means to attract the power to shift from West to the East.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/01/31/the-global-power-shift-and-the-role-of-asian-players/>

Cooperation or Competition: Gwadar versus Chahbahar

Shahzadi Tooba Hussain Syed

Gwadar port is located at the mouth of gulf and opposite strategic choke points of Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman. The Gwadar port is seen as central to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that will connect the impoverished western region with Central Asia and the Middle East through a network of rail and road links passing through Pakistan. The port is visualized to become a regional hub serving commercial traffic of Middle East and Gulf countries. The port of Gwadar may attract transit and trans-shipment trade from over twenty countries including Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Oman, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq and Iran. These countries may open their warehouses in Gwadar for export of goods and storing of imported goods for later shipment to their countries.

On the other hand, the strategic Chabahar port in southeastern Iran is central to New Delhi's efforts to circumvent Pakistan and open up a route to landlocked Afghanistan where it has developed close security relations and economic interests. It's a symbol of Indo-Iran economic and strategic cooperation and will provide India access to Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan. Chabahar is also linked to India's natural gas imports from Iran, as the port would also serve as the point of origin for the proposed Iran-Oman-India pipeline.

India's strategic thinkers also view the port as a strategic counterweight to China's pursuit of a port in Pakistan's Gwadar. It's India's ultimate desire to connect Chabahar with Central Asian countries through roads and a network of railway system to bypass Pakistan, and to reduce the dependency of Central Asian countries on the port of Gwader. It is the part of the Indian plan to develop transportation infrastructure in eastern Iran, in order to reduce the growing influence of Gwader port. How India sees the Gwadar Port. According to the recent report of Delhi Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, that Gwadar will provide Beijing with a facility to monitor Indian naval activity in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, as well as any future maritime cooperation between India and Iran. Gwadar port being so close to the Straits of Hormuz also has negative implications for India's commercial interest, as in 2008 then Indian chief of naval staff Sureesh Mehta said that Gwader could be used by Pakistan to "take control over the world's energy juggler." At the same time Iranian officials apprehend that Gwadar would be used by the United States as a base to monitor activities inside Iran.

China's interests at Gwadar are very clear; China is looking for monitoring of its Gulf oil supply route as well as an opening for import/ export trade from its Muslim-majority Xinjiang

Autonomous Region. However, as a part of Pakistan's overall strategy for enhancing its influence in Central Asia and beyond the deep water port, Pakistan can provide Gwadar port to landlocked CARs. Gwadar can be a potential trade route for the CARs. The trade route can bring a lot of investment to Pakistan. So far the newborn states are relying more upon Pakistan for trade and commercial purposes.

This port would have tremendous economic impetus to Pakistan for several reasons. It is located about 250 miles from the Straits of Hormuz through which some (40 percent of the world's oil supplies Region). Second, the strategic location of the port makes it as an important regional shipping hub, providing the landlocked Central Asian republics, Afghanistan, and the Chinese Xingjian region an access to the Arabian Sea and third it will reduce the distances of 500 km between Pakistan and Central Asia. And more significantly, it will facilitate the transfer of Central Asia's vast energy resources to world markets through Pakistan with significant profits in transit fees.

Chabahar would provide India an access to Afghanistan via Indian Ocean. India, Iran and Afghanistan have signed an agreement to give Indian goods, heading for Central Asia and Afghanistan, preferential treatment and tariff reductions at Chabahar. India also assisted Iran to construct railway spurs linking its rail network to that of Central Asia, the process considerably reduces Pakistan's strategic leverage over these landlocked states thus providing them alternative corridors to the sea. New Delhi has undertaken vital role in the development of Iranian port facilities along with the construction of road and rail links. Indian engineers have contributed immensely towards the up gradation and development of the Iranian port of Chabahar. New Delhi and Tehran have agreed to 'join hands' in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and to support the development of alternative access routes to that country (bypassing Pakistan) via Iran's Chabahar port.

Moreover, India is developing Chabahar and is laying railway tracks to connect it to Zaranj in Afghanistan, proclaiming that this would be a commercial port. In addition, India has constructed the 218 km long Zaranj-Delaram highway that now links Afghanistan to the Iranian port of Chabahar as part of the Afghan circular road that connects Herat and Kabul via Mazar-e-Sharif in the north and Kandhar in the south- thereby providing easier access to Afghanistan and possibly even further, to Central Asia via Iran. There is also another project that involves linking Chabahar to the Iranian rail network that is also well connected to Central Asia and Europe. Islamabad-Tehran's conflicting interests over Afghanistan have played a pivotal role in the formation of their Indo-Iranian Nexus. Moreover, India's attempt to build roads linking Afghanistan and Central Asia and Iranian ports as a response to China's building up of a deep-water port in Gwadar as a gateway to global markets for Central Asian resources.

Competition aside, a proposal has been made by Iran to increase their bilateral cooperation. The current volume of bilateral trade between Iran-Pakistan is about \$230 million per annum, but the two countries are eyeing to increase it to \$5 billion over the next five years. Pakistan's stance on Chahbahar port is that Pakistan expected Chabahar and Gwadar ports to complement each other instead of being rivals.

Thus cooperation is a better idea instead of taking competitive positions and creating hurdles for development of each other's ports. Because both parties' optimal benefits from this opportunity is conditional to mutual trust and cooperation. Pakistan and Iran must not let any third power to take opportunity of getting all the benefit.

<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/01/31/cooperation-or-competition-gwadar-versus-chahbahar/>

Marshall Islands v. Pakistan: Questioning the Jurisdiction of the Court and a Way Forward

Shakeel Ahmad

From 8 March to 16 March 2016, a public hearing is going to be held on Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. Pakistan) in The International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Peace Palace in The Hague. Through an unofficial press release of ICJ issued on 29 January 2016, in this public hearing the jurisdiction and the admissibility of the application will be determined. Pakistani representative will try to repudiate the admissibility and the jurisdiction of The Court. Whereas, the Marshall Islands in its application has established the jurisdiction based on the declarations made by the Pakistan in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the ICJ.

Earlier before, on 24 April 2014, the republic of Marshal Islands had filed an application against Pakistan and eight other States claiming that these States had not fulfilled their obligation regarding nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race. By a Note Verbale the Government of Pakistan had requested to extend the time for submission of its counter memorial. If the Marshal Islands establishes the Jurisdiction of the court than the Government of Pakistan will have to face the following allegations that Pakistan is (i) in continuing breach of its obligations under customary international law, including specifically its obligation to pursue in good faith negotiations to cease the nuclear arms race at an early date, as well as to pursue in good faith negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control; and (ii) in continuing breach of its obligation to perform its international legal obligations in good faith.

The Marshal Islands has established same claims against India as well, both countries are not party to NPT therefore major claims have been established under the Customary International Law. If Pakistan fails to establish non-jurisdiction of the Court than at the next stage it would be a real test of Pakistan's diplomatic and legal intellect. Ahmer Bilal Soofi, advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan and Law Minster of Caretaker government of 2013 along with Mr. Moazzam Ahmad Khan, Pakistani Ambassador in the Hague, Netherland, are excellent representative and well prepared to challenge the jurisdiction of the ICJ and the admissibility the case.

In its application the Marshall Islands has claimed the jurisdiction based on the declarations made by the Pakistan in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the ICJ and the Court is competent to entertain a dispute through the reciprocal effect of

declarations. As on 13 September 1960, the Government of Pakistan had recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all legal disputes concerning any question of International law and any act regarding breach of an international obligation. It will not be an easy task for Pakistani representative to challenge the Courts Jurisdiction and same will be the situation of India.

In the matters related to international courts and arbitration Pakistan had been relying much on foreign legal experts by remunerating them extensively. However, the outcome has not always been in favor of Pakistan. For example, in its judgment in the case concerning the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), by a vote of fourteen to two, the Court declared that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute brought before it by Pakistan against India. Moreover, in Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration, the court declared that India may accordingly divert water from the Kishenganga/Neelum River for power generation. By highlighting these cases I want to mention that in the past the issues involving the international courts and tribunals have hardly resulted into a success story. The fact of the matter is that the area of international law like the domestic courts is one of the most neglected areas of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Law and Justice as well as in the Pakistani academia.

In the Marshall Island application against Pakistan the Jurisdiction of the court is yet to be established therefore it is too early to refute and comment on the other claims relating to violation of customary international law and breach of international obligation regarding nuclear disarmament. At this stage it must be realized to strengthen the field of international law in related institutions of Pakistan. A time is approaching when the major decisions and the strategies of the States will be steered by considering the role and the Jurisdiction of the international and regional Courts. Pakistan should keep itself prepared not only the battle grounds but also legal grounds.

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