REPORT
Two Days National Seminar on
NPT Review Conference and Future of the Non-Proliferation Regime
June 3-4, 2015
The Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) organized a Two Days Seminar on the “NPT Review Conference and Future of the Non-Proliferation Regime” on June 03-04, 2015 at the Marriott Islamabad Hotel. Aim of the seminar was to examine the expectations and outcomes of the ‘NPT Review Conference 2015’, to reevaluate the institutional structure and process of the Non-Proliferation Regime (NPR), and its successes vs. failures under the prevailing international environment. The seminar also focused on restructuring and reformation of NPR by identification of its weaknesses.

Day 1

Session I

In the Inaugural Session, a brief introduction to the SVI was followed by the welcome remarks by President/Executive Director of SVI, Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema. He thanked the Chief Guest, Ambassador (Retd) Masood Khan, Director-General of Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI), the Speakers and Participants. The conference was well attended by the members of academia, diplomats, policy-making civil and military establishments
and students in the field of strategic and nuclear studies, and international politics from prominent universities in Islamabad.

Dr. Cheema presented a detailed overview on the evolution of NPT and the NPR in the contemporary international environment and highlighted the foremost prevailing challenges to global peace, security and stability by the spread of nuclear weapons. He emphasized that the international mechanism to combat nuclear proliferation is becoming increasingly ‘inadequate’ not only to deal with potential proliferators, but there are unambiguous and discriminatory violations of Article I of the NPT by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to realize their international strategic, security and foreign policies’ agenda. India-US nuclear deal, originally signed in 2005 by specifically amending the US non-proliferation laws and supplemented in January 2015 during President Obama’s visit to India on its Republic Day to ostensibly solicit India’s support against China in the pursuit of US Asia-Pacific strategy to contain the Chinese influence, has been strongly criticized by international professional experts and institutions as a transparent violation of the Article I of the NPT. George Perkovich’s remarks on the Indo-US nuclear deal are illustrative:

The US-India nuclear deal and its transformation into the NSG-India exemption involved making and unmaking of international rules. By exempting India from rules, the deal amounted to selective non-enforcement. Thus many observers and governments fear that the NSG-India exemption is a bad portent; it may signal corrosion of the rules-based nuclear order.

In addition, Jayantha Dhanapala, former United Nations Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, described the deal a campaign of “brutal and unconscionable pressure”. Since then, many countries supporting the deal, including France, Russia, and Canada have entered into nuclear agreements with India. The Indo-US nuclear deal and the US and Western powers’ clandestine technological, strategic and fissile material support to Israel for its undeclared and sizeable nuclear weapons stockpile is a clear manifestation of
how the NPT and NPR have been openly hijacked by the NWS for their global geostrategic interests.

Dr. Cheema underlined that NWS has also failed to meet their obligations under Article IV of the NPT on the transfer of nuclear technology for exclusively peaceful purposes to states that are not their favorites or not allied with them under the fears that such NNWS may misuse nuclear technology for developing nuclear weapons. He further added that until the 1980s, the international measures to prevent nuclear proliferation were relatively more successful, but later on the non-nuclear weapon states were not constrained by instruments of international non-proliferation regime. So far, only nine states (P-5, T-3 and North Korea) have acquired nuclear weapons while more than 30 states have technological capability to acquire them which poses serious challenges to NPT.

Ambassador (Retd) Masood Khan, while addressing the inaugural session, highlighted the repeated occurrence of international discriminatory standards by NWS. He opined that the kind of exceptional treatment extended to India in the shape of Indo-US nuclear deal and the plans for admitting it in Nuclear Suppliers Group prove that Pakistan’s decision on not joining the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and conducting the nuclear tests was the right call. He recommended that Pakistan should continue refining its nuclear deterrent to maintain its credibility. He opined that with the continuing emphasis on non-proliferation, the future of disarmament is bleak. Former Ambassador adjudged that Pakistan is a de jure Nuclear Weapon State and not a de facto one as being generally stated because it’s not a member of the NPT and thereby not in violation of any of the NPT provisions.

Referring to China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), he said that India does not want development in Pakistan as the Indian Prime Minister, in his recent visit to
China, expressed his opposition and reservations over the proposed multi-billion CPEC. Ambassador (Retd) Khan described the statement of Indian Defense Minister, Manohar Parrikar, a shocking example of Indian prejudice. Indian leaders are giving open statements to expose their enmity against Pakistan. He elaborated that the statements show intentions of Indian leadership that it does not want development and stability in Pakistan, indicated by their aiding and abetting the deteriorating law and order situation in Baluchistan, Peshawar and Karachi, which is a reflection of the Indian mindset. Commenting on positive diplomatic development between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Khan said that friendly ties between two neighboring countries are unbearable for India and therefore it is hatching conspiracies to sabotage the process.

**Session II**

The session titled “Current State of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: An Overview” was chaired by Dr. Zulfqar Khan (HoD, Department of Strategic Studies, NDU). He introduced the distinguished speakers of the session and provided a brief overview on the foundation of NPR and the fourfold objectives of the NPT. He also recounted all the important points presented by the speakers and highlighted in the discussion.

Dr. Zafar Khan (Asst. Prof., Department of Strategic Studies, NDU) while speaking on “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Past Dynamics and Current Assessment” said that despite the long existence of the NPT regime, it remains consistently weak and inefficient as is the international nonproliferation regime. The nonproliferation regime consistently failed to provide security to the states that did not possess nuclear weapons. In fact, the nonproliferation regime does not have a
mechanism under which NNWS may be assured full spectrum security against those who possess nuclear weapons. He highlighted that the failure of the nonproliferation regime is that Israel, India and Pakistan have never been part of the NPT; moreover the regime has failed to devise a mechanism for punishing those who withdraw. The nonproliferation regime is silent on both sophisticated conventional and strategic force modernization of the NWS that are party to the regime. He called for a combined and holistic approach by both NWS and NNWS for making the non-proliferation regime “non-discriminatory, flawless, effective, and universal”.

Ambassador (Retd) Tariq Osman Hyder, who until recently was a member of the Oversight Board for Strategic Export Controls, in his presentation on “The NPT Review Conference 2015 and its impact on the Future of the Non-Proliferation Regime” added that the outcome of the NPT Review Conference had disappointed all those who supported disarmament and nonproliferation. He said that failure of the NPT Review Conference was a setback to both NWS and NNWS that had projected this flawed and discriminatory treaty as the linchpin of the non-proliferation regime. The outcome, Ambassador Hyder believed, vindicated Pakistan’s position in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that it was not Pakistan, but the major Western powers which were obstructing progress on nuclear disarmament. At the CD, the Western countries, he said, misconstrued Pakistan’s justified national security concerns to distract from their own reluctance to make any meaningful move towards fulfilling their disarmament obligations.

Brigadier Zahir H. Kazmi, who is serving as Director at Strategic Plans Division’s Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, viewed the non-proliferation regime a mixed bag of progress. He said that while the world has far less, nine, nuclear weapons states than was once feared
twenty-five, because of the non-proliferation regime, but still proliferation was taking place. All nuclear powers are believed to be vertically proliferating either in qualitative, quantitative or in both senses.

He suggested that Pakistan should be granted Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver under similar terms as India. He simultaneously proposed that expansion in the membership of the NSG should be put on a hold for a period of at least six years after which the NSG could assess its interaction with Pakistan, India and Israel and decide their membership claims on merit. Such a measure, Brig Kazmi said, would assuage Islamabad’s concerns and allow the NSG to examine if the non-NPT powers are delivering on their pledges. “Such action could lay the groundwork for prudent decisions about the further expansion of the NSG and other export-control arrangements. The haste to grant membership to India has benefited neither the non-proliferation regime, nor South Asian strategic stability.”

Session III

The third session titled “NPT Review Conference: Expectations and Outcomes” was chaired by Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal (Director, School Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad). After introducing the distinguished speakers, he highlighted that new developments in Indo-US nuclear deal, especially the fissile material tracking issue and the liability issue are very significant. Whilst commenting on K2 and K3, he said that there is a particular lobby which states that anything coming towards Pakistan is dangerous rather than its going somewhere else is useful.

The first speaker of session, Dr. Syed Shahid Hussain Bukhari (Asst. Prof., Department of Political Science, BZU), made a presentation on “Article I & II of NPT: A Case Study of Indo-US nuclear deal and Implications for Pakistan”. He stated that India-US nuclear deal provides indirect assistance to a kind of vertical proliferation of Indian nuclear weapons; hence, it is in
great contradiction with the principles of NPT where the United States has breached its obligations under Article I of the NPT and contributed to hamper the effectiveness of the otherwise powerful non-proliferation regime. He feared that along with the violation of NPT, India-US nuclear deal shall also have negative implications on the strategic stability in South Asia where India and Pakistan are known as the arch-rivals.

Dr. Rizwana Karim Abbasi (Asst. Prof., Department of Strategic Studies, NDU) expounded on “Cooperation, Commitments and Concerns over Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology: Case Study of K-2, K3 Nuclear Energy Projects”. She discussed Pakistan’s legal and institutional rights to acquire peaceful nuclear technology / energy since its commitments are already aligned with the international export control system. On the question of Pakistan aspiring to add more nuclear reactors to its national power grid, she said, Pakistan is energy deficient and thus aspires to add more reactors. Further, the option of K-2 and K-3 is cost-effective for Pakistan. However, by doing this Pakistan did not violate even a single norm of export control arrangements. She further added that Pakistan demands criteria based membership to NSG as its reactors are running under IAEA safeguards with excellent record of accomplishment and hence proved itself as a responsible nuclear state. She also endeavored to propose a cooperative mechanism for the existing non-proliferation system in parallel.

Dr. Tughral Yamin (Associate Dean, Department of Peace & Conflict Studies, NUST), while presenting his views on “Divergence between NWS and NNWS on Nuclear Disarmament: A Review of Article VI” said that the biggest challenge to the future of the non-proliferation regime is from the failure to progress on disarmament. He feared that the international non-proliferation regime could “collapse” due to the “short sightedness” of the nuclear weapon states (NWS), who are
unwilling to give up their hegemony and continuously improvement of quality of their nuclear arsenals. He also discussed the international double standards by highlighting that Israel is accepted as the de-facto nuclear power in Middle East, hence the Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) remains a distant dream as has been established from lack of consensus in the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

Day 1 proceedings were concluded by Lt Gen (Retd) Syed Muhammad Owais. He emphasized on the need for trust, transparency and institutional reforms in NPR. He said that such reforms may control the strategic force modernization and increasing warheads of the states party to the regime. Strengthening of the nonproliferation regime may convince the major power to revisit their warlike doctrinal postures and encourage adoption of Negative Security Assurances. He further added that the NPR has been significantly weakened because of exceptions given to India, while on other hand, the disarmament process is moving slowly at the speed set by the Nuclear Weapon State. On the future of non-proliferation regime, he said, it needs to become efficient, effective and non-discriminatory.
Day 2

Session IV

In the fourth session titled “IAEA Safeguards: Scope and Limitations”, the Chair of session, Dr. Pervez Iqbal Cheema (Dean, Faculty of Contemporary Studies, NDU, Islamabad) introduced the speakers. He opined that various aspects of IAEA safeguards are important enough to discuss viewing the contemporary scenario and introduced the eminent scholars for rewarding discussion on the subject. He recounted the major findings of discussion to conclude the session.

Brig. (Retd) Naeem Salik (Distinguished CISS Visiting Fellow), discussed the “Scope and Limitations of IAEA Safeguards: Prospects and Challenges”. He elaborated that all NNWS party to the NPT are required to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities under their control while the nuclear weapons states parties to NPT have no such obligation. Non-NPT states such as Pakistan enter into facility specific safeguards agreements with the IAEA. The traditional IAEA safeguards regime based on inspections of declared facilities and accounting of declared materials supplemented with remote monitoring equipment has been challenged and circumvented on several occasions in the past. The weaknesses in the safeguards regime have been addressed through both legal and technical means and the scope of safeguards has thus been greatly expanded. However as in the past, the safeguards system is likely to face new challenges in the future as well. Will the regime show enough dynamism to keep pace with the emerging challenges is yet to be seen.
Syed Shaukat Hasan (Former Director Disarmament & Safeguards, PAEC), spoke on: “India Specific vs. Full Scope Safeguards: Impacts on NPT, Non-Proliferation and NNWS” and compared the India-specific Safeguards Agreement with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) also known as the Full Scope Safeguards Agreement. On India specific safeguards, he said that it changed the dynamics of the non-proliferation regime by extending illicit privileges by a nuclear weapon state to a non-NPT state.

Air Cdre. (Retd) Khalid Iqbal (Non Resident Consultant, IPRI) congratulated Strategic Vision Institute for organizing this timely Seminar on a very important subject. In his presentation on “India’s Exemption from NSG Guidelines and its Potential Membership: Impacts on Proliferation and Concerns for Pakistan”, he mentioned the similarities in the Indian and Pakistani candidature for the Nuclear Suppliers Group. He said that any criterion-based expansion of the group would see the two neighbors together joining the group. However, he warned of serious implications if India was allowed into the group while keeping Pakistan out. He further highlighted the implications that such a thing would “embolden India to significantly expand its nuclear weapons arsenal, turn down any meaningful disarmament/arms control offers, including coming from Pakistan, and use negative vote to block Pakistan’s entry into the NSG and other nuclear interests.” He maintained that with over four decades of safe operation of vintage nuclear power plants, impeccable nuclear safety record, having an acclaimed nuclear regulator, with all its foreign supplied nuclear power reactors under IAEA safeguards, and being a signatory to most of the international nuclear regimes and instruments, Pakistan outstrips any other contender—especially India for the NSG membership—should there be an even playing field and an inclusive approach.
Session V

The fifth session entitled “Nuclear Threats and Initiatives” was chaired by Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema (President/ED SVI). He said that speakers throughout the two day seminar have been outstanding professional experts. Dr. Cheema introduced the panel of last session of Two Day seminar by highlighting their professional expertise on national issues and nuclear studies.

Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal (Director, School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad)) discussed important issues of “Fissile Material Stockpiles and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). He opined that since the beginning of Conference on Disarmament sessions in 2012, majority of security observers have been stating that Pakistan was/is the only state, which obstructed the CD Agenda, particularly FMCT. The general impression is that Pakistan in addition to FMCT has also opposed the other core items of the CD agenda 2015. Islamabad’s representative at the CD categorically stated on February 13, 2015: “We were and are ready to negotiate on any or all of the CD’s agenda items except FMCT with the Shannon Mandate.” He added that we also deplored the position of some delegations that have reduced the CD to a forum to only negotiate a FMCT. This has made the CD hostage to the FMCT.” He said, realistically, the great powers policies are not conducive for the start of negotiations on the FMCT draft at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. They have given priority to their commercial gains and profiteering over the goals of non-proliferation; arms control and disarmament. Therefore, the stalemate continues at the CD on the subject of FMCT. Thus, an appropriate approach for ending the impasse at the CD and addressing the fissile material stockpiles issues is to revamp the Shannon Mandate to resolve the puzzle of existing asymmetries in weapon grade fissile material as well as to deal with or accommodate the security concerns of all states.
Amb. (Retd) Ali Sarwar Naqvi (Executive Director, CISS) in his presentation on “Nuclear Safety and Security through NSS Framework and Beyond: Achievements and Future Prospects” discussed the progress made in the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process and the challenges for it, including its future beyond 2016 summit. He said: “The global nature of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism demands broad international action of which multilateral joint statements can and should be a key part.” He suggested fixing the implementation timeframe for the step to be announced in future statements instead of keeping them open ended. Amb. Naqvi said that the NSS process made “a positive contribution to global security.”

Air Cdre. (Retd) Ghulam Mujaddid (Registrar, Air University) presented his views on: “Nuclear Terrorism: Scope of NTC/ICSANT and Future Challenges”. While speaking on the future trends in NSR-NTC/ICSANT, he said that Nuclear Terrorism would remain linked with Islamist/jihadist terrorism by the US and its allies/partners. Pakistan would remain under microscope for nuclear terrorism, whereas more likely indigenous sources of nuclear terrorism in other nations are likely to be ignored. Moreover, dangerous options to “secure” Pakistan’s nuclear assets in certain “fairy-tale” scenarios would remain in strategic calculus of the US and India would continue to be glorified as responsible and respected nuclear power and rewarded with NSG membership and nuclear cooperation, while Israel would continue to be shielded on all accounts by the United States. Pakistan, he said, could consider signing ICSANT and use the right not to accept Clause(s) that does not suit its national interest. Conversely, Pakistan would likely to continue constructive engagement with IAEA; whole-hearted cooperation with GICNT, CPPNM, UNSC Resolutions 1373 and 1540, Nuclear Security Summit and other informal forums and arrangements of NSR.
The proceedings of each session were followed by an interactive discussion in which the participants raised a number of high quality questions regarding the issues covered in the respective sessions and were answered comprehensively by the concerned speakers. At the end, Dr. Noman Omar Sattar (Associate Prof. Area Study Centre for Africa, North & South America) presented the rapporteur’s recommendations. While presenting the recommendations adopted by the seminar, he said, that the NPT has been significantly weakened because of exceptions given to India. Moreover, to build a consensus in non-proliferation regime, the US needs to stop facilitating Israel. Otherwise, the future of NPT is bleak as more discriminatory agreements are being signed outside the framework of NPT. In a reference to India, he said that the states suspected to use their peaceful technology for military purposes are privileged to receive nuclear technology from nuclear weapon states, whereas others intending to use the nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are being denied the same in violation of Article IV of the NPT that provides for peaceful uses of nuclear energy without discrimination. He cautioned that India’s entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) would disturb the region’s strategic equilibrium, besides forcing Pakistan into arms race for keeping its nuclear deterrence credible. He regretted that the major world powers were themselves violating the non-proliferation norms. He mentioned the discussion at seminar was rightfully critical of the exceptions given to India and defense of Israeli nukes by US, Canada and the United Kingdom at Review Conference 2015. He called for steps to make reforms in the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) besides making it transparent and non-discriminatory.

Recommendations

Final recommendations were prepared at the end of the two-day seminar on “NPT Review Conference and Future of the Non-Proliferation Regime” organized by the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI). The speakers at seminar made specific references to the violations of Article I of the NPT by the Indo-US nuclear deal. They highlighted that Article I of the NPT
prohibits each Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) party to the Treaty from transferring nuclear technology directly or indirectly to a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS). It was reiterated that the original and revived advancement of Indo-US nuclear deal undermines the non-proliferation efforts as it not only violates Articles I of the NPT but also defies its primary objective to prevent nuclear proliferation. Professional experts further added that India’s potential inclusion in Nuclear Supply Group (NSG), after the India-specific exemption to NSG guidelines, will disturb the regional nuclear equilibrium and force Pakistan to augment its nuclear weapons capability to ensure the credibility of its Minimum Credible Deterrence (MCD). Ironically, the guardians of NPT are themselves violating its norms.

It was further stated that Article IV of the NPT provided for the provision of equal opportunities for exploiting nuclear energy for peaceful use but again that was not happening. The states suspected to use their peaceful technology for military purposes are privileged to receive nuclear technology from NWS (a reference to exceptions being given to India and Israel), whereas other in genuine need of energy were being denied the opportunity. The point was also highlighted that under Article VI of the NPT, NWS are required to pursue disarmament within the framework of the Treaty to create of balance of obligations vis-à-vis the NNWS and regretted the United States and Russia continue their nuclear disarmament process outside the NPT framework. It was more regrettable that other NWS, e.g. Britain and France has not joined the disarmament process.

Experts at the seminar expressed disappointment over NPT member states’ failure to reach a consensus agreement on non-proliferation and disarmament in the 2015 NPT Review Conference and feared for the future of the regime. They stated that the failure to reach a consensus document raised doubts about the willingness of the NWS signatories to abide by their NPT commitments.

The statement issued at the conclusion of the seminar underlined that there is a need for trust, transparency and institutional reforms. The NPT has been significantly weakened because of exceptions given to India. Moreover, to build a consensus in non-proliferation regime, the US needs to stop facilitating Israel otherwise the future of NPT is
bleak. The seminar demanded reforms in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) besides making it transparent and non-discriminatory.

**Vote of Thanks by Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema**

After all the presentations by the learned speakers and interactive question/answer sessions, Dr. Zafar Iqbal Cheema concluded the seminar by profoundly thanking the entire audience present in the house and said that their presence has made this seminar a successful endeavor. He paid special thanks to the chief guest and expressed his appreciation to all the honorable speakers who presented their paper and enlightened the audience with their expertise on the subject. He extended his gratitude towards research and secretarial staff of the SVI for the hard work put into successfully conducting this two day seminar. He also greatly admired and appreciated the help of other associations, publishers, printers (including Panaflex), the press, media, photographer and volunteers.
Press Coverage

The proceeding of seminar was covered in various leading newspapers. The links are mentioned below:

Dawn

The News

Business Recorder
http://www.brecorder.com/general-news/172/1192553/

Pakistan Observer
http://epaper.pakobserver.net/201506/04/national.php

Frontier Post
http://thefrontierpost.com/article/306457/

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Express Tribune

Business Recorder
http://www.brecorder.com/general-news/172/1192871/